[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Feb 11 14:00:19 UTC 2014
===========================================================================
==== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/6 ====
===========================================================================
version 56
Author: arma
Date: 2014-02-11T13:29:01+00:00
--
--- version 55
+++ version 56
@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@
News from Tor StackExchange
---------------------------
-strugee is running a fast, running and valid relay and wonders when the
-relay will get the V2Dir flag [36]. weasel answered that relay should
+strugee is running a Fast, Running and Valid relay and wonders when the
+relay will get the V2Dir flag [36]. weasel answered that relays should
“get the V2Dir flag simply by publishing a DirPort”, but that Tor
-will not always publish a DirPort, the full list can be found in the
+will not always publish a DirPort: the full list can be found in the
source code [37].
[36]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1485/88
version 55
Author: arma
Date: 2014-02-11T13:18:51+00:00
--
--- version 54
+++ version 55
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@
Feb 20 9:00 | Digital Safety for Journalists — 1/2 day hands-on Workshop
| Grand Hotel, Reykjavík, Iceland
|
-Feb 22 9:30 | Tor public hack day
+Feb 21 9:30 | Tor public hack day
| Grand Hotel, Reykjavík, Iceland
This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by Lunar, Matt Pagan,
version 54
Author: arma
Date: 2014-02-11T13:15:53+00:00
--
--- version 53
+++ version 54
@@ -197,11 +197,11 @@
News from Tor StackExchange
---------------------------
-strugee is running a fast, running and valid relay running and wonders
-when the relay will get the V2Dir flag [36]. weasel answered that relay
-should “get the V2Dir flag simply by publishing a DirPort”. Tor will not
-always publish a DirPort, the full list can be found in the source
-code [37].
+strugee is running a fast, running and valid relay and wonders when the
+relay will get the V2Dir flag [36]. weasel answered that relay should
+“get the V2Dir flag simply by publishing a DirPort”, but that Tor
+will not always publish a DirPort, the full list can be found in the
+source code [37].
[36]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1485/88
[37]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/tor-0.2.4.20:/src/or/router.c#l1018
version 53
Author: arma
Date: 2014-02-11T13:05:52+00:00
--
--- version 52
+++ version 53
@@ -82,11 +82,11 @@
classifier and finds an unclassified connection can figure out if it’s
Tor simply by trying to connect to the same destination.
-ScrambleSuit [10] comes to the rescue. On top of making the traffic harder
-to recognize by timing or volume characteristics, ScrambleSuit also shares
-a secret between the bridge and the client. A censor looking at the connection
-would not have this secret, and therefore be unable to connect to the bridge
-and confirm that it's Tor.
+ScrambleSuit [10] comes to the rescue. On top of making the traffic
+harder to recognize by timing or volume characteristics, ScrambleSuit
+also shares a secret between the bridge and the client. A censor looking
+at the connection would not have this secret, and therefore be unable
+to connect to the bridge and confirm that it's Tor.
obfsproxy 0.2.6 was released last week [11] and adds ScrambleSuit to the
set of available pluggable transports. Bridge operators are now
version 52
Author: arma
Date: 2014-02-11T13:04:10+00:00
--
--- version 51
+++ version 52
@@ -85,7 +85,8 @@
ScrambleSuit [10] comes to the rescue. On top of making the traffic harder
to recognize by timing or volume characteristics, ScrambleSuit also shares
a secret between the bridge and the client. A censor looking at the connection
-would not have this secret, and therefore be unable to connect to the bridge.
+would not have this secret, and therefore be unable to connect to the bridge
+and confirm that it's Tor.
obfsproxy 0.2.6 was released last week [11] and adds ScrambleSuit to the
set of available pluggable transports. Bridge operators are now
@@ -105,8 +106,8 @@
[14]: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/obfsproxy
[15]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003894.html
-More status status reports for January 2014
--------------------------------------------
+More status reports for January 2014
+------------------------------------
The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
month of January continued. Kevin P Dyer [16], Nick Mathewson [17],
@@ -139,7 +140,7 @@
David Fifield is looking for testers [26] for experimental 3.5.2 bundles
with tor-fw-helper. “tor-fw-helper is a tool that uses UPnP or NAT-PMP
-to forward a port automatically.” Something that flashproxy [27]
+to forward a port automatically.” -- something that flashproxy [27]
requires. David is “interested in finding out how likely it is to work”.
