commit 46a321fbdde353d0c0b37556d7e3e81cd2b42979
Merge: 1eb3719a6 967efc0d2
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org>
Date: Wed Dec 5 10:25:12 2018 -0500
Merge branch 'maint-0.3.5'
changes/bug28619 | 6 ++++++
src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 6 ++++--
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
1
0
[tor/release-0.3.5] hs-v3: Do not close RP circuits when deleting an ephemeral service
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
05 Dec '18
commit d37dbb09c2e8867cf2b87dc45e8646351754e94a
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org>
Date: Mon Nov 26 14:40:22 2018 -0500
hs-v3: Do not close RP circuits when deleting an ephemeral service
Bug reported on tor-dev@ and here is the detail explanation of the issue:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-November/013558.html
Fixes bug #28619
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org>
---
changes/bug28619 | 6 ++++++
src/or/hs_service.c | 6 ++++--
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug28619 b/changes/bug28619
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..86be8cb2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug28619
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes (hidden service v3):
+ - When deleting an ephemeral onion service (DEL_ONION), do not close any
+ rendezvous circuits in order to let the existing client connections
+ finish by themselves or closed by the application. The HS v2 is doing
+ that already so now we have the same behavior for all versions. Fixes
+ bug 28619; bugfix on 0.3.3.1-alpha.
diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.c b/src/or/hs_service.c
index 4c67aff42..3273705ae 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_service.c
@@ -3105,8 +3105,10 @@ hs_service_del_ephemeral(const char *address)
goto err;
}
- /* Close circuits, remove from map and finally free. */
- close_service_circuits(service);
+ /* Close introduction circuits, remove from map and finally free. Notice
+ * that the rendezvous circuits aren't closed in order for any existing
+ * connections to finish. We let the application terminate them. */
+ close_service_intro_circuits(service);
remove_service(hs_service_map, service);
hs_service_free(service);
1
0
[tor/release-0.3.5] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/546' into maint-0.3.5
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
05 Dec '18
commit 967efc0d28ffdedfb52640456e4483dd2ee63e05
Merge: 0906dde9d d37dbb09c
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org>
Date: Wed Dec 5 10:23:28 2018 -0500
Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/546' into maint-0.3.5
changes/bug28619 | 6 ++++++
src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 6 ++++--
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --cc src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
index 7d56c9e2a,000000000..304242895
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
@@@ -1,4168 -1,0 +1,4170 @@@
+/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file hs_service.c
+ * \brief Implement next generation hidden service functionality
+ **/
+
+#define HS_SERVICE_PRIVATE
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "app/config/statefile.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
+#include "core/or/circuituse.h"
+#include "core/or/relay.h"
+#include "feature/client/circpathbias.h"
+#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
+#include "feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/describe.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/node_select.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+#include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ope.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+
+#include "feature/hs/hs_circuit.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_common.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_config.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_control.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_service.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_stats.h"
+
+#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/edge_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
+#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h"
+#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
+
+#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
+
+/* Trunnel */
+#include "trunnel/ed25519_cert.h"
+#include "trunnel/hs/cell_common.h"
+#include "trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Helper macro. Iterate over every service in the global map. The var is the
+ * name of the service pointer. */
+#define FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(var) \
+ STMT_BEGIN \
+ hs_service_t **var##_iter, *var; \
+ HT_FOREACH(var##_iter, hs_service_ht, hs_service_map) { \
+ var = *var##_iter;
+#define FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END } STMT_END ;
+
+/* Helper macro. Iterate over both current and previous descriptor of a
+ * service. The var is the name of the descriptor pointer. This macro skips
+ * any descriptor object of the service that is NULL. */
+#define FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, var) \
+ STMT_BEGIN \
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *var; \
+ for (int var ## _loop_idx = 0; var ## _loop_idx < 2; \
+ ++var ## _loop_idx) { \
+ (var ## _loop_idx == 0) ? (var = service->desc_current) : \
+ (var = service->desc_next); \
+ if (var == NULL) continue;
+#define FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END } STMT_END ;
+
+/* Onion service directory file names. */
+static const char fname_keyfile_prefix[] = "hs_ed25519";
+static const char dname_client_pubkeys[] = "authorized_clients";
+static const char fname_hostname[] = "hostname";
+static const char address_tld[] = "onion";
+
+/* Staging list of service object. When configuring service, we add them to
+ * this list considered a staging area and they will get added to our global
+ * map once the keys have been loaded. These two steps are separated because
+ * loading keys requires that we are an actual running tor process. */
+static smartlist_t *hs_service_staging_list;
+
+/** True if the list of available router descriptors might have changed which
+ * might result in an altered hash ring. Check if the hash ring changed and
+ * reupload if needed */
+static int consider_republishing_hs_descriptors = 0;
+
+/* Static declaration. */
+static int load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service);
+static void set_descriptor_revision_counter(hs_service_descriptor_t *hs_desc,
+ time_t now, bool is_current);
+static int build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc);
+static void move_descriptors(hs_service_t *src, hs_service_t *dst);
+static int service_encode_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp,
+ char **encoded_out);
+
+/* Helper: Function to compare two objects in the service map. Return 1 if the
+ * two service have the same master public identity key. */
+static inline int
+hs_service_ht_eq(const hs_service_t *first, const hs_service_t *second)
+{
+ tor_assert(first);
+ tor_assert(second);
+ /* Simple key compare. */
+ return ed25519_pubkey_eq(&first->keys.identity_pk,
+ &second->keys.identity_pk);
+}
+
+/* Helper: Function for the service hash table code below. The key used is the
+ * master public identity key which is ultimately the onion address. */
+static inline unsigned int
+hs_service_ht_hash(const hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+ return (unsigned int) siphash24g(service->keys.identity_pk.pubkey,
+ sizeof(service->keys.identity_pk.pubkey));
+}
+
+/* This is _the_ global hash map of hidden services which indexed the service
+ * contained in it by master public identity key which is roughly the onion
+ * address of the service. */
+static struct hs_service_ht *hs_service_map;
+
+/* Register the service hash table. */
+HT_PROTOTYPE(hs_service_ht, /* Name of hashtable. */
+ hs_service_t, /* Object contained in the map. */
+ hs_service_node, /* The name of the HT_ENTRY member. */
+ hs_service_ht_hash, /* Hashing function. */
+ hs_service_ht_eq) /* Compare function for objects. */
+
+HT_GENERATE2(hs_service_ht, hs_service_t, hs_service_node,
+ hs_service_ht_hash, hs_service_ht_eq,
+ 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_)
+
+/* Query the given service map with a public key and return a service object
+ * if found else NULL. It is also possible to set a directory path in the
+ * search query. If pk is NULL, then it will be set to zero indicating the
+ * hash table to compare the directory path instead. */
+STATIC hs_service_t *
+find_service(hs_service_ht *map, const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
+{
+ hs_service_t dummy_service;
+ tor_assert(map);
+ tor_assert(pk);
+ memset(&dummy_service, 0, sizeof(dummy_service));
+ ed25519_pubkey_copy(&dummy_service.keys.identity_pk, pk);
+ return HT_FIND(hs_service_ht, map, &dummy_service);
+}
+
+/* Register the given service in the given map. If the service already exists
+ * in the map, -1 is returned. On success, 0 is returned and the service
+ * ownership has been transferred to the global map. */
+STATIC int
+register_service(hs_service_ht *map, hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(map);
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&service->keys.identity_pk));
+
+ if (find_service(map, &service->keys.identity_pk)) {
+ /* Existing service with the same key. Do not register it. */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Taking ownership of the object at this point. */
+ HT_INSERT(hs_service_ht, map, service);
+
+ /* If we just modified the global map, we notify. */
+ if (map == hs_service_map) {
+ hs_service_map_has_changed();
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Remove a given service from the given map. If service is NULL or the
+ * service key is unset, return gracefully. */
+STATIC void
+remove_service(hs_service_ht *map, hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ hs_service_t *elm;
+
+ tor_assert(map);
+
+ /* Ignore if no service or key is zero. */
+ if (BUG(service == NULL) ||
+ BUG(ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&service->keys.identity_pk))) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ elm = HT_REMOVE(hs_service_ht, map, service);
+ if (elm) {
+ tor_assert(elm == service);
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not find service in the global map "
+ "while removing service %s",
+ escaped(service->config.directory_path));
+ }
+
+ /* If we just modified the global map, we notify. */
+ if (map == hs_service_map) {
+ hs_service_map_has_changed();
+ }
+}
+
+/* Set the default values for a service configuration object <b>c</b>. */
+static void
+set_service_default_config(hs_service_config_t *c,
+ const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ (void) options;
+ tor_assert(c);
+ c->ports = smartlist_new();
+ c->directory_path = NULL;
+ c->max_streams_per_rdv_circuit = 0;
+ c->max_streams_close_circuit = 0;
+ c->num_intro_points = NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT;
+ c->allow_unknown_ports = 0;
+ c->is_single_onion = 0;
+ c->dir_group_readable = 0;
+ c->is_ephemeral = 0;
+}
+
+/* From a service configuration object config, clear everything from it
+ * meaning free allocated pointers and reset the values. */
+STATIC void
+service_clear_config(hs_service_config_t *config)
+{
+ if (config == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+ tor_free(config->directory_path);
+ if (config->ports) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config->ports, rend_service_port_config_t *, p,
+ rend_service_port_config_free(p););
+ smartlist_free(config->ports);
+ }
+ if (config->clients) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config->clients, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
+ service_authorized_client_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(config->clients);
+ }
+ memset(config, 0, sizeof(*config));
+}
+
+/* Helper function to return a human readable description of the given intro
+ * point object.
+ *
+ * This function is not thread-safe. Each call to this invalidates the
+ * previous values returned by it. */
+static const char *
+describe_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ /* Hex identity digest of the IP prefixed by the $ sign and ends with NUL
+ * byte hence the plus two. */
+ static char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN + 2];
+ const char *legacy_id = NULL;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->base.link_specifiers,
+ const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, lspec) {
+ if (lspec->type == LS_LEGACY_ID) {
+ legacy_id = (const char *) lspec->u.legacy_id;
+ break;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(lspec);
+
+ /* For now, we only print the identity digest but we could improve this with
+ * much more information such as the ed25519 identity has well. */
+ buf[0] = '$';
+ if (legacy_id) {
+ base16_encode(buf + 1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN + 1, legacy_id, DIGEST_LEN);
+ }
+
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* Return the lower bound of maximum INTRODUCE2 cells per circuit before we
+ * rotate intro point (defined by a consensus parameter or the default
+ * value). */
+static int32_t
+get_intro_point_min_introduce2(void)
+{
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
+ * in the future. */
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_min_introduce2",
+ INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
+ 0, INT32_MAX);
+}
+
+/* Return the upper bound of maximum INTRODUCE2 cells per circuit before we
+ * rotate intro point (defined by a consensus parameter or the default
+ * value). */
+static int32_t
+get_intro_point_max_introduce2(void)
+{
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
+ * in the future. */
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_max_introduce2",
+ INTRO_POINT_MAX_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
+ 0, INT32_MAX);
+}
+
+/* Return the minimum lifetime in seconds of an introduction point defined by a
+ * consensus parameter or the default value. */
+static int32_t
+get_intro_point_min_lifetime(void)
+{
+#define MIN_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING 10
+ if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
+ return MIN_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING;
+ }
+
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
+ * in the future. */
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_min_lifetime",
+ INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS,
+ 0, INT32_MAX);
+}
+
+/* Return the maximum lifetime in seconds of an introduction point defined by a
+ * consensus parameter or the default value. */
+static int32_t
+get_intro_point_max_lifetime(void)
+{
+#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING 30
+ if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
+ return MAX_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING;
+ }
+
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
+ * in the future. */
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_max_lifetime",
+ INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS,
+ 0, INT32_MAX);
+}
+
+/* Return the number of extra introduction point defined by a consensus
+ * parameter or the default value. */
+static int32_t
+get_intro_point_num_extra(void)
+{
+ /* The [0, 128] range bounds the number of extra introduction point allowed.
+ * Above 128 intro points, it's getting a bit crazy. */
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_num_extra",
+ NUM_INTRO_POINTS_EXTRA, 0, 128);
+}
+
+/* Helper: Function that needs to return 1 for the HT for each loop which
+ * frees every service in an hash map. */
+static int
+ht_free_service_(struct hs_service_t *service, void *data)
+{
+ (void) data;
+ hs_service_free(service);
+ /* This function MUST return 1 so the given object is then removed from the
+ * service map leading to this free of the object being safe. */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Free every service that can be found in the global map. Once done, clear
+ * and free the global map. */
+static void
+service_free_all(void)
+{
+ if (hs_service_map) {
+ /* The free helper function returns 1 so this is safe. */
+ hs_service_ht_HT_FOREACH_FN(hs_service_map, ht_free_service_, NULL);
+ HT_CLEAR(hs_service_ht, hs_service_map);
+ tor_free(hs_service_map);
+ hs_service_map = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (hs_service_staging_list) {
+ /* Cleanup staging list. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(hs_service_staging_list, hs_service_t *, s,
+ hs_service_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(hs_service_staging_list);
+ hs_service_staging_list = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Free a given service intro point object. */
+STATIC void
+service_intro_point_free_(hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ if (!ip) {
+ return;
+ }
+ memwipe(&ip->auth_key_kp, 0, sizeof(ip->auth_key_kp));
+ memwipe(&ip->enc_key_kp, 0, sizeof(ip->enc_key_kp));
+ crypto_pk_free(ip->legacy_key);
+ replaycache_free(ip->replay_cache);
+ hs_intropoint_clear(&ip->base);
+ tor_free(ip);
+}
+
+/* Helper: free an hs_service_intro_point_t object. This function is used by
+ * digest256map_free() which requires a void * pointer. */
+static void
+service_intro_point_free_void(void *obj)
+{
+ service_intro_point_free_(obj);
+}
+
+/* Return a newly allocated service intro point and fully initialized from the
+ * given extend_info_t ei if non NULL.
+ * If is_legacy is true, we also generate the legacy key.
+ * If supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any is true, we add the relay's ed25519
+ * key to the link specifiers.
+ *
+ * If ei is NULL, returns a hs_service_intro_point_t with an empty link
+ * specifier list and no onion key. (This is used for testing.)
+ * On any other error, NULL is returned.
+ *
+ * ei must be an extend_info_t containing an IPv4 address. (We will add supoort
+ * for IPv6 in a later release.) When calling extend_info_from_node(), pass
+ * 0 in for_direct_connection to make sure ei always has an IPv4 address. */
+STATIC hs_service_intro_point_t *
+service_intro_point_new(const extend_info_t *ei, unsigned int is_legacy,
+ unsigned int supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any)
+{
+ hs_desc_link_specifier_t *ls;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip;
+
+ ip = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ip));
+ /* We'll create the key material. No need for extra strong, those are short
+ * term keys. */
+ ed25519_keypair_generate(&ip->auth_key_kp, 0);
+
+ { /* Set introduce2 max cells limit */
+ int32_t min_introduce2_cells = get_intro_point_min_introduce2();
+ int32_t max_introduce2_cells = get_intro_point_max_introduce2();
+ if (BUG(max_introduce2_cells < min_introduce2_cells)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ip->introduce2_max = crypto_rand_int_range(min_introduce2_cells,
+ max_introduce2_cells);
+ }
+ { /* Set intro point lifetime */
+ int32_t intro_point_min_lifetime = get_intro_point_min_lifetime();
+ int32_t intro_point_max_lifetime = get_intro_point_max_lifetime();
+ if (BUG(intro_point_max_lifetime < intro_point_min_lifetime)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ip->time_to_expire = approx_time() +
+ crypto_rand_int_range(intro_point_min_lifetime,intro_point_max_lifetime);
+ }
+
+ ip->replay_cache = replaycache_new(0, 0);
+
+ /* Initialize the base object. We don't need the certificate object. */
+ ip->base.link_specifiers = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* Generate the encryption key for this intro point. */
+ curve25519_keypair_generate(&ip->enc_key_kp, 0);
+ /* Figure out if this chosen node supports v3 or is legacy only. */
+ if (is_legacy) {
+ ip->base.is_only_legacy = 1;
+ /* Legacy mode that is doesn't support v3+ with ed25519 auth key. */
+ ip->legacy_key = crypto_pk_new();
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(ip->legacy_key) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(ip->legacy_key,
+ (char *) ip->legacy_key_digest) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ei == NULL) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* We'll try to add all link specifiers. Legacy is mandatory.
+ * IPv4 or IPv6 is required, and we always send IPv4. */
+ ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_IPV4);
+ /* It is impossible to have an extend info object without a v4. */
+ if (BUG(!ls)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
+
+ ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_LEGACY_ID);
+ /* It is impossible to have an extend info object without an identity
+ * digest. */
+ if (BUG(!ls)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
+
+ /* ed25519 identity key is optional for intro points. If the node supports
+ * ed25519 link authentication, we include it. */
+ if (supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any) {
+ ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_ED25519_ID);
+ if (ls) {
+ smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* IPv6 is not supported in this release. */
+
+ /* Finally, copy onion key from the extend_info_t object. */
+ memcpy(&ip->onion_key, &ei->curve25519_onion_key, sizeof(ip->onion_key));
+
+ done:
+ return ip;
+ err:
+ service_intro_point_free(ip);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Add the given intro point object to the given intro point map. The intro
+ * point MUST have its RSA encryption key set if this is a legacy type or the
+ * authentication key set otherwise. */
+STATIC void
+service_intro_point_add(digest256map_t *map, hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *old_ip_entry;
+
+ tor_assert(map);
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ old_ip_entry = digest256map_set(map, ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey, ip);
+ /* Make sure we didn't just try to double-add an intro point */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(!old_ip_entry);
+}
+
+/* For a given service, remove the intro point from that service's descriptors
+ * (check both current and next descriptor) */
+STATIC void
+service_intro_point_remove(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ /* Trying all descriptors. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ /* We'll try to remove the descriptor on both descriptors which is not
+ * very expensive to do instead of doing loopup + remove. */
+ digest256map_remove(desc->intro_points.map,
+ ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* For a given service and authentication key, return the intro point or NULL
+ * if not found. This will check both descriptors in the service. */
+STATIC hs_service_intro_point_t *
+service_intro_point_find(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key)
+{
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(auth_key);
+
+ /* Trying all descriptors to find the right intro point.
+ *
+ * Even if we use the same node as intro point in both descriptors, the node
+ * will have a different intro auth key for each descriptor since we generate
+ * a new one everytime we pick an intro point.
+ *
+ * After #22893 gets implemented, intro points will be moved to be
+ * per-service instead of per-descriptor so this function will need to
+ * change.
+ */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ if ((ip = digest256map_get(desc->intro_points.map,
+ auth_key->pubkey)) != NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+
+ return ip;
+}
+
+/* For a given service and intro point, return the descriptor for which the
+ * intro point is assigned to. NULL is returned if not found. */
+STATIC hs_service_descriptor_t *
+service_desc_find_by_intro(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *descp = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ if (digest256map_get(desc->intro_points.map,
+ ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey)) {
+ descp = desc;
+ break;
+ }
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+
+ return descp;
+}
+
+/* From a circuit identifier, get all the possible objects associated with the
+ * ident. If not NULL, service, ip or desc are set if the object can be found.
+ * They are untouched if they can't be found.
+ *
+ * This is an helper function because we do those lookups often so it's more
+ * convenient to simply call this functions to get all the things at once. */
+STATIC void
+get_objects_from_ident(const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident,
+ hs_service_t **service, hs_service_intro_point_t **ip,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t **desc)
+{
+ hs_service_t *s;
+
+ tor_assert(ident);
+
+ /* Get service object from the circuit identifier. */
+ s = find_service(hs_service_map, &ident->identity_pk);
+ if (s && service) {
+ *service = s;
+ }
+
+ /* From the service object, get the intro point object of that circuit. The
+ * following will query both descriptors intro points list. */
+ if (s && ip) {
+ *ip = service_intro_point_find(s, &ident->intro_auth_pk);
+ }
+
+ /* Get the descriptor for this introduction point and service. */
+ if (s && ip && *ip && desc) {
+ *desc = service_desc_find_by_intro(s, *ip);
+ }
+}
+
+/* From a given intro point, return the first link specifier of type
+ * encountered in the link specifier list. Return NULL if it can't be found.
+ *
+ * The caller does NOT have ownership of the object, the intro point does. */
+static hs_desc_link_specifier_t *
+get_link_spec_by_type(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip, uint8_t type)
+{
+ hs_desc_link_specifier_t *lnk_spec = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->base.link_specifiers,
+ hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, ls) {
+ if (ls->type == type) {
+ lnk_spec = ls;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ls);
+
+ end:
+ return lnk_spec;
+}
+
+/* Given a service intro point, return the node_t associated to it. This can
+ * return NULL if the given intro point has no legacy ID or if the node can't
+ * be found in the consensus. */
+STATIC const node_t *
+get_node_from_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *ls;
+
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ ls = get_link_spec_by_type(ip, LS_LEGACY_ID);
+ if (BUG(!ls)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* XXX In the future, we want to only use the ed25519 ID (#22173). */
+ return node_get_by_id((const char *) ls->u.legacy_id);
+}
+
+/* Given a service intro point, return the extend_info_t for it. This can
+ * return NULL if the node can't be found for the intro point or the extend
+ * info can't be created for the found node. If direct_conn is set, the extend
+ * info is validated on if we can connect directly. */
+static extend_info_t *
+get_extend_info_from_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
+ unsigned int direct_conn)
+{
+ extend_info_t *info = NULL;
+ const node_t *node;
+
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ node = get_node_from_intro_point(ip);
+ if (node == NULL) {
+ /* This can happen if the relay serving as intro point has been removed
+ * from the consensus. In that case, the intro point will be removed from
+ * the descriptor during the scheduled events. */
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* In the case of a direct connection (single onion service), it is possible
+ * our firewall policy won't allow it so this can return a NULL value. */
+ info = extend_info_from_node(node, direct_conn);
+
+ end:
+ return info;
+}
+
+/* Return the number of introduction points that are established for the
+ * given descriptor. */
+static unsigned int
+count_desc_circuit_established(const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ unsigned int count = 0;
+
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ count += ip->circuit_established;
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+/* For a given service and descriptor of that service, close all active
+ * directory connections. */
+static void
+close_directory_connections(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ unsigned int count = 0;
+ smartlist_t *dir_conns;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* Close pending HS desc upload connections for the blinded key of 'desc'. */
+ dir_conns = connection_list_by_type_purpose(CONN_TYPE_DIR,
+ DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_HSDESC);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(dir_conns, connection_t *, conn) {
+ dir_connection_t *dir_conn = TO_DIR_CONN(conn);
+ if (ed25519_pubkey_eq(&dir_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk,
+ &service->keys.identity_pk) &&
+ ed25519_pubkey_eq(&dir_conn->hs_ident->blinded_pk,
+ &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey)) {
+ connection_mark_for_close(conn);
+ count++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Closed %u active service directory connections for "
+ "descriptor %s of service %s",
+ count, safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey)),
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ /* We don't have ownership of the objects in this list. */
+ smartlist_free(dir_conns);
+}
+
+/* Close all rendezvous circuits for the given service. */
+static void
+close_service_rp_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* The reason we go over all circuit instead of using the circuitmap API is
+ * because most hidden service circuits are rendezvous circuits so there is
+ * no real improvement at getting all rendezvous circuits from the
+ * circuitmap and then going over them all to find the right ones.
+ * Furthermore, another option would have been to keep a list of RP cookies
+ * for a service but it creates an engineering complexity since we don't
+ * have a "RP circuit closed" event to clean it up properly so we avoid a
+ * memory DoS possibility. */
+
+ while ((ocirc = circuit_get_next_service_rp_circ(ocirc))) {
+ /* Only close circuits that are v3 and for this service. */
+ if (ocirc->hs_ident != NULL &&
+ ed25519_pubkey_eq(ô->hs_ident->identity_pk,
+ &service->keys.identity_pk)) {
+ /* Reason is FINISHED because service has been removed and thus the
+ * circuit is considered old/uneeded. When freed, it is removed from the
+ * hs circuitmap. */
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Close the circuit(s) for the given map of introduction points. */
+static void
+close_intro_circuits(hs_service_intropoints_t *intro_points)
+{
+ tor_assert(intro_points);
+
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(intro_points->map, key,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ origin_circuit_t *ocirc = hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip);
+ if (ocirc) {
+ /* Reason is FINISHED because service has been removed and thus the
+ * circuit is considered old/uneeded. When freed, the circuit is removed
+ * from the HS circuitmap. */
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ }
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+}
+
+/* Close all introduction circuits for the given service. */
+static void
+close_service_intro_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ close_intro_circuits(&desc->intro_points);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* Close any circuits related to the given service. */
+static void
+close_service_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* Only support for version >= 3. */
+ if (BUG(service->config.version < HS_VERSION_THREE)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Close intro points. */
+ close_service_intro_circuits(service);
+ /* Close rendezvous points. */
+ close_service_rp_circuits(service);
+}
+
+/* Move every ephemeral services from the src service map to the dst service
+ * map. It is possible that a service can't be register to the dst map which
+ * won't stop the process of moving them all but will trigger a log warn. */
+static void
+move_ephemeral_services(hs_service_ht *src, hs_service_ht *dst)
+{
+ hs_service_t **iter, **next;
+
+ tor_assert(src);
+ tor_assert(dst);
+
+ /* Iterate over the map to find ephemeral service and move them to the other
+ * map. We loop using this method to have a safe removal process. */
+ for (iter = HT_START(hs_service_ht, src); iter != NULL; iter = next) {
+ hs_service_t *s = *iter;
+ if (!s->config.is_ephemeral) {
+ /* Yeah, we are in a very manual loop :). */
+ next = HT_NEXT(hs_service_ht, src, iter);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Remove service from map and then register to it to the other map.
+ * Reminder that "*iter" and "s" are the same thing. */
+ next = HT_NEXT_RMV(hs_service_ht, src, iter);
+ if (register_service(dst, s) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Ephemeral service key is already being used. "
+ "Skipping.");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return a const string of the directory path escaped. If this is an
+ * ephemeral service, it returns "[EPHEMERAL]". This can only be called from
+ * the main thread because escaped() uses a static variable. */
+static const char *
+service_escaped_dir(const hs_service_t *s)
+{
+ return (s->config.is_ephemeral) ? "[EPHEMERAL]" :
+ escaped(s->config.directory_path);
+}
+
+/** Move the hidden service state from <b>src</b> to <b>dst</b>. We do this
+ * when we receive a SIGHUP: <b>dst</b> is the post-HUP service */
+static void
+move_hs_state(hs_service_t *src_service, hs_service_t *dst_service)
+{
+ tor_assert(src_service);
+ tor_assert(dst_service);
+
+ hs_service_state_t *src = &src_service->state;
+ hs_service_state_t *dst = &dst_service->state;
+
+ /* Let's do a shallow copy */
+ dst->intro_circ_retry_started_time = src->intro_circ_retry_started_time;
+ dst->num_intro_circ_launched = src->num_intro_circ_launched;
+ /* Freeing a NULL replaycache triggers an info LD_BUG. */
+ if (dst->replay_cache_rend_cookie != NULL) {
+ replaycache_free(dst->replay_cache_rend_cookie);
+ }
+ dst->replay_cache_rend_cookie = src->replay_cache_rend_cookie;
+ dst->next_rotation_time = src->next_rotation_time;
+
+ src->replay_cache_rend_cookie = NULL; /* steal pointer reference */
+}
+
+/* Register services that are in the staging list. Once this function returns,
+ * the global service map will be set with the right content and all non
+ * surviving services will be cleaned up. */
+static void
+register_all_services(void)
+{
+ struct hs_service_ht *new_service_map;
+
+ tor_assert(hs_service_staging_list);
+
+ /* Allocate a new map that will replace the current one. */
+ new_service_map = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*new_service_map));
+ HT_INIT(hs_service_ht, new_service_map);
+
+ /* First step is to transfer all ephemeral services from the current global
+ * map to the new one we are constructing. We do not prune ephemeral
+ * services as the only way to kill them is by deleting it from the control
+ * port or stopping the tor daemon. */
+ move_ephemeral_services(hs_service_map, new_service_map);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(hs_service_staging_list, hs_service_t *, snew) {
+ hs_service_t *s;
+
+ /* Check if that service is already in our global map and if so, we'll
+ * transfer the intro points to it. */
+ s = find_service(hs_service_map, &snew->keys.identity_pk);
+ if (s) {
+ /* Pass ownership of the descriptors from s (the current service) to
+ * snew (the newly configured one). */
+ move_descriptors(s, snew);
+ move_hs_state(s, snew);
+ /* Remove the service from the global map because after this, we need to
+ * go over the remaining service in that map that aren't surviving the
+ * reload to close their circuits. */
+ remove_service(hs_service_map, s);
+ hs_service_free(s);
+ }
+ /* Great, this service is now ready to be added to our new map. */
+ if (BUG(register_service(new_service_map, snew) < 0)) {
+ /* This should never happen because prior to registration, we validate
+ * every service against the entire set. Not being able to register a
+ * service means we failed to validate correctly. In that case, don't
+ * break tor and ignore the service but tell user. */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to register service with directory %s",
+ service_escaped_dir(snew));
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(hs_service_staging_list, snew);
+ hs_service_free(snew);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(snew);
+
+ /* Close any circuits associated with the non surviving services. Every
+ * service in the current global map are roaming. */
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+ close_service_circuits(service);
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+
+ /* Time to make the switch. We'll clear the staging list because its content
+ * has now changed ownership to the map. */
+ smartlist_clear(hs_service_staging_list);
+ service_free_all();
+ hs_service_map = new_service_map;
+ /* We've just register services into the new map and now we've replaced the
+ * global map with it so we have to notify that the change happened. When
+ * registering a service, the notify is only triggered if the destination
+ * map is the global map for which in here it was not. */
+ hs_service_map_has_changed();
+}
+
+/* Write the onion address of a given service to the given filename fname_ in
+ * the service directory. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */
+STATIC int
+write_address_to_file(const hs_service_t *service, const char *fname_)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ char *fname = NULL;
+ char *addr_buf = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(fname_);
+
+ /* Construct the full address with the onion tld and write the hostname file
+ * to disk. */
+ tor_asprintf(&addr_buf, "%s.%s\n", service->onion_address, address_tld);
+ /* Notice here that we use the given "fname_". */
+ fname = hs_path_from_filename(service->config.directory_path, fname_);
+ if (write_str_to_file(fname, addr_buf, 0) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not write onion address to hostname file %s",
+ escaped(fname));
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+#ifndef _WIN32
+ if (service->config.dir_group_readable) {
+ /* Mode to 0640. */
+ if (chmod(fname, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Unable to make onion service hostname file %s "
+ "group-readable.", escaped(fname));
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* !defined(_WIN32) */
+
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ tor_free(fname);
+ tor_free(addr_buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Load and/or generate private keys for the given service. On success, the
+ * hostname file will be written to disk along with the master private key iff
+ * the service is not configured for offline keys. Return 0 on success else -1
+ * on failure. */
+static int
+load_service_keys(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ char *fname = NULL;
+ ed25519_keypair_t *kp;
+ const hs_service_config_t *config;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ config = &service->config;
+
+ /* Create and fix permission on service directory. We are about to write
+ * files to that directory so make sure it exists and has the right
+ * permissions. We do this here because at this stage we know that Tor is
+ * actually running and the service we have has been validated. */
+ if (hs_check_service_private_dir(get_options()->User,
+ config->directory_path,
+ config->dir_group_readable, 1) < 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to load the keys from file or generate it if not found. */
+ fname = hs_path_from_filename(config->directory_path, fname_keyfile_prefix);
+ /* Don't ask for key creation, we want to know if we were able to load it or
+ * we had to generate it. Better logging! */
+ kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT, LOG_INFO, NULL, 0, 0,
+ 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!kp) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to load keys from %s. Generating it...", fname);
+ /* We'll now try to generate the keys and for it we want the strongest
+ * randomness for it. The keypair will be written in different files. */
+ uint32_t key_flags = INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE | INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG |
+ INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT;
+ kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, key_flags, LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ if (!kp) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to generate keys and save in %s.", fname);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Copy loaded or generated keys to service object. */
+ ed25519_pubkey_copy(&service->keys.identity_pk, &kp->pubkey);
+ memcpy(&service->keys.identity_sk, &kp->seckey,
+ sizeof(service->keys.identity_sk));
+ /* This does a proper memory wipe. */
+ ed25519_keypair_free(kp);
+
+ /* Build onion address from the newly loaded keys. */
+ tor_assert(service->config.version <= UINT8_MAX);
+ hs_build_address(&service->keys.identity_pk,
+ (uint8_t) service->config.version,
+ service->onion_address);
+
+ /* Write onion address to hostname file. */
+ if (write_address_to_file(service, fname_hostname) < 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Load all client authorization keys in the service. */
+ if (load_client_keys(service) < 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Succes. */
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ tor_free(fname);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Check if the client file name is valid or not. Return 1 if valid,
+ * otherwise return 0. */
+STATIC int
+client_filename_is_valid(const char *filename)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+ const char *valid_extension = ".auth";
+
+ tor_assert(filename);
+
+ /* The file extension must match and the total filename length can't be the
+ * length of the extension else we do not have a filename. */
+ if (!strcmpend(filename, valid_extension) &&
+ strlen(filename) != strlen(valid_extension)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Parse an authorized client from a string. The format of a client string
+ * looks like (see rend-spec-v3.txt):
+ *
+ * <auth-type>:<key-type>:<base32-encoded-public-key>
+ *
+ * The <auth-type> can only be "descriptor".
