[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Apr 1 12:40:08 UTC 2014
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/13 ===
===========================================================================
version 65
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-04-01T12:08:28+00:00
FROZEN
--- version 64
+++ version 65
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
''39th issue of Tor Weekly News. Covering what's happening from March 25th, 2014 to April 1st, 2014. To be released on April 2nd, 2014.''
'''Editor:''' Lunar
+
+'''Status:''' FROZEN. Language and technical fixes only. New items should go in [wiki:TorWeeklyNews/2014/14 next week's edition]. Expected publication time 2014-04-02 12:00 UTC.
'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — April 2nd, 2014
@@ -10,59 +12,63 @@
========================================================================
Welcome to the thirteenth issue of Tor Weekly News in 2014, the weekly
-newsletter that covers what is happening in the XXX Tor community.
+newsletter that covers what is happening in the Tor community.
Tor Project website redesign takes two steps forward
----------------------------------------------------
Andrew Lewman put out two calls for help with the ongoing Tor Project
-website redesign: one for the sponsor page [XXX], and another for the
-download area [XXX]. Both were immediately met with proposals and design
+website redesign: one for the sponsor page [1], and another for the
+download area [2]. Both were immediately met with proposals and design
suggestions from the www-team mailing list: Olssy produced two
-mock-ups [XXX] of the sponsorship page as possible models for further
+mock-ups [3] of the sponsorship page as possible models for further
work, while William Papper and Lance Tuller have been working on a
-repository [XXX] for the download page, with comments from other list
+repository [4] for the download page, with comments from other list
members on topics such as the use of Javascript and possible layout
decisions.
If you’d like to give the website redesign further momentum, please see
-the dedicated project page on the wiki [XXX] for open tickets and
-advice on how to contribute, then come to the www-team mailing
-list [XXX] and join in!
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/www-team/2014-March/000238.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/www-team/2014-March/000249.html
- [XXX]: http://tor.harrytuttle.net/
- [XXX]: https://github.com/wpapper/tor-download-web
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/Website
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/www-team
+the dedicated project page on the wiki [5] for open tickets and advice
+on how to contribute, then come to the www-team mailing list [6] and
+join in!
+
+ [1]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/www-team/2014-March/000238.html
+ [2]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/www-team/2014-March/000249.html
+ [3]: http://tor.harrytuttle.net/
+ [4]: https://github.com/wpapper/tor-download-web
+ [5]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/Website
+ [6]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/www-team
QR codes for bridge addresses
-----------------------------
-Since most pocket computers (sometimes called “phones”) and laptops began
-incorporating cameras, QR codes [XXX] have become a ubiquitous way to enter
-short sequences of data into our devices. URLs are the canonical example,
-but the process also works for Bitcoin addresses or OpenPGP fingerprints [XXX].
-
-Bridges are the standard tool for circumventing filters that prevent access to
-the Tor network. Users currently enter bridge addresses in Tor by copy/pasting
-from the BridgeDB web page [XXX] or auto-responder email. But manually giving
-IP addresses and fingerprints to Orbot on keyboard-less devices is an
-error-prone process.
-
-QR codes might be a solution to this problem. They could also enable peer-to-peer
-exchange among friends, or circumvention strategies involving IPv6 addresses and
-paper. According to Isis Lovecruft, adding QR codes to the BridgeDB web interface
-would be easy [XXX]. Would any reader feel like hacking Orbot [XXX] or the Tor
-Launcher [XXX] Firefox extension?
-
- [XXX]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code
- [XXX]: http://web.monkeysphere.info/monkeysign/
- [XXX]: https://bridges.torproject.org/
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11345
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/5096
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-launcher.git
+Since most pocket computers (sometimes called “phones”) and laptops
+began incorporating cameras, QR codes [7] have become a ubiquitous way
+to enter short sequences of data into our devices. URLs are the
+canonical example, but the process also works for Bitcoin addresses or
+OpenPGP fingerprints [8].