[26]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-qa/2014-February/000324.html
version 51
Author: arma
Date: 2014-02-11T12:58:47+00:00
--
--- version 50
+++ version 51
@@ -82,10 +82,10 @@
classifier and finds an unclassified connection can figure out if it’s
Tor simply by trying to connect to the same destination.
-ScrambleSuit [10] comes to the rescue. On top of making the traffic
-undistinguishable, it requires sharing a secret between the bridge and
-the client. A censor looking at the connection would not have this
-secret, therefore unable to connect to the bridge.
+ScrambleSuit [10] comes to the rescue. On top of making the traffic harder
+to recognize by timing or volume characteristics, ScrambleSuit also shares
+a secret between the bridge and the client. A censor looking at the connection
+would not have this secret, and therefore be unable to connect to the bridge.
obfsproxy 0.2.6 was released last week [11] and adds ScrambleSuit to the
set of available pluggable transports. Bridge operators are now
version 50
Author: arma
Date: 2014-02-11T12:56:24+00:00
--
--- version 49
+++ version 50
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@
Currently, obfuscation is achieved through “obfs2” and “obfs3”. obfs2 is
being phased out as it is flawed and can be recognized by deep packet
inspection. obfs3 is unfortunately still vulnerable to active attackers.
-As an obfs3 bridge is open to anyone, an attacker looking at an
-unclassified connection can figure out if it’s Tor simply by trying to
-connect to its ends.
+As an obfs3 bridge is open to anyone, an attacker who uses a traffic
+classifier and finds an unclassified connection can figure out if it’s
+Tor simply by trying to connect to the same destination.
ScrambleSuit [10] comes to the rescue. On top of making the traffic
undistinguishable, it requires sharing a secret between the bridge and
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
ScrambleSuit to Tor users who need it. Please help!
[8]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/proposals/125-bridges.txt
- [9]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/proposals/180-pluggable-transport.txt
+ [9]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/pt-spec.txt
[10]: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/
[11]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git/commit/a3b43d475c4172355e787de1d6761d6d1fc2cae6
[12]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003886.html
version 49
Author: arma
Date: 2014-02-11T12:47:11+00:00
--
--- version 48
+++ version 49
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
contains fixes to the “new identity” feature, window size rounding, and
the welcome screen with right-to-left language, among others.
-The curious can take a pick at the changelog [6] for more details.
+The curious can take a peek at the changelog [6] for more details.
Every Tor user is encouraged to upgrade as soon possible. Jump to the
download page [7]!
version 48
Author: arma
Date: 2014-02-11T12:42:00+00:00
--
--- version 47
+++ version 48
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
While advertised as a minor version, the new version brings a major
usability improvement as incremental upgrades are now enabled.
Previously, upgrading Tails basically meant installing Tails again by
-downloading the image, and putting it on a DVD or a USB stick. Users who
+downloading the image and putting it on a DVD or a USB stick. Users who
store persistent data in their Tails instance then had to use this new
medium to upgrade the stick with their data. A tedious process, to say
the least. Now, with incremental upgrades, Tails users with USB sticks
version 47
Author: arma
Date: 2014-02-11T12:39:53+00:00
--
--- version 46
+++ version 47
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
knowledge.
Tails 0.22.1 [1] contains security fixes [2] to Firefox, NSS, and Pidgin.
-It also brings an updated Linux kernel and several fixes to regressions
+It also brings an updated Linux kernel and several fixes for regressions
and small issues.
While advertised as a minor version, the new version brings a major
version 46
Author: arma
Date: 2014-02-11T12:38:28+00:00
--
--- version 45
+++ version 46
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@
-------------------
The Tails team has cut its 36th release on February 4th. Their live
-operating system based on Debian continue to provide anonymity by
+operating system based on Debian continues to provide anonymity by
ensuring that all outgoing connections are routed through Tor, and
privacy by ensuring that no traces are left without the user’s
knowledge.
