[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Mon Sep 9 18:20:11 UTC 2013
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2013/10 ===
===========================================================================
version 48
Author: lunar
Date: 2013-09-09T17:34:28+00:00
mention that Tails 0.20.1 is going to ship Tor 0.2.4.17-rc
--- version 47
+++ version 48
@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@
For relays running Debian or Ubuntu, upgrading to the development branch
can be done using the Tor project's package repository [XXX]. New
versions of the beta branch of the Tor Browser Bundle are also
-available [XXX] since September 6th.
+available [XXX] since September 6th. The next Tails release, scheduled
+for September 19th [XXX] will also contain 0.2.4.17-rc [XXX].
Hopefully, this will be the last release candidate. What looks missing
at this point to declare the 0.2.4.x series stable is simply enough time
@@ -53,6 +54,8 @@
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2013-September/002701.html
[XXX] https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en#development
[XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/new-tor-02417-rc-packages
+ [XXX] https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2013-September/003622.html
+ [XXX] https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2013-September/003621.html
The future of Tor cryptography
------------------------------
version 47
Author: lunar
Date: 2013-09-09T17:15:21+00:00
clean up cruft
--- version 46
+++ version 47
@@ -213,13 +213,6 @@
[XXX] https://svn.torproject.org/cgi-bin/viewvc.cgi/Tor?view=revision&revision=26333
[XXX] https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html
-Vulnerabilities
----------------
-
-XXX: Reported vulnerabilities [XXX].
-
- [XXX] vulnerability report source
-
Tor Help Desk roundup
---------------------
version 46
Author: lunar
Date: 2013-09-09T17:09:18+00:00
format the monthly reports
--- version 45
+++ version 46
@@ -153,32 +153,28 @@
[XXX] https://metrics.torproject.org/performance.html
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005388.html
-Monthly status reports for XXX month 2013
------------------------------------------
-
-The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
-month of XXX has begun. XXX released his report first [XXX], followed
-by reports from name 2 [XXX], name 3 [XXX], and name 4 [XXX].
-
- [XXX]
- [XXX]
- [XXX]
- [XXX]
-
-MOAR reports:
-Sukhbir Singh https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000326.html
-Matt Pagan https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000327.html
-Ximin Luo https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000328.html
-Nima https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000329.html
-Pearl Crescent https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000330.html
-Andrew Lewman https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000331.html
-Mike Perry https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000332.html
-Kelley Misata https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000333.html
-Nick Mathewson https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000334.html
-Jason Tsai https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000335.html
-Tails https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000336.html
-Aaron https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000337.html
-Damian Johnson https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000338.html
+More monthly status reports for August 2013
+-------------------------------------------
+
+The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members continued
+this week with Sukhbir Singh [XXX], Matt Pagan [XXX], Ximin Luo [XXX],
+mrphs [XXX], Pearl Crescent [XXX], Andrew Lewman [XXX], Mike Perry
+[XXX], Kelley Misata [XXX], Nick Mathewson [XXX], Jason Tsai [XXX],
+Tails [XXX], Aaron [XXX], and Damian Johnson [XXX].
+
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000326.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000327.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000328.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000329.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000330.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000331.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000332.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000333.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000334.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000335.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000336.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000337.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000338.html
Miscellaneous news
------------------
version 45
Author: lunar
Date: 2013-09-09T17:04:30+00:00
rework Tor help desk roundup: do not use we; be less bold in what we
believe; reference the previous item about future of crypto
--- version 44
+++ version 45
@@ -224,38 +224,28 @@
[XXX] vulnerability report source
-Help Desk Roundup
------------------
-We had a number of emails this week asking about the recent stories in
-the New York Times, the Guardian, and Pro Publica regarding NSA's cryptographic
-capabilities. Some users asked whether there was a backdoor in Tor. Others asked
-if Tor's crypto was broken.
-
-There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. We have been vocal in the past about how
-tremendously irresponsible it would be to backdoor our users[xxx]. We also have
-an FAQ entry explaining some ways we would fight back if anyone tried[xxx].
-
-We do not have any more facts about NSA's cryptanalysis capabilities than have
-been published in newspapers. However it is the belief of many Tor developers
-that even considering these new developments, Tor's encryption is effective.
-Tor uses TLS for link encryption. If the TLS is good, an outside attacker can't
-even get to Tor's crypto. If the TLS is bad, good thing we have Tor's crypto.
-
-Breaking SSL/TLS could involve something besides cracking cryptographic
-primitives. For example an attack could be accomplished by finding some
-vulnerability in the way the https protocol is implemented, or by compromising
-the computers of Certificate Authorites to get their private keys. Or by legally
-coercing Certificate Authorities to hand over their private keys and shut up
-about it. I'm sure there are other ways it could be done as well. The math that
-makes encryption hard to break still stands. Tor's code is completely open source
-and has many eyes inspecting it. The encryption that Tor uses is summarized on the
-FAQ page[xxx] and detailed in the Tor specification[xxx].
