Hello,
The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us tomorrow for our monthly
community meeting.
*=> Where? *OONI Slack channel: https://slack.ooni.org/ (bridged with IRC:
ircs://irc.oftc.net:6697/#ooni)
*=> When?* Tomorrow, *27th September 2022 at 14:00 UTC* (for 1 hour)
As part of the meeting, we'll be discussing the *improved version of OONI's
Code of Conduct* and we'll be requesting your feedback for further
improvements.
Please add any additional topics that you'd like to discuss during the
meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting-keep
We hope you can join us!
Thanks,
~ OONI team
Hello,
Today OONI published a new report documenting the latest censorship events
in Iran amid the ongoing protests.
Read the report here:
https://ooni.org/post/2022-iran-blocks-social-media-mahsa-amini-protests/
*# Key Findings*
OONI data shows new blocking events in Iran amid ongoing protests:
** Increased blocking of encrypted DNS. *As of 20th September 2022, OONI
data shows that ISPs in Iran started blocking DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
endpoints by means of DNS based tampering (returning bogons), in addition
to implementing TLS level interference. Previously reachable DoH endpoints
(such as cloudflare-dns.com) are now blocked.
** Blocking of WhatsApp and Instagram. *As of 21st September 2022, OONI
data shows that many ISPs in Iran started blocking access to WhatsApp
endpoints, web.whatsapp.com, and www.instagram.com. We mostly observe
TCP/IP blocking, with additional DNS and TLS blocking.
** Blocking of Google Play Store and Apple App Store. *As of 22nd September
2022, OONI data shows that multiple ISPs in Iran started blocking access to
Google Play Store and Apple App Store domains.
** Blocking of Skype and Linkedin. *As of 23rd September 2022, OONI data
shows the blocking of Skype, while the blocking of Linkedin is
automatically confirmed on at least 10 networks in Iran.
In addition to the above blocks (and many other long-term blocks), Iran
experienced *5 major outages affecting mobile networks* over the past week,
which are visible in the IODA, Cloudflare Radar and Kentik datasets.
OONI data suggests that Psiphon and Tor Snowflake work in Iran, and can
potentially be used for censorship circumvention.
We also share the key findings of our study in this Twitter thread:
https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1574108767226155008
You can continue to monitor censorship events in Iran through real-time
OONI data:
https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&test_name=web_connectivity&…
We thank OONI Probe users in Iran who contributed measurements, supporting
this study. <3
~ OONI team.
Hello,
Today OONI and Azerbaijan Internet Watch published a new research report
which shares *OONI data on the* *blocking of TikTok in Armenia and
Azerbaijan* during the border clashes over the last days.
Read our report here:
https://ooni.org/post/2022-azerbaijan-and-armenia-blocks-tiktok/
In *Azerbaijan*, OONI data shows:
* TikTok website & endpoints blocked on at least 3 networks;
* TLS level interference by dropping packets after noticing a disallowed
server_name;
* ISPs block TikTok based on different lists of TikTok endpoint domains.
In *Armenia*, OONI data shows:
* TikTok blocked on at least 2 networks;
* On most networks, TikTok interference observed at the DNS level by
returning an NXDOMAIN error, an IP address associated with www.google.com,
or a set of unrelated IP addresses which contain an expired certificate for
the server_name it.domain.name;
* Not all tested networks in Armenia implemented the TikTok block and
censorship techniques varied from network to network;
* Several endpoints used by the TikTok app and website are also blocked on
at least one network in Armenia.
Overall, OONI data shows that Azerbaijan blocked TikTok by means of TLS
level interference, while Armenia implemented both DNS level blocks and TLS
level interference.
Learn more through our report:
https://ooni.org/post/2022-azerbaijan-and-armenia-blocks-tiktok/
We thank OONI Probe users in Armenia and Azerbaijan who contributed
measurements, supporting this study.
You can continue to monitor the reachability of TikTok (and other
platforms) in Armenia and Azerbaijan through OONI data:
https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat
Thanks,
Maria.
Hello friends,
Hope you're all doing well.
I'm touching base to share updated OONI user guides and documentation,
which we hope you will find useful.
*# Test Lists*
Interested in contributing websites for censorship testing around the world?
You can do that through our *Test Lists Editor*: https://test-lists.ooni.org
Learn how to use the platform through our *new user guide*:
https://ooni.org/support/test-lists-editor
We have also updated our documentation for:
* Contributing to test lists via GitHub:
https://ooni.org/support/github-test-lists
* General test list documentation:
https://ooni.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists (which we recommend
reading, if you'd like to contribute to test lists)
*# OONI Probe user guides*
We also recently updated our user guides for:
* OONI Probe Mobile: https://ooni.org/support/ooni-probe-mobile
* OONI Probe Desktop: https://ooni.org/support/ooni-probe-desktop
We're happy to address any questions, or discuss any feedback you may have.
Cheers,
Maria.