+ * The <key-type> can only be "x25519".
+ *
+ * Return the key on success, return NULL, otherwise. */
+STATIC hs_service_authorized_client_t *
+parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str)
+{
+ char *auth_type = NULL;
+ char *key_type = NULL;
+ char *pubkey_b32 = NULL;
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *client = NULL;
+ smartlist_t *fields = smartlist_new();
+
+ tor_assert(client_key_str);
+
+ smartlist_split_string(fields, client_key_str, ":",
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE, 0);
+ /* Wrong number of fields. */
+ if (smartlist_len(fields) != 3) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown format of client authorization file.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ auth_type = smartlist_get(fields, 0);
+ key_type = smartlist_get(fields, 1);
+ pubkey_b32 = smartlist_get(fields, 2);
+
+ /* Currently, the only supported auth type is "descriptor". */
+ if (strcmp(auth_type, "descriptor")) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization auth type '%s' not supported.",
+ auth_type);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Currently, the only supported key type is "x25519". */
+ if (strcmp(key_type, "x25519")) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization key type '%s' not supported.",
+ key_type);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We expect a specific length of the base32 encoded key so make sure we
+ * have that so we don't successfully decode a value with a different length
+ * and end up in trouble when copying the decoded key into a fixed length
+ * buffer. */
+ if (strlen(pubkey_b32) != BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization encoded base32 public key "
+ "length is invalid: %s", pubkey_b32);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_authorized_client_t));
+ if (base32_decode((char *) client->client_pk.public_key,
+ sizeof(client->client_pk.public_key),
+ pubkey_b32, strlen(pubkey_b32)) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization public key cannot be decoded: %s",
+ pubkey_b32);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Success. */
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ service_authorized_client_free(client);
+ done:
+ /* It is also a good idea to wipe the public key. */
+ if (pubkey_b32) {
+ memwipe(pubkey_b32, 0, strlen(pubkey_b32));
+ }
+ tor_assert(fields);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(fields, char *, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(fields);
+ return client;
+}
+
+/* Load all the client public keys for the given service. Return 0 on
+ * success else -1 on failure. */
+static int
+load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ char *client_key_str = NULL;
+ char *client_key_file_path = NULL;
+ char *client_keys_dir_path = NULL;
+ hs_service_config_t *config;
+ smartlist_t *file_list = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ config = &service->config;
+
+ /* Before calling this function, we already call load_service_keys to make
+ * sure that the directory exists with the right permission. So, if we
+ * cannot create a client pubkey key directory, we consider it as a bug. */
+ client_keys_dir_path = hs_path_from_filename(config->directory_path,
+ dname_client_pubkeys);
+ if (BUG(hs_check_service_private_dir(get_options()->User,
+ client_keys_dir_path,
+ config->dir_group_readable, 1) < 0)) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* If the list of clients already exists, we must clear it first. */
+ if (config->clients) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config->clients, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
+ service_authorized_client_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(config->clients);
+ }
+
+ config->clients = smartlist_new();
+
+ file_list = tor_listdir(client_keys_dir_path);
+ if (file_list == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization directory %s can't be listed.",
+ client_keys_dir_path);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(file_list, const char *, filename) {
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *client = NULL;
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Loading a client authorization key file %s...",
+ filename);
+
+ if (!client_filename_is_valid(filename)) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization unrecognized filename %s. "
+ "File must end in .auth. Ignoring.", filename);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Create a full path for a file. */
+ client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(client_keys_dir_path,
+ filename);
+ client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL);
+ /* Free immediately after using it. */
+ tor_free(client_key_file_path);
+
+ /* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */
+ if (!client_key_str) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization file %s can't be read. "
+ "Corrupted or verify permission? Ignoring.",
+ client_key_file_path);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ client = parse_authorized_client(client_key_str);
+ /* Wipe and free immediately after using it. */
+ memwipe(client_key_str, 0, strlen(client_key_str));
+ tor_free(client_key_str);
+
+ if (client) {
+ smartlist_add(config->clients, client);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Loaded a client authorization key file %s.",
+ filename);
+ }
+
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(filename);
+
+ /* If the number of clients is greater than zero, set the flag to be true. */
+ if (smartlist_len(config->clients) > 0) {
+ config->is_client_auth_enabled = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ if (client_key_str) {
+ memwipe(client_key_str, 0, strlen(client_key_str));
+ }
+ if (file_list) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(file_list, char *, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(file_list);
+ }
+ tor_free(client_key_str);
+ tor_free(client_key_file_path);
+ tor_free(client_keys_dir_path);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+STATIC void
+service_authorized_client_free_(hs_service_authorized_client_t *client)
+{
+ if (!client) {
+ return;
+ }
+ memwipe(&client->client_pk, 0, sizeof(client->client_pk));
+ tor_free(client);
+}
+
+/* Free a given service descriptor object and all key material is wiped. */
+STATIC void
+service_descriptor_free_(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ if (!desc) {
+ return;
+ }
+ hs_descriptor_free(desc->desc);
+ memwipe(&desc->signing_kp, 0, sizeof(desc->signing_kp));
+ memwipe(&desc->blinded_kp, 0, sizeof(desc->blinded_kp));
+ /* Cleanup all intro points. */
+ digest256map_free(desc->intro_points.map, service_intro_point_free_void);
+ digestmap_free(desc->intro_points.failed_id, tor_free_);
+ if (desc->previous_hsdirs) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->previous_hsdirs, char *, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(desc->previous_hsdirs);
+ }
+ crypto_ope_free(desc->ope_cipher);
+ tor_free(desc);
+}
+
+/* Return a newly allocated service descriptor object. */
+STATIC hs_service_descriptor_t *
+service_descriptor_new(void)
+{
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *sdesc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*sdesc));
+ sdesc->desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_descriptor_t));
+ /* Initialize the intro points map. */
+ sdesc->intro_points.map = digest256map_new();
+ sdesc->intro_points.failed_id = digestmap_new();
+ sdesc->previous_hsdirs = smartlist_new();
+ return sdesc;
+}
+
+/* Allocate and return a deep copy of client. */
+static hs_service_authorized_client_t *
+service_authorized_client_dup(const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client)
+{
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *client_dup = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(client);
+
+ client_dup = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_authorized_client_t));
+ /* Currently, the public key is the only component of
+ * hs_service_authorized_client_t. */
+ memcpy(client_dup->client_pk.public_key,
+ client->client_pk.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+
+ return client_dup;
+}
+
+/* If two authorized clients are equal, return 0. If the first one should come
+ * before the second, return less than zero. If the first should come after
+ * the second, return greater than zero. */
+static int
+service_authorized_client_cmp(const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client1,
+ const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client2)
+{
+ tor_assert(client1);
+ tor_assert(client2);
+
+ /* Currently, the public key is the only component of
+ * hs_service_authorized_client_t. */
+ return tor_memcmp(client1->client_pk.public_key,
+ client2->client_pk.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+}
+
+/* Helper for sorting authorized clients. */
+static int
+compare_service_authorzized_client_(const void **_a, const void **_b)
+{
+ const hs_service_authorized_client_t *a = *_a, *b = *_b;
+ return service_authorized_client_cmp(a, b);
+}
+
+/* If the list of hs_service_authorized_client_t's is different between
+ * src and dst, return 1. Otherwise, return 0. */
+STATIC int
+service_authorized_client_config_equal(const hs_service_config_t *config1,
+ const hs_service_config_t *config2)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+ smartlist_t *sl1 = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_t *sl2 = smartlist_new();
+
+ tor_assert(config1);
+ tor_assert(config2);
+ tor_assert(config1->clients);
+ tor_assert(config2->clients);
+
+ /* If the number of clients is different, it is obvious that the list
+ * changes. */
+ if (smartlist_len(config1->clients) != smartlist_len(config2->clients)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* We do not want to mutate config1 and config2, so we will duplicate both
+ * entire client lists here. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config1->clients,
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client,
+ smartlist_add(sl1, service_authorized_client_dup(client)));
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config2->clients,
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client,
+ smartlist_add(sl2, service_authorized_client_dup(client)));
+
+ smartlist_sort(sl1, compare_service_authorzized_client_);
+ smartlist_sort(sl2, compare_service_authorzized_client_);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(sl1); i++) {
+ /* If the clients at index i in both lists differ, the whole configs
+ * differ. */
+ if (service_authorized_client_cmp(smartlist_get(sl1, i),
+ smartlist_get(sl2, i))) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 1;
+
+ done:
+ if (sl1) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl1, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
+ service_authorized_client_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(sl1);
+ }
+ if (sl2) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl2, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
+ service_authorized_client_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(sl2);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Move descriptor(s) from the src service to the dst service and modify their
+ * content if necessary. We do this during SIGHUP when we re-create our
+ * hidden services. */
+static void
+move_descriptors(hs_service_t *src, hs_service_t *dst)
+{
+ tor_assert(src);
+ tor_assert(dst);
+
+ if (src->desc_current) {
+ /* Nothing should be there, but clean it up just in case */
+ if (BUG(dst->desc_current)) {
+ service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_current);
+ }
+ dst->desc_current = src->desc_current;
+ src->desc_current = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (src->desc_next) {
+ /* Nothing should be there, but clean it up just in case */
+ if (BUG(dst->desc_next)) {
+ service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_next);
+ }
+ dst->desc_next = src->desc_next;
+ src->desc_next = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* If the client authorization changes, we must rebuild the superencrypted
+ * section and republish the descriptors. */
+ int client_auth_changed =
+ !service_authorized_client_config_equal(&src->config, &dst->config);
+ if (client_auth_changed && dst->desc_current) {
+ /* We have to clear the superencrypted content first. */
+ hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(
+ &dst->desc_current->desc->superencrypted_data);
+ if (build_service_desc_superencrypted(dst, dst->desc_current) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ service_desc_schedule_upload(dst->desc_current, time(NULL), 1);
+ }
+ if (client_auth_changed && dst->desc_next) {
+ /* We have to clear the superencrypted content first. */
+ hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(
+ &dst->desc_next->desc->superencrypted_data);
+ if (build_service_desc_superencrypted(dst, dst->desc_next) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ service_desc_schedule_upload(dst->desc_next, time(NULL), 1);
+ }
+
+ return;
+
+ err:
+ /* If there is an error, free all descriptors to make it clean and generate
+ * them later. */
+ service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_current);
+ service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_next);
+}
+
+/* From the given service, remove all expired failing intro points for each
+ * descriptor. */
+static void
+remove_expired_failing_intro(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* For both descriptors, cleanup the failing intro points list. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(desc->intro_points.failed_id, key, time_t *, t) {
+ time_t failure_time = *t;
+ if ((failure_time + INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD) <= now) {
+ MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
+ tor_free(t);
+ }
+ } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* For the given descriptor desc, put all node_t object found from its failing
+ * intro point list and put them in the given node_list. */
+static void
+setup_intro_point_exclude_list(const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
+ smartlist_t *node_list)
+{
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(node_list);
+
+ DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.failed_id, key, time_t *, t) {
+ (void) t; /* Make gcc happy. */
+ const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(key);
+ if (node) {
+ smartlist_add(node_list, (void *) node);
+ }
+ } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
+}
+
+/* For the given failing intro point ip, we add its time of failure to the
+ * failed map and index it by identity digest (legacy ID) in the descriptor
+ * desc failed id map. */
+static void
+remember_failing_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ time_t *time_of_failure, *prev_ptr;
+ const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *legacy_ls;
+
+ tor_assert(ip);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ time_of_failure = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(time_t));
+ *time_of_failure = now;
+ legacy_ls = get_link_spec_by_type(ip, LS_LEGACY_ID);
+ tor_assert(legacy_ls);
+ prev_ptr = digestmap_set(desc->intro_points.failed_id,
+ (const char *) legacy_ls->u.legacy_id,
+ time_of_failure);
+ tor_free(prev_ptr);
+}
+
+/* Copy the descriptor link specifier object from src to dst. */
+static void
+link_specifier_copy(hs_desc_link_specifier_t *dst,
+ const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *src)
+{
+ tor_assert(dst);
+ tor_assert(src);
+ memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(hs_desc_link_specifier_t));
+}
+
+/* Using a given descriptor signing keypair signing_kp, a service intro point
+ * object ip and the time now, setup the content of an already allocated
+ * descriptor intro desc_ip.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success else a negative value. */
+static int
+setup_desc_intro_point(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
+ time_t now, hs_desc_intro_point_t *desc_ip)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ time_t nearest_hour = now - (now % 3600);
+
+ tor_assert(signing_kp);
+ tor_assert(ip);
+ tor_assert(desc_ip);
+
+ /* Copy the onion key. */
+ memcpy(&desc_ip->onion_key, &ip->onion_key, sizeof(desc_ip->onion_key));
+
+ /* Key and certificate material. */
+ desc_ip->auth_key_cert = tor_cert_create(signing_kp,
+ CERT_TYPE_AUTH_HS_IP_KEY,
+ &ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey,
+ nearest_hour,
+ HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
+ CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
+ if (desc_ip->auth_key_cert == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to create intro point auth-key certificate");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy link specifier(s). */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->base.link_specifiers,
+ const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, ls) {
+ hs_desc_link_specifier_t *copy = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*copy));
+ link_specifier_copy(copy, ls);
+ smartlist_add(desc_ip->link_specifiers, copy);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ls);
+
+ /* For a legacy intro point, we'll use an RSA/ed cross certificate. */
+ if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) {
+ desc_ip->legacy.key = crypto_pk_dup_key(ip->legacy_key);
+ /* Create cross certification cert. */
+ ssize_t cert_len = tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(
+ &signing_kp->pubkey,
+ desc_ip->legacy.key,
+ nearest_hour + HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
+ &desc_ip->legacy.cert.encoded);
+ if (cert_len < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to create enc key legacy cross cert.");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ desc_ip->legacy.cert.len = cert_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Encryption key and its cross certificate. */
+ {
+ ed25519_public_key_t ed25519_pubkey;
+
+ /* Use the public curve25519 key. */
+ memcpy(&desc_ip->enc_key, &ip->enc_key_kp.pubkey,
+ sizeof(desc_ip->enc_key));
+ /* The following can't fail. */
+ ed25519_public_key_from_curve25519_public_key(&ed25519_pubkey,
+ &ip->enc_key_kp.pubkey,
+ 0);
+ desc_ip->enc_key_cert = tor_cert_create(signing_kp,
+ CERT_TYPE_CROSS_HS_IP_KEYS,
+ &ed25519_pubkey, nearest_hour,
+ HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
+ CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
+ if (desc_ip->enc_key_cert == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to create enc key curve25519 cross cert.");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 0;
+
+ done:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Using the given descriptor from the given service, build the descriptor
+ * intro point list so we can then encode the descriptor for publication. This
+ * function does not pick intro points, they have to be in the descriptor
+ * current map. Cryptographic material (keys) must be initialized in the
+ * descriptor for this function to make sense. */
+static void
+build_desc_intro_points(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *encrypted;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* Ease our life. */
+ encrypted = &desc->desc->encrypted_data;
+ /* Cleanup intro points, we are about to set them from scratch. */
+ hs_descriptor_clear_intro_points(desc->desc);
+
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ hs_desc_intro_point_t *desc_ip = hs_desc_intro_point_new();
+ if (setup_desc_intro_point(&desc->signing_kp, ip, now, desc_ip) < 0) {
+ hs_desc_intro_point_free(desc_ip);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* We have a valid descriptor intro point. Add it to the list. */
+ smartlist_add(encrypted->intro_points, desc_ip);
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+}
+
+/* Build the descriptor signing key certificate. */
+static void
+build_desc_signing_key_cert(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *plaintext;
+
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(desc->desc);
+
+ /* Ease our life a bit. */
+ plaintext = &desc->desc->plaintext_data;
+
+ /* Get rid of what we have right now. */
+ tor_cert_free(plaintext->signing_key_cert);
+
+ /* Fresh certificate for the signing key. */
+ plaintext->signing_key_cert =
+ tor_cert_create(&desc->blinded_kp, CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_HS_DESC,
+ &desc->signing_kp.pubkey, now, HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
+ CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
+ /* If the cert creation fails, the descriptor encoding will fail and thus
+ * ultimately won't be uploaded. We'll get a stack trace to help us learn
+ * where the call came from and the tor_cert_create() will log the error. */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(plaintext->signing_key_cert);
+}
+
+/* Populate the descriptor encrypted section from the given service object.
+ * This will generate a valid list of introduction points that can be used
+ * after for circuit creation. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */
+static int
+build_service_desc_encrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *encrypted;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ encrypted = &desc->desc->encrypted_data;
+
+ encrypted->create2_ntor = 1;
+ encrypted->single_onion_service = service->config.is_single_onion;
+
+ /* Setup introduction points from what we have in the service. */
+ if (encrypted->intro_points == NULL) {
+ encrypted->intro_points = smartlist_new();
+ }
+ /* We do NOT build introduction point yet, we only do that once the circuit
+ * have been opened. Until we have the right number of introduction points,
+ * we do not encode anything in the descriptor. */
+
+ /* XXX: Support client authorization (#20700). */
+ encrypted->intro_auth_types = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Populate the descriptor superencrypted section from the given service
+ * object. This will generate a valid list of hs_desc_authorized_client_t
+ * of clients that are authorized to use the service. Return 0 on success
+ * else -1 on error. */
+static int
+build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ const hs_service_config_t *config;
+ int i;
+ hs_desc_superencrypted_data_t *superencrypted;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ superencrypted = &desc->desc->superencrypted_data;
+ config = &service->config;
+
+ /* The ephemeral key pair is already generated, so this should not give
+ * an error. */
+ if (BUG(!curve25519_public_key_is_ok(&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey))) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(&superencrypted->auth_ephemeral_pubkey,
+ &desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey,
+ sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
+
+ /* Test that subcred is not zero because we might use it below */
+ if (BUG(tor_mem_is_zero((char*)desc->desc->subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN))) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Create a smartlist to store clients */
+ superencrypted->clients = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* We do not need to build the desc authorized client if the client
+ * authorization is disabled */
+ if (config->is_client_auth_enabled) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(config->clients,
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client) {
+ hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client;
+ desc_client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_authorized_client_t));
+
+ /* Prepare the client for descriptor and then add to the list in the
+ * superencrypted part of the descriptor */
+ hs_desc_build_authorized_client(desc->desc->subcredential,
+ &client->client_pk,
+ &desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.seckey,
+ desc->descriptor_cookie, desc_client);
+ smartlist_add(superencrypted->clients, desc_client);
+
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(client);
+ }
+
+ /* We cannot let the number of auth-clients to be zero, so we need to
+ * make it be 16. If it is already a multiple of 16, we do not need to
+ * do anything. Otherwise, add the additional ones to make it a
+ * multiple of 16. */
+ int num_clients = smartlist_len(superencrypted->clients);
+ int num_clients_to_add;
+ if (num_clients == 0) {
+ num_clients_to_add = HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE;
+ } else if (num_clients % HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE == 0) {
+ num_clients_to_add = 0;
+ } else {
+ num_clients_to_add =
+ HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE
+ - (num_clients % HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_clients_to_add; i++) {
+ hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client =
+ hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client();
+ smartlist_add(superencrypted->clients, desc_client);
+ }
+
+ /* Shuffle the list to prevent the client know the position in the
+ * config. */
+ smartlist_shuffle(superencrypted->clients);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Populate the descriptor plaintext section from the given service object.
+ * The caller must make sure that the keys in the descriptors are valid that
+ * is are non-zero. This can't fail. */
+static void
+build_service_desc_plaintext(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *plaintext;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) &desc->blinded_kp,
+ sizeof(desc->blinded_kp)));
+ tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) &desc->signing_kp,
+ sizeof(desc->signing_kp)));
+
+ /* Set the subcredential. */
+ hs_get_subcredential(&service->keys.identity_pk, &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey,
+ desc->desc->subcredential);
+
+ plaintext = &desc->desc->plaintext_data;
+
+ plaintext->version = service->config.version;
+ plaintext->lifetime_sec = HS_DESC_DEFAULT_LIFETIME;
+ /* Copy public key material to go in the descriptor. */
+ ed25519_pubkey_copy(&plaintext->signing_pubkey, &desc->signing_kp.pubkey);
+ ed25519_pubkey_copy(&plaintext->blinded_pubkey, &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey);
+
+ /* Create the signing key certificate. This will be updated before each
+ * upload but we create it here so we don't complexify our unit tests. */
+ build_desc_signing_key_cert(desc, approx_time());
+}
+
+/** Compute the descriptor's OPE cipher for encrypting revision counters. */
+static crypto_ope_t *
+generate_ope_cipher_for_desc(const hs_service_descriptor_t *hs_desc)
+{
+ /* Compute OPE key as H("rev-counter-generation" | blinded privkey) */
+ uint8_t key[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ crypto_digest_t *digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ const char ope_key_prefix[] = "rev-counter-generation";
+ const ed25519_secret_key_t *eph_privkey = &hs_desc->blinded_kp.seckey;
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, ope_key_prefix, sizeof(ope_key_prefix));
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char*)eph_privkey->seckey,
+ sizeof(eph_privkey->seckey));
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *)key, sizeof(key));
+ crypto_digest_free(digest);
+
+ return crypto_ope_new(key);
+}
+
+/* For the given service and descriptor object, create the key material which
+ * is the blinded keypair, the descriptor signing keypair, the ephemeral
+ * keypair, and the descriptor cookie. Return 0 on success else -1 on error
+ * where the generated keys MUST be ignored. */
+static int
+build_service_desc_keys(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ ed25519_keypair_t kp;
+
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) &service->keys.identity_pk,
+ ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN));
+
+ /* XXX: Support offline key feature (#18098). */
+
+ /* Copy the identity keys to the keypair so we can use it to create the
+ * blinded key. */
+ memcpy(&kp.pubkey, &service->keys.identity_pk, sizeof(kp.pubkey));
+ memcpy(&kp.seckey, &service->keys.identity_sk, sizeof(kp.seckey));
+ /* Build blinded keypair for this time period. */
+ hs_build_blinded_keypair(&kp, NULL, 0, desc->time_period_num,
+ &desc->blinded_kp);
+ /* Let's not keep too much traces of our keys in memory. */
+ memwipe(&kp, 0, sizeof(kp));
+
+ /* Compute the OPE cipher struct (it's tied to the current blinded key) */
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Getting OPE for TP#%u", (unsigned) desc->time_period_num);
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(!desc->ope_cipher);
+ desc->ope_cipher = generate_ope_cipher_for_desc(desc);
+
+ /* No need for extra strong, this is a temporary key only for this
+ * descriptor. Nothing long term. */
+ if (ed25519_keypair_generate(&desc->signing_kp, 0) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Can't generate descriptor signing keypair for "
+ "service %s",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* No need for extra strong, this is a temporary key only for this
+ * descriptor. Nothing long term. */
+ if (curve25519_keypair_generate(&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp, 0) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Can't generate auth ephemeral keypair for "
+ "service %s",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Random descriptor cookie to be used as a part of a key to encrypt the
+ * descriptor, only if the client auth is enabled will it be used. */
+ crypto_strongest_rand(desc->descriptor_cookie,
+ sizeof(desc->descriptor_cookie));
+
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Given a service and the current time, build a descriptor for the service.
+ * This function does not pick introduction point, this needs to be done by
+ * the update function. On success, desc_out will point to the newly allocated
+ * descriptor object.
+ *
+ * This can error if we are unable to create keys or certificate. */
+static void
+build_service_descriptor(hs_service_t *service, uint64_t time_period_num,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t **desc_out)
+{
+ char *encoded_desc;
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc_out);
+
+ desc = service_descriptor_new();
+
+ /* Set current time period */
+ desc->time_period_num = time_period_num;
+
+ /* Create the needed keys so we can setup the descriptor content. */
+ if (build_service_desc_keys(service, desc) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Setup plaintext descriptor content. */
+ build_service_desc_plaintext(service, desc);
+
+ /* Setup superencrypted descriptor content. */
+ if (build_service_desc_superencrypted(service, desc) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Setup encrypted descriptor content. */
+ if (build_service_desc_encrypted(service, desc) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's make sure that we've created a descriptor that can actually be
+ * encoded properly. This function also checks if the encoded output is
+ * decodable after. */
+ if (BUG(service_encode_descriptor(service, desc, &desc->signing_kp,
+ &encoded_desc) < 0)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_free(encoded_desc);
+
+ /* Assign newly built descriptor to the next slot. */
+ *desc_out = desc;
+ /* Fire a CREATED control port event. */
+ hs_control_desc_event_created(service->onion_address,
+ &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey);
+ return;
+
+ err:
+ service_descriptor_free(desc);
+}
+
+/* Build both descriptors for the given service that has just booted up.
+ * Because it's a special case, it deserves its special function ;). */
+static void
+build_descriptors_for_new_service(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
+{
+ uint64_t current_desc_tp, next_desc_tp;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ /* These are the conditions for a new service. */
+ tor_assert(!service->desc_current);
+ tor_assert(!service->desc_next);
+
+ /*
+ * +------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ * | |
+ * | 00:00 12:00 00:00 12:00 00:00 12:00 |
+ * | SRV#1 TP#1 SRV#2 TP#2 SRV#3 TP#3 |
+ * | |
+ * | $==========|-----------$===========|-----------$===========| |
+ * | ^ ^ |
+ * | A B |
+ * +------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ *
+ * Case A: The service boots up before a new time period, the current time
+ * period is thus TP#1 and the next is TP#2 which for both we have access to
+ * their SRVs.
+ *
+ * Case B: The service boots up inside TP#2, we can't use the TP#3 for the
+ * next descriptor because we don't have the SRV#3 so the current should be
+ * TP#1 and next TP#2.
+ */
+
+ if (hs_in_period_between_tp_and_srv(NULL, now)) {
+ /* Case B from the above, inside of the new time period. */
+ current_desc_tp = hs_get_previous_time_period_num(0); /* TP#1 */
+ next_desc_tp = hs_get_time_period_num(0); /* TP#2 */
+ } else {
+ /* Case A from the above, outside of the new time period. */
+ current_desc_tp = hs_get_time_period_num(0); /* TP#1 */
+ next_desc_tp = hs_get_next_time_period_num(0); /* TP#2 */
+ }
+
+ /* Build descriptors. */
+ build_service_descriptor(service, current_desc_tp, &service->desc_current);
+ build_service_descriptor(service, next_desc_tp, &service->desc_next);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service %s has just started. Both descriptors "
+ "built. Now scheduled for upload.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+}
+
+/* Build descriptors for each service if needed. There are conditions to build
+ * a descriptor which are details in the function. */
+STATIC void
+build_all_descriptors(time_t now)
+{
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+
+ /* A service booting up will have both descriptors to NULL. No other cases
+ * makes both descriptor non existent. */
+ if (service->desc_current == NULL && service->desc_next == NULL) {
+ build_descriptors_for_new_service(service, now);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Reaching this point means we are pass bootup so at runtime. We should
+ * *never* have an empty current descriptor. If the next descriptor is
+ * empty, we'll try to build it for the next time period. This only
+ * happens when we rotate meaning that we are guaranteed to have a new SRV
+ * at that point for the next time period. */
+ if (BUG(service->desc_current == NULL)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (service->desc_next == NULL) {
+ build_service_descriptor(service, hs_get_next_time_period_num(0),
+ &service->desc_next);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service %s next descriptor successfully "
+ "built. Now scheduled for upload.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ }
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* Randomly pick a node to become an introduction point but not present in the
+ * given exclude_nodes list. The chosen node is put in the exclude list
+ * regardless of success or not because in case of failure, the node is simply
+ * unsusable from that point on.
+ *
+ * If direct_conn is set, try to pick a node that our local firewall/policy
+ * allows us to connect to directly. If we can't find any, return NULL.
+ * This function supports selecting dual-stack nodes for direct single onion
+ * service IPv6 connections. But it does not send IPv6 addresses in link
+ * specifiers. (Current clients don't use IPv6 addresses to extend, and
+ * direct client connections to intro points are not supported.)
+ *
+ * Return a newly allocated service intro point ready to be used for encoding.
+ * Return NULL on error. */
+static hs_service_intro_point_t *
+pick_intro_point(unsigned int direct_conn, smartlist_t *exclude_nodes)
+{
+ const node_t *node;
+ extend_info_t *info = NULL;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+ /* Normal 3-hop introduction point flags. */
+ router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_UPTIME | CRN_NEED_DESC;
+ /* Single onion flags. */
+ router_crn_flags_t direct_flags = flags | CRN_PREF_ADDR | CRN_DIRECT_CONN;
+
+ node = router_choose_random_node(exclude_nodes, get_options()->ExcludeNodes,
+ direct_conn ? direct_flags : flags);
+ /* Unable to find a node. When looking for a node for a direct connection,
+ * we could try a 3-hop path instead. We'll add support for this in a later
+ * release. */
+ if (!node) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We have a suitable node, add it to the exclude list. We do this *before*
+ * we can validate the extend information because even in case of failure,
+ * we don't want to use that node anymore. */
+ smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void *) node);
+
+ /* We do this to ease our life but also this call makes appropriate checks
+ * of the node object such as validating ntor support for instance.
+ *
+ * We must provide an extend_info for clients to connect over a 3-hop path,
+ * so we don't pass direct_conn here. */
+ info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
+ if (BUG(info == NULL)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's do a basic sanity check here so that we don't end up advertising the
+ * ed25519 identity key of relays that don't actually support the link
+ * protocol */
+ if (!node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 0)) {
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&info->ed_identity));
+ } else {
+ /* Make sure we *do* have an ed key if we support the link authentication.
+ * Sending an empty key would result in a failure to extend. */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&info->ed_identity));
+ }
+
+ /* Create our objects and populate them with the node information.
+ * We don't care if the intro's link auth is compatible with us, because
+ * we are sending the ed25519 key to a remote client via the descriptor. */
+ ip = service_intro_point_new(info, !node_supports_ed25519_hs_intro(node),
+ node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node,
+ 0));
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Picked intro point: %s", extend_info_describe(info));
+ extend_info_free(info);
+ return ip;
+ err:
+ service_intro_point_free(ip);
+ extend_info_free(info);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* For a given descriptor from the given service, pick any needed intro points
+ * and update the current map with those newly picked intro points. Return the
+ * number node that might have been added to the descriptor current map. */
+static unsigned int
+pick_needed_intro_points(hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ int i = 0, num_needed_ip;
+ smartlist_t *exclude_nodes = smartlist_new();
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* Compute how many intro points we actually need to open. */
+ num_needed_ip = service->config.num_intro_points -
+ digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map);
+ if (BUG(num_needed_ip < 0)) {
+ /* Let's not make tor freak out here and just skip this. */
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* We want to end up with config.num_intro_points intro points, but if we
+ * have no intro points at all (chances are they all cycled or we are
+ * starting up), we launch get_intro_point_num_extra() extra circuits and
+ * use the first config.num_intro_points that complete. See proposal #155,
+ * section 4 for the rationale of this which is purely for performance.