+
+Bridges are the standard tool for circumventing filters that prevent
+access to the Tor network. Users currently enter bridge addresses in Tor
+by copy/pasting from the BridgeDB web page [9] or auto-responder email.
+But manually giving IP addresses and fingerprints to Orbot on
+keyboard-less devices is an error-prone process.
+
+QR codes might be a solution to this problem. They could also enable
+peer-to-peer exchange among friends, or circumvention strategies
+involving IPv6 addresses and paper. According to Isis Lovecruft, adding
+QR codes to the BridgeDB web interface would be easy [10]. Would any
+reader feel like hacking Orbot [11] or the Tor Launcher [12] Firefox
+extension (see relevant documentation [13] and API [14])?
+
+ [7]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code
+ [8]: http://web.monkeysphere.info/monkeysign/
+ [9]: https://bridges.torproject.org/
+ [10]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11345
+ [11]: https://bugs.torproject.org/5096
+ [12]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-launcher.git
+ [13]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/WebRTC/taking_webcam_photos
+ [14]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Navigator.getUserMedia
Client identification in hidden service applications
----------------------------------------------------
@@ -71,206 +77,206 @@
differentiate between client connections. Tor will make a different
local TCP connection for each connections it receives, but the software
is unable to tell if they are coming from the same circuit. Harry
-SeventyOne felt [XXX] the latter would be useful to enable applications
+SeventyOne felt [15] the latter would be useful to enable applications
for diagnostic log analysis, identifying traffic trends, rate-limiting
or temporarily blocking operations coming from the same client.
Harry sent a very rough patch to the Tor development mailing which
enables circuit distinction by using a different source IP address from
the IPv4 localhost pool (127.0.0.0/8) for each circuit. Nick Mathewson
-liked the idea [XXX] and gave several comments about the preliminary
+liked the idea [16] and gave several comments about the preliminary
patch. Hopefully this work will make the life of hidden service
operators easier in the future.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006576.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006610.html
+ [15]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006576.html
+ [16]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006610.html
Monthly status reports for XXX month 2014
-----------------------------------------
The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
-month of March has begun. Georg Koppen released his report first [XXX],
-followed by reports from Pearl Crescent [XXX], Damian Johnson [XXX],
-Sherief Alaa [XXX], Nick Mathewson [XXX], Matt Pagan [XXX], Lunar [XXX],
-and Karsten Loesing [XXX].
-
-Lunar also reported help desk statistics [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000487.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000488.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000489.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000490.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000491.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000492.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000494.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000495.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000493.html
+month of March has begun. Georg Koppen released his report first [17],
+followed by reports from Pearl Crescent [18], Damian Johnson [19],
+Sherief Alaa [20], Nick Mathewson [21], Matt Pagan [22], Lunar [23], and
+Karsten Loesing [24].
+
+Lunar also reported help desk statistics [25].
+
+ [17]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000487.html
+ [18]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000488.html
+ [19]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000489.html
+ [20]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000490.html
+ [21]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000491.html
+ [22]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000492.html
+ [23]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000494.html
+ [24]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000495.html
+ [25]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000493.html
Miscellaneous news
------------------
-An extensive guide to hacking on Tor Browser was posted [XXX] to the Tor
+An extensive guide to hacking on Tor Browser was posted [26] to the Tor
Project’s wiki by Mike Perry. Among other things, it covers the
browser’s build instructions, design principles and testing procedures,
as well as a summary of how browser team members organize and
communicate. If you’d like to get involved in Tor Browser development,
please take a look!
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/Hacking
-
-Nicholas Hopper followed up [XXX,XXX] on George Kadianakis’ research on
+ [26]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/Hacking
+
+Nicholas Hopper followed up [27,28] on George Kadianakis’ research on
switching to a single guard. He used Aaron Johnson’s TorPS simulator to
find out the “typical” bandwidth for a client. The conclusions match
George’s: a single guard and a bandwidth cutoff of 2 Mbit/s would
improve over the current situation. George subsequently sent an initial
-draft proposal [XXX] to start the formal process.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006563.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006575.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006570.html
-
-BridgeDB version 1.6 was deployed on March 26th [XXX]. Thanks to Isis
-Lovecruft, users should now be able to solve the CAPTCHA again [XXX].