-
-[xxx]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/calea-2-and-tor
-[xxx]: http://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#Backdoor
-[xxx]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#KeyManagement
-[xxx]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git?a=blob_plain;hb=HEAD;f=tor-spec.txt
-
+Tor Help Desk roundup
+---------------------
+
+The Tor help desk had a number of emails this week asking about the
+recent stories in the New York Times, the Guardian, and Pro Publica
+regarding NSA’s cryptographic capabilities. Some users asked whether
+there was a backdoor in Tor. Others asked if Tor’s crypto was broken.
+
+There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Tor project members have been
+vocal in the past about how tremendously irresponsible it would be to
+backdoor our users [XXX]. As it is a frequently asked question,
+users have been encouraged to read how the project would respond to
+institutional pressure [XXX].
+
+The Tor project does not have any more facts about NSA’s cryptanalysis
+capabilities than what have been published in newspapers. Even if there
+is no actual evidence that Tor encryption is actually broken, the
+idea is to pace on the safe side by using more trusted algorithms for
+the Tor protocols. See above for a more detailed write-up.
+
+ [XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/calea-2-and-tor
+ [XXX] http://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#Backdoor
Simple Ways to Contribute This Week
-----------------------------------
version 44
Author: lunar
Date: 2013-09-09T16:48:23+00:00
mention mttp's work on the faq
--- version 43
+++ version 44
@@ -211,6 +211,12 @@
[XXX] https://gitweb.torproject.org/doctor.git
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-consensus-health
+Matt Pagan has migrated [XXX] several Frequently Asked Questions from the wiki to the
+official Tor website [XXX]. This should enable more users to find the answers they need!
+
+ [XXX] https://svn.torproject.org/cgi-bin/viewvc.cgi/Tor?view=revision&revision=26333
+ [XXX] https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html
+
Vulnerabilities
---------------
version 43
Author: lunar
Date: 2013-09-09T16:32:49+00:00
also link to Asa's remarkable timeline
--- version 42
+++ version 43
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
----------------------
There are now confirmations [XXX] that the sudden influx of Tor clients which
-started mid-August is indeed coming from a botnet. “I guess all that
+started mid-August [XXX] is indeed coming from a botnet. “I guess all that
work we've been doing on scalability was a good idea” wrote Roger
Dingledine wrote in a blog post about “how to handle millions of new
Tor clients” [XXX].
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
to finish the release notes.
[XXX] http://blog.fox-it.com/2013/09/05/large-botnet-cause-of-recent-tor-network-overload/
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/029822.html
[XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/how-to-handle-millions-new-tor-clients
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/029857.html
[XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9574
@@ -308,7 +309,6 @@
Possible items:
- * Asa's timeline about the rise of new users and events that could have affected Tor https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/029822.html
* George forgot the torrc modification in his howto https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2013-September/002691.html
* another research paper about hidden services https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/029856.html
* Testing flash proxy infrastructure https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005402.html
version 42
Author: lunar
Date: 2013-09-09T16:28:30+00:00
remove sponsorf meeting minutes, as discussed on mailing list
--- version 41
+++ version 42
@@ -210,12 +210,6 @@
[XXX] https://gitweb.torproject.org/doctor.git
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-consensus-health
-On Tuesday September 3rd, the IRC meeting was held to discuss a progress on sponsor F [XXX]
-project. See Karsten Loesing’s notes for output [XXX].
-
- [XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/sponsors/SponsorF
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005370.html
-
Vulnerabilities
---------------
@@ -316,7 +310,6 @@
* Asa's timeline about the rise of new users and events that could have affected Tor https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/029822.html
* George forgot the torrc modification in his howto https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2013-September/002691.html
- * Karsten's notes on IRC dev-meeting https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005370.html / Nathan's https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005371.html
* another research paper about hidden services https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/029856.html
* Testing flash proxy infrastructure https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005402.html
* Quickly testing TOR using Chutney and Fluxcapacitor https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005403.html
version 41
Author: lunar
Date: 2013-09-09T16:25:25+00:00
got an adjective for this week
--- version 40
+++ version 41
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
========================================================================
Welcome to the eleventh issue of Tor Weekly News, the weekly newsletter that
-covers what is happening in the XXX Tor community.
+covers what is happening in the taut Tor community.
Tor 0.2.4.17-rc is out
----------------------
--
Your friendly TWN monitoring script
In case of malfunction, please reach out for lunar at torproject.org
or for the worst cases, tell weasel at torproject.org to kill me.
More information about the news-team
mailing list