tor-commits December 2019

tor-commits@lists.torproject.org

21 participants
1811 discussions

[translation/https_everywhere_completed] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=https_everywhere_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 03 Dec '19

03 Dec '19

commit 05f973042df8dc3a19acff4c963af32df6df5b11 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 3 18:16:11 2019 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=https_everywhere_co… --- is/https-everywhere.dtd | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) diff --git a/is/https-everywhere.dtd b/is/https-everywhere.dtd index b1b17a35a4..e8814a8c51 100644 --- a/is/https-everywhere.dtd +++ b/is/https-everywhere.dtd @@ -1,67 +1,68 @@ -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.title "Um HTTPS-allsstaðar"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.ext_name "HTTPS-allsstaðar"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.ext_description "Dulkóðaðu vefinn! Notaðu sjálfkrafa HTTPS-öryggi á mörgum vefsvæðum."> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.version "Útgáfa"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.rulesets_version "Útgáfa reglusetta fyrir"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.add_new_rule "Bæta við nýrri reglu"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.title ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.ext_name ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.ext_description ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.version ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.rulesets_version ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.add_new_rule ""> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.donate_eff_imperative "Styrkja EFF"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.observatory "Kjörstillingar SSL Observatory"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.globalDisable "SLÖKKT er á HTTPS-allsstaðar"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.globalEnable "KVEIKT er á HTTPS-allsstaðar"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.encryptAllSitesEligibleOn "KVEIKT er á að dulrita öll tiltæk vefsvæði (EASE)"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.encryptAllSitesEligibleOff "SLÖKKT er á að dulrita öll tiltæk vefsvæði (EASE)"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.httpNoWhereExplainedBlocked "Lokað er á ódulritaðar beiðnir"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.httpNoWhereExplainedAllowed "Opið er á ódulritaðar beiðnir"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.seeMore "Sjá meira"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.seeLess "Sjá minna"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.httpNoWhereMore "Þessi hamur lokar á allar ódulritaðar beiðnir og efni"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.showCounter "Birta teljara"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.viewAllRules "Skoða allar reglur"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.donate_eff_imperative ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.observatory ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.globalDisable ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.globalEnable ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.encryptAllSitesEligibleOn ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.encryptAllSitesEligibleOff ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.httpNoWhereExplainedBlocked ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.httpNoWhereExplainedAllowed ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.seeMore ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.seeLess ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.httpNoWhereMore ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.showCounter ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.viewAllRules ""> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.settings "Stillingar"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.generalSettings "Almennar stillingar"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.advancedSettings "Ítarlegar stillingar"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.updateChannels "Uppfærslurásir"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.enableMixedRulesets "Virkja reglusett fyrir blandað efni"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.showDevtoolsTab "Birta Devtools-flipa"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.autoUpdateRulesets "Uppfæra reglusett sjálfvirkt"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.userRulesListed "Notendareglur fyrir HTTPS-allsstaðar"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.disabledUrlsListed "Vefir með HTTPS-allsstaðar óvirkir"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.updateChannelsWarning "Aðvörun: ef bætt er við uppfærslurásum, gefast fleiri leiðir fyrir óþokka að ná völdum yfir vafranum þínum. Ekki breyta þessum hluta nema að þú vitir hvað þú ert að gera!"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.addUpdateChannel "Bæta við uppfærslurás"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.enterUpdateChannelName "Settu inn heiti á uppfærslurás"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.delete "Eyða"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.update "Uppfæra"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.storedRulesetsVersion "Útgáfa vistaðra reglusetta:"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.updatesLastChecked "Síðast athugað með uppfærslur:"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.updatesLastCheckedNever "aldrei"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.debuggingRulesets "Reglusett fyrir villuleit (ítarlegt)"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.settings ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.generalSettings ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.advancedSettings ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.updateChannels ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.enableMixedRulesets ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.showDevtoolsTab ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.autoUpdateRulesets ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.userRulesListed ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.disabledUrlsListed ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.updateChannelsWarning ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.addUpdateChannel ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.enterUpdateChannelName ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.delete ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.update ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.storedRulesetsVersion ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.updatesLastChecked ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.updatesLastCheckedNever ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.debuggingRulesets ""> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.prefs.export_settings "Flytja út stillingar"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.prefs.reset_defaults "Frumstilla á sjálfgefnar stillingar"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.prefs.reset_defaults_message "Þetta mun frumstilla hvert reglusett á sjálfgefin gildi þess. Halda áfram?"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.prefs.export_settings ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.prefs.reset_defaults ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.prefs.reset_defaults_message ""> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.he_blocking_explainer "HTTPS-allsstaðar tók eftir að þú varst að fara á síðu sem ekki notar HTTPS, og reyndi því að senda þig í staðinn á HTTPS útgáfu síðunnar. HTTPS útgáfan er ekki aðgengileg. Líklega styður þetta vefsvæði ekki HTTPS, en það er líka inni í myndinni að einhver þrjótur sé að hindra aðganginn að HTTPS útgáfunni. Ef þú vilt samt sjá ódulritaða útgáfu síðunnar, geturðu gert það með því að velja 'Loka á allar ódulritaðar beiðnir (EASE)' í HTTPS-allsstaðar viðaukanum. Hafðu samt í huga að með því að gera þennan valkost óvirkan gæti vafrinn þinn orðið aðgengilegur fyrir netkerfistengdar niðurfærsluárásir á vefsvæðum sem þú skoðar."> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.he_blocking_network "netkerfistengdar niðurfærsluárásir"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.open_page "Opna óörugga síðu"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.he_blocking_explainer ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.he_blocking_network ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.open_page ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.http_once ""> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.settings_for_this_site_header "Stillingar fyrir þetta vefsvæði"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.settings_for_this_site_subheader "Breyttu kjörstillingum þínum fyrir dulritaðar tengingar"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.settings_for_this_site_explained "Á meðan þú vafrar á mismunandi vefsvæðum, geturðu breytt kjörstillingum þínum fyrir hvert vefsvæði"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.stable_rules "Stöðugar reglur"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.stable_rules_description "Þvinga dulritaðar tengingar við þessi vefsvæði:"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.experimental_rules "Reglur á tilraunastigi"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.experimental_rules_description "Getur valdið hruni eða viðvörunum. Sjálfgefið óvirkt."> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.disable_on_this_site "Gera HTTPS-allsstaðar óvirkt á þessum vef"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.enable_on_this_site "Virkja HTTPS-allsstaðar á þessum vef"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.add_rule "Bæta við reglu fyrir þetta vefsvæði"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.add_new_rule "Bæta við nýrri reglu fyrir þetta vefsvæði"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.always_https_for_host "Alltaf nota HTTPS fyrir þessa vél"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.host "Hýsilvél:"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.show_advanced "Birta ítarlegt"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.hide_advanced "Fela ítarlegt"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.rule_name "Heiti reglu"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.regex "Samsvarandi reglulegri segð"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.redirect_to "Endurbeina á"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.status_cancel_button "Hætta við"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.settings_for_this_site_header ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.settings_for_this_site_subheader ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.settings_for_this_site_explained ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.stable_rules ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.stable_rules_description ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.experimental_rules ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.experimental_rules_description ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.disable_on_this_site ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.enable_on_this_site ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.add_rule ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.add_new_rule ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.always_https_for_host ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.host ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.show_advanced ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.hide_advanced ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.rule_name ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.regex ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.redirect_to ""> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.status_cancel_button "">