-Tails 0.22.1 [1] contains security fixes [2] to Firefox, NSS and Pidgin.
+Tails 0.22.1 [1] contains security fixes [2] to Firefox, NSS, and Pidgin.
It also brings an updated Linux kernel and several fixes to regressions
and small issues.
version 45
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-02-11T12:31:15+00:00
fix number
--- version 44
+++ version 45
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
'''Editor:''' Lunar
-'''Status:''' FROZEN. Only technical and language fixes are welcome. New items should go to [wiki:TorWeeklyNews/2014/6 next week's edition]. Expected publication time: 2014-02-12 12:00 UTC.
+'''Status:''' FROZEN. Only technical and language fixes are welcome. New items should go to [wiki:TorWeeklyNews/2014/7 next week's edition]. Expected publication time: 2014-02-12 12:00 UTC.
'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — February 12th, 2014
version 44
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-02-11T12:30:52+00:00
FREEZE
--- version 43
+++ version 44
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
''32nd issue of Tor Weekly News. Covering what's happening from February 4th, 2014 to February 11th, 2014. To be released on February 12th, 2014.''
'''Editor:''' Lunar
+
+'''Status:''' FROZEN. Only technical and language fixes are welcome. New items should go to [wiki:TorWeeklyNews/2014/6 next week's edition]. Expected publication time: 2014-02-12 12:00 UTC.
'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — February 12th, 2014
@@ -18,203 +20,210 @@
The Tails team has cut its 36th release on February 4th. Their live
operating system based on Debian continue to provide anonymity by
ensuring that all outgoing connections are routed through Tor, and
-privacy by ensuring that no traces are left without the user's
+privacy by ensuring that no traces are left without the user’s
knowledge.
-Tails 0.22.1 [XXX] contains security fixes [XXX] to Firefox, NSS and
-Pidgin. It also brings an updated Linux kernel and several fixes to
-regressions and small issues.
+Tails 0.22.1 [1] contains security fixes [2] to Firefox, NSS and Pidgin.
+It also brings an updated Linux kernel and several fixes to regressions
+and small issues.
While advertised as a minor version, the new version brings a major
usability improvement as incremental upgrades are now enabled.
-Previously, upgrading Tails basically meant installing Tails again
-by downloading the image, and putting it on a DVD or a USB stick. Users
-who store persistent data in their Tails instance
-then had to use this new medium to upgrade the stick with
-their data. A tedious process, to say the least. Now, with incremental
-upgrades, Tails users with USB sticks will be prompted to perform a few
-clicks, wait, and reboot to get their system up-to-date.
+Previously, upgrading Tails basically meant installing Tails again by
+downloading the image, and putting it on a DVD or a USB stick. Users who
+store persistent data in their Tails instance then had to use this new
+medium to upgrade the stick with their data. A tedious process, to say
+the least. Now, with incremental upgrades, Tails users with USB sticks
+will be prompted to perform a few clicks, wait, and reboot to get their
+system up-to-date.
One usability change might surprise long time Tails users: the browser
now has to be manually opened when Tor has successfully reached the
network.
-As always, be sure to upgrade [XXX]! Users of Tails 0.22 on USB sticks
-can easily do so by reaching out for the “Tails Upgrader” application in
-the “Tails” menu.
-
- [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/news/version_0.22.1/
- [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/security/Numerous_security_holes_in_0.22/
- [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/upgrade/
+As always, be sure to upgrade [3]! Users of Tails 0.22 on USB sticks can
+easily do so by reaching out for the “Tails Upgrader” application in the
+“Tails” menu.
+
+ [1]: https://tails.boum.org/news/version_0.22.1/
+ [2]: https://tails.boum.org/security/Numerous_security_holes_in_0.22/
+ [3]: https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/upgrade/
Tor Browser Bundle 3.5.2 is released
------------------------------------
-The Tor Browser team delivers a new Tor Browser Bundle [XXX]. Version
-3.5.2 brings Tor users important security fixes from Firefox [XXX] and
+The Tor Browser team delivers a new Tor Browser Bundle [4]. Version
+3.5.2 brings Tor users important security fixes from Firefox [5] and
contains fixes to the “new identity” feature, window size rounding, and
the welcome screen with right-to-left language, among others.
