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[tor/master] Add a test for entry_guard_state_should_expire()
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 171981f8a0eebf3f00feabe36dc66e031d51c5bd Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 30 11:28:18 2016 -0500 Add a test for entry_guard_state_should_expire() --- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index 5fff1d6..5360b0e 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -2926,6 +2926,37 @@ test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_pending(void *arg) smartlist_free(result); } +static void +test_enty_guard_should_expire_waiting(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + circuit_guard_state_t *fake_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*fake_state)); + /* We'll leave "guard" unset -- it won't matter here. */ + + /* No state? Can't expire. */ + tt_assert(! entry_guard_state_should_expire(NULL)); + + /* Let's try one that expires. */ + fake_state->state = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BETTER_GUARD; + fake_state->state_set_at = + approx_time() - DFLT_NONPRIMARY_GUARD_IDLE_TIMEOUT - 1; + + tt_assert(entry_guard_state_should_expire(fake_state)); + + /* But it wouldn't expire if we changed the state. */ + fake_state->state = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD; + tt_assert(! entry_guard_state_should_expire(fake_state)); + + /* And it wouldn't have expired a few seconds ago. */ + fake_state->state = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BETTER_GUARD; + fake_state->state_set_at = + approx_time() - DFLT_NONPRIMARY_GUARD_IDLE_TIMEOUT + 5; + tt_assert(! entry_guard_state_should_expire(fake_state)); + + done: + tor_free(fake_state); +} + static const struct testcase_setup_t fake_network = { fake_network_setup, fake_network_cleanup }; @@ -3017,6 +3048,8 @@ struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = { UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_complete, "c1-done c2-done"), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_blocked_by_better_circ_pending, "c2-done"), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_pending, "c1-done"), + { "should_expire_waiting", test_enty_guard_should_expire_waiting, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES };

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'prop271_030_v1_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 2cee38f76a46860e2fb29fbd95ba36b332aa38c6 Merge: b310929 20292ec Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Dec 16 11:20:59 2016 -0500 Merge branch 'prop271_030_v1_squashed' src/common/address.c | 8 + src/common/address.h | 2 + src/common/container.c | 18 + src/common/container.h | 1 + src/common/log.c | 2 +- src/common/torlog.h | 4 +- src/common/util.c | 32 +- src/common/util.h | 3 +- src/or/bridges.c | 866 +++++++++ src/or/bridges.h | 66 + src/or/channel.c | 3 + src/or/channeltls.c | 9 + src/or/circpathbias.c | 330 ++-- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 105 +- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 9 +- src/or/circuitlist.c | 121 +- src/or/circuitlist.h | 3 + src/or/circuituse.c | 40 +- src/or/circuituse.h | 1 + src/or/config.c | 57 + src/or/connection.c | 6 + src/or/connection_or.c | 11 + src/or/control.c | 11 +- src/or/directory.c | 101 +- src/or/directory.h | 6 +- src/or/entrynodes.c | 4347 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- src/or/entrynodes.h | 617 ++++++- src/or/include.am | 2 + src/or/main.c | 14 +- src/or/networkstatus.c | 20 + src/or/networkstatus.h | 5 + src/or/or.h | 32 +- src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +- src/or/rendservice.c | 2 +- src/or/routerlist.c | 11 +- src/or/routerparse.c | 3 +- src/or/routerset.c | 13 + src/or/routerset.h | 5 +- src/or/statefile.c | 2 + src/or/transports.c | 2 +- src/test/test_config.c | 1 + src/test/test_containers.c | 41 + src/test/test_controller.c | 1 + src/test/test_dir.c | 17 +- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 2599 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/test/test_routerlist.c | 10 + src/test/test_util.c | 17 + 47 files changed, 8206 insertions(+), 1372 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/bridges.c index 0000000,4058979..7d1acdf mode 000000,100644..100644 --- a/src/or/bridges.c +++ b/src/or/bridges.c @@@ -1,0 -1,847 +1,866 @@@ + /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + + /** + * \file bridges.c + * \brief Code to manage bridges and bridge selection. + * + * Bridges are fixed entry nodes, used for censorship circumvention. + **/ + + #include "or.h" + #include "bridges.h" + #include "circuitbuild.h" + #include "config.h" + #include "connection.h" + #include "directory.h" + #include "entrynodes.h" + #include "nodelist.h" + #include "policies.h" + #include "router.h" + #include "routerlist.h" + #include "routerset.h" + #include "transports.h" + + /** Information about a configured bridge. Currently this just matches the + * ones in the torrc file, but one day we may be able to learn about new + * bridges on our own, and remember them in the state file. */ + struct bridge_info_t { + /** Address and port of the bridge, as configured by the user.*/ + tor_addr_port_t addrport_configured; + /** Address of the bridge. */ + tor_addr_t addr; + /** TLS port for the bridge. */ + uint16_t port; + /** Boolean: We are re-parsing our bridge list, and we are going to remove + * this one if we don't find it in the list of configured bridges. */ + unsigned marked_for_removal : 1; + /** Expected identity digest, or all zero bytes if we don't know what the + * digest should be. */ + char identity[DIGEST_LEN]; + + /** Name of pluggable transport protocol taken from its config line. */ + char *transport_name; + + /** When should we next try to fetch a descriptor for this bridge? */ + download_status_t fetch_status; + + /** A smartlist of k=v values to be passed to the SOCKS proxy, if + transports are used for this bridge. */ + smartlist_t *socks_args; + }; + + static void bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge); + + /** A list of configured bridges. Whenever we actually get a descriptor + * for one, we add it as an entry guard. Note that the order of bridges + * in this list does not necessarily correspond to the order of bridges + * in the torrc. */ + static smartlist_t *bridge_list = NULL; + + /** Mark every entry of the bridge list to be removed on our next call to + * sweep_bridge_list unless it has first been un-marked. */ + void + mark_bridge_list(void) + { + if (!bridge_list) + bridge_list = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b, + b->marked_for_removal = 1); + } + + /** Remove every entry of the bridge list that was marked with + * mark_bridge_list if it has not subsequently been un-marked. */ + void + sweep_bridge_list(void) + { + if (!bridge_list) + bridge_list = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b) { + if (b->marked_for_removal) { + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(bridge_list, b); + bridge_free(b); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(b); + } + + /** Initialize the bridge list to empty, creating it if needed. */ + static void + clear_bridge_list(void) + { + if (!bridge_list) + bridge_list = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b, bridge_free(b)); + smartlist_clear(bridge_list); + } + + /** Free the bridge bridge. */ + static void + bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge) + { + if (!bridge) + return; + + tor_free(bridge->transport_name); + if (bridge->socks_args) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge->socks_args, char*, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(bridge->socks_args); + } + + tor_free(bridge); + } + + /** Return a list of all the configured bridges, as bridge_info_t pointers. */ + const smartlist_t * + bridge_list_get(void) + { + if (!bridge_list) + bridge_list = smartlist_new(); + return bridge_list; + } + + /** + * Given a bridge, return a pointer to its RSA identity digest, or + * NULL if we don't know one for it. + */ + const uint8_t * + bridge_get_rsa_id_digest(const bridge_info_t *bridge) + { + tor_assert(bridge); + if (tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) + return NULL; + else + return (const uint8_t *) bridge->identity; + } + + /** + * Given a bridge, return a pointer to its configured addr:port + * combination. + */ + const tor_addr_port_t * + bridge_get_addr_port(const bridge_info_t *bridge) + { + tor_assert(bridge); + return &bridge->addrport_configured; + } + + /** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches digest, or a + * bridge with no known digest whose address matches any of the + * tor_addr_port_t's in orports, return that bridge. Else return + * NULL. */ + static bridge_info_t * + get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(const char *digest, + const smartlist_t *orports) + { + if (!bridge_list) + return NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) + { + if (tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, ap) + { + if (tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &ap->addr, CMP_EXACT) == 0 && + bridge->port == ap->port) + return bridge; + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ap); + } + if (digest && tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + return bridge; + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + return NULL; + } + + /** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches digest, or a + * bridge with no known digest whose address matches addr:port, + * return that bridge. Else return NULL. If digest is NULL, check for + * address/port matches only. */ + bridge_info_t * + get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *digest) + { + if (!bridge_list) + return NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) + { + if ((tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) || digest == NULL) && + !tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, addr, CMP_EXACT) && + bridge->port == port) + return bridge; + if (digest && tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + return bridge; + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + return NULL; + } + + /** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches digest, or a + * bridge with no known digest whose address matches addr:port, + * return 1. Else return 0. If digest is NULL, check for + * address/port matches only. */ + int + addr_is_a_configured_bridge(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *digest) + { + tor_assert(addr); + return get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, port, digest) ? 1 : 0; + } + + /** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches + * ei->identity_digest, or a bridge with no known digest whose address + * matches ei->addr:ei->port, return 1. Else return 0. + * If ei->onion_key is NULL, check for address/port matches only. */ + int + extend_info_is_a_configured_bridge(const extend_info_t *ei) + { + const char *digest = ei->onion_key ? ei->identity_digest : NULL; + return addr_is_a_configured_bridge(&ei->addr, ei->port, digest); + } + + /** Wrapper around get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest() to look + * it up via router descriptor ri. */ + static bridge_info_t * + get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(const routerinfo_t *ri) + { + bridge_info_t *bi = NULL; + smartlist_t *orports = router_get_all_orports(ri); + bi = get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(ri->cache_info.identity_digest, + orports); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, p, tor_free(p)); + smartlist_free(orports); + return bi; + } + + /** Return 1 if ri is one of our known bridges, else 0. */ + int + routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri) + { + return get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(ri) ? 