1 0

[translation/https_everywhere] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 03 Dec '19

03 Dec '19

commit 5d75a59ca373aa2e6b6a1cc7b975ab4af9228518 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 3 18:16:05 2019 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=https_everywhere --- is/https-everywhere.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/is/https-everywhere.dtd b/is/https-everywhere.dtd index 0af3ae21d6..ecfc708b10 100644 --- a/is/https-everywhere.dtd +++ b/is/https-everywhere.dtd @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ <!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.he_blocking_explainer "HTTPS-allsstaðar tók eftir að þú varst að fara á síðu sem ekki notar HTTPS, og reyndi því að senda þig í staðinn á HTTPS útgáfu síðunnar. HTTPS útgáfan er ekki aðgengileg. Líklega styður þetta vefsvæði ekki HTTPS, en það er líka inni í myndinni að einhver þrjótur sé að hindra aðganginn að HTTPS útgáfunni. Ef þú vilt samt sjá ódulritaða útgáfu síðunnar, geturðu gert það með því að velja 'Loka á allar ódulritaðar beiðnir (EASE)' í HTTPS-allsstaðar viðaukanum. Hafðu samt í huga að með því að gera þennan valkost óvirkan gæti vafrinn þinn orðið aðgengilegur fyrir netkerfistengdar niðurfærsluárásir á vefsvæðum sem þú skoðar."> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.he_blocking_network "netkerfistengdar niðurfærsluárásir"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.open_page "Opna óörugga síðu"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.http_once "Open insecure page for this session only"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.http_once "Opna óörugga síðu einungis í þessari setu"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.settings_for_this_site_header "Stillingar fyrir þetta vefsvæði"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.settings_for_this_site_subheader "Breyttu kjörstillingum þínum fyrir dulritaðar tengingar">

1 0

[tor/master] hs-v3: Fix NULL deref. in hs_circ_service_get_established_intro_circ()
by asn＠torproject.org 03 Dec '19

