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August 2018

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New report: The State of Internet Censorship in Venezuela
by Maria Xynou 16 Aug '18

16 Aug '18

Hello, Today Venezuela Inteligente, IPYS Venezuela and OONI jointly published a research report examining internet censorship in Venezuela. Our research report is available here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/ Our study is based on the analysis of hundreds of thousands of OONI Probe network measurements collected from multiple local vantage points over the last 4 years. Key findings include: 1. **Media censorship:** A number of independent media websites are blocked (primarily by means of DNS tampering) by (at least) 4 Venezuelan ISPs. These include El Pitazo and El Nacional, two of Venezuela's major, independent news outlets known for reporting extensively on corruption (and other political issues). All 3 of El Pitazo's domains (elpitazo.info, elpitazo.com, elpitazo.ml) were found to be blocked across ISPs (possibly in an attempt to reinforce the censorship). Over the last days, state-owned CANTV appears to have started blocking investigative journalism site armando.info as well (by means of HTTP blocking). This though requires further testing, since some measurements aren't consistent. 2. Blogs expressing political criticism, Zello (heavily used by protesters), and a number of currency exchange websites were found to be blocked. This suggests that internet censorship in Venezuela may be a symptom of its economic and political crisis. 3. **Tor blocking:** We were able to confirm the blocking of the Tor network and obfs4 by state-owned CANTV through OONI measurements and through a number of additional tests and experiments. Our report shares relevant data (in tsv files). The blocking started about two months ago, and appears to be ongoing. Overall, internet censorship in Venezuela doesn't appear to be centralized, since different ISPs were found to adopt different censorship techniques and censor different platforms. Moreover, ISPs don't always appear to roll out the same censorship in all regions (for example, CANTV appears to block armando.info in Caracas, but not in other states). The recent blocking of Tor and (more) independent media sites signifies that internet censorship in Venezuela is potentially becoming more pervasive. Further research and testing is therefore required. You can expand upon our study through the use of OONI Probe (https://ooni.torproject.org/install/) and OONI data (https://ooni.torproject.org/data/) Thanks for reading! Best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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New report on South Sudan: Measuring Internet Censorship in the World's Youngest Nation
by Maria Xynou 01 Aug '18

01 Aug '18

Hello, Today, OONI and South Sudan's The Advocates for Human Rights and Democracy (TAHURID) published a joint report examining internet censorship in South Sudan. Our research report is available here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/south-sudan-censorship/ Established in July 2011, South Sudan is the world's youngest nation. The country though is in turmoil in light of ongoing civil war. OONI and TAHURID joined forces to measure internet censorship locally, particularly following local reports on the blocking of media outlets. OONI data corroborates these reports, showing the blocking of media outlets Sudan Tribune and Radio Tamazuj, and of Nyamilepedia and Paanluel Wel, the leading blogs of the Nuer and Dinka tribes. MTN (AS37594) appears to block TCP/IP connections to these sites, while IPTEC (AS36892) blocks access by means of DNS tampering. We also detected the presence of the Mikrotik HTTP transparent proxy through measurements collected in 2017 from South Sudan's 4G Telecom (AS327786) network. This proxy though is more likely being used to improve connectivity and network performance, than to implement internet censorship. Based on our testing, internet censorship in South Sudan does not appear to be pervasive, but limited to sites that authorities deem to publish "subversive content" and incite violence. Locals report that the media operate in a state of fear, and most forms of censorship are currently non-digital (involving the intimidation, jailing, and killing of journalists). Self-censorship may therefore be one of the most effective forms of censorship in South Sudan today. That said, the fact that South Sudan has already started implementing internet censorship raises questions as to whether its internet censorship apparatus will expand as internet penetration levels increase and political events unfold. Our study shares some initial observations based on OONI network measurements. If you're interested in expanding upon this research, you can do so through the use of OONI Probe (https://ooni.torproject.org/install/) and OONI data (https://ooni.torproject.org/data/) Please share this study with your contacts: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1024643397766860801 Thanks for reading! Best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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