1 : 0; + } + + /** Return 1 if node is one of our configured bridges, else 0. */ + int + node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node) + { + int retval = 0; + smartlist_t *orports = node_get_all_orports(node); + retval = get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(node->identity, + orports) != NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, p, tor_free(p)); + smartlist_free(orports); + return retval; + } + + /** We made a connection to a router at addr:port + * without knowing its digest. Its digest turned out to be digest. + * If it was a bridge, and we still don't know its digest, record it. + */ + void + learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *digest) ++ const char *digest, ++ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) + { ++ // XXXX prop220 use ed_id here, once there is some way to specify ++ (void)ed_id; ++ int learned = 0; + bridge_info_t *bridge = + get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, port, digest); + if (bridge && tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) { ++ memcpy(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN); ++ learned = 1; ++ } ++ /* XXXX prop220 remember bridge ed25519 identities -- add a field */ ++#if 0 ++ if (bridge && ed_id && ++ ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&bridge->ed25519_identity) && ++ !ed25519_public_key_is_zero(ed_id)) { ++ memcpy(&bridge->ed25519_identity, ed_id, sizeof(*ed_id)); ++ learned = 1; ++ } ++#endif ++ if (learned) { + char *transport_info = NULL; + const char *transport_name = + find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(addr, port); + if (transport_name) + tor_asprintf(&transport_info, " (with transport '%s')", transport_name); + - memcpy(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN); ++ // XXXX prop220 log both fingerprints. + log_notice(LD_DIR, "Learned fingerprint %s for bridge %s%s.", + hex_str(digest, DIGEST_LEN), fmt_addrport(addr, port), + transport_info ? transport_info : ""); + tor_free(transport_info); + entry_guard_learned_bridge_identity(&bridge->addrport_configured, + (const uint8_t *)digest); + } + } + + /** Return true if bridge has the same identity digest as + * digest. If digest is NULL, it matches + * bridges with unspecified identity digests. */ + static int + bridge_has_digest(const bridge_info_t *bridge, const char *digest) + { + if (digest) + return tor_memeq(digest, bridge->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + else + return tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity); + } + + /** We are about to add a new bridge at addr:port, with optional + * digest and transport_name. Mark for removal any previously + * existing bridge with the same address and port, and warn the user as + * appropriate. + */ + static void + bridge_resolve_conflicts(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *digest, const char *transport_name) + { + /* Iterate the already-registered bridge list: + + If you find a bridge with the same adress and port, mark it for + removal. It doesn't make sense to have two active bridges with + the same IP:PORT. If the bridge in question has a different + digest or transport than digest/transport_name, + it's probably a misconfiguration and we should warn the user. + */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (bridge->marked_for_removal) + continue; + + if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) && (bridge->port == port)) { + + bridge->marked_for_removal = 1; + + if (!bridge_has_digest(bridge, digest) || + strcmp_opt(bridge->transport_name, transport_name)) { + /* warn the user */ + char *bridge_description_new, *bridge_description_old; + tor_asprintf(&bridge_description_new, "%s:%s:%s", + fmt_addrport(addr, port), + digest ? hex_str(digest, DIGEST_LEN) : "", + transport_name ? transport_name : ""); + tor_asprintf(&bridge_description_old, "%s:%s:%s", + fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, bridge->port), + tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) ? + "" : hex_str(bridge->identity,DIGEST_LEN), + bridge->transport_name ? bridge->transport_name : ""); + + log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Tried to add bridge '%s', but we found a conflict" + " with the already registered bridge '%s'. We will discard" + " the old bridge and keep '%s'. If this is not what you" + " wanted, please change your configuration file accordingly.", + bridge_description_new, bridge_description_old, + bridge_description_new); + + tor_free(bridge_description_new); + tor_free(bridge_description_old); + } + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + } + + /** Return True if we have a bridge that uses a transport with name + * transport_name. */ + MOCK_IMPL(int, + transport_is_needed, (const char *transport_name)) + { + if (!bridge_list) + return 0; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, const bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (bridge->transport_name && + !strcmp(bridge->transport_name, transport_name)) + return 1; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + + return 0; + } + + /** Register the bridge information in bridge_line to the + * bridge subsystem. Steals reference of bridge_line. */ + void + bridge_add_from_config(bridge_line_t *bridge_line) + { + bridge_info_t *b; + ++ // XXXX prop220 add a way to specify ed25519 ID to bridge_line_t. ++ + { /* Log the bridge we are about to register: */ + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Registering bridge at %s (transport: %s) (%s)", + fmt_addrport(&bridge_line->addr, bridge_line->port), + bridge_line->transport_name ? + bridge_line->transport_name : "no transport", + tor_digest_is_zero(bridge_line->digest) ? + "no key listed" : hex_str(bridge_line->digest, DIGEST_LEN)); + + if (bridge_line->socks_args) { /* print socks arguments */ + int i = 0; + + tor_assert(smartlist_len(bridge_line->socks_args) > 0); + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Bridge uses %d SOCKS arguments:", + smartlist_len(bridge_line->socks_args)); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_line->socks_args, const char *, arg, + log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "%d: %s", ++i, arg)); + } + } + + bridge_resolve_conflicts(&bridge_line->addr, + bridge_line->port, + bridge_line->digest, + bridge_line->transport_name); + + b = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(bridge_info_t)); + tor_addr_copy(&b->addrport_configured.addr, &bridge_line->addr); + b->addrport_configured.port = bridge_line->port; + tor_addr_copy(&b->addr, &bridge_line->addr); + b->port = bridge_line->port; + memcpy(b->identity, bridge_line->digest, DIGEST_LEN); + if (bridge_line->transport_name) + b->transport_name = bridge_line->transport_name; + b->fetch_status.schedule = DL_SCHED_BRIDGE; + b->fetch_status.backoff = DL_SCHED_RANDOM_EXPONENTIAL; + b->socks_args = bridge_line->socks_args; + if (!bridge_list) + bridge_list = smartlist_new(); + + tor_free(bridge_line); /* Deallocate bridge_line now. */ + + smartlist_add(bridge_list, b); + } + + /** If digest is one of our known bridges, return it. */ + bridge_info_t * + find_bridge_by_digest(const char *digest) + { + if (! bridge_list) + return NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge, + { + if (tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + return bridge; + }); + return NULL; + } + + /** Given the addr and port of a bridge, if that bridge + * supports a pluggable transport, return its name. Otherwise, return + * NULL. */ + const char * + find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port) + { + if (!bridge_list) + return NULL; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, const bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) && + (bridge->port == port)) + return bridge->transport_name; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + + return NULL; + } + + /** If addr and port match the address and port of a + * bridge of ours that uses pluggable transports, place its transport + * in transport. + * + * Return 0 on success (found a transport, or found a bridge with no + * transport, or found no bridge); return -1 if we should be using a + * transport, but the transport could not be found. + */ + int + get_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const transport_t **transport) + { + *transport = NULL; + if (!bridge_list) + return 0; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, const bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) && + (bridge->port == port)) { /* bridge matched */ + if (bridge->transport_name) { /* it also uses pluggable transports */ + *transport = transport_get_by_name(bridge->transport_name); + if (*transport == NULL) { /* it uses pluggable transports, but + the transport could not be found! */ + return -1; + } + return 0; + } else { /* bridge matched, but it doesn't use transports. */ + break; + } + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + + *transport = NULL; + return 0; + } + + /** Return a smartlist containing all the SOCKS arguments that we + * should pass to the SOCKS proxy. */ + const smartlist_t * + get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port) + { + bridge_info_t *bridge = get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, + port, + NULL); + return bridge ? bridge->socks_args : NULL; + } + + /** We need to ask bridge for its server descriptor. */ + static void + launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge) + { + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + if (connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose( + CONN_TYPE_DIR, &bridge->addr, bridge->port, + DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC)) + return; /* it's already on the way */ + + if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) { + download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status); + log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.", + safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&bridge->addr))); + return; + } + + /* Until we get a descriptor for the bridge, we only know one address for + * it. */ + if (!fascist_firewall_allows_address_addr(&bridge->addr, bridge->port, + FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0, 0)) { + log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Tried to fetch a descriptor directly from a " + "bridge, but that bridge is not reachable through our " + "firewall."); + return; + } + + directory_initiate_command(&bridge->addr, bridge->port, + NULL, 0, /*no dirport*/ + bridge->identity, + DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC, + ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE, + DIRIND_ONEHOP, "authority.z", NULL, 0, 0); + } + + /** Fetching the bridge descriptor from the bridge authority returned a + * "not found". Fall back to trying a direct fetch. */ + void + retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest) + { + bridge_info_t *bridge = find_bridge_by_digest(digest); + if (!bridge) + return; /* not found? oh well. */ + + launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge); + } + + /** For each bridge in our list for which we don't currently have a + * descriptor, fetch a new copy of its descriptor -- either directly + * from the bridge or via a bridge authority. */ + void + fetch_bridge_descriptors(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) + { + int num_bridge_auths = get_n_authorities(BRIDGE_DIRINFO); + int ask_bridge_directly; + int