August 2012 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays
by Roger Dingledine 09 Jan '13

09 Jan '13

For a few years now, funders have been asking if they can pay Tor to run more relays. I kept telling them their money was better spent on code and design improvements: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/why-tor-is-slow https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Tor/Performance since a) network load would just grow to fill whatever new capacity we have, especially if we don't deal with the tiny fraction of users who do bulk downloads, and b) reducing diversity of relay operator control can harm anonymity. But lately the Tor network has become noticeably faster, and I think it has a lot to do with the growing amount of excess relay capacity relative to network load: https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html?graph=bandwidth&start=2010-06-0… At the same time, much of our performance improvement comes from better load balancing -- that is, concentrating traffic on the relays that can handle it better. The result though is a direct tradeoff with relay diversity: on today's network, clients choose one of the fastest 5 exit relays around 25-30% of the time, and 80% of their choices come from a pool of 40-50 relays. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6443 Since extra capacity is clearly good for performance, and since we're not doing particularly well at diversity with the current approach, we're going to try an experiment: we'll connect funding to exit relay operators so they can run bigger and/or better exit relays. If we do it right (make more faster exit relays that aren't the current biggest ones, so there are more to choose from), we will improve the network's diversity as well as being able to handle more users. We've lined up our first funder (BBG, aka http://www.voanews.com/) and they're excited to have us start as soon as we can. They want to sponsor 125+ fast exits. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Open questions we need to decide about: 1) What exactly would we pay for? I think the right way to do it is to offer to reimburse bandwidth/hosting costs -- I don't want to get into the business of paying people to run relays, and I don't want people to be trying to figure out how to "profit". That leads to all sorts of horrible incentive structures. More broadly, we should keep in mind that the primary cost of running an exit relay is effort, not dollars: it takes dedication to find an ISP who will host it, and to hold that ISP's hand when an abuse complaint arrives. Or said another way, hosting costs are in many cases not the biggest barrier to running an exit relay. I think we should aim to constrain ourselves to talking about >=100mbit exits, assuming that turns out to give us enough choices. That said, we don't want to concentrate bandwidth too much in any given relay, so we should limit the amount we'll reimburse per relay. 2) Should we fund existing relays or new ones? The worst failure mode here would be that we screw up the current community of relay operators. That's why it's extra important to keep them involved at each step of this discussion. I think the right answer is probably a balance of reimbursing costs from current exits and encouraging new exits to appear. Before we can get more precise though, we need to get a handle on how many current fast exits there are, and what their constraints are (whether their hosting situation could give them more bandwidth, whether they're paying now or getting a deal through a friend/employer, etc). Even then, there are interesting further questions like: - Should we prefer big collectives like torservers, noisetor, CCC, dfri.se, and riseup (which can get great bulk rates on bandwidth and are big enough to have relationships with local lawyers and ISPs), or should we prefer individuals since they maximize our operator diversity? I think "explore both approaches" is a fine first plan. - For existing relays who pay for hosting, should we prefer that our money go to covering their existing costs (and then we encourage them to save their money for use, say, after this experiment finishes), or should we aim to add additional funding so the relay can use more bandwidth? I'd say it comes down to the preferences of the relay operator. That said, if we have plenty to choose from, we should pick the relays that will make the network grow -- but we should take extra care to avoid situations where operators in the first category say "well, fine" and shut down their relay. More generally, we need to consider sustainability. Our current exit relay funding is for a period of 12 months, and while there's reason to think we will find continued support, the Tor network must not end up addicted to external funding. So long as everybody is running an exit relay because they want to save the world, I think we should be fine. 4) What exactly do we mean by diversity? There's network diversity (AS / upstream network topology), organization and operator diversity, jurisdictional (country) diversity, funding diversity, data-center diversity, and more. We've started to answer some of these questions at https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6232 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problem-measuring-safety-tor-netw… but this research topic will need ongoing attention. I'd love to get to the point where our diversity metrics can recommend network locations that best improve the various diversity scores. 