Hello, Today OONI published a new report documenting the latest censorship events in Iran amid the ongoing protests. Read the report here: https://ooni.org/post/2022-iran-blocks-social-media-mahsa-amini-protests/ *# Key Findings* OONI data shows new blocking events in Iran amid ongoing protests: ** Increased blocking of encrypted DNS. *As of 20th September 2022, OONI data shows that ISPs in Iran started blocking DNS over HTTPS (DoH) endpoints by means of DNS based tampering (returning bogons), in addition to implementing TLS level interference. Previously reachable DoH endpoints (such as cloudflare-dns.com) are now blocked. ** Blocking of WhatsApp and Instagram. *As of 21st September 2022, OONI data shows that many ISPs in Iran started blocking access to WhatsApp endpoints, web.whatsapp.com, and www.instagram.com. We mostly observe TCP/IP blocking, with additional DNS and TLS blocking. ** Blocking of Google Play Store and Apple App Store. *As of 22nd September 2022, OONI data shows that multiple ISPs in Iran started blocking access to Google Play Store and Apple App Store domains. ** Blocking of Skype and Linkedin. *As of 23rd September 2022, OONI data shows the blocking of Skype, while the blocking of Linkedin is automatically confirmed on at least 10 networks in Iran. In addition to the above blocks (and many other long-term blocks), Iran experienced *5 major outages affecting mobile networks* over the past week, which are visible in the IODA, Cloudflare Radar and Kentik datasets. OONI data suggests that Psiphon and Tor Snowflake work in Iran, and can potentially be used for censorship circumvention. We also share the key findings of our study in this Twitter thread: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1574108767226155008 You can continue to monitor censorship events in Iran through real-time OONI data: https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=IR&test_name=web_connectivity&s... We thank OONI Probe users in Iran who contributed measurements, supporting this study. <3 ~ OONI team.