anti-censorship-team January 2023

anti-censorship-team@lists.torproject.org

5 participants
4 discussions

Microsoft announces shutting down domain fronting attempts in Azure
by Cecylia Bocovich 18 Nov '24

18 Nov '24

It looks like Azure is going to shutdown domain fronting: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/26/securing-our-approach-to… There isn't a time frame listed in the article, and I haven't gotten any notifications through my Azure account yet. Cecylia

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(FWD) [anti-censorship-alerts] monit alert -- Connection failed default-bridge-georgetown
by Roger Dingledine 19 Jan '23

19 Jan '23

Hi Micah! Is the georgetown bridge is flaky as it seems? We have alerts set up for the default bridges and it seems like yours alerts a lot and the others alert rarely. It always comes back after a little while, so this isn't a "hey your bridge is down" mail so much as a "what's up with your bridge" mail. I wonder if it is an issue with the network it's running on; or if it's an issue with the bridge itself, e.g. maybe there is something in Tor's logs that could help diagnose; or if it's something wonky about our alerts. (I am cc'ing anti-censorship-team so others can coordinate and stay in sync; note that this is a public list with archives.) Thanks! --Roger ----- Forwarded message from Monit <anti-censorship-monitor(a)nymity.ch> ----- Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 12:26:36 GMT From: Monit <anti-censorship-monitor(a)nymity.ch> To: anti-censorship-alerts(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: [anti-censorship-alerts] monit alert -- Connection failed default-bridge-georgetown X-Mailer: Monit 5.26.0 Connection failed Service default-bridge-georgetown Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 13:26:35 Action: alert Host: server01 Description: failed protocol test [DEFAULT] at [209.148.46.65]:443 [TCP/IP] -- Connection timed out _______________________________________________ anti-censorship-alerts mailing list anti-censorship-alerts(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/anti-censorship-alerts ----- End forwarded message -----

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Paper identifying snowflake traffic
by Kevin Bock 09 Jan '23

09 Jan '23

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How much traffic is Snowflake sending to stunprotocol.org
by John Selbie 03 Jan '23

03 Jan '23

Greetings, I hope this is an appropriate mailing list to discuss a technical issue with Tor's Snowflake project. Please redirect me to the right place if not. I am the original author and maintainer of the open source project, Stuntman. Stuntman is an implementation of the STUN protocol, which includes the STUN server. More details at www.stunprotocol.org. In short, a STUN server helps bootstream direct "p2p" connections such as WebRTC sessions or similar VOIP scenarios by allowing internet devices to self-discover their own public IP address and obtain a (UDP) port for communicating with another node. I also run a public instance of a STUN server with the code at stun.stunprotocol.org. It's been up and running for about 10 years now. It's hosted on AWS. In recent years, the hosting bills for this server have started to get on the high side, even with reserved instances. The number of STUN queries it processes per day is now on the order of hundreds of millions. The stunprotocol.org domain receives nearly a million DNS queries on Route 53 daily. What used to cost a trivial number of dollars to run is now starting to reach $1000 in annual service costs. This isn't paid for by a corporation or well funded internet organization. I pay this out of my personal pocket. It's been a mystery what has been driving the increasing traffic to the server - especially redundant requests from the same IPs. I was inspecting the DNS logs the other day and started to investigate the nodes sending out redundant DNS requests repetitively. Trying to understand why these nodes wouldn't leverage DNS caching. And to my surprise, one of the IPs was running a web server that presented a TOR landing page. That led me to discover this discussion online: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snow… And a quick inspection of the Snowflake code leads me to find that stun.stunprotocol.org is the default STUN server for Snowflake proxy and listed throughout the documentation as well. While the Snowflake project has good intentions, it doesn't appear to take my hosting costs into consideration. I'm hoping we can have a good discussion on the following: 1) How many snowflake clients and proxies are active and how many STUN requests are each generating towards stunprotocol.org? Do we think the entire worldwide usage of Snowflake could be responsible for millions of STUN queries to stunprotocol.org per day? 2) Expected number of DNS queries (it's a 3-day TTL on these DNS entries, so it blows my mind that there are so many redundant requests). Does Pion or any other part of the Snowflake code tend to go direct to the namespace server itself? 3) Removing stun.stunprotocol.org as the default STUN server. OR... 4) Alternatively, I'm always open to accepting donations to help run the service costs of stunprotocol.org. I'm definitely not getting rich running this thing. Thanks, John Selbie

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anti-censorship-team January 2023