February 2013 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Better document an XXX comment about refactoring.
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '13

07 Feb '13

commit bbd38f293f37b806a299f436ec5e03e8152f8d8f Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Mon Feb 4 17:01:56 2013 -0800 Better document an XXX comment about refactoring. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 5 ++++- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 26edccd..7c46f5f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2336,7 +2336,10 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) * pathbias_measure_use_rate(). It may be possible to combine them * eventually, especially if we can ever remove the need for 3 * levels of closure warns (if the overall circuit failure rate - * goes down with ntor). + * goes down with ntor). One way to do so would be to multiply + * the build rate with the use rate to get an idea of the total + * fraction of the total network paths the user is able to use. + * See ticket #8159. */ static void pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'ticket8161_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '13

07 Feb '13

commit 12c6475c064c7792004582031b8409dddfe0327f Merge: 0175209 eb15be3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 7 14:31:04 2013 -0500 Merge branch 'ticket8161_squashed' changes/bug8161 | 6 ++++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 4 ++-- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 21 ++++++++++++--------- src/or/entrynodes.h | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Mention a trac ticket relevant to an XXX comment.
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '13

07 Feb '13

commit eb15be3d4563ebdf6c4642a92eacc7e5a693f938 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Mon Feb 4 17:03:48 2013 -0800 Mention a trac ticket relevant to an XXX comment. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 7c46f5f..b9a4f89 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2460,7 +2460,7 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) * * XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done * better by keeping separate pending counters that get - * transfered at circuit close. + * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160. */ static void pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard) @@ -2506,7 +2506,7 @@ pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard) * * XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done * better by keeping separate pending counters that get - * transfered at circuit close. + * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160. */ void pathbias_scale_use_rates(entry_guard_t *guard)

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[tor/master] Tolerate curve25519 backends where the high bit of the pk isn't ignored
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '13

07 Feb '13

commit 266419d244c1a4795407479693b016c5a8b5da96 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 4 12:50:01 2013 -0500 Tolerate curve25519 backends where the high bit of the pk isn't ignored Right now, all our curve25519 backends ignore the high bit of the public key. But possibly, others could treat the high bit of the public key as encoding out-of-bounds values, or as something to be preserved. This could be used to distinguish clients with different backends, at the cost of killing a circuit. As a workaround, let's just clear the high bit of each public key indiscriminately before we use it. Fix for bug 8121, reported by rransom. Bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. --- changes/bug8121 | 7 +++++++ src/common/crypto_curve25519.c | 11 +++++++++-- src/test/test_crypto.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug8121 b/changes/bug8121 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..60cba72 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug8121 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Minor features: + - Clear the high bit on curve25519 public keys before passing them to + our backend, in case we ever wind up using a backend that doesn't do + so itself. If we used such a backend, and *didn't* clear the high bit, + we could wind up in a situation where users with such backends would + be distinguishable from users without. Fix for bug 8121; bugfix on + 0.2.4.8-alpha. diff --git a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c index 425a1a0..3e4004d 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c @@ -33,13 +33,20 @@ int curve25519_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret, const uint8_t *basepoint) { + uint8_t bp[CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN]; + int r; + memcpy(bp, basepoint, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + /* Clear the high bit, in case our backend foolishly looks at it. */ + bp[31] &= 0x7f; #ifdef USE_CURVE25519_DONNA - return curve25519_donna(output, secret, basepoint); + r = curve25519_donna(output, secret, bp); #elif defined(USE_CURVE25519_NACL) - return crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(output, secret, basepoint); + r = crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(output, secret, bp); #else #error "No implementation of curve25519 is available." #endif + memwipe(bp, 0, sizeof(bp)); + return r; } /* ============================== diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 37843d1..273e03b 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -941,6 +941,8 @@ test_crypto_curve25519_impl(void *arg) /* adapted from curve25519_donna, which adapted it from test-curve25519 version 20050915, by D. J. Bernstein, Public domain. */ + const int randomize_high_bit = (arg != NULL); + unsigned char e1k[32]; unsigned char e2k[32]; unsigned char e1e2k[32]; @@ -952,12 +954,19 @@ test_crypto_curve25519_impl(void *arg) const int loop_max=10000; char *mem_op_hex_tmp = NULL; - (void)arg; - for (loop = 0; loop < loop_max; ++loop) { curve25519_impl(e1k,e1,k); curve25519_impl(e2e1k,e2,e1k); curve25519_impl(e2k,e2,k); + if (randomize_high_bit) { + /* We require that the high bit of the public key be ignored. So if + * we're doing this variant test, we randomize the high bit of e2k, and + * make sure that the handshake still works out the same as it would + * otherwise. */ + uint8_t byte; + crypto_rand((char*)&byte, 1); + e2k[31] |= (byte & 0x80); + } curve25519_impl(e1e2k,e1,e2k); test_memeq(e1e2k, e2e1k, 32); if (loop == loop_max-1) { @@ -1135,6 +1144,7 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = { { "hkdf_sha256", test_crypto_hkdf_sha256, 0, NULL, NULL }, #ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED { "curve25519_impl", test_crypto_curve25519_impl, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "curve25519_impl_hibit", test_crypto_curve25519_impl, 0, NULL, (void*)"y" }, { "curve25519_wrappers", test_crypto_curve25519_wrappers, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "curve25519_encode", test_crypto_curve25519_encode, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "curve25519_persist", test_crypto_curve25519_persist, 0, NULL, NULL },