5) How much "should" an exit relay cost? Since we're aiming for diversity, we can't send all our volunteers to the same cut-rate German VPS provider. After all, much of the work in setting up an exit relay is finding a good provider that doesn't already host a bunch of Tor relays. But if we declare that we'll reimburse $50/month for 100mbit, we're going to attract a different set of volunteers -- and a different set of network locations -- than if we reimburse $100/month for 100mbit. We need to learn about current bandwidth pricing: I know there are 10 cheap hosting places that will tolerate exit relays, but are there 200? And do all of those 200 turn out to overlap diversity-wise? Initial guesses appreciated. I'm inclined toward the $100 number to give our volunteers more flexibility. If we want to reimburse on a monthly basis, how do we handle situations where the ISP wants a longer-term contract? I think the answer will come down to how many choices we have. 6) How exactly should we choose which exit relay operators to reimburse? It might be premature to speculate until we better understand what choices are available to us. But I think the answer must include doing it in a way that encourages continued growth of the relay operator _community_. People who are active in the Tor community, and well-known to many other people, should be part of the answer. At the same time, we should be willing to put some of the money into trying out new places and people, especially if they're in good locations diversity-wise. The broader answer is that we as a community need to figure out a good answer here. I definitely don't want it to be "Roger picks people in an opaque way". But I also don't want the answer to be "anybody on the Internet who offers to take our money". Maybe we should put together a consortium of current Tor activists who run fast exits? 7) How do we audit / track the sponsored relays? How should we check that your 100mbit relay is really working? What do we measure to confirm its capacity? To a first approximation I'm fine assuming that nobody is going to try to cheat (say, by colluding with an ISP to write legit-looking invoices but then just split the money). But as the plan scales, we need good ways to track statistics on how many relays are being sponsored and how much bandwidth they're providing (so funders can see how effective their money is), and what fraction of the overall network these sponsored relays are (to keep an eye on the diversity questions). 8) Legal questions? Tor exit relays raise plenty of legal questions already, especially when you consider jurisdiction variety. But reimbursing relays introduces even more excitement, such as: - Does such a relay operator end up in a different situation legally? - Does the overall Tor network change legal categories in some country, e.g. becoming a telecommunications service when it wasn't before? - Does The Tor Project Inc incur new liabilities for offering this money? Tor has a history of creating fascinating new challenges for legal scholars, and this exit relay funding experiment will be no exception. I believe if we position it correctly, we won't really change the legal context. But I encourage people to investigate these questions for their jurisdiction. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Next steps: I'm going to do a short blog post pointing to this thread, since many interested parties aren't on tor-relays yet. Then I'll send individual emails to exit relay operators pointing them to it and asking for their feedback (on the list or private, whichever they prefer). I'll also try to get some sense of how much their hosting costs, whether they'd want to participate in our experiment, whether they're in a position to ramp up to a faster connection, etc. Once we have some concrete facts about how many current exit relays want to participate, how many new volunteers want to help, and how many ISPs could handle more exit relays and at what prices, we'll be in a better position to decide how to proceed. --Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 18, Issue 1
by Christian 13 Sep '12