can_use_bridge_authority; + + if (!bridge_list) + return; + + /* If we still have unconfigured managed proxies, don't go and + connect to a bridge. */ + if (pt_proxies_configuration_pending()) + return; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) + { + if (!download_status_is_ready(&bridge->fetch_status, now, + IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD)) + continue; /* don't bother, no need to retry yet */ + if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) { + download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status); + log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.", + safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&bridge->addr))); + continue; + } + + /* schedule another fetch as if this one will fail, in case it does */ + download_status_failed(&bridge->fetch_status, 0); + + can_use_bridge_authority = !tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) && + num_bridge_auths; + ask_bridge_directly = !can_use_bridge_authority || + !options->UpdateBridgesFromAuthority; + log_debug(LD_DIR, "ask_bridge_directly=%d (%d, %d, %d)", + ask_bridge_directly, tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity), + !options->UpdateBridgesFromAuthority, !num_bridge_auths); + + if (ask_bridge_directly && + !fascist_firewall_allows_address_addr(&bridge->addr, bridge->port, + FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0, + 0)) { + log_notice(LD_DIR, "Bridge at '%s' isn't reachable by our " + "firewall policy. %s.", + fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, bridge->port), + can_use_bridge_authority ? + "Asking bridge authority instead" : "Skipping"); + if (can_use_bridge_authority) + ask_bridge_directly = 0; + else + continue; + } + + if (ask_bridge_directly) { + /* we need to ask the bridge itself for its descriptor. */ + launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge); + } else { + /* We have a digest and we want to ask an authority. We could + * combine all the requests into one, but that may give more + * hints to the bridge authority than we want to give. */ + char resource[10 + HEX_DIGEST_LEN]; + memcpy(resource, "fp/", 3); + base16_encode(resource+3, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, + bridge->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + memcpy(resource+3+HEX_DIGEST_LEN, ".z", 3); + log_info(LD_DIR, "Fetching bridge info '%s' from bridge authority.", + resource); + directory_get_from_dirserver(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC, + ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE, resource, 0, DL_WANT_AUTHORITY); + } + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + } + + /** If our bridge is configured to be a different address than + * the bridge gives in node, rewrite the routerinfo + * we received to use the address we meant to use. Now we handle + * multihomed bridges better. + */ + static void + rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(const bridge_info_t *bridge, node_t *node) + { + /* XXXX move this function. */ + /* XXXX overridden addresses should really live in the node_t, so that the + * routerinfo_t and the microdesc_t can be immutable. But we can only + * do that safely if we know that no function that connects to an OR + * does so through an address from any source other than node_get_addr(). + */ + tor_addr_t addr; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + if (node->ri) { + routerinfo_t *ri = node->ri; + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, ri->addr); + + if ((!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &addr, CMP_EXACT) && + bridge->port == ri->or_port) || + (!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &ri->ipv6_addr, CMP_EXACT) && + bridge->port == ri->ipv6_orport)) { + /* they match, so no need to do anything */ + } else { + if (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET) { + ri->addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&bridge->addr); + ri->or_port = bridge->port; + log_info(LD_DIR, + "Adjusted bridge routerinfo for '%s' to match configured " + "address %s:%d.", + ri->nickname, fmt_addr32(ri->addr), ri->or_port); + } else if (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET6) { + tor_addr_copy(&ri->ipv6_addr, &bridge->addr); + ri->ipv6_orport = bridge->port; + log_info(LD_DIR, + "Adjusted bridge routerinfo for '%s' to match configured " + "address %s.", + ri->nickname, fmt_addrport(&ri->ipv6_addr, ri->ipv6_orport)); + } else { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Address family not supported: %d.", + tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr)); + return; + } + } + + if (options->ClientPreferIPv6ORPort == -1) { + /* Mark which address to use based on which bridge_t we got. */ + node->ipv6_preferred = (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET6 && + !tor_addr_is_null(&node->ri->ipv6_addr)); + } else { + /* Mark which address to use based on user preference */ + node->ipv6_preferred = (fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(options) && + !tor_addr_is_null(&node->ri->ipv6_addr)); + } + + /* XXXipv6 we lack support for falling back to another address for + the same relay, warn the user */ + if (!tor_addr_is_null(&ri->ipv6_addr)) { + tor_addr_port_t ap; + node_get_pref_orport(node, &ap); + log_notice(LD_CONFIG, + "Bridge '%s' has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address. " + "Will prefer using its %s address (%s) based on %s.", + ri->nickname, + node->ipv6_preferred ? "IPv6" : "IPv4", + fmt_addrport(&ap.addr, ap.port), + options->ClientPreferIPv6ORPort == -1 ? + "the configured Bridge address" : + "ClientPreferIPv6ORPort"); + } + } + if (node->rs) { + routerstatus_t *rs = node->rs; + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, rs->addr); + + if (!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &addr, CMP_EXACT) && + bridge->port == rs->or_port) { + /* they match, so no need to do anything */ + } else { + rs->addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&bridge->addr); + rs->or_port = bridge->port; + log_info(LD_DIR, + "Adjusted bridge routerstatus for '%s' to match " + "configured address %s.", + rs->nickname, fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, rs->or_port)); + } + } + } + + /** We just learned a descriptor for a bridge. See if that + * digest is in our entry guard list, and add it if not. */ + void + learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache) + { + tor_assert(ri); + tor_assert(ri->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE); + if (get_options()->UseBridges) { + int first = num_bridges_usable() <= 1; + bridge_info_t *bridge = get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(ri); + time_t now = time(NULL); + router_set_status(ri->cache_info.identity_digest, 1); + + if (bridge) { /* if we actually want to use this one */ + node_t *node; + /* it's here; schedule its re-fetch for a long time from now. */ + if (!from_cache) + download_status_reset(&bridge->fetch_status); + + node = node_get_mutable_by_id(ri->cache_info.identity_digest); + tor_assert(node); + rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(bridge, node); + if (tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) { + memcpy(bridge->identity,ri->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); + log_notice(LD_DIR, "Learned identity %s for bridge at %s:%d", + hex_str(bridge->identity, DIGEST_LEN), + fmt_and_decorate_addr(&bridge->addr), + (int) bridge->port); + } + if (get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) { + #ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM + add_bridge_as_entry_guard(get_guard_selection_info(), node); + #else + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + #endif + } else { + entry_guard_learned_bridge_identity(&bridge->addrport_configured, + (const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest); + } + + log_notice(LD_DIR, "new bridge descriptor '%s' (%s): %s", ri->nickname, + from_cache ? "cached" : "fresh", router_describe(ri)); + /* set entry->made_contact so if it goes down we don't drop it from + * our entry node list */ + if (get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) { + #ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM + entry_guard_register_connect_status(ri->cache_info.identity_digest, + 1, 0, now); + #else + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + #endif + } + if (first) { + routerlist_retry_directory_downloads(now); + } + } + } + } + + /** Return the number of bridges that have descriptors that + * are marked with purpose 'bridge' and are running. + * + * We use this function to decide if we're ready to start building + * circuits through our bridges, or if we need to wait until the + * directory "server/authority" requests finish. */ + int + any_bridge_descriptors_known(void) + { + tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges); + + if (!bridge_list) + return 0; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + const node_t *node; + if (!tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) && + (node = node_get_by_id(bridge->identity)) != NULL && + node->ri) { + return 1; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + + return 0; + } + + /** Return a smartlist containing all bridge identity digests */ + MOCK_IMPL(smartlist_t *, + list_bridge_identities, (void)) + { + smartlist_t *result = NULL; + char *digest_tmp; + + if (get_options()->UseBridges && bridge_list) { + result = smartlist_new(); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b) { + digest_tmp = tor_malloc(DIGEST_LEN); + memcpy(digest_tmp, b->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + smartlist_add(result, digest_tmp); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(b); + } + + return result; + } + + /** Get the download status for a bridge descriptor given its identity */ + MOCK_IMPL(download_status_t *, + get_bridge_dl_status_by_id, (const char *digest)) + { + download_status_t *dl = NULL; + + if (digest && get_options()->UseBridges && bridge_list) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b) { + if (tor_memeq(digest, b->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) { + dl = &(b->fetch_status); + break; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(b); + } + + return dl; + } + + /** Release all storage held in bridges.c */ + void + bridges_free_all(void) + { + clear_bridge_list(); + smartlist_free(bridge_list); + bridge_list = NULL; + } + diff --cc src/or/bridges.h index 0000000,74c5113..de23fe6 mode 000000,100644..100644 --- a/src/or/bridges.h +++ b/src/or/bridges.h @@@ -1,0 -1,65 +1,66 @@@ + /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + + /** + * \file bridges.h + * \brief Header file for circuitbuild.c. + **/ + + #ifndef TOR_BRIDGES_H + #define TOR_BRIDGES_H + + struct bridge_line_t; + + /* Opaque handle to a configured bridge */ + typedef struct bridge_info_t bridge_info_t; + + void mark_bridge_list(void); + void sweep_bridge_list(void); + const smartlist_t *bridge_list_get(void); + bridge_info_t *find_bridge_by_digest(const char *digest); + const uint8_t *bridge_get_rsa_id_digest(const bridge_info_t *bridge); + const tor_addr_port_t * bridge_get_addr_port(const bridge_info_t *bridge); + bridge_info_t *get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest( + const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *digest); + + int addr_is_a_configured_bridge(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *digest); + int extend_info_is_a_configured_bridge(const extend_info_t *ei); + int routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri); + int node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node); + void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *digest); ++ const char *digest, ++ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id); + + void bridge_add_from_config(struct bridge_line_t *bridge_line); + void retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest); + void fetch_bridge_descriptors(const or_options_t *options, time_t now); + void learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache); + int any_bridge_descriptors_known(void); + const smartlist_t *get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port); + + int any_bridges_dont_support_microdescriptors(void); + + const char *find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port); + struct transport_t; + int get_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const struct transport_t **transport); + + MOCK_DECL(int, transport_is_needed, (const char *transport_name)); + int validate_pluggable_transports_config(void); + + MOCK_DECL(smartlist_t *, list_bridge_identities, (void)); + MOCK_DECL(download_status_t *, get_bridge_dl_status_by_id, + (const char *digest)); + + void bridges_free_all(void); + + #endif + diff --cc src/or/circuitlist.c index b7ae3f5,ab38b54..5943e51 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@@ -63,8 -63,8 +63,9 @@@ #include "connection_edge.h" #include "connection_or.h" #include "control.h" - #include "hs_circuitmap.h" + #include "entrynodes.h" #include "main.h" ++#include "hs_circuitmap.h" #include "hs_common.