March 2022 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[translation/support-portal] new translations in support-portal
by translation＠torproject.org 10 Mar '22

10 Mar '22

commit 1de00b4e67f714c865e83ee55a249ab668fab51e Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 10 14:47:51 2022 +0000 new translations in support-portal --- contents+ko.po | 2 +- contents+uk.po | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/contents+ko.po b/contents+ko.po index b1443a2326..176cc9a8fa 100644 --- a/contents+ko.po +++ b/contents+ko.po @@ -6925,7 +6925,7 @@ msgstr "" #: https//support.torproject.org/tormobile/tormobile-1/ #: (content/tormobile/tormobile-1/contents+en.lrquestion.title) msgid "Can I run Tor Browser on an Android device?" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Tor 브라우저를 Android 기기에서도 쓸 수 있을까요?" #: https//support.torproject.org/tormobile/tormobile-1/ #: (content/tormobile/tormobile-1/contents+en.lrquestion.description) diff --git a/contents+uk.po b/contents+uk.po index c19ebab35b..85fae1abab 100644 --- a/contents+uk.po +++ b/contents+uk.po @@ -1486,6 +1486,8 @@ msgid "" "[Tor](../tor-tor-network-core-tor) [traffic](../traffic) look random, so " "that it does not look like Tor or any other protocol." msgstr "" +"Obfs3 — це [pluggable transport](../pluggable-transports), завдяки якому [Tor](../tor-tor-network-core-tor) [traffic](../traffic) виглядає випадковим, щоб не бути схожим на Tor чи будь-який інший протокол.\n" +" " #: https//support.torproject.org/glossary/obfs3/ #: (content/glossary/obfs3/contents+en.lrword.definition) @@ -1731,6 +1733,8 @@ msgid "" "A proxy is a middle man between a [client](../client) (like a [web " "browser](../web-browser)) and a service (like a [web server](../server))." msgstr "" +"Проксі є посередником між [клієнтом](../клієнтом) (наприклад, [веб-браузер](../веб-браузер)) і сервісом (наприклад, [веб-сервер](../сервер)) .\n" +" " #: https//support.torproject.org/glossary/proxy/ #: (content/glossary/proxy/contents+en.lrword.definition) @@ -1740,6 +1744,8 @@ msgid "" "the response back to the client. The service only communicates with and sees" " the proxy." msgstr "" +"Замість безпосереднього підключення до служби клієнт надсилає повідомлення проксі-серверу. Проксі-сервер робить запит від імені клієнта і передає відповідь назад клієнту. Служба тільки спілкується з проксі та бачить його.\n" +" " #: https//support.torproject.org/glossary/public-key/ #: (content/glossary/public-key/contents+en.lrword.term) @@ -1803,16 +1809,22 @@ msgid "" "[signature](../cryptographic-signature) to prove the identity of the creator" " of a message or other files." msgstr "" +"Крім того, закритий ключ можна використовувати для створення [підпису](../cryptographic-signature), щоб підтвердити особу автора повідомлення або інших файлів.\n" +" " #: https//support.torproject.org/glossary/public-key-cryptography/ #: (content/glossary/public-key-cryptography/contents+en.lrword.definition) msgid "This signature can be verified by the public key." msgstr "" +"Цей підпис можна перевірити відкритим ключем.\n" +" " #: https//support.torproject.org/glossary/public-key-fingerprint/ #: (content/glossary/public-key-fingerprint/contents+en.lrword.term) msgid "public key fingerprint" msgstr "" +"відбиток відкритого ключа\n" +" " #: https//support.torproject.org/glossary/public-key-fingerprint/ #: (content/glossary/public-key-fingerprint/contents+en.lrword.definition) @@ -1821,6 +1833,8 @@ msgid "" "fingerprint is a sequence of bytes that is used to identify and authenticate" " a corresponding longer [public key](../public-key)." msgstr "" +"У [криптографії з відкритим ключем](../public-key-cryptography) відбиток відкритого ключа — це послідовність байтів, яка використовується для ідентифікації та аутентифікації відповідного довшого [відкритого ключа](../public-key).\n" +" " #: https//support.torproject.org/glossary/relay/ #: (content/glossary/relay/contents+en.lrword.term)