-The curious can take a pick at the changelog [XXX] for more details.
+The curious can take a pick at the changelog [6] for more details.
Every Tor user is encouraged to upgrade as soon possible. Jump to the
-download page [XXX]!
-
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-352-released
- [XXX]: https://www.mozilla.org/security/known-vulnerabilities/firefoxESR.html#firefox24.3
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/refs/heads/master:/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt
- [XXX]: https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html
+download page [7]!
+
+ [4]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-352-released
+ [5]: https://www.mozilla.org/security/known-vulnerabilities/firefoxESR.html#firefox24.3
+ [6]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/refs/heads/master:/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt
+ [7]: https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html
Call to bridge operators to deploy ScrambleSuit
-----------------------------------------------
In the beginning there was Tor. Then censors started to filter every
-known relay address. So bridges [XXX] were invented as a way to access
-the Tor network through unlisted relays. Then DPI systems started to
-filter Tor based on its traffic signature. So pluggable transports were
-designed [XXX] and obfucation protocols to prevent bridges detection.
-
-Currently, obfuscation is achieved through “obfs2” and “obfs3”. obfs2
-is being phased out as it is flawed and can be recognized by deep packet
+known relay address. So bridges [8] were invented as a way to access the
+Tor network through unlisted relays. Then DPI systems started to filter
+Tor based on its traffic signature. So pluggable transports were
+designed [9] and obfucation protocols to prevent bridges detection.
+
+Currently, obfuscation is achieved through “obfs2” and “obfs3”. obfs2 is
+being phased out as it is flawed and can be recognized by deep packet
inspection. obfs3 is unfortunately still vulnerable to active attackers.
As an obfs3 bridge is open to anyone, an attacker looking at an
-unclassified connection can figure out if it's Tor simply by trying to
+unclassified connection can figure out if it’s Tor simply by trying to
connect to its ends.
-ScrambleSuit [XXX] comes to the rescue. On top of making the traffic
+ScrambleSuit [10] comes to the rescue. On top of making the traffic
undistinguishable, it requires sharing a secret between the bridge and
the client. A censor looking at the connection would not have this
secret, therefore unable to connect to the bridge.
-obfsproxy 0.2.6 was released last week [XXX] and adds ScrambleSuit
-to the set of available pluggable transports. Bridge operators are
-now called [XXX] to update their software and configuration. At least
-Tor 0.2.5.1-alpha is required. The latest version of obfsproxy can be
-installed from source [XXX], pip [XXX] and Debian unstable [XXX].
+obfsproxy 0.2.6 was released last week [11] and adds ScrambleSuit to the
+set of available pluggable transports. Bridge operators are now
+called [12] to update their software and configuration. At least Tor
+0.2.5.1-alpha is required. The latest version of obfsproxy can be
+installed from source [13], pip [14] and Debian unstable [15].
It is very important to get enough bridges ready before offering
ScrambleSuit to Tor users who need it. Please help!
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/proposals/125-bridges.txt
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/proposals/180-pluggable-transport.txt
- [XXX]: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git/commit/a3b43d475c4172355e787de1d6761d6d1fc2cae6
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003886.html
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git
- [XXX]: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/obfsproxy
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003894.html
+ [8]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/proposals/125-bridges.txt
+ [9]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/proposals/180-pluggable-transport.txt
+ [10]: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/
+ [11]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git/commit/a3b43d475c4172355e787de1d6761d6d1fc2cae6
+ [12]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003886.html
+ [13]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git
+ [14]: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/obfsproxy
+ [15]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003894.html
More status status reports for January 2014
-------------------------------------------
-The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for
-the month of January continued. Kevin P Dyer [XXX], Nick Mathewson [XXX],
-Georg Koppen [XXX], Karsten Loesing [XXX], Jacob Appelbaum [XXX], Arturo
-Filastò [XXX], Isis Lovecruft [XXX] and Nicolas Vigier [XXX] all released
+The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
+month of January continued. Kevin P Dyer [16], Nick Mathewson [17],
+Georg Koppen [18], Karsten Loesing [19], Jacob Appelbaum [20], Arturo
+Filastò [21], Isis Lovecruft [22] and Nicolas Vigier [23] all released
their reports this week.
