July 2014 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[flashproxy/master] How to set up Google Authenticator for a Gmail account.
by dcf＠torproject.org 12 Jul '14

12 Jul '14

commit 9ef292b79bf8696dfd0f0c2a58713f043b3cd4f4 Author: David Fifield <david(a)bamsoftware.com> Date: Sat Jul 12 08:44:49 2014 -0700 How to set up Google Authenticator for a Gmail account. This way you don't have to maintain access to the phone number used when you registered. --- facilitator/doc/email-howto.txt | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/facilitator/doc/email-howto.txt b/facilitator/doc/email-howto.txt index 9cbfdb6..a8d8433 100644 --- a/facilitator/doc/email-howto.txt +++ b/facilitator/doc/email-howto.txt @@ -60,16 +60,28 @@ Click "Save Changes". Enable two-factor authentication. We do this not so much for the two-factor, but because it allows creating an independent password that is used only for IMAP and does not have access to the web interface of -Gmail. Click the email address in the upper right, then "Account". Click -"Security". By "2-step verification" click "Edit". Click through until -it lets you set up. The phone number you provided when the account was -created will be automatically filled in. Choose "Text message (SMS)" -then click "Send code". Get your text message, type it in, and hit -"Verify". Uncheck "Trust this computer" on the next screen. Finally -"Confirm". On the following summary page, click "Show backup codes" and -save the codes to encrypted storage. Future codes can be generated at -https://www.google.com/accounts/SmsAuthConfig. - -Still on the 2-step summary page, click "Manage application-specific -passwords". Enter "IMAP" for the name and click "Generate password". -Now store this in reg-email.pass, as mentioned in the introduction. +Gmail. Two-factor authentication also enables you to set up a Google +Authenticator one-time password token and decouple the account from the +phone number. Click the email address in the upper right, then +"Account". Click "Security". By "2-step verification" click "Setup". +Click through until it lets you set up. The phone number you provided +when the account was created will be automatically filled in. Choose +"Text message (SMS)" then click "Send code". Get your text message, type +it in, and hit "Verify". Uncheck "Trust this computer" on the next +screen. Finally "Confirm". + +Now set up a Google Authenticator secret and. Under "Primary way you +receive codes", click "Switch to app". Choose "BlackBerry" and +"Continue". Copy the secret key to a file. Use a program such as +https://github.com/tadeck/onetimepass to generate a verification code +and click "Verify and Save". Now you can remove the phone number if you +wish by clicking "Remove" next to it. + +Under "Backup codes", click "Print or download", and save the codes to a +file so you can log in if all else fails. + +Still on the 2-step verification page, click the "App-specific +passwords" tab and the "Manage application-specific passwords" button. +Under "Select app", select "Custom" and enter "IMAP" for the name. Click +"Generate". Store the password in reg-email.pass, as mentioned in the +introduction.

1 0

r26866: {website} when we bump the include/versions.wmi, we should also bump M (website/trunk)
by Roger Dingledine 12 Jul '14

12 Jul '14

Author: arma Date: 2014-07-12 11:17:28 +0000 (Sat, 12 Jul 2014) New Revision: 26866 Modified: website/trunk/Makefile Log: when we bump the include/versions.wmi, we should also bump Makefile Modified: website/trunk/Makefile =================================================================== --- website/trunk/Makefile 2014-07-12 10:56:02 UTC (rev 26865) +++ website/trunk/Makefile 2014-07-12 11:17:28 UTC (rev 26866) @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ # 5. ./publish export STABLETAG=tor-0.2.4.22 -export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.5.4-alpha +export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.5.5-alpha WMLBASE=. SUBDIRS=docs eff projects press about download getinvolved donate docs/torbutton

1 0

r26865: {website} remove the exit enclaving faq entry (exit enclaving doesn't (website/trunk/docs/en)
by Roger Dingledine 12 Jul '14