+ *
+ * The ones after the first config.num_intro_points will be converted to
+ * 'General' internal circuits and then we'll drop them from the list of
+ * intro points. */
+ if (digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map) == 0) {
+ num_needed_ip += get_intro_point_num_extra();
+ }
+
+ /* Build an exclude list of nodes of our intro point(s). The expiring intro
+ * points are OK to pick again because this is afterall a concept of round
+ * robin so they are considered valid nodes to pick again. */
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key,
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ const node_t *intro_node = get_node_from_intro_point(ip);
+ if (intro_node) {
+ smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void*)intro_node);
+ }
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+ /* Also, add the failing intro points that our descriptor encounteered in
+ * the exclude node list. */
+ setup_intro_point_exclude_list(desc, exclude_nodes);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_needed_ip; i++) {
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip;
+
+ /* This function will add the picked intro point node to the exclude nodes
+ * list so we don't pick the same one at the next iteration. */
+ ip = pick_intro_point(service->config.is_single_onion, exclude_nodes);
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ /* If we end up unable to pick an introduction point it is because we
+ * can't find suitable node and calling this again is highly unlikely to
+ * give us a valid node all of the sudden. */
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to find a suitable node to be an "
+ "introduction point for service %s.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* Valid intro point object, add it to the descriptor current map. */
+ service_intro_point_add(desc->intro_points.map, ip);
+ }
+ /* We've successfully picked all our needed intro points thus none are
+ * missing which will tell our upload process to expect the number of
+ * circuits to be the number of configured intro points circuits and not the
+ * number of intro points object that we have. */
+ desc->missing_intro_points = 0;
+
+ /* Success. */
+ done:
+ /* We don't have ownership of the node_t object in this list. */
+ smartlist_free(exclude_nodes);
+ return i;
+}
+
+/** Clear previous cached HSDirs in <b>desc</b>. */
+static void
+service_desc_clear_previous_hsdirs(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ if (BUG(!desc->previous_hsdirs)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->previous_hsdirs, char*, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_clear(desc->previous_hsdirs);
+}
+
+/** Note that we attempted to upload <b>desc</b> to <b>hsdir</b>. */
+static void
+service_desc_note_upload(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, const node_t *hsdir)
+{
+ char b64_digest[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1] = {0};
+ digest_to_base64(b64_digest, hsdir->identity);
+
+ if (BUG(!desc->previous_hsdirs)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!smartlist_contains_string(desc->previous_hsdirs, b64_digest)) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(desc->previous_hsdirs, b64_digest);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Schedule an upload of <b>desc</b>. If <b>descriptor_changed</b> is set, it
+ * means that this descriptor is dirty. */
+STATIC void
+service_desc_schedule_upload(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
+ time_t now,
+ int descriptor_changed)
+
+{
+ desc->next_upload_time = now;
+
+ /* If the descriptor changed, clean up the old HSDirs list. We want to
+ * re-upload no matter what. */
+ if (descriptor_changed) {
+ service_desc_clear_previous_hsdirs(desc);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Pick missing intro points for this descriptor if needed. */
+static void
+update_service_descriptor_intro_points(hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ unsigned int num_intro_points;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(desc->desc);
+
+ num_intro_points = digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map);
+
+ /* Pick any missing introduction point(s). */
+ if (num_intro_points < service->config.num_intro_points) {
+ unsigned int num_new_intro_points = pick_needed_intro_points(service,
+ desc);
+ if (num_new_intro_points != 0) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Service %s just picked %u intro points and wanted "
+ "%u for %s descriptor. It currently has %d intro "
+ "points. Launching ESTABLISH_INTRO circuit shortly.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
+ num_new_intro_points,
+ service->config.num_intro_points - num_intro_points,
+ (desc == service->desc_current) ? "current" : "next",
+ num_intro_points);
+ /* We'll build those introduction point into the descriptor once we have
+ * confirmation that the circuits are opened and ready. However,
+ * indicate that this descriptor should be uploaded from now on. */
+ service_desc_schedule_upload(desc, now, 1);
+ }
+ /* Were we able to pick all the intro points we needed? If not, we'll
+ * flag the descriptor that it's missing intro points because it
+ * couldn't pick enough which will trigger a descriptor upload. */
+ if ((num_new_intro_points + num_intro_points) <
+ service->config.num_intro_points) {
+ desc->missing_intro_points = 1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Update descriptor intro points for each service if needed. We do this as
+ * part of the periodic event because we need to establish intro point circuits
+ * before we publish descriptors. */
+STATIC void
+update_all_descriptors_intro_points(time_t now)
+{
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+ /* We'll try to update each descriptor that is if certain conditions apply
+ * in order for the descriptor to be updated. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ update_service_descriptor_intro_points(service, desc, now);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+}
+
+/* Return true iff the given intro point has expired that is it has been used
+ * for too long or we've reached our max seen INTRODUCE2 cell. */
+STATIC int
+intro_point_should_expire(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
+ time_t now)
+{
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ if (ip->introduce2_count >= ip->introduce2_max) {
+ goto expired;
+ }
+
+ if (ip->time_to_expire <= now) {
+ goto expired;
+ }
+
+ /* Not expiring. */
+ return 0;
+ expired:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Go over the given set of intro points for each service and remove any
+ * invalid ones. The conditions for removal are:
+ *
+ * - The node doesn't exists anymore (not in consensus)
+ * OR
+ * - The intro point maximum circuit retry count has been reached and no
+ * circuit can be found associated with it.
+ * OR
+ * - The intro point has expired and we should pick a new one.
+ *
+ * If an intro point is removed, the circuit (if any) is immediately close.
+ * If a circuit can't be found, the intro point is kept if it hasn't reached
+ * its maximum circuit retry value and thus should be retried. */
+static void
+cleanup_intro_points(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
+{
+ /* List of intro points to close. We can't mark the intro circuits for close
+ * in the modify loop because doing so calls
+ * hs_service_intro_circ_has_closed() which does a digest256map_get() on the
+ * intro points map (that we are iterating over). This can't be done in a
+ * single iteration after a MAP_DEL_CURRENT, the object will still be
+ * returned leading to a use-after-free. So, we close the circuits and free
+ * the intro points after the loop if any. */
+ smartlist_t *ips_to_free = smartlist_new();
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* For both descriptors, cleanup the intro points. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ /* Go over the current intro points we have, make sure they are still
+ * valid and remove any of them that aren't. */
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(desc->intro_points.map, key,
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ const node_t *node = get_node_from_intro_point(ip);
+ int has_expired = intro_point_should_expire(ip, now);
+
+ /* We cleanup an intro point if it has expired or if we do not know the
+ * node_t anymore (removed from our latest consensus) or if we've
+ * reached the maximum number of retry with a non existing circuit. */
+ if (has_expired || node == NULL ||
+ ip->circuit_retries > MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Intro point %s%s (retried: %u times). "
+ "Removing it.",
+ describe_intro_point(ip),
+ has_expired ? " has expired" :
+ (node == NULL) ? " fell off the consensus" : "",
+ ip->circuit_retries);
+
+ /* We've retried too many times, remember it as a failed intro point
+ * so we don't pick it up again for INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD sec. */
+ if (ip->circuit_retries > MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES) {
+ remember_failing_intro_point(ip, desc, approx_time());
+ }
+
+ /* Remove intro point from descriptor map and add it to the list of
+ * ips to free for which we'll also try to close the intro circuit. */
+ MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
+ smartlist_add(ips_to_free, ip);
+ }
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+
+ /* Go over the intro points to free and close their circuit if any. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ips_to_free, hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ /* See if we need to close the intro point circuit as well */
+
+ /* XXX: Legacy code does NOT close circuits like this: it keeps the circuit
+ * open until a new descriptor is uploaded and then closed all expiring
+ * intro point circuit. Here, we close immediately and because we just
+ * discarded the intro point, a new one will be selected, a new descriptor
+ * created and uploaded. There is no difference to an attacker between the
+ * timing of a new consensus and intro point rotation (possibly?). */
+ origin_circuit_t *ocirc = hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip);
+ if (ocirc && !TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc)->marked_for_close) {
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ }
+
+ /* Cleanup the intro point */
+ service_intro_point_free(ip);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
+
+ smartlist_free(ips_to_free);
+}
+
+/* Set the next rotation time of the descriptors for the given service for the
+ * time now. */
+static void
+set_rotation_time(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ service->state.next_rotation_time =
+ sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run() +
+ sr_state_get_protocol_run_duration();
+
+ {
+ char fmt_time[ISO_TIME_LEN + 1];
+ format_local_iso_time(fmt_time, service->state.next_rotation_time);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Next descriptor rotation time set to %s for %s",
+ fmt_time, safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return true iff the service should rotate its descriptor. The time now is
+ * only used to fetch the live consensus and if none can be found, this
+ * returns false. */
+static unsigned int
+should_rotate_descriptors(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
+{
+ const networkstatus_t *ns;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ ns = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now);
+ if (ns == NULL) {
+ goto no_rotation;
+ }
+
+ if (ns->valid_after >= service->state.next_rotation_time) {
+ /* In theory, we should never get here with no descriptors. We can never
+ * have a NULL current descriptor except when tor starts up. The next
+ * descriptor can be NULL after a rotation but we build a new one right
+ * after.
+ *
+ * So, when tor starts, the next rotation time is set to the start of the
+ * next SRV period using the consensus valid after time so it should
+ * always be set to a future time value. This means that we should never
+ * reach this point at bootup that is this check safeguards tor in never
+ * allowing a rotation if the valid after time is smaller than the next
+ * rotation time.
+ *
+ * This is all good in theory but we've had a NULL descriptor issue here
+ * so this is why we BUG() on both with extra logging to try to understand
+ * how this can possibly happens. We'll simply ignore and tor should
+ * recover from this by skipping rotation and building the missing
+ * descriptors just after this. */
+ if (BUG(service->desc_current == NULL || service->desc_next == NULL)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Service descriptor is NULL (%p/%p). Next rotation "
+ "time is %ld (now: %ld). Valid after time from "
+ "consensus is %ld",
+ service->desc_current, service->desc_next,
+ (long)service->state.next_rotation_time,
+ (long)now,
+ (long)ns->valid_after);
+ goto no_rotation;
+ }
+ goto rotation;
+ }
+
+ no_rotation:
+ return 0;
+ rotation:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Rotate the service descriptors of the given service. The current descriptor
+ * will be freed, the next one put in as the current and finally the next
+ * descriptor pointer is NULLified. */
+static void
+rotate_service_descriptors(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ if (service->desc_current) {
+ /* Close all IP circuits for the descriptor. */
+ close_intro_circuits(&service->desc_current->intro_points);
+ /* We don't need this one anymore, we won't serve any clients coming with
+ * this service descriptor. */
+ service_descriptor_free(service->desc_current);
+ }
+ /* The next one become the current one and emptying the next will trigger
+ * a descriptor creation for it. */
+ service->desc_current = service->desc_next;
+ service->desc_next = NULL;
+
+ /* We've just rotated, set the next time for the rotation. */
+ set_rotation_time(service);
+}
+
+/* Rotate descriptors for each service if needed. A non existing current
+ * descriptor will trigger a descriptor build for the next time period. */
+STATIC void
+rotate_all_descriptors(time_t now)
+{
+ /* XXX We rotate all our service descriptors at once. In the future it might
+ * be wise, to rotate service descriptors independently to hide that all
+ * those descriptors are on the same tor instance */
+
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+
+ /* Note for a service booting up: Both descriptors are NULL in that case
+ * so this function might return true if we are in the timeframe for a
+ * rotation leading to basically swapping two NULL pointers which is
+ * harmless. However, the side effect is that triggering a rotation will
+ * update the service state and avoid doing anymore rotations after the
+ * two descriptors have been built. */
+ if (!should_rotate_descriptors(service, now)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Time to rotate our descriptors (%p / %p) for %s",
+ service->desc_current, service->desc_next,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+
+ rotate_service_descriptors(service);
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+}
+
+/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Make sure all our services are up
+ * to date and ready for the other scheduled events. This includes looking at
+ * the introduction points status and descriptor rotation time. */
+STATIC void
+run_housekeeping_event(time_t now)
+{
+ /* Note that nothing here opens circuit(s) nor uploads descriptor(s). We are
+ * simply moving things around or removing unneeded elements. */
+
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+
+ /* If the service is starting off, set the rotation time. We can't do that
+ * at configure time because the get_options() needs to be set for setting
+ * that time that uses the voting interval. */
+ if (service->state.next_rotation_time == 0) {
+ /* Set the next rotation time of the descriptors. If it's Oct 25th
+ * 23:47:00, the next rotation time is when the next SRV is computed
+ * which is at Oct 26th 00:00:00 that is in 13 minutes. */
+ set_rotation_time(service);
+ }
+
+ /* Cleanup invalid intro points from the service descriptor. */
+ cleanup_intro_points(service, now);
+
+ /* Remove expired failing intro point from the descriptor failed list. We
+ * reset them at each INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD. */
+ remove_expired_failing_intro(service, now);
+
+ /* At this point, the service is now ready to go through the scheduled
+ * events guaranteeing a valid state. Intro points might be missing from
+ * the descriptors after the cleanup but the update/build process will
+ * make sure we pick those missing ones. */
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+}
+
+/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Make sure all descriptors are up to
+ * date. Once this returns, each service descriptor needs to be considered for
+ * new introduction circuits and then for upload. */
+static void
+run_build_descriptor_event(time_t now)
+{
+ /* For v2 services, this step happens in the upload event. */
+
+ /* Run v3+ events. */
+ /* We start by rotating the descriptors only if needed. */
+ rotate_all_descriptors(now);
+
+ /* Then, we'll try to build new descriptors that we might need. The
+ * condition is that the next descriptor is non existing because it has
+ * been rotated or we just started up. */
+ build_all_descriptors(now);
+
+ /* Finally, we'll check if we should update the descriptors' intro
+ * points. Missing introduction points will be picked in this function which
+ * is useful for newly built descriptors. */
+ update_all_descriptors_intro_points(now);
+}
+
+/* For the given service, launch any intro point circuits that could be
+ * needed. This considers every descriptor of the service. */
+static void
+launch_intro_point_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* For both descriptors, try to launch any missing introduction point
+ * circuits using the current map. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ /* Keep a ref on if we need a direct connection. We use this often. */
+ unsigned int direct_conn = service->config.is_single_onion;
+
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(desc->intro_points.map, key,
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ extend_info_t *ei;
+
+ /* Skip the intro point that already has an existing circuit
+ * (established or not). */
+ if (hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ei = get_extend_info_from_intro_point(ip, direct_conn);
+ if (ei == NULL) {
+ /* This is possible if we can get a node_t but not the extend info out
+ * of it. In this case, we remove the intro point and a new one will
+ * be picked at the next main loop callback. */
+ MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
+ service_intro_point_free(ip);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Launch a circuit to the intro point. */
+ ip->circuit_retries++;
+ if (hs_circ_launch_intro_point(service, ip, ei) < 0) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to launch intro circuit to node %s "
+ "for service %s.",
+ safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(ei)),
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ /* Intro point will be retried if possible after this. */
+ }
+ extend_info_free(ei);
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* Don't try to build more than this many circuits before giving up for a
+ * while. Dynamically calculated based on the configured number of intro
+ * points for the given service and how many descriptor exists. The default
+ * use case of 3 introduction points and two descriptors will allow 28
+ * circuits for a retry period (((3 + 2) + (3 * 3)) * 2). */
+static unsigned int
+get_max_intro_circ_per_period(const hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ unsigned int count = 0;
+ unsigned int multiplier = 0;
+ unsigned int num_wanted_ip;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(service->config.num_intro_points <=
+ HS_CONFIG_V3_MAX_INTRO_POINTS);
+
+/* For a testing network, allow to do it for the maximum amount so circuit
+ * creation and rotation and so on can actually be tested without limit. */
+#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES_TESTING -1
+ if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
+ return MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES_TESTING;
+ }
+
+ num_wanted_ip = service->config.num_intro_points;
+
+ /* The calculation is as follow. We have a number of intro points that we
+ * want configured as a torrc option (num_intro_points). We then add an
+ * extra value so we can launch multiple circuits at once and pick the
+ * quickest ones. For instance, we want 3 intros, we add 2 extra so we'll
+ * pick 5 intros and launch 5 circuits. */
+ count += (num_wanted_ip + get_intro_point_num_extra());
+
+ /* Then we add the number of retries that is possible to do for each intro
+ * point. If we want 3 intros, we'll allow 3 times the number of possible
+ * retry. */
+ count += (num_wanted_ip * MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES);
+
+ /* Then, we multiply by a factor of 2 if we have both descriptor or 0 if we
+ * have none. */
+ multiplier += (service->desc_current) ? 1 : 0;
+ multiplier += (service->desc_next) ? 1 : 0;
+
+ return (count * multiplier);
+}
+
+/* For the given service, return 1 if the service is allowed to launch more
+ * introduction circuits else 0 if the maximum has been reached for the retry
+ * period of INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD. */
+STATIC int
+can_service_launch_intro_circuit(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* Consider the intro circuit retry period of the service. */
+ if (now > (service->state.intro_circ_retry_started_time +
+ INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD)) {
+ service->state.intro_circ_retry_started_time = now;
+ service->state.num_intro_circ_launched = 0;
+ goto allow;
+ }
+ /* Check if we can still launch more circuits in this period. */
+ if (service->state.num_intro_circ_launched <=
+ get_max_intro_circ_per_period(service)) {
+ goto allow;
+ }
+
+ /* Rate limit log that we've reached our circuit creation limit. */
+ {
+ char *msg;
+ time_t elapsed_time = now - service->state.intro_circ_retry_started_time;
+ static ratelim_t rlimit = RATELIM_INIT(INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD);
+ if ((msg = rate_limit_log(&rlimit, now))) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service %s exceeded its circuit launch limit "
+ "of %u per %d seconds. It launched %u circuits in "
+ "the last %ld seconds. Will retry in %ld seconds.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
+ get_max_intro_circ_per_period(service),
+ INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD,
+ service->state.num_intro_circ_launched,
+ (long int) elapsed_time,
+ (long int) (INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD - elapsed_time));
+ tor_free(msg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Not allow. */
+ return 0;
+ allow:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Make sure we have all the circuits
+ * we need for each service. */
+static void
+run_build_circuit_event(time_t now)
+{
+ /* Make sure we can actually have enough information or able to build
+ * internal circuits as required by services. */
+ if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN ||
+ !have_completed_a_circuit()) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Run v2 check. */
+ if (rend_num_services() > 0) {
+ rend_consider_services_intro_points(now);
+ }
+
+ /* Run v3+ check. */
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+ /* For introduction circuit, we need to make sure we don't stress too much
+ * circuit creation so make sure this service is respecting that limit. */
+ if (can_service_launch_intro_circuit(service, now)) {
+ /* Launch intro point circuits if needed. */
+ launch_intro_point_circuits(service);
+ /* Once the circuits have opened, we'll make sure to update the
+ * descriptor intro point list and cleanup any extraneous. */
+ }
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+}
+
+/* Encode and sign the service descriptor desc and upload it to the given
+ * hidden service directory. This does nothing if PublishHidServDescriptors
+ * is false. */
+static void
+upload_descriptor_to_hsdir(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, const node_t *hsdir)
+{
+ char *encoded_desc = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(hsdir);
+
+ /* Let's avoid doing that if tor is configured to not publish. */
+ if (!get_options()->PublishHidServDescriptors) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Service %s not publishing descriptor. "
+ "PublishHidServDescriptors is set to 1.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* First of all, we'll encode the descriptor. This should NEVER fail but
+ * just in case, let's make sure we have an actual usable descriptor. */
+ if (BUG(service_encode_descriptor(service, desc, &desc->signing_kp,
+ &encoded_desc) < 0)) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Time to upload the descriptor to the directory. */
+ hs_service_upload_desc_to_dir(encoded_desc, service->config.version,
+ &service->keys.identity_pk,
+ &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, hsdir->rs);
+
+ /* Add this node to previous_hsdirs list */
+ service_desc_note_upload(desc, hsdir);
+
+ /* Logging so we know where it was sent. */
+ {
+ int is_next_desc = (service->desc_next == desc);
+ const uint8_t *idx = (is_next_desc) ? hsdir->hsdir_index.store_second:
+ hsdir->hsdir_index.store_first;
+ char *blinded_pubkey_log_str =
+ tor_strdup(hex_str((char*)&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey.pubkey, 32));
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Service %s %s descriptor of revision %" PRIu64
+ " initiated upload request to %s with index %s (%s)",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
+ (is_next_desc) ? "next" : "current",
+ desc->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter,
+ safe_str_client(node_describe(hsdir)),
+ safe_str_client(hex_str((const char *) idx, 32)),
+ safe_str_client(blinded_pubkey_log_str));
+ tor_free(blinded_pubkey_log_str);
+
+ /* Fire a UPLOAD control port event. */
+ hs_control_desc_event_upload(service->onion_address, hsdir->identity,
+ &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, idx);
+ }
+
+ end:
+ tor_free(encoded_desc);
+ return;
+}
+
+/** Set the revision counter in <b>hs_desc</b>. We do this by encrypting a
+ * timestamp using an OPE scheme and using the ciphertext as our revision
+ * counter.
+ *
+ * If <b>is_current</b> is true, then this is the current HS descriptor,
+ * otherwise it's the next one. */
+static void
+set_descriptor_revision_counter(hs_service_descriptor_t *hs_desc, time_t now,
+ bool is_current)
+{
+ uint64_t rev_counter = 0;
+
+ /* Get current time */
+ time_t srv_start = 0;
+
+ /* As our revision counter plaintext value, we use the seconds since the
+ * start of the SR protocol run that is relevant to this descriptor. This is
+ * guaranteed to be a positive value since we need the SRV to start making a
+ * descriptor (so that we know where to upload it).
+ *
+ * Depending on whether we are building the current or the next descriptor,
+ * services use a different SRV value. See [SERVICEUPLOAD] in
+ * rend-spec-v3.txt:
+ *
+ * In particular, for the current descriptor (aka first descriptor), Tor
+ * always uses the previous SRV for uploading the descriptor, and hence we
+ * should use the start time of the previous protocol run here.
+ *
+ * Whereas for the next descriptor (aka second descriptor), Tor always uses
+ * the current SRV for uploading the descriptor. and hence we use the start
+ * time of the current protocol run.
+ */
+ if (is_current) {
+ srv_start = sr_state_get_start_time_of_previous_protocol_run();
+ } else {
+ srv_start = sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run();
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Setting rev counter for TP #%u: "
+ "SRV started at %d, now %d (%s)",
+ (unsigned) hs_desc->time_period_num, (int)srv_start,
+ (int)now, is_current ? "current" : "next");
+
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(now >= srv_start);
+
+ /* Compute seconds elapsed since the start of the time period. That's the
+ * number of seconds of how long this blinded key has been active. */
+ time_t seconds_since_start_of_srv = now - srv_start;
+
+ /* Increment by one so that we are definitely sure this is strictly
+ * positive and not zero. */
+ seconds_since_start_of_srv++;
+
+ /* Check for too big inputs. */
+ if (BUG(seconds_since_start_of_srv > OPE_INPUT_MAX)) {
+ seconds_since_start_of_srv = OPE_INPUT_MAX;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we compute the final revision counter value by encrypting the
+ plaintext using our OPE cipher: */
+ tor_assert(hs_desc->ope_cipher);
+ rev_counter = crypto_ope_encrypt(hs_desc->ope_cipher,
+ (int) seconds_since_start_of_srv);
+
+ /* The OPE module returns CRYPTO_OPE_ERROR in case of errors. */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(rev_counter < CRYPTO_OPE_ERROR);
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Encrypted revision counter %d to %ld",
+ (int) seconds_since_start_of_srv, (long int) rev_counter);
+
+ hs_desc->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter = rev_counter;
+}
+
+/* Encode and sign the service descriptor desc and upload it to the
+ * responsible hidden service directories. If for_next_period is true, the set
+ * of directories are selected using the next hsdir_index. This does nothing
+ * if PublishHidServDescriptors is false. */
+STATIC void
+upload_descriptor_to_all(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ smartlist_t *responsible_dirs = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* We'll first cancel any directory request that are ongoing for this
+ * descriptor. It is possible that we can trigger multiple uploads in a
+ * short time frame which can lead to a race where the second upload arrives
+ * before the first one leading to a 400 malformed descriptor response from
+ * the directory. Closing all pending requests avoids that. */
+ close_directory_connections(service, desc);
+
+ /* Get our list of responsible HSDir. */
+ responsible_dirs = smartlist_new();
+ /* The parameter 0 means that we aren't a client so tell the function to use
+ * the spread store consensus paremeter. */
+ hs_get_responsible_hsdirs(&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, desc->time_period_num,
+ service->desc_next == desc, 0, responsible_dirs);
+
+ /** Clear list of previous hsdirs since we are about to upload to a new
+ * list. Let's keep it up to date. */
+ service_desc_clear_previous_hsdirs(desc);
+
+ /* For each responsible HSDir we have, initiate an upload command. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(responsible_dirs, const routerstatus_t *,
+ hsdir_rs) {
+ const node_t *hsdir_node = node_get_by_id(hsdir_rs->identity_digest);
+ /* Getting responsible hsdir implies that the node_t object exists for the
+ * routerstatus_t found in the consensus else we have a problem. */
+ tor_assert(hsdir_node);
+ /* Upload this descriptor to the chosen directory. */
+ upload_descriptor_to_hsdir(service, desc, hsdir_node);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(hsdir_rs);
+
+ /* Set the next upload time for this descriptor. Even if we are configured
+ * to not upload, we still want to follow the right cycle of life for this
+ * descriptor. */
+ desc->next_upload_time =
+ (time(NULL) + crypto_rand_int_range(HS_SERVICE_NEXT_UPLOAD_TIME_MIN,
+ HS_SERVICE_NEXT_UPLOAD_TIME_MAX));
+ {
+ char fmt_next_time[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ format_local_iso_time(fmt_next_time, desc->next_upload_time);
+ log_debug(LD_REND, "Service %s set to upload a descriptor at %s",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address), fmt_next_time);
+ }
+
+ smartlist_free(responsible_dirs);
+ return;
+}
+
+/** The set of HSDirs have changed: check if the change affects our descriptor
+ * HSDir placement, and if it does, reupload the desc. */
+STATIC int
+service_desc_hsdirs_changed(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ int should_reupload = 0;
+ smartlist_t *responsible_dirs = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* No desc upload has happened yet: it will happen eventually */
+ if (!desc->previous_hsdirs || !smartlist_len(desc->previous_hsdirs)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Get list of responsible hsdirs */
+ hs_get_responsible_hsdirs(&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, desc->time_period_num,
+ service->desc_next == desc, 0, responsible_dirs);
+
+ /* Check if any new hsdirs have been added to the responsible hsdirs set:
+ * Iterate over the list of new hsdirs, and reupload if any of them is not
+ * present in the list of previous hsdirs.
+ */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(responsible_dirs, const routerstatus_t *, hsdir_rs) {
+ char b64_digest[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1] = {0};
+ digest_to_base64(b64_digest, hsdir_rs->identity_digest);
+
+ if (!smartlist_contains_string(desc->previous_hsdirs, b64_digest)) {
+ should_reupload = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(hsdir_rs);
+
+ done:
+ smartlist_free(responsible_dirs);
+
+ return should_reupload;
+}
+
+/* Return 1 if the given descriptor from the given service can be uploaded
+ * else return 0 if it can not. */
+static int
+should_service_upload_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ unsigned int num_intro_points;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* If this descriptors has missing intro points that is that it couldn't get
+ * them all when it was time to pick them, it means that we should upload
+ * instead of waiting an arbitrary amount of time breaking the service.
+ * Else, if we have no missing intro points, we use the value taken from the
+ * service configuration. */
+ if (desc->missing_intro_points) {
+ num_intro_points = digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map);
+ } else {
+ num_intro_points = service->config.num_intro_points;
+ }
+
+ /* This means we tried to pick intro points but couldn't get any so do not
+ * upload descriptor in this case. We need at least one for the service to
+ * be reachable. */
+ if (desc->missing_intro_points && num_intro_points == 0) {
+ goto cannot;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if all our introduction circuit have been established for all the
+ * intro points we have selected. */
+ if (count_desc_circuit_established(desc) != num_intro_points) {
+ goto cannot;
+ }
+
+ /* Is it the right time to upload? */
+ if (desc->next_upload_time > now) {
+ goto cannot;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't upload desc if we don't have a live consensus */
+ if (!networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now)) {
+ goto cannot;
+ }
+
+ /* Do we know enough router descriptors to have adequate vision of the HSDir
+ hash ring? */
+ if (!router_have_minimum_dir_info()) {
+ goto cannot;
+ }
+
+ /* Can upload! */
+ return 1;
+ cannot:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Refresh the given service descriptor meaning this will update every mutable
+ * field that needs to be updated before we upload.
+ *
+ * This should ONLY be called before uploading a descriptor. It assumes that
+ * the descriptor has been built (desc->desc) and that all intro point
+ * circuits have been established. */
+static void
+refresh_service_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ /* There are few fields that we consider "mutable" in the descriptor meaning
+ * we need to update them regurlarly over the lifetime fo the descriptor.
+ * The rest are set once and should not be modified.
+ *
+ * - Signing key certificate.
+ * - Revision counter.
+ * - Introduction points which includes many thing. See
+ * hs_desc_intro_point_t. and the setup_desc_intro_point() function.
+ */
+
+ /* Create the signing key certificate. */
+ build_desc_signing_key_cert(desc, now);
+
+ /* Build the intro points descriptor section. The refresh step is just
+ * before we upload so all circuits have been properly established. */
+ build_desc_intro_points(service, desc, now);
+
+ /* Set the desc revision counter right before uploading */
+ set_descriptor_revision_counter(desc, now, service->desc_current == desc);
+}
+
+/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Try to upload the descriptor for
+ * each service. */
+STATIC void
+run_upload_descriptor_event(time_t now)
+{
+ /* v2 services use the same function for descriptor creation and upload so
+ * we do everything here because the intro circuits were checked before. */
+ if (rend_num_services() > 0) {
+ rend_consider_services_upload(now);
+ rend_consider_descriptor_republication();
+ }
+
+ /* Run v3+ check. */
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ /* If we were asked to re-examine the hash ring, and it changed, then
+ schedule an upload */
+ if (consider_republishing_hs_descriptors &&
+ service_desc_hsdirs_changed(service, desc)) {
+ service_desc_schedule_upload(desc, now, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Can this descriptor be uploaded? */
+ if (!should_service_upload_descriptor(service, desc, now)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Initiating upload for hidden service %s descriptor "
+ "for service %s with %u/%u introduction points%s.",
+ (desc == service->desc_current) ? "current" : "next",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
+ digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map),
+ service->config.num_intro_points,
+ (desc->missing_intro_points) ? " (couldn't pick more)" : "");
+
+ /* We are about to upload so we need to do one last step which is to
+ * update the service's descriptor mutable fields in order to upload a
+ * coherent descriptor. */
+ refresh_service_descriptor(service, desc, now);
+
+ /* Proceed with the upload, the descriptor is ready to be encoded. */
+ upload_descriptor_to_all(service, desc);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+
+ /* We are done considering whether to republish rend descriptors */
+ consider_republishing_hs_descriptors = 0;
+}
+
+/* Called when the introduction point circuit is done building and ready to be
+ * used. */
+static void
+service_intro_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+
+ /* Let's do some basic sanity checking of the circ state */
+ if (BUG(!circ->cpath)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (BUG(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (BUG(!circ->hs_ident)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the corresponding service and intro point. */
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, &desc);
+
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service identity key %s on the introduction "
+ "circuit %u. Can't find onion service.",
+ safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown introduction point auth key on circuit %u "
+ "for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* We can't have an IP object without a descriptor. */
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ if (hs_circ_service_intro_has_opened(service, ip, desc, circ)) {
+ /* Getting here means that the circuit has been re-purposed because we
+ * have enough intro circuit opened. Remove the IP from the service. */
+ service_intro_point_remove(service, ip);
+ service_intro_point_free(ip);
+ }
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ /* Close circuit, we can't use it. */
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOSUCHSERVICE);
+ done:
+ return;
+}
+
+/* Called when a rendezvous circuit is done building and ready to be used. */
+static void
+service_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath);
+ /* Getting here means this is a v3 rendezvous circuit. */
+ tor_assert(circ->hs_ident);
+ tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
+
+ /* Declare the circuit dirty to avoid reuse, and for path-bias. We set the
+ * timestamp regardless of its content because that circuit could have been
+ * cannibalized so in any cases, we are about to use that circuit more. */
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ);
+
+ /* Get the corresponding service and intro point. */
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, NULL, NULL);
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service identity key %s on the rendezvous "
+ "circuit %u with cookie %s. Can't find onion service.",
+ safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ hex_str((const char *) circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie,
+ REND_COOKIE_LEN));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If the cell can't be sent, the circuit will be closed within this
+ * function. */
+ hs_circ_service_rp_has_opened(service, circ);
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOSUCHSERVICE);
+ done:
+ return;
+}
+
+/* We've been expecting an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on this circuit and it just
+ * arrived. Handle the INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell arriving on the given
+ * introduction circuit. Return 0 on success else a negative value. */
+static int
+service_handle_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const uint8_t *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(payload);
+ tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO);
+
+ /* We need the service and intro point for this cell. */
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, NULL);
+
+ /* Get service object from the circuit identifier. */
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service identity key %s on the introduction "
+ "circuit %u. Can't find onion service.",
+ safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ /* We don't recognize the key. */
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction circuit established without an intro "
+ "point object on circuit %u for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to parse the payload into a cell making sure we do actually have a
+ * valid cell. On success, the ip object and circuit purpose is updated to
+ * reflect the fact that the introduction circuit is established. */
+ if (hs_circ_handle_intro_established(service, ip, circ, payload,
+ payload_len) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Flag that we have an established circuit for this intro point. This value
+ * is what indicates the upload scheduled event if we are ready to build the
+ * intro point into the descriptor and upload. */
+ ip->circuit_established = 1;
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Successfully received an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell "
+ "on circuit %u for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ return 0;
+
+ err:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* We just received an INTRODUCE2 cell on the established introduction circuit
+ * circ. Handle the cell and return 0 on success else a negative value. */
+static int
+service_handle_introduce2(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(payload);
+ tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO);
+
+ /* We'll need every object associated with this circuit. */
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, &desc);
+
+ /* Get service object from the circuit identifier. */
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown service identity key %s when handling "
+ "an INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u",
+ safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ /* We don't recognize the key. */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown introduction auth key when handling "
+ "an INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* If we have an IP object, we MUST have a descriptor object. */
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* The following will parse, decode and launch the rendezvous point circuit.
