December 2016 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Merge branch 'ticket20826_v2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 988b0afbd6bbb97e3ca796a608a4087888f162aa Merge: 4ec9751 e044b4f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Dec 16 11:29:02 2016 -0500 Merge branch 'ticket20826_v2' src/or/entrynodes.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Support restrictive ENTRYNODES configurations correctly.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit e044b4f8ce8ba009ed11b662f46d254b52a2791c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Dec 8 12:19:40 2016 -0500 Support restrictive ENTRYNODES configurations correctly. Since we already had a separate function for getting the universe of possible guards, all we had to do was tweak it to handle very the GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED case. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index ac5398f..ad4f99c 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -965,7 +965,8 @@ get_max_sample_size(guard_selection_t *gs, * that were already sampled. */ static smartlist_t * -get_eligible_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, +get_eligible_guards(const or_options_t *options, + guard_selection_t *gs, int *n_guards_out) { /* Construct eligible_guards as GUARDS - SAMPLED_GUARDS */ @@ -995,6 +996,14 @@ get_eligible_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodes, const node_t *, node) { if (! node_is_possible_guard(node)) continue; + if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED) { + /* In restricted mode, we apply the filter BEFORE sampling, so + * that we are sampling from the nodes that we might actually + * select. If we sampled first, we might wind up with a sample + * that didn't include any EntryNodes at all. */ + if (! node_passes_guard_filter(options, node)) + continue; + } ++n_guards; if (digestset_contains(sampled_guard_ids, node->identity)) continue; @@ -1046,11 +1055,12 @@ STATIC entry_guard_t * entry_guards_expand_sample(guard_selection_t *gs) { tor_assert(gs); + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); int n_sampled = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards); entry_guard_t *added_guard = NULL; int n_usable_filtered_guards = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL); int n_guards = 0; - smartlist_t *eligible_guards = get_eligible_guards(gs, &n_guards); + smartlist_t *eligible_guards = get_eligible_guards(options, gs, &n_guards); const int max_sample = get_max_sample_size(gs, n_guards); const int min_filtered_sample = get_min_filtered_sample_size();

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[tor/master] Note a couple of XXX-prop271s as spec deviations.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 1e9cd5d2bbbf54818da6b6585bb60298712e6f06 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Nov 29 14:32:32 2016 -0500 Note a couple of XXX-prop271s as spec deviations. --- src/or/control.c | 2 +- src/or/entrynodes.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 9cc99b6..03742e8 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -2597,7 +2597,7 @@ getinfo_helper_events(control_connection_t *control_conn, if (circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) state = "BUILT"; else if (circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_GUARD_WAIT) - state = "GUARD_WAIT"; // XXXX prop271 must specify this. + state = "GUARD_WAIT"; // XXXX prop271 spec deviation-- specify this. else if (circ->cpath) state = "EXTENDED"; else diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index bb8cd4c..c624c64 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ get_max_sample_threshold(void) /** * We always try to make our sample contain at least this many guards. * - * XXXX prop271 There was a MIN_SAMPLE_THRESHOLD in the proposal, but I - * removed it in favor of MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE. -NM + * XXXX prop271 spec deviation There was a MIN_SAMPLE_THRESHOLD in the + * proposal, but I removed it in favor of MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE. -NM */ STATIC int get_min_filtered_sample_size(void)

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[tor/master] Implement support for per-circuit guard restrictions.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 87f9b42179bd23418c3e698938bdeead56da1c43 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 30 08:49:39 2016 -0500 Implement support for per-circuit guard restrictions. This is an important thing I hadn't considered when writing prop271: sometimes you have to restrict what guard you use for a particular circuit. Most frequently, that would be because you plan to use a certain node as your exit, and so you can't choose that for your guard. This change means that the upgrade-waiting-circuits algorithm needs a slight tweak too: circuit A cannot block circuit B from upgrading if circuit B needs to follow a restriction that circuit A does not follow. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 15 +++++- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 1 + src/or/entrynodes.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/or/entrynodes.h | 38 +++++++++++++- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++----------------- 5 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index c7e116e..0790309 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2515,8 +2515,8 @@ extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info) return newinfo; } -/** Return the routerinfo_t for the chosen exit router in state. - * If there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for +/** Return the node_t for the chosen exit router in state. + * If there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the node_t for * the chosen exit, return NULL. */ const node_t * @@ -2527,6 +2527,17 @@ build_state_get_exit_node(cpath_build_state_t *state) return node_get_by_id(state->chosen_exit->identity_digest); } +/** Return the RSA ID digest for the chosen exit router in state. + * If there is no chosen exit, return NULL. + */ +const uint8_t * +build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(cpath_build_state_t *state) +{ + if (!state || !state->chosen_exit) + return NULL; + return (const uint8_t *) state->chosen_exit->identity_digest; +} + /** Return the nickname for the chosen exit router in state. If * there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for the * chosen exit, return NULL. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h index 2c83a16..b85dbec 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ int extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei); int circuit_can_use_tap(const origin_circuit_t *circ); int circuit_has_usable_onion_key(const origin_circuit_t *circ); int extend_info_has_preferred_onion_key(const extend_info_t* ei); +const uint8_t *build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(cpath_build_state_t *state); const node_t *build_state_get_exit_node(cpath_build_state_t *state); const char *build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index dd3a890..9b38641 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -168,6 +168,8 @@ static entry_guard_t *entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(guard_selection_t *gs, const tor_addr_port_t *bridge_addrport); static entry_guard_t *get_sampled_guard_by_bridge_addr(guard_selection_t *gs, const tor_addr_port_t *addrport); +static int entry_guard_obeys_restriction(const entry_guard_t *guard, + const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst); /** Return 0 if we should apply guardfraction information found in the * consensus. A specific consensus can be specified with the @@ -878,13 +880,20 @@ entry_guard_learned_bridge_identity(const tor_addr_port_t *addrport, /** * Return the number of sampled guards in gs that are "filtered" * (that is, we're willing to connect to them) and that are "usable" - * (that is, either "reachable" or "maybe reachable"). */ + * (that is, either "reachable" or "maybe reachable"). + * + * If a restriction is provided in rst, do not count any guards that + * violate it. + */ STATIC int -num_reachable_filtered_guards(guard_selection_t *gs) +num_reachable_filtered_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, + const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst) { int n_reachable_filtered_guards = 0; SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { entry_guard_consider_retry(guard); + if (! entry_guard_obeys_restriction(guard, rst)) + continue; if (guard->is_usable_filtered_guard) ++n_reachable_filtered_guards; } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard); @@ -1003,7 +1012,7 @@ entry_guards_expand_sample(guard_selection_t *gs) tor_assert(gs); int n_sampled = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards); entry_guard_t *added_guard = NULL; - int n_usable_filtered_guards = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs); + int n_usable_filtered_guards = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL); int n_guards = 0; smartlist_t *eligible_guards = get_eligible_guards(gs, &n_guards); @@ -1324,6 +1333,22 @@ entry_guard_passes_filter(const or_options_t *options, guard_selection_t *gs, } /** + * Return true iff guard obeys the restrictions defined in rst. + * (If rst is NULL, there are no restrictions.) + */ +static int +entry_guard_obeys_restriction(const entry_guard_t *guard, + const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst) +{ + tor_assert(guard); + if (! rst) + return 1; // No restriction? No problem. + + // Only one kind of restriction exists right now + return tor_memneq(guard->identity, rst->exclude_id, DIGEST_LEN); +} + +/** * Update the is_filtered_guard and is_usable_filtered_guard * flags on guard. */ void @@ -1373,9 +1398,13 @@ entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(guard_selection_t *gs) * * Make sure that the sample is big enough, and that all the filter flags * are set correctly, before calling this function. + * + * If a restriction is provided in rst, do not return any guards that + * violate it. **/ STATIC entry_guard_t * sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, + const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst, unsigned flags) { tor_assert(gs); @@ -1389,7 +1418,7 @@ sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, entry_guard_consider_retry(guard); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard); - const int n_reachable_filtered = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs); + const int n_reachable_filtered = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, rst); log_info(LD_GUARD, "Trying to sample a reachable guard: We know of %d " "in the USABLE_FILTERED set.", n_reachable_filtered); @@ -1407,6 +1436,8 @@ sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, smartlist_t *reachable_filtered_sample = smartlist_new(); SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { entry_guard_consider_retry(guard);// redundant, but cheap. + if (! entry_guard_obeys_restriction(guard, rst)) + continue; if (! guard->is_usable_filtered_guard) continue; if (exclude_confirmed && guard->confirmed_idx >= 0) @@ -1568,7 +1599,7 @@ entry_guards_update_primary(guard_selection_t *gs) /* Finally, fill out the list with sampled guards. */ while (smartlist_len(new_primary_guards) < N_PRIMARY_GUARDS) { - entry_guard_t *guard = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, + entry_guard_t *guard = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, NULL, SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_CONFIRMED| SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PRIMARY| SAMPLE_NO_UPDATE_PRIMARY); @@ -1708,7 +1739,9 @@ entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(guard_selection_t *gs) * of the circuit. */ STATIC entry_guard_t * -select_entry_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, unsigned *state_out) +select_entry_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, + const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst, + unsigned *state_out) { /*XXXX prop271 consider splitting this function up. */ tor_assert(gs); @@ -1721,6 +1754,8 @@ select_entry_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, unsigned *state_out) <maybe> or <yes>, return the first such guard." */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { entry_guard_consider_retry(guard); + if (! entry_guard_obeys_restriction(guard, rst)) + continue; if (guard->is_reachable != GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) { *state_out = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION; guard->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time(); @@ -1737,6 +1772,8 @@ select_entry_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, unsigned *state_out) SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { if (guard->is_primary) continue; /* we already considered this one. */ + if (! entry_guard_obeys_restriction(guard, rst)) + continue; entry_guard_consider_retry(guard); if (guard->is_usable_filtered_guard && ! guard->is_pending) { guard->is_pending = 1; @@ -1755,6 +1792,7 @@ select_entry_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, unsigned *state_out) { entry_guard_t *guard; guard = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, + rst, SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_CONFIRMED | SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PRIMARY | SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PENDING); @@ -1925,6 +1963,13 @@ entry_guard_has_higher_priority(entry_guard_t *a, entry_guard_t *b) } } +/** Release all storage held in restriction */ +static void +entry_guard_restriction_free(entry_guard_restriction_t *rst) +{ + tor_free(rst); +} + /** * Release all storage held in state. */ @@ -1933,6 +1978,7 @@ circuit_guard_state_free(circuit_guard_state_t *state) { if (!state) return; + entry_guard_restriction_free(state->restrictions); entry_guard_handle_free(state->guard); tor_free(state); } @@ -1942,9 +1988,14 @@ circuit_guard_state_free(circuit_guard_state_t *state) * in *chosen_node_out. Set *guard_state_out to an opaque * state object that will record whether the circuit is ready to be used * or not. Return 0 on success; on failure, return -1. + * + * If a restriction is provided in rst, do not return any guards that + * violate it, and remember that restriction in guard_state_out for + * later use. (Takes ownership of the rst object.) */ int entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, + entry_guard_restriction_t *rst, const node_t **chosen_node_out, circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out) { @@ -1955,23 +2006,27 @@ entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, *guard_state_out = NULL; unsigned state = 0; - entry_guard_t *guard = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &state); + entry_guard_t *guard = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, rst, &state); if (! guard) - return -1; + goto fail; if (BUG(state == 0)) - return -1; + goto fail; const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(guard->identity); // XXXX prop271 check Ed ID. if (! node) - return -1; + goto fail; *chosen_node_out = node; *guard_state_out = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circuit_guard_state_t)); (*guard_state_out)->guard = entry_guard_handle_new(guard); (*guard_state_out)->state = state; (*guard_state_out)->state_set_at = approx_time(); + (*guard_state_out)->restrictions = rst; return 0; + fail: + entry_guard_restriction_free(rst); + return -1; } /** @@ -2098,9 +2153,14 @@ entry_guards_all_primary_guards_are_down(guard_selection_t *gs) } /** Wrapper for entry_guard_has_higher_priority that compares the - * guard-priorities of a pair of circuits. */ + * guard-priorities of a pair of circuits. + * + * If a restriction is provided in rst, then do not consider + * a to have higher priority if it violates the restriction. + */ static int circ_state_has_higher_priority(origin_circuit_t *a, + const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst, origin_circuit_t *b) { circuit_guard_state_t *state_a = origin_circuit_get_guard_state(a); @@ -2118,6 +2178,9 @@ circ_state_has_higher_priority(origin_circuit_t *a, } else if (! guard_b) { /* Known guard -- higher priority than any unknown guard. */ return 1; + } else if (! entry_guard_obeys_restriction(guard_a, rst)) { + /* Restriction violated; guard_a cannot have higher priority. */ + return 0; } else { /* Both known -- compare.*/ return entry_guard_has_higher_priority(guard_a, guard_b); @@ -2175,13 +2238,13 @@ entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(guard_selection_t *gs, if (state->state == GUARD_CIRC_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BETTER_GUARD) { ++n_waiting; if (! best_waiting_circuit || - circ_state_has_higher_priority(circ, best_waiting_circuit)) { + circ_state_has_higher_priority(circ, NULL, best_waiting_circuit)) { best_waiting_circuit = circ; } } else if (state->state == GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE) { ++n_complete; if (! best_complete_circuit || - circ_state_has_higher_priority(circ, best_complete_circuit)) { + circ_state_has_higher_priority(circ, NULL, best_complete_circuit)) { best_complete_circuit = circ; } } @@ -2193,8 +2256,15 @@ entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(guard_selection_t *gs, goto no_change; } + /* We'll need to keep track of what restrictions were used when picking this + * circuit, so that we don't allow any circuit without those restrictions to + * block it. */ + const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst_on_best_waiting = + origin_circuit_get_guard_state(best_waiting_circuit)->restrictions; + if (best_complete_circuit) { if (circ_state_has_higher_priority(best_complete_circuit, + rst_on_best_waiting, best_waiting_circuit)) { /* "If any circuit is <complete>, then do not use any <waiting_for_better_guard> or <usable_if_no_better_guard> circuits @@ -2225,8 +2295,10 @@ entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(guard_selection_t *gs, continue; if (state->state != GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD) continue; - if (state->state_set_at > state_set_at_cutoff && - circ_state_has_higher_priority(circ, best_waiting_circuit)) + if (state->state_set_at <= state_set_at_cutoff) + continue; + if (circ_state_has_higher_priority(circ, rst_on_best_waiting, + best_waiting_circuit)) ++n_blockers_found; } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ); @@ -2246,9 +2318,14 @@ entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(guard_selection_t *gs, circuit_guard_state_t *state = origin_circuit_get_guard_state(circ); if (BUG(state == NULL)) continue; + if (circ != best_waiting_circuit && rst_on_best_waiting) { + /* Can't upgrade other circ with same priority as best; might + be blocked. */ + continue; + } if (state->state != GUARD_CIRC_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BETTER_GUARD) continue; - if (circ_state_has_higher_priority(best_waiting_circuit, circ)) + if (circ_state_has_higher_priority(best_waiting_circuit, NULL, circ)) continue; state->state = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE; @@ -4759,10 +4836,18 @@ guards_choose_guard(cpath_build_state_t *state, if (get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) { return choose_random_entry(state); } else { - // XXXX prop271 we need to look at the chosen exit node if any, and - // not duplicate it. const node_t *r = NULL; + const uint8_t *exit_id = NULL; + entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL; + // XXXX prop271 spec deviation -- use of restriction here. + if (state && (exit_id = build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(state))) { + /* We're building to a targeted exit node, so that node can't be + * chosen as our guard for this circuit. */ + rst = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t)); + memcpy(rst->exclude_id, exit_id, DIGEST_LEN); + } if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(), + rst, &r, guard_state_out) < 0) { tor_assert(r == NULL); @@ -4788,6 +4873,7 @@ guards_choose_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t info, * microdescriptors. -NM */ const node_t *r = NULL; if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(), + NULL, &r, guard_state_out) < 0) { tor_assert(r == NULL); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index 4ea60e8..753d6f7 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ typedef struct entry_guard_t entry_guard_t; private. */ typedef struct circuit_guard_state_t circuit_guard_state_t; +/* Forward declaration for entry_guard_restriction_t; the real declaration is + private. */ +typedef struct entry_guard_restriction_t entry_guard_restriction_t; + /* Information about a guard's pathbias status. * These fields are used in circpathbias.c to try to detect entry * nodes that are failing circuits at a