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" diff --cc src/or/config.c index 5dcdf93,2ec96d3..aba567a --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@@ -305,8 -306,11 +306,12 @@@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = V(ExtORPortCookieAuthFile, STRING, NULL), V(ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable, BOOL, "0"), V(ExtraInfoStatistics, BOOL, "1"), + V(ExtendByEd25519ID, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), V(FallbackDir, LINELIST, NULL), + /* XXXX prop271 -- this has an ugly name to remind us to remove it. */ + VAR("UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm_", BOOL, + UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm, "0"), + V(UseDefaultFallbackDirs, BOOL, "1"), OBSOLETE("FallbackNetworkstatusFile"), diff --cc src/or/connection_or.c index 635d3e4,6233fb7..b3ae291 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@@ -1715,13 -1675,16 +1721,18 @@@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or } log_fn(severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, - "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but identity key was not " - "as expected: wanted %s but got %s.%s", - conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port, expected, seen, extra_log); + "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but RSA identity key was not " + "as expected: wanted %s + %s but got %s + %s.%s", + conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port, + expected_rsa, expected_ed, seen_rsa, seen_ed, extra_log); + + /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */ + entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)); + #ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM + /* Tell the old guard API about the channel failure */ entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest, 0, 1, time(NULL)); + #endif control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY); if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) diff --cc src/or/entrynodes.c index af1b1a3,ac5398f..4c68247 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@@ -15,9 -118,10 +118,11 @@@ #define ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE #include "or.h" +#include "channel.h" + #include "bridges.h" #include "circpathbias.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" + #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuitstats.h" #include "config.h" #include "confparse.h" diff --cc src/or/or.h index f63fe06,04ff548..d45dc68 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@@ -4563,14 -4588,13 +4580,22 @@@ typedef struct /** If 1, we skip all OOS checks. */ int DisableOOSCheck; + /** Autobool: Should we include Ed25519 identities in extend2 cells? + * If -1, we should do whatever the consensus parameter says. */ + int ExtendByEd25519ID; + + /** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority, + * do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */ + /* NOTE: remove this option someday. */ + int AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys; ++ + /** If 1, we use the old (pre-prop271) guard selection algorithm. + * + * XXXX prop271 This option is only here as a stopgap while we're + * XXXX tuning and debugging the new (post-prop271) algorithm. Eventually + * we should remove it entirely. + */ + int UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm; } or_options_t; /** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */

1 0

[tor/master] Per suggestion, increase the retry frequency for primary guards.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 20292ec4974b777d430e7962cc38349c5f82b220 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Dec 8 13:10:22 2016 -0500 Per suggestion, increase the retry frequency for primary guards. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index cf85dad..ac5398f 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -1708,8 +1708,8 @@ get_retry_schedule(time_t failing_since, time_t now, const struct { time_t maximum; int primary_delay; int nonprimary_delay; } delays[] = { - { SIX_HOURS, 30*60, 1*60*60 }, - { FOUR_DAYS, 2*60*60, 4*60*60 }, + { SIX_HOURS, 10*60, 1*60*60 }, + { FOUR_DAYS, 90*60, 4*60*60 }, { SEVEN_DAYS, 4*60*60, 18*60*60 }, { TIME_MAX, 9*60*60, 36*60*60 } };

1 0

[tor/master] prop271: Tests for the highlevel or_state_t encode/decode functions
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 79d3e94f8b1769ee8d1957cb1d6dd35bd02a7271 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 30 12:35:16 2016 -0500 prop271: Tests for the highlevel or_state_t encode/decode functions --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 4 +- src/or/entrynodes.h | 2 + src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 238 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 9441be4..1f6d562 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -1115,8 +1115,8 @@ remove_guard_from_confirmed_and_primary_lists(guard_selection_t *gs, /** Return true iff guard is currently "listed" -- that is, it * appears in the consensus, or as a configured bridge (as * appropriate) */ -static int -entry_guard_is_listed(guard_selection_t *gs, const entry_guard_t *guard) +MOCK_IMPL(STATIC int, +entry_guard_is_listed,(guard_selection_t *gs, const entry_guard_t *guard)) { if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE) { return NULL != get_bridge_info_for_guard(guard); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index b676172..c05a3e3 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -498,6 +498,8 @@ STATIC guard_selection_t *guard_selection_new(const char *name, STATIC guard_selection_t *get_guard_selection_by_name( const char *name, guard_selection_type_t type, int create_if_absent); STATIC void guard_selection_free(guard_selection_t *gs); +MOCK_DECL(STATIC int, entry_guard_is_listed, + (guard_selection_t *gs, const entry_guard_t *guard)); STATIC const char *choose_guard_selection(const or_options_t *options, const networkstatus_t *ns, const char *old_selection, diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index 5360b0e..1fbb8f8 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "bridges.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "config.h" +#include "confparse.h" #include "entrynodes.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "networkstatus.h" @@ -1247,6 +1248,239 @@ test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_partial_failure(void *arg) tor_free(mem_op_hex_tmp); } +static int +mock_entry_guard_is_listed(guard_selection_t *gs, const entry_guard_t *guard) +{ + (void)gs; + (void)guard; + return 1; +} + +static void +test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_full(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + /* Here's a state I made while testing. The identities and locations for + * the bridges are redacted. */ + const char STATE[] = + "Guard in=default rsa_id=214F44BD5B638E8C817D47FF7C97397790BF0345 " + "nickname=TotallyNinja sampled_on=2016-11-12T19:32:49 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev " + "listed=1\n" + "Guard in=default rsa_id=052900AB0EA3ED54BAB84AE8A99E74E8693CE2B2 " + "nickname=5OfNovember sampled_on=2016-11-20T04:32:05 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev " + "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-22T08:13:28 confirmed_idx=0 " + "pb_circ_attempts=4.000000 pb_circ_successes=2.000000 " + "pb_successful_circuits_closed=2.000000\n" + "Guard in=default rsa_id=7B700C0C207EBD0002E00F499BE265519AC3C25A " + "nickname=dc6jgk11 sampled_on=2016-11-28T11:50:13 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev " + "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-24T08:45:30 confirmed_idx=4 " + "pb_circ_attempts=5.000000 pb_circ_successes=5.000000 " + "pb_successful_circuits_closed=5.000000\n" + "Guard in=wobblesome rsa_id=7B700C0C207EBD0002E00F499BE265519AC3C25A " + "nickname=dc6jgk11 sampled_on=2016-11-28T11:50:13 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev " + "listed=1\n" + "Guard in=default rsa_id=E9025AD60D86875D5F11548D536CC6AF60F0EF5E " + "nickname=maibrunn sampled_on=2016-11-25T22:36:38 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n" + "Guard in=default rsa_id=DCD30B90BA3A792DA75DC54A327EF353FB84C38E " + "nickname=Unnamed sampled_on=2016-11-25T14:34:00 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n" + "Guard in=bridges rsa_id=8FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF2E " + "bridge_addr=24.1.1.1:443 sampled_on=2016-11-25T06:44:14 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1 " + "confirmed_on=2016-11-29T10:36:06 confirmed_idx=0 " + "pb_circ_attempts=8.000000 pb_circ_successes=8.000000 " + "pb_successful_circuits_closed=13.000000\n" + "Guard in=bridges rsa_id=5800000000000000000000000000000000000000 " + "bridge_addr=37.218.246.143:28366 " + "sampled_on=2016-11-18T15:07:34 sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n"; + + config_line_t *lines = NULL; + or_state_t *state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_state_t)); + int r = config_get_lines(STATE, &lines, 0); + char *msg = NULL; + smartlist_t *text = smartlist_new(); + char *joined = NULL; + + MOCK(entry_guard_is_listed, mock_entry_guard_is_listed); + + dummy_state = state; + MOCK(get_or_state, + get_or_state_replacement); + + tt_assert(r == 0); + tt_assert(lines); + + state->Guard = lines; + + /* Try it first without setting the result. */ + r = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 0, &msg); + tt_assert(r == 0); + guard_selection_t *gs_br = + get_guard_selection_by_name("bridges", GS_TYPE_BRIDGE, 0); + tt_assert(!gs_br); + + r = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 1, &msg); + tt_assert(r == 0); + gs_br = get_guard_selection_by_name("bridges", GS_TYPE_BRIDGE, 0); + guard_selection_t *gs_df = + get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0); + guard_selection_t *gs_wb = + get_guard_selection_by_name("wobblesome", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0); + + tt_assert(gs_br); + tt_assert(gs_df); + tt_assert(gs_wb); + + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_df->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 5); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_br->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 2); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_wb->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 1); + + /* Try again; make sure it doesn't double-add the guards. */ + r = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 1, &msg); + tt_assert(r == 0); + gs_br = get_guard_selection_by_name("bridges", GS_TYPE_BRIDGE, 0); + gs_df = get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0); + tt_assert(gs_br); + tt_assert(gs_df); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_df->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 5); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_br->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 2); + + /* Re-encode; it should be the same... almost. */ + { + /* (Make a guard nonpersistent first) */ + entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs_df->sampled_entry_guards, 0); + g->is_persistent = 0; + } + config_free_lines(lines); + lines = state->Guard = NULL; // to prevent double-free. + entry_guards_update_state(state); + tt_assert(state->Guard); + lines = state->Guard; + + config_line_t *ln; + for (ln = lines; ln; ln = ln->next) { + smartlist_add_asprintf(text, "%s %s\n",ln->key, ln->value); + } + joined = smartlist_join_strings(text, "", 0, NULL); + tt_str_op(joined, OP_EQ, + "Guard in=default rsa_id=052900AB0EA3ED54BAB84AE8A99E74E8693CE2B2 " + "nickname=5OfNovember sampled_on=2016-11-20T04:32:05 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev " + "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-22T08:13:28 confirmed_idx=0 " + "pb_circ_attempts=4.000000 pb_circ_successes=2.000000 " + "pb_successful_circuits_closed=2.000000\n" + "Guard in=default rsa_id=7B700C0C207EBD0002E00F499BE265519AC3C25A " + "nickname=dc6jgk11 sampled_on=2016-11-28T11:50:13 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev " + "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-24T08:45:30 confirmed_idx=1 " + "pb_circ_attempts=5.000000 pb_circ_successes=5.000000 " + "pb_successful_circuits_closed=5.000000\n" + "Guard in=default rsa_id=E9025AD60D86875D5F11548D536CC6AF60F0EF5E " + "nickname=maibrunn sampled_on=2016-11-25T22:36:38 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n" + "Guard in=default rsa_id=DCD30B90BA3A792DA75DC54A327EF353FB84C38E " + "nickname=Unnamed sampled_on=2016-11-25T14:34:00 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n" + "Guard in=wobblesome rsa_id=7B700C0C207EBD0002E00F499BE265519AC3C25A " + "nickname=dc6jgk11 sampled_on=2016-11-28T11:50:13 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev " + "listed=1\n" + "Guard in=bridges rsa_id=8FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF2E " + "bridge_addr=24.1.1.1:443 sampled_on=2016-11-25T06:44:14 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1 " + "confirmed_on=2016-11-29T10:36:06 confirmed_idx=0 " + "pb_circ_attempts=8.000000 pb_circ_successes=8.000000 " + "pb_successful_circuits_closed=13.000000\n" + "Guard in=bridges rsa_id=5800000000000000000000000000000000000000 " + "bridge_addr=37.218.246.143:28366 " + "sampled_on=2016-11-18T15:07:34 sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n"); + + done: + config_free_lines(lines); + tor_free(state); + tor_free(msg); + UNMOCK(get_or_state); + UNMOCK(entry_guard_is_listed); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(text, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(text); + tor_free(joined); +} + +static void +test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_broken(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + /* Here's a variation on the previous state. Every line but the first is + * busted somehow. */ + const char STATE[] = + /* Okay. */ + "Guard in=default rsa_id=214F44BD5B638E8C817D47FF7C97397790BF0345 " + "nickname=TotallyNinja sampled_on=2016-11-12T19:32:49 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev " + "listed=1\n" + /* No selection listed. */ + "Guard rsa_id=052900AB0EA3ED54BAB84AE8A99E74E8693CE2B2 " + "nickname=5OfNovember sampled_on=2016-11-20T04:32:05 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev " + "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-22T08:13:28 confirmed_idx=0 " + "pb_circ_attempts=4.000000 pb_circ_successes=2.000000 " + "pb_successful_circuits_closed=2.000000\n" + /* Selection is "legacy"!! */ + "Guard in=legacy rsa_id=7B700C0C207EBD0002E00F499BE265519AC3C25A " + "nickname=dc6jgk11 sampled_on=2016-11-28T11:50:13 " + "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev " + "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-24T08:45:30 confirmed_idx=4 " + "pb_circ_attempts=5.000000 pb_circ_successes=5.000000 " + "pb_successful_circuits_closed=5.000000\n"; + + config_line_t *lines = NULL; + or_state_t *state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_state_t)); + int r = config_get_lines(STATE, &lines, 0); + char *msg = NULL; + + dummy_state = state; + MOCK(get_or_state, + get_or_state_replacement); + + tt_assert(r == 0); + tt_assert(lines); + + state->Guard = lines; + + /* First, no-set case. we should get an error. */ + r = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 0, &msg); + tt_int_op(r, OP_LT, 0); + tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_NE, NULL); + /* And we shouldn't have made anything. */ + guard_selection_t *gs_df = + get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0); + tt_assert(gs_df == NULL); + tor_free(msg); + + /* Now see about the set case (which shouldn't happen IRL) */ + r = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 1, &msg); + tt_int_op(r, OP_LT, 0); + tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_NE, NULL); + gs_df = get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0); + tt_assert(gs_df != NULL); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_df->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 1); + guard_selection_t *gs_legacy = + get_guard_selection_by_name("legacy", GS_TYPE_LEGACY, 0); + tt_assert(gs_legacy != NULL); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_legacy->chosen_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 0); + + done: + config_free_lines(lines); + tor_free(state); + tor_free(msg); + UNMOCK(get_or_state); +} + static void test_entry_guard_get_guard_selection_by_name(void *arg) { @@ -3019,6 +3253,10 @@ struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = { test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_failure, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "parse_from_state_partial_failure", test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_partial_failure, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "parse_from_state_full", + test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_full, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "parse_from_state_broken", + test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_broken, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "get_guard_selection_by_name", test_entry_guard_get_guard_selection_by_name, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, BFN_TEST(add_single_guard),

1 0

[tor/master] Easy code fixes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 50783d0123c38c649851421f33c616e0bf75d827 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue Dec 6 14:35:31 2016 -0500 Easy code fixes. - Correctly maintain the previous guard selection in choose_guard_selection(). - Print bridge identifier instead of nothing in entry_guard_describe()._ --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ src/or/entrynodes.h | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index a28603d..bcf4182 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -341,7 +341,8 @@ entry_guard_describe(const entry_guard_t *guard) static char buf[256]; tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s ($%s)", - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + guard->nickname ? guard->nickname : "[bridge]", + hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); return buf; } @@ -527,7 +528,7 @@ get_extreme_restriction_threshold(void) STATIC const char * choose_guard_selection(const or_options_t *options, const networkstatus_t *live_ns, - const char *old_selection, + const guard_selection_t *old_selection, guard_selection_type_t *type_out) { tor_assert(options); @@ -607,7 +608,11 @@ choose_guard_selection(const or_options_t *options, } } - /* Trickier case: we do have a previous selection */ + /* Trickier case: we do have a previous guard selection context. */ + tor_assert(old_selection); + + /* Use high and low thresholds to decide guard selection, and if we fall in + the middle then keep the current guard selection context. */ if (n_passing_filter >= meaningful_threshold_high) { *type_out = GS_TYPE_NORMAL; return "default"; @@ -615,7 +620,9 @@ choose_guard_selection(const or_options_t *options, *type_out = GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED; return "restricted"; } else { - return NULL; + /* we are in the middle: maintain previous guard selection */ + *type_out = old_selection->type; + return old_selection->name; } } @@ -634,16 +641,16 @@ update_guard_selection_choice(const or_options_t *options) return 1; } - const char *cur_name = curr_guard_context->name; guard_selection_type_t type = GS_TYPE_INFER; const char *new_name = choose_guard_selection( options, networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()), - cur_name, + curr_guard_context, &type); tor_assert(new_name); tor_assert(type != GS_TYPE_INFER); + const char *cur_name = curr_guard_context->name; if (! strcmp(cur_name, new_name)) { log_debug(LD_GUARD, "Staying with guard context \"%s\" (no change)", new_name); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index 116e5ab..1133525 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -519,9 +519,9 @@ STATIC void guard_selection_free(guard_selection_t *gs); MOCK_DECL(STATIC int, entry_guard_is_listed, (guard_selection_t *gs, const entry_guard_t *guard)); STATIC const char *choose_guard_selection(const or_options_t *options, - const networkstatus_t *ns, - const char *old_selection, - guard_selection_type_t *type_out); + const networkstatus_t *ns, + const guard_selection_t *old_selection, + guard_selection_type_t *type_out); STATIC entry_guard_t *get_sampled_guard_with_id(guard_selection_t *gs, const uint8_t *rsa_id);

1 0

[tor/master] Update node-selection tests to consider restrictions
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit d9f010db8448fa2aa4de80f0c26c41fafb25a694 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 30 13:37:37 2016 -0500 Update node-selection tests to consider restrictions --- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index 84fdf07..e443210 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -2464,6 +2464,19 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) tt_i64_op(guard->unreachable_since, OP_EQ, approx_time() - 30); }); + /* Let's try again and we should get the first primary guard again */ + g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); + tt_ptr_op(g, OP_EQ, smartlist_get(gs->primary_entry_guards, 0)); + g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); + tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_EQ, g); + + /* But if we impose a restriction, we don't get the same guard */ + entry_guard_restriction_t rst; + memset(&rst, 0, sizeof(rst)); + memcpy(rst.exclude_id, g->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &rst, &state); + tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, g); + done: guard_selection_free(gs); } @@ -2527,10 +2540,22 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_confirmed(void *arg) tt_uint_op(state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD); tt_i64_op(g2->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, approx_time()); + // If we say that the next confirmed guard in order is excluded, we get + // The one AFTER that. + g = smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, + smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards)+2); + entry_guard_restriction_t rst; + memset(&rst, 0, sizeof(rst)); + memcpy(rst.exclude_id, g->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, &rst, &state); + tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, g); + tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, + smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards)+3); + // If we make every confirmed guard become pending then we start poking // other guards. const int n_remaining_confirmed = - N_CONFIRMED - 2 - smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards); + N_CONFIRMED - 3 - smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards); for (i = 0; i < n_remaining_confirmed; ++i) { g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_GE, 0);