+ * Both current and legacy cells are handled. */
+ if (hs_circ_handle_introduce2(service, circ, ip, desc->desc->subcredential,
+ payload, payload_len) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ err:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Add to list every filename used by service. This is used by the sandbox
+ * subsystem. */
+static void
+service_add_fnames_to_list(const hs_service_t *service, smartlist_t *list)
+{
+ const char *s_dir;
+ char fname[128] = {0};
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(list);
+
+ /* Ease our life. */
+ s_dir = service->config.directory_path;
+ /* The hostname file. */
+ smartlist_add(list, hs_path_from_filename(s_dir, fname_hostname));
+ /* The key files splitted in two. */
+ tor_snprintf(fname, sizeof(fname), "%s_secret_key", fname_keyfile_prefix);
+ smartlist_add(list, hs_path_from_filename(s_dir, fname));
+ tor_snprintf(fname, sizeof(fname), "%s_public_key", fname_keyfile_prefix);
+ smartlist_add(list, hs_path_from_filename(s_dir, fname));
+}
+
+/* Return true iff the given service identity key is present on disk. */
+static int
+service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ char *fname;
+ ed25519_keypair_t *kp = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(directory_path);
+
+ /* Build the v3 key path name and then try to load it. */
+ fname = hs_path_from_filename(directory_path, fname_keyfile_prefix);
+ kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT,
+ LOG_DEBUG, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (kp) {
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+ ed25519_keypair_free(kp);
+ tor_free(fname);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* This is a proxy function before actually calling hs_desc_encode_descriptor
+ * because we need some preprocessing here */
+static int
+service_encode_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp,
+ char **encoded_out)
+{
+ int ret;
+ const uint8_t *descriptor_cookie = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(encoded_out);
+
+ /* If the client authorization is enabled, send the descriptor cookie to
+ * hs_desc_encode_descriptor. Otherwise, send NULL */
+ if (service->config.is_client_auth_enabled) {
+ descriptor_cookie = desc->descriptor_cookie;
+ }
+
+ ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc->desc, signing_kp,
+ descriptor_cookie, encoded_out);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ========== */
+/* Public API */
+/* ========== */
+
+/* This is called everytime the service map (v2 or v3) changes that is if an
+ * element is added or removed. */
+void
+hs_service_map_has_changed(void)
+{
+ /* If we now have services where previously we had not, we need to enable
+ * the HS service main loop event. If we changed to having no services, we
+ * need to disable the event. */
+ rescan_periodic_events(get_options());
+}
+
+/* Upload an encoded descriptor in encoded_desc of the given version. This
+ * descriptor is for the service identity_pk and blinded_pk used to setup the
+ * directory connection identifier. It is uploaded to the directory hsdir_rs
+ * routerstatus_t object.
+ *
+ * NOTE: This function does NOT check for PublishHidServDescriptors because it
+ * is only used by the control port command HSPOST outside of this subsystem.
+ * Inside this code, upload_descriptor_to_hsdir() should be used. */
+void
+hs_service_upload_desc_to_dir(const char *encoded_desc,
+ const uint8_t version,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *blinded_pk,
+ const routerstatus_t *hsdir_rs)
+{
+ char version_str[4] = {0};
+ directory_request_t *dir_req;
+ hs_ident_dir_conn_t ident;
+
+ tor_assert(encoded_desc);
+ tor_assert(identity_pk);
+ tor_assert(blinded_pk);
+ tor_assert(hsdir_rs);
+
+ /* Setup the connection identifier. */
+ memset(&ident, 0, sizeof(ident));
+ hs_ident_dir_conn_init(identity_pk, blinded_pk, &ident);
+
+ /* This is our resource when uploading which is used to construct the URL
+ * with the version number: "/tor/hs/<version>/publish". */
+ tor_snprintf(version_str, sizeof(version_str), "%u", version);
+
+ /* Build the directory request for this HSDir. */
+ dir_req = directory_request_new(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_HSDESC);
+ directory_request_set_routerstatus(dir_req, hsdir_rs);
+ directory_request_set_indirection(dir_req, DIRIND_ANONYMOUS);
+ directory_request_set_resource(dir_req, version_str);
+ directory_request_set_payload(dir_req, encoded_desc,
+ strlen(encoded_desc));
+ /* The ident object is copied over the directory connection object once
+ * the directory request is initiated. */
+ directory_request_upload_set_hs_ident(dir_req, &ident);
+
+ /* Initiate the directory request to the hsdir.*/
+ directory_initiate_request(dir_req);
+ directory_request_free(dir_req);
+}
+
+/* Add the ephemeral service using the secret key sk and ports. Both max
+ * streams parameter will be set in the newly created service.
+ *
+ * Ownership of sk and ports is passed to this routine. Regardless of
+ * success/failure, callers should not touch these values after calling this
+ * routine, and may assume that correct cleanup has been done on failure.
+ *
+ * Return an appropriate hs_service_add_ephemeral_status_t. */
+hs_service_add_ephemeral_status_t
+hs_service_add_ephemeral(ed25519_secret_key_t *sk, smartlist_t *ports,
+ int max_streams_per_rdv_circuit,
+ int max_streams_close_circuit, char **address_out)
+{
+ hs_service_add_ephemeral_status_t ret;
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(sk);
+ tor_assert(ports);
+ tor_assert(address_out);
+
+ service = hs_service_new(get_options());
+
+ /* Setup the service configuration with specifics. A default service is
+ * HS_VERSION_TWO so explicitly set it. */
+ service->config.version = HS_VERSION_THREE;
+ service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit = max_streams_per_rdv_circuit;
+ service->config.max_streams_close_circuit = !!max_streams_close_circuit;
+ service->config.is_ephemeral = 1;
+ smartlist_free(service->config.ports);
+ service->config.ports = ports;
+
+ /* Handle the keys. */
+ memcpy(&service->keys.identity_sk, sk, sizeof(service->keys.identity_sk));
+ if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&service->keys.identity_pk,
+ &service->keys.identity_sk) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unable to generate ed25519 public key"
+ "for v3 service.");
+ ret = RSAE_BADPRIVKEY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure we have at least one port. */
+ if (smartlist_len(service->config.ports) == 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "At least one VIRTPORT/TARGET must be specified "
+ "for v3 service.");
+ ret = RSAE_BADVIRTPORT;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Build the onion address for logging purposes but also the control port
+ * uses it for the HS_DESC event. */
+ hs_build_address(&service->keys.identity_pk,
+ (uint8_t) service->config.version,
+ service->onion_address);
+
+ /* The only way the registration can fail is if the service public key
+ * already exists. */
+ if (BUG(register_service(hs_service_map, service) < 0)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Onion Service private key collides with an "
+ "existing v3 service.");
+ ret = RSAE_ADDREXISTS;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Added ephemeral v3 onion service: %s",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+
+ *address_out = tor_strdup(service->onion_address);
+ ret = RSAE_OKAY;
+ goto end;
+
+ err:
+ hs_service_free(service);
+
+ end:
+ memwipe(sk, 0, sizeof(ed25519_secret_key_t));
+ tor_free(sk);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* For the given onion address, delete the ephemeral service. Return 0 on
+ * success else -1 on error. */
+int
+hs_service_del_ephemeral(const char *address)
+{
+ uint8_t version;
+ ed25519_public_key_t pk;
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(address);
+
+ if (hs_parse_address(address, &pk, NULL, &version) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested malformed v3 onion address for removal.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (version != HS_VERSION_THREE) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested version of onion address for removal "
+ "is not supported.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ service = find_service(hs_service_map, &pk);
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-existent v3 hidden service for "
+ "removal.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!service->config.is_ephemeral) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-ephemeral v3 hidden service for "
+ "removal.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
- /* Close circuits, remove from map and finally free. */
- close_service_circuits(service);
++ /* Close introduction circuits, remove from map and finally free. Notice
++ * that the rendezvous circuits aren't closed in order for any existing
++ * connections to finish. We let the application terminate them. */
++ close_service_intro_circuits(service);
+ remove_service(hs_service_map, service);
+ hs_service_free(service);
+
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Removed ephemeral v3 hidden service: %s",
+ safe_str_client(address));
+ return 0;
+
+ err:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Using the ed25519 public key pk, find a service for that key and return the
+ * current encoded descriptor as a newly allocated string or NULL if not
+ * found. This is used by the control port subsystem. */
+char *
+hs_service_lookup_current_desc(const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
+{
+ const hs_service_t *service;
+
+ tor_assert(pk);
+
+ service = find_service(hs_service_map, pk);
+ if (service && service->desc_current) {
+ char *encoded_desc = NULL;
+ /* No matter what is the result (which should never be a failure), return
+ * the encoded variable, if success it will contain the right thing else
+ * it will be NULL. */
+ service_encode_descriptor(service,
+ service->desc_current,
+ &service->desc_current->signing_kp,
+ &encoded_desc);
+ return encoded_desc;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Return the number of service we have configured and usable. */
+unsigned int
+hs_service_get_num_services(void)
+{
+ if (hs_service_map == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return HT_SIZE(hs_service_map);
+}
+
+/* Called once an introduction circuit is closed. If the circuit doesn't have
+ * a v3 identifier, it is ignored. */
+void
+hs_service_intro_circ_has_closed(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+
+ if (circ->hs_ident == NULL) {
+ /* This is not a v3 circuit, ignore. */
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, &desc);
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ /* This is possible if the circuits are closed and the service is
+ * immediately deleted. */
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to find any hidden service associated "
+ "identity key %s on intro circuit %u.",
+ ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ /* The introduction point object has already been removed probably by our
+ * cleanup process so ignore. */
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* Can't have an intro point object without a descriptor. */
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* Circuit disappeared so make sure the intro point is updated. By
+ * keeping the object in the descriptor, we'll be able to retry. */
+ ip->circuit_established = 0;
+
+ end:
+ return;
+}
+
+/* Given conn, a rendezvous edge connection acting as an exit stream, look up
+ * the hidden service for the circuit circ, and look up the port and address
+ * based on the connection port. Assign the actual connection address.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success. Return -1 on failure and the caller should NOT close
+ * the circuit. Return -2 on failure and the caller MUST close the circuit for
+ * security reasons. */
+int
+hs_service_set_conn_addr_port(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ edge_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
+ tor_assert(circ->hs_ident);
+
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to find any hidden service associated "
+ "identity key %s on rendezvous circuit %u.",
+ ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
+ /* We want the caller to close the circuit because it's not a valid
+ * service so no danger. Attempting to bruteforce the entire key space by
+ * opening circuits to learn which service is being hosted here is
+ * impractical. */
+ goto err_close;
+ }
+
+ /* Enforce the streams-per-circuit limit, and refuse to provide a mapping if
+ * this circuit will exceed the limit. */
+ if (service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit > 0 &&
+ (circ->hs_ident->num_rdv_streams >=
+ service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit)) {
+#define MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL 600
+ static struct ratelim_t stream_ratelim =
+ RATELIM_INIT(MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL);
+ log_fn_ratelim(&stream_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_REND,
+ "Maximum streams per circuit limit reached on "
+ "rendezvous circuit %u for service %s. Circuit has "
+ "%" PRIu64 " out of %" PRIu64 " streams. %s.",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ service->onion_address,
+ circ->hs_ident->num_rdv_streams,
+ service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit,
+ service->config.max_streams_close_circuit ?
+ "Closing circuit" : "Ignoring open stream request");
+ if (service->config.max_streams_close_circuit) {
+ /* Service explicitly configured to close immediately. */
+ goto err_close;
+ }
+ /* Exceeding the limit makes tor silently ignore the stream creation
+ * request and keep the circuit open. */
+ goto err_no_close;
+ }
+
+ /* Find a virtual port of that service mathcing the one in the connection if
+ * successful, set the address in the connection. */
+ if (hs_set_conn_addr_port(service->config.ports, conn) < 0) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "No virtual port mapping exists for port %d for "
+ "hidden service %s.",
+ TO_CONN(conn)->port, service->onion_address);
+ if (service->config.allow_unknown_ports) {
+ /* Service explicitly allow connection to unknown ports so close right
+ * away because we do not care about port mapping. */
+ goto err_close;
+ }
+ /* If the service didn't explicitly allow it, we do NOT close the circuit
+ * here to raise the bar in terms of performance for port mapping. */
+ goto err_no_close;
+ }
+
+ /* Success. */
+ return 0;
+ err_close:
+ /* Indicate the caller that the circuit should be closed. */
+ return -2;
+ err_no_close:
+ /* Indicate the caller to NOT close the circuit. */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/** Does the service with identity pubkey <b>pk</b> export the circuit IDs of
+ * its clients? */
+hs_circuit_id_protocol_t
+hs_service_exports_circuit_id(const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = find_service(hs_service_map, pk);
+ if (!service) {
+ return HS_CIRCUIT_ID_PROTOCOL_NONE;
+ }
+
+ return service->config.circuit_id_protocol;
+}
+
+/* Add to file_list every filename used by a configured hidden service, and to
+ * dir_list every directory path used by a configured hidden service. This is
+ * used by the sandbox subsystem to whitelist those. */
+void
+hs_service_lists_fnames_for_sandbox(smartlist_t *file_list,
+ smartlist_t *dir_list)
+{
+ tor_assert(file_list);
+ tor_assert(dir_list);
+
+ /* Add files and dirs for legacy services. */
+ rend_services_add_filenames_to_lists(file_list, dir_list);
+
+ /* Add files and dirs for v3+. */
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+ /* Skip ephemeral service, they don't touch the disk. */
+ if (service->config.is_ephemeral) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ service_add_fnames_to_list(service, file_list);
+ smartlist_add_strdup(dir_list, service->config.directory_path);
+ smartlist_add_strdup(dir_list, dname_client_pubkeys);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* Called when our internal view of the directory has changed. We might have
+ * received a new batch of descriptors which might affect the shape of the
+ * HSDir hash ring. Signal that we should reexamine the hash ring and
+ * re-upload our HS descriptors if needed. */
+void
+hs_service_dir_info_changed(void)
+{
+ if (hs_service_get_num_services() > 0) {
+ /* New directory information usually goes every consensus so rate limit
+ * every 30 minutes to not be too conservative. */
+ static struct ratelim_t dir_info_changed_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(30 * 60);
+ log_fn_ratelim(&dir_info_changed_ratelim, LOG_INFO, LD_REND,
+ "New dirinfo arrived: consider reuploading descriptor");
+ consider_republishing_hs_descriptors = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Called when we get an INTRODUCE2 cell on the circ. Respond to the cell and
+ * launch a circuit to the rendezvous point. */
+int
+hs_service_receive_introduce2(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(payload);
+
+ /* Do some initial validation and logging before we parse the cell */
+ if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Received an INTRODUCE2 cell on a "
+ "non introduction circuit of purpose %d",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (circ->hs_ident) {
+ ret = service_handle_introduce2(circ, payload, payload_len);
+ hs_stats_note_introduce2_cell(1);
+ } else {
+ ret = rend_service_receive_introduction(circ, payload, payload_len);
+ hs_stats_note_introduce2_cell(0);
+ }
+
+ done:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell. Mark the circuit as an
+ * established introduction point. Return 0 on success else a negative value
+ * and the circuit is closed. */
+int
+hs_service_receive_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const uint8_t *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(payload);
+
+ if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO) {
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Received an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on a "
+ "non introduction circuit of purpose %d",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Handle both version. v2 uses rend_data and v3 uses the hs circuit
+ * identifier hs_ident. Can't be both. */
+ if (circ->hs_ident) {
+ ret = service_handle_intro_established(circ, payload, payload_len);
+ } else {
+ ret = rend_service_intro_established(circ, payload, payload_len);
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ err:
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Called when any kind of hidden service circuit is done building thus
+ * opened. This is the entry point from the circuit subsystem. */
+void
+hs_service_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ tor_assert(circ);
+
+ /* Handle both version. v2 uses rend_data and v3 uses the hs circuit
+ * identifier hs_ident. Can't be both. */
+ switch (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose) {
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
+ if (circ->hs_ident) {
+ service_intro_circ_has_opened(circ);
+ } else {
+ rend_service_intro_has_opened(circ);
+ }
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
+ if (circ->hs_ident) {
+ service_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(circ);
+ } else {
+ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(circ);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ tor_assert(0);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return the service version by looking at the key in the service directory.
+ * If the key is not found or unrecognized, -1 is returned. Else, the service
+ * version is returned. */
+int
+hs_service_get_version_from_key(const hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ int version = -1; /* Unknown version. */
+ const char *directory_path;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* We'll try to load the key for version 3. If not found, we'll try version
+ * 2 and if not found, we'll send back an unknown version (-1). */
+ directory_path = service->config.directory_path;
+
+ /* Version 3 check. */
+ if (service_key_on_disk(directory_path)) {
+ version = HS_VERSION_THREE;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* Version 2 check. */
+ if (rend_service_key_on_disk(directory_path)) {
+ version = HS_VERSION_TWO;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ end:
+ return version;
+}
+
+/* Load and/or generate keys for all onion services including the client
+ * authorization if any. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
+int
+hs_service_load_all_keys(void)
+{
+ /* Load v2 service keys if we have v2. */
+ if (rend_num_services() != 0) {
+ if (rend_service_load_all_keys(NULL) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Load or/and generate them for v3+. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(hs_service_staging_list, hs_service_t *, service) {
+ /* Ignore ephemeral service, they already have their keys set. */
+ if (service->config.is_ephemeral) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Loading v3 onion service keys from %s",
+ service_escaped_dir(service));
+ if (load_service_keys(service) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(service);
+
+ /* Final step, the staging list contains service in a quiescent state that
+ * is ready to be used. Register them to the global map. Once this is over,
+ * the staging list will be cleaned up. */
+ register_all_services();
+
+ /* All keys have been loaded successfully. */
+ return 0;
+ err:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Put all service object in the given service list. After this, the caller
+ * looses ownership of every elements in the list and responsible to free the
+ * list pointer. */
+void
+hs_service_stage_services(const smartlist_t *service_list)
+{
+ tor_assert(service_list);
+ /* This list is freed at registration time but this function can be called
+ * multiple time. */
+ if (hs_service_staging_list == NULL) {
+ hs_service_staging_list = smartlist_new();
+ }
+ /* Add all service object to our staging list. Caller is responsible for
+ * freeing the service_list. */
+ smartlist_add_all(hs_service_staging_list, service_list);
+}
+
+/* Allocate and initilize a service object. The service configuration will
+ * contain the default values. Return the newly allocated object pointer. This
+ * function can't fail. */
+hs_service_t *
+hs_service_new(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_t));
+ /* Set default configuration value. */
+ set_service_default_config(&service->config, options);
+ /* Set the default service version. */
+ service->config.version = HS_SERVICE_DEFAULT_VERSION;
+ /* Allocate the CLIENT_PK replay cache in service state. */
+ service->state.replay_cache_rend_cookie =
+ replaycache_new(REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL, REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL);
+
+ return service;
+}
+
+/* Free the given <b>service</b> object and all its content. This function
+ * also takes care of wiping service keys from memory. It is safe to pass a
+ * NULL pointer. */
+void
+hs_service_free_(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Free descriptors. Go over both descriptor with this loop. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ service_descriptor_free(desc);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+
+ /* Free service configuration. */
+ service_clear_config(&service->config);
+
+ /* Free replay cache from state. */
+ if (service->state.replay_cache_rend_cookie) {
+ replaycache_free(service->state.replay_cache_rend_cookie);
+ }
+
+ /* Wipe service keys. */
+ memwipe(&service->keys.identity_sk, 0, sizeof(service->keys.identity_sk));
+
+ tor_free(service);
+}
+
+/* Periodic callback. Entry point from the main loop to the HS service
+ * subsystem. This is call every second. This is skipped if tor can't build a
+ * circuit or the network is disabled. */
+void
+hs_service_run_scheduled_events(time_t now)
+{
+ /* First thing we'll do here is to make sure our services are in a
+ * quiescent state for the scheduled events. */
+ run_housekeeping_event(now);
+
+ /* Order matters here. We first make sure the descriptor object for each
+ * service contains the latest data. Once done, we check if we need to open
+ * new introduction circuit. Finally, we try to upload the descriptor for
+ * each service. */
+
+ /* Make sure descriptors are up to date. */
+ run_build_descriptor_event(now);
+ /* Make sure services have enough circuits. */
+ run_build_circuit_event(now);
+ /* Upload the descriptors if needed/possible. */
+ run_upload_descriptor_event(now);
+}
+
+/* Initialize the service HS subsystem. */
+void
+hs_service_init(void)
+{
+ /* Should never be called twice. */
+ tor_assert(!hs_service_map);
+ tor_assert(!hs_service_staging_list);
+
+ /* v2 specific. */
+ rend_service_init();
+
+ hs_service_map = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(struct hs_service_ht));
+ HT_INIT(hs_service_ht, hs_service_map);
+
+ hs_service_staging_list = smartlist_new();
+}
+
+/* Release all global storage of the hidden service subsystem. */
+void
+hs_service_free_all(void)
+{
+ rend_service_free_all();
+ service_free_all();
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+
+/* Return the global service map size. Only used by unit test. */
+STATIC unsigned int
+get_hs_service_map_size(void)
+{
+ return HT_SIZE(hs_service_map);
+}
+
+/* Return the staging list size. Only used by unit test. */
+STATIC int
+get_hs_service_staging_list_size(void)
+{
+ return smartlist_len(hs_service_staging_list);
+}
+
+STATIC hs_service_ht *
+get_hs_service_map(void)
+{
+ return hs_service_map;
+}
+
+STATIC hs_service_t *
+get_first_service(void)
+{
+ hs_service_t **obj = HT_START(hs_service_ht, hs_service_map);
+ if (obj == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return *obj;
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
1
0
[tor/release-0.3.5] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.5' into release-0.3.5
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
05 Dec '18
commit b9d0aa21080014d86a61946e9d09652d8e7fa058
Merge: 85674f59b 967efc0d2
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org>
Date: Wed Dec 5 10:25:12 2018 -0500
Merge branch 'maint-0.3.5' into release-0.3.5
changes/bug28619 | 6 ++++++
src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 6 ++++--
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
1
0
[tor/maint-0.3.5] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/546' into maint-0.3.5
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
05 Dec '18
commit 967efc0d28ffdedfb52640456e4483dd2ee63e05
Merge: 0906dde9d d37dbb09c
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org>
Date: Wed Dec 5 10:23:28 2018 -0500
Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/546' into maint-0.3.5
changes/bug28619 | 6 ++++++
src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 6 ++++--
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --cc src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
index 7d56c9e2a,000000000..304242895
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
@@@ -1,4168 -1,0 +1,4170 @@@
+/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file hs_service.c
+ * \brief Implement next generation hidden service functionality
+ **/
+
+#define HS_SERVICE_PRIVATE
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "app/config/statefile.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
+#include "core/or/circuituse.h"
+#include "core/or/relay.h"
+#include "feature/client/circpathbias.h"
+#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
+#include "feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/describe.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/node_select.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+#include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ope.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+
+#include "feature/hs/hs_circuit.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_common.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_config.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_control.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_service.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_stats.h"
+
+#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/edge_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
+#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h"
+#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
+
+#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
+
+/* Trunnel */
+#include "trunnel/ed25519_cert.h"
+#include "trunnel/hs/cell_common.h"
+#include "trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Helper macro. Iterate over every service in the global map. The var is the
+ * name of the service pointer. */
+#define FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(var) \
+ STMT_BEGIN \
+ hs_service_t **var##_iter, *var; \
+ HT_FOREACH(var##_iter, hs_service_ht, hs_service_map) { \
+ var = *var##_iter;
+#define FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END } STMT_END ;
+
+/* Helper macro. Iterate over both current and previous descriptor of a
+ * service. The var is the name of the descriptor pointer. This macro skips
+ * any descriptor object of the service that is NULL. */
+#define FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, var) \
+ STMT_BEGIN \
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *var; \
+ for (int var ## _loop_idx = 0; var ## _loop_idx < 2; \
+ ++var ## _loop_idx) { \
+ (var ## _loop_idx == 0) ? (var = service->desc_current) : \
+ (var = service->desc_next); \
+ if (var == NULL) continue;
+#define FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END } STMT_END ;
+
+/* Onion service directory file names. */
+static const char fname_keyfile_prefix[] = "hs_ed25519";
+static const char dname_client_pubkeys[] = "authorized_clients";
+static const char fname_hostname[] = "hostname";
+static const char address_tld[] = "onion";
+
+/* Staging list of service object. When configuring service, we add them to
+ * this list considered a staging area and they will get added to our global
+ * map once the keys have been loaded. These two steps are separated because
+ * loading keys requires that we are an actual running tor process. */
+static smartlist_t *hs_service_staging_list;
+
+/** True if the list of available router descriptors might have changed which
+ * might result in an altered hash ring. Check if the hash ring changed and
+ * reupload if needed */
+static int consider_republishing_hs_descriptors = 0;
+
+/* Static declaration. */
+static int load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service);
+static void set_descriptor_revision_counter(hs_service_descriptor_t *hs_desc,
+ time_t now, bool is_current);
+static int build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc);
+static void move_descriptors(hs_service_t *src, hs_service_t *dst);
+static int service_encode_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp,
+ char **encoded_out);
+
+/* Helper: Function to compare two objects in the service map. Return 1 if the
+ * two service have the same master public identity key. */
+static inline int
+hs_service_ht_eq(const hs_service_t *first, const hs_service_t *second)
+{
+ tor_assert(first);
+ tor_assert(second);
+ /* Simple key compare. */
+ return ed25519_pubkey_eq(&first->keys.identity_pk,
+ &second->keys.identity_pk);
+}
+
+/* Helper: Function for the service hash table code below. The key used is the
+ * master public identity key which is ultimately the onion address. */
+static inline unsigned int
+hs_service_ht_hash(const hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+ return (unsigned int) siphash24g(service->keys.identity_pk.pubkey,
+ sizeof(service->keys.identity_pk.pubkey));
+}
+
+/* This is _the_ global hash map of hidden services which indexed the service
+ * contained in it by master public identity key which is roughly the onion
+ * address of the service. */
+static struct hs_service_ht *hs_service_map;
+
+/* Register the service hash table. */
+HT_PROTOTYPE(hs_service_ht, /* Name of hashtable. */
+ hs_service_t, /* Object contained in the map. */
+ hs_service_node, /* The name of the HT_ENTRY member. */
+ hs_service_ht_hash, /* Hashing function. */
+ hs_service_ht_eq) /* Compare function for objects. */
+
+HT_GENERATE2(hs_service_ht, hs_service_t, hs_service_node,
+ hs_service_ht_hash, hs_service_ht_eq,
+ 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_)
+
+/* Query the given service map with a public key and return a service object
+ * if found else NULL. It is also possible to set a directory path in the
+ * search query. If pk is NULL, then it will be set to zero indicating the
+ * hash table to compare the directory path instead. */
+STATIC hs_service_t *
+find_service(hs_service_ht *map, const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
+{
+ hs_service_t dummy_service;
+ tor_assert(map);
+ tor_assert(pk);
+ memset(&dummy_service, 0, sizeof(dummy_service));
+ ed25519_pubkey_copy(&dummy_service.keys.identity_pk, pk);
+ return HT_FIND(hs_service_ht, map, &dummy_service);
+}
+
+/* Register the given service in the given map. If the service already exists
+ * in the map, -1 is returned. On success, 0 is returned and the service
+ * ownership has been transferred to the global map. */
+STATIC int
+register_service(hs_service_ht *map, hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(map);
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&service->keys.identity_pk));
+
+ if (find_service(map, &service->keys.identity_pk)) {
+ /* Existing service with the same key. Do not register it. */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Taking ownership of the object at this point. */
+ HT_INSERT(hs_service_ht, map, service);
+
+ /* If we just modified the global map, we notify. */
+ if (map == hs_service_map) {
+ hs_service_map_has_changed();
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Remove a given service from the given map. If service is NULL or the
+ * service key is unset, return gracefully. */
+STATIC void
+remove_service(hs_service_ht *map, hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ hs_service_t *elm;
+
+ tor_assert(map);
+
+ /* Ignore if no service or key is zero. */
+ if (BUG(service == NULL) ||
+ BUG(ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&service->keys.identity_pk))) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ elm = HT_REMOVE(hs_service_ht, map, service);
+ if (elm) {
+ tor_assert(elm == service);
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not find service in the global map "
+ "while removing service %s",
+ escaped(service->config.directory_path));
+ }
+
+ /* If we just modified the global map, we notify. */
+ if (map == hs_service_map) {
+ hs_service_map_has_changed();
+ }
+}
+
+/* Set the default values for a service configuration object <b>c</b>. */
+static void
+set_service_default_config(hs_service_config_t *c,
+ const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ (void) options;
+ tor_assert(c);
+ c->ports = smartlist_new();
+ c->directory_path = NULL;
+ c->max_streams_per_rdv_circuit = 0;
+ c->max_streams_close_circuit = 0;
+ c->num_intro_points = NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT;
+ c->allow_unknown_ports = 0;
+ c->is_single_onion = 0;
+ c->dir_group_readable = 0;
+ c->is_ephemeral = 0;
+}
+
+/* From a service configuration object config, clear everything from it
+ * meaning free allocated pointers and reset the values. */
+STATIC void
+service_clear_config(hs_service_config_t *config)
+{
+ if (config == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+ tor_free(config->directory_path);
+ if (config->ports) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config->ports, rend_service_port_config_t *, p,
+ rend_service_port_config_free(p););
+ smartlist_free(config->ports);
+ }
+ if (config->clients) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config->clients, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
+ service_authorized_client_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(config->clients);
+ }
+ memset(config, 0, sizeof(*config));
+}
+
+/* Helper function to return a human readable description of the given intro
+ * point object.
+ *
+ * This function is not thread-safe. Each call to this invalidates the
+ * previous values returned by it. */
+static const char *
+describe_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ /* Hex identity digest of the IP prefixed by the $ sign and ends with NUL
+ * byte hence the plus two. */
+ static char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN + 2];
+ const char *legacy_id = NULL;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->base.link_specifiers,
+ const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, lspec) {
+ if (lspec->type == LS_LEGACY_ID) {
+ legacy_id = (const char *) lspec->u.legacy_id;
+ break;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(lspec);
+
+ /* For now, we only print the identity digest but we could improve this with
+ * much more information such as the ed25519 identity has well. */
+ buf[0] = '$';
+ if (legacy_id) {
+ base16_encode(buf + 1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN + 1, legacy_id, DIGEST_LEN);
+ }
+
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* Return the lower bound of maximum INTRODUCE2 cells per circuit before we
+ * rotate intro point (defined by a consensus parameter or the default
+ * value). */
+static int32_t
+get_intro_point_min_introduce2(void)
+{
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
+ * in the future. */
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_min_introduce2",
+ INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
+ 0, INT32_MAX);
+}
+
+/* Return the upper bound of maximum INTRODUCE2 cells per circuit before we
+ * rotate intro point (defined by a consensus parameter or the default
+ * value). */
+static int32_t
+get_intro_point_max_introduce2(void)
+{
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
+ * in the future. */
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_max_introduce2",
+ INTRO_POINT_MAX_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
+ 0, INT32_MAX);
+}
+
+/* Return the minimum lifetime in seconds of an introduction point defined by a
+ * consensus parameter or the default value. */
+static int32_t
+get_intro_point_min_lifetime(void)
+{
+#define MIN_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING 10
+ if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
+ return MIN_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING;
+ }
+
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
+ * in the future. */
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_min_lifetime",
+ INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS,
+ 0, INT32_MAX);
+}
+
+/* Return the maximum lifetime in seconds of an introduction point defined by a
+ * consensus parameter or the default value. */
+static int32_t
+get_intro_point_max_lifetime(void)
+{
+#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING 30
+ if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
+ return MAX_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING;
+ }
+
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
+ * in the future. */
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_max_lifetime",
+ INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS,
+ 0, INT32_MAX);
+}
+
+/* Return the number of extra introduction point defined by a consensus
+ * parameter or the default value. */
+static int32_t
+get_intro_point_num_extra(void)
+{
+ /* The [0, 128] range bounds the number of extra introduction point allowed.