03 Dec '19

commit 3b64c6b6fc1f41ccfae99b49a56f134ba6ee7662 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 3 10:11:42 2019 -0500 hs-v3: Fix NULL deref. in hs_circ_service_get_established_intro_circ() Found by Stem regression tests. Reported by atagar. Fixes #32664 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c index a43e7f0e2..a09e31972 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c @@ -673,7 +673,8 @@ hs_circ_service_get_established_intro_circ(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip) } /* Only return circuit if it is established. */ - return (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) ? circ : NULL; + return (circ && TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) ? + circ : NULL; } /** Called when we fail building a rendezvous circuit at some point other than

1 0

[tpo/master] Add new Tor Browser version: 9.0.2
by boklm＠torproject.org 03 Dec '19

03 Dec '19

commit 6199b766c31a94108a0a8c3833078b8877d65689 Author: Nicolas Vigier <boklm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 3 18:31:48 2019 +0100 Add new Tor Browser version: 9.0.2 --- content/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions/contents.lr | 4 ++++ databags/versions.ini | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions/contents.lr b/content/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions/contents.lr index 0dcffc5..fefc18f 100644 --- a/content/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions/contents.lr +++ b/content/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions/contents.lr @@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ body: "9.0.1-MacOS", "9.0.1-Linux", "9.0.1-Windows", +"9.0.2", +"9.0.2-MacOS", +"9.0.2-Linux", +"9.0.2-Windows", "9.5a1", "9.5a1-MacOS", "9.5a1-Linux", diff --git a/databags/versions.ini b/databags/versions.ini index 70ca689..264ce54 100644 --- a/databags/versions.ini +++ b/databags/versions.ini @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ [torbrowser-stable] -version = 9.0.1 +version = 9.0.2 win32 = 0.4.1.6 [torbrowser-alpha]

1 0

[tor/master] hsv3: Abstract parts of hs_config_client_authorization() into func.
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 03 Dec '19

03 Dec '19

commit 8ed8707f0ab78e9c954dad870f0529369c01c518 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Nov 25 18:03:53 2019 +0200 hsv3: Abstract parts of hs_config_client_authorization() into func. Now we have a function that reads a file and returns a credential. We need that for the REMOVE control port command. --- src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index 0247a0199..cb902290f 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -1569,6 +1569,50 @@ hs_client_register_auth_credentials(hs_client_service_authorization_t *creds) return retval; } +/** Load a client authorization file with filename that is stored under + * the global client auth directory, and return a newly-allocated credentials + * object if it parsed well. Otherwise, return NULL. + */ +static hs_client_service_authorization_t * +get_creds_from_client_auth_filename(const char *filename, + const or_options_t *options) +{ + hs_client_service_authorization_t *auth = NULL; + char *client_key_file_path = NULL; + char *client_key_str = NULL; + + log_info(LD_REND, "Loading a client authorization key file %s...", + filename); + + if (!auth_key_filename_is_valid(filename)) { + log_notice(LD_REND, "Client authorization unrecognized filename %s. " + "File must end in .auth_private. Ignoring.", + filename); + goto err; + } + + /* Create a full path for a file. */ + client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(options->ClientOnionAuthDir, + filename); + + client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL); + if (!client_key_str) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "The file %s cannot be read.", filename); + goto err; + } + + auth = parse_auth_file_content(client_key_str); + if (!auth) { + goto err; + } + + err: + tor_free(client_key_str); + tor_free(client_key_file_path); + + return auth; +} + /** Remove client auth credentials for the service hs_address. */ hs_client_removal_auth_status_t hs_client_remove_auth_credentials(const char *hsaddress) @@ -1958,8 +2002,6 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, int ret = -1; digest256map_t *auths = digest256map_new(); smartlist_t *file_list = NULL; - char *client_key_str = NULL; - char *client_key_file_path = NULL; tor_assert(options); @@ -1982,37 +2024,11 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, goto end; } - SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(file_list, char *, filename) { - + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(file_list, const char *, filename) { hs_client_service_authorization_t *auth = NULL; ed25519_public_key_t identity_pk; - log_info(LD_REND, "Loading a client authorization key file %s...", - filename); - - if (!auth_key_filename_is_valid(filename)) { - log_notice(LD_REND, "Client authorization unrecognized filename %s. " - "File must end in .auth_private. Ignoring.", - filename); - continue; - } - - /* Create a full path for a file. */ - client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(options->ClientOnionAuthDir, - filename); - client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL); - /* Free the file path immediately after using it. */ - tor_free(client_key_file_path); - - /* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */ - if (!client_key_str) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "The file %s cannot be read.", filename); - continue; - } - - auth = parse_auth_file_content(client_key_str); - /* Free immediately after using it. */ - tor_free(client_key_str); + auth = get_creds_from_client_auth_filename(filename, options); if (!auth) { continue; } @@ -2044,8 +2060,6 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, ret = 0; end: - tor_free(client_key_str); - tor_free(client_key_file_path); if (file_list) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(file_list, char *, s, tor_free(s)); smartlist_free(file_list);