-A custom solution is now used instead of Google's reCAPTCHA services
-which will give more flexibility in the future.
-
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/f266f32
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809
-
-John Brooks presented [XXX] Torsion, “a ready-to-use hidden service
-instant messaging client” [XXX]. “I’m looking for people to try it out,
+draft proposal [29] to start the formal process.
+
+ [27]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006563.html
+ [28]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006575.html
+ [29]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006570.html
+
+BridgeDB version 1.6 was deployed on March 26th [30]. Thanks to Isis
+Lovecruft, users should now be able to solve the CAPTCHA again [31]. A
+custom solution is now used instead of Google’s reCAPTCHA services which
+will give more flexibility in the future.
+
+ [30]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/f266f32
+ [31]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809
+
+John Brooks presented [32] Torsion, “a ready-to-use hidden service
+instant messaging client”. “I’m looking for people to try it out,
validate my ideas and implementation, and help plan the future”, wrote
John. You can consult the design documentation and build instructions on
-Github [XXX]; please share your comments with the community!
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032476.html
- [XXX]: https://github.com/special/torsion
-
-Martin Weinelt shared [XXX] a plugin [XXX] that generates graphs in the
-Munin network monitoring tool [XXX] from data provided by Tor, using
-Stem [XXX]. “At the moment it supports a connection graph, getting its
+Github [33]; please share your comments with the community!
+
+ [32]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032476.html
+ [33]: https://github.com/special/torsion
+
+Martin Weinelt shared [34] a plugin [35] that generates graphs in the
+Munin network monitoring tool [36] from data provided by Tor, using
+Stem [37]. “At the moment it supports a connection graph, getting its
data from orconn-status. More graphs are possible, but not yet
implemented. Ideas are welcome,” wrote Martin.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-March/004168.html
- [XXX]: https://github.com/mweinelt/munin-tor
- [XXX]: http://munin-monitoring.org/
- [XXX]: https://stem.torproject.org/
+ [34]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-March/004168.html
+ [35]: https://github.com/mweinelt/munin-tor
+ [36]: http://munin-monitoring.org/
+ [37]: https://stem.torproject.org/
Amid the ongoing censorship of internet services in Turkey, there were
reports that the Tor Project’s website was unavailable over connections
-supplied by some Turkish ISPs [XXX]. Feel free to try one of the
-mirrors [XXX]!
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032487.html
- [XXX]: https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/mirrors.html
-
-Karsten Loesing published [XXX] a draft of a guide [XXX] to running a
-blog over a Tor hidden service using the Jekyll static site
-generator [XXX]. “The intended audience are bloggers who can handle a
-terminal window but who don’t know the typical pitfalls of securely
-setting up a web server over a hidden service”, he wrote. However, the
-guide is in its first stages, and “may contain severe problems harming
-your privacy!” Feedback on its content, wording, and layout would be
-greatly appreciated.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006602.html
- [XXX]: http://csxeeumg5ynu2rk7.onion/
- [XXX]: http://jekyllrb.com/
-
-Yawning Angel called [XXX] for help with testing obfsclient-0.0.2 [XXX],
-a C++ implementation of the obfs3 and ScrambleSuit pluggable transports:
+supplied by some Turkish ISPs [38]. Feel free to try one of the
+mirrors [39]!
+
+ [38]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032487.html
+ [39]: https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/mirrors.html
+
+Karsten Loesing published [40] a draft of a guide [41] to running a blog
+over a Tor hidden service using the Jekyll static site generator [42].
+“The intended audience are bloggers who can handle a terminal window but
+who don’t know the typical pitfalls of securely setting up a web server
+over a hidden service”, he wrote. However, the guide is in its first
+stages, and “may contain severe problems harming your privacy!” Feedback
+on its content, wording, and layout would be greatly appreciated.