+ * Above 128 intro points, it's getting a bit crazy. */
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_num_extra",
+ NUM_INTRO_POINTS_EXTRA, 0, 128);
+}
+
+/* Helper: Function that needs to return 1 for the HT for each loop which
+ * frees every service in an hash map. */
+static int
+ht_free_service_(struct hs_service_t *service, void *data)
+{
+ (void) data;
+ hs_service_free(service);
+ /* This function MUST return 1 so the given object is then removed from the
+ * service map leading to this free of the object being safe. */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Free every service that can be found in the global map. Once done, clear
+ * and free the global map. */
+static void
+service_free_all(void)
+{
+ if (hs_service_map) {
+ /* The free helper function returns 1 so this is safe. */
+ hs_service_ht_HT_FOREACH_FN(hs_service_map, ht_free_service_, NULL);
+ HT_CLEAR(hs_service_ht, hs_service_map);
+ tor_free(hs_service_map);
+ hs_service_map = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (hs_service_staging_list) {
+ /* Cleanup staging list. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(hs_service_staging_list, hs_service_t *, s,
+ hs_service_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(hs_service_staging_list);
+ hs_service_staging_list = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Free a given service intro point object. */
+STATIC void
+service_intro_point_free_(hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ if (!ip) {
+ return;
+ }
+ memwipe(&ip->auth_key_kp, 0, sizeof(ip->auth_key_kp));
+ memwipe(&ip->enc_key_kp, 0, sizeof(ip->enc_key_kp));
+ crypto_pk_free(ip->legacy_key);
+ replaycache_free(ip->replay_cache);
+ hs_intropoint_clear(&ip->base);
+ tor_free(ip);
+}
+
+/* Helper: free an hs_service_intro_point_t object. This function is used by
+ * digest256map_free() which requires a void * pointer. */
+static void
+service_intro_point_free_void(void *obj)
+{
+ service_intro_point_free_(obj);
+}
+
+/* Return a newly allocated service intro point and fully initialized from the
+ * given extend_info_t ei if non NULL.
+ * If is_legacy is true, we also generate the legacy key.
+ * If supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any is true, we add the relay's ed25519
+ * key to the link specifiers.
+ *
+ * If ei is NULL, returns a hs_service_intro_point_t with an empty link
+ * specifier list and no onion key. (This is used for testing.)
+ * On any other error, NULL is returned.
+ *
+ * ei must be an extend_info_t containing an IPv4 address. (We will add supoort
+ * for IPv6 in a later release.) When calling extend_info_from_node(), pass
+ * 0 in for_direct_connection to make sure ei always has an IPv4 address. */
+STATIC hs_service_intro_point_t *
+service_intro_point_new(const extend_info_t *ei, unsigned int is_legacy,
+ unsigned int supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any)
+{
+ hs_desc_link_specifier_t *ls;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip;
+
+ ip = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ip));
+ /* We'll create the key material. No need for extra strong, those are short
+ * term keys. */
+ ed25519_keypair_generate(&ip->auth_key_kp, 0);
+
+ { /* Set introduce2 max cells limit */
+ int32_t min_introduce2_cells = get_intro_point_min_introduce2();
+ int32_t max_introduce2_cells = get_intro_point_max_introduce2();
+ if (BUG(max_introduce2_cells < min_introduce2_cells)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ip->introduce2_max = crypto_rand_int_range(min_introduce2_cells,
+ max_introduce2_cells);
+ }
+ { /* Set intro point lifetime */
+ int32_t intro_point_min_lifetime = get_intro_point_min_lifetime();
+ int32_t intro_point_max_lifetime = get_intro_point_max_lifetime();
+ if (BUG(intro_point_max_lifetime < intro_point_min_lifetime)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ip->time_to_expire = approx_time() +
+ crypto_rand_int_range(intro_point_min_lifetime,intro_point_max_lifetime);
+ }
+
+ ip->replay_cache = replaycache_new(0, 0);
+
+ /* Initialize the base object. We don't need the certificate object. */
+ ip->base.link_specifiers = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* Generate the encryption key for this intro point. */
+ curve25519_keypair_generate(&ip->enc_key_kp, 0);
+ /* Figure out if this chosen node supports v3 or is legacy only. */
+ if (is_legacy) {
+ ip->base.is_only_legacy = 1;
+ /* Legacy mode that is doesn't support v3+ with ed25519 auth key. */
+ ip->legacy_key = crypto_pk_new();
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(ip->legacy_key) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(ip->legacy_key,
+ (char *) ip->legacy_key_digest) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ei == NULL) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* We'll try to add all link specifiers. Legacy is mandatory.
+ * IPv4 or IPv6 is required, and we always send IPv4. */
+ ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_IPV4);
+ /* It is impossible to have an extend info object without a v4. */
+ if (BUG(!ls)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
+
+ ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_LEGACY_ID);
+ /* It is impossible to have an extend info object without an identity
+ * digest. */
+ if (BUG(!ls)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
+
+ /* ed25519 identity key is optional for intro points. If the node supports
+ * ed25519 link authentication, we include it. */
+ if (supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any) {
+ ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_ED25519_ID);
+ if (ls) {
+ smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* IPv6 is not supported in this release. */
+
+ /* Finally, copy onion key from the extend_info_t object. */
+ memcpy(&ip->onion_key, &ei->curve25519_onion_key, sizeof(ip->onion_key));
+
+ done:
+ return ip;
+ err:
+ service_intro_point_free(ip);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Add the given intro point object to the given intro point map. The intro
+ * point MUST have its RSA encryption key set if this is a legacy type or the
+ * authentication key set otherwise. */
+STATIC void
+service_intro_point_add(digest256map_t *map, hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *old_ip_entry;
+
+ tor_assert(map);
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ old_ip_entry = digest256map_set(map, ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey, ip);
+ /* Make sure we didn't just try to double-add an intro point */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(!old_ip_entry);
+}
+
+/* For a given service, remove the intro point from that service's descriptors
+ * (check both current and next descriptor) */
+STATIC void
+service_intro_point_remove(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ /* Trying all descriptors. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ /* We'll try to remove the descriptor on both descriptors which is not
+ * very expensive to do instead of doing loopup + remove. */
+ digest256map_remove(desc->intro_points.map,
+ ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* For a given service and authentication key, return the intro point or NULL
+ * if not found. This will check both descriptors in the service. */
+STATIC hs_service_intro_point_t *
+service_intro_point_find(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key)
+{
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(auth_key);
+
+ /* Trying all descriptors to find the right intro point.
+ *
+ * Even if we use the same node as intro point in both descriptors, the node
+ * will have a different intro auth key for each descriptor since we generate
+ * a new one everytime we pick an intro point.
+ *
+ * After #22893 gets implemented, intro points will be moved to be
+ * per-service instead of per-descriptor so this function will need to
+ * change.
+ */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ if ((ip = digest256map_get(desc->intro_points.map,
+ auth_key->pubkey)) != NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+
+ return ip;
+}
+
+/* For a given service and intro point, return the descriptor for which the
+ * intro point is assigned to. NULL is returned if not found. */
+STATIC hs_service_descriptor_t *
+service_desc_find_by_intro(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *descp = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ if (digest256map_get(desc->intro_points.map,
+ ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey)) {
+ descp = desc;
+ break;
+ }
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+
+ return descp;
+}
+
+/* From a circuit identifier, get all the possible objects associated with the
+ * ident. If not NULL, service, ip or desc are set if the object can be found.
+ * They are untouched if they can't be found.
+ *
+ * This is an helper function because we do those lookups often so it's more
+ * convenient to simply call this functions to get all the things at once. */
+STATIC void
+get_objects_from_ident(const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident,
+ hs_service_t **service, hs_service_intro_point_t **ip,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t **desc)
+{
+ hs_service_t *s;
+
+ tor_assert(ident);
+
+ /* Get service object from the circuit identifier. */
+ s = find_service(hs_service_map, &ident->identity_pk);
+ if (s && service) {
+ *service = s;
+ }
+
+ /* From the service object, get the intro point object of that circuit. The
+ * following will query both descriptors intro points list. */
+ if (s && ip) {
+ *ip = service_intro_point_find(s, &ident->intro_auth_pk);
+ }
+
+ /* Get the descriptor for this introduction point and service. */
+ if (s && ip && *ip && desc) {
+ *desc = service_desc_find_by_intro(s, *ip);
+ }
+}
+
+/* From a given intro point, return the first link specifier of type
+ * encountered in the link specifier list. Return NULL if it can't be found.
+ *
+ * The caller does NOT have ownership of the object, the intro point does. */
+static hs_desc_link_specifier_t *
+get_link_spec_by_type(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip, uint8_t type)
+{
+ hs_desc_link_specifier_t *lnk_spec = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->base.link_specifiers,
+ hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, ls) {
+ if (ls->type == type) {
+ lnk_spec = ls;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ls);
+
+ end:
+ return lnk_spec;
+}
+
+/* Given a service intro point, return the node_t associated to it. This can
+ * return NULL if the given intro point has no legacy ID or if the node can't
+ * be found in the consensus. */
+STATIC const node_t *
+get_node_from_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
+{
+ const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *ls;
+
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ ls = get_link_spec_by_type(ip, LS_LEGACY_ID);
+ if (BUG(!ls)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* XXX In the future, we want to only use the ed25519 ID (#22173). */
+ return node_get_by_id((const char *) ls->u.legacy_id);
+}
+
+/* Given a service intro point, return the extend_info_t for it. This can
+ * return NULL if the node can't be found for the intro point or the extend
+ * info can't be created for the found node. If direct_conn is set, the extend
+ * info is validated on if we can connect directly. */
+static extend_info_t *
+get_extend_info_from_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
+ unsigned int direct_conn)
+{
+ extend_info_t *info = NULL;
+ const node_t *node;
+
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ node = get_node_from_intro_point(ip);
+ if (node == NULL) {
+ /* This can happen if the relay serving as intro point has been removed
+ * from the consensus. In that case, the intro point will be removed from
+ * the descriptor during the scheduled events. */
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* In the case of a direct connection (single onion service), it is possible
+ * our firewall policy won't allow it so this can return a NULL value. */
+ info = extend_info_from_node(node, direct_conn);
+
+ end:
+ return info;
+}
+
+/* Return the number of introduction points that are established for the
+ * given descriptor. */
+static unsigned int
+count_desc_circuit_established(const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ unsigned int count = 0;
+
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ count += ip->circuit_established;
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+/* For a given service and descriptor of that service, close all active
+ * directory connections. */
+static void
+close_directory_connections(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ unsigned int count = 0;
+ smartlist_t *dir_conns;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* Close pending HS desc upload connections for the blinded key of 'desc'. */
+ dir_conns = connection_list_by_type_purpose(CONN_TYPE_DIR,
+ DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_HSDESC);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(dir_conns, connection_t *, conn) {
+ dir_connection_t *dir_conn = TO_DIR_CONN(conn);
+ if (ed25519_pubkey_eq(&dir_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk,
+ &service->keys.identity_pk) &&
+ ed25519_pubkey_eq(&dir_conn->hs_ident->blinded_pk,
+ &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey)) {
+ connection_mark_for_close(conn);
+ count++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Closed %u active service directory connections for "
+ "descriptor %s of service %s",
+ count, safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey)),
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ /* We don't have ownership of the objects in this list. */
+ smartlist_free(dir_conns);
+}
+
+/* Close all rendezvous circuits for the given service. */
+static void
+close_service_rp_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* The reason we go over all circuit instead of using the circuitmap API is
+ * because most hidden service circuits are rendezvous circuits so there is
+ * no real improvement at getting all rendezvous circuits from the
+ * circuitmap and then going over them all to find the right ones.
+ * Furthermore, another option would have been to keep a list of RP cookies
+ * for a service but it creates an engineering complexity since we don't
+ * have a "RP circuit closed" event to clean it up properly so we avoid a
+ * memory DoS possibility. */
+
+ while ((ocirc = circuit_get_next_service_rp_circ(ocirc))) {
+ /* Only close circuits that are v3 and for this service. */
+ if (ocirc->hs_ident != NULL &&
+ ed25519_pubkey_eq(ô->hs_ident->identity_pk,
+ &service->keys.identity_pk)) {
+ /* Reason is FINISHED because service has been removed and thus the
+ * circuit is considered old/uneeded. When freed, it is removed from the
+ * hs circuitmap. */
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Close the circuit(s) for the given map of introduction points. */
+static void
+close_intro_circuits(hs_service_intropoints_t *intro_points)
+{
+ tor_assert(intro_points);
+
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(intro_points->map, key,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ origin_circuit_t *ocirc = hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip);
+ if (ocirc) {
+ /* Reason is FINISHED because service has been removed and thus the
+ * circuit is considered old/uneeded. When freed, the circuit is removed
+ * from the HS circuitmap. */
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ }
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+}
+
+/* Close all introduction circuits for the given service. */
+static void
+close_service_intro_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ close_intro_circuits(&desc->intro_points);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* Close any circuits related to the given service. */
+static void
+close_service_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* Only support for version >= 3. */
+ if (BUG(service->config.version < HS_VERSION_THREE)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Close intro points. */
+ close_service_intro_circuits(service);
+ /* Close rendezvous points. */
+ close_service_rp_circuits(service);
+}
+
+/* Move every ephemeral services from the src service map to the dst service
+ * map. It is possible that a service can't be register to the dst map which
+ * won't stop the process of moving them all but will trigger a log warn. */
+static void
+move_ephemeral_services(hs_service_ht *src, hs_service_ht *dst)
+{
+ hs_service_t **iter, **next;
+
+ tor_assert(src);
+ tor_assert(dst);
+
+ /* Iterate over the map to find ephemeral service and move them to the other
+ * map. We loop using this method to have a safe removal process. */
+ for (iter = HT_START(hs_service_ht, src); iter != NULL; iter = next) {
+ hs_service_t *s = *iter;
+ if (!s->config.is_ephemeral) {
+ /* Yeah, we are in a very manual loop :). */
+ next = HT_NEXT(hs_service_ht, src, iter);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Remove service from map and then register to it to the other map.
+ * Reminder that "*iter" and "s" are the same thing. */
+ next = HT_NEXT_RMV(hs_service_ht, src, iter);
+ if (register_service(dst, s) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Ephemeral service key is already being used. "
+ "Skipping.");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return a const string of the directory path escaped. If this is an
+ * ephemeral service, it returns "[EPHEMERAL]". This can only be called from
+ * the main thread because escaped() uses a static variable. */
+static const char *
+service_escaped_dir(const hs_service_t *s)
+{
+ return (s->config.is_ephemeral) ? "[EPHEMERAL]" :
+ escaped(s->config.directory_path);
+}
+
+/** Move the hidden service state from <b>src</b> to <b>dst</b>. We do this
+ * when we receive a SIGHUP: <b>dst</b> is the post-HUP service */
+static void
+move_hs_state(hs_service_t *src_service, hs_service_t *dst_service)
+{
+ tor_assert(src_service);
+ tor_assert(dst_service);
+
+ hs_service_state_t *src = &src_service->state;
+ hs_service_state_t *dst = &dst_service->state;
+
+ /* Let's do a shallow copy */
+ dst->intro_circ_retry_started_time = src->intro_circ_retry_started_time;
+ dst->num_intro_circ_launched = src->num_intro_circ_launched;
+ /* Freeing a NULL replaycache triggers an info LD_BUG. */
+ if (dst->replay_cache_rend_cookie != NULL) {
+ replaycache_free(dst->replay_cache_rend_cookie);
+ }
+ dst->replay_cache_rend_cookie = src->replay_cache_rend_cookie;
+ dst->next_rotation_time = src->next_rotation_time;
+
+ src->replay_cache_rend_cookie = NULL; /* steal pointer reference */
+}
+
+/* Register services that are in the staging list. Once this function returns,
+ * the global service map will be set with the right content and all non
+ * surviving services will be cleaned up. */
+static void
+register_all_services(void)
+{
+ struct hs_service_ht *new_service_map;
+
+ tor_assert(hs_service_staging_list);
+
+ /* Allocate a new map that will replace the current one. */
+ new_service_map = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*new_service_map));
+ HT_INIT(hs_service_ht, new_service_map);
+
+ /* First step is to transfer all ephemeral services from the current global
+ * map to the new one we are constructing. We do not prune ephemeral
+ * services as the only way to kill them is by deleting it from the control
+ * port or stopping the tor daemon. */
+ move_ephemeral_services(hs_service_map, new_service_map);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(hs_service_staging_list, hs_service_t *, snew) {
+ hs_service_t *s;
+
+ /* Check if that service is already in our global map and if so, we'll
+ * transfer the intro points to it. */
+ s = find_service(hs_service_map, &snew->keys.identity_pk);
+ if (s) {
+ /* Pass ownership of the descriptors from s (the current service) to
+ * snew (the newly configured one). */
+ move_descriptors(s, snew);
+ move_hs_state(s, snew);
+ /* Remove the service from the global map because after this, we need to
+ * go over the remaining service in that map that aren't surviving the
+ * reload to close their circuits. */
+ remove_service(hs_service_map, s);
+ hs_service_free(s);
+ }
+ /* Great, this service is now ready to be added to our new map. */
+ if (BUG(register_service(new_service_map, snew) < 0)) {
+ /* This should never happen because prior to registration, we validate
+ * every service against the entire set. Not being able to register a
+ * service means we failed to validate correctly. In that case, don't
+ * break tor and ignore the service but tell user. */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to register service with directory %s",
+ service_escaped_dir(snew));
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(hs_service_staging_list, snew);
+ hs_service_free(snew);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(snew);
+
+ /* Close any circuits associated with the non surviving services. Every
+ * service in the current global map are roaming. */
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+ close_service_circuits(service);
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+
+ /* Time to make the switch. We'll clear the staging list because its content
+ * has now changed ownership to the map. */
+ smartlist_clear(hs_service_staging_list);
+ service_free_all();
+ hs_service_map = new_service_map;
+ /* We've just register services into the new map and now we've replaced the
+ * global map with it so we have to notify that the change happened. When
+ * registering a service, the notify is only triggered if the destination
+ * map is the global map for which in here it was not. */
+ hs_service_map_has_changed();
+}
+
+/* Write the onion address of a given service to the given filename fname_ in
+ * the service directory. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */
+STATIC int
+write_address_to_file(const hs_service_t *service, const char *fname_)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ char *fname = NULL;
+ char *addr_buf = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(fname_);
+
+ /* Construct the full address with the onion tld and write the hostname file
+ * to disk. */
+ tor_asprintf(&addr_buf, "%s.%s\n", service->onion_address, address_tld);
+ /* Notice here that we use the given "fname_". */
+ fname = hs_path_from_filename(service->config.directory_path, fname_);
+ if (write_str_to_file(fname, addr_buf, 0) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not write onion address to hostname file %s",
+ escaped(fname));
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+#ifndef _WIN32
+ if (service->config.dir_group_readable) {
+ /* Mode to 0640. */
+ if (chmod(fname, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Unable to make onion service hostname file %s "
+ "group-readable.", escaped(fname));
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* !defined(_WIN32) */
+
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ tor_free(fname);
+ tor_free(addr_buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Load and/or generate private keys for the given service. On success, the
+ * hostname file will be written to disk along with the master private key iff
+ * the service is not configured for offline keys. Return 0 on success else -1
+ * on failure. */
+static int
+load_service_keys(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ char *fname = NULL;
+ ed25519_keypair_t *kp;
+ const hs_service_config_t *config;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ config = &service->config;
+
+ /* Create and fix permission on service directory. We are about to write
+ * files to that directory so make sure it exists and has the right
+ * permissions. We do this here because at this stage we know that Tor is
+ * actually running and the service we have has been validated. */
+ if (hs_check_service_private_dir(get_options()->User,
+ config->directory_path,
+ config->dir_group_readable, 1) < 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to load the keys from file or generate it if not found. */
+ fname = hs_path_from_filename(config->directory_path, fname_keyfile_prefix);
+ /* Don't ask for key creation, we want to know if we were able to load it or
+ * we had to generate it. Better logging! */
+ kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT, LOG_INFO, NULL, 0, 0,
+ 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!kp) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to load keys from %s. Generating it...", fname);
+ /* We'll now try to generate the keys and for it we want the strongest
+ * randomness for it. The keypair will be written in different files. */
+ uint32_t key_flags = INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE | INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG |
+ INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT;
+ kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, key_flags, LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ if (!kp) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to generate keys and save in %s.", fname);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Copy loaded or generated keys to service object. */
+ ed25519_pubkey_copy(&service->keys.identity_pk, &kp->pubkey);
+ memcpy(&service->keys.identity_sk, &kp->seckey,
+ sizeof(service->keys.identity_sk));
+ /* This does a proper memory wipe. */
+ ed25519_keypair_free(kp);
+
+ /* Build onion address from the newly loaded keys. */
+ tor_assert(service->config.version <= UINT8_MAX);
+ hs_build_address(&service->keys.identity_pk,
+ (uint8_t) service->config.version,
+ service->onion_address);
+
+ /* Write onion address to hostname file. */
+ if (write_address_to_file(service, fname_hostname) < 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Load all client authorization keys in the service. */
+ if (load_client_keys(service) < 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Succes. */
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ tor_free(fname);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Check if the client file name is valid or not. Return 1 if valid,
+ * otherwise return 0. */
+STATIC int
+client_filename_is_valid(const char *filename)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+ const char *valid_extension = ".auth";
+
+ tor_assert(filename);
+
+ /* The file extension must match and the total filename length can't be the
+ * length of the extension else we do not have a filename. */
+ if (!strcmpend(filename, valid_extension) &&
+ strlen(filename) != strlen(valid_extension)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Parse an authorized client from a string. The format of a client string
+ * looks like (see rend-spec-v3.txt):
+ *
+ * <auth-type>:<key-type>:<base32-encoded-public-key>
+ *
+ * The <auth-type> can only be "descriptor".
+ * The <key-type> can only be "x25519".
+ *
+ * Return the key on success, return NULL, otherwise. */
+STATIC hs_service_authorized_client_t *
+parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str)
+{
+ char *auth_type = NULL;
+ char *key_type = NULL;
+ char *pubkey_b32 = NULL;
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *client = NULL;
+ smartlist_t *fields = smartlist_new();
+
+ tor_assert(client_key_str);
+
+ smartlist_split_string(fields, client_key_str, ":",
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE, 0);
+ /* Wrong number of fields. */
+ if (smartlist_len(fields) != 3) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown format of client authorization file.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ auth_type = smartlist_get(fields, 0);
+ key_type = smartlist_get(fields, 1);
+ pubkey_b32 = smartlist_get(fields, 2);
+
+ /* Currently, the only supported auth type is "descriptor". */
+ if (strcmp(auth_type, "descriptor")) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization auth type '%s' not supported.",
+ auth_type);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Currently, the only supported key type is "x25519". */
+ if (strcmp(key_type, "x25519")) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization key type '%s' not supported.",
+ key_type);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We expect a specific length of the base32 encoded key so make sure we
+ * have that so we don't successfully decode a value with a different length
+ * and end up in trouble when copying the decoded key into a fixed length
+ * buffer. */
+ if (strlen(pubkey_b32) != BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization encoded base32 public key "
+ "length is invalid: %s", pubkey_b32);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_authorized_client_t));
+ if (base32_decode((char *) client->client_pk.public_key,
+ sizeof(client->client_pk.public_key),
+ pubkey_b32, strlen(pubkey_b32)) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization public key cannot be decoded: %s",
+ pubkey_b32);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Success. */
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ service_authorized_client_free(client);
+ done:
+ /* It is also a good idea to wipe the public key. */
+ if (pubkey_b32) {
+ memwipe(pubkey_b32, 0, strlen(pubkey_b32));
+ }
+ tor_assert(fields);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(fields, char *, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(fields);
+ return client;
+}
+
+/* Load all the client public keys for the given service. Return 0 on
+ * success else -1 on failure. */
+static int
+load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ char *client_key_str = NULL;
+ char *client_key_file_path = NULL;
+ char *client_keys_dir_path = NULL;
+ hs_service_config_t *config;
+ smartlist_t *file_list = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ config = &service->config;
+
+ /* Before calling this function, we already call load_service_keys to make
+ * sure that the directory exists with the right permission. So, if we
+ * cannot create a client pubkey key directory, we consider it as a bug. */
+ client_keys_dir_path = hs_path_from_filename(config->directory_path,
+ dname_client_pubkeys);
+ if (BUG(hs_check_service_private_dir(get_options()->User,
+ client_keys_dir_path,
+ config->dir_group_readable, 1) < 0)) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* If the list of clients already exists, we must clear it first. */
+ if (config->clients) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config->clients, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
+ service_authorized_client_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(config->clients);
+ }
+
+ config->clients = smartlist_new();
+
+ file_list = tor_listdir(client_keys_dir_path);
+ if (file_list == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization directory %s can't be listed.",
+ client_keys_dir_path);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(file_list, const char *, filename) {
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *client = NULL;
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Loading a client authorization key file %s...",
+ filename);
+
+ if (!client_filename_is_valid(filename)) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization unrecognized filename %s. "
+ "File must end in .auth. Ignoring.", filename);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Create a full path for a file. */
+ client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(client_keys_dir_path,
+ filename);
+ client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL);
+ /* Free immediately after using it. */
+ tor_free(client_key_file_path);
+
+ /* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */
+ if (!client_key_str) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization file %s can't be read. "
+ "Corrupted or verify permission? Ignoring.",
+ client_key_file_path);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ client = parse_authorized_client(client_key_str);
+ /* Wipe and free immediately after using it. */
+ memwipe(client_key_str, 0, strlen(client_key_str));
+ tor_free(client_key_str);
+
+ if (client) {
+ smartlist_add(config->clients, client);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Loaded a client authorization key file %s.",
+ filename);
+ }
+
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(filename);
+
+ /* If the number of clients is greater than zero, set the flag to be true. */
+ if (smartlist_len(config->clients) > 0) {
+ config->is_client_auth_enabled = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ if (client_key_str) {
+ memwipe(client_key_str, 0, strlen(client_key_str));
+ }
+ if (file_list) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(file_list, char *, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(file_list);
+ }
+ tor_free(client_key_str);
+ tor_free(client_key_file_path);
+ tor_free(client_keys_dir_path);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+STATIC void
+service_authorized_client_free_(hs_service_authorized_client_t *client)
+{
+ if (!client) {
+ return;
+ }
+ memwipe(&client->client_pk, 0, sizeof(client->client_pk));
+ tor_free(client);
+}
+
+/* Free a given service descriptor object and all key material is wiped. */
+STATIC void
+service_descriptor_free_(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ if (!desc) {
+ return;
+ }
+ hs_descriptor_free(desc->desc);
+ memwipe(&desc->signing_kp, 0, sizeof(desc->signing_kp));
+ memwipe(&desc->blinded_kp, 0, sizeof(desc->blinded_kp));
+ /* Cleanup all intro points. */
+ digest256map_free(desc->intro_points.map, service_intro_point_free_void);
+ digestmap_free(desc->intro_points.failed_id, tor_free_);
+ if (desc->previous_hsdirs) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->previous_hsdirs, char *, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(desc->previous_hsdirs);
+ }
+ crypto_ope_free(desc->ope_cipher);
+ tor_free(desc);
+}
+
+/* Return a newly allocated service descriptor object. */
+STATIC hs_service_descriptor_t *
+service_descriptor_new(void)
+{
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *sdesc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*sdesc));
+ sdesc->desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_descriptor_t));
+ /* Initialize the intro points map. */
+ sdesc->intro_points.map = digest256map_new();
+ sdesc->intro_points.failed_id = digestmap_new();
+ sdesc->previous_hsdirs = smartlist_new();
+ return sdesc;
+}
+
+/* Allocate and return a deep copy of client. */
+static hs_service_authorized_client_t *
+service_authorized_client_dup(const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client)
+{
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *client_dup = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(client);
+
+ client_dup = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_authorized_client_t));
+ /* Currently, the public key is the only component of
+ * hs_service_authorized_client_t. */
+ memcpy(client_dup->client_pk.public_key,
+ client->client_pk.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+
+ return client_dup;
+}
+
+/* If two authorized clients are equal, return 0. If the first one should come
+ * before the second, return less than zero. If the first should come after
+ * the second, return greater than zero. */
+static int
+service_authorized_client_cmp(const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client1,
+ const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client2)
+{
+ tor_assert(client1);
+ tor_assert(client2);
+
+ /* Currently, the public key is the only component of
+ * hs_service_authorized_client_t. */
+ return tor_memcmp(client1->client_pk.public_key,
+ client2->client_pk.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+}
+
+/* Helper for sorting authorized clients. */
+static int
+compare_service_authorzized_client_(const void **_a, const void **_b)
+{
+ const hs_service_authorized_client_t *a = *_a, *b = *_b;
+ return service_authorized_client_cmp(a, b);
+}
+
+/* If the list of hs_service_authorized_client_t's is different between
+ * src and dst, return 1. Otherwise, return 0. */
+STATIC int
+service_authorized_client_config_equal(const hs_service_config_t *config1,
+ const hs_service_config_t *config2)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+ smartlist_t *sl1 = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_t *sl2 = smartlist_new();
+
+ tor_assert(config1);
+ tor_assert(config2);
+ tor_assert(config1->clients);
+ tor_assert(config2->clients);
+
+ /* If the number of clients is different, it is obvious that the list
+ * changes. */
+ if (smartlist_len(config1->clients) != smartlist_len(config2->clients)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* We do not want to mutate config1 and config2, so we will duplicate both
+ * entire client lists here. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config1->clients,
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client,
+ smartlist_add(sl1, service_authorized_client_dup(client)));
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config2->clients,
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client,
+ smartlist_add(sl2, service_authorized_client_dup(client)));
+
+ smartlist_sort(sl1, compare_service_authorzized_client_);
+ smartlist_sort(sl2, compare_service_authorzized_client_);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(sl1); i++) {
+ /* If the clients at index i in both lists differ, the whole configs
+ * differ. */
+ if (service_authorized_client_cmp(smartlist_get(sl1, i),
+ smartlist_get(sl2, i))) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 1;
+
+ done:
+ if (sl1) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl1, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
+ service_authorized_client_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(sl1);
+ }
+ if (sl2) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl2, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
+ service_authorized_client_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(sl2);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Move descriptor(s) from the src service to the dst service and modify their
+ * content if necessary. We do this during SIGHUP when we re-create our
+ * hidden services. */
+static void
+move_descriptors(hs_service_t *src, hs_service_t *dst)
+{
+ tor_assert(src);
+ tor_assert(dst);
+
+ if (src->desc_current) {
+ /* Nothing should be there, but clean it up just in case */
+ if (BUG(dst->desc_current)) {
+ service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_current);
+ }
+ dst->desc_current = src->desc_current;
+ src->desc_current = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (src->desc_next) {
+ /* Nothing should be there, but clean it up just in case */
+ if (BUG(dst->desc_next)) {
+ service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_next);
+ }
+ dst->desc_next = src->desc_next;
+ src->desc_next = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* If the client authorization changes, we must rebuild the superencrypted
+ * section and republish the descriptors. */
+ int client_auth_changed =
+ !service_authorized_client_config_equal(&src->config, &dst->config);
+ if (client_auth_changed && dst->desc_current) {
+ /* We have to clear the superencrypted content first. */
+ hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(
+ &dst->desc_current->desc->superencrypted_data);
+ if (build_service_desc_superencrypted(dst, dst->desc_current) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ service_desc_schedule_upload(dst->desc_current, time(NULL), 1);
+ }
+ if (client_auth_changed && dst->desc_next) {
+ /* We have to clear the superencrypted content first. */
+ hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(
+ &dst->desc_next->desc->superencrypted_data);
+ if (build_service_desc_superencrypted(dst, dst->desc_next) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ service_desc_schedule_upload(dst->desc_next, time(NULL), 1);
+ }
+
+ return;
+
+ err:
+ /* If there is an error, free all descriptors to make it clean and generate
+ * them later. */
+ service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_current);
+ service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_next);
+}
+
+/* From the given service, remove all expired failing intro points for each
+ * descriptor. */
+static void
+remove_expired_failing_intro(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* For both descriptors, cleanup the failing intro points list. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(desc->intro_points.failed_id, key, time_t *, t) {
+ time_t failure_time = *t;
+ if ((failure_time + INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD) <= now) {
+ MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
+ tor_free(t);
+ }
+ } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* For the given descriptor desc, put all node_t object found from its failing
+ * intro point list and put them in the given node_list. */
+static void
+setup_intro_point_exclude_list(const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
+ smartlist_t *node_list)
+{
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(node_list);
+
+ DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.failed_id, key, time_t *, t) {
+ (void) t; /* Make gcc happy. */
+ const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(key);
+ if (node) {
+ smartlist_add(node_list, (void *) node);
+ }
+ } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
+}
+
+/* For the given failing intro point ip, we add its time of failure to the
+ * failed map and index it by identity digest (legacy ID) in the descriptor
+ * desc failed id map. */
+static void
+remember_failing_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ time_t *time_of_failure, *prev_ptr;
+ const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *legacy_ls;
+
+ tor_assert(ip);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ time_of_failure = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(time_t));
+ *time_of_failure = now;
+ legacy_ls = get_link_spec_by_type(ip, LS_LEGACY_ID);
+ tor_assert(legacy_ls);
+ prev_ptr = digestmap_set(desc->intro_points.failed_id,
+ (const char *) legacy_ls->u.legacy_id,
+ time_of_failure);
+ tor_free(prev_ptr);
+}
+
+/* Copy the descriptor link specifier object from src to dst. */
+static void
+link_specifier_copy(hs_desc_link_specifier_t *dst,
+ const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *src)
+{
+ tor_assert(dst);
+ tor_assert(src);
+ memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(hs_desc_link_specifier_t));
+}
+
+/* Using a given descriptor signing keypair signing_kp, a service intro point
+ * object ip and the time now, setup the content of an already allocated
+ * descriptor intro desc_ip.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success else a negative value. */
+static int
+setup_desc_intro_point(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
+ time_t now, hs_desc_intro_point_t *desc_ip)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ time_t nearest_hour = now - (now % 3600);
+
+ tor_assert(signing_kp);
+ tor_assert(ip);
+ tor_assert(desc_ip);
+
+ /* Copy the onion key. */
+ memcpy(&desc_ip->onion_key, &ip->onion_key, sizeof(desc_ip->onion_key));
+
+ /* Key and certificate material. */
+ desc_ip->auth_key_cert = tor_cert_create(signing_kp,
+ CERT_TYPE_AUTH_HS_IP_KEY,
+ &ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey,
+ nearest_hour,
+ HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
+ CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
+ if (desc_ip->auth_key_cert == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to create intro point auth-key certificate");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy link specifier(s). */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->base.link_specifiers,
+ const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, ls) {
+ hs_desc_link_specifier_t *copy = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*copy));
+ link_specifier_copy(copy, ls);
+ smartlist_add(desc_ip->link_specifiers, copy);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ls);
+
+ /* For a legacy intro point, we'll use an RSA/ed cross certificate. */
+ if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) {
+ desc_ip->legacy.key = crypto_pk_dup_key(ip->legacy_key);
+ /* Create cross certification cert. */
+ ssize_t cert_len = tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(
+ &signing_kp->pubkey,
+ desc_ip->legacy.key,
+ nearest_hour + HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
+ &desc_ip->legacy.cert.encoded);
+ if (cert_len < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to create enc key legacy cross cert.");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ desc_ip->legacy.cert.len = cert_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Encryption key and its cross certificate. */
+ {
+ ed25519_public_key_t ed25519_pubkey;
+
+ /* Use the public curve25519 key. */
+ memcpy(&desc_ip->enc_key, &ip->enc_key_kp.pubkey,
+ sizeof(desc_ip->enc_key));
+ /* The following can't fail. */
+ ed25519_public_key_from_curve25519_public_key(&ed25519_pubkey,
+ &ip->enc_key_kp.pubkey,
+ 0);
+ desc_ip->enc_key_cert = tor_cert_create(signing_kp,
+ CERT_TYPE_CROSS_HS_IP_KEYS,
+ &ed25519_pubkey, nearest_hour,
+ HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
+ CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
+ if (desc_ip->enc_key_cert == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to create enc key curve25519 cross cert.");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 0;
+
+ done:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Using the given descriptor from the given service, build the descriptor
+ * intro point list so we can then encode the descriptor for publication. This
+ * function does not pick intro points, they have to be in the descriptor
+ * current map. Cryptographic material (keys) must be initialized in the
+ * descriptor for this function to make sense. */
+static void
+build_desc_intro_points(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *encrypted;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* Ease our life. */
+ encrypted = &desc->desc->encrypted_data;
+ /* Cleanup intro points, we are about to set them from scratch. */
+ hs_descriptor_clear_intro_points(desc->desc);
+
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key,
+ const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ hs_desc_intro_point_t *desc_ip = hs_desc_intro_point_new();
+ if (setup_desc_intro_point(&desc->signing_kp, ip, now, desc_ip) < 0) {
+ hs_desc_intro_point_free(desc_ip);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* We have a valid descriptor intro point. Add it to the list. */
+ smartlist_add(encrypted->intro_points, desc_ip);
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+}
+
+/* Build the descriptor signing key certificate. */
+static void
+build_desc_signing_key_cert(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *plaintext;
+
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(desc->desc);
+
+ /* Ease our life a bit. */
+ plaintext = &desc->desc->plaintext_data;
+
+ /* Get rid of what we have right now. */
+ tor_cert_free(plaintext->signing_key_cert);
+
+ /* Fresh certificate for the signing key. */
+ plaintext->signing_key_cert =
+ tor_cert_create(&desc->blinded_kp, CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_HS_DESC,
+ &desc->signing_kp.pubkey, now, HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
+ CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
+ /* If the cert creation fails, the descriptor encoding will fail and thus
+ * ultimately won't be uploaded. We'll get a stack trace to help us learn
+ * where the call came from and the tor_cert_create() will log the error. */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(plaintext->signing_key_cert);
+}
+
+/* Populate the descriptor encrypted section from the given service object.