1 0

[tor/master] hsv3: Remove support for client auth nicknames.
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 03 Dec '19

03 Dec '19

commit 9395a0c765302f5f3fd15e8d9dd2e87404cea5ee Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Nov 25 17:22:52 2019 +0200 hsv3: Remove support for client auth nicknames. Because the function that parses client auth credentials saved on disk (parse_auth_file_content()) is not future compatible, there is no way to add support for storing the nickname on the disk. Hence, nicknames cannot persist after Tor restart making them pretty much useless. In the future we can introduce nicknames by adding a new file format for client auth credentials, but this was not deemed worth doing at this stage. --- src/feature/control/control_hs.c | 14 +------------- src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 4 ---- src/feature/hs/hs_client.h | 6 ------ src/test/test_hs_control.c | 15 +++++---------- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/control/control_hs.c b/src/feature/control/control_hs.c index 97938211d..94940a739 100644 --- a/src/feature/control/control_hs.c +++ b/src/feature/control/control_hs.c @@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ const control_cmd_syntax_t onion_client_auth_add_syntax = { * register the new client-side client auth credentials: * "ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_ADD" SP HSAddress * SP KeyType ":" PrivateKeyBlob - * [SP "ClientName=" Nickname] * [SP "Type=" TYPE] CRLF */ int @@ -112,14 +111,7 @@ handle_control_onion_client_auth_add(control_connection_t *conn, /* Now let's parse the remaining arguments (variable size) */ for (const config_line_t *line = args->kwargs; line; line = line->next) { - if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "ClientName")) { - if (strlen(line->value) > HS_CLIENT_AUTH_MAX_NICKNAME_LENGTH) { - control_write_endreply(conn, 512, "Too big 'ClientName' argument"); - goto err; - } - creds->nickname = tor_strdup(line->value); - - } else if (!strcasecmpstart(line->key, "Flags")) { + if (!strcasecmpstart(line->key, "Flags")) { smartlist_split_string(flags, line->value, ",", SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); if (smartlist_len(flags) < 1) { control_write_endreply(conn, 512, "Invalid 'Flags' argument"); @@ -249,10 +241,6 @@ encode_client_auth_cred_for_control_port( smartlist_add_asprintf(control_line, "CLIENT x25519:%s", x25519_b64); - if (cred->nickname) { /* nickname is optional */ - smartlist_add_asprintf(control_line, " ClientName=%s", cred->nickname); - } - if (cred->flags) { /* flags are also optional */ if (cred->flags & CLIENT_AUTH_FLAG_IS_PERMANENT) { smartlist_add_asprintf(control_line, " Flags=Permanent"); diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index 3c681dd85..c4bfdd2d9 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -1832,10 +1832,6 @@ client_service_authorization_free_(hs_client_service_authorization_t *auth) return; } - if (auth->nickname) { - tor_free(auth->nickname); - } - memwipe(auth, 0, sizeof(*auth)); tor_free(auth); } diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h index 75a911107..e4869a961 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h @@ -60,9 +60,6 @@ typedef enum { /** Flag to set when a client auth is permanent (saved on disk). */ #define CLIENT_AUTH_FLAG_IS_PERMANENT (1<<0) -/** Max length of a client auth nickname */ -#define HS_CLIENT_AUTH_MAX_NICKNAME_LENGTH 255 - /** Client-side configuration of client authorization */ typedef struct hs_client_service_authorization_t { /** An curve25519 secret key used to compute decryption keys that @@ -72,9 +69,6 @@ typedef struct hs_client_service_authorization_t { /** An onion address that is used to connect to the onion service. */ char onion_address[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32+1]; - /* An optional nickname for this client */ - char *nickname; - /* Optional flags for this client. */ int flags; } hs_client_service_authorization_t; diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_control.c b/src/test/test_hs_control.c index 0de2bca04..572b7f3ab 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_control.