September 2013 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Is this HAL?
by I 21 Sep '13

21 Sep '13

3 2

non-exit risks?
by That Guy 21 Sep '13

21 Sep '13

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > You're probably fine, especially if not running an exit. You didn't list your home country, though; I'm assuming United States. > Best, > -Gordon M. While I know you have vastly more knowledge and experience than me and often my observations or worries are doe to me mis-understanding something but about the comment above, I have experienced issues running a non-exit relay pretty soon after it going up and though I have no idea if there is a connection, I started to get more trouble after the doubling of connections at the end of July. I was blocked from a number of websites, Had many of my emails returned because of a flagged IP(the one listed was not my ip) Ended up on a several blacklists within a week of starting my relay, SORBS being the most eager to BL you it seems. a few other small but new issues/quirks that I don't know enough about to attribute to anything Tor other than the timing. anyway, just my .02 btc That Guy grep(a)gmx.us _________________________________________________________________________ GnuPG Fingerprint: 7770 D186 A06E A329 2217 3161 63EB F269 37B8 8644 _________________________________________________________________________ “If you’re doing nothing wrong, you have nothing to hide from the giant surveillance apparatus that the government’s been hiding.” – Stephen Colbert -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJSPFjnAAoJEGPr8mk3uIZErgYQAJFXCfo0C0ekeY82Z6T2+hTO cWNL+S3swDU9Mr3IyT2bVYep3IDrBmJ4HtyixtMo2DzVQjYKsl1cNT6U07GILmdp bSUfOc5PEyn9phZ4bz1dR6dcXn2vMMAXMaiFfCcgbZnQyIZC/Xmkzq8jiwk/SEaU n/k3536nNj/2QToMhd5D702vDl5vJ1VOa174/w5/8LEgHgE7MBKAyFKYnZSVTBbl /BqF5UqucNPZBbOEL4dljawehENlWkBe2LRGmrXtHABgZtN49UQV3lIzPGg6mUOP BPlp5AkKNwRkS1PcH9oGBDFgTXo9ekumT2uxJs5g2fsskYcINXHc8LM18U9M5CLp Zab5AsSwOWnuNX8WNPSTN9Fv2jHgpalboE7ku2CfXQ52YvxytNJ6FS3QWVVJ058J jsXhvK9C/TizFImZssRlBzCoP2xLAtKFy9Z2dtIYXJ+nh9oOwvg9Ps+pX5c9yM6O hS+eG/rStIKNNEunMgM7h9ikBEjjP4ywUY+5Hbqrx5NMqZtHLhU06v0BivR97Gfi Yfg5tKRrgrBLb9kP/7M0RGPcTtVxwMcRTDt4lGR5IoW2VkfUsLhCMoMyMvOaD6bf fFbvkVjB//4l2SMBghppDpUIelw0OhrOKi8ZXOwejzQITtEXgWXOIAuZPqF+OU0f jMtxNs5m1uvZVNyxreTK =8PY+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

6 7

State of the art in NAT busting?
by Gordon Morehouse 20 Sep '13

20 Sep '13

I have a question which relates to my ongoing groundwork to build a Raspberry Pi (and hopefully Beagle and Cubie) friendly set of Debian packaged programs which can turn one of these small, low-power machines into a plug n' forget Tor relay. What is the start of the art in NAT hole punching if one does not have a UPnP or (other-standard-mumble) compliant router? If I'm behind such a router, what's the best I can do to help the Tor network if, for any reason, the user is unable to port forward? Sub-questions: 1. What's the best I can do without any outside help? 2. What's the best I can do with minimal outside help, e.g. STUN+ICE, TURN, etc? Does Tor itself support any of those? Could a Tor relay or bridge + not-yet-written scripts make use of those? 3. Are there any options I'm forgetting to consider, other than wholesale relaying of traffic (eg IP_A:portN -> hole-punched NATed Tor instance where IP_A is another machine handling some or all of the NATed relay's traffic)? Best, -Gordon M.

1 0

Re: [tor-relays] Reimbursement of Exit Operators
by tor＠t-3.net 20 Sep '13

20 Sep '13

Think bigger, say what? Certain of the world's biggest and most well-funded intelligence agencies hate personal privacy on the internet so much that they've been going to extreme efforts to destroy it. They are packet sniffing the NAPs and fiber backbones to pull out everything they can, they hacked/broke HTTPS, they are backdoored into the big content providers, they hacked the banking system, they are apparently 'in' some hardware crypto chips - the list goes on - They infiltrated the tech groups which were designing software and hardware and sabotaged their work, making their crypto be weaker/breakable and their systems easier to hack into. They use the vulnerabilities they created to their own ends. As of today, Tor appears to provide privacy, at least as far as the .onion sites goes. Maybe it even works for it's entire function of providing anonymous internet browsing. 'They' would definitely want to be IN this thing, because they either want to compromise it, or if that doesn't work well enough, destroy it. 'They' are known to infiltrate and be influential in getting what they want. Literally, they are professionals at this. 'Getting to know' the exit relay operators and identifying their bank accounts would help facilitate things when it came time for them to make their move. In the context of September 2013, this whole thing is scary. It was perhaps not scary in September of 2012, when we didn't know anything. Also. It makes me wonder things when, for example, you say "Think bigger" while pointing to a couple of potential dollars in someone's pocket. Safeguarding the operators of the exit relays is a bigger deal than chump change. I'm not making an honest accusation but, to the people who are the most vocal in approving of this - you don't work for the NSA, right? :) On Wednesday 18/09/2013 at 6:08 pm, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:10:25AM -0400, tor(a)t-3.net wrote: >> >> The Wau Holland Foundation can currently only >> reimburse via wire transfer. >> >> This seems to be end-of-story in terms of who, in the end, is >> ultimately getting liability/risk, and points to practically no >> chance at anonymity > > Think bigger --