1 0

[translation/tails-misc_release] new translations in tails-misc_release
by translation＠torproject.org 10 Mar '22

10 Mar '22

commit 15cdd3995562c9f1402bf4140ba0516d0a529e45 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 10 14:46:37 2022 +0000 new translations in tails-misc_release --- zh_CN.po | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/zh_CN.po b/zh_CN.po index 8f823e35fa..ec38a530b9 100644 --- a/zh_CN.po +++ b/zh_CN.po @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2022-02-07 10:07+0100\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2022-03-10 14:09+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2022-03-10 14:18+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Meng San\n" "Language-Team: Chinese (China) (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/zh_CN/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -2016,7 +2016,7 @@ msgid "" "The Unsafe Browser is not anonymous and the websites that you visit can see " "your real IP address.\\n\\nOnly use the Unsafe Browser to sign in to a " "network using a captive portal." -msgstr "不安全的浏览器不是匿名的，您访问的网站可以看见您的真实IP地址。\\n\\n只使用不安全的浏览器登陆强制主页。" +msgstr "" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/sbin/unsafe-browser:53 msgid "" @@ -2024,7 +2024,7 @@ msgid "" "href='file:///usr/share/doc/tails/website/doc/anonymous_internet/unsafe_browser.en.html#use'>use" " the Unsafe Browser</a>, restart Tails and enable the Unsafe Browser in the " "additional settings of the Welcome Screen." -msgstr "不安全的浏览器没有在欢迎页面中启用。\\n\\n要<a href='file:///usr/share/doc/tails/website/doc/anonymous_internet/unsafe_browser.en.html#use'>使用不安全浏览器</a>，请重新启动Tails，并在欢迎页面的附加设置中启用不安全浏览器。" +msgstr "" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/sbin/unsafe-browser:58 msgid ""

1 0

[translation/tails-misc] new translations in tails-misc
by translation＠torproject.org 10 Mar '22

10 Mar '22

commit 997b1bac48b999f837b8d6754ee0e4e74df6d703 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 10 14:45:51 2022 +0000 new translations in tails-misc --- zh_CN.po | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/zh_CN.po b/zh_CN.po index fe1968ed3a..3b5b09118e 100644 --- a/zh_CN.po +++ b/zh_CN.po @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2022-02-07 10:07+0100\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2022-03-10 14:09+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2022-03-10 14:18+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Meng San\n" "Language-Team: Chinese (China) (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/zh_CN/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"

1 0

[tor/main] hs: Schedule mainloop event on dirinfo change
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 10 Mar '22

