Hi all,
I'm running ooniprobe on a Raspberry Pi with Pi-Hole and CloudFlare as the upstream DNS, and it seems to be working fine with the exception that it appears to be detecting the wrong country. It's showing "Country: BE". I initially thought it was showing the wrong ASN, too, but lookups using multiple tools confirm it's the correct one.
I assume "BE" means Belgium, but those 2 letters are also the first two of the county in which I live in the UK. Is it possible that ooniprobe is …
[View More]pulling in the state/province/county data as Country rather than the actual country by mistake? (Just guessing).
It's uploading the measurements with this same BE Country information, and I'm concerned that it's polluting OONI data.
I've read the documentation, searched online, etc, but I can't find how to stop the bad detection or to override those values in the ooniprobe.conf file. Assuming I shouldn't just ignore this, can anyone steer me in the right direction, please?
Thanks,
Matt
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Hello,
The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us tomorrow for our monthly
community meeting.
=> Where? OONI Slack channel: https://slack.ooni.org/ (bridged with IRC:
ircs://irc.oftc.net:6697/#ooni)
=> When? Tuesday, 26th November 2019 at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour, until
15:00 UTC)
The monthly OONI community meetings aim to:
* Collect community feedback on OONI tools & methodologies
* Address questions in relation to the use of OONI tools and OONI data
* Foster discussions on …
[View More]internet censorship issues
* Receive updates from the community
We'd love to meet you and hear from you, and hope you can join us!
Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in this
pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting
If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on
Slack/IRC on any other day!
All the best,
~ OONI team
--
Maria Xynou
Research & Partnerships Director
Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
https://ooni.torproject.org/
PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E
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Hello,
In collaboration with CAIDA/IODA and Iranian community members (Kandoo),
we co-published a research report which shares measurement data and
technical observations on Iran's internet blackout.
Our report is available here:
https://ooni.org/post/2019-iran-internet-blackout/
Iran’s nation-wide Internet blackout is confirmed by several data
sources, such as IODA, Google traffic data, and Oracle’s Internet
Intelligence data. These data sources show that the Internet blackout in
Iran …
[View More]started on 16th November 2019 and has been ongoing. As of 21st
November 2019 (and more drastically from 23rd November 2019), Internet
connectivity is being restored in Iran.
IODA data shows that Iranian cellular operators were disconnected first
on 16th November 2019 (followed by almost all other operators over the
next 5 hours), and that ISPs appear to have used diverse mechanisms to
enforce the blackout.
By analyzing packet captures from the MCCI (AS197207) network, we found
that a RST packet is injected at both ends of the connection.
During the blackout, most Iranians were barred from connecting to the
global Internet, but they still had access to Iran’s national intranet:
the domestic network hosting Iranian websites and services.
Yet, OONI measurements (which require Internet connectivity) were
collected from multiple networks in Iran between 16th November 2019 to
23rd November 2019, showing that the internet blackout was not total.
To explore whether and how connectivity to the Internet could be
possible from Iran during the blackout, we performed manual testing
locally.
We found that DNS tunneling could possibly be a low bandwidth solution
to get network traffic to leave Iran.
We also found that it was possible to connect to the Internet by using
virtual private servers (VPS) to setup a local proxy in Iran and use
that proxy to tunnel traffic to another proxy outside Iran.
Please share this report with your networks:
https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1198321792076701696
Thank you,
~ OONI team.
--
Maria Xynou
Research & Partnerships Director
Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
https://ooni.torproject.org/
PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E
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Hello friends,
First, I'd like to thank those of you who have been facilitating OONI
workshops over the last years, engaging communities far and wide with
OONI Probe and censorship measurement research. We really appreciate
your important work!
To support your efforts and encourage others to facilitate OONI
workshops too, we have published some OONI workshop slides that you can
use:
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1UAxGeF1NhCXc8pT7cfWTp0NPdkWB5LInBkG…
We have published these OONI …
[View More]workshop slides on Google Slides so that
you can:
* download the slides in the format of your choice
* edit and customize the slides (so that they're more relevant to your
local context and to the needs of the communities you teach)
You can also find the OONI workshop slides via the Get Involved section
of the OONI website: https://ooni.org/get-involved/
We hope you find these workshop slides useful and feel
encouraged/inspired to teach your local communities!
Feedback is very much appreciated, and I'm happy to address any
questions you may have (particularly since not all slides are
self-explanatory).
If anyone else would like to share their OONI workshop slides, that too
is of course encouraged! :)
Cheers,
Maria.
--
Maria Xynou
Research & Partnerships Director
Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
https://ooni.torproject.org/
PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E
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