8 9

Re: [tor-relays] Reimbursement of Exit Operators
by tor＠t-3.net 20 Sep '13

20 Sep '13

The OP I saw said: The Wau Holland Foundation can currently only reimburse via wire transfer. This seems to be end-of-story in terms of who, in the end, is ultimately getting liability/risk, and points to practically no chance at anonymity within our currently hacked banking system. It's not related to taxation or what organization may or may not be trusted. It's about what information is being gathered from the system by 3rd parties for possible use tomorrow. There's another perspective to this as well. Speaking objectively and without knowledge of the organization involved, and nothing personal intended. It may be worth noting that certain presumably-Tor-hostile and well-funded agencies are known to infiltrate the tech organizations/efforts which they wish to weaken, and influence them from the inside. In this context, seeing Tor's exit node operators being offered cash via bank transfer is waist-deep into creepy. On Wednesday 18/09/2013 at 7:38 am, Tom Ritter wrote: > create or work with a trusted organization who is willing to shoulder > liability, risk, and expense of investigating the legality and tax > consequences, and then actually executing, reimbursing people through > anonymous means.It's not easy. May not even be possible. But there is > a rigid but not inflexible framework of tax law that must be worked > within. > IMO, this is net gain. Excited to see it happen, and congrats to all > whose hard work has brought it here. > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >

5 4

Re: [tor-relays] 0.2.4.17-rc on Pi, a couple weeks on
by Joshua Datko 20 Sep '13

20 Sep '13

Just for comparison sake, I'm running a relay on the BeagleBone Black, running Ubuntu (raring), and Tor 0.2.4.17-rc with the following log entries: Sep 19 16:16:40.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 16771/16781 TAP, 13/13 NTor. Sep 19 17:16:40.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 17229/17240 TAP, 14/14 NTor. Sep 19 18:16:40.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 17371/17385 TAP, 13/13 NTor. Sep 19 19:16:40.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 17084/17099 TAP, 17/17 NTor. Sep 19 20:16:40.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 16694/16702 TAP, 13/13 NTor. Sep 19 21:16:40.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 17380/17382 TAP, 20/20 NTor. Sep 19 21:16:45.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 11 days 18:00 hours, with 715 circuits open. I've sent 221.93 GB and received 225.81 GB. Sep 19 21:16:45.000 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 87.388% Sep 19 21:16:45.000 [notice] TLS write overhead: 8% I currently have the Fast, Guard, Named, Running, Stable and Valid flags. I initially had a "your computer is too slow" message and then I set MaxAdvertisedBandwidth to 200KB and it's be better since. CPU usage is about 70%. The BBB actually has an AES crypto accelerator, but I don't think it's being used and I'm trying to work through that at the moment. Lastly (an somewhat related), I submitted a workshop proposal to 30C3 called "Using the BeagleBone for Fun and Privacy" to talk about BeagleBone hacking and running Tor. I won't find out if it's accepted until November... Josh