10 Mar '22

commit 254b23ab9d82a85892d01499100cde0b3d8b6931 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Mar 9 13:47:27 2022 -0500 hs: Schedule mainloop event on dirinfo change Due to a possible Guard subsystem recursion, when the HS client gets notified that the directory information has changed, it must run it in a seperate mainloop event to avoid such issue. See the ticket for more information on the recursion. This also fixes a fatal assert. Fixes #40579 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket40579 | 3 +++ src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket40579 b/changes/ticket40579 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2558c1102 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket40579 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (onion service, client): + - Fix a fatal assert due to a guard subsystem recursion triggered by the + onion service client. Fixes bug 40579; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index 4b4e268542..6c9645f0b8 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h" #include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h" #include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h" @@ -46,11 +47,30 @@ #include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" #include "core/or/socks_request_st.h" +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h" + +/** This event is activated when we are notified that directory information has + * changed. It must be done asynchronous from the call due to possible + * recursion from the caller of that notification. See #40579. */ +static struct mainloop_event_t *dir_info_changed_ev = NULL; + /** Client-side authorizations for hidden services; map of service identity * public key to hs_client_service_authorization_t *. */ static digest256map_t *client_auths = NULL; -#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h" +/** Mainloop callback. Scheduled to run when we are notified of a directory + * info change. See hs_client_dir_info_changed(). */ +static void +dir_info_changed_callback(mainloop_event_t *event, void *arg) +{ + (void) event; + (void) arg; + + /* We have possibly reached the minimum directory information or new + * consensus so retry all pending SOCKS connection in + * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state in order to fetch the descriptor. */ + retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); +} /** Return a human-readable string for the client fetch status code. */ static const char * @@ -2584,6 +2604,9 @@ hs_client_free_all(void) /* Purge the hidden service request cache. */ hs_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(); client_service_authorization_free_all(); + + /* This is NULL safe. */ + mainloop_event_free(dir_info_changed_ev); } /** Purge all potentially remotely-detectable state held in the hidden @@ -2609,14 +2632,27 @@ hs_client_purge_state(void) log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service client state has been purged."); } -/** Called when our directory information has changed. */ +/** Called when our directory information has changed. + * + * The work done in that function has to either be kept within the HS subsystem + * or else scheduled as a mainloop event. In other words, this function can't + * call outside to another subsystem to avoid risking recursion problems. */ void hs_client_dir_info_changed(void) { - /* We have possibly reached the minimum directory information or new - * consensus so retry all pending SOCKS connection in - * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state in order to fetch the descriptor. */ - retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); + /* Make sure the mainloop has been initialized. Code path exist that reaches + * this before it is. */ + if (!tor_libevent_is_initialized()) { + return; + } + + /* Lazily create the event. HS Client subsystem doesn't have an init function + * and so we do it here before activating it. */ + if (!dir_info_changed_ev) { + dir_info_changed_ev = mainloop_event_new(dir_info_changed_callback, NULL); + } + /* Activate it to run immediately. */ + mainloop_event_activate(dir_info_changed_ev); } #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS

1 0

[tor/maint-0.4.5] hs: Schedule mainloop event on dirinfo change
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 10 Mar '22

10 Mar '22

commit 254b23ab9d82a85892d01499100cde0b3d8b6931 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Mar 9 13:47:27 2022 -0500 hs: Schedule mainloop event on dirinfo change Due to a possible Guard subsystem recursion, when the HS client gets notified that the directory information has changed, it must run it in a seperate mainloop event to avoid such issue. See the ticket for more information on the recursion. This also fixes a fatal assert. Fixes #40579 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket40579 | 3 +++ src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket40579 b/changes/ticket40579 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2558c1102 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket40579 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (onion service, client): + - Fix a fatal assert due to a guard subsystem recursion triggered by the + onion service client. Fixes bug 40579; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index 4b4e268542..6c9645f0b8 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h" #include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h" #include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h" @@ -46,11 +47,30 @@ #include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" #include "core/or/socks_request_st.h" +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h" + +/** This event is activated when we are notified that directory information has + * changed. It must be done asynchronous from the call due to possible + * recursion from the caller of that notification. See #40579. */ +static struct mainloop_event_t *dir_info_changed_ev = NULL; + /** Client-side authorizations for hidden services; map of service identity * public key to hs_client_service_authorization_t *. */ static digest256map_t *client_auths = NULL; -#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h" +/** Mainloop callback. Scheduled to run when we are notified of a directory + * info change. See hs_client_dir_info_changed(). */ +static void +dir_info_changed_callback(mainloop_event_t *event, void *arg) +{ + (void) event; + (void) arg; + + /* We have possibly reached the minimum directory information or new + * consensus so retry all pending SOCKS connection in + * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state in order to fetch the descriptor. */ + retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); +} /** Return a human-readable string for the client fetch status code. */ static const char * @@ -2584,6 +2604,9 @@ hs_client_free_all(void) /* Purge the hidden service request cache. */ hs_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(); client_service_authorization_free_all(); + + /* This is NULL safe. */ + mainloop_event_free(dir_info_changed_ev); } /** Purge all potentially remotely-detectable state held in the hidden @@ -2609,14 +2632,27 @@ hs_client_purge_state(void) log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service client state has been purged."); } -/** Called when our directory information has changed. */ +/** Called when our directory information has changed. + * + * The work done in that function has to either be kept within the HS subsystem + * or else scheduled as a mainloop event. In other words, this function can't + * call outside to another subsystem to avoid risking recursion problems. */ void hs_client_dir_info_changed(void) { - /* We have possibly reached the minimum directory information or new - * consensus so retry all pending SOCKS connection in - * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state in order to fetch the descriptor. */ - retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); + /* Make sure the mainloop has been initialized. Code path exist that reaches + * this before it is. */ + if (!tor_libevent_is_initialized()) { + return; + } + + /* Lazily create the event. HS Client subsystem doesn't have an init function + * and so we do it here before activating it. */ + if (!dir_info_changed_ev) { + dir_info_changed_ev = mainloop_event_new(dir_info_changed_callback, NULL); + } + /* Activate it to run immediately. */ + mainloop_event_activate(dir_info_changed_ev); } #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS

1 0

[tor/maint-0.4.6] hs: Schedule mainloop event on dirinfo change
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 10 Mar '22

10 Mar '22

commit 254b23ab9d82a85892d01499100cde0b3d8b6931 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Mar 9 13:47:27 2022 -0500 hs: Schedule mainloop event on dirinfo change Due to a possible Guard subsystem recursion, when the HS client gets notified that the directory information has changed, it must run it in a seperate mainloop event to avoid such issue. See the ticket for more information on the recursion. This also fixes a fatal assert. Fixes #40579 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket40579 | 3 +++ src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket40579 b/changes/ticket40579 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2558c1102 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket40579 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (onion service, client): + - Fix a fatal assert due to a guard subsystem recursion triggered by the + onion service client. Fixes bug 40579; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index 4b4e268542..6c9645f0b8 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h" #include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h" #include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h" @@ -46,11 +47,30 @@ #include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" #include "core/or/socks_request_st.h" +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h" + +/** This event is activated when we are notified that directory information has + * changed. It must be done asynchronous from the call due to possible + * recursion from the caller of that notification. See #40579. */ +static struct mainloop_event_t *dir_info_changed_ev = NULL; + /** Client-side authorizations for hidden services; map of service identity * public key to hs_client_service_authorization_t *. */ static digest256map_t *client_auths = NULL; -#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h" +/** Mainloop callback. Scheduled to run when we are notified of a directory + * info change. See hs_client_dir_info_changed(). */ +static void +dir_info_changed_callback(mainloop_event_t *event, void *arg) +{ + (void) event; + (void) arg; + + /* We have possibly reached the minimum directory information or new + * consensus so retry all pending SOCKS connection in + * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state in order to fetch the descriptor. */ + retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); +} /** Return a human-readable string for the client fetch status code. */ static const char * @@ -2584,6 +2604,9 @@ hs_client_free_all(void) /* Purge the hidden service request cache. */ hs_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(); client_service_authorization_free_all(); + + /* This is NULL safe. */ + mainloop_event_free(dir_info_changed_ev); } /** Purge all potentially remotely-detectable state held in the hidden @@ -2609,14 +2632,27 @@ hs_client_purge_state(void) log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service client state has been purged."); } -/** Called when our directory information has changed. */ +/** Called when our directory information has changed. + * + * The work done in that function has to either be kept within the HS subsystem + * or else scheduled as a mainloop event. In other words, this function can't + * call outside to another subsystem to avoid risking recursion problems. */ void hs_client_dir_info_changed(void) { - /* We have possibly reached the minimum directory information or new - * consensus so retry all pending SOCKS connection in - * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state in order to fetch the descriptor. */ - retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); + /* Make sure the mainloop has been initialized. Code path exist that reaches + * this before it is. */ + if (!tor_libevent_is_initialized()) { + return; + } + + /* Lazily create the event. HS Client subsystem doesn't have an init function + * and so we do it here before activating it. */ + if (!dir_info_changed_ev) { + dir_info_changed_ev = mainloop_event_new(dir_info_changed_callback, NULL); + } + /* Activate it to run immediately. */ + mainloop_event_activate(dir_info_changed_ev); } #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS

1 0

[tor/release-0.4.6] hs: Schedule mainloop event on dirinfo change
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 10 Mar '22

10 Mar '22

commit 254b23ab9d82a85892d01499100cde0b3d8b6931 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Mar 9 13:47:27 2022 -0500 hs: Schedule mainloop event on dirinfo change Due to a possible Guard subsystem recursion, when the HS client gets notified that the directory information has changed, it must run it in a seperate mainloop event to avoid such issue. See the ticket for more information on the recursion. This also fixes a fatal assert. Fixes #40579 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket40579 | 3 +++ src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket40579 b/changes/ticket40579 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2558c1102 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket40579 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (onion service, client): + - Fix a fatal assert due to a guard subsystem recursion triggered by the + onion service client. Fixes bug 40579; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index 4b4e268542..6c9645f0b8 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h" #include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h" #include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h" @@ -46,11 +47,30 @@ #include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" #include "core/or/socks_request_st.h" +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h" + +/** This event is activated when we are notified that directory information has + * changed. It must be done asynchronous from the call due to possible + * recursion from the caller of that notification. See #40579. */ +static struct mainloop_event_t *dir_info_changed_ev = NULL; + /** Client-side authorizations for hidden services; map of service identity * public key to hs_client_service_authorization_t *. */ static digest256map_t *client_auths = NULL; -#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h" +/** Mainloop callback. Scheduled to run when we are notified of a directory + * info change. See hs_client_dir_info_changed(). */ +static void +dir_info_changed_callback(mainloop_event_t *event, void *arg) +{ + (void) event; + (void) arg; + + /* We have possibly reached the minimum directory information or new + * consensus so retry all pending SOCKS connection in + * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state in order to fetch the descriptor. */ + retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); +} /** Return a human-readable string for the client fetch status code. */ static const char * @@ -2584,6 +2604,9 @@ hs_client_free_all(void) /* Purge the hidden service request cache. */ hs_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(); client_service_authorization_free_all(); + + /* This is NULL safe. */ + mainloop_event_free(dir_info_changed_ev); } /** Purge all potentially remotely-detectable state held in the hidden @@ -2609,14 +2632,27 @@ hs_client_purge_state(void) log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service client state has been purged."); } -/** Called when our directory information has changed. */ +/** Called when our directory information has changed. + * + * The work done in that function has to either be kept within the HS subsystem + * or else scheduled as a mainloop event. In other words, this function can't + * call outside to another subsystem to avoid risking recursion problems. */ void hs_client_dir_info_changed(void) { - /* We have possibly reached the minimum directory information or new - * consensus so retry all pending SOCKS connection in - * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state in order to fetch the descriptor. */ - retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); + /* Make sure the mainloop has been initialized. Code path exist that reaches + * this before it is. */ + if (!tor_libevent_is_initialized()) { + return; + } + + /* Lazily create the event. HS Client subsystem doesn't have an init function + * and so we do it here before activating it. */ + if (!dir_info_changed_ev) { + dir_info_changed_ev = mainloop_event_new(dir_info_changed_callback, NULL); + } + /* Activate it to run immediately. */ + mainloop_event_activate(dir_info_changed_ev); } #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS

1 0

[tor/release-0.4.5] hs: Schedule mainloop event on dirinfo change
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 10 Mar '22