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_control.c @@ -245,8 +245,7 @@ test_hs_control_good_onion_client_auth_add(void *arg) /* Register first service */ args = tor_strdup("2fvhjskjet3n5syd6yfg5lhvwcs62bojmthr35ko5bllr3iqdb4ctdyd " - "x25519:iJ1tjKCrMAbiFT2bVrCjhbfMDnE1fpaRbIS5ZHKUvEQ= " - "ClientName=bob"); + "x25519:iJ1tjKCrMAbiFT2bVrCjhbfMDnE1fpaRbIS5ZHKUvEQ= "); retval = handle_control_command(&conn, (uint32_t) strlen(args), args); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); @@ -277,13 +276,11 @@ test_hs_control_good_onion_client_auth_add(void *arg) hs_client_service_authorization_t *client_2fv = digest256map_get(client_auths, service_identity_pk_2fv.pubkey); tt_assert(client_2fv); - tt_str_op(client_2fv->nickname, OP_EQ, "bob"); tt_int_op(client_2fv->flags, OP_EQ, 0); hs_client_service_authorization_t *client_jt4 = digest256map_get(client_auths, service_identity_pk_jt4.pubkey); tt_assert(client_jt4); - tt_assert(!client_jt4->nickname); tt_int_op(client_jt4->flags, OP_EQ, 0); /* Now let's VIEW the auth credentials */ @@ -296,8 +293,7 @@ test_hs_control_good_onion_client_auth_add(void *arg) #define VIEW_CORRECT_REPLY_NO_ADDR "250-ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_VIEW\r\n" \ "250-CLIENT x25519:eIIdIGoSZwI2Q/lSzpf92akGki5I+PZIDz37MA5BhlA=\r\n"\ - "250-CLIENT x25519:iJ1tjKCrMAbiFT2bVrCjhbfMDnE1fpaRbIS5ZHKUvEQ= " \ - "ClientName=bob\r\n" \ + "250-CLIENT x25519:iJ1tjKCrMAbiFT2bVrCjhbfMDnE1fpaRbIS5ZHKUvEQ=\r\n" \ "250 OK\r\n" retval = handle_control_command(&conn, (uint32_t) strlen(args), args); @@ -516,7 +512,7 @@ test_hs_control_store_permanent_creds(void *arg) /* Try registering first service with no ClientOnionAuthDir set */ args = tor_strdup("2fvhjskjet3n5syd6yfg5lhvwcs62bojmthr35ko5bllr3iqdb4ctdyd " "x25519:iJ1tjKCrMAbiFT2bVrCjhbfMDnE1fpaRbIS5ZHKUvEQ= " - "ClientName=bob Flags=Permanent"); + "Flags=Permanent"); retval = handle_control_command(&conn, (uint32_t) strlen(args), args); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); @@ -546,7 +542,7 @@ test_hs_control_store_permanent_creds(void *arg) /* Try the control port command again. This time it should work! */ args = tor_strdup("2fvhjskjet3n5syd6yfg5lhvwcs62bojmthr35ko5bllr3iqdb4ctdyd " "x25519:iJ1tjKCrMAbiFT2bVrCjhbfMDnE1fpaRbIS5ZHKUvEQ= " - "ClientName=bob Flags=Permanent"); + "Flags=Permanent"); retval = handle_control_command(&conn, (uint32_t) strlen(args), args); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); @@ -571,7 +567,7 @@ test_hs_control_store_permanent_creds(void *arg) /* Overwrite the credentials and check that they got overwrited. */ args = tor_strdup("2fvhjskjet3n5syd6yfg5lhvwcs62bojmthr35ko5bllr3iqdb4ctdyd " "x25519:UDRvZLvcJo0QRLvDfkpgbtsqbkhIUQZyeo2FNBrgS18= " - "ClientName=fab Flags=Permanent"); + "Flags=Permanent"); retval = handle_control_command(&conn, (uint32_t) strlen(args), args); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); @@ -600,7 +596,6 @@ test_hs_control_store_permanent_creds(void *arg) hs_client_service_authorization_t *client_2fv = digest256map_get(client_auths, service_identity_pk_2fv.pubkey); tt_assert(client_2fv); - tt_assert(!client_2fv->nickname); tt_int_op(client_2fv->flags, OP_EQ, CLIENT_AUTH_FLAG_IS_PERMANENT); tt_str_op(hex_str((char*)client_2fv->enc_seckey.secret_key, 32), OP_EQ, "50346F64BBDC268D1044BBC37E4A606EDB2A6E48485106727A8D85341AE04B5F");