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug8121_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '13

07 Feb '13

commit 0175209e6b3bf990633838e35b9c70d4099124ae Merge: b4a68d1 266419d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 7 14:09:17 2013 -0500 Merge branch 'bug8121_squashed' changes/bug8121 | 7 +++++++ src/common/crypto_curve25519.c | 11 +++++++++-- src/test/test_crypto.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

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[translation/tsum_completed] Update translations for tsum_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 07 Feb '13

07 Feb '13

commit 8fdb6b314e15e2d8519b81cc3cd955ab8ab00ce0 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 7 18:45:24 2013 +0000 Update translations for tsum_completed --- fr/short-user-manual_fr_noimg.xhtml | 13 +++++++------ 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fr/short-user-manual_fr_noimg.xhtml b/fr/short-user-manual_fr_noimg.xhtml index f891fe7..2b16cb3 100644 --- a/fr/short-user-manual_fr_noimg.xhtml +++ b/fr/short-user-manual_fr_noimg.xhtml @@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ Note: Les Bundles Tor Browser pour Linux et Mac OS X sont assez volumineux, et vous ne serez pas en mesure de recevoir un de ces paquets avec un compte Gmail, Hotmail ou Yahoo. Si vous ne pouvez pas recevoir le paquet que vous voulez, envoyez un email à help(a)rt.torproject.org et nous allons vous donner une liste de sites miroirs à utiliser. <h3 id="tor-for-smartphones">Tor pour les smartphones</h3> Vous pouvez obtenir Tor sur votre appareil Android en installant le paquet nommé Orbot. Pour plus d'informations sur le téléchargement et l'installation d'Orbot consultez le <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/android.html.en">site du Projet Tor</a>. - Nous avons aussi les paquets expérimentaux pour <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/N900.html.en">Nokia Maemo/N900</a> et <a href="http://sid77.slackware.it/ios/">Apple iOS</a>. + Nous avons également des archives expérimentales pour <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/N900.html.en">Nokia Maemo/N900</a> et <a href="http://sid77.slackware.it/iphone/">Apple iOS</a>. <h3 id="how-to-verify-that-you-have-the-right-version">Comment vérifier que vous avez la bonne version?</h3> Avant de lancer le Navigateur Tor, vous devriez vous assurer que vous avez la bonne version. Le logiciel que vous allez recevoir est accompagné d'un fichier qui porte le même nom que le package avec l'extension .asc. Ce fichier .asc est un signature GPG et va vous permettre de vérifier que le fichier que vous avez téléchargé est exactement celui que vous souhaitez obtenir. Avant de pouvoir vérifier la signature, vous devez télécharger et installer GnuPG: - Windows: <a href="http://gpg4win.org/download.html">http://gpg4win.org/download.html</a> Mac OS X: <a href="http://www.gpgtools.org/">http://www.gpgtools.org/</a> Linux: La plupart des distributions Linux embarque une version pré-installée de GnuPG. + Windows: <a href="http://gpg4win.org/download.html">http://gpg4win.org/download.html</a> Mac OS X: <a href="http://macgpg.sourceforge.net/">http://macgpg.sourceforge.net/</a> Linux: La plupart des distributions Linux embarque une version pré-installée de GnuPG. Veuillez noter qu'il peut-être nécessaire de modifier les chemins et les commandes utilisés ci-dessous pour le faire fonctionner sur votre PC. Le package Navigateur Tor est signé avec la clé 0x63FEE659 par Erinn Clark. Pour importer la clé de Erinn, lancer: <pre> @@ -43,9 +43,10 @@ <pre> <code>pub 2048R/63FEE659 2003-10-16 Key fingerprint = 8738 A680 B84B 3031 A630 F2DB 416F 0610 63FE E659 -uid Erinn Clark &lt;erinn(a)torproject.org&gt; -uid Erinn Clark &lt;erinn(a)debian.org&gt; -uid Erinn Clark &lt;erinn(a)double-helix.org&gt; +uid Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> +uid Erinn Clark <erinn(a)debian.org> + +uid Erinn Clark <erinn(a)double-helix.org> sub 2048R/EB399FD7 2003-10-16 </code> </pre> @@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ sub 2048R/EB399FD7 2003-10-16 Si tout est bon &quot;Signature correcte&quot; devrait s'afficher. Une mauvaise signature signifie que le fichier peut avoir été altéré ou corrompu. Si vous voyez une signature incorrecte, envoyer les informations concernant le site où vous avez téléchargé le paquet, comment vous avez vous vérifié la signature, et le résultat de GnuPG par email à help(a)rt.torproject.org. Dès lors que vous avez vérifié la signature et vu le message &quot;signature correcte&quot;, poursuivez en décompactant le package. Vous devez obtenir un dossier identique à tor-browser_en-US. A l'intérieur de ce dossier vous trouverez un sous-dossier nommé Docs contenant un fichier nommé changelog. Vous devez vous assurer que le numéro de version apparaissant en haut du fichier changelog correspond au numéro de version du nom du fichier. <h3 id="how-to-use-the-tor-browser-bundle">Comment utiliser le Navigateur Tor?</h3> - Après avoir téléchargé Tor Browser Bundle, décompressez l'archive sur votre bureau ou sur une clé USB. Vous devriez obtenir un répertoire contenant quelques fichiers. Un de ces fichiers est un exécutable appelé "Start Tor Browser" (ou "start-tor-browser", selon votre système d'exploitation). + Après avoir téléchargé et décompressé l'archive Tor Browser Bundle, vous devriez avoir un répertoire contenant quelques fichiers. Un de ces fichiers est un exécutable nommé "Start Tor Browser" (ou "start-tor-browser", selon votre système d'exploitation). Lorsque que vous démarrerez le package navigateur, vous verrez Vidalia démarrer et se connecter au réseau. Après cela, vous verrez le navigateur vous confirmez que vous utilisez à présent Tor. Cela s'obtient en visualisant <a href="https://check.torproject.org/">https://check.torproject.org/</a>. Vous naviguez dès lors sur Internet à travers Tor. Veuillez noter qu'il est important que vous utilisiez le navigateur fourni avec le paquet, et non pas votre navigateur.

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[translation/tsum] Update translations for tsum
by translation＠torproject.org 07 Feb '13