-Roger Dingledine has also sent the report [XXX] to SponsorF.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000446.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000447.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000448.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000449.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000450.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000451.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000452.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000453.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000454.html
+Roger Dingledine has also sent the report [24] to SponsorF.
+
+ [16]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000446.html
+ [17]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000447.html
+ [18]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000448.html
+ [19]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000449.html
+ [20]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000450.html
+ [21]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000451.html
+ [22]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000452.html
+ [23]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000453.html
+ [24]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000454.html
Miscellaneous news
------------------
-Most Tor developers will gather next week in Reykjavík, Iceland for the 2014 winter
-meeting [XXX]. Expect a drop of activity on the usual communication channels while
-everyone is busy with face-to-face conversations. See upcoming events below for
-activities open to the larger Tor community.
-
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2014WinterDevMeeting
-
-David Fifield is looking for testers [XXX] for experimental 3.5.2 bundles with
-tor-fw-helper. “tor-fw-helper is a tool that uses UPnP or NAT-PMP to forward a port
-automatically.” Something that flashproxy [XXX] requires. David is “interested in
-finding out how likely it is to work”.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-qa/2014-February/000324.html
- [XXX]: https://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/
-
-David Goulet gave us an update on the development of Torsocks 2.x [XXX]. He hopes
-to perform a “full on release” after the Tor developers meeting.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-February/006172.html
-
-”The Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes project is coming closer to the next
-data review (03/2014)” wrote [XXX] Sebastian Urbach. If you are a relay operator,
-please help find out how Tor performs against network-level attackers. The team now
-has a scoreboard [XXX] with feedback for the participants.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003865.html
- [XXX]: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html
-
-One relay started to act funny regarding its advertised bandwidth. Roger Dingledine
-quickly reported his worries [XXX] to the tor-talk mailing list.
-A couple of hours later Hyoung-Kee Choi reported that one of the students from
-his research group had made a mistake while experimenting on the Tor bandwidth
-scanner. Directory authorities are now restricting its usage in the consensus.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-February/032094.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-February/032096.html
-
-On February 11th, the Tor Project participated on “The Day We Fight Back” [XXX],
-a global day of mobilization against NSA mass surveillance.
-
- [XXX]: https://thedaywefightback.org/
+Most Tor developers will gather next week in Reykjavík, Iceland for the
+2014 winter meeting [25]. Expect a drop of activity on the usual
+communication channels while everyone is busy with face-to-face
+conversations. See upcoming events below for activities open to the
+larger Tor community.
+
+ [25]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2014WinterDevMeeting
+
+David Fifield is looking for testers [26] for experimental 3.5.2 bundles
+with tor-fw-helper. “tor-fw-helper is a tool that uses UPnP or NAT-PMP
+to forward a port automatically.” Something that flashproxy [27]
+requires. David is “interested in finding out how likely it is to work”.
+
+ [26]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-qa/2014-February/000324.html
+ [27]: https://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/
+
+David Goulet gave us an update on the development of Torsocks 2.x [28].
+He hopes to perform a “full on release” after the Tor developers
+meeting.
+
+ [28]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-February/006172.html
+
+”The Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes project is coming closer to the next
+data review (03/2014)” wrote [29] Sebastian Urbach. If you are a relay
+operator, please help find out how Tor performs against network-level
+attackers. The team now has a scoreboard [30] with feedback for the
+participants.
+
+ [29]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003865.html
+ [30]: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html
+
+One relay started to act funny regarding its advertised bandwidth. Roger
+Dingledine quickly reported his worries [31] to the tor-talk mailing
+list. A couple of hours later Hyoung-Kee Choi accounted [32] that one
+of the students from his research group had made a mistake while
+experimenting on the Tor bandwidth scanner. Directory authorities are
+now restricting its usage in the consensus.
+
+ [31]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-February/032094.html
+ [32]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-February/032096.html
+
+On February 11th, the Tor Project participated on “The Day We Fight
+Back” [33], a global day of mobilization against NSA mass surveillance.