1 0

[tor/master] hsv3: Start refactoring hs_config_client_authorization().
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 03 Dec '19

03 Dec '19

commit 763f33729062ba015b10369dc767db3408733ad4 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Nov 25 17:40:22 2019 +0200 hsv3: Start refactoring hs_config_client_authorization(). - Remove key_dir which is useless. - Kill an indentation layer. We want to make it cleaner and slimmer so that we can reuse parts of it in the REMOVE command for removing the right client auth file. --- src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index c4bfdd2d9..0247a0199 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -1957,7 +1957,6 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, { int ret = -1; digest256map_t *auths = digest256map_new(); - char *key_dir = NULL; smartlist_t *file_list = NULL; char *client_key_str = NULL; char *client_key_file_path = NULL; @@ -1971,17 +1970,15 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, goto end; } - key_dir = tor_strdup(options->ClientOnionAuthDir); - /* Make sure the directory exists and is private enough. */ - if (check_private_dir(key_dir, 0, options->User) < 0) { + if (check_private_dir(options->ClientOnionAuthDir, 0, options->User) < 0) { goto end; } - file_list = tor_listdir(key_dir); + file_list = tor_listdir(options->ClientOnionAuthDir); if (file_list == NULL) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization key directory %s can't be listed.", - key_dir); + options->ClientOnionAuthDir); goto end; } @@ -2000,7 +1997,8 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, } /* Create a full path for a file. */ - client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(key_dir, filename); + client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(options->ClientOnionAuthDir, + filename); client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL); /* Free the file path immediately after using it. */ tor_free(client_key_file_path); @@ -2015,36 +2013,37 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, /* Free immediately after using it. */ tor_free(client_key_str); - if (auth) { - /* Parse the onion address to get an identity public key and use it - * as a key of global map in the future. */ - if (hs_parse_address(auth->onion_address, &identity_pk, - NULL, NULL) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "The onion address \"%s\" is invalid in " - "file %s", filename, auth->onion_address); - client_service_authorization_free(auth); - continue; - } + if (!auth) { + continue; + } - if (digest256map_get(auths, identity_pk.pubkey)) { + /* Parse the onion address to get an identity public key and use it + * as a key of global map in the future. */ + if (hs_parse_address(auth->onion_address, &identity_pk, + NULL, NULL) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "The onion address \"%s\" is invalid in " + "file %s", filename, auth->onion_address); + client_service_authorization_free(auth); + continue; + } + + if (digest256map_get(auths, identity_pk.pubkey)) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Duplicate authorization for the same hidden " - "service address %s.", + "service address %s.", safe_str_client_opts(options, auth->onion_address)); client_service_authorization_free(auth); goto end; - } - - digest256map_set(auths, identity_pk.pubkey, auth); - log_info(LD_REND, "Loaded a client authorization key file %s.", - filename); } + + digest256map_set(auths, identity_pk.pubkey, auth); + log_info(LD_REND, "Loaded a client authorization key file %s.", + filename); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(filename); /* Success. */ ret = 0; end: - tor_free(key_dir); tor_free(client_key_str); tor_free(client_key_file_path); if (file_list) {

1 0

[tor/master] hsv3: ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_REMOVE now also removes the credential file.
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 03 Dec '19