12 Jul '14

Author: arma Date: 2014-07-12 10:56:02 +0000 (Sat, 12 Jul 2014) New Revision: 26865 Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: remove the exit enclaving faq entry (exit enclaving doesn't work for most users now, since most users only see the summary exit policy, which describes ports but not addresses.) this would be a good candidate for an ifaq, if we had one, to explain what this feature used to be. Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-07-12 10:54:19 UTC (rev 26864) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-07-12 10:56:02 UTC (rev 26865) @@ -237,7 +237,6 @@ communications? Isn't that bad? </a></li> <li><a href="#AmITotallyAnonymous">So I'm totally anonymous if I use Tor?</a></li> - <li><a href="#ExitEnclaving">What is Exit Enclaving?</a></li> <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></li> <li><a href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></li> @@ -3563,69 +3562,6 @@ <hr> - <a id="ExitEnclaving"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitEnclaving">What is Exit Enclaving?</a> - </h3> - - - When a machine that runs a Tor relay also runs a public service, such as - a webserver, you can configure Tor to offer Exit Enclaving to that - service. Running an Exit Enclave for all of your services you wish to - be accessible via Tor provides your users the assurance that they will - exit through your server, rather than exiting from a randomly selected - exit node that could be watched. Normally, a tor circuit would end at - an exit node and then that node would make a connection to your service. - Anyone watching that exit node could see the connection to your service, - and be able to snoop on the contents if it were an unencrypted - connection. If you run an Exit Enclave for your service, then the exit - from the Tor network happens on the machine that runs your service, - rather than on an untrusted random node. This works when Tor clients - wishing to connect to this public service extend their circuit - to exit from the Tor relay running on that same host. For example, if - the server at 1.2.3.4 runs a web server on port 80 and also acts as a - Tor relay configured for Exit Enclaving, then Tor clients wishing to - connect to the webserver will extend their circuit a fourth hop to exit - to port 80 on the Tor relay running on 1.2.3.4. - - - Exit Enclaving is disabled by default to prevent attackers from - exploiting trust relationships with locally bound services. For - example, often 127.0.0.1 will run services that are not designed to - be shared with the entire world. Sometimes these services will also - be bound to the public IP address, but will only allow connections if - the source address is something trusted, such as 127.0.0.1. - - - As a result of possible trust issues, relay operators must configure - their exit policy to allow connections to themselves, but they should - do so only when they are certain that this is a feature that they would - like. Once certain, turning off the ExitPolicyRejectPrivate option will - enable Exit Enclaving. An example configuration would be as follows: - - <pre> - ExitPolicy accept 1.2.3.4:80 - ExitPolicy reject 127.0.0.1/8 - ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0 - </pre> - - This option should be used with care as it may expose internal network - blocks that are not meant to be accessible from the outside world or - the Tor network. Please tailor your ExitPolicy to reflect all netblocks - that you want to prohibit access. - - - This option should be used with care as it may expose internal network - blocks that are not meant to be accessible from the outside world or - the Tor network. Please tailor your ExitPolicy to reflect all netblocks - that you want to prohibit access. - - - While useful, this behavior may go away in the future because it is - imperfect. A great idea but not such a great implementation. - - - <hr> - <a id="KeyManagement"></a> <h3><a class="anchor" href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></h3>

1 0

r26864: {website} more updates on the 'change your path length' faq entry (website/trunk/docs/en)
by Roger Dingledine 12 Jul '14

12 Jul '14

Author: arma Date: 2014-07-12 10:54:19 +0000 (Sat, 12 Jul 2014) New Revision: 26864 Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: more updates on the 'change your path length' faq entry Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-07-12 01:22:08 UTC (rev 26863) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-07-12 10:54:19 UTC (rev 26864) @@ -4232,21 +4232,24 @@ example if you're accessing a hidden service or a ".exit" address it could be 4. - We don't want to encourage people to use paths longer than this -- it + We don't want to encourage people to use paths longer than this — it increases load on the network without (as far as we can tell) providing - any more security. In fact, using paths longer than 3 could harm anonymity - ("Oh, there's that person who changed her path length again"). Remember that + any more security. Remember that <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#s…"> the best way to attack Tor is to attack the endpoints and ignore the middle of the path</a>. + Also, using paths longer than 3 could harm anonymity, first because + it makes <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#ccs07-doa">"denial of + security"</a> attacks easier, and second because it could act as an + identifier if only a few people do it ("Oh, there's that person who + changed her path length again"). And we don't want to encourage people to use paths of length 1 either. - Currently there is no reason to suspect that investigating a single - relay will yield user-destination pairs, but if many people are using + Currently there is no reason to suspect that investigating a single + relay will yield user-destination pairs, but if many people are using only a single hop, we make it more likely that attackers will seize or - break into relays in hopes - of tracing users. + break into relays in hopes of tracing users. Now, there is a good argument for making the number of hops in a path @@ -4255,8 +4258,10 @@ for sure which entry node you used. Choosing path length from, say, a geometric distribution will turn this into a statistical attack, which seems to be an improvement. On the other hand, a longer path - length is bad for usability. We're not sure of the right trade-offs - here. Please write a research paper that tells us what to do. + length is bad for usability, and without further protections it seems + likely that an adversary can estimate your path length anyway. We're + not sure of the right trade-offs here. Please write a research paper + that tells us what to do. <hr>