+
+ [33]: https://thedaywefightback.org/
Tor help desk roundup
---------------------
-Tor supporters can be curious about the legal risks involved in running
+Tor supporters can be curious about the legal risks involved in running
a Tor relay. The Tor Project is not aware of any country where running
-Tor is reprehensible. Running a bridge relay or a non-exit relay is the
+Tor is reprehensible. Running a bridge relay or a non-exit relay is the
best way to grow the Tor network without being exposed to additional
-legal scrutiny. Running an exit relay should be decided only after carefully
-reviewing the best practices [XXX]. Unlike non-exit and bridge operators, exit
-relay operators need to be prepared to respond to abuse complaints.
-
-Users continue to express interest in a Windows 64-bit Tor Browser Bundle.
-Work to provide this new variant is on-going [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/running-exit-node
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/10026
+legal scrutiny. Running an exit relay should be decided only after
+carefully reviewing the best practices [34]. Unlike non-exit and bridge
+operators, exit relay operators need to be prepared to respond to abuse
+complaints.
+
+Users continue to express interest in a Windows 64-bit Tor Browser
+Bundle. Work to provide this new variant is on-going [35].
+
+ [34]: https://blog.torproject.org/running-exit-node
+ [35]: https://bugs.torproject.org/10026
News from Tor StackExchange
---------------------------
-strugee is running a fast, running and valid relay running and wonders when
-the relay will get the V2Dir flag [XXX]. weasel answered that relay should
-“get the V2Dir flag simply by publishing a DirPort”. Tor will not always
-publish a DirPort, the full list can be found in the source code [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1485/88
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/tor-0.2.4.20:/src/or/router.c#l1018
-
-Ivar noted that the site How's my SSL [XXX] thinks that the SSL configuration
-of the Tor Browser is bad and wondered how the situation could be improved [XXX]. Jens
-Kubieziel explained some settings for about:config and pointed to a
-more detailed blog post [XXX]. Sam Whited also pointed out some settings
-for Firefox and noted that Firefox 27 improved the rating to
-“probably good” [XXX] which will help the Tor Browser in the future.
-
- [XXX]: https://www.howsmyssl.com/
- [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1455/88
- [XXX]: http://kubieziel.de/blog/archives/1564-Using-SSL-securely-in-your-browser.html
- [XXX]: https://blog.samwhited.com/2014/01/fixing-tls-in-firefox/
-
-fred set up a relay on a Windows machine where µTorrent is used besides Tor.
-When Tor is enabled many trackers become unreachable, but come back as soon as
-the relay is disabled. An explanation to this behaviour [XXX] has yet to be
-found, don't hesitate to chime in.
-
- [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1243/88
+strugee is running a fast, running and valid relay running and wonders
+when the relay will get the V2Dir flag [36]. weasel answered that relay
+should “get the V2Dir flag simply by publishing a DirPort”. Tor will not
+always publish a DirPort, the full list can be found in the source
+code [37].
+
+ [36]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1485/88
+ [37]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/tor-0.2.4.20:/src/or/router.c#l1018
+
+Ivar noted that the site How’s my SSL [38] thinks that the SSL
+configuration of the Tor Browser is bad and wondered how the situation
+could be improved [39]. Jens Kubieziel explained some settings for
+about:config and pointed to a more detailed blog post [40]. Sam Whited
+also pointed out some settings for Firefox and noted that Firefox 27
+improved the rating to “probably good” [41] which will help the Tor
+Browser in the future.
+
+ [38]: https://www.howsmyssl.com/
+ [39]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1455/88
+ [40]: http://kubieziel.de/blog/archives/1564-Using-SSL-securely-in-your-browser.html
+ [41]: https://blog.samwhited.com/2014/01/fixing-tls-in-firefox/
+
+fred set up a relay on a Windows machine where µTorrent is used besides
+Tor. When Tor is enabled many trackers become unreachable, but come
+back as soon as the relay is disabled. An explanation to this
+behaviour [42] has yet to be found, don’t hesitate to chime in.