03 Dec '19

commit 12305b6bb6a68640e011dc5e2f2557bdccc2ae22 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Nov 25 18:31:29 2019 +0200 hsv3: ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_REMOVE now also removes the credential file. --- src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/test/test_hs_control.c | 23 ++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index cb902290f..823a0a45a 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -1613,6 +1613,84 @@ get_creds_from_client_auth_filename(const char *filename, return auth; } +/* + * Remove the file in filename under the global client auth credential + * storage. + */ +static void +remove_client_auth_creds_file(const char *filename) +{ + char *creds_file_path = NULL; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + creds_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(options->ClientOnionAuthDir, + filename); + if (tor_unlink(creds_file_path) != 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to remove client auth file (%s).", + creds_file_path); + goto end; + } + + log_warn(LD_REND, "Successfuly removed client auth file (%s).", + creds_file_path); + + end: + tor_free(creds_file_path); +} + +/** + * Find the filesystem file corresponding to the permanent client auth + * credentials in cred and remove it. + */ +static void +find_and_remove_client_auth_creds_file( + const hs_client_service_authorization_t *cred) +{ + smartlist_t *file_list = NULL; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + tor_assert(cred->flags & CLIENT_AUTH_FLAG_IS_PERMANENT); + + if (!options->ClientOnionAuthDir) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Found permanent credential but no ClientOnionAuthDir " + "configured. There is no file to be removed."); + goto end; + } + + file_list = tor_listdir(options->ClientOnionAuthDir); + if (file_list == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization key directory %s can't be listed.", + options->ClientOnionAuthDir); + goto end; + } + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(file_list, const char *, filename) { + hs_client_service_authorization_t *tmp_cred = NULL; + + tmp_cred = get_creds_from_client_auth_filename(filename, options); + if (!tmp_cred) { + continue; + } + + /* Find the right file for this credential */ + if (!strcmp(tmp_cred->onion_address, cred->onion_address)) { + /* Found it! Remove the file! */ + remove_client_auth_creds_file(filename); + /* cleanup and get out of here */ + client_service_authorization_free(tmp_cred); + break; + } + + client_service_authorization_free(tmp_cred); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(filename); + + end: + if (file_list) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(file_list, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(file_list); + } +} + /** Remove client auth credentials for the service hs_address. */ hs_client_removal_auth_status_t hs_client_remove_auth_credentials(const char *hsaddress) @@ -1629,8 +1707,14 @@ hs_client_remove_auth_credentials(const char *hsaddress) hs_client_service_authorization_t *cred = NULL; cred = digest256map_remove(client_auths, service_identity_pk.pubkey); + /* digestmap_remove() returns the previously stored data if there were any */ if (cred) { + if (cred->flags & CLIENT_AUTH_FLAG_IS_PERMANENT) { + /* These creds are stored on disk: remove the corresponding file. */ + find_and_remove_client_auth_creds_file(cred); + } + client_service_authorization_free(cred); return REMOVAL_SUCCESS; } diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_control.c b/src/test/test_hs_control.c index 572b7f3ab..d064f203a 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_control.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_control.c @@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ test_hs_control_store_permanent_creds(void *arg) /* This is the base32 represenation of the base64 UDRv... key above */ "x25519:ka2g6zf33qti2ecexpbx4stan3nsu3sijbiqm4t2rwctigxajnpq"); - /* Now for our final act!!! Actually get the HS client subsystem to parse the + /* Now for our next act!!! Actually get the HS client subsystem to parse the * whole directory and make sure that it extracted the right credential! */ hs_config_client_authorization(get_options(), 0); @@ -600,6 +600,27 @@ test_hs_control_store_permanent_creds(void *arg) tt_str_op(hex_str((char*)client_2fv->enc_seckey.secret_key, 32), OP_EQ, "50346F64BBDC268D1044BBC37E4A606EDB2A6E48485106727A8D85341AE04B5F"); + /* And now for the final act! Use the REMOVE control port command to remove + the credential, and ensure that the file has also been removed! */ + tor_free(conn.current_cmd); + tor_free(cp1); + tor_free(args); + + /* Ensure that the creds file exists */ + tt_int_op(file_status(creds_fname), OP_EQ, FN_FILE); + + /* Do the REMOVE */ + conn.current_cmd = tor_strdup("ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_REMOVE"); + args =tor_strdup("2fvhjskjet3n5syd6yfg5lhvwcs62bojmthr35ko5bllr3iqdb4ctdyd"); + retval = handle_control_command(&conn, (uint32_t) strlen(args), args); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); + cp1 = buf_get_contents(TO_CONN(&conn)->outbuf, &sz); + tt_str_op(cp1, OP_EQ, "250 OK\r\n"); + + /* Ensure that the file has been removed and the map is empty */ + tt_int_op(file_status(creds_fname), OP_EQ, FN_NOENT); + tt_uint_op(digest256map_size(client_auths), OP_EQ, 0); + done: tor_free(args); tor_free(cp1);

1 0

[tor/master] Merge branch 'tor-github/pr/1563'
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 03 Dec '19

03 Dec '19

commit 65759f29019ed4cd33502fef9b06bb92aa6e348a Merge: df6c5382a 12305b6bb Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 3 09:22:21 2019 -0500 Merge branch 'tor-github/pr/1563' src/feature/control/control_hs.c | 18 +-- src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 296 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- src/feature/hs/hs_client.h | 8 +- src/test/test_hs_control.c | 181 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 422 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-)

1 0

[tor/master] hsv3: Implement permanent storage of auth credentials.
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 03 Dec '19