1 0

0.2.4.17-rc on Pi, a couple weeks on
by Gordon Morehouse 19 Sep '13

19 Sep '13

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hey folks, Here are my reports. First the good news: it's WAY more stable. Then the bad news: it still gets OOM-killed once in a while, possibly preventably. THE GOOD (notes from September 14): Here's my Pi relay since compilation of 0.2.4.17-rc: Sep 14 11:50:59.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 13308/13324 TAP, 22/22 NTor. Sep 14 11:51:51.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 7 days 18:00 hours, with 434 circuits open. I've sent 42.85 GB and received 34.05 GB. Sep 14 11:51:51.000 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 98.369% Sep 14 11:51:51.000 [notice] TLS write overhead: 9% That low NTor number is depressing. That high TAP number is scary. TAP is the old way and the way the botnet is using. NTor is post-0.2.4.8, I think. The replay has settled into a fairly steady state (after losing its flags except Named) of sending 5-10KB more per sec than it gets. I have a feeling this is literally due to the TAP replies being bigger than the TAP requests. It's handling tens of thousands every 6 hours. Load average is steadyish at 0.7. Unlike its predecessor, though, it's not yet crashed under the new network conditions. ...By last night (18 Sept) it had settled in to no Stable flag, but forwarding an essentially random amount of traffic that looked similar minute-to-minute. Load was between 0.9 and 1.1 with tor, top, and nload being really the only active processes. There is still room for tuning with the Pi given that this load was attained relaying about 2Mbps when I looked. THE BAD: This morning: Sep 18 04:50:59.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 34818/41100 TAP, 50/52 NTor. Sep 18 05:30:43.000 [warn] Your system clock just jumped 101 seconds forward; assuming established circuits no longer work. The system clock thing is a Pi thing. I'm pretty sure I need to get much more aggressive with ntpd. (Pis have no battery backup and tend to have pretty bad clock drift.) But then, 2 minutes later: Sep 18 05:32:20 tulameen kernel: [2188444.188460] Out of memory: Kill process 7544 (tor) score 148 or sacrifice child Sep 18 05:32:20 tulameen kernel: [2188444.188475] Killed process 7544 (tor) total-vm:153352kB, anon-rss:115156kB, file-rss:36712kB Coincidence? Bug? Smells like the latter. Shouldn't Tor be shedding memory if it closes all its circuits, not acquiring more? Best, - -Gordon M. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJSOa+yAAoJED/jpRoe7/ujs4UH/iXK4+hAAk06nYUptKChGRyx boZxDxpNum4uEzkJNZlUdvUILuVLX2DXytN7kNJUKDYKGzwCwBhhcQ7tOyBFucz+ muVcbwgyjM8zDhMFexWX8wVh7lauJRpjcNxzE+5hVRkzMFrbGy7FLXZbTiNGT5Ez cSfZAziu0Au3OKhxLQMUdYiZtfi/b/ReMIx72Xz4pBX4hPiagORG5NPgKpNzeBij C+khy5up1WuE7qxGX8+zG1T6K0whAW6MFYKdIT63GlwVWzYAP7tZDbbQd3kB46Yd e5I+ySBGL7VnOzH6CQl+2l1enu87JDyZ1Hw6zkZp3GQ6u8ThiHQQvmNQx9N3rxQ= =sx6s -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4 8

Tor Relay getting "Failed to terminate process with PID" messages
by Michael Gorbach 19 Sep '13

19 Sep '13

Hi, I started up a Tor relay several days ago, and the usage seems to be ramping up nicely. However, I am seeing some unexpected messages like this, in ARM and in the tor log files: 17:21:56 [NOTICE] Failed to terminate process with PID ‘29778' They seem to be showing up, reliably, every 5 minutes or so. Each has a different PID. What’s strange is that these PIDs don’t exist by the time I see the message, i.e. I guess whatever process had that PID is now dead. Anyone know what could be causing this? Should I be concerned, or is this some kind of artifact of my setup or software? The machine is a modern Gentoo linux install running a 3.10 kernel and Tor 0.2.3.25 (running inside VMWare). Thanks in advance for your help. Yours, ~ M.

2 4

Too little traffic on my #2 non-exit relay
by Christian Dietrich 19 Sep '13

19 Sep '13

Hey there, I'm currently running two tor (non-exit) relays on one host machine. "000000000000myTOR1" and "000000000000myTOR2". Now my problem is that tor relay #2 generates almost no traffic. https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/000000000000myTOR Log Relay #1: Circuit handshake stats since last time: 1566234/14743525 TAP, 10428/10433 NTor. Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 7 days 6:00 hours, with 56008 circuits open. I've sent 2167.46 GB and received 1567.97 GB. Log Relay #2: Circuit handshake stats since last time: 63/63 TAP, 1/1 NTor. Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 7 days 6:00 hours, with 4 circuits open. I've sent 1.58 GB and received 844.66 MB. Both have the same binary and configuration (except incoming/outgoing IPv4). I've also tried to switch from "fully self compiled debian, with custom kernel, and own tor binary" to "Out of the Box Ubuntu LTS, with torproject tor package" .. without any improvement. Both relays works as expected. OT: for my opinion avg 150 mbit/s (99% done by node #1) is too less for an Ivy-Bridge Based Xeon Quad Core (/w HT) on an unshared gigabit line. Apart from the fact that multithread support is really missing. Can anyone give me a hint, or am i just too stupid? Thanks ;)

4 8

Re: [tor-relays] Reimbursement of Exit Operators
by tor＠t-3.net 18 Sep '13

18 Sep '13

It's a little old. Posted July 24, 2012 We knew a lot less on that date. On Wednesday 18/09/2013 at 3:08 pm, Andrew Lewman wrote: > On Wed, 18 Sep 2013 13:36:39 -0400 > Rick <rerushg(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> Nope, I don't think so. Perhaps it's the timing. In this post-Snowden >> period most everything is a little bit creepy. There's plenty of FUD >> to go around. A position paper from Torproject on this and other >> recent issues would be handy about now. > > Does this qualify as a position paper? > https://blog.torproject.org/blog/turning-funding-more-exit-relays > > -- > Andrew > http://tpo.is/contact > pgp 0x6B4D6475 > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

1 0