+
+ [42]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1243/88
Upcoming events
---------------
@@ -239,13 +248,10 @@
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
-important news. Please see the project page [XXX], write down your
-name and subscribe to the team mailing list [XXX] if you want to
+important news. Please see the project page [43], write down your
+name and subscribe to the team mailing list [44] if you want to
get involved!
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
+ [43]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
+ [44]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
}}}
-
-Possible items:
-
version 43
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-02-11T12:21:02+00:00
more reword of Tor SE
--- version 42
+++ version 43
@@ -190,26 +190,23 @@
---------------------------
strugee is running a fast, running and valid relay running and wonders when
-the relay will get the V2Dir flag [XXX]. Despite having DirPort set, the
-port is unreachable with telnet. weasel suggested
-that it depends on many factors and advised to have a look at router.c [XXX].
+the relay will get the V2Dir flag [XXX]. weasel answered that relay should
+“get the V2Dir flag simply by publishing a DirPort”. Tor will not always
+publish a DirPort, the full list can be found in the source code [XXX].
[XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1485/88
[XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/tor-0.2.4.20:/src/or/router.c#l1018
Ivar noted that the site How's my SSL [XXX] thinks that the SSL configuration
-of the Tor Browser is bad and wondered how he can improve it [XXX]. Jens
-Kubieziel explained some settings for about:config and pointed to a blog
-post [XXX]. There he discusses the settings of different browsers and the
-minimum SSL/TLS version. Jens has a listing of sites with their supported
-versions [XXX]. In the moment many don't support TLS 1.1 or better.
-Sam Whited also pointed out some settings for Firefox and noted that
-Firefox 27 was just released which lifts the rating to 'probably good' [XXX].
+of the Tor Browser is bad and wondered how the situation could be improved [XXX]. Jens
+Kubieziel explained some settings for about:config and pointed to a
+more detailed blog post [XXX]. Sam Whited also pointed out some settings
+for Firefox and noted that Firefox 27 improved the rating to
+“probably good” [XXX] which will help the Tor Browser in the future.
[XXX]: https://www.howsmyssl.com/
[XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1455/88
[XXX]: http://kubieziel.de/blog/archives/1564-Using-SSL-securely-in-your-browser.html
- [XXX]: https://ssl-stats.hacked.jp/
[XXX]: https://blog.samwhited.com/2014/01/fixing-tls-in-firefox/
fred set up a relay on a Windows machine where µTorrent is used besides Tor.
===========================================================================
==== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/7 ====
===========================================================================
version 1
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-02-11T12:32:29+00:00
import template
---
+++ version 1
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+''33rd issue of Tor Weekly News. Covering what's happening from February 11th, 2014 to February 18th, 2014. To be released on February 19th, 2014.''
+
+'''Editor:'''
+
+'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — February 19th, 2014
+
+{{{
+========================================================================
+Tor Weekly News February 19th, 2014
+========================================================================
+
+Welcome to the seventh issue of Tor Weekly News in 2014, the weekly
+newsletter that covers what is happening in the XXX Tor community.
+
+New Release of XXX
+------------------
+
+XXX: cite specific release date, numbers, and developers responsible
+
+XXX: details about release
+
+ [XXX]:
+
+Monthly status reports for XXX month 2014
+-----------------------------------------
+
+The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
+month of XXX has begun. XXX released his report first [XXX], followed
+by reports from name 2 [XXX], name 3 [XXX], and name 4 [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+
+Miscellaneous news
+------------------
+
+Item 1 with cited source [XXX].
+
+Item 2 with cited source [XXX].
+
+Item 3 with cited source [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+
+Tor help desk roundup
+---------------------
+
+Summary of some questions sent to the Tor help desk.
+
+Vulnerabilities
+---------------
+
+XXX: Reported vulnerabilities [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]: vulnerability report source
+
+Upcoming events
+---------------
+
+Jul XX-XX | Event XXX brief description
+ | Event City, Event Country
+ | Event website URL
+ |
+Jul XX-XX | Event XXX brief description
+ | Event City, Event Country
+ | Event website URL
+
+
+This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by XXX, XXX, and
+XXX.
+
+Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
+We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
+important news. Please see the project page [XXX], write down your
+name and subscribe to the team mailing list [XXX] if you want to
+get involved!
+
+ [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
+}}}
--
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