03 Dec '19

commit 70572b9abd660448777ebbee3dc71d7d70b37d8c Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Nov 25 15:55:12 2019 +0200 hsv3: Implement permanent storage of auth credentials. - See hs_client_register_auth_credentials() for the entry point. - Also set the permanent flag for credentials we read from the filesystem. - Also add some missing documentation. --- src/feature/control/control_hs.c | 4 ++ src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/feature/hs/hs_client.h | 2 + 3 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/feature/control/control_hs.c b/src/feature/control/control_hs.c index 4c1d16a8c..97938211d 100644 --- a/src/feature/control/control_hs.c +++ b/src/feature/control/control_hs.c @@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ handle_control_onion_client_auth_add(control_connection_t *conn, /* It's a bug because the service addr has already been validated above */ control_printf_endreply(conn, 512, "Invalid v3 address \"%s\"", hsaddress); break; + case REGISTER_FAIL_PERMANENT_STORAGE: + control_printf_endreply(conn, 553, "Unable to store creds for \"%s\"", + hsaddress); + break; case REGISTER_SUCCESS_ALREADY_EXISTS: control_printf_endreply(conn, 251,"Client for onion existed and replaced"); break; diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index 787b29b57..3c681dd85 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -1445,6 +1445,80 @@ client_dir_fetch_unexpected(dir_connection_t *dir_conn, const char *reason, NULL); } +/** Get the full filename for storing the client auth credentials for the + * service in onion_address. The base directory is dir. + * This function never returns NULL. */ +static char * +get_client_auth_creds_filename(const char *onion_address, + const char *dir) +{ + char *full_fname = NULL; + char *fname; + + tor_asprintf(&fname, "%s.auth_private", onion_address); + full_fname = hs_path_from_filename(dir, fname); + tor_free(fname); + + return full_fname; +} + +/** Permanently store the credentials in creds to disk. + * + * Return -1 if there was an error while storing the credentials, otherwise + * return 0. + */ +static int +store_permanent_client_auth_credentials( + const hs_client_service_authorization_t *creds) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + char *full_fname = NULL; + char *file_contents = NULL; + char priv_key_b32[BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)+1]; + int retval = -1; + + tor_assert(creds->flags & CLIENT_AUTH_FLAG_IS_PERMANENT); + + /* We need ClientOnionAuthDir to be set, otherwise we can't proceed */ + if (!options->ClientOnionAuthDir) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Can't register permanent client auth credentials " + "for %s without ClientOnionAuthDir option. Discarding.", + creds->onion_address); + goto err; + } + + /* Make sure the directory exists and is private enough. */ + if (check_private_dir(options->ClientOnionAuthDir, 0, options->User) < 0) { + goto err; + } + + /* Get filename that we should store the credentials */ + full_fname = get_client_auth_creds_filename(creds->onion_address, + options->ClientOnionAuthDir); + + /* Encode client private key */ + base32_encode(priv_key_b32, sizeof(priv_key_b32), + (char*)creds->enc_seckey.secret_key, + sizeof(creds->enc_seckey.secret_key)); + + /* Get the full file contents and write it to disk! */ + tor_asprintf(&file_contents, "%s:descriptor:x25519:%s", + creds->onion_address, priv_key_b32); + if (write_str_to_file(full_fname, file_contents, 0) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Failed to write client auth creds file for %s!", + creds->onion_address); + goto err; + } + + retval = 0; + + err: + tor_free(file_contents); + tor_free(full_fname); + + return retval; +} + /** Register the credential creds as part of the client auth subsystem. * * Takes ownership of creds. @@ -1468,6 +1542,15 @@ hs_client_register_auth_credentials(hs_client_service_authorization_t *creds) return REGISTER_FAIL_BAD_ADDRESS; } + /* If we reach this point, the credentials will be stored one way or another: + * Make them permanent if the user asked us to. */ + if (creds->flags & CLIENT_AUTH_FLAG_IS_PERMANENT) { + if (store_permanent_client_auth_credentials(creds) < 0) { + client_service_authorization_free(creds); + return REGISTER_FAIL_PERMANENT_STORAGE; + } + } + old_creds = digest256map_get(client_auths, service_identity_pk.pubkey); if (old_creds) { digest256map_remove(client_auths, service_identity_pk.pubkey); @@ -1795,6 +1878,13 @@ auth_key_filename_is_valid(const char *filename) return ret; } +/** Parse the client auth credentials off a string in client_key_str + * based on the file format documented in the "Client side configuration" + * section of rend-spec-v3.txt. + * + * Return NULL if there was an error, otherwise return a newly allocated + * hs_client_service_authorization_t structure. + */ STATIC hs_client_service_authorization_t * parse_auth_file_content(const char *client_key_str) { @@ -1825,7 +1915,7 @@ parse_auth_file_content(const char *client_key_str) goto err; } - if (strlen(seckey_b32) != BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { + if (strlen(seckey_b32) != BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN)) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization encoded base32 private key " "length is invalid: %s", seckey_b32); goto err; @@ -1842,6 +1932,9 @@ parse_auth_file_content(const char *client_key_str) } strncpy(auth->onion_address, onion_address, HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32); + /* We are reading this from the disk, so set the permanent flag anyway. */ + auth->flags |= CLIENT_AUTH_FLAG_IS_PERMANENT; + /* Success. */ goto done; diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h index 04827ea92..75a911107 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ typedef enum { REGISTER_SUCCESS_AND_DECRYPTED, /* We failed to register these credentials, because of a bad HS address. */ REGISTER_FAIL_BAD_ADDRESS, + /* We failed to register these credentials, because of a bad HS address. */ + REGISTER_FAIL_PERMANENT_STORAGE, } hs_client_register_auth_status_t; /* Status code of client auth credential removal */

1 0

Jump to page:

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

tor-commits December 2019