1 0

[tor/master] Wrap all of the legacy guard code, and its users, in #ifdefs
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 68679504323b0a676a446b8fb34b976c9dc66b4f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 7 12:36:13 2016 -0500 Wrap all of the legacy guard code, and its users, in #ifdefs This will make it easier to see what we remove down the line. --- src/or/bridges.c | 8 ++++ src/or/channel.c | 2 + src/or/circpathbias.c | 6 +++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 + src/or/circuituse.c | 16 ++++---- src/or/config.c | 9 +++++ src/or/connection_or.c | 4 ++ src/or/control.c | 5 +++ src/or/entrynodes.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/entrynodes.h | 26 +++++++++++++ src/or/routerlist.c | 6 +++ src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 20 ++++++++-- src/test/test_routerlist.c | 10 +++++ 13 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/bridges.c b/src/or/bridges.c index c480e3f..4058979 100644 --- a/src/or/bridges.c +++ b/src/or/bridges.c @@ -743,7 +743,11 @@ learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache) (int) bridge->port); } if (get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) { +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM add_bridge_as_entry_guard(get_guard_selection_info(), node); +#else + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); +#endif } else { entry_guard_learned_bridge_identity(&bridge->addrport_configured, (const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest); @@ -754,8 +758,12 @@ learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache) /* set entry->made_contact so if it goes down we don't drop it from * our entry node list */ if (get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) { +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM entry_guard_register_connect_status(ri->cache_info.identity_digest, 1, 0, now); +#else + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); +#endif } if (first) { routerlist_retry_directory_downloads(now); diff --git a/src/or/channel.c b/src/or/channel.c index 1e3e99c..9898148 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.c +++ b/src/or/channel.c @@ -2538,6 +2538,7 @@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan) if (started_here) { circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); rep_hist_note_connect_succeeded(chan->identity_digest, now); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM // XXXX prop271 this call is no longer useful with the new algorithm. if (entry_guard_register_connect_status( chan->identity_digest, 1, 0, now) < 0) { @@ -2549,6 +2550,7 @@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan) "connection so we can retry the earlier entry guards."); close_origin_circuits = 1; } +#endif router_set_status(chan->identity_digest, 1); } else { /* only report it to the geoip module if it's not a known router */ diff --git a/src/or/circpathbias.c b/src/or/circpathbias.c index be11465..d86d70f 100644 --- a/src/or/circpathbias.c +++ b/src/or/circpathbias.c @@ -1279,7 +1279,10 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) tor_lround(pb->timeouts), tor_lround(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()/1000)); pb->path_bias_disabled = 1; +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM + // XXXX entry_guard_mark_bad(guard); +#endif return; } } else if (!pb->path_bias_use_extreme) { @@ -1385,7 +1388,10 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) tor_lround(pb->timeouts), tor_lround(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()/1000)); pb->path_bias_disabled = 1; +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM + // XXXX entry_guard_mark_bad(guard); +#endif return; } } else if (!pb->path_bias_extreme) { diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 0790309..bf52b90 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2277,6 +2277,7 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state, * family. */ nodelist_add_node_and_family(excluded, node); } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /* and exclude current entry guards and their families, * unless we're in a test network, and excluding guards * would exclude all nodes (i.e. we're in an incredibly small tor network, @@ -2295,6 +2296,7 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state, } }); } +#endif if (state) { if (state->need_uptime) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 787c490..8e0fbd1 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -550,16 +550,14 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) == CPATH_STATE_OPEN; log_info(LD_CIRC, "No circuits are opened. Relaxing timeout for circuit %d " - "(a %s %d-hop circuit in state %s with channel state %s). " - "%d guards are live.", + "(a %s %d-hop circuit in state %s with channel state %s).", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier, circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose), TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state ? TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len : -1, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), - channel_state_to_string(victim->n_chan->state), - num_live_entry_guards(0)); + channel_state_to_string(victim->n_chan->state)); /* We count the timeout here for CBT, because technically this * was a timeout, and the timeout value needs to reset if we @@ -577,7 +575,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) "No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for circuit %d " "(a %s %d-hop circuit in state %s with channel state %s) to " "%ldms. However, it appears the circuit has timed out " - "anyway. %d guards are live.", + "anyway.", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier, circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose), TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state ? @@ -585,8 +583,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) -1, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), channel_state_to_string(victim->n_chan->state), - (long)build_close_ms, - num_live_entry_guards(0)); + (long)build_close_ms); } } @@ -1655,8 +1652,10 @@ circuit_build_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ) /* New guard API: we failed. */ if (circ->guard_state) entry_guard_failed(&circ->guard_state); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /* Old guard API: we failed. */ entry_guard_register_connect_status(n_chan_id, 0, 1, time(NULL)); +#endif /* if there are any one-hop streams waiting on this circuit, fail * them now so they can retry elsewhere. */ connection_ap_fail_onehop(n_chan_id, circ->build_state); @@ -1966,7 +1965,7 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, int severity = LOG_NOTICE; /* Retry some stuff that might help the connection work. */ if (entry_list_is_constrained(options) && - entries_known_but_down(options)) { + guards_retry_optimistic(options)) { log_fn(severity, LD_APP|LD_DIR, "Application request when we haven't %s. " "Optimistically trying known %s again.", @@ -1974,7 +1973,6 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, "used client functionality lately" : "received a consensus with exits", options->UseBridges ? "bridges" : "entrynodes"); - entries_retry_all(options); } else if (!options->UseBridges || any_bridge_descriptors_known()) { log_fn(severity, LD_APP|LD_DIR, "Application request when we haven't %s. " diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 22e5dfd..2ec96d3 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -2116,11 +2116,13 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) rep_hist_desc_stats_term(); /* Check if we need to parse and add the EntryNodes config option. */ +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM if (options->EntryNodes && (!old_options || !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes) || !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes))) entry_nodes_should_be_added(); +#endif /* Since our options changed, we might need to regenerate and upload our * server descriptor. @@ -3040,6 +3042,13 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, warn_about_relative_paths(options); +#ifndef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM + if (options->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "DeprecatedGuardAlgorithm not supported."); + return -1; + } +#endif + if (server_mode(options) && (!strcmpstart(uname, "Windows 95") || !strcmpstart(uname, "Windows 98") || diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 3b6f82c..6233fb7 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -737,9 +737,11 @@ connection_or_about_to_close(or_connection_t *or_conn) rep_hist_note_connect_failed(or_conn->identity_digest, now); /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */ entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan)); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /* Tell the old guard API about the channel failure */ entry_guard_register_connect_status(or_conn->identity_digest,0, !options->HTTPSProxy, now); +#endif if (conn->state >= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) { int reason = tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error); control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, @@ -1678,9 +1680,11 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port, expected, seen, extra_log); /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */ entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /* Tell the old guard API about the channel failure */ entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest, 0, 1, time(NULL)); +#endif control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY); if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 03742e8..9a8845a 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -4041,12 +4041,17 @@ handle_control_dropguards(control_connection_t *conn, smartlist_split_string(args, body, " ", SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM if (smartlist_len(args)) { connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "512 Too many arguments to DROPGUARDS\r\n"); } else { remove_all_entry_guards(); send_control_done(conn); } +#else + // XXXX + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "512 not supported\r\n"); +#endif SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); smartlist_free(args); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index ac62155..76070a3 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -149,11 +149,13 @@ static guard_selection_t *curr_guard_context = NULL; * and those changes need to be flushed to