07 Feb '13

commit 84aba6343dcd7dee7c0f70cb1de49497877e8d1c Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 7 18:45:21 2013 +0000 Update translations for tsum --- fr/short-user-manual_fr_noimg.xhtml | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fr/short-user-manual_fr_noimg.xhtml b/fr/short-user-manual_fr_noimg.xhtml index 7922c07..2b16cb3 100644 --- a/fr/short-user-manual_fr_noimg.xhtml +++ b/fr/short-user-manual_fr_noimg.xhtml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Note: Les Bundles Tor Browser pour Linux et Mac OS X sont assez volumineux, et vous ne serez pas en mesure de recevoir un de ces paquets avec un compte Gmail, Hotmail ou Yahoo. Si vous ne pouvez pas recevoir le paquet que vous voulez, envoyez un email à help(a)rt.torproject.org et nous allons vous donner une liste de sites miroirs à utiliser. <h3 id="tor-for-smartphones">Tor pour les smartphones</h3> Vous pouvez obtenir Tor sur votre appareil Android en installant le paquet nommé Orbot. Pour plus d'informations sur le téléchargement et l'installation d'Orbot consultez le <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/android.html.en">site du Projet Tor</a>. - We also have experimental packages for <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/N900.html.en">Nokia Maemo/N900</a> and <a href="http://sid77.slackware.it/iphone/">Apple iOS</a>. + Nous avons également des archives expérimentales pour <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/N900.html.en">Nokia Maemo/N900</a> et <a href="http://sid77.slackware.it/iphone/">Apple iOS</a>. <h3 id="how-to-verify-that-you-have-the-right-version">Comment vérifier que vous avez la bonne version?</h3> Avant de lancer le Navigateur Tor, vous devriez vous assurer que vous avez la bonne version. Le logiciel que vous allez recevoir est accompagné d'un fichier qui porte le même nom que le package avec l'extension .asc. Ce fichier .asc est un signature GPG et va vous permettre de vérifier que le fichier que vous avez téléchargé est exactement celui que vous souhaitez obtenir. @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ sub 2048R/EB399FD7 2003-10-16 Si tout est bon &quot;Signature correcte&quot; devrait s'afficher. Une mauvaise signature signifie que le fichier peut avoir été altéré ou corrompu. Si vous voyez une signature incorrecte, envoyer les informations concernant le site où vous avez téléchargé le paquet, comment vous avez vous vérifié la signature, et le résultat de GnuPG par email à help(a)rt.torproject.org. Dès lors que vous avez vérifié la signature et vu le message &quot;signature correcte&quot;, poursuivez en décompactant le package. Vous devez obtenir un dossier identique à tor-browser_en-US. A l'intérieur de ce dossier vous trouverez un sous-dossier nommé Docs contenant un fichier nommé changelog. Vous devez vous assurer que le numéro de version apparaissant en haut du fichier changelog correspond au numéro de version du nom du fichier. <h3 id="how-to-use-the-tor-browser-bundle">Comment utiliser le Navigateur Tor?</h3> - After downloading the Tor Browser Bundle and extracting the package, you should have a directory with a few files in it. One of the files is an executable called "Start Tor Browser" (or "start-tor-browser", depending on your operating system). + Après avoir téléchargé et décompressé l'archive Tor Browser Bundle, vous devriez avoir un répertoire contenant quelques fichiers. Un de ces fichiers est un exécutable nommé "Start Tor Browser" (ou "start-tor-browser", selon votre système d'exploitation). Lorsque que vous démarrerez le package navigateur, vous verrez Vidalia démarrer et se connecter au réseau. Après cela, vous verrez le navigateur vous confirmez que vous utilisez à présent Tor. Cela s'obtient en visualisant <a href="https://check.torproject.org/">https://check.torproject.org/</a>. Vous naviguez dès lors sur Internet à travers Tor. Veuillez noter qu'il est important que vous utilisiez le navigateur fourni avec le paquet, et non pas votre navigateur.

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[torspec/master] patch from atagar: disallow "13." as a number
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '13

07 Feb '13

commit 546d115f65ea850e67a5eba2d3660362bee29bd4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 7 12:22:57 2013 -0500 patch from atagar: disallow "13." as a number --- dir-spec.txt | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/dir-spec.txt b/dir-spec.txt index 6e14a33..e3813dc 100644 --- a/dir-spec.txt +++ b/dir-spec.txt @@ -1200,7 +1200,7 @@ Thresholds = Threshold | Threshold SP Thresholds Threshold = ThresholdKey '=' ThresholdVal ThresholdKey = (KeywordChar | "_") + - ThresholdVal = [0-9]+("."[0-9]*)? "%"? + ThresholdVal = [0-9]+("."[0-9]+)? "%"? Commonly used Thresholds at this point include:

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[translation/vidalia_help] Update translations for vidalia_help
by translation＠torproject.org 07 Feb '13

07 Feb '13

commit c558d514c9c1817bf242e8d0ac8c2ef482df856c Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 7 16:45:31 2013 +0000 Update translations for vidalia_help --- eu/config.po | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/eu/config.po b/eu/config.po index 6574858..f0d95d3 100644 --- a/eu/config.po +++ b/eu/config.po @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2010-06-26 16:58+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2013-02-07 16:01+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2013-02-07 16:20+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Antxon Baldarra <baldarra(a)euskalerria.org>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ msgid "" "listening on the ports allowed by your firewall or proxy. Simply enter a " "list of ports permitted by your firewall or proxy, separated by commas. " "(Example: 80,443,8080)" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Nire firewallak bakarrik ataka zehatz batzuetara konektatzea baimentzen dit: Firewall murritzaile edo konekta zaitezkeen atakak mugatzen dituen proxy baten atzean baldin bazaude, Tor zuzenean zure firewallak edo proxyak baimendutako ataketan entzutzen dauden erreleetara konektatzeko konfiguratu dezakezu. Zure firewallak edo proxyak baimendutako ataken zerrenda bat, komaz bereizita, sar ezazu besterik gabe. (Adibidea: 80,443,8080)" #. type: Content of: <html><body><ul><li> #: en/config.html:69

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[torspec/master] Add proposal 218: Controller events to better understand connection/circuit usage
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '13

