ooni-talk December 2016

ooni-talk@lists.torproject.org

2 participants
3 discussions

Australia Censoring popular P2P Sites and More
by Andri Effendi 24 Dec '16

24 Dec '16

Hi All, For the first time at least where it is now publicly visible, Australia is now as of last week censoring many websites that aren't on the Interpol "worst of worst" list. These are popular websites that whilst maybe known for file sharing of so called "copyrighted" works, they got many folks through Highschool and university medical school with all the resources available on there. I think I should highlight this here and I ask that who ever is in a position to can keep the ooni telemetry coming in from Australia as the internet censoring really begins now. **At one point the AU censors tried to block Wikileaks but overturned it in the end. Kind Regards, -- Andri Effendi <fusionman133(a)gmx.de> GPG fingerprint: 8438 138D ECDA 05E0 591F F2B4 4721 0F03 AC24 DF73 Confidentiality cannot be guaranteed on emails sent or received unencrypted.

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OONI & Sinar Project Report: The State of Internet Censorship in Malaysia
by Maria Xynou 20 Dec '16

20 Dec '16

Hi Oonitarians, Today OONI and Sinar Project jointly released a report that examines internet censorship in Malaysia over the last few months. This study involved the collection of network measurements through the use of ooniprobe in an attempt to collect data that can serve as evidence of internet censorship events, as well as the examination of relevant laws and policies. Our report can be found here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/malaysia-report/ The key findings of our study include: 1. We found *39 different websites* to be blocked through the *DNS injection of block pages*. These sites include: - *News outlets*, *blogs*, and *medium.com* for covering the *1MDB scandal*. - A site that expresses heavy criticism towards Islam (and which, in the Malaysian context, can be viewed as inciting hatred towards Islam). - Popular torrenting sites (such as thepiratebay.org). - A popular online dating site. - Pornographic sites. - Gambling sites. 2. This study provides evidence of *politically motivated censorship* (since news outlets and blogs covering the 1MDB scandal were found to be blocked). This censorship though has vaguely been justified by Malaysian authorities on the grounds of "national security" under the Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA) 1998. 3. The pornographic and gambling sites that were found to be blocked might be part of the thousands of websites that were recently announced to be blocked by Malaysian authorities (reference: http://english.astroawani.com/malaysia-news/mcmc-blocks-over-5-000-websites…). In any case, the blocking of these sites can be justified under Malaysia's laws and regulations (see "Legal environment" section of the report). 4. Some previously blocked sites (Bersih rally websites) were found to be accessible as part of this study. Social media and censorship circumvention tools also appeared to be accessible. 5. Even though Sharia law poses restrictions to LGBTI rights, all LGBTI sites that we tested were found to be accessible. Please contact us with any questions you may have. All the best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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New OONI & Amnesty report: Evidence of internet censorship in Ethiopia
by Maria Xynou 14 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

Hello Oonitarians! Today OONI and Amnesty International released a joint report that examines internet censorship events in Ethiopia from June to October 2016, in the midst of heavy protests and leading up to the country's state of emergency. You can find the report via the following links: OONI: *https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ethiopia-report/* Amnesty International: *https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/5312/2016/en/* You can also find the *pdf* version of the report here: https://ooni.torproject.org/documents/Ethiopia-Offline-evidence-of.pdf As part of our study, OONI conducted network measurement tests in Ethiopia with the help of anonymous researchers and Amnesty International collected testimonies pertaining to censorship events through interviews with Ethiopians. We were able to corroborate reports on censorship events with technical data that now serves as *evidence* of such events. Our key findings show: 1. *WhatsApp was blocked* during the protests. 2. *Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)* technology was used to block access to *ecadforum.com*, a major Ethiopian news website. 3. *16 different news websites appeared to be censored* in similar fashion to ecadforum.com, indicating that they were likely blocked by DPI technology as well. 4. Amongst the various different types of websites that appear to have been blocked during the protests are the following: - *LGBTI websites*. - *Sites advocating for free expression*. - *News outlets and online forums*. - *Armed groups and political opposition websites*. - *Circumvention tool websites *(including *torproject.org* and *psiphon.ca*). However, we did not find tor software itself being blocked, and Tor Metrics data indicates that there was an increased usage of tor software over the last months (possibly due to increased censorship). 5. Third-party data (such as Google transparency reports) clearly shows that there was an *internet shutdown in Ethiopia in August* in the midst of heavy protests. While Ethiopians also reported a mobile shutdown in October, third-party data does not show a total shutdown, but that there was a decrease in the overall traffic originating from Ethiopia during that month (indicating that some networks might have been shut down in certain locations). Many of the censorship events detected as part of this study can now potentially be justified by the Ethiopian government under the state of emergency. However, it's important to emphasize that WhatsApp, news outlets, online forums, and various other websites were found to be filtered /prior/ to the state of emergency declaration, and in the midst of heavy protests. OONI data can serve as evidence of such censorship events, and it can be found here: *https://explorer.ooni.torproject.org/country/ET *Please contact us with any questions you may have. All the best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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ooni-talk December 2016