13 Sep '12

Hi Roger, > Who owns that socket file? /var/run/tor/control is owned by debian-tor. > Anything else in that other default config file? The tor-service-defaults-torrc file contains: DataDirectory /var/lib/tor PidFile /var/run/tor/tor.pid RunAsDaemon 1 User debian-tor ControlSocket /var/run/tor/control ControlSocketsGroupWritable 1 CookieAuthentication 1 CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 1 CookieAuthFile /var/run/tor/control.authcookie Log notice file /var/log/tor/log > > ORPort 443 NoListen > > > ORPort 0.0.0.0:9090 NoAdvertise > > > ORPort [::]:9090 IPv6Only NoAdvertise > > > > Is this ipv6 bind attempt the one causing problems? > > > > The ipv6 bind attempt was a try to solve the problem. Problem persists with and without ipv6 bind attempt. Thanks a lot! christian > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of the > listener ports (Christian) > 2. Re: Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of > the listener ports (Roger Dingledine) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sun, 01 Jul 2012 06:14:19 +0200 > From: Christian <brightsidedarkside(a)t-online.de> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: [tor-relays] Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind > one of the listener ports > Message-ID: <1341116059.2767.42.camel(a)delusions.local> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > > Hi Nick, hi Jean, > > thanks a lot for your fast reaction. I was at my parents' place for a > week, that's why I'm a little late. > > First, I tried port 9001, but in fact it is a port forwarding on the > router from 443 to 9090. > > Following, I post the terminal output when using the given torrc and the > torrc file itself. > Really, no logs are created, independent of the logging options. > The socket unlink issue happens since I use tor and that's for a while > now - it never affected functionality. > Yes, I'm into psychiatric symptoms. A friend of mine uses monsters' > names from films. ;-) > > Again, thanks a lot for your help! > > Thankfully > > christian > > ca@delusions:~$ sudo service tor restart > [sudo] password for ca: > * Stopping tor daemon... > [ OK ] > * Starting tor > daemon... > Jul 01 06:00:13.321 [warn] Could not unlink /var/run/tor/control: > Permission denied > Jul 01 06:00:13.321 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to > bind one of the listener ports. > Jul 01 06:00:13.321 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. > > [fail] > ca@delusions:~$ > > > > The torrc (complete to prevent me from confusing, but slightly spoiled > by my mail client with line breaks - RunAsDeamon is set by another > default config file): > > > ## Configuration file for a typical Tor user > ## Last updated 22 April 2012 for Tor 0.2.3.14-alpha. > ## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.) > ## > ## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines > ## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them > ## by removing the "#" symbol. > ## > ## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html, > ## for more options you can use in this file. > ## > ## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform: > ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc > > ## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't > ## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only > ## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself. > #SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections. > #SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this adddress:port too. > > ## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address. > ## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept > ## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who > ## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections > ## you make. > #SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16 > #SocksPolicy reject * > > ## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something > ## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as > ## you want. > ## > ## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose > ## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the > logs. > ## > ## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher > to /var/log/tor/notices.log > #Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log > ## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log > Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log > ## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles > #Log notice syslog > ## To send all messages to stderr: > #Log debug stderr > > ## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use > ## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows; > ## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service. > #RunAsDaemon 1 > > ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store > ## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows. > #DataDirectory /var/lib/tor > > ## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor > ## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt. > #ControlPort 9051 > ## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these > ## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it. > #HashedControlPassword > 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C > #CookieAuthentication 1 > > ############### This section is just for location-hidden services ### > > ## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the > ## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address > ## to tell people. > ## > ## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the > ## address y:z. > > #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ > #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 > > #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/ > #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 > #HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22 > > ################ This section is just for relays ##################### > # > ## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details. > > ## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections. > #ORPort 443 > ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in > ## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as > ## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding > ## yourself to make this work. > ORPort 443 NoListen > ORPort 0.0.0.0:9090 NoAdvertise > ORPort [::]:9090 IPv6Only NoAdvertise > > ## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your > ## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess. > #Address noname.example.com > > ## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for > ## outgoing traffic to use. > # OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5 > > ## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key. > Nickname BrightSideDarkSide > > ## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your > ## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must > ## be at least 20 KB. > ## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not > bits > ## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, > etc. > #RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps) > #RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps) > > ## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month. > ## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received > bytes, > ## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before > ## hibernating. > ## > ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period. > #AccountingMax 4 GB > ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day) > #AccountingStart day 00:00 > ## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax > ## is per month) > #AccountingStart month 3 15:00 > > ## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you > ## if your relay is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Google > ## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it. > ContactInfo Sides of the moon <brightsidedarkside AT t-online dot de> > ## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one: > #ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> > > ## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do > ## if you have enough bandwidth. > #DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections > ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in > ## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as > ## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port > ## forwarding yourself to make this work. > #DirPort 80 NoListen > #DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise > ## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now > you > ## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is > ## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source > ## distribution for a sample. > #DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html > > ## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the > identity > ## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on > ## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid > ## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See > ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays > ## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it > would > ## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address. > #MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,... > > ## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first > ## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_ > ## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an > ## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the > ## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which > is > ## described in the man page or at > ## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html > ## > ## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses > ## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy. > ## > ## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your > firewall, > ## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor > ## users will be told that those destinations are down. > ## > ## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local) > ## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry > ## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving". > ## > #ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more > #ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy > ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed > > ## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the > ## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even > an > ## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably > ## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat > you > ## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can > ## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge! > BridgeRelay 1 > ## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various > ## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run > ## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge > ## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line: > #PublishServerDescriptor 0 > > User debian-tor > > > > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org: > > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > > > > Today's Topics: > > > > 1. Re: Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of > > the listener ports (Nick Mathewson) > > 2. Re: Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of > > the listener ports (Jean Trolleur) > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Message: 1 > > Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 11:59:22 -0400 > > From: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)freehaven.net> > > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Failed to parse/validate config: failed to > > bind one of the listener ports > > Message-ID: > > <CAKDKvuyeEBDEO6rrbqVQSZcOy_cbeuGWMX2gisUjjETk0VgJEw(a)mail.gmail.com> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > > > On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 7:38 PM, Christian > > <brightsidedarkside(a)t-online.de> wrote: > > > Hi dear fellows, > > > > > > I'm sorry to use again this way of addressing my problem as in Vol 17, > > > Issue 5. It will be the last time. Promise. > > > > > > I can't find any solution on the web. > > > When starting tor, it always reads "Failed to parse/validate config: > > > failed to bind one of the listener ports". > > > > Hm. It really should be saying something more than that on startup; > > there should be a message right before that about *why* it couldn't > > parse or validate the ports. > > > > I just tried the ORPort combination you listed there, and it seemed to > > work out okay for me. It might be easier to diagnose if you could > > upload your entire torrc, and the entire output of starting Tor up to > > the point where it says "failed to parse/validate config:" > > > > hth, > > -- > > Nick > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 2 > > Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 15:18:42 -0500 > > From: Jean Trolleur <sigtstp(a)gmail.com> > > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Failed to parse/validate config: failed to > > bind one of the listener ports > > Message-ID: > > <CAPN5qOdaMr==8D-kTz01cAZDHrDXSGuh5T+3DVfscJLx8jLgZA(a)mail.gmail.com> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > > > Try: > > > > ORPort 443 > > ORListenAddress 0.0.0.0:9001 > > > > On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 6:38 PM, Christian > > <brightsidedarkside(a)t-online.de> wrote: > > > Hi dear fellows, > > > > > > I'm sorry to use again this way of addressing my problem as in Vol 17, > > > Issue 5. It will be the last time. Promise. > > > > > > I can't find any solution on the web. > > > When starting tor, it always reads "Failed to parse/validate config: > > > failed to bind one of the listener ports". > > > > > > Furthermore, there are only empty logfiles, independent of the > > > configuration of the logs option "notice". > > > > > > Has anyone else this kind of problem? > > > > > > This is my ORPort section: > > > ORPort 443 NoListen > > > ORPort 0.0.0.0:9090 NoAdvertise > > > > > > I even can't make a control port accessible for e.g. arm running on the > > > same machine, although I didn't use it before. > > > > > > Client functionality is not working either. No connections through tor. > > > > > > Tor is configured as a bridge, my OS is Ubuntu lucid 10.04 and Tor's > > > version is 2.3.17-beta-1~lucid+1. > > > > > > It just worked until the upgrade to the new version through torproject's > > > repository. > > > > > > I really do have forwarded external port 443 to port 9090 on my machine. > > > > > > It nearly has me left in broken state dying. > > > > > > I checked for new requests concerning apparmor allowance, but there were > > > only the ability to chown and access to /sys/devices/system/cpu/ which I > > > granted both. > > > > > > I'm not so really competent with computers and therefore grateful for > > > any help. > > > Strange. No error logs, no function, no topic on the web.. > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > christian > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > tor-relays mailing list > > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > tor-relays mailing list > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > > > > End of tor-relays Digest, Vol 17, Issue 8 > > ***************************************** > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Sun, 1 Jul 2012 05:14:22 -0400 > From: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Failed to parse/validate config: failed to > bind one of the listener ports > Message-ID: <20120701091422.GB8804(a)moria.seul.org> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > On Sun, Jul 01, 2012 at 06:14:19AM +0200, Christian wrote: > > Really, no logs are created, independent of the logging options. > > That's expected -- it's because logs are parsed in the same step as > binding the sockets, and it never gets to the 'setting up the logs' part. > > > The socket unlink issue happens since I use tor and that's for a while > > now - it never affected functionality. > > Who owns that socket file? > > > The torrc (complete to prevent me from confusing, but slightly spoiled > > by my mail client with line breaks - RunAsDeamon is set by another > > default config file): > > Anything else in that other default config file? > > > ORPort 443 NoListen > > ORPort 0.0.0.0:9090 NoAdvertise > > ORPort [::]:9090 IPv6Only NoAdvertise > > Is this ipv6 bind attempt the one causing problems? > > --Roger > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > End of tor-relays Digest, Vol 18, Issue 1 > *****************************************