disk. */ static int entry_guards_dirty = 0; +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM static const node_t *choose_random_entry_impl(guard_selection_t *gs, cpath_build_state_t *state, int for_directory, dirinfo_type_t dirtype, int *n_options_out); +#endif static void entry_guard_set_filtered_flags(const or_options_t *options, guard_selection_t *gs, entry_guard_t *guard); @@ -228,7 +230,9 @@ guard_selection_new(const char *name, gs = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*gs)); gs->name = tor_strdup(name); gs->type = type; +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM gs->chosen_entry_guards = smartlist_new(); +#endif gs->sampled_entry_guards = smartlist_new(); gs->confirmed_entry_guards = smartlist_new(); gs->primary_entry_guards = smartlist_new(); @@ -298,6 +302,7 @@ get_guard_selection_info(void) return curr_guard_context; } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /** Return the list of entry guards for a guard_selection_t, creating it * if necessary. */ const smartlist_t * @@ -324,6 +329,7 @@ entry_guard_mark_bad(entry_guard_t *guard) guard->bad_since = approx_time(); entry_guards_changed(); } +#endif /** Return a statically allocated human-readable description of guard */ @@ -2831,6 +2837,7 @@ entry_guards_load_guards_from_state(or_state_t *state, int set) /* XXXXX prop271 ----- end of new-for-prop271 code ----- */ /* XXXXX ----------------------------------------------- */ +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /** * @name Constants for old (pre-prop271) guard selection algorithm. */ @@ -3109,6 +3116,7 @@ num_live_entry_guards(int for_directory) return num_live_entry_guards_for_guard_selection( get_guard_selection_info(), for_directory); } +#endif /** If digest matches the identity of any node in the * entry_guards list for the provided guard selection state, @@ -3123,11 +3131,12 @@ entry_guard_get_by_id_digest_for_guard_selection(guard_selection_t *gs, if (tor_memeq(digest, entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) return entry; ); - +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->chosen_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry, if (tor_memeq(digest, entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) return entry; ); +#endif return NULL; } @@ -3150,6 +3159,7 @@ entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest) get_guard_selection_info(), digest); } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /** Dump a description of our list of entry guards in the given guard * selection context to the log at level severity. */ static void @@ -3375,6 +3385,7 @@ pick_entry_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, if (changed) entry_guards_changed_for_guard_selection(gs); } +#endif /** Release all storage held by e. */ STATIC void @@ -3383,7 +3394,9 @@ entry_guard_free(entry_guard_t *e) if (!e) return; entry_guard_handles_clear(e); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM tor_free(e->chosen_by_version); +#endif tor_free(e->sampled_by_version); tor_free(e->extra_state_fields); tor_free(e->selection_name); @@ -3391,6 +3404,7 @@ entry_guard_free(entry_guard_t *e) tor_free(e); } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /** Remove from a guard selection context any entry guard which was selected * by an unknown version of Tor, or which was selected by a version of Tor * that's known to select entry guards badly, or which was selected more 2 @@ -3869,6 +3883,7 @@ entry_guards_set_from_config(guard_selection_t *gs, smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_not_on_list); entry_guards_changed_for_guard_selection(gs); } +#endif /** Return 0 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the * directory to our entry guard list, or return 1 if we have a @@ -3877,6 +3892,7 @@ entry_guards_set_from_config(guard_selection_t *gs, int entry_list_is_constrained(const or_options_t *options) { + // XXXX prop271 look at the current selection. if (options->EntryNodes) return 1; if (options->UseBridges) @@ -3884,6 +3900,7 @@ entry_list_is_constrained(const or_options_t *options) return 0; } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards. If * state is non-NULL, this is for a specific circuit -- * make sure not to pick this circuit's exit or any node in the @@ -3910,6 +3927,7 @@ choose_random_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t type) return choose_random_entry_impl(get_guard_selection_info(), NULL, 1, type, NULL); } +#endif /** Return the number of bridges that have descriptors that are marked with * purpose 'bridge' and are running. @@ -3920,10 +3938,13 @@ num_bridges_usable(void) int n_options = 0; if (get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) { - +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges); (void) choose_random_entry_impl(get_guard_selection_info(), NULL, 0, 0, &n_options); +#else + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); +#endif } else { /* XXXX prop271 Is this quite right? */ tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges); @@ -3944,6 +3965,7 @@ num_bridges_usable(void) return n_options; } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /** Filter all_entry_guards for usable entry guards and put them * in live_entry_guards. We filter based on whether the node is * currently alive, and on whether it satisfies the restrictions @@ -4156,6 +4178,7 @@ choose_random_entry_impl(guard_selection_t *gs, smartlist_free(live_entry_guards); return node; } +#endif static void pathbias_check_use_success_count(entry_guard_t *node) @@ -4199,6 +4222,7 @@ pathbias_check_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *node) } } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /** Parse state and learn about the entry guards it describes. * If set is true, and there are no errors, replace the guard * list in the provided guard selection context with what we find. @@ -4452,6 +4476,7 @@ entry_guards_parse_state_for_guard_selection( digestmap_free(added_by, tor_free_); return *msg ? -1 : 0; } +#endif /** Parse state and learn about the entry guards it describes. * If set is true, and there are no errors, replace the guard @@ -4466,9 +4491,13 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg) int r1 = entry_guards_load_guards_from_state(state, set); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM int r2 = entry_guards_parse_state_for_guard_selection( get_guard_selection_by_name("legacy", GS_TYPE_LEGACY, 1), state, set, msg); +#else + int r2 = 0; +#endif entry_guards_dirty = 0; @@ -4530,8 +4559,6 @@ entry_guards_changed(void) void entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state) { - config_line_t **next, *line; - entry_guards_dirty = 0; // Handles all non-legacy guard info. @@ -4539,6 +4566,9 @@ entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state) entry_guards_dirty = 0; +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM + config_line_t **next, *line; + guard_selection_t *gs; gs = get_guard_selection_by_name("legacy", GS_TYPE_LEGACY, 0); if (!gs) @@ -4612,6 +4642,7 @@ entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state) } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e); +#endif if (!get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites) or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), 0); entry_guards_dirty = 0; @@ -4634,11 +4665,18 @@ getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn, guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_info(); tor_assert(gs != NULL); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM tor_assert(gs->chosen_entry_guards != NULL); +#else + // XXXX + (void)question; + (void)answer; +#endif (void) conn; (void) errmsg; +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM if (!strcmp(question,"entry-guards") || !strcmp(question,"helper-nodes")) { smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new(); @@ -4683,6 +4721,7 @@ getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn, SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c)); smartlist_free(sl); } +#endif return 0; } @@ -4721,6 +4760,7 @@ guard_get_guardfraction_bandwidth(guardfraction_bandwidth_t *guardfraction_bw, guardfraction_bw->non_guard_bw = orig_bandwidth - (int) guard_bw; } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /** Returns true iff the node is used as a guard in the specified guard * context */ int @@ -4819,6 +4859,7 @@ entries_retry_all(const or_options_t *options) tor_assert(entry_list_is_constrained(options)); entries_retry_helper(options, 1); } +#endif /** Helper: Update the status of all entry guards, in whatever algorithm * is used. Return true if we should stop using all previously generated @@ -4833,7 +4874,11 @@ guards_update_all(void) tor_assert(curr_guard_context); if (curr_guard_context->type == GS_TYPE_LEGACY) { +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM entry_guards_compute_status(get_options(), approx_time()); +#else + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); +#endif } else { if (entry_guards_update_all(curr_guard_context)) mark_circuits = 1; @@ -4849,7 +4894,12 @@ guards_choose_guard(cpath_build_state_t *state, circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out) { if (get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) { +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM return choose_random_entry(state); +#else + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + return NULL; +#endif } else { const node_t *r = NULL; const uint8_t *exit_id = NULL; @@ -4877,7 +4927,13 @@ guards_choose_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t info, circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out) { if (get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) { +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM return choose_random_dirguard(info); +#else + (void)info; + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + return NULL; +#endif } else { /* XXXX prop271 We don't need to look at the dirinfo_type_t here, * apparently. If you look at the old implementation, and you follow info @@ -4897,6 +4953,31 @@ guards_choose_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t info, } } +/** + * If we're running with a constrained guard set, then maybe mark our guards + * usable. Return 1 if we do; 0 if we don't. + */ +int +guards_retry_optimistic(const or_options_t *options) +{ + if (! entry_list_is_constrained(options)) + return 0; + +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM + if (options->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) { + if (entries_known_but_down(options)) { + entries_retry_all(options); + return 1; + } + } +#endif + + // XXXX prop271 -- is this correct? + mark_primary_guards_maybe_reachable(get_guard_selection_info()); + + return 1; +} + /** Free one guard selection context */ STATIC void guard_selection_free(guard_selection_t *gs) @@ -4905,12 +4986,14 @@ guard_selection_free(guard_selection_t *gs) tor_free(gs->name); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM if (gs->chosen_entry_guards) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->chosen_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, entry_guard_free(e)); smartlist_free(gs->chosen_entry_guards); gs->chosen_entry_guards = NULL; } +#endif if (gs->sampled_entry_guards) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index c05a3e3..3250be1 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ typedef struct circuit_guard_state_t circuit_guard_state_t; private. */ typedef struct entry_guard_restriction_t entry_guard_restriction_t; +/* + XXXX Prop271 undefine this in order to disable all legacy guard functions. +*/ +#define ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM + /* Information about a guard's pathbias status. * These fields are used in circpathbias.c to try to detect entry * nodes that are failing circuits at a suspicious frequency. @@ -174,6 +179,7 @@ struct entry_guard_t { guard_selection_t *in_selection; /**@}*/ +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /** * @name legacy guard selection algorithm fields * @@ -202,6 +208,7 @@ struct entry_guard_t { * at which we last failed to connect to it. */ /**}@*/ +#endif /** Path bias information for this guard. */ guard_pathbias_t pb; @@ -298,6 +305,7 @@ struct guard_selection_s { * confirmed_entry_guards receive? */ int next_confirmed_idx; +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /** * A list of our chosen entry guards, as entry_guard_t structures; this * preserves the pre-Prop271 behavior. @@ -310,6 +318,7 @@ struct guard_selection_s { * preserves the pre-Prop271 behavior. */ int should_add_entry_nodes; +#endif }; struct entry_guard_handle_t; @@ -369,9 +378,11 @@ entry_guard_t *entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest); void entry_guards_changed_for_guard_selection(guard_selection_t *gs); void entry_guards_changed(void); guard_selection_t * get_guard_selection_info(void); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM const smartlist_t *get_entry_guards_for_guard_selection( guard_selection_t *gs); const smartlist_t *get_entry_guards(void); +#endif int num_live_entry_guards_for_guard_selection( guard_selection_t *gs, int for_directory); @@ -379,7 +390,9 @@ int num_live_entry_guards(int for_directory); #endif const node_t *entry_guard_find_node(const entry_guard_t *guard); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM void entry_guard_mark_bad(entry_guard_t *guard); +#endif const char *entry_guard_get_rsa_id_digest(const entry_guard_t *guard); const char *entry_guard_describe(const entry_guard_t *guard); guard_pathbias_t *entry_guard_get_pathbias_state(entry_guard_t *guard); @@ -408,8 +421,10 @@ void entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(guard_selection_t *gs); int update_guard_selection_choice(const or_options_t *options); /* Used by bridges.c only. */ +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM void add_bridge_as_entry_guard(guard_selection_t *gs, const node_t *chosen); +#endif int num_bridges_usable(void); #ifdef ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE @@ -568,6 +583,7 @@ STATIC unsigned entry_guards_note_guard_success(guard_selection_t *gs, unsigned old_state); STATIC int entry_guard_has_higher_priority(entry_guard_t *a, entry_guard_t *b); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM // ---------- XXXX this stuff is pre-prop271. STATIC const node_t *add_an_entry_guard(guard_selection_t *gs, @@ -599,16 +615,20 @@ STATIC const node_t *entry_is_live(const entry_guard_t *e, const char **msg); STATIC int entry_is_time_to_retry(const entry_guard_t *e, time_t now); +#endif #endif +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM void remove_all_entry_guards_for_guard_selection(guard_selection_t *gs); void remove_all_entry_guards(void); +#endif struct bridge_info_t; void entry_guard_learned_bridge_identity(const tor_addr_port_t *addrport, const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM void entry_guards_compute_status_for_guard_selection( guard_selection_t *gs, const or_options_t *options, time_t now); void entry_guards_compute_status(const or_options_t *options, time_t now); @@ -619,9 +639,13 @@ int entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded, int mark_relay_status, time_t now); void entry_nodes_should_be_added_for_guard_selection(guard_selection_t *gs); void entry_nodes_should_be_added(void); +#endif int entry_list_is_constrained(const or_options_t *options); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM const node_t *choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state); const node_t *choose_random_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t t); +#endif +int guards_retry_optimistic(const or_options_t *options); int entry_guards_parse_state_for_guard_selection( guard_selection_t *gs, or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg); int entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg); @@ -629,9 +653,11 @@ void entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state); int getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn, const char *question, char **answer, const char **errmsg); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM int is_node_used_as_guard_for_guard_selection(guard_selection_t *gs, const node_t *node); MOCK_DECL(int, is_node_used_as_guard, (const node_t *node)); +#endif int entries_known_but_down(const or_options_t *options); void entries_retry_all(const or_options_t *options); diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index d2f360a..cfa570c 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -2003,6 +2003,10 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(dirinfo_type_t type, int flags, int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0, n_busy = 0; int try_ip_pref = 1; +#ifndef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM + tor_assert_nonfatal(! for_guard); +#endif + if (!consensus) return NULL; @@ -2038,10 +2042,12 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(dirinfo_type_t type, int flags, if ((type & EXTRAINFO_DIRINFO) && !router_supports_extrainfo(node->identity, is_trusted_extrainfo)) continue; +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /* Don't make the same node a guard twice */ if (for_guard && is_node_used_as_guard(node)) { continue; } +#endif /* Ensure that a directory guard is actually a guard node. */ if (for_guard && !node->is_possible_guard) { continue; diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index fbb3b13..594708a 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ get_or_state_replacement(void) return dummy_state; } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /* Unittest cleanup function: Cleanup the fake network. */ static int fake_network_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *testcase, void *ptr) @@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ fake_network_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) /* Return anything but NULL (it's interpreted as test fail) */ return dummy_state; } +#endif static networkstatus_t *dummy_consensus = NULL; @@ -200,6 +202,7 @@ mock_get_options(void) return &mocked_options; } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM /** Test choose_random_entry() with none of our routers being guard nodes. */ static void test_choose_random_entry_no_guards(void *arg) @@ -888,6 +891,7 @@ test_entry_is_live(void *arg) done: ; /* XXX */ } +#endif #define TEST_IPV4_ADDR "123.45.67.89" #define TEST_IPV6_ADDR "[1234:5678:90ab:cdef::]" @@ -1471,8 +1475,12 @@ test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_broken(void *arg) tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_df->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 1); guard_selection_t *gs_legacy = get_guard_selection_by_name("legacy", GS_TYPE_LEGACY, 0); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM tt_assert(gs_legacy != NULL); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_legacy->chosen_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 0); +#else + tt_assert(gs_legacy == NULL); +#endif done: config_free_lines(lines); @@ -2455,7 +2463,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) // if we mark that guard down, we should get a different primary guard. // auto-retry it. g->is_reachable = GUARD_REACHABLE_NO; - g->unreachable_since = approx_time() - 10; + g->failing_since = approx_time() - 10; g->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time() - 10; state = 9999; g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); @@ -2469,7 +2477,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) // If we say that the first primary guard was last tried a long time ago, we // should get an automatic retry on it. - g->unreachable_since = approx_time() - 72*60*60; + g->failing_since = approx_time() - 72*60*60; g->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time() - 72*60*60; state = 9999; g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); @@ -2484,7 +2492,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard, { guard->is_reachable = GUARD_REACHABLE_NO; guard->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time() - 5; - guard->unreachable_since = approx_time() - 30; + guard->failing_since = approx_time() - 30; }); state = 9999; g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, NULL, &state); @@ -2503,7 +2511,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg) tt_assert(guard->is_usable_filtered_guard == 1); // no change to these fields. tt_i64_op(guard->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, approx_time() - 5); - tt_i64_op(guard->unreachable_since, OP_EQ, approx_time() - 30); + tt_i64_op(guard->failing_since, OP_EQ, approx_time() - 30); }); /* Let's try again and we should get the first primary guard again */ @@ -3334,9 +3342,11 @@ test_enty_guard_should_expire_waiting(void *arg) tor_free(fake_state); } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM static const struct testcase_setup_t fake_network = { fake_network_setup, fake_network_cleanup }; +#endif static const struct testcase_setup_t big_fake_network = { big_fake_network_setup, big_fake_network_cleanup @@ -3354,6 +3364,7 @@ static const struct testcase_setup_t upgrade_circuits = { (void*)(arg) } struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = { +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM { "entry_is_time_to_retry", test_entry_is_time_to_retry, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "choose_random_entry_no_guards", test_choose_random_entry_no_guards, @@ -3379,6 +3390,7 @@ struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = { { "entry_is_live", test_entry_is_live, TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL }, +#endif { "node_preferred_orport", test_node_preferred_orport, 0, NULL, NULL }, diff --git a/src/test/test_routerlist.c b/src/test/test_routerlist.c index af5c121..73e8d10 100644 --- a/src/test/test_routerlist.c +++ b/src/test/test_routerlist.c @@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ mock_usable_consensus_flavor(void) return mock_usable_consensus_flavor_value; } +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM static smartlist_t *mock_is_guard_list = NULL; static int @@ -250,6 +251,7 @@ clear_mock_guard_list(void) mock_is_guard_list = NULL; } } +#endif static void test_router_pick_directory_server_impl(void *arg) @@ -271,7 +273,9 @@ test_router_pick_directory_server_impl(void *arg) (void)arg; MOCK(usable_consensus_flavor, mock_usable_consensus_flavor); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM MOCK(is_node_used_as_guard, mock_is_node_used_as_guard); +#endif /* With no consensus, we must be bootstrapping, regardless of time or flavor */ @@ -384,6 +388,7 @@ test_router_pick_directory_server_impl(void *arg) node_router1->is_valid = 1; node_router3->is_valid = 1; +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM flags |= PDS_FOR_GUARD; mark_node_used_as_guard(node_router1); mark_node_used_as_guard(node_router2); @@ -397,8 +402,10 @@ test_router_pick_directory_server_impl(void *arg) rs = NULL; mark_node_unused_as_guard(node_router2); mark_node_unused_as_guard(node_router3); +#endif /* One not valid, one guard. This should leave one remaining */ +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM node_router1->is_valid = 0; mark_node_used_as_guard(node_router2); rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); @@