10 Mar '22

commit 254b23ab9d82a85892d01499100cde0b3d8b6931 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Mar 9 13:47:27 2022 -0500 hs: Schedule mainloop event on dirinfo change Due to a possible Guard subsystem recursion, when the HS client gets notified that the directory information has changed, it must run it in a seperate mainloop event to avoid such issue. See the ticket for more information on the recursion. This also fixes a fatal assert. Fixes #40579 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket40579 | 3 +++ src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket40579 b/changes/ticket40579 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2558c1102 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket40579 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (onion service, client): + - Fix a fatal assert due to a guard subsystem recursion triggered by the + onion service client. Fixes bug 40579; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index 4b4e268542..6c9645f0b8 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h" #include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h" #include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h" @@ -46,11 +47,30 @@ #include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" #include "core/or/socks_request_st.h" +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h" + +/** This event is activated when we are notified that directory information has + * changed. It must be done asynchronous from the call due to possible + * recursion from the caller of that notification. See #40579. */ +static struct mainloop_event_t *dir_info_changed_ev = NULL; + /** Client-side authorizations for hidden services; map of service identity * public key to hs_client_service_authorization_t *. */ static digest256map_t *client_auths = NULL; -#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h" +/** Mainloop callback. Scheduled to run when we are notified of a directory + * info change. See hs_client_dir_info_changed(). */ +static void +dir_info_changed_callback(mainloop_event_t *event, void *arg) +{ + (void) event; + (void) arg; + + /* We have possibly reached the minimum directory information or new + * consensus so retry all pending SOCKS connection in + * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state in order to fetch the descriptor. */ + retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); +} /** Return a human-readable string for the client fetch status code. */ static const char * @@ -2584,6 +2604,9 @@ hs_client_free_all(void) /* Purge the hidden service request cache. */ hs_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(); client_service_authorization_free_all(); + + /* This is NULL safe. */ + mainloop_event_free(dir_info_changed_ev); } /** Purge all potentially remotely-detectable state held in the hidden @@ -2609,14 +2632,27 @@ hs_client_purge_state(void) log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service client state has been purged."); } -/** Called when our directory information has changed. */ +/** Called when our directory information has changed. + * + * The work done in that function has to either be kept within the HS subsystem + * or else scheduled as a mainloop event. In other words, this function can't + * call outside to another subsystem to avoid risking recursion problems. */ void hs_client_dir_info_changed(void) { - /* We have possibly reached the minimum directory information or new - * consensus so retry all pending SOCKS connection in - * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state in order to fetch the descriptor. */ - retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); + /* Make sure the mainloop has been initialized. Code path exist that reaches + * this before it is. */ + if (!tor_libevent_is_initialized()) { + return; + } + + /* Lazily create the event. HS Client subsystem doesn't have an init function + * and so we do it here before activating it. */ + if (!dir_info_changed_ev) { + dir_info_changed_ev = mainloop_event_new(dir_info_changed_callback, NULL); + } + /* Activate it to run immediately. */ + mainloop_event_activate(dir_info_changed_ev); } #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS

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[translation/support-portal] new translations in support-portal
by translation＠torproject.org 10 Mar '22