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Current state of v0.2.3.x IPv6 bridges?
by Steve Snyder 10 Sep '12

10 Sep '12

I'm wondering about the benefit of running abridge on an IPv6 address. Since the big announcement last December that v0.2.3.9 supports IPv6 addresses for bridges, I've read a few comments to the affect that BridgDB doesn't understand IPv6 addresses. So... what is the state of publishing IPv6 bridge addresses? Will clients requesting a bridge address ever be given an IPv6 address? Can a client specifically request an IPv6 address (or IPv4 address, for that matter)? Thanks.

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Operating a sponsored relay II
by Dude 31 Aug '12

31 Aug '12

My research is telling me I can not host a Tor relay at most retail ISPs because it is perceived as an "open relay" and these cause a lot of headaches for ISPs. So that leaves colo, but this gets expensive fast. This is very expensive outside the USA. Could I work as an agent of torservers.net? Is there a FAQ listing friendly ISPs? I understand the need for documentation and receipts for expenses. It might be helpful to get quarterly payments instead of monthly. I was thinking of an USA Llc. for protection. Looking at my notes I now remember an 's-corp' is better for a single owner (simple corporation). Here is a link to the US commercial code for s-corps: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title26/html/USCODE-2011-title26-s… I would be happy to document the process of setting up a US s-corp. if I create one. Cheers!

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Has anyone had any success running a relay on an mk802?
by someonelse 30 Aug '12

30 Aug '12

I currently run a relay at home during the day, but would like to run one 24/7. Has anyone had any success doing this with the mk802 or similar device? This site seems to say it's possible: http://romanrm.ru/en/a10/mk802-server "It can run Web/Mail/DNS/DHCP/VPN/Jabber/Mumble/Tor servers..." I think this may work for me since I prefer Debian, something inexpensive (~$70 qualifies), low power and want to run wired Internet. If not the mk802 or mk802-II, then what device would do this better for around the same price? Thanks, Someonelse

1 0

Operating a sponsored relay
by Dude 29 Aug '12

29 Aug '12

Hello, I have experience working at ISPs supporting dedicated servers and am interested in operating a sponsored relay. Potential issues I see: # A true 100mb network connection is going to be expensive. Often a 24 port edge switch has just one 100mb uplink port. # As an operator, I might want an LLC to protect me from personal liability in the USA. # Ideally an ISP outside the USA would be used so the server is in a different legal jurisdiction than the operator. This would make payment and communication more difficult. At this time I imagine a server with an encrypted file system and long term log retention disabled. Reasonably hardened OS, but nothing too exotic. I think $100 a month above other costs would be fair. But I do not know how much attention a node would require once it was set up. If it requires a lot of time, more compensation would be in order. I am not looking to make a lot of money doing this, but I can not do it gratis. Cheers, John

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Re: [tor-relays] "Relay info kit" for Tor exits at universities
by Scott Bennett 25 Aug '12