suspicious frequency. @@ -311,6 +315,24 @@ struct guard_selection_s { struct entry_guard_handle_t; /** + * A restriction to remember which entry guards are off-limits for a given + * circuit. + * + * Right now, we only use restrictions to block a single guard from being + * selected; this mechanism is designed to be more extensible in the future, + * however. + * + * Note: This mechanism is NOT for recording which guards are never to be + * used: only which guards cannot be used on one particular circuit. + */ +struct entry_guard_restriction_t { + /** + * The guard's RSA identity digest must not equal this. + */ + uint8_t exclude_id[DIGEST_LEN]; +}; + +/** * Per-circuit state to track whether we'll be able to use the circuit. */ struct circuit_guard_state_t { @@ -320,6 +342,14 @@ struct circuit_guard_state_t { time_t state_set_at; /** One of GUARD_CIRC_STATE_* */ uint8_t state; + + /** + * A set of restrictions that were placed on this guard when we selected it + * for this particular circuit. We need to remember the restrictions here, + * since any guard that breaks these restrictions will not block this + * circuit from becoming COMPLETE. + */ + entry_guard_restriction_t *restrictions; }; #endif @@ -356,6 +386,7 @@ guard_pathbias_t *entry_guard_get_pathbias_state(entry_guard_t *guard); void circuit_guard_state_free(circuit_guard_state_t *state); int entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, + entry_guard_restriction_t *rst, const node_t **chosen_node_out, circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out); typedef enum { @@ -491,12 +522,14 @@ STATIC int entry_guards_all_primary_guards_are_down(guard_selection_t *gs); /**@}*/ STATIC entry_guard_t *sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards( guard_selection_t *gs, + const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst, unsigned flags); STATIC void entry_guard_consider_retry(entry_guard_t *guard); STATIC void make_guard_confirmed(guard_selection_t *gs, entry_guard_t *guard); STATIC void entry_guards_update_confirmed(guard_selection_t *gs); STATIC void entry_guards_update_primary(guard_selection_t *gs); -STATIC int num_reachable_filtered_guards(guard_selection_t *gs); +STATIC int num_reachable_filtered_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, + const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst); STATIC void sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(guard_selection_t *gs); /** * @name Possible guard-states for a circuit. @@ -522,7 +555,8 @@ STATIC void sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(guard_selection_t *gs); STATIC void entry_guards_note_guard_failure(guard_selection_t *gs, entry_guard_t *guard); STATIC entry_guard_t *select_entry_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, - unsigned *state_out); + const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst, + unsigned *state_out); STATIC void mark_primary_guards_maybe_reachable(guard_selection_t *gs); STATIC unsigned entry_guards_note_guard_success(guard_selection_t *gs, entry_guard_t *guard, diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index e3a9d18..0921e20 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -1353,7 +1353,7 @@ test_entry_guard_node_filter(void *arg) tt_assert(g[i]->is_filtered_guard == 1); tt_assert(g[i]->is_usable_filtered_guard == 1); } - tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs), OP_EQ, NUM); + tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, NUM); /* Make sure refiltering doesn't hurt */ entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(gs); @@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ test_entry_guard_node_filter(void *arg) tt_assert(g[i]->is_filtered_guard == 1); tt_assert(g[i]->is_usable_filtered_guard == 1); } - tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs), OP_EQ, NUM); + tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, NUM); /* Now start doing things to make the guards get filtered out, 1 by 1. */ @@ -1401,7 +1401,7 @@ test_entry_guard_node_filter(void *arg) tt_assert(g[i]->is_filtered_guard == (i == 5 || i == 6)); tt_assert(g[i]->is_usable_filtered_guard == (i == 6)); } - tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs), OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, 1); /* Now make sure we have no live consensus, and no nodes. Nothing should * pass the filter any more. */ @@ -1415,7 +1415,7 @@ test_entry_guard_node_filter(void *arg) tt_assert(g[i]->is_filtered_guard == 0); tt_assert(g[i]->is_usable_filtered_guard == 0); } - tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, 0); done: guard_selection_free(gs); @@ -1434,11 +1434,11 @@ test_entry_guard_expand_sample(void *arg) // Every sampled guard here should be filtered and reachable for now. tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, - num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs)); + num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL)); /* Make sure we got the right number. */ tt_int_op(DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE, OP_EQ, - num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs)); + num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL)); // Make sure everything we got was from our fake node list, and everything // was unique. @@ -1457,7 +1457,7 @@ test_entry_guard_expand_sample(void *arg) guard = entry_guards_expand_sample(gs); tt_assert(! guard); // no guard was added. tt_int_op(DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE, OP_EQ, - num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs)); + num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL)); // Make a few guards unreachable. guard = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 0); @@ -1467,21 +1467,21 @@ test_entry_guard_expand_sample(void *arg) guard = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 2); guard->is_usable_filtered_guard = 0; tt_int_op(DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE - 3, OP_EQ, - num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs)); + num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL)); // This time, expanding the sample will add some more guards. guard = entry_guards_expand_sample(gs); tt_assert(guard); // no guard was added. tt_int_op(DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE, OP_EQ, - num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs)); + num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL)); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, - num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs)+3); + num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL)+3); // Still idempotent. guard = entry_guards_expand_sample(gs); tt_assert(! guard); // no guard was added. tt_int_op(DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE, OP_EQ, - num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs)); + num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL)); // Now, do a nasty trick: tell the filter to exclude 31/32 of the