1 0

[translation/bridgedb] Update translations for bridgedb
by translation＠torproject.org 12 Jul '14

12 Jul '14

commit b80395f92deba6f5e66bc81ba09217303dd5057b Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Jul 12 07:15:02 2014 +0000 Update translations for bridgedb --- ar/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/ar/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po b/ar/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po index e83da35..28ed3c3 100644 --- a/ar/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po +++ b/ar/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po @@ -12,13 +12,14 @@ # Sherief Alaa <sheriefalaa.w(a)gmail.com>, 2013-2014 # Sherief Alaa <sheriefalaa.w(a)gmail.com>, 2013 # محمد الحرقان <malham1(a)gmail.com>, 2011 +# محيي الدين <tx99h4(a)hotmail.com>, 2014 msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: 'https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=BridgeDB&keywo…'\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2014-06-06 21:46+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-07-07 10:51+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: AnonymousLady <farah.jaza(a)hotmail.com>\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-07-12 07:00+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: محيي الدين <tx99h4(a)hotmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: Arabic (http://www.transifex.com/projects/p/torproject/language/ar/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ msgstr "ابلغ عن خطأ بالبرنامج" #: lib/bridgedb/templates/base.html:93 msgid "Source Code" -msgstr "" +msgstr "الرمز المصدري" #: lib/bridgedb/templates/base.html:96 msgid "Changelog" @@ -276,7 +277,7 @@ msgstr "" #: lib/bridgedb/templates/base.html:98 msgid "Contact" -msgstr "" +msgstr "جهات الاتصال" #. TRANSLATORS: Please translate this into some silly way to say #. "There was a problem!" in your language. For example,

1 0

r26863: {website} What do all these numbers indicate? (website/trunk/docs/en)
by Matt Pagan 12 Jul '14

12 Jul '14

Author: mttp Date: 2014-07-12 01:22:08 +0000 (Sat, 12 Jul 2014) New Revision: 26863 Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: What do all these numbers indicate? Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-07-12 01:16:53 UTC (rev 26862) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-07-12 01:22:08 UTC (rev 26863) @@ -2884,112 +2884,7 @@ configure your server to not hit these limits. For example, in SWSoft's Virtuozzo, investigate /proc/user_beancounters. Look for "failcnt" in tcpsndbuf, tcprecvbuf, numothersock, and othersockbuf. Ask for these to -be increased accordingly. Some users have seen settings work well as follows: - -<table border="1"> -<tr> -<td> -resource -</td> -<td> -held -</td> -<td> -maxheld -</td> -<td> -barrier -</td> -<td> -limit -</td> -<td> -failcnt -</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> -tcpsndbuf -</td> -<td> -46620 -</td> -<td> -48840 -</td> -<td> -3440640 -</td> -<td> -5406720 -</td> -<td> -0 -</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> -tcprcvbuf -</td> -<td> -0 -</td> -<td> -2220 -</td> -<td> -3440640 -</td> -<td> -5406720 -</td> -<td> -0 -</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> -othersockbuf -</td> -<td> -243516 -</td> -<td> -260072 -</td> -<td> -2252160 -</td> -<td> -4194304 -</td> -<td> -0 -</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> -numothersock -</td> -<td> -151 -</td> -<td> -153 -</td> -<td> -720 -</td> -<td> -720 -</td> -<td> -0 -</td> -</tr> -</table> - - Xen, Virtual Box and VMware virtual servers have no such limits normally. +be increased accordingly. Xen, Virtual Box and VMware virtual servers have no such limits normally. If the vserver admin will not increase system limits another option is

1 0

r26862: {website} More than 3 hops can harm anonymity (FAQ). (website/trunk/docs/en)
by Matt Pagan 12 Jul '14

12 Jul '14

Author: mttp Date: 2014-07-12 01:16:53 +0000 (Sat, 12 Jul 2014) New Revision: 26862 Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: More than 3 hops can harm anonymity (FAQ). Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-07-11 13:00:56 UTC (rev 26861) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-07-12 01:16:53 UTC (rev 26862) @@ -4339,11 +4339,11 @@ We don't want to encourage people to use paths longer than this -- it increases load on the network without (as far as we can tell) providing - any more security. Remember that <a - href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#s…"> + any more security. In fact, using paths longer than 3 could harm anonymity + ("Oh, there's that person who changed her path length again"). Remember that +<a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#s…"> the best way to attack Tor is to attack the endpoints and ignore the middle - of the path -</a>. + of the path</a>. And we don't want to encourage people to use paths of length 1 either.

1 0

[translation/tails-misc_completed] Update translations for tails-misc_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 11 Jul '14

11 Jul '14

commit ad48a3dc1b3a3c54bed56bf33218f8c19c2df435 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 11 23:15:41 2014 +0000 Update translations for tails-misc_completed --- ko.po | 16 +++++++++------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/ko.po b/ko.po index c2ba280..5c38779 100644 --- a/ko.po +++ b/ko.po @@ -5,13 +5,14 @@ # Translators: # ilbe123 <a3057016(a)drdrb.net>, 2014 # Dr.what <javrick6(a)naver.com>, 2014 +# ryush00 <ryush00(a)gmail.com>, 2014 msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-04-27 19:29+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-05-06 08:20+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: ilbe123 <a3057016(a)drdrb.net>\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-06-08 19:08+0200\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-07-11 23:00+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: ryush00 <ryush00(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: Korean (http://www.transifex.com/projects/p/torproject/language/ko/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -219,10 +220,6 @@ msgstr "강제 종료" msgid "Reboot Immediately" msgstr "강제 재시동" -#: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/shutdown_helper_applet:72 -msgid "Shutdown Helper" -msgstr "종료 도우미" - #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/tails-about:16 msgid "not available" msgstr "불가능" @@ -244,6 +241,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "생성 정보:\n%s" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/tails-about:27 +#: ../config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/applications/tails-about.desktop.in.h:1 msgid "About Tails" msgstr "Tails에 관하여" @@ -480,6 +478,10 @@ msgstr "i2p" msgid "Anonymous overlay network" msgstr "익명 오버레이 네트워크" +#: ../config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/applications/tails-about.desktop.in.h:2 +msgid "Learn more about Tails" +msgstr "Tails에 대해서 더 알아보기" + #: ../config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/applications/tails-reboot.desktop.in.h:1 msgid "Reboot" msgstr "재시동"

1 0

[translation/tails-misc] Update translations for tails-misc
by translation＠torproject.org 11 Jul '14

11 Jul '14

commit 4daa51624c4273b1203b882f731b389ac5f66f30 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 11 23:15:34 2014 +0000 Update translations for tails-misc --- ko.po | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/ko.po b/ko.po index 22b8711..5c38779 100644 --- a/ko.po +++ b/ko.po @@ -5,13 +5,14 @@ # Translators: # ilbe123 <a3057016(a)drdrb.net>, 2014 # Dr.what <javrick6(a)naver.com>, 2014 +# ryush00 <ryush00(a)gmail.com>, 2014 msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-05-29 00:14+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-05-29 08:50+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: runasand <runa.sandvik(a)gmail.com>\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-06-08 19:08+0200\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-07-11 23:00+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: ryush00 <ryush00(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: Korean (http://www.transifex.com/projects/p/torproject/language/ko/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -479,7 +480,7 @@ msgstr "익명 오버레이 네트워크" #: ../config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/applications/tails-about.desktop.in.h:2 msgid "Learn more about Tails" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Tails에 대해서 더 알아보기" #: ../config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/applications/tails-reboot.desktop.in.h:1 msgid "Reboot"

1 0

[tor-launcher/master] Bug 11193: Change "Tor Browser Bundle" to "Tor Browser"
by brade＠torproject.org 11 Jul '14

11 Jul '14

commit 3800f076154152ca5446cd8ea8ec33a46d0b9bf4 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Fri Jul 11 13:37:27 2014 -0400 Bug 11193: Change "Tor Browser Bundle" to "Tor Browser" Update the logo that is displayed in the network settings wizard. --- src/chrome/skin/network-settings.css | 5 +++-- src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.png | Bin 15395 -> 20231 bytes 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/skin/network-settings.css b/src/chrome/skin/network-settings.css index b1f7f92..c27878c 100644 --- a/src/chrome/skin/network-settings.css +++ b/src/chrome/skin/network-settings.css @@ -89,8 +89,9 @@ button.firstAnswer { .tbb-logo { list-style-image: url("chrome://torlauncher/skin/tbb-logo.png"); - width: 198px; - height: 70px; + width: 115px; + height: 80px; + margin-right: 20px; } #bridgeCustomEntry { diff --git a/src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.png b/src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.png index d6744ae..5499203 100644 Binary files a/src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.png and b/src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.png differ

1 0