10 Mar '22

commit 6f13963748d10d83afdc966068cd0e8302ba6369 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 10 14:17:53 2022 +0000 new translations in support-portal --- contents+ko.po | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/contents+ko.po b/contents+ko.po index 501e690bf0..b1443a2326 100644 --- a/contents+ko.po +++ b/contents+ko.po @@ -7063,24 +7063,24 @@ msgstr "" msgid "" "That version, however, does not enable you to send other apps outside of the" " Tor Browser for Android through it." -msgstr "" +msgstr "하지만 해당 버전에선 Android용 Tor 브라우저 외 다른 앱에 전송하는 기능이 빠져있습니다." #: https//support.torproject.org/tormobile/tormobile-6/ #: (content/tormobile/tormobile-6/contents+en.lrquestion.description) msgid "" "Depending on how you want to use the Tor network, either one or both of " "these could be a great option." -msgstr "" +msgstr "Tor 네트워크를 어떻게 쓰길 원하는 지에 따라, 하나만 설정하든 두 개를 설정하든 훌륭한 선택일 수 있습니다." #: https//support.torproject.org/tormobile/tormobile-7/ #: (content/tormobile/tormobile-7/contents+en.lrquestion.title) msgid "Is Tor Browser available on F-Droid?" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Tor 브라우저를 F-Droid에서도 받을 수 있을까요?" #: https//support.torproject.org/tormobile/tormobile-7/ #: (content/tormobile/tormobile-7/contents+en.lrquestion.description) msgid "It will be, _soon_." -msgstr "" +msgstr "_곧_ 가능할 거에요." #: https//support.torproject.org/tormobile/tormobile-7/ #: (content/tormobile/tormobile-7/contents+en.lrquestion.description) @@ -9249,19 +9249,19 @@ msgstr "귀하의 출구 중계서버 IP 주소가 가정의 IP 주소와 다르 msgid "" "Of course, you should avoid keeping any sensitive or personal information on" " the computer hosting your exit relay." -msgstr "" +msgstr "출구 중계서버로 호스팅 중인 컴퓨터에 민감한 개인 정보를 저장해두는 것도 당연히 피하셔야 합니다." #: https//support.torproject.org/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/ #: (content/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/contents+en.lrquestion.title) msgid "How should I configure the outgoing filters on my relay?" -msgstr "" +msgstr "제 중계회선의 발신 필터를 어떻게 설정해야 할까요?" #: https//support.torproject.org/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/ #: (content/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/contents+en.lrquestion.description) msgid "" "All outgoing connections must be allowed, so that each relay can communicate" " with every other relay." -msgstr "" +msgstr "반드시 모든 발신 연결을 허용하도록 설정해야 합니다. 그래야 각 중계회선이 다른 중계회선과 통신할 수 있습니다." #: https//support.torproject.org/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/ #: (content/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/contents+en.lrquestion.description) @@ -9270,17 +9270,19 @@ msgid "" " common carrier regulations that prevent internet service providers from " "being held liable for third-party content that passes through their network." msgstr "" +"Tor 중계서버 관리자는 공통 통신 규약에 의해 적법하게 보호받습니다. 즉 ISP의 네트워크를 거쳐간 제3자 컨텐츠에 대한 책임을 현지 " +"ISP에서 부담하지 않는 게 공통 통신 규약에 규정돼있는데, 이것이 Tor 중계서버 관리자에게도 적용되는 것입니다.." #: https//support.torproject.org/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/ #: (content/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/contents+en.lrquestion.description) msgid "" "Exit relays that filter some traffic would likely forfeit those protections." -msgstr "" +msgstr "트래픽을 필터링하는 출구 중계서버에는 위와 같은 규약에 의한 보호가 박탈됩니다," #: https//support.torproject.org/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/ #: (content/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/contents+en.lrquestion.description) msgid "Tor promotes free network access without interference." -msgstr "" +msgstr "Tor는 간섭 및 개입이 없는 자유로운 네트워크 접속을 장려합니다." #: https//support.torproject.org/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/ #: (content/relay-operators/outgoing-firewall/contents+en.lrquestion.description)

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[translation/tails-misc_release] new translations in tails-misc_release
by translation＠torproject.org 10 Mar '22

10 Mar '22

commit 9c2f4f8b21ec28b7b2ec4e80e1485dbdd65ca56a Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 10 14:16:39 2022 +0000 new translations in tails-misc_release --- zh_CN.po | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/zh_CN.po b/zh_CN.po index b47ac87cc3..8f823e35fa 100644 --- a/zh_CN.po +++ b/zh_CN.po @@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2022-02-07 10:07+0100\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2022-02-17 05:47+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: ff98sha\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2022-03-10 14:09+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Meng San\n" "Language-Team: Chinese (China) (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/zh_CN/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -2038,7 +2038,7 @@ msgstr "重启(_R)" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/sbin/unsafe-browser:62 msgid "_Close" -msgstr "关闭(C)" +msgstr "" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/sbin/unsafe-browser:67 msgid "Failed to restart the system." @@ -2649,7 +2649,7 @@ msgstr "请求一个新网桥(_R)" #: ../config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/tails/tca/main.ui.in:260 msgid "_Enter a bridge that you already know" -msgstr "输入一个一个你已知的网桥(_E)" +msgstr "" #: ../config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/tails/tca/main.ui.in:283 msgid ""

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