guards. // This will cause the sample size to get reeeeally huge, while the @@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ test_entry_guard_expand_sample(void *arg) entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(gs); // Surely (p ~ 1-2**-60), one of our guards has been excluded. - tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs), OP_LT, + tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_LT, DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE); // Try to regenerate the guards. @@ -1505,7 +1505,7 @@ test_entry_guard_expand_sample(void *arg) tt_assert(guard); // no guard was added. /* this time, it's possible that we didn't add enough sampled guards. */ - tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs), OP_LE, + tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_LE, DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE); /* but we definitely didn't exceed the sample maximum. */ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_LE, @@ -1538,7 +1538,7 @@ test_entry_guard_expand_sample_small_net(void *arg) tt_assert(guard); // the last guard returned -- some guard was added. tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_GT, 0); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_LT, 10); - tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, 0); done: guard_selection_free(gs); } @@ -1562,7 +1562,7 @@ test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_status(void *arg) /* First, sample some guards. */ entry_guards_expand_sample(gs); int n_sampled_pre = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards); - int n_filtered_pre = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs); + int n_filtered_pre = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL); tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre); tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_GT, 10); @@ -1584,7 +1584,7 @@ test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_status(void *arg) dummy_consensus = NULL; sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(gs); tt_i64_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_sampled_pre); - tt_i64_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs), OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre); + tt_i64_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre); /* put the networkstatus back. */ dummy_consensus = ns_tmp; ns_tmp = NULL; @@ -1596,7 +1596,7 @@ test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_status(void *arg) sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(gs); tt_i64_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_sampled_pre); - tt_i64_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs), OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre - 5); + tt_i64_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre-5); for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) { entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i); tt_assert(! g->currently_listed); @@ -1666,7 +1666,7 @@ test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_repair(void *arg) /* First, sample some guards. */ entry_guards_expand_sample(gs); int n_sampled_pre = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards); - int n_filtered_pre = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs); + int n_filtered_pre = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL); tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre); tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_GT, 10); @@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_repair(void *arg) teardown_capture_of_logs(); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_sampled_pre); - tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs), OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre - 3); + tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre-3); for (i = 3; i < n_sampled_pre; ++i) { /* these will become listed. */ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i); @@ -1731,7 +1731,7 @@ test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_remove(void *arg) /* First, sample some guards. */ entry_guards_expand_sample(gs); int n_sampled_pre = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards); - int n_filtered_pre = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs); + int n_filtered_pre = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL); tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre); tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_GT, 10); @@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@ test_entry_guard_sample_reachable_filtered(void *arg) entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(gs); gs->primary_guards_up_to_date = 1; - tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs), OP_EQ, n_guards - 1); + tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, n_guards - 1); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_guards); // +1 since the one we made disabled will make another one get added. @@ -1934,7 +1934,7 @@ test_entry_guard_sample_reachable_filtered(void *arg) const int excluded_flags = tests[j].flag; const int excluded_idx = tests[j].idx; for (i = 0; i < N; ++i) { - g = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, excluded_flags); + g = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, NULL, excluded_flags); tor_assert(g); int pos = smartlist_pos(gs->sampled_entry_guards, g); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_guards); @@ -1965,7 +1965,7 @@ test_entry_guard_sample_reachable_filtered_empty(void *arg) SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, n, n->is_possible_guard = 0); - entry_guard_t *g = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, 0); + entry_guard_t *g = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, NULL, 0); tt_ptr_op(g, OP_EQ, NULL); done: @@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) entry_guards_update_primary(gs); unsigned state = 9999; - entry_guard_t *g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &state); + entry_guard_t *g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); tt_assert(g); tt_assert(g->is_primary); @@ -2172,7 +2172,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) tt_i64_op(g->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, approx_time()); // If we do that again, we should get the same guard. - entry_guard_t *g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &state); + entry_guard_t *g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_EQ, g); // if we mark that guard down, we should get a different primary guard. @@ -2181,7 +2181,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) g->unreachable_since = approx_time() - 10; g->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time() - 10; state = 9999; - g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &state); + g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, g); tt_assert(g2); tt_assert(g2->is_primary); @@ -2195,7 +2195,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) g->unreachable_since = approx_time() - 72*60*60; g->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time() - 72*60*60; state = 9999; - g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &state); + g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_EQ, g); tt_assert(g2); tt_uint_op(state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION); @@ -2210,7 +2210,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) guard->unreachable_since = approx_time() - 30; }); state = 9999; - g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &state); + g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); tt_assert(g2); tt_assert(!g2->is_primary); tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1); @@ -2254,7 +2254,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_confirmed(void *arg) unsigned state = 9999; // As above, this gives us a primary guard. - entry_guard_t *g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &state); + entry_guard_t *g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); tt_assert(g); tt_assert(g->is_primary); tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 0); @@ -2271,7 +2271,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_confirmed(void *arg) // ... we should get a confirmed guard. state = 9999; - g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &state); + g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); tt_assert(g); tt_assert(! g->is_primary); tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards)); @@ -2282,7 +2282,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_confirmed(void *arg) // And if we try again, we should get a different confirmed guard, since // that one is pending. state = 9999; - entry_guard_t *g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &state); + entry_guard_t *g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); tt_assert(g2); tt_assert(! g2->is_primary); tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, g); @@ -2297,12 +2297,12 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_confirmed(void *arg) const int n_remaining_confirmed = N_CONFIRMED - 2 - smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards); for (i = 0; i < n_remaining_confirmed; ++i) { - g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &state); + g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_GE, 0); tt_assert(g); } state = 9999; - g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &state); + g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); tt_assert(g); tt_assert(g->is_pending); tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1); @@ -2329,7 +2329,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary(void *arg) * Make sure that the pick-for-circuit API basically works. We'll get * a primary guard, so it'll be usable on completion. */ - int r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &guard); + int r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &guard); tt_assert(r == 0); tt_assert(node); @@ -2361,7 +2361,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary(void *arg) /* Try again. We'll also get a primary guard this time. (The same one, in fact.) But this time, we'll say the connection has failed. */ update_approx_time(start+35); - r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &guard); + r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &guard); tt_assert(r == 0); tt_assert(node); tt_assert(guard); @@ -2396,7 +2396,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary(void *arg) * (still primary) guard. */ update_approx_time(start+60); - r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &guard); + r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &guard); tt_assert(r == 0); tt_assert(node); tt_assert(guard); @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_confirm_other(void *arg) /* Primary guards are down! */ for (i = 0; i < N_PRIMARY; ++i) { - r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &guard); + r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &guard); tt_assert(node); tt_assert(guard); tt_assert(r == 0); @@ -2461,7 +2461,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_confirm_other(void *arg) /* Next guard should be non-primary. */ node = NULL; - r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &guard); + r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &guard); tt_assert(node); tt_assert(guard); tt_assert(r == 0); @@ -2513,7 +2513,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary_retry(void *arg) /* Make primary guards confirmed (so they won't be superseded by a later * guard), then mark them down. */ for (i = 0; i < N_PRIMARY; ++i) { - r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &guard); + r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &guard); tt_assert(node); tt_assert(guard); tt_assert(r == 0); @@ -2529,7 +2529,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary_retry(void *arg) } /* Get another guard that we might try. */ - r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &guard); + r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &guard); tt_assert(node); tt_assert(guard); tt_assert(r == 0); @@ -2556,7 +2556,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary_retry(void *arg) }); /* Have a circuit to a primary guard succeed. */ - r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &guard2); + r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &guard2); tt_assert(r == 0); tt_int_op(guard2->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION); u = entry_guard_succeeded(&guard2); @@ -2585,7 +2585,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_and_cancel(void *arg) /* Once more, we mark all the primary guards down. */ entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(gs); for (i = 0; i < N_PRIMARY; ++i) { - r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &guard); + r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &guard); tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION); g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard); tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 1); @@ -2600,7 +2600,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_and_cancel(void *arg) tt_assert(entry_guards_all_primary_guards_are_down(gs)); /* Now get another guard we could try... */ - r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &guard); + r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &guard); tt_assert(node); tt_assert(guard); tt_assert(r == 0); @@ -2659,7 +2659,7 @@ upgrade_circuits_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) data->start = approx_time(); entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(gs); for (i = 0; i < N_PRIMARY; ++i) { - entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &guard); + entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &guard); g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard); make_guard_confirmed(gs, g); entry_guard_failed(&guard); @@ -2670,7 +2670,7 @@ upgrade_circuits_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) data->all_origin_circuits = smartlist_new(); update_approx_time(data->start + 27); - entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &data->guard1_state); + entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &data->guard1_state); origin_circuit_t *circ; data->circ1 = circ = origin_circuit_new(); circ->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; @@ -2678,7 +2678,7 @@ upgrade_circuits_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) smartlist_add(data->all_origin_circuits, circ); update_approx_time(data->start + 30); - entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, &node, &data->guard2_state); + entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &node, &data->guard2_state); data->circ2 = circ = origin_circuit_new(); circ->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; circ->guard_state = data->guard2_state;

1 0

[tor/master] Fix a magic number in get_max_sample_size
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 9d065ecc3d9e1a34c35be2d3531696798f6ecd3e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Nov 29 14:47:39 2016 -0500 Fix a magic number in get_max_sample_size --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index c624c64..9630f17 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -898,14 +898,17 @@ get_max_sample_size(guard_selection_t *gs, int n_guards) { const int using_bridges = (gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE); + const int min_sample = get_min_filtered_sample_size(); /* XXXX prop271 spec deviation with bridges, max_sample is "all of them" */ if (using_bridges) return n_guards; - else if (n_guards < 20) // XXXX prop271 spec deviation - return n_guards; + + const int max_sample = (int)(n_guards * get_max_sample_threshold()); + if (max_sample < min_sample) // XXXX prop271 spec deviation + return min_sample; else - return (int)(n_guards * get_max_sample_threshold()); + return max_sample; } /**

1 0

[tor/master] guards_choose_dirguard(): replace one XXXX with another.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 17c3faa2e393c59e9ee4aeca6986b0905d17f3b5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 30 07:51:40 2016 -0500 guards_choose_dirguard(): replace one XXXX with another. I had been asking myself, "hey, doesn't the new code need to look at this "info" parameter? The old code did!" But it turns out that the old code hasn't, since 05f7336624d6a47b3. So instead of "support this!" the comment now says "we can remove this!" --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 9630f17..dd3a890 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -4779,7 +4779,13 @@ guards_choose_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t info, if (get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) { return choose_random_dirguard(info); } else { - // XXXX prop271 look at info? + /* XXXX prop271 We don't need to look at the dirinfo_type_t here, + * apparently. If you look at the old implementation, and you follow info + * downwards through choose_random_dirguard(), into + * choose_random_entry_impl(), into populate_live_entry_guards()... you + * find out that it isn't even used, and hasn't been since 0.2.7.1-alpha, + * when we realized that every Tor on the network would support + * microdescriptors. -NM */ const node_t *r = NULL; if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(), &r,

1 0

[tor/master] Remove some resolved "XXXX prop271" comments.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit f4e64c04f49a3cd8c9b2289bd28641db85441acc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Nov 29 14:31:24 2016 -0500 Remove some resolved "XXXX prop271" comments. --- src/or/circuituse.c | 3 ++- src/or/connection_or.c | 6 ++++-- src/or/entrynodes.c | 1 - src/or/entrynodes.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 698b158..787c490 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1652,9 +1652,10 @@ circuit_build_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ) "Our circuit died before the first hop with no connection"); } if (n_chan_id && !already_marked) { + /* New guard API: we failed. */ if (circ->guard_state) entry_guard_failed(&circ->guard_state); - /* XXXX prop271 -- old API */ + /* Old guard API: we failed. */ entry_guard_register_connect_status(n_chan_id, 0, 1, time(NULL)); /* if there are any one-hop streams waiting on this circuit, fail * them now so they can retry elsewhere. */ diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 14d5979..3b6f82c 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -735,8 +735,9 @@ connection_or_about_to_close(or_connection_t *or_conn) const or_options_t *options = get_options(); connection_or_note_state_when_broken(or_conn); rep_hist_note_connect_failed(or_conn->identity_digest, now); + /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */ entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan)); - /* XXXX prop271 -- old API */ + /* Tell the old guard API about the channel failure */ entry_guard_register_connect_status(or_conn->identity_digest,0, !options->HTTPSProxy, now); if (conn->state >= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) { @@ -1675,8 +1676,9 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but identity key was not " "as expected: wanted %s but got %s.%s", conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port, expected, seen, extra_log); + /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */ entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)); - /* XXXX prop271 old API */ + /* Tell the old guard API about the channel failure */ entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest, 0, 1, time(NULL)); control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 8380dbf..bb8cd4c 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -1928,7 +1928,6 @@ entry_guard_has_higher_priority(entry_guard_t *a, entry_guard_t *b) void circuit_guard_state_free(circuit_guard_state_t *state) { - /* XXXX prop271 -- do we want to inline this structure? */ if (!state) return; entry_guard_handle_free(state->guard); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index ceccd0f..4ea60e8 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -226,7 +226,6 @@ typedef enum guard_selection_type_t { /** * All of the the context for guard selection on a particular client. * - * (XXXX prop271 this paragraph below is not actually implemented yet.) * We maintain multiple guard selection contexts for a client, depending * aspects on its current configuration -- whether an extremely * restrictive EntryNodes is used, whether UseBridges is enabled, and so