+ * This will generate a valid list of introduction points that can be used
+ * after for circuit creation. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */
+static int
+build_service_desc_encrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *encrypted;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ encrypted = &desc->desc->encrypted_data;
+
+ encrypted->create2_ntor = 1;
+ encrypted->single_onion_service = service->config.is_single_onion;
+
+ /* Setup introduction points from what we have in the service. */
+ if (encrypted->intro_points == NULL) {
+ encrypted->intro_points = smartlist_new();
+ }
+ /* We do NOT build introduction point yet, we only do that once the circuit
+ * have been opened. Until we have the right number of introduction points,
+ * we do not encode anything in the descriptor. */
+
+ /* XXX: Support client authorization (#20700). */
+ encrypted->intro_auth_types = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Populate the descriptor superencrypted section from the given service
+ * object. This will generate a valid list of hs_desc_authorized_client_t
+ * of clients that are authorized to use the service. Return 0 on success
+ * else -1 on error. */
+static int
+build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ const hs_service_config_t *config;
+ int i;
+ hs_desc_superencrypted_data_t *superencrypted;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ superencrypted = &desc->desc->superencrypted_data;
+ config = &service->config;
+
+ /* The ephemeral key pair is already generated, so this should not give
+ * an error. */
+ if (BUG(!curve25519_public_key_is_ok(&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey))) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(&superencrypted->auth_ephemeral_pubkey,
+ &desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey,
+ sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
+
+ /* Test that subcred is not zero because we might use it below */
+ if (BUG(tor_mem_is_zero((char*)desc->desc->subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN))) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Create a smartlist to store clients */
+ superencrypted->clients = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* We do not need to build the desc authorized client if the client
+ * authorization is disabled */
+ if (config->is_client_auth_enabled) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(config->clients,
+ hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client) {
+ hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client;
+ desc_client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_authorized_client_t));
+
+ /* Prepare the client for descriptor and then add to the list in the
+ * superencrypted part of the descriptor */
+ hs_desc_build_authorized_client(desc->desc->subcredential,
+ &client->client_pk,
+ &desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.seckey,
+ desc->descriptor_cookie, desc_client);
+ smartlist_add(superencrypted->clients, desc_client);
+
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(client);
+ }
+
+ /* We cannot let the number of auth-clients to be zero, so we need to
+ * make it be 16. If it is already a multiple of 16, we do not need to
+ * do anything. Otherwise, add the additional ones to make it a
+ * multiple of 16. */
+ int num_clients = smartlist_len(superencrypted->clients);
+ int num_clients_to_add;
+ if (num_clients == 0) {
+ num_clients_to_add = HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE;
+ } else if (num_clients % HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE == 0) {
+ num_clients_to_add = 0;
+ } else {
+ num_clients_to_add =
+ HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE
+ - (num_clients % HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_clients_to_add; i++) {
+ hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client =
+ hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client();
+ smartlist_add(superencrypted->clients, desc_client);
+ }
+
+ /* Shuffle the list to prevent the client know the position in the
+ * config. */
+ smartlist_shuffle(superencrypted->clients);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Populate the descriptor plaintext section from the given service object.
+ * The caller must make sure that the keys in the descriptors are valid that
+ * is are non-zero. This can't fail. */
+static void
+build_service_desc_plaintext(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *plaintext;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) &desc->blinded_kp,
+ sizeof(desc->blinded_kp)));
+ tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) &desc->signing_kp,
+ sizeof(desc->signing_kp)));
+
+ /* Set the subcredential. */
+ hs_get_subcredential(&service->keys.identity_pk, &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey,
+ desc->desc->subcredential);
+
+ plaintext = &desc->desc->plaintext_data;
+
+ plaintext->version = service->config.version;
+ plaintext->lifetime_sec = HS_DESC_DEFAULT_LIFETIME;
+ /* Copy public key material to go in the descriptor. */
+ ed25519_pubkey_copy(&plaintext->signing_pubkey, &desc->signing_kp.pubkey);
+ ed25519_pubkey_copy(&plaintext->blinded_pubkey, &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey);
+
+ /* Create the signing key certificate. This will be updated before each
+ * upload but we create it here so we don't complexify our unit tests. */
+ build_desc_signing_key_cert(desc, approx_time());
+}
+
+/** Compute the descriptor's OPE cipher for encrypting revision counters. */
+static crypto_ope_t *
+generate_ope_cipher_for_desc(const hs_service_descriptor_t *hs_desc)
+{
+ /* Compute OPE key as H("rev-counter-generation" | blinded privkey) */
+ uint8_t key[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ crypto_digest_t *digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ const char ope_key_prefix[] = "rev-counter-generation";
+ const ed25519_secret_key_t *eph_privkey = &hs_desc->blinded_kp.seckey;
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, ope_key_prefix, sizeof(ope_key_prefix));
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char*)eph_privkey->seckey,
+ sizeof(eph_privkey->seckey));
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *)key, sizeof(key));
+ crypto_digest_free(digest);
+
+ return crypto_ope_new(key);
+}
+
+/* For the given service and descriptor object, create the key material which
+ * is the blinded keypair, the descriptor signing keypair, the ephemeral
+ * keypair, and the descriptor cookie. Return 0 on success else -1 on error
+ * where the generated keys MUST be ignored. */
+static int
+build_service_desc_keys(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ ed25519_keypair_t kp;
+
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) &service->keys.identity_pk,
+ ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN));
+
+ /* XXX: Support offline key feature (#18098). */
+
+ /* Copy the identity keys to the keypair so we can use it to create the
+ * blinded key. */
+ memcpy(&kp.pubkey, &service->keys.identity_pk, sizeof(kp.pubkey));
+ memcpy(&kp.seckey, &service->keys.identity_sk, sizeof(kp.seckey));
+ /* Build blinded keypair for this time period. */
+ hs_build_blinded_keypair(&kp, NULL, 0, desc->time_period_num,
+ &desc->blinded_kp);
+ /* Let's not keep too much traces of our keys in memory. */
+ memwipe(&kp, 0, sizeof(kp));
+
+ /* Compute the OPE cipher struct (it's tied to the current blinded key) */
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Getting OPE for TP#%u", (unsigned) desc->time_period_num);
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(!desc->ope_cipher);
+ desc->ope_cipher = generate_ope_cipher_for_desc(desc);
+
+ /* No need for extra strong, this is a temporary key only for this
+ * descriptor. Nothing long term. */
+ if (ed25519_keypair_generate(&desc->signing_kp, 0) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Can't generate descriptor signing keypair for "
+ "service %s",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* No need for extra strong, this is a temporary key only for this
+ * descriptor. Nothing long term. */
+ if (curve25519_keypair_generate(&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp, 0) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Can't generate auth ephemeral keypair for "
+ "service %s",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Random descriptor cookie to be used as a part of a key to encrypt the
+ * descriptor, only if the client auth is enabled will it be used. */
+ crypto_strongest_rand(desc->descriptor_cookie,
+ sizeof(desc->descriptor_cookie));
+
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Given a service and the current time, build a descriptor for the service.
+ * This function does not pick introduction point, this needs to be done by
+ * the update function. On success, desc_out will point to the newly allocated
+ * descriptor object.
+ *
+ * This can error if we are unable to create keys or certificate. */
+static void
+build_service_descriptor(hs_service_t *service, uint64_t time_period_num,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t **desc_out)
+{
+ char *encoded_desc;
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc_out);
+
+ desc = service_descriptor_new();
+
+ /* Set current time period */
+ desc->time_period_num = time_period_num;
+
+ /* Create the needed keys so we can setup the descriptor content. */
+ if (build_service_desc_keys(service, desc) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Setup plaintext descriptor content. */
+ build_service_desc_plaintext(service, desc);
+
+ /* Setup superencrypted descriptor content. */
+ if (build_service_desc_superencrypted(service, desc) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Setup encrypted descriptor content. */
+ if (build_service_desc_encrypted(service, desc) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's make sure that we've created a descriptor that can actually be
+ * encoded properly. This function also checks if the encoded output is
+ * decodable after. */
+ if (BUG(service_encode_descriptor(service, desc, &desc->signing_kp,
+ &encoded_desc) < 0)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_free(encoded_desc);
+
+ /* Assign newly built descriptor to the next slot. */
+ *desc_out = desc;
+ /* Fire a CREATED control port event. */
+ hs_control_desc_event_created(service->onion_address,
+ &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey);
+ return;
+
+ err:
+ service_descriptor_free(desc);
+}
+
+/* Build both descriptors for the given service that has just booted up.
+ * Because it's a special case, it deserves its special function ;). */
+static void
+build_descriptors_for_new_service(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
+{
+ uint64_t current_desc_tp, next_desc_tp;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ /* These are the conditions for a new service. */
+ tor_assert(!service->desc_current);
+ tor_assert(!service->desc_next);
+
+ /*
+ * +------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ * | |
+ * | 00:00 12:00 00:00 12:00 00:00 12:00 |
+ * | SRV#1 TP#1 SRV#2 TP#2 SRV#3 TP#3 |
+ * | |
+ * | $==========|-----------$===========|-----------$===========| |
+ * | ^ ^ |
+ * | A B |
+ * +------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ *
+ * Case A: The service boots up before a new time period, the current time
+ * period is thus TP#1 and the next is TP#2 which for both we have access to
+ * their SRVs.
+ *
+ * Case B: The service boots up inside TP#2, we can't use the TP#3 for the
+ * next descriptor because we don't have the SRV#3 so the current should be
+ * TP#1 and next TP#2.
+ */
+
+ if (hs_in_period_between_tp_and_srv(NULL, now)) {
+ /* Case B from the above, inside of the new time period. */
+ current_desc_tp = hs_get_previous_time_period_num(0); /* TP#1 */
+ next_desc_tp = hs_get_time_period_num(0); /* TP#2 */
+ } else {
+ /* Case A from the above, outside of the new time period. */
+ current_desc_tp = hs_get_time_period_num(0); /* TP#1 */
+ next_desc_tp = hs_get_next_time_period_num(0); /* TP#2 */
+ }
+
+ /* Build descriptors. */
+ build_service_descriptor(service, current_desc_tp, &service->desc_current);
+ build_service_descriptor(service, next_desc_tp, &service->desc_next);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service %s has just started. Both descriptors "
+ "built. Now scheduled for upload.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+}
+
+/* Build descriptors for each service if needed. There are conditions to build
+ * a descriptor which are details in the function. */
+STATIC void
+build_all_descriptors(time_t now)
+{
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+
+ /* A service booting up will have both descriptors to NULL. No other cases
+ * makes both descriptor non existent. */
+ if (service->desc_current == NULL && service->desc_next == NULL) {
+ build_descriptors_for_new_service(service, now);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Reaching this point means we are pass bootup so at runtime. We should
+ * *never* have an empty current descriptor. If the next descriptor is
+ * empty, we'll try to build it for the next time period. This only
+ * happens when we rotate meaning that we are guaranteed to have a new SRV
+ * at that point for the next time period. */
+ if (BUG(service->desc_current == NULL)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (service->desc_next == NULL) {
+ build_service_descriptor(service, hs_get_next_time_period_num(0),
+ &service->desc_next);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service %s next descriptor successfully "
+ "built. Now scheduled for upload.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ }
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* Randomly pick a node to become an introduction point but not present in the
+ * given exclude_nodes list. The chosen node is put in the exclude list
+ * regardless of success or not because in case of failure, the node is simply
+ * unsusable from that point on.
+ *
+ * If direct_conn is set, try to pick a node that our local firewall/policy
+ * allows us to connect to directly. If we can't find any, return NULL.
+ * This function supports selecting dual-stack nodes for direct single onion
+ * service IPv6 connections. But it does not send IPv6 addresses in link
+ * specifiers. (Current clients don't use IPv6 addresses to extend, and
+ * direct client connections to intro points are not supported.)
+ *
+ * Return a newly allocated service intro point ready to be used for encoding.
+ * Return NULL on error. */
+static hs_service_intro_point_t *
+pick_intro_point(unsigned int direct_conn, smartlist_t *exclude_nodes)
+{
+ const node_t *node;
+ extend_info_t *info = NULL;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+ /* Normal 3-hop introduction point flags. */
+ router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_UPTIME | CRN_NEED_DESC;
+ /* Single onion flags. */
+ router_crn_flags_t direct_flags = flags | CRN_PREF_ADDR | CRN_DIRECT_CONN;
+
+ node = router_choose_random_node(exclude_nodes, get_options()->ExcludeNodes,
+ direct_conn ? direct_flags : flags);
+ /* Unable to find a node. When looking for a node for a direct connection,
+ * we could try a 3-hop path instead. We'll add support for this in a later
+ * release. */
+ if (!node) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We have a suitable node, add it to the exclude list. We do this *before*
+ * we can validate the extend information because even in case of failure,
+ * we don't want to use that node anymore. */
+ smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void *) node);
+
+ /* We do this to ease our life but also this call makes appropriate checks
+ * of the node object such as validating ntor support for instance.
+ *
+ * We must provide an extend_info for clients to connect over a 3-hop path,
+ * so we don't pass direct_conn here. */
+ info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
+ if (BUG(info == NULL)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's do a basic sanity check here so that we don't end up advertising the
+ * ed25519 identity key of relays that don't actually support the link
+ * protocol */
+ if (!node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 0)) {
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&info->ed_identity));
+ } else {
+ /* Make sure we *do* have an ed key if we support the link authentication.
+ * Sending an empty key would result in a failure to extend. */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&info->ed_identity));
+ }
+
+ /* Create our objects and populate them with the node information.
+ * We don't care if the intro's link auth is compatible with us, because
+ * we are sending the ed25519 key to a remote client via the descriptor. */
+ ip = service_intro_point_new(info, !node_supports_ed25519_hs_intro(node),
+ node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node,
+ 0));
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Picked intro point: %s", extend_info_describe(info));
+ extend_info_free(info);
+ return ip;
+ err:
+ service_intro_point_free(ip);
+ extend_info_free(info);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* For a given descriptor from the given service, pick any needed intro points
+ * and update the current map with those newly picked intro points. Return the
+ * number node that might have been added to the descriptor current map. */
+static unsigned int
+pick_needed_intro_points(hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ int i = 0, num_needed_ip;
+ smartlist_t *exclude_nodes = smartlist_new();
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* Compute how many intro points we actually need to open. */
+ num_needed_ip = service->config.num_intro_points -
+ digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map);
+ if (BUG(num_needed_ip < 0)) {
+ /* Let's not make tor freak out here and just skip this. */
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* We want to end up with config.num_intro_points intro points, but if we
+ * have no intro points at all (chances are they all cycled or we are
+ * starting up), we launch get_intro_point_num_extra() extra circuits and
+ * use the first config.num_intro_points that complete. See proposal #155,
+ * section 4 for the rationale of this which is purely for performance.
+ *
+ * The ones after the first config.num_intro_points will be converted to
+ * 'General' internal circuits and then we'll drop them from the list of
+ * intro points. */
+ if (digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map) == 0) {
+ num_needed_ip += get_intro_point_num_extra();
+ }
+
+ /* Build an exclude list of nodes of our intro point(s). The expiring intro
+ * points are OK to pick again because this is afterall a concept of round
+ * robin so they are considered valid nodes to pick again. */
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key,
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ const node_t *intro_node = get_node_from_intro_point(ip);
+ if (intro_node) {
+ smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void*)intro_node);
+ }
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+ /* Also, add the failing intro points that our descriptor encounteered in
+ * the exclude node list. */
+ setup_intro_point_exclude_list(desc, exclude_nodes);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_needed_ip; i++) {
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip;
+
+ /* This function will add the picked intro point node to the exclude nodes
+ * list so we don't pick the same one at the next iteration. */
+ ip = pick_intro_point(service->config.is_single_onion, exclude_nodes);
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ /* If we end up unable to pick an introduction point it is because we
+ * can't find suitable node and calling this again is highly unlikely to
+ * give us a valid node all of the sudden. */
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to find a suitable node to be an "
+ "introduction point for service %s.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* Valid intro point object, add it to the descriptor current map. */
+ service_intro_point_add(desc->intro_points.map, ip);
+ }
+ /* We've successfully picked all our needed intro points thus none are
+ * missing which will tell our upload process to expect the number of
+ * circuits to be the number of configured intro points circuits and not the
+ * number of intro points object that we have. */
+ desc->missing_intro_points = 0;
+
+ /* Success. */
+ done:
+ /* We don't have ownership of the node_t object in this list. */
+ smartlist_free(exclude_nodes);
+ return i;
+}
+
+/** Clear previous cached HSDirs in <b>desc</b>. */
+static void
+service_desc_clear_previous_hsdirs(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ if (BUG(!desc->previous_hsdirs)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->previous_hsdirs, char*, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_clear(desc->previous_hsdirs);
+}
+
+/** Note that we attempted to upload <b>desc</b> to <b>hsdir</b>. */
+static void
+service_desc_note_upload(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, const node_t *hsdir)
+{
+ char b64_digest[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1] = {0};
+ digest_to_base64(b64_digest, hsdir->identity);
+
+ if (BUG(!desc->previous_hsdirs)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!smartlist_contains_string(desc->previous_hsdirs, b64_digest)) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(desc->previous_hsdirs, b64_digest);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Schedule an upload of <b>desc</b>. If <b>descriptor_changed</b> is set, it
+ * means that this descriptor is dirty. */
+STATIC void
+service_desc_schedule_upload(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
+ time_t now,
+ int descriptor_changed)
+
+{
+ desc->next_upload_time = now;
+
+ /* If the descriptor changed, clean up the old HSDirs list. We want to
+ * re-upload no matter what. */
+ if (descriptor_changed) {
+ service_desc_clear_previous_hsdirs(desc);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Pick missing intro points for this descriptor if needed. */
+static void
+update_service_descriptor_intro_points(hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ unsigned int num_intro_points;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(desc->desc);
+
+ num_intro_points = digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map);
+
+ /* Pick any missing introduction point(s). */
+ if (num_intro_points < service->config.num_intro_points) {
+ unsigned int num_new_intro_points = pick_needed_intro_points(service,
+ desc);
+ if (num_new_intro_points != 0) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Service %s just picked %u intro points and wanted "
+ "%u for %s descriptor. It currently has %d intro "
+ "points. Launching ESTABLISH_INTRO circuit shortly.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
+ num_new_intro_points,
+ service->config.num_intro_points - num_intro_points,
+ (desc == service->desc_current) ? "current" : "next",
+ num_intro_points);
+ /* We'll build those introduction point into the descriptor once we have
+ * confirmation that the circuits are opened and ready. However,
+ * indicate that this descriptor should be uploaded from now on. */
+ service_desc_schedule_upload(desc, now, 1);
+ }
+ /* Were we able to pick all the intro points we needed? If not, we'll
+ * flag the descriptor that it's missing intro points because it
+ * couldn't pick enough which will trigger a descriptor upload. */
+ if ((num_new_intro_points + num_intro_points) <
+ service->config.num_intro_points) {
+ desc->missing_intro_points = 1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Update descriptor intro points for each service if needed. We do this as
+ * part of the periodic event because we need to establish intro point circuits
+ * before we publish descriptors. */
+STATIC void
+update_all_descriptors_intro_points(time_t now)
+{
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+ /* We'll try to update each descriptor that is if certain conditions apply
+ * in order for the descriptor to be updated. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ update_service_descriptor_intro_points(service, desc, now);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+}
+
+/* Return true iff the given intro point has expired that is it has been used
+ * for too long or we've reached our max seen INTRODUCE2 cell. */
+STATIC int
+intro_point_should_expire(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
+ time_t now)
+{
+ tor_assert(ip);
+
+ if (ip->introduce2_count >= ip->introduce2_max) {
+ goto expired;
+ }
+
+ if (ip->time_to_expire <= now) {
+ goto expired;
+ }
+
+ /* Not expiring. */
+ return 0;
+ expired:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Go over the given set of intro points for each service and remove any
+ * invalid ones. The conditions for removal are:
+ *
+ * - The node doesn't exists anymore (not in consensus)
+ * OR
+ * - The intro point maximum circuit retry count has been reached and no
+ * circuit can be found associated with it.
+ * OR
+ * - The intro point has expired and we should pick a new one.
+ *
+ * If an intro point is removed, the circuit (if any) is immediately close.
+ * If a circuit can't be found, the intro point is kept if it hasn't reached
+ * its maximum circuit retry value and thus should be retried. */
+static void
+cleanup_intro_points(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
+{
+ /* List of intro points to close. We can't mark the intro circuits for close
+ * in the modify loop because doing so calls
+ * hs_service_intro_circ_has_closed() which does a digest256map_get() on the
+ * intro points map (that we are iterating over). This can't be done in a
+ * single iteration after a MAP_DEL_CURRENT, the object will still be
+ * returned leading to a use-after-free. So, we close the circuits and free
+ * the intro points after the loop if any. */
+ smartlist_t *ips_to_free = smartlist_new();
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* For both descriptors, cleanup the intro points. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ /* Go over the current intro points we have, make sure they are still
+ * valid and remove any of them that aren't. */
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(desc->intro_points.map, key,
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ const node_t *node = get_node_from_intro_point(ip);
+ int has_expired = intro_point_should_expire(ip, now);
+
+ /* We cleanup an intro point if it has expired or if we do not know the
+ * node_t anymore (removed from our latest consensus) or if we've
+ * reached the maximum number of retry with a non existing circuit. */
+ if (has_expired || node == NULL ||
+ ip->circuit_retries > MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Intro point %s%s (retried: %u times). "
+ "Removing it.",
+ describe_intro_point(ip),
+ has_expired ? " has expired" :
+ (node == NULL) ? " fell off the consensus" : "",
+ ip->circuit_retries);
+
+ /* We've retried too many times, remember it as a failed intro point
+ * so we don't pick it up again for INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD sec. */
+ if (ip->circuit_retries > MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES) {
+ remember_failing_intro_point(ip, desc, approx_time());
+ }
+
+ /* Remove intro point from descriptor map and add it to the list of
+ * ips to free for which we'll also try to close the intro circuit. */
+ MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
+ smartlist_add(ips_to_free, ip);
+ }
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+
+ /* Go over the intro points to free and close their circuit if any. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ips_to_free, hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ /* See if we need to close the intro point circuit as well */
+
+ /* XXX: Legacy code does NOT close circuits like this: it keeps the circuit
+ * open until a new descriptor is uploaded and then closed all expiring
+ * intro point circuit. Here, we close immediately and because we just
+ * discarded the intro point, a new one will be selected, a new descriptor
+ * created and uploaded. There is no difference to an attacker between the
+ * timing of a new consensus and intro point rotation (possibly?). */
+ origin_circuit_t *ocirc = hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip);
+ if (ocirc && !TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc)->marked_for_close) {
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ }
+
+ /* Cleanup the intro point */
+ service_intro_point_free(ip);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
+
+ smartlist_free(ips_to_free);
+}
+
+/* Set the next rotation time of the descriptors for the given service for the
+ * time now. */
+static void
+set_rotation_time(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ service->state.next_rotation_time =
+ sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run() +
+ sr_state_get_protocol_run_duration();
+
+ {
+ char fmt_time[ISO_TIME_LEN + 1];
+ format_local_iso_time(fmt_time, service->state.next_rotation_time);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Next descriptor rotation time set to %s for %s",
+ fmt_time, safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return true iff the service should rotate its descriptor. The time now is
+ * only used to fetch the live consensus and if none can be found, this
+ * returns false. */
+static unsigned int
+should_rotate_descriptors(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
+{
+ const networkstatus_t *ns;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ ns = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now);
+ if (ns == NULL) {
+ goto no_rotation;
+ }
+
+ if (ns->valid_after >= service->state.next_rotation_time) {
+ /* In theory, we should never get here with no descriptors. We can never
+ * have a NULL current descriptor except when tor starts up. The next
+ * descriptor can be NULL after a rotation but we build a new one right
+ * after.
+ *
+ * So, when tor starts, the next rotation time is set to the start of the
+ * next SRV period using the consensus valid after time so it should
+ * always be set to a future time value. This means that we should never
+ * reach this point at bootup that is this check safeguards tor in never
+ * allowing a rotation if the valid after time is smaller than the next
+ * rotation time.