+
+ [40]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006602.html
+ [41]: http://csxeeumg5ynu2rk7.onion/
+ [42]: http://jekyllrb.com/
+
+Yawning Angel called [43] for help with testing obfsclient-0.0.2 [44], a
+C++ implementation of the obfs3 and ScrambleSuit pluggable transports:
“This is mostly a bug fix release that addresses issues found in
-testing/actual use […] Questions, comments, feedback appreciated as
+testing/actual use […] Questions, comments, feedback appreciated as
always.”
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006592.html
- [XXX]: https://github.com/Yawning/obfsclient/archive/v0.0.2.tar.gz
+ [43]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006592.html
+ [44]: https://github.com/Yawning/obfsclient/archive/v0.0.2.tar.gz
Michael Rogers has been “working on a messaging app that uses Tor hidden
services to provide unlinkability (from the point of view of a network
-observer) between users and their contacts”. But as “users know who their
-contacts are”, the mutual anonymity provided by hidden services is not
-a requirement. Michael asked [XXX] how hidden services performance
+observer) between users and their contacts”. But as “users know who
+their contacts are”, the mutual anonymity provided by hidden services is
+not a requirement. Michael asked [45] how hidden services performance
could be improved for this use case.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006572.html
-
-On the Tor Blog, Sukhbir Singh posted [XXX] a round-up of the various
+ [45]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006572.html
+
+On the Tor Blog, Sukhbir Singh posted [46] a round-up of the various
methods by which users can download and run the Tor Browser, covering
download mirrors, GetTor, bridge address distribution, and pluggable
transports usage. If you’re having trouble acquiring or using a copy of
the Tor Browser, please look here for links and guidance.
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/ways-get-tor-browser-bundle
-
-Mike Perry discovered [XXX] “that the Linux kernel appears to have a
-leak in how it applies transproxy rules to the TCP CLOSE_WAIT shutdown
+ [46]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/ways-get-tor-browser-bundle
+
+Mike Perry discovered [47] “that the Linux kernel appears to have a leak
+in how it applies transproxy rules to the TCP CLOSE_WAIT shutdown
condition under certain circumstances”. Be sure to look at Mike’s email
-if you use Tor’s TransProxy feature. velope later improved [XXX] the
+if you use Tor’s TransProxy feature. velope later improved [48] the
original mitigating firewall rule.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032503.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032507.html
+ [47]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032503.html
+ [48]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-March/032507.html
As part of the ongoing project to rewrite the Tor Weather service,
-Sreenatha Bhatlapenumarthi and Karsten Loesing collaborated [XXX] to
+Sreenatha Bhatlapenumarthi and Karsten Loesing collaborated [49] to
produce a Python script that enables it to determine whether or not
-relay operators have fulfilled the requirements [XXX] for a free Tor
+relay operators have fulfilled the requirements [50] for a free Tor
T-shirt.
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/9889
- [XXX]: https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/tshirt
-
-Lukas Erlacher announced the avaibility of OnionPy [XXX], “a Python wrapper for
-OnionOO with support for transparently caching OnionOO replies in memcached”.
-It should be useful to the on-going rewrite of the Tor Weather service [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
- [XXX]: https://weather.torproject.org/
+ [49]: https://bugs.torproject.org/9889
+ [50]: https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/tshirt
+
+Lukas Erlacher announced the avaibility of OnionPy [51], “a Python
+wrapper for OnionOO with support for transparently caching OnionOO
+replies in memcached”. It should be useful to the on-going rewrite of
+the Tor Weather service [52].
+
+ [51]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006603.html
+ [52]: https://weather.torproject.org/
The deadline for submissions to the Tails logo contest passed on March
31st; you can review all of the proposed designs, from the minimalist to
-the psychedelic, on the Tails website [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/
+the psychedelic, on the Tails website [53].
+
+ [53]: https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/
Tor help desk roundup
---------------------
-The help desk often gets confusing reports that after being directed to
-download the latest Tor Browser version by a flashing TorBrowserButton,
-users still sometimes see a message that their Tor Browser is out of date.
-This happens when the new Tor Browser version was installed over the
-previous one. Fortunately the underlying bug [XXX] will be fixed in the next
-Tor Browser release. We recommend extracting each Tor Browser update to an
-empty directory rather than overwriting the old one, to prevent similar
-unexpected behaviors. The longer-term solution for issues like this is an
-auto-updating Tor Browser [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11242
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/4234
+The help desk often gets confusing reports that after being directed to
+download the latest Tor Browser version by a flashing TorBrowserButton,
+users still sometimes see a message that their Tor Browser is out of
+date. This happens when the new Tor Browser version was installed over
+the previous one. Fortunately the underlying bug [54] will be fixed in
+the next Tor Browser release. We recommend extracting each Tor Browser
+update to an empty directory rather than overwriting the old one, to
+prevent similar unexpected behaviors. The longer-term solution for
+issues like this is an auto-updating Tor Browser [55].
+
+ [54]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11242
+ [55]: https://bugs.torproject.org/4234
News from Tor StackExchange
---------------------------
-saurav wanted to know the total bandwidth of all guard nodes in the current
-network [XXX]. gacar pointed to the bandwidth.csv file [XXX] and explained
-the format of the file.
-
- [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1824/88
- [XXX]: https://metrics.torproject.org/stats/bandwidth.csv
-
-Tor’s StackExchange site is doing a self-evaluation [XXX]. If you have an account,
-please log in and evaluate the questions as well as their answers. It helps to
-improve the answers and the site in general.
-
-Furthermore, if you happen to visit the site, check the list of unanswered
-questions [XXX]. If you know an answer, please share your knowledge with the
-people.
-
- [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/review/site-eval
- [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/unanswered
+saurav wanted to know the total bandwidth of all guard nodes in the
+current network [56]. gacar pointed to the bandwidth.csv file [57] and
+explained the format of the file.
+
+ [56]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1824/88
+ [57]: https://metrics.torproject.org/stats/bandwidth.csv
+
+Tor’s StackExchange site is doing a self-evaluation [58]. If you have an
+account, please log in and evaluate the questions as well as their
+answers. It helps to improve the answers and the site in general.
+
+Furthermore, if you happen to visit the site, check the list of
+unanswered questions [59]. If you know an answer, please share your
+knowledge with the people.
+
+ [58]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/review/site-eval
+ [59]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/unanswered
Upcoming events
---------------
@@ -304,10 +310,10 @@
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
-important news. Please see the project page [XXX], write down your
-name and subscribe to the team mailing list [XXX] if you want to
+important news. Please see the project page [60], write down your
+name and subscribe to the team mailing list [61] if you want to
get involved!
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
-}}}+ [60]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
+ [61]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
+}}}
version 64
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-04-01T11:53:34+00:00
remove unproperly documented event
--- version 63
+++ version 64
@@ -283,11 +283,6 @@
| #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
| https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006616.html
|
-Apr 2-3 | Great Wide Open Conference
- | Atlanta, Georgia
- | http://greatwideopen.org/
- | gsathya generally hanging about
- |
Apr 4 17:00 UTC | Pluggable transports online meeting
| #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
|
version 63
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-04-01T11:50:23+00:00
add credits
--- version 62
+++ version 63
@@ -304,8 +304,8 @@
| http://f.ounders.com/
-This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by XXX, XXX, and
-XXX.
+This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by Lunar, harmony,
+David Fifield, Matt Pagan, and qbi.
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
@@ -315,7 +315,4 @@
[XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
-}}}
-
-Possible items:
-
+}}}
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/14 ===
===========================================================================
version 4
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-04-01T12:05:49+00:00
add item
--- version 3
+++ version 4
@@ -83,4 +83,5 @@
Possible items:
- * sequential IP IDs on Tor relays https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-March/004199.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idle_Scan https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004205.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004206.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004207.html+ * sequential IP IDs on Tor relays https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-March/004199.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idle_Scan https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004205.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004206.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004207.html
+ * end of Tails logo contest https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2014-April/005390.html
--
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