Hello,
The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us next Friday for our monthly
community meeting.
Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org/ (OONI Slack channel)
When: Friday, 31st May 2019 at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour, until 15:00 UTC)
The monthly OONI community meetings aim to:
* Collect community feedback on OONI tools & methodologies
* Address questions in relation to the use of OONI tools and OONI data
* Foster discussions on internet censorship issues
* Receive updates from the community
We'd love to meet you and hear from you, and hope you can join us!
Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in this
pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting
If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on
Slack or IRC (#ooni) on any other day!
All the best,
~ OONI team
--
Maria Xynou
Research & Partnerships Director
Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
https://ooni.torproject.org/
PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E
Hello,
Today OONI and Nigeria's Paradigm Initiative jointly published a
research report examining information controls during Nigeria's 2019
elections.
We have published two versions of this report:
* Nigeria's 2019 elections through the lens of network measurements:
https://ooni.io/post/2019-nigeria-internet-censorship/ (focusing on OONI
analysis)
* Nigeria's 2019 elections through the lens of digital rights:
https://paradigmhq.org/download/the-2019-nigerian-elections-through-the-len…
(includes full PDF with broader digital rights analysis)
Thousands of OONI measurements collected from 16 different ASNs between
1st February 2019 to 31st March 2019 suggest that major internet
services were accessible in Nigeria throughout the 2019 general
elections. Most of the tested websites were found to be accessible,
while popular instant messaging platforms, WhatsApp and Facebook
Messenger, were working as well.
However, a number of sites hosting content associated to the Biafra
secessionist movement remained blocked.
Recent OONI measurements show that Globacom continues to block these
sites by means of TCP/IP blocking, MTN by means of DNS tampering, and
Airtel at the HTTP layer. This is strongly suggested by the fact that
the same network anomalies (in comparison to last year) are observed on
the same networks with regards to the testing of the same list of sites.
Out of more than a thousand URLs tested in total, only sites associated
to Biafra consistently presented network anomalies throughout the
testing period.
You can expand upon this study through the use of OONI Probe
(https://ooni.io/install/) and OONI data (https://ooni.io/data/), which
is openly available.
Best,
Maria.
--
Maria Xynou
Research & Partnerships Director
Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
https://ooni.torproject.org/
PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E
Hello,
The OONI team will launch a sparkling, brand new OONI Explorer in June 2019!
Thanks to great feedback provided by the community, the OONI team has
been working on revamping OONI Explorer entirely.
To further improve upon OONI Explorer before the stable release (public
launch), we invite you to test the OONI Explorer beta and to report any
bugs/issues.
# Beta of OONI Explorer
Access the beta of the revamped OONI Explorer here:
https://explorer-beta.ooni.io/
# Reporting issues
Once you have played around with the OONI Explorer beta, we encourage
you to report any issues you encounter.
You can file tickets on the following GitHub repository:
https://github.com/ooni/explorer/issues
Please check if the problem you are encountering has already been reported.
If you’re not a GitHub user, you can share your feedback with us by:
* Writing an email to bugs(a)openobservatory.org
or
* Clicking on the icon on the bottom right corner in the OONI Explorer
beta (https://explorer-beta.ooni.io/) and submitting your feedback via
the pop-up form
Your feedback and bug reporting is hugely appreciated, as it will help
us launch a better OONI Explorer for the community!
Thanks a million, and happy testing!
~ The OONI team.
--
Maria Xynou
Research & Partnerships Director
Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
https://ooni.torproject.org/
PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E
Hello,
Over the last few weeks, China started blocking all language editions of
Wikipedia.
We share OONI data on the blocking via our latest report:
https://ooni.torproject.org/post/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking/
Thanks to our local collaborators, we were able to publish a Chinese
version of the report as well:
https://ooni.torproject.org/post/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking.zh/
You can also find the report published on iYouPort:
https://www.iyouport.org/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking/
Previously, Chinese ISPs only blocked the Chinese language edition of
Wikipedia (zh.wikipedia.org).
Now, they are blocking all language editions of *.wikipedia.org (in
addition to zh.wikinews.org) by means of both DNS injection and SNI
filtering (which could perhaps be viewed as a form of "defense in depth"
tactic for network filtering, as they create multiple layers of
censorship that make circumvention harder).
OONI measurements show blocking of all wikipedia.org sub-domains from
25th April 2019 onwards.
Regards,
OONI team.
--
Maria Xynou
Research & Partnerships Director
Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
https://ooni.torproject.org/
PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E
Hello,
OONI & IODA collaborated on a joint report which shares network
measurement data on the recent censorship events that occurred in Benin
during its elections.
We share OONI data and Ripe Atlas measurements which show the blocking
of social media in Benin on 28th April 2019, as well as IODA data which
shows that an internet blackout occurred on 4 large ASes in Benin.
You can find our report here:
https://ooni.io/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/
All the best,
Maria.
--
Maria Xynou
Research & Partnerships Director
Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
https://ooni.torproject.org/
PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E