+ *
+ * This is all good in theory but we've had a NULL descriptor issue here
+ * so this is why we BUG() on both with extra logging to try to understand
+ * how this can possibly happens. We'll simply ignore and tor should
+ * recover from this by skipping rotation and building the missing
+ * descriptors just after this. */
+ if (BUG(service->desc_current == NULL || service->desc_next == NULL)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Service descriptor is NULL (%p/%p). Next rotation "
+ "time is %ld (now: %ld). Valid after time from "
+ "consensus is %ld",
+ service->desc_current, service->desc_next,
+ (long)service->state.next_rotation_time,
+ (long)now,
+ (long)ns->valid_after);
+ goto no_rotation;
+ }
+ goto rotation;
+ }
+
+ no_rotation:
+ return 0;
+ rotation:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Rotate the service descriptors of the given service. The current descriptor
+ * will be freed, the next one put in as the current and finally the next
+ * descriptor pointer is NULLified. */
+static void
+rotate_service_descriptors(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ if (service->desc_current) {
+ /* Close all IP circuits for the descriptor. */
+ close_intro_circuits(&service->desc_current->intro_points);
+ /* We don't need this one anymore, we won't serve any clients coming with
+ * this service descriptor. */
+ service_descriptor_free(service->desc_current);
+ }
+ /* The next one become the current one and emptying the next will trigger
+ * a descriptor creation for it. */
+ service->desc_current = service->desc_next;
+ service->desc_next = NULL;
+
+ /* We've just rotated, set the next time for the rotation. */
+ set_rotation_time(service);
+}
+
+/* Rotate descriptors for each service if needed. A non existing current
+ * descriptor will trigger a descriptor build for the next time period. */
+STATIC void
+rotate_all_descriptors(time_t now)
+{
+ /* XXX We rotate all our service descriptors at once. In the future it might
+ * be wise, to rotate service descriptors independently to hide that all
+ * those descriptors are on the same tor instance */
+
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+
+ /* Note for a service booting up: Both descriptors are NULL in that case
+ * so this function might return true if we are in the timeframe for a
+ * rotation leading to basically swapping two NULL pointers which is
+ * harmless. However, the side effect is that triggering a rotation will
+ * update the service state and avoid doing anymore rotations after the
+ * two descriptors have been built. */
+ if (!should_rotate_descriptors(service, now)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Time to rotate our descriptors (%p / %p) for %s",
+ service->desc_current, service->desc_next,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+
+ rotate_service_descriptors(service);
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+}
+
+/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Make sure all our services are up
+ * to date and ready for the other scheduled events. This includes looking at
+ * the introduction points status and descriptor rotation time. */
+STATIC void
+run_housekeeping_event(time_t now)
+{
+ /* Note that nothing here opens circuit(s) nor uploads descriptor(s). We are
+ * simply moving things around or removing unneeded elements. */
+
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+
+ /* If the service is starting off, set the rotation time. We can't do that
+ * at configure time because the get_options() needs to be set for setting
+ * that time that uses the voting interval. */
+ if (service->state.next_rotation_time == 0) {
+ /* Set the next rotation time of the descriptors. If it's Oct 25th
+ * 23:47:00, the next rotation time is when the next SRV is computed
+ * which is at Oct 26th 00:00:00 that is in 13 minutes. */
+ set_rotation_time(service);
+ }
+
+ /* Cleanup invalid intro points from the service descriptor. */
+ cleanup_intro_points(service, now);
+
+ /* Remove expired failing intro point from the descriptor failed list. We
+ * reset them at each INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD. */
+ remove_expired_failing_intro(service, now);
+
+ /* At this point, the service is now ready to go through the scheduled
+ * events guaranteeing a valid state. Intro points might be missing from
+ * the descriptors after the cleanup but the update/build process will
+ * make sure we pick those missing ones. */
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+}
+
+/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Make sure all descriptors are up to
+ * date. Once this returns, each service descriptor needs to be considered for
+ * new introduction circuits and then for upload. */
+static void
+run_build_descriptor_event(time_t now)
+{
+ /* For v2 services, this step happens in the upload event. */
+
+ /* Run v3+ events. */
+ /* We start by rotating the descriptors only if needed. */
+ rotate_all_descriptors(now);
+
+ /* Then, we'll try to build new descriptors that we might need. The
+ * condition is that the next descriptor is non existing because it has
+ * been rotated or we just started up. */
+ build_all_descriptors(now);
+
+ /* Finally, we'll check if we should update the descriptors' intro
+ * points. Missing introduction points will be picked in this function which
+ * is useful for newly built descriptors. */
+ update_all_descriptors_intro_points(now);
+}
+
+/* For the given service, launch any intro point circuits that could be
+ * needed. This considers every descriptor of the service. */
+static void
+launch_intro_point_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* For both descriptors, try to launch any missing introduction point
+ * circuits using the current map. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ /* Keep a ref on if we need a direct connection. We use this often. */
+ unsigned int direct_conn = service->config.is_single_onion;
+
+ DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(desc->intro_points.map, key,
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
+ extend_info_t *ei;
+
+ /* Skip the intro point that already has an existing circuit
+ * (established or not). */
+ if (hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ei = get_extend_info_from_intro_point(ip, direct_conn);
+ if (ei == NULL) {
+ /* This is possible if we can get a node_t but not the extend info out
+ * of it. In this case, we remove the intro point and a new one will
+ * be picked at the next main loop callback. */
+ MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
+ service_intro_point_free(ip);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Launch a circuit to the intro point. */
+ ip->circuit_retries++;
+ if (hs_circ_launch_intro_point(service, ip, ei) < 0) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to launch intro circuit to node %s "
+ "for service %s.",
+ safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(ei)),
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ /* Intro point will be retried if possible after this. */
+ }
+ extend_info_free(ei);
+ } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* Don't try to build more than this many circuits before giving up for a
+ * while. Dynamically calculated based on the configured number of intro
+ * points for the given service and how many descriptor exists. The default
+ * use case of 3 introduction points and two descriptors will allow 28
+ * circuits for a retry period (((3 + 2) + (3 * 3)) * 2). */
+static unsigned int
+get_max_intro_circ_per_period(const hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ unsigned int count = 0;
+ unsigned int multiplier = 0;
+ unsigned int num_wanted_ip;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(service->config.num_intro_points <=
+ HS_CONFIG_V3_MAX_INTRO_POINTS);
+
+/* For a testing network, allow to do it for the maximum amount so circuit
+ * creation and rotation and so on can actually be tested without limit. */
+#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES_TESTING -1
+ if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
+ return MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES_TESTING;
+ }
+
+ num_wanted_ip = service->config.num_intro_points;
+
+ /* The calculation is as follow. We have a number of intro points that we
+ * want configured as a torrc option (num_intro_points). We then add an
+ * extra value so we can launch multiple circuits at once and pick the
+ * quickest ones. For instance, we want 3 intros, we add 2 extra so we'll
+ * pick 5 intros and launch 5 circuits. */
+ count += (num_wanted_ip + get_intro_point_num_extra());
+
+ /* Then we add the number of retries that is possible to do for each intro
+ * point. If we want 3 intros, we'll allow 3 times the number of possible
+ * retry. */
+ count += (num_wanted_ip * MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES);
+
+ /* Then, we multiply by a factor of 2 if we have both descriptor or 0 if we
+ * have none. */
+ multiplier += (service->desc_current) ? 1 : 0;
+ multiplier += (service->desc_next) ? 1 : 0;
+
+ return (count * multiplier);
+}
+
+/* For the given service, return 1 if the service is allowed to launch more
+ * introduction circuits else 0 if the maximum has been reached for the retry
+ * period of INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD. */
+STATIC int
+can_service_launch_intro_circuit(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* Consider the intro circuit retry period of the service. */
+ if (now > (service->state.intro_circ_retry_started_time +
+ INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD)) {
+ service->state.intro_circ_retry_started_time = now;
+ service->state.num_intro_circ_launched = 0;
+ goto allow;
+ }
+ /* Check if we can still launch more circuits in this period. */
+ if (service->state.num_intro_circ_launched <=
+ get_max_intro_circ_per_period(service)) {
+ goto allow;
+ }
+
+ /* Rate limit log that we've reached our circuit creation limit. */
+ {
+ char *msg;
+ time_t elapsed_time = now - service->state.intro_circ_retry_started_time;
+ static ratelim_t rlimit = RATELIM_INIT(INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD);
+ if ((msg = rate_limit_log(&rlimit, now))) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service %s exceeded its circuit launch limit "
+ "of %u per %d seconds. It launched %u circuits in "
+ "the last %ld seconds. Will retry in %ld seconds.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
+ get_max_intro_circ_per_period(service),
+ INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD,
+ service->state.num_intro_circ_launched,
+ (long int) elapsed_time,
+ (long int) (INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD - elapsed_time));
+ tor_free(msg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Not allow. */
+ return 0;
+ allow:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Make sure we have all the circuits
+ * we need for each service. */
+static void
+run_build_circuit_event(time_t now)
+{
+ /* Make sure we can actually have enough information or able to build
+ * internal circuits as required by services. */
+ if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN ||
+ !have_completed_a_circuit()) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Run v2 check. */
+ if (rend_num_services() > 0) {
+ rend_consider_services_intro_points(now);
+ }
+
+ /* Run v3+ check. */
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+ /* For introduction circuit, we need to make sure we don't stress too much
+ * circuit creation so make sure this service is respecting that limit. */
+ if (can_service_launch_intro_circuit(service, now)) {
+ /* Launch intro point circuits if needed. */
+ launch_intro_point_circuits(service);
+ /* Once the circuits have opened, we'll make sure to update the
+ * descriptor intro point list and cleanup any extraneous. */
+ }
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+}
+
+/* Encode and sign the service descriptor desc and upload it to the given
+ * hidden service directory. This does nothing if PublishHidServDescriptors
+ * is false. */
+static void
+upload_descriptor_to_hsdir(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, const node_t *hsdir)
+{
+ char *encoded_desc = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(hsdir);
+
+ /* Let's avoid doing that if tor is configured to not publish. */
+ if (!get_options()->PublishHidServDescriptors) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Service %s not publishing descriptor. "
+ "PublishHidServDescriptors is set to 1.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* First of all, we'll encode the descriptor. This should NEVER fail but
+ * just in case, let's make sure we have an actual usable descriptor. */
+ if (BUG(service_encode_descriptor(service, desc, &desc->signing_kp,
+ &encoded_desc) < 0)) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Time to upload the descriptor to the directory. */
+ hs_service_upload_desc_to_dir(encoded_desc, service->config.version,
+ &service->keys.identity_pk,
+ &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, hsdir->rs);
+
+ /* Add this node to previous_hsdirs list */
+ service_desc_note_upload(desc, hsdir);
+
+ /* Logging so we know where it was sent. */
+ {
+ int is_next_desc = (service->desc_next == desc);
+ const uint8_t *idx = (is_next_desc) ? hsdir->hsdir_index.store_second:
+ hsdir->hsdir_index.store_first;
+ char *blinded_pubkey_log_str =
+ tor_strdup(hex_str((char*)&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey.pubkey, 32));
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Service %s %s descriptor of revision %" PRIu64
+ " initiated upload request to %s with index %s (%s)",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
+ (is_next_desc) ? "next" : "current",
+ desc->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter,
+ safe_str_client(node_describe(hsdir)),
+ safe_str_client(hex_str((const char *) idx, 32)),
+ safe_str_client(blinded_pubkey_log_str));
+ tor_free(blinded_pubkey_log_str);
+
+ /* Fire a UPLOAD control port event. */
+ hs_control_desc_event_upload(service->onion_address, hsdir->identity,
+ &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, idx);
+ }
+
+ end:
+ tor_free(encoded_desc);
+ return;
+}
+
+/** Set the revision counter in <b>hs_desc</b>. We do this by encrypting a
+ * timestamp using an OPE scheme and using the ciphertext as our revision
+ * counter.
+ *
+ * If <b>is_current</b> is true, then this is the current HS descriptor,
+ * otherwise it's the next one. */
+static void
+set_descriptor_revision_counter(hs_service_descriptor_t *hs_desc, time_t now,
+ bool is_current)
+{
+ uint64_t rev_counter = 0;
+
+ /* Get current time */
+ time_t srv_start = 0;
+
+ /* As our revision counter plaintext value, we use the seconds since the
+ * start of the SR protocol run that is relevant to this descriptor. This is
+ * guaranteed to be a positive value since we need the SRV to start making a
+ * descriptor (so that we know where to upload it).
+ *
+ * Depending on whether we are building the current or the next descriptor,
+ * services use a different SRV value. See [SERVICEUPLOAD] in
+ * rend-spec-v3.txt:
+ *
+ * In particular, for the current descriptor (aka first descriptor), Tor
+ * always uses the previous SRV for uploading the descriptor, and hence we
+ * should use the start time of the previous protocol run here.
+ *
+ * Whereas for the next descriptor (aka second descriptor), Tor always uses
+ * the current SRV for uploading the descriptor. and hence we use the start
+ * time of the current protocol run.
+ */
+ if (is_current) {
+ srv_start = sr_state_get_start_time_of_previous_protocol_run();
+ } else {
+ srv_start = sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run();
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Setting rev counter for TP #%u: "
+ "SRV started at %d, now %d (%s)",
+ (unsigned) hs_desc->time_period_num, (int)srv_start,
+ (int)now, is_current ? "current" : "next");
+
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(now >= srv_start);
+
+ /* Compute seconds elapsed since the start of the time period. That's the
+ * number of seconds of how long this blinded key has been active. */
+ time_t seconds_since_start_of_srv = now - srv_start;
+
+ /* Increment by one so that we are definitely sure this is strictly
+ * positive and not zero. */
+ seconds_since_start_of_srv++;
+
+ /* Check for too big inputs. */
+ if (BUG(seconds_since_start_of_srv > OPE_INPUT_MAX)) {
+ seconds_since_start_of_srv = OPE_INPUT_MAX;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we compute the final revision counter value by encrypting the
+ plaintext using our OPE cipher: */
+ tor_assert(hs_desc->ope_cipher);
+ rev_counter = crypto_ope_encrypt(hs_desc->ope_cipher,
+ (int) seconds_since_start_of_srv);
+
+ /* The OPE module returns CRYPTO_OPE_ERROR in case of errors. */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(rev_counter < CRYPTO_OPE_ERROR);
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Encrypted revision counter %d to %ld",
+ (int) seconds_since_start_of_srv, (long int) rev_counter);
+
+ hs_desc->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter = rev_counter;
+}
+
+/* Encode and sign the service descriptor desc and upload it to the
+ * responsible hidden service directories. If for_next_period is true, the set
+ * of directories are selected using the next hsdir_index. This does nothing
+ * if PublishHidServDescriptors is false. */
+STATIC void
+upload_descriptor_to_all(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ smartlist_t *responsible_dirs = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* We'll first cancel any directory request that are ongoing for this
+ * descriptor. It is possible that we can trigger multiple uploads in a
+ * short time frame which can lead to a race where the second upload arrives
+ * before the first one leading to a 400 malformed descriptor response from
+ * the directory. Closing all pending requests avoids that. */
+ close_directory_connections(service, desc);
+
+ /* Get our list of responsible HSDir. */
+ responsible_dirs = smartlist_new();
+ /* The parameter 0 means that we aren't a client so tell the function to use
+ * the spread store consensus paremeter. */
+ hs_get_responsible_hsdirs(&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, desc->time_period_num,
+ service->desc_next == desc, 0, responsible_dirs);
+
+ /** Clear list of previous hsdirs since we are about to upload to a new
+ * list. Let's keep it up to date. */
+ service_desc_clear_previous_hsdirs(desc);
+
+ /* For each responsible HSDir we have, initiate an upload command. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(responsible_dirs, const routerstatus_t *,
+ hsdir_rs) {
+ const node_t *hsdir_node = node_get_by_id(hsdir_rs->identity_digest);
+ /* Getting responsible hsdir implies that the node_t object exists for the
+ * routerstatus_t found in the consensus else we have a problem. */
+ tor_assert(hsdir_node);
+ /* Upload this descriptor to the chosen directory. */
+ upload_descriptor_to_hsdir(service, desc, hsdir_node);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(hsdir_rs);
+
+ /* Set the next upload time for this descriptor. Even if we are configured
+ * to not upload, we still want to follow the right cycle of life for this
+ * descriptor. */
+ desc->next_upload_time =
+ (time(NULL) + crypto_rand_int_range(HS_SERVICE_NEXT_UPLOAD_TIME_MIN,
+ HS_SERVICE_NEXT_UPLOAD_TIME_MAX));
+ {
+ char fmt_next_time[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ format_local_iso_time(fmt_next_time, desc->next_upload_time);
+ log_debug(LD_REND, "Service %s set to upload a descriptor at %s",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address), fmt_next_time);
+ }
+
+ smartlist_free(responsible_dirs);
+ return;
+}
+
+/** The set of HSDirs have changed: check if the change affects our descriptor
+ * HSDir placement, and if it does, reupload the desc. */
+STATIC int
+service_desc_hsdirs_changed(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
+{
+ int should_reupload = 0;
+ smartlist_t *responsible_dirs = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* No desc upload has happened yet: it will happen eventually */
+ if (!desc->previous_hsdirs || !smartlist_len(desc->previous_hsdirs)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Get list of responsible hsdirs */
+ hs_get_responsible_hsdirs(&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, desc->time_period_num,
+ service->desc_next == desc, 0, responsible_dirs);
+
+ /* Check if any new hsdirs have been added to the responsible hsdirs set:
+ * Iterate over the list of new hsdirs, and reupload if any of them is not
+ * present in the list of previous hsdirs.
+ */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(responsible_dirs, const routerstatus_t *, hsdir_rs) {
+ char b64_digest[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1] = {0};
+ digest_to_base64(b64_digest, hsdir_rs->identity_digest);
+
+ if (!smartlist_contains_string(desc->previous_hsdirs, b64_digest)) {
+ should_reupload = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(hsdir_rs);
+
+ done:
+ smartlist_free(responsible_dirs);
+
+ return should_reupload;
+}
+
+/* Return 1 if the given descriptor from the given service can be uploaded
+ * else return 0 if it can not. */
+static int
+should_service_upload_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ unsigned int num_intro_points;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* If this descriptors has missing intro points that is that it couldn't get
+ * them all when it was time to pick them, it means that we should upload
+ * instead of waiting an arbitrary amount of time breaking the service.
+ * Else, if we have no missing intro points, we use the value taken from the
+ * service configuration. */
+ if (desc->missing_intro_points) {
+ num_intro_points = digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map);
+ } else {
+ num_intro_points = service->config.num_intro_points;
+ }
+
+ /* This means we tried to pick intro points but couldn't get any so do not
+ * upload descriptor in this case. We need at least one for the service to
+ * be reachable. */
+ if (desc->missing_intro_points && num_intro_points == 0) {
+ goto cannot;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if all our introduction circuit have been established for all the
+ * intro points we have selected. */
+ if (count_desc_circuit_established(desc) != num_intro_points) {
+ goto cannot;
+ }
+
+ /* Is it the right time to upload? */
+ if (desc->next_upload_time > now) {
+ goto cannot;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't upload desc if we don't have a live consensus */
+ if (!networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now)) {
+ goto cannot;
+ }
+
+ /* Do we know enough router descriptors to have adequate vision of the HSDir
+ hash ring? */
+ if (!router_have_minimum_dir_info()) {
+ goto cannot;
+ }
+
+ /* Can upload! */
+ return 1;
+ cannot:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Refresh the given service descriptor meaning this will update every mutable
+ * field that needs to be updated before we upload.
+ *
+ * This should ONLY be called before uploading a descriptor. It assumes that
+ * the descriptor has been built (desc->desc) and that all intro point
+ * circuits have been established. */
+static void
+refresh_service_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
+{
+ /* There are few fields that we consider "mutable" in the descriptor meaning
+ * we need to update them regurlarly over the lifetime fo the descriptor.
+ * The rest are set once and should not be modified.
+ *
+ * - Signing key certificate.
+ * - Revision counter.
+ * - Introduction points which includes many thing. See
+ * hs_desc_intro_point_t. and the setup_desc_intro_point() function.
+ */
+
+ /* Create the signing key certificate. */
+ build_desc_signing_key_cert(desc, now);
+
+ /* Build the intro points descriptor section. The refresh step is just
+ * before we upload so all circuits have been properly established. */
+ build_desc_intro_points(service, desc, now);
+
+ /* Set the desc revision counter right before uploading */
+ set_descriptor_revision_counter(desc, now, service->desc_current == desc);
+}
+
+/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Try to upload the descriptor for
+ * each service. */
+STATIC void
+run_upload_descriptor_event(time_t now)
+{
+ /* v2 services use the same function for descriptor creation and upload so
+ * we do everything here because the intro circuits were checked before. */
+ if (rend_num_services() > 0) {
+ rend_consider_services_upload(now);
+ rend_consider_descriptor_republication();
+ }
+
+ /* Run v3+ check. */
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ /* If we were asked to re-examine the hash ring, and it changed, then
+ schedule an upload */
+ if (consider_republishing_hs_descriptors &&
+ service_desc_hsdirs_changed(service, desc)) {
+ service_desc_schedule_upload(desc, now, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Can this descriptor be uploaded? */
+ if (!should_service_upload_descriptor(service, desc, now)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Initiating upload for hidden service %s descriptor "
+ "for service %s with %u/%u introduction points%s.",
+ (desc == service->desc_current) ? "current" : "next",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
+ digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map),
+ service->config.num_intro_points,
+ (desc->missing_intro_points) ? " (couldn't pick more)" : "");
+
+ /* We are about to upload so we need to do one last step which is to
+ * update the service's descriptor mutable fields in order to upload a
+ * coherent descriptor. */
+ refresh_service_descriptor(service, desc, now);
+
+ /* Proceed with the upload, the descriptor is ready to be encoded. */
+ upload_descriptor_to_all(service, desc);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+ } FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
+
+ /* We are done considering whether to republish rend descriptors */
+ consider_republishing_hs_descriptors = 0;
+}
+
+/* Called when the introduction point circuit is done building and ready to be
+ * used. */
+static void
+service_intro_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+
+ /* Let's do some basic sanity checking of the circ state */
+ if (BUG(!circ->cpath)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (BUG(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (BUG(!circ->hs_ident)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the corresponding service and intro point. */
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, &desc);
+
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service identity key %s on the introduction "
+ "circuit %u. Can't find onion service.",
+ safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown introduction point auth key on circuit %u "
+ "for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* We can't have an IP object without a descriptor. */
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ if (hs_circ_service_intro_has_opened(service, ip, desc, circ)) {
+ /* Getting here means that the circuit has been re-purposed because we
+ * have enough intro circuit opened. Remove the IP from the service. */
+ service_intro_point_remove(service, ip);
+ service_intro_point_free(ip);
+ }
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ /* Close circuit, we can't use it. */
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOSUCHSERVICE);
+ done:
+ return;
+}
+
+/* Called when a rendezvous circuit is done building and ready to be used. */
+static void
+service_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath);
+ /* Getting here means this is a v3 rendezvous circuit. */
+ tor_assert(circ->hs_ident);
+ tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
+
+ /* Declare the circuit dirty to avoid reuse, and for path-bias. We set the
+ * timestamp regardless of its content because that circuit could have been
+ * cannibalized so in any cases, we are about to use that circuit more. */
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ);
+
+ /* Get the corresponding service and intro point. */
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, NULL, NULL);
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service identity key %s on the rendezvous "
+ "circuit %u with cookie %s. Can't find onion service.",
+ safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ hex_str((const char *) circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie,
+ REND_COOKIE_LEN));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If the cell can't be sent, the circuit will be closed within this
+ * function. */
+ hs_circ_service_rp_has_opened(service, circ);
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOSUCHSERVICE);
+ done:
+ return;
+}
+
+/* We've been expecting an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on this circuit and it just
+ * arrived. Handle the INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell arriving on the given
+ * introduction circuit. Return 0 on success else a negative value. */
+static int
+service_handle_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const uint8_t *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(payload);
+ tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO);
+
+ /* We need the service and intro point for this cell. */
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, NULL);
+
+ /* Get service object from the circuit identifier. */
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service identity key %s on the introduction "
+ "circuit %u. Can't find onion service.",
+ safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ /* We don't recognize the key. */
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction circuit established without an intro "
+ "point object on circuit %u for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to parse the payload into a cell making sure we do actually have a
+ * valid cell. On success, the ip object and circuit purpose is updated to
+ * reflect the fact that the introduction circuit is established. */
+ if (hs_circ_handle_intro_established(service, ip, circ, payload,
+ payload_len) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Flag that we have an established circuit for this intro point. This value
+ * is what indicates the upload scheduled event if we are ready to build the
+ * intro point into the descriptor and upload. */
+ ip->circuit_established = 1;
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Successfully received an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell "
+ "on circuit %u for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ return 0;
+
+ err:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* We just received an INTRODUCE2 cell on the established introduction circuit
+ * circ. Handle the cell and return 0 on success else a negative value. */
+static int
+service_handle_introduce2(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(payload);
+ tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO);
+
+ /* We'll need every object associated with this circuit. */
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, &desc);
+
+ /* Get service object from the circuit identifier. */
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown service identity key %s when handling "
+ "an INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u",
+ safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ /* We don't recognize the key. */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown introduction auth key when handling "
+ "an INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* If we have an IP object, we MUST have a descriptor object. */
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* The following will parse, decode and launch the rendezvous point circuit.
+ * Both current and legacy cells are handled. */
+ if (hs_circ_handle_introduce2(service, circ, ip, desc->desc->subcredential,
+ payload, payload_len) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ err:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Add to list every filename used by service. This is used by the sandbox
+ * subsystem. */
+static void
+service_add_fnames_to_list(const hs_service_t *service, smartlist_t *list)
+{
+ const char *s_dir;
+ char fname[128] = {0};
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(list);
+
+ /* Ease our life. */
+ s_dir = service->config.directory_path;
+ /* The hostname file. */
+ smartlist_add(list, hs_path_from_filename(s_dir, fname_hostname));
+ /* The key files splitted in two. */
+ tor_snprintf(fname, sizeof(fname), "%s_secret_key", fname_keyfile_prefix);
+ smartlist_add(list, hs_path_from_filename(s_dir, fname));
+ tor_snprintf(fname, sizeof(fname), "%s_public_key", fname_keyfile_prefix);
+ smartlist_add(list, hs_path_from_filename(s_dir, fname));
+}
+
+/* Return true iff the given service identity key is present on disk. */
+static int
+service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ char *fname;
+ ed25519_keypair_t *kp = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(directory_path);
+
+ /* Build the v3 key path name and then try to load it. */
+ fname = hs_path_from_filename(directory_path, fname_keyfile_prefix);
+ kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT,
+ LOG_DEBUG, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (kp) {
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+ ed25519_keypair_free(kp);
+ tor_free(fname);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* This is a proxy function before actually calling hs_desc_encode_descriptor
+ * because we need some preprocessing here */
+static int
+service_encode_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp,
+ char **encoded_out)
+{
+ int ret;
+ const uint8_t *descriptor_cookie = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(desc);
+ tor_assert(encoded_out);
+
+ /* If the client authorization is enabled, send the descriptor cookie to
+ * hs_desc_encode_descriptor. Otherwise, send NULL */
+ if (service->config.is_client_auth_enabled) {
+ descriptor_cookie = desc->descriptor_cookie;
+ }
+
+ ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc->desc, signing_kp,
+ descriptor_cookie, encoded_out);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ========== */
+/* Public API */
+/* ========== */
+
+/* This is called everytime the service map (v2 or v3) changes that is if an
+ * element is added or removed. */
+void
+hs_service_map_has_changed(void)
+{
+ /* If we now have services where previously we had not, we need to enable
+ * the HS service main loop event. If we changed to having no services, we
+ * need to disable the event. */
+ rescan_periodic_events(get_options());
+}
+
+/* Upload an encoded descriptor in encoded_desc of the given version. This
+ * descriptor is for the service identity_pk and blinded_pk used to setup the
+ * directory connection identifier. It is uploaded to the directory hsdir_rs
+ * routerstatus_t object.
+ *
+ * NOTE: This function does NOT check for PublishHidServDescriptors because it
+ * is only used by the control port command HSPOST outside of this subsystem.
+ * Inside this code, upload_descriptor_to_hsdir() should be used. */
+void
+hs_service_upload_desc_to_dir(const char *encoded_desc,
+ const uint8_t version,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *blinded_pk,
+ const routerstatus_t *hsdir_rs)
+{
+ char version_str[4] = {0};
+ directory_request_t *dir_req;
+ hs_ident_dir_conn_t ident;
+
+ tor_assert(encoded_desc);
+ tor_assert(identity_pk);
+ tor_assert(blinded_pk);
+ tor_assert(hsdir_rs);
+
+ /* Setup the connection identifier. */
+ memset(&ident, 0, sizeof(ident));
+ hs_ident_dir_conn_init(identity_pk, blinded_pk, &ident);
+
+ /* This is our resource when uploading which is used to construct the URL
+ * with the version number: "/tor/hs/<version>/publish". */
+ tor_snprintf(version_str, sizeof(version_str), "%u", version);
+
+ /* Build the directory request for this HSDir. */
+ dir_req = directory_request_new(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_HSDESC);
+ directory_request_set_routerstatus(dir_req, hsdir_rs);
+ directory_request_set_indirection(dir_req, DIRIND_ANONYMOUS);
+ directory_request_set_resource(dir_req, version_str);
+ directory_request_set_payload(dir_req, encoded_desc,
+ strlen(encoded_desc));
+ /* The ident object is copied over the directory connection object once
+ * the directory request is initiated. */
+ directory_request_upload_set_hs_ident(dir_req, &ident);
+
+ /* Initiate the directory request to the hsdir.*/
+ directory_initiate_request(dir_req);
+ directory_request_free(dir_req);
+}
+
+/* Add the ephemeral service using the secret key sk and ports. Both max
+ * streams parameter will be set in the newly created service.
+ *
+ * Ownership of sk and ports is passed to this routine. Regardless of
+ * success/failure, callers should not touch these values after calling this
+ * routine, and may assume that correct cleanup has been done on failure.
+ *
+ * Return an appropriate hs_service_add_ephemeral_status_t. */
+hs_service_add_ephemeral_status_t
+hs_service_add_ephemeral(ed25519_secret_key_t *sk, smartlist_t *ports,
+ int max_streams_per_rdv_circuit,
+ int max_streams_close_circuit, char **address_out)
+{
+ hs_service_add_ephemeral_status_t ret;
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(sk);
+ tor_assert(ports);
+ tor_assert(address_out);
+
+ service = hs_service_new(get_options());
+
+ /* Setup the service configuration with specifics. A default service is
+ * HS_VERSION_TWO so explicitly set it. */
+ service->config.version = HS_VERSION_THREE;
+ service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit = max_streams_per_rdv_circuit;
+ service->config.max_streams_close_circuit = !!max_streams_close_circuit;
+ service->config.is_ephemeral = 1;
+ smartlist_free(service->config.ports);
+ service->config.ports = ports;
+
+ /* Handle the keys. */
+ memcpy(&service->keys.identity_sk, sk, sizeof(service->keys.identity_sk));
+ if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&service->keys.identity_pk,
+ &service->keys.identity_sk) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unable to generate ed25519 public key"
+ "for v3 service.");
+ ret = RSAE_BADPRIVKEY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure we have at least one port. */
+ if (smartlist_len(service->config.ports) == 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "At least one VIRTPORT/TARGET must be specified "
+ "for v3 service.");
+ ret = RSAE_BADVIRTPORT;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Build the onion address for logging purposes but also the control port
+ * uses it for the HS_DESC event. */
+ hs_build_address(&service->keys.identity_pk,
+ (uint8_t) service->config.version,
+ service->onion_address);
+
+ /* The only way the registration can fail is if the service public key
+ * already exists. */
+ if (BUG(register_service(hs_service_map, service) < 0)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Onion Service private key collides with an "
+ "existing v3 service.");
+ ret = RSAE_ADDREXISTS;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Added ephemeral v3 onion service: %s",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+
+ *address_out = tor_strdup(service->onion_address);
+ ret = RSAE_OKAY;
+ goto end;
+
+ err:
+ hs_service_free(service);
+
+ end:
+ memwipe(sk, 0, sizeof(ed25519_secret_key_t));
+ tor_free(sk);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* For the given onion address, delete the ephemeral service. Return 0 on
+ * success else -1 on error. */
+int
+hs_service_del_ephemeral(const char *address)
+{
+ uint8_t version;
+ ed25519_public_key_t pk;
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(address);
+
+ if (hs_parse_address(address, &pk, NULL, &version) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested malformed v3 onion address for removal.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (version != HS_VERSION_THREE) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested version of onion address for removal "
+ "is not supported.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ service = find_service(hs_service_map, &pk);
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-existent v3 hidden service for "
+ "removal.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!service->config.is_ephemeral) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-ephemeral v3 hidden service for "
+ "removal.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
- /* Close circuits, remove from map and finally free. */
- close_service_circuits(service);
++ /* Close introduction circuits, remove from map and finally free. Notice
++ * that the rendezvous circuits aren't closed in order for any existing
++ * connections to finish. We let the application terminate them. */
++ close_service_intro_circuits(service);
+ remove_service(hs_service_map, service);
+ hs_service_free(service);
+
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Removed ephemeral v3 hidden service: %s",
+ safe_str_client(address));
+ return 0;
+
+ err:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Using the ed25519 public key pk, find a service for that key and return the
+ * current encoded descriptor as a newly allocated string or NULL if not
+ * found. This is used by the control port subsystem. */
+char *
+hs_service_lookup_current_desc(const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
+{
+ const hs_service_t *service;
+
+ tor_assert(pk);
+
+ service = find_service(hs_service_map, pk);
+ if (service && service->desc_current) {
+ char *encoded_desc = NULL;
+ /* No matter what is the result (which should never be a failure), return
+ * the encoded variable, if success it will contain the right thing else
+ * it will be NULL. */
+ service_encode_descriptor(service,
+ service->desc_current,
+ &service->desc_current->signing_kp,
+ &encoded_desc);
+ return encoded_desc;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Return the number of service we have configured and usable. */
+unsigned int
+hs_service_get_num_services(void)
+{
+ if (hs_service_map == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return HT_SIZE(hs_service_map);
+}
+
+/* Called once an introduction circuit is closed. If the circuit doesn't have
+ * a v3 identifier, it is ignored. */
+void
+hs_service_intro_circ_has_closed(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+
+ if (circ->hs_ident == NULL) {
+ /* This is not a v3 circuit, ignore. */
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, &desc);
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ /* This is possible if the circuits are closed and the service is
+ * immediately deleted. */
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to find any hidden service associated "
+ "identity key %s on intro circuit %u.",
+ ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ /* The introduction point object has already been removed probably by our
+ * cleanup process so ignore. */
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* Can't have an intro point object without a descriptor. */
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* Circuit disappeared so make sure the intro point is updated. By
+ * keeping the object in the descriptor, we'll be able to retry. */
+ ip->circuit_established = 0;
+
+ end:
+ return;
+}
+
+/* Given conn, a rendezvous edge connection acting as an exit stream, look up
+ * the hidden service for the circuit circ, and look up the port and address
+ * based on the connection port. Assign the actual connection address.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success. Return -1 on failure and the caller should NOT close
+ * the circuit. Return -2 on failure and the caller MUST close the circuit for
+ * security reasons. */
+int
+hs_service_set_conn_addr_port(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ edge_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
+ tor_assert(circ->hs_ident);
+
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to find any hidden service associated "
+ "identity key %s on rendezvous circuit %u.",
+ ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
+ /* We want the caller to close the circuit because it's not a valid
+ * service so no danger. Attempting to bruteforce the entire key space by
+ * opening circuits to learn which service is being hosted here is
+ * impractical. */
+ goto err_close;
+ }
+
+ /* Enforce the streams-per-circuit limit, and refuse to provide a mapping if
+ * this circuit will exceed the limit. */
+ if (service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit > 0 &&
+ (circ->hs_ident->num_rdv_streams >=
+ service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit)) {
+#define MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL 600
+ static struct ratelim_t stream_ratelim =
+ RATELIM_INIT(MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL);
+ log_fn_ratelim(&stream_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_REND,
+ "Maximum streams per circuit limit reached on "
+ "rendezvous circuit %u for service %s. Circuit has "
+ "%" PRIu64 " out of %" PRIu64 " streams. %s.",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ service->onion_address,
+ circ->hs_ident->num_rdv_streams,
+ service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit,
+ service->config.max_streams_close_circuit ?