25 Aug '12

On Sat, 11 Aug 2012 04:08:57 -0400 Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> wrote: >I've spent the week talking to my contacts at US universities, to get >them to spin up fast exits. Currently the fast exits in North American >universities are: > >- University of Waterloo (Ian Goldberg) >- Boston University (Leo Reyzin) > >We're now on track to add: >- UPenn (Matt Blaze) >- UMichigan (Alex Halderman) >- CMU (Nicolas Christin) >- Georgia Tech (Dave Dagon) > >and I have professors from George Mason, Illinois, UNM, UMN, UConn, >UW, and others looking into it. > >Wendy and I are talking to some lawyers to try to write up a short >(several paragraph) document targeted toward the university's general >counsel, for preemptive use by the computer science professors who plan >to run the Tor exit. > >What else should go in a "so you want to run a big exit" info kit? > >- Pointers to the legal-faq (and dmca template) and abuse-faq. > >- Pointers to Mike's blog entry: >https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment >and my old Tor-at-universities wiki page: >https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorGuideUniversities > >- Is there some document suggesting how to SWIP your address, and >explaining the importance of having your abuse mails go to someplace >other than your general university abuse team? It's touched on in several >places but we should make it even clearer. > >- What are the good answers now to "what hardware should I use, and how >should I configure it?" I've been telling people they'll be happiest with >Debian, and that something 64-bit and/or with AESNI support will be best. Fast relays use lots of memory, which vastly worsens the effects of the "small TLB" problem inherent in all modern CPUs, so running a fast relay on a FreeBSD kernel with superpages support enabled is likely to reduce considerably the CPU load for the traffic served, which is more or less equivalent to increasing the traffic capacity for any given CPU speed. Superpages support has been available since 7.2 for i386 and amd64 platforms, but will likely be available on other platforms at some point. Support on another platform was supposed to appear in 9.0, IIRC, but I don't remember which (ia64?). I'm not sure what will be in later releases, but my understanding is that the kernel development team planned to add superpages support eventually to the rest of the FreeBSD-supported hardware platforms that are capable of it (not, for example, powerpc because that hardware does not support the multiple page sizes involved). Rather than risk triggering OS religious wars here, it might be better to limit OS recommendations to merely which to avoid because they have limitations likely to prevent successful operation of a fast exit node (e.g., non-server versions of Windows). The administrators of fast nodes already know what their current setups are and the current knowledge bases of their staffs are. > >- [remainder deleted -SB] Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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"Relay info kit" for Tor exits at universities
by Roger Dingledine 24 Aug '12

24 Aug '12

I've spent the week talking to my contacts at US universities, to get them to spin up fast exits. Currently the fast exits in North American universities are: - University of Waterloo (Ian Goldberg) - Boston University (Leo Reyzin) We're now on track to add: - UPenn (Matt Blaze) - UMichigan (Alex Halderman) - CMU (Nicolas Christin) - Georgia Tech (Dave Dagon) and I have professors from George Mason, Illinois, UNM, UMN, UConn, UW, and others looking into it. Wendy and I are talking to some lawyers to try to write up a short (several paragraph) document targeted toward the university's general counsel, for preemptive use by the computer science professors who plan to run the Tor exit. What else should go in a "so you want to run a big exit" info kit? - Pointers to the legal-faq (and dmca template) and abuse-faq. - Pointers to Mike's blog entry: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment and my old Tor-at-universities wiki page: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorGuideUniversities - Is there some document suggesting how to SWIP your address, and explaining the importance of having your abuse mails go to someplace other than your general university abuse team? It's touched on in several places but we should make it even clearer. - What are the good answers now to "what hardware should I use, and how should I configure it?" I've been telling people they'll be happiest with Debian, and that something 64-bit and/or with AESNI support will be best. - We should set up a mailing list for university relay operators to share experiences and feel solidarity. I'll also encourage them to sign up here. We might also post a list of university Tor exits somewhere obvious, so new ones can gain more confidence in the idea. What other resources exist already that would be especially useful for new fast exits? What resources don't exist but should? --Roger

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exit node with different IP address
by cmeclax-sazri 22 Aug '12

22 Aug '12

I rebooted my computer with a freshly compiled kernel and world, brought up my browser, and before doing something where I need to know my IP address is hidden, brought up check.torproject.org. It said "You are not using Tor." But the address is 217.148.84.179, which isn't anywhere near me. So I brought up torstatus.blutmagie.de and searched the page. It lists AMORPHIS at 217.148.84.180. I don't see ExitAddress in torrc. Should there be one? cmeclax

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hi
by P.H. H 19 Aug '12

19 Aug '12

tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org

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