07 Feb '13

commit f529758e08f66332e9f48d1f97baa240d5906f62 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 7 11:44:40 2013 -0500 Add proposal 218: Controller events to better understand connection/circuit usage --- proposals/000-index.txt | 2 + proposals/218-usage-controller-events.txt | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt index 7677925..3a04148 100644 --- a/proposals/000-index.txt +++ b/proposals/000-index.txt @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ Proposals by number: 215 Let the minimum consensus method change with time [OPEN] 216 Improved circuit-creation key exchange [FINISHED] 217 Tor Extended ORPort Authentication [OPEN] +218 Controller events to better understand connection/circuit usage [OPEN] Proposals by status: @@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ Proposals by status: 214 Allow 4-byte circuit IDs in a new link protocol 215 Let the minimum consensus method change with time 217 Tor Extended ORPort Authentication [for 0.2.5.x] + 218 Controller events to better understand connection/circuit usage [for 0.2.5.x] ACCEPTED: 140 Provide diffs between consensuses 147 Eliminate the need for v2 directories in generating v3 directories [for 0.2.4.x] diff --git a/proposals/218-usage-controller-events.txt b/proposals/218-usage-controller-events.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0268df5 --- /dev/null +++ b/proposals/218-usage-controller-events.txt @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +Filename: 218-usage-controller-events.txt +Title: Controller events to better understand connection/circuit usage +Author: Rob Jansen, Karsten Loesing +Created: 2013-02-06 +Status: Open +Target: 0.2.5.x + +1. Overview + + This proposal defines three new controller events that shall help + understand connection and circuit usage. These events are designed + to be emitted in private Tor networks only. This proposal also + defines a tweak to an existing event for the same purpose. + +2. Motivation + + We need to better understand connection and circuit usage in order to + better simulate Tor networks. Existing controller events are a fine + start, but we need more detailed information about per-connection + bandwidth, processed cells by circuit, and token bucket refills. This + proposal defines controller events containing the desired information. + + Most of these usage data are too sensitive to be captured in the + public network, unless aggregated sufficiently. That is why we're + focusing on private Tor networks first, that is, relays that have + TestingTorNetwork set. The new controller events described in this + proposal shall all be restricted to private Tor networks. In the next + step we might define aggregate statistics to be gathered by public + relays, but that will require a new proposal. + +3. Design + + The proposed new event types use Tor's asynchronous event mechanism + where a controller registers for events by type and processes events + received from the Tor process. + + Tor controllers can register for any of the new event types, but + events will only be emitted if the Tor process is running in + TestingTorNetwork mode. + +4. Security implications + + There should be no security implications from the new event types, + because they are only emitted in private Tor networks. + +5. Specification + +5.1. Adding an ID field to ORCONN events + + The new syntax for ORCONN events is: + + "650" SP "ORCONN" SP (LongName / Target) SP ORStatus + [ SP "ID=" ConnId ] [ SP "REASON=" Reason ] + [ SP "NCIRCS=" NumCircuits ] CRLF + + ConnID is the connection ID which is locally unique among all + connection types and which is only included in TestingTorNetwork + mode. + + The remaining specification of that event type stays unchanged. + +5.2. Bandwidth used on an OR or DIR or EXIT connection + + The syntax is: + "650" SP "CONN_BW" SP ConnID SP ConnType SP BytesRead SP + BytesWritten CRLF + BytesRead = 1*DIGIT + BytesWritten = 1*DIGIT + + ConnID is the connection ID which is locally unique among all + connection types. + + ConnType is the connection type, which can be "OR" or "DIR" or "EXIT". + + BytesWritten and BytesRead are the number of bytes written and read + by Tor since the last CONN_BW event on this connection. + + These events are generated about once per second per connection; no + events are generated for connections that have not read or written. + These events are only generated if TestingTorNetwork is set. + +5.3. Per-circuit cell stats + + The syntax is: + "650" SP "CELL_STATS" SP + PCircID SP PConnID SP PAdded SP PRemoved SP PTime SP + NCircID SP NConnID SP NAdded SP NRemoved SP NTime CRLF + + PCircID and NCircID are the locally unique IDs of the app-ward + (PCircID) and exit-ward (NCircID) circuit. + + PConnID and NConnID are the locally unique IDs of the app-ward + (PConnID) and exit-ward (NConnID) OR connection. + + PAdded and NAdded are the total number of cells added to the app-ward + (PAdded) and exit-ward (NAdded) queues of this circuit. + + PRemoved and NRemoved are the total number of cells processed from the + app-ward (PRemoved) and exit-ward (NRemoved) queues of this circuit. + + PTime and NTime are the total waiting times in milliseconds of all + processed cells in the app-ward (PTime) and exit-ward (NTime) queues + of this circuit. + + PAdded, NAdded, PRemoved, NRemoved, PTime, and NTime are + semicolon-separated key-value lists with keys being lower-case cell + types and values being cell numbers or waiting times. + + These events are generated about once per second per circuit; no + events are generated for circuits that have not added or processed any + cell. These events are only generated if TestingTorNetwork is set. + +5.4. Token buckets refilled + + The syntax is: + "650" SP "TB_EMPTY" SP ["GLOBAL" || "RELAY" || "ORCONN" SP ConnID] + SP ReadBucketEmpty SP WriteBucketEmpty SP LastRefill CRLF + + This event is generated when refilling a previously empty token + bucket. The "GLOBAL" and "RELAY" keywords are used for the global or + relay token buckets, the "ORCONN" keyword together with a ConnID is + used for the token buckets of an OR connection. + + If both global and relay buckets and/or the buckets of one or more OR + connections run out of tokens at the same time, multiple separate + events are generated. + + ReadBucketEmpty (WriteBucketEmpty) is the time in millis that the read + (write) bucket was empty. LastRefill is the time in millis since the + last refill. ReadBucketEmpty or WriteBucketEmpty are capped at + LastRefill in order not to report empty times more than once. + + These events are only generated if TestingTorNetwork is set. + +6. Compatibility + + There should not be any compatibility issues with other Tor versions. + +7. Implementation + + Most of the implementation should be straight-forward. + + There's one exception: we pondered adding a unique circuit ID to + CELL_STATS events, but so far, only origin circuits have a unique ID. + We could move that field from origin_circuit_t to circuit_t and + update all references in the code. But this may have undesired side + effects which we're not yet aware of. We don't have a good answer + yet if we need this ID or not. + +8. Performance and scalability notes + + Most of the new code won't be executed in normal Tor mode. Wherever + we needed new fields in existing structs, we tried hard to keep them + as small as possible. Still, we should make sure that memory + requirements won't grow significantly on busy relays. +

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