+ "Closing circuit" : "Ignoring open stream request");
+ if (service->config.max_streams_close_circuit) {
+ /* Service explicitly configured to close immediately. */
+ goto err_close;
+ }
+ /* Exceeding the limit makes tor silently ignore the stream creation
+ * request and keep the circuit open. */
+ goto err_no_close;
+ }
+
+ /* Find a virtual port of that service mathcing the one in the connection if
+ * successful, set the address in the connection. */
+ if (hs_set_conn_addr_port(service->config.ports, conn) < 0) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "No virtual port mapping exists for port %d for "
+ "hidden service %s.",
+ TO_CONN(conn)->port, service->onion_address);
+ if (service->config.allow_unknown_ports) {
+ /* Service explicitly allow connection to unknown ports so close right
+ * away because we do not care about port mapping. */
+ goto err_close;
+ }
+ /* If the service didn't explicitly allow it, we do NOT close the circuit
+ * here to raise the bar in terms of performance for port mapping. */
+ goto err_no_close;
+ }
+
+ /* Success. */
+ return 0;
+ err_close:
+ /* Indicate the caller that the circuit should be closed. */
+ return -2;
+ err_no_close:
+ /* Indicate the caller to NOT close the circuit. */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/** Does the service with identity pubkey <b>pk</b> export the circuit IDs of
+ * its clients? */
+hs_circuit_id_protocol_t
+hs_service_exports_circuit_id(const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = find_service(hs_service_map, pk);
+ if (!service) {
+ return HS_CIRCUIT_ID_PROTOCOL_NONE;
+ }
+
+ return service->config.circuit_id_protocol;
+}
+
+/* Add to file_list every filename used by a configured hidden service, and to
+ * dir_list every directory path used by a configured hidden service. This is
+ * used by the sandbox subsystem to whitelist those. */
+void
+hs_service_lists_fnames_for_sandbox(smartlist_t *file_list,
+ smartlist_t *dir_list)
+{
+ tor_assert(file_list);
+ tor_assert(dir_list);
+
+ /* Add files and dirs for legacy services. */
+ rend_services_add_filenames_to_lists(file_list, dir_list);
+
+ /* Add files and dirs for v3+. */
+ FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
+ /* Skip ephemeral service, they don't touch the disk. */
+ if (service->config.is_ephemeral) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ service_add_fnames_to_list(service, file_list);
+ smartlist_add_strdup(dir_list, service->config.directory_path);
+ smartlist_add_strdup(dir_list, dname_client_pubkeys);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+}
+
+/* Called when our internal view of the directory has changed. We might have
+ * received a new batch of descriptors which might affect the shape of the
+ * HSDir hash ring. Signal that we should reexamine the hash ring and
+ * re-upload our HS descriptors if needed. */
+void
+hs_service_dir_info_changed(void)
+{
+ if (hs_service_get_num_services() > 0) {
+ /* New directory information usually goes every consensus so rate limit
+ * every 30 minutes to not be too conservative. */
+ static struct ratelim_t dir_info_changed_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(30 * 60);
+ log_fn_ratelim(&dir_info_changed_ratelim, LOG_INFO, LD_REND,
+ "New dirinfo arrived: consider reuploading descriptor");
+ consider_republishing_hs_descriptors = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Called when we get an INTRODUCE2 cell on the circ. Respond to the cell and
+ * launch a circuit to the rendezvous point. */
+int
+hs_service_receive_introduce2(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(payload);
+
+ /* Do some initial validation and logging before we parse the cell */
+ if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Received an INTRODUCE2 cell on a "
+ "non introduction circuit of purpose %d",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (circ->hs_ident) {
+ ret = service_handle_introduce2(circ, payload, payload_len);
+ hs_stats_note_introduce2_cell(1);
+ } else {
+ ret = rend_service_receive_introduction(circ, payload, payload_len);
+ hs_stats_note_introduce2_cell(0);
+ }
+
+ done:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell. Mark the circuit as an
+ * established introduction point. Return 0 on success else a negative value
+ * and the circuit is closed. */
+int
+hs_service_receive_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const uint8_t *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(payload);
+
+ if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO) {
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Received an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on a "
+ "non introduction circuit of purpose %d",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Handle both version. v2 uses rend_data and v3 uses the hs circuit
+ * identifier hs_ident. Can't be both. */
+ if (circ->hs_ident) {
+ ret = service_handle_intro_established(circ, payload, payload_len);
+ } else {
+ ret = rend_service_intro_established(circ, payload, payload_len);
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ err:
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Called when any kind of hidden service circuit is done building thus
+ * opened. This is the entry point from the circuit subsystem. */
+void
+hs_service_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ tor_assert(circ);
+
+ /* Handle both version. v2 uses rend_data and v3 uses the hs circuit
+ * identifier hs_ident. Can't be both. */
+ switch (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose) {
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
+ if (circ->hs_ident) {
+ service_intro_circ_has_opened(circ);
+ } else {
+ rend_service_intro_has_opened(circ);
+ }
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
+ if (circ->hs_ident) {
+ service_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(circ);
+ } else {
+ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(circ);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ tor_assert(0);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return the service version by looking at the key in the service directory.
+ * If the key is not found or unrecognized, -1 is returned. Else, the service
+ * version is returned. */
+int
+hs_service_get_version_from_key(const hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ int version = -1; /* Unknown version. */
+ const char *directory_path;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* We'll try to load the key for version 3. If not found, we'll try version
+ * 2 and if not found, we'll send back an unknown version (-1). */
+ directory_path = service->config.directory_path;
+
+ /* Version 3 check. */
+ if (service_key_on_disk(directory_path)) {
+ version = HS_VERSION_THREE;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* Version 2 check. */
+ if (rend_service_key_on_disk(directory_path)) {
+ version = HS_VERSION_TWO;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ end:
+ return version;
+}
+
+/* Load and/or generate keys for all onion services including the client
+ * authorization if any. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
+int
+hs_service_load_all_keys(void)
+{
+ /* Load v2 service keys if we have v2. */
+ if (rend_num_services() != 0) {
+ if (rend_service_load_all_keys(NULL) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Load or/and generate them for v3+. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(hs_service_staging_list, hs_service_t *, service) {
+ /* Ignore ephemeral service, they already have their keys set. */
+ if (service->config.is_ephemeral) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Loading v3 onion service keys from %s",
+ service_escaped_dir(service));
+ if (load_service_keys(service) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(service);
+
+ /* Final step, the staging list contains service in a quiescent state that
+ * is ready to be used. Register them to the global map. Once this is over,
+ * the staging list will be cleaned up. */
+ register_all_services();
+
+ /* All keys have been loaded successfully. */
+ return 0;
+ err:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Put all service object in the given service list. After this, the caller
+ * looses ownership of every elements in the list and responsible to free the
+ * list pointer. */
+void
+hs_service_stage_services(const smartlist_t *service_list)
+{
+ tor_assert(service_list);
+ /* This list is freed at registration time but this function can be called
+ * multiple time. */
+ if (hs_service_staging_list == NULL) {
+ hs_service_staging_list = smartlist_new();
+ }
+ /* Add all service object to our staging list. Caller is responsible for
+ * freeing the service_list. */
+ smartlist_add_all(hs_service_staging_list, service_list);
+}
+
+/* Allocate and initilize a service object. The service configuration will
+ * contain the default values. Return the newly allocated object pointer. This
+ * function can't fail. */
+hs_service_t *
+hs_service_new(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_t));
+ /* Set default configuration value. */
+ set_service_default_config(&service->config, options);
+ /* Set the default service version. */
+ service->config.version = HS_SERVICE_DEFAULT_VERSION;
+ /* Allocate the CLIENT_PK replay cache in service state. */
+ service->state.replay_cache_rend_cookie =
+ replaycache_new(REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL, REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL);
+
+ return service;
+}
+
+/* Free the given <b>service</b> object and all its content. This function
+ * also takes care of wiping service keys from memory. It is safe to pass a
+ * NULL pointer. */
+void
+hs_service_free_(hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Free descriptors. Go over both descriptor with this loop. */
+ FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
+ service_descriptor_free(desc);
+ } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
+
+ /* Free service configuration. */
+ service_clear_config(&service->config);
+
+ /* Free replay cache from state. */
+ if (service->state.replay_cache_rend_cookie) {
+ replaycache_free(service->state.replay_cache_rend_cookie);
+ }
+
+ /* Wipe service keys. */
+ memwipe(&service->keys.identity_sk, 0, sizeof(service->keys.identity_sk));
+
+ tor_free(service);
+}
+
+/* Periodic callback. Entry point from the main loop to the HS service
+ * subsystem. This is call every second. This is skipped if tor can't build a
+ * circuit or the network is disabled. */
+void
+hs_service_run_scheduled_events(time_t now)
+{
+ /* First thing we'll do here is to make sure our services are in a
+ * quiescent state for the scheduled events. */
+ run_housekeeping_event(now);
+
+ /* Order matters here. We first make sure the descriptor object for each
+ * service contains the latest data. Once done, we check if we need to open
+ * new introduction circuit. Finally, we try to upload the descriptor for
+ * each service. */
+
+ /* Make sure descriptors are up to date. */
+ run_build_descriptor_event(now);
+ /* Make sure services have enough circuits. */
+ run_build_circuit_event(now);
+ /* Upload the descriptors if needed/possible. */
+ run_upload_descriptor_event(now);
+}
+
+/* Initialize the service HS subsystem. */
+void
+hs_service_init(void)
+{
+ /* Should never be called twice. */
+ tor_assert(!hs_service_map);
+ tor_assert(!hs_service_staging_list);
+
+ /* v2 specific. */
+ rend_service_init();
+
+ hs_service_map = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(struct hs_service_ht));
+ HT_INIT(hs_service_ht, hs_service_map);
+
+ hs_service_staging_list = smartlist_new();
+}
+
+/* Release all global storage of the hidden service subsystem. */
+void
+hs_service_free_all(void)
+{
+ rend_service_free_all();
+ service_free_all();
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+
+/* Return the global service map size. Only used by unit test. */
+STATIC unsigned int
+get_hs_service_map_size(void)
+{
+ return HT_SIZE(hs_service_map);
+}
+
+/* Return the staging list size. Only used by unit test. */
+STATIC int
+get_hs_service_staging_list_size(void)
+{
+ return smartlist_len(hs_service_staging_list);
+}
+
+STATIC hs_service_ht *
+get_hs_service_map(void)
+{
+ return hs_service_map;
+}
+
+STATIC hs_service_t *
+get_first_service(void)
+{
+ hs_service_t **obj = HT_START(hs_service_ht, hs_service_map);
+ if (obj == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return *obj;
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
1
0
[tor/maint-0.3.5] hs-v3: Do not close RP circuits when deleting an ephemeral service
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
05 Dec '18
commit d37dbb09c2e8867cf2b87dc45e8646351754e94a
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org>
Date: Mon Nov 26 14:40:22 2018 -0500
hs-v3: Do not close RP circuits when deleting an ephemeral service
Bug reported on tor-dev@ and here is the detail explanation of the issue:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-November/013558.html
Fixes bug #28619
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org>
---
changes/bug28619 | 6 ++++++
src/or/hs_service.c | 6 ++++--
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug28619 b/changes/bug28619
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..86be8cb2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug28619
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes (hidden service v3):
+ - When deleting an ephemeral onion service (DEL_ONION), do not close any
+ rendezvous circuits in order to let the existing client connections
+ finish by themselves or closed by the application. The HS v2 is doing
+ that already so now we have the same behavior for all versions. Fixes
+ bug 28619; bugfix on 0.3.3.1-alpha.
diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.c b/src/or/hs_service.c
index 4c67aff42..3273705ae 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_service.c
@@ -3105,8 +3105,10 @@ hs_service_del_ephemeral(const char *address)
goto err;
}
- /* Close circuits, remove from map and finally free. */
- close_service_circuits(service);
+ /* Close introduction circuits, remove from map and finally free. Notice
+ * that the rendezvous circuits aren't closed in order for any existing
+ * connections to finish. We let the application terminate them. */
+ close_service_intro_circuits(service);
remove_service(hs_service_map, service);
hs_service_free(service);
1
0
commit 54c3a5f09d9634b359344f8155dd973dafe0e86e
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org>
Date: Wed Dec 5 09:44:12 2018 -0500
Close and merge prop298
---
dir-spec.txt | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
proposals/000-index.txt | 4 ++--
proposals/298-canonical-families.txt | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dir-spec.txt b/dir-spec.txt
index e9f201c..65f329d 100644
--- a/dir-spec.txt
+++ b/dir-spec.txt
@@ -1500,6 +1500,32 @@
The "family" element as specified in section 2.1.1.
+ When generating microdescriptors for consensus method 29 or later,
+ the following canonicalization algorithm is applied to improve
+ compression:
+
+ For all entries of the form $hexid=name or $hexid~name,
+ remove the =name or ~name portion.
+
+ Remove all entries of the form $hexid, where hexid is not
+ 40 hexadecimal characters long.
+
+ If an entry is a valid nickname, put it into lower case.
+
+ If an entry is a valid $hexid, put it into upper case.
+
+ If there are any entries, add a single $hexid entry for
+ the relay in question, so that it is a member of its own
+ family.
+
+ Sort all entries in lexical order.
+
+ Remove duplicate entries.
+
+ (Note that if an entry is not of the form "nickname", "$hexid",
+ "$hexid=nickname" or "$hexid~nickname", then it will be unchanged:
+ this is what makes the algorithm forward-compatible.)
+
"p" SP ("accept" / "reject") SP PortList NL
[Exactly once.]
@@ -1517,8 +1543,8 @@
[At most once]
- The IPv6 exit policy summary as specified in sections 3.4.1 and 3.8.2. A
- missing "p6" line is equivalent to "p6 reject 1-65535".
+ The IPv6 exit policy summary as specified in sections 3.4.1 and
+ 3.8.2. A missing "p6" line is equivalent to "p6 reject 1-65535".
(Only included when generating microdescriptors for
consensus-method 15 or later.)
@@ -2972,6 +2998,7 @@
"26" -- Initialize bandwidth weights to 1 to avoid division-by-zero.
"27" -- Adds support for "a" lines in microdescriptor consensues.
"28" -- Removes "a" lines from microdescriptors.
+ "29" -- Canonicalizes families in microdescriptors.
Before generating a consensus, an authority must decide which consensus
method to use. To do this, it looks for the highest version number
diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt
index 7960f95..9746434 100644
--- a/proposals/000-index.txt
+++ b/proposals/000-index.txt
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ Proposals by number:
295 Using ADL-GCM for relay cryptography (solving the crypto-tagging attack) [OPEN]
296 Have Directory Authorities expose raw bandwidth list files [OPEN]
297 Relaxing the protover-based shutdown rules [OPEN]
-298 Putting family lines in canonical form [OPEN]
+298 Putting family lines in canonical form [CLOSED]
Proposals by status:
@@ -250,7 +250,6 @@ Proposals by status:
295 Using ADL-GCM for relay cryptography (solving the crypto-tagging attack)
296 Have Directory Authorities expose raw bandwidth list files
297 Relaxing the protover-based shutdown rules [for 0.3.5.x]
- 298 Putting family lines in canonical form [for 0.3.6.x]
ACCEPTED:
188 Bridge Guards and other anti-enumeration defenses
249 Allow CREATE cells with >505 bytes of handshake data
@@ -356,6 +355,7 @@ Proposals by status:
283 Move IPv6 ORPorts from microdescriptors to the microdesc consensus [for 0.3.3.x] [in 0.3.3.1-alpha]
284 Hidden Service v3 Control Port
293 Other ways for relays to know when to publish [for 0.3.5] [in 0.4.0.1-alpha]
+ 298 Putting family lines in canonical form [for 0.3.6.x] [in 0.4.0.1-alpha]
SUPERSEDED:
112 Bring Back Pathlen Coin Weight
113 Simplifying directory authority administration
diff --git a/proposals/298-canonical-families.txt b/proposals/298-canonical-families.txt
index 938754d..a96ab8d 100644
--- a/proposals/298-canonical-families.txt
+++ b/proposals/298-canonical-families.txt
@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@ Filename: 298-canonical-families.txt
Title: Putting family lines in canonical form
Author: Nick Mathewson
Created: 31-Oct-2018
-Status: Open
+Status: Closed
Target: 0.3.6.x
+Implemented-In: 0.4.0.1-alpha
1. Introduction
1
0
05 Dec '18
commit 0e9a963b6b87282011fe204e81b5c2530153a935
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org>
Date: Sat Nov 24 10:30:15 2018 -0500
Revise nodefamily.c to match proposal 298
Prop298 says that family entries should be formatted with
$hexids in uppercase, nicknames in lower case, $hexid~names
truncated, and everything sorted lexically. These changes implement
that ordering for nodefamily.c.
We don't _strictly speaking_ need to nodefamily.c formatting use
this for prop298 microdesc generation, but it seems silly to have
two separate canonicalization algorithms.
---
src/feature/nodelist/nodefamily.c | 2 ++
src/feature/nodelist/nodefamily_st.h | 8 ++++----
src/test/test_microdesc.c | 2 +-
src/test/test_nodelist.c | 18 +++++++++---------
4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/nodefamily.c b/src/feature/nodelist/nodefamily.c
index 6b504c0ac..29659ed93 100644
--- a/src/feature/nodelist/nodefamily.c
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/nodefamily.c
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ nodefamily_from_members(const smartlist_t *members,
ptr[0] = NODEFAMILY_BY_NICKNAME;
tor_assert(strlen(cp) < DIGEST_LEN); // guaranteed by is_legal_nickname
memcpy(ptr+1, cp, strlen(cp));
+ tor_strlower((char*) ptr+1);
bad_element = false;
} else if (is_legal_hexdigest(cp)) {
char digest_buf[DIGEST_LEN];
@@ -346,6 +347,7 @@ nodefamily_format(const nodefamily_t *family)
char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2];
buf[0]='$';
base16_encode(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, (char*)ptr+1, DIGEST_LEN);
+ tor_strupper(buf);
smartlist_add_strdup(sl, buf);
break;
}
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/nodefamily_st.h b/src/feature/nodelist/nodefamily_st.h
index f88ada494..a498b4b3b 100644
--- a/src/feature/nodelist/nodefamily_st.h
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/nodefamily_st.h
@@ -26,12 +26,12 @@ struct nodefamily_t {
#define NODEFAMILY_MEMBER_LEN (1+DIGEST_LEN)
-/** Tag byte, indicates that the following bytes are a NUL-padded nickname.
- */
-#define NODEFAMILY_BY_NICKNAME 0
/** Tag byte, indicates that the following bytes are a RSA1024 SHA1 ID.
*/
-#define NODEFAMILY_BY_RSA_ID 1
+#define NODEFAMILY_BY_RSA_ID 0
+/** Tag byte, indicates that the following bytes are a NUL-padded nickname.
+ */
+#define NODEFAMILY_BY_NICKNAME 1
/**
* Number of bytes to allocate in the array for a nodefamily_t with N members.
diff --git a/src/test/test_microdesc.c b/src/test/test_microdesc.c
index 3318408d5..debb11155 100644
--- a/src/test/test_microdesc.c
+++ b/src/test/test_microdesc.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ test_md_cache(void *data)
tt_ptr_op(md3->family, OP_NE, NULL);
encoded_family = nodefamily_format(md3->family);
- tt_str_op(encoded_family, OP_EQ, "nodeX nodeY nodeZ");
+ tt_str_op(encoded_family, OP_EQ, "nodex nodey nodez");
/* Now rebuild the cache! */
tt_int_op(microdesc_cache_rebuild(mc, 1), OP_EQ, 0);
diff --git a/src/test/test_nodelist.c b/src/test/test_nodelist.c
index 0287be330..afbcc60ac 100644
--- a/src/test/test_nodelist.c
+++ b/src/test/test_nodelist.c
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ test_nodelist_nodefamily(void *arg)
tt_ptr_op(nf1, OP_EQ, nf3);
/* Do we get the expected result when we re-encode? */
- tor_asprintf(&enc, "hello $%s", h1);
+ tor_asprintf(&enc, "$%s hello", h1);
enc2 = nodefamily_format(nf1);
tt_str_op(enc2, OP_EQ, enc);
tor_free(enc2);
@@ -399,8 +399,8 @@ test_nodelist_nodefamily_parse_err(void *arg)
tt_assert(nf1);
enc = nodefamily_format(nf1);
tt_str_op(enc, OP_EQ,
- "reticulatogranulate "
- "$7468696E67732D696E2D7468656D73656C766573");
+ "$7468696E67732D696E2D7468656D73656C766573 "
+ "reticulatogranulate");
tor_free(enc);
}
@@ -470,11 +470,11 @@ test_nodelist_nodefamily_lookup(void *arg)
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(sl), OP_EQ, 3);
const node_t *n = smartlist_get(sl, 0);
- tt_str_op(n->identity, OP_EQ, "erewhon");
- n = smartlist_get(sl, 1);
test_memeq_hex(n->identity, "3333333333333333333333333333333333333333");
- n = smartlist_get(sl, 2);
+ n = smartlist_get(sl, 1);
test_memeq_hex(n->identity, "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE");
+ n = smartlist_get(sl, 2);
+ tt_str_op(n->identity, OP_EQ, "erewhon");
done:
UNMOCK(node_get_by_nickname);
@@ -583,9 +583,9 @@ test_nodelist_node_nodefamily(void *arg)
node_lookup_declared_family(nodes, &mock_node1);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(nodes), OP_EQ, 2);
const node_t *n = smartlist_get(nodes, 0);
- tt_str_op(n->identity, OP_EQ, "NodeFour");
- n = smartlist_get(nodes, 1);
tt_mem_op(n->identity, OP_EQ, "SecondNodeWe'reTestn", DIGEST_LEN);
+ n = smartlist_get(nodes, 1);
+ tt_str_op(n->identity, OP_EQ, "nodefour");
// free, try the other one.
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nodes, node_t *, x, tor_free(x));
@@ -594,9 +594,9 @@ test_nodelist_node_nodefamily(void *arg)
node_lookup_declared_family(nodes, &mock_node2);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(nodes), OP_EQ, 2);
n = smartlist_get(nodes, 0);
+ // This gets a truncated hex hex ID since it was looked up by name
tt_str_op(n->identity, OP_EQ, "NodeThree");
n = smartlist_get(nodes, 1);
- // This gets a truncated hex hex ID since it was looked up by name
tt_str_op(n->identity, OP_EQ, "4e6f64654f6e654e6f6");
done:
1
0
[tor/master] Extract get_declared_family() into its own function.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
05 Dec '18
commit f82eb6269ff738d136aff66cff59b51b9c56f731
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org>
Date: Sat Nov 24 12:07:54 2018 -0500
Extract get_declared_family() into its own function.
This will help as we refactor it.
---
src/feature/relay/router.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/router.c b/src/feature/relay/router.c
index 9d61ced11..3f153e3a2 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/router.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/router.c
@@ -1807,6 +1807,71 @@ router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr)
CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER);
}
+/**
+ * Return a new smartlist containing the family members configured in
+ * <b>options</b>. Warn about invalid or missing entries. Return NULL
+ * if this relay should not declare a family.
+ **/
+static smartlist_t *
+get_declared_family(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (!options->MyFamily)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (options->BridgeRelay)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!warned_nonexistent_family)
+ warned_nonexistent_family = smartlist_new();
+
+ smartlist_t *declared_family = smartlist_new();
+ config_line_t *family;
+ for (family = options->MyFamily; family; family = family->next) {
+ char *name = family->value;
+ const node_t *member;
+ if (!strcasecmp(name, options->Nickname))
+ continue; /* Don't list ourself, that's redundant */
+ else
+ member = node_get_by_nickname(name, 0);
+ if (!member) {
+ int is_legal = is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(name);
+ if (!smartlist_contains_string(warned_nonexistent_family, name) &&
+ !is_legal_hexdigest(name)) {
+ if (is_legal)
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "I have no descriptor for the router named \"%s\" in my "
+ "declared family; I'll use the nickname as is, but "
+ "this may confuse clients.", name);
+ else
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named \"%s\" in my "
+ "declared family, but that isn't a legal nickname. "
+ "Skipping it.", escaped(name));
+ smartlist_add_strdup(warned_nonexistent_family, name);
+ }
+ if (is_legal) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(declared_family, name);
+ }
+ } else if (router_digest_is_me(member->identity)) {
+ /* Don't list ourself in our own family; that's redundant */
+ /* XXX shouldn't be possible */
+ } else {
+ char *fp = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
+ fp[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(fp+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
+ member->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ smartlist_add(declared_family, fp);
+ if (smartlist_contains_string(warned_nonexistent_family, name))
+ smartlist_string_remove(warned_nonexistent_family, name);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* remove duplicates from the list */
+ smartlist_sort_strings(declared_family);
+ smartlist_uniq_strings(declared_family);
+
+ return declared_family;
+}
+
/** Build a fresh routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document
* for this OR. Set r to the generated routerinfo, e to the generated
* extra-info document. Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error. Failure to
@@ -1921,54 +1986,7 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
tor_free(p_tmp);
}
- if (options->MyFamily && ! options->BridgeRelay) {
- if (!warned_nonexistent_family)
- warned_nonexistent_family = smartlist_new();
- ri->declared_family = smartlist_new();
- config_line_t *family;
- for (family = options->MyFamily; family; family = family->next) {
- char *name = family->value;
- const node_t *member;
- if (!strcasecmp(name, options->Nickname))
- continue; /* Don't list ourself, that's redundant */
- else
- member = node_get_by_nickname(name, 0);
- if (!member) {
- int is_legal = is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(name);
- if (!smartlist_contains_string(warned_nonexistent_family, name) &&
- !is_legal_hexdigest(name)) {
- if (is_legal)
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
- "I have no descriptor for the router named \"%s\" in my "
- "declared family; I'll use the nickname as is, but "
- "this may confuse clients.", name);
- else
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named \"%s\" in my "
- "declared family, but that isn't a legal nickname. "
- "Skipping it.", escaped(name));
- smartlist_add_strdup(warned_nonexistent_family, name);
- }
- if (is_legal) {
- smartlist_add_strdup(ri->declared_family, name);
- }
- } else if (router_digest_is_me(member->identity)) {
- /* Don't list ourself in our own family; that's redundant */
- /* XXX shouldn't be possible */
- } else {
- char *fp = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
- fp[0] = '$';
- base16_encode(fp+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
- member->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
- smartlist_add(ri->declared_family, fp);
- if (smartlist_contains_string(warned_nonexistent_family, name))
- smartlist_string_remove(warned_nonexistent_family, name);
- }
- }
-
- /* remove duplicates from the list */
- smartlist_sort_strings(ri->declared_family);
- smartlist_uniq_strings(ri->declared_family);
- }
+ ri->declared_family = get_declared_family(options);
/* Now generate the extrainfo. */
ei = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extrainfo_t));
1
0
[tor/master] Add a consensus method in which md families get canonicalized.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Dec '18
05 Dec '18
commit 0a0c612b79cb5230cc70922634a37f73a1c87c10
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org>
Date: Sat Nov 24 11:51:41 2018 -0500
Add a consensus method in which md families get canonicalized.
Implements prop298. Closes ticket 28266.
---
changes/ticket28266 | 5 +++++
src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h | 8 +++++++-
src/test/test_microdesc.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/ticket28266 b/changes/ticket28266
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d90dc74f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/ticket28266
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+ o Minor features (directory authority):
+ - Directory authorities support a new consensus algorithm,
+ under which microdescriptor entries are encoded in a canonical
+ form. This improves their compressibility in transit and on the client.
+ Closes ticket 28266; implements proposal 298.
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c b/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c
index 066a9e6e8..6c4e12cd5 100644
--- a/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include "feature/nodelist/fmt_routerstatus.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/microdesc.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodefamily.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
@@ -3799,8 +3800,16 @@ dirvote_create_microdescriptor(const routerinfo_t *ri, int consensus_method)
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "a %s\n",
fmt_addrport(&ri->ipv6_addr, ri->ipv6_orport));
- if (family)
- smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "family %s\n", family);
+ if (family) {
+ if (consensus_method < MIN_METHOD_FOR_CANONICAL_FAMILIES_IN_MICRODESCS) {
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "family %s\n", family);
+ } else {
+ const uint8_t *id = (const uint8_t *)ri->cache_info.identity_digest;
+ char *canonical_family = nodefamily_canonicalize(family, id, 0);
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "family %s\n", canonical_family);
+ tor_free(canonical_family);
+ }
+ }
if (summary && strcmp(summary, "reject 1-65535"))
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "p %s\n", summary);
@@ -3898,7 +3907,10 @@ static const struct consensus_method_range_t {
int high;
} microdesc_consensus_methods[] = {
{MIN_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD, MIN_METHOD_FOR_NO_A_LINES_IN_MICRODESC - 1},
- {MIN_METHOD_FOR_NO_A_LINES_IN_MICRODESC, MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD},
+ {MIN_METHOD_FOR_NO_A_LINES_IN_MICRODESC,
+ MIN_METHOD_FOR_CANONICAL_FAMILIES_IN_MICRODESCS - 1},
+ {MIN_METHOD_FOR_CANONICAL_FAMILIES_IN_MICRODESCS,
+ MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD},
{-1, -1}
};
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h b/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h
index a21e9f345..6afb6047f 100644
--- a/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
#define MIN_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD 25
/** The highest consensus method that we currently support. */
-#define MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD 28
+#define MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD 29
/** Lowest consensus method where authorities vote on required/recommended
* protocols. */
@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@
* addresses. See #23828 and #20916. */
#define MIN_METHOD_FOR_NO_A_LINES_IN_MICRODESC 28
+/**
+ * Lowest consensus method where microdescriptor lines are put in canonical
+ * form for improved compressibility and ease of storage. See proposal 298.
+ **/
+#define MIN_METHOD_FOR_CANONICAL_FAMILIES_IN_MICRODESCS 29
+
/** Default bandwidth to clip unmeasured bandwidths to using method >=
* MIN_METHOD_TO_CLIP_UNMEASURED_BW. (This is not a consensus method; do not
* get confused with the above macros.) */
diff --git a/src/test/test_microdesc.c b/src/test/test_microdesc.c
index debb11155..fd79aee6b 100644
--- a/src/test/test_microdesc.c
+++ b/src/test/test_microdesc.c
@@ -421,6 +421,28 @@ static const char test_md2_21[] =
"ntor-onion-key hbxdRnfVUJJY7+KcT4E3Rs7/zuClbN3hJrjSBiEGMgI=\n"
"id ed25519 wqfLzgfCtRfYNg88LsL1QpzxS0itapJ1aj6TbnByx/Q\n";
+static const char test_md2_withfamily_28[] =
+ "onion-key\n"
+ "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+ "MIGJAoGBAL2R8EfubUcahxha4u02P4VAR0llQIMwFAmrHPjzcK7apcQgDOf2ovOA\n"
+ "+YQnJFxlpBmCoCZC6ssCi+9G0mqo650lFuTMP5I90BdtjotfzESfTykHLiChyvhd\n"
+ "l0dlqclb2SU/GKem/fLRXH16aNi72CdSUu/1slKs/70ILi34QixRAgMBAAE=\n"
+ "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+ "ntor-onion-key hbxdRnfVUJJY7+KcT4E3Rs7/zuClbN3hJrjSBiEGMgI=\n"
+ "family OtherNode !Strange\n"
+ "id ed25519 wqfLzgfCtRfYNg88LsL1QpzxS0itapJ1aj6TbnByx/Q\n";
+
+static const char test_md2_withfamily_29[] =
+ "onion-key\n"
+ "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+ "MIGJAoGBAL2R8EfubUcahxha4u02P4VAR0llQIMwFAmrHPjzcK7apcQgDOf2ovOA\n"
+ "+YQnJFxlpBmCoCZC6ssCi+9G0mqo650lFuTMP5I90BdtjotfzESfTykHLiChyvhd\n"
+ "l0dlqclb2SU/GKem/fLRXH16aNi72CdSUu/1slKs/70ILi34QixRAgMBAAE=\n"
+ "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+ "ntor-onion-key hbxdRnfVUJJY7+KcT4E3Rs7/zuClbN3hJrjSBiEGMgI=\n"
+ "family !Strange $B7E27F104213C36F13E7E9829182845E495997A0 othernode\n"
+ "id ed25519 wqfLzgfCtRfYNg88LsL1QpzxS0itapJ1aj6TbnByx/Q\n";
+
static void
test_md_generate(void *arg)
{
@@ -451,6 +473,17 @@ test_md_generate(void *arg)
tt_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(md->ed25519_identity_pkey,
&ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key));
+ // Try family encoding.
+ microdesc_free(md);
+ ri->declared_family = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_add_strdup(ri->declared_family, "OtherNode !Strange");
+ md = dirvote_create_microdescriptor(ri, 28);
+ tt_str_op(md->body, OP_EQ, test_md2_withfamily_28);
+
+ microdesc_free(md);
+ md = dirvote_create_microdescriptor(ri, 29);
+ tt_str_op(md->body, OP_EQ, test_md2_withfamily_29);
+
done:
microdesc_free(md);
routerinfo_free(ri);
1
0