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[tor/master] Extract guard_selection_infer_type into its own function.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 217590ad05943968683f02c3f556b987e99158b1 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 30 10:16:24 2016 -0500 Extract guard_selection_infer_type into its own function. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ src/or/entrynodes.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 02ed924..9441be4 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -194,14 +194,13 @@ should_apply_guardfraction(const networkstatus_t *ns) } /** - * Allocate and return a new guard_selection_t, with the name name. + * Try to determine the correct type for a selection named "name", + * if type is GS_TYPE_INFER. */ -STATIC guard_selection_t * -guard_selection_new(const char *name, - guard_selection_type_t type) +STATIC guard_selection_type_t +guard_selection_infer_type(guard_selection_type_t type, + const char *name) { - guard_selection_t *gs; - if (type == GS_TYPE_INFER) { if (!strcmp(name, "legacy")) type = GS_TYPE_LEGACY; @@ -212,6 +211,19 @@ guard_selection_new(const char *name, else type = GS_TYPE_NORMAL; } + return type; +} + +/** + * Allocate and return a new guard_selection_t, with the name name. + */ +STATIC guard_selection_t * +guard_selection_new(const char *name, + guard_selection_type_t type) +{ + guard_selection_t *gs; + + type = guard_selection_infer_type(type, name); gs = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*gs)); gs->name = tor_strdup(name); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index 753d6f7..b676172 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -490,6 +490,9 @@ STATIC double get_extreme_restriction_threshold(void); // ---------- XXXX these functions and definitions are post-prop271. HANDLE_DECL(entry_guard, entry_guard_t, STATIC) +STATIC guard_selection_type_t guard_selection_infer_type( + guard_selection_type_t type_in, + const char *name); STATIC guard_selection_t *guard_selection_new(const char *name, guard_selection_type_t type); STATIC guard_selection_t *get_guard_selection_by_name(

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[tor/master] Another tweak for guard restrictions: don't let complete circs block
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 2c8c58ab2fe7d452d06abdb7328be7eae658bcc0 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 30 09:04:34 2016 -0500 Another tweak for guard restrictions: don't let complete circs block If a complete circuit C2 doesn't obey the restrictions of C1, then C2 cannot block C1. The patch here is a little big-ish, since we can no longer look through all the complete circuits and all the waiting circuits on a single pass: we have to find the best waiting circuit first. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 9b38641..02ed924 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -2214,8 +2214,8 @@ entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(guard_selection_t *gs, int n_waiting = 0; int n_complete = 0; + int n_complete_blocking = 0; origin_circuit_t *best_waiting_circuit = NULL; - origin_circuit_t *best_complete_circuit = NULL; smartlist_t *all_circuits = smartlist_new(); SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_circuits_in, origin_circuit_t *, circ) { // We filter out circuits that aren't ours, or which we can't @@ -2241,12 +2241,6 @@ entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(guard_selection_t *gs, circ_state_has_higher_priority(circ, NULL, best_waiting_circuit)) { best_waiting_circuit = circ; } - } else if (state->state == GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE) { - ++n_complete; - if (! best_complete_circuit || - circ_state_has_higher_priority(circ, NULL, best_complete_circuit)) { - best_complete_circuit = circ; - } } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ); @@ -2262,19 +2256,28 @@ entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(guard_selection_t *gs, const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst_on_best_waiting = origin_circuit_get_guard_state(best_waiting_circuit)->restrictions; - if (best_complete_circuit) { - if (circ_state_has_higher_priority(best_complete_circuit, - rst_on_best_waiting, - best_waiting_circuit)) { - /* "If any circuit is <complete>, then do not use any - <waiting_for_better_guard> or <usable_if_no_better_guard> circuits - circuits whose guards have lower priority." */ - log_debug(LD_GUARD, "Considered upgrading guard-stalled circuits: found " - "%d complete and %d guard-stalled. At least one complete " - "circuit had higher priority, so not upgrading.", - n_complete, n_waiting); - goto no_change; - } + /* First look at the complete circuits: Do any block this circuit? */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_circuits, origin_circuit_t *, circ) { + circuit_guard_state_t *state = origin_circuit_get_guard_state(circ); + if BUG((state == NULL)) + continue; + if (state->state != GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE) + continue; + ++n_complete; + if (circ_state_has_higher_priority(circ, rst_on_best_waiting, + best_waiting_circuit)) + ++n_complete_blocking; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ); + + if (n_complete_blocking) { + /* "If any circuit is <complete>, then do not use any + <waiting_for_better_guard> or <usable_if_no_better_guard> circuits + circuits whose guards have lower priority." */ + log_debug(LD_GUARD, "Considered upgrading guard-stalled circuits: found " + "%d complete and %d guard-stalled. At least one complete " + "circuit had higher priority, so not upgrading.", + n_complete, n_waiting); + goto no_change; } /* "If any circuit is <waiting_for_better_guard>, and every currently

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[tor/master] Repair unit test for tiny-network case.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 13315812e857f37828475101cc8d5acb63403c0e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 30 09:19:10 2016 -0500 Repair unit test for tiny-network case. The test assumed that the old rules about handling small max_sample were in effect, and didn't actually handle that case very well anyway. --- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index 0921e20..5fff1d6 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -1524,7 +1524,7 @@ test_entry_guard_expand_sample_small_net(void *arg) /* Fun corner case: not enough guards to make up our whole sample size. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, n, { - if (n_sl_idx >= 40) { + if (n_sl_idx >= 15) { tor_free(n->rs); tor_free(n->md); tor_free(n); @@ -1536,8 +1536,9 @@ test_entry_guard_expand_sample_small_net(void *arg) entry_guard_t *guard = entry_guards_expand_sample(gs); tt_assert(guard); // the last guard returned -- some guard was added. - tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_GT, 0); - tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_LT, 10); + // half the nodes are guards, so we have 8 guards left. The set + // is small, so we sampled everything. + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 8); tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, 0); done: guard_selection_free(gs);

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