I'm right in thinking that running scramblesuit is not going to do anything for a middle relay correct?

On 2 October 2014 00:41, isis isis@torproject.org wrote:

Jan Nielsen transcribed 2.2K bytes:

...

Hi.

I am trying to enable Scramblesuit for my bridge. I am wondering if there is a method to verify that it is working, similar to how obfs3 shows "registered server transport". There is not much out there about scramblesuit but there is one mention that the log should show "

registered

...

server transport scramble suit".

Tor version is 0.2.5.8-rc

Obfsproxy version 0.2.12

ExtORPort auto

ServerTransportPlugin obfs3,scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed

Oct 01 03:03:28.000 [notice] Registered server transport 'obfs3' at ' 0.0.0.0:39491'

Is there something wrong with my config?

One way to figure out if scramblesuit is running would be to enable logging, like this:

ServerTransportPlugin scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy --log-file /var/log/tor/scramblesuit.log --log-min-severity info managed

-- ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft _________________________________________________________ GPG: 4096R/A3ADB67A2CDB8B35 Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt

---

tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Thanks, will look at that link - sounds interesting indeed! Maybe something to play with in the future. On 2 Oct 2014 01:24, "isis" isis@torproject.org wrote:

Chris Whittleston transcribed 5.0K bytes:

...

I'm right in thinking that running scramblesuit is not going to do

anything

...

for a middle relay correct?

Correct.

Pluggable Transports are (normally) used for hiding that one is speaking the Tor protocol (also they could be used to disguise any protocol). [0] A middle relay, or any normal non-bridge relay, is listed in the consensus, meaning that anyone who looks at the consensus already knows you're speaking Tor.

All of that said, scramblesuit and obfs4 both have some interesting protections against traffic fingerprinting via timing correlations and packet size distributions, meaning that (if there were a way to do this) relays could use PTs between them to protect against some correlations. Doing this would be super weird. No one has done yet, to my knowledge, a security analysis of how running PTs in between normal relays would change things. That analysis would be really interesting.

https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableTr... for visual explanation of how some of the different PTs change your traffic.

-- ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft _________________________________________________________ GPG: 4096R/A3ADB67A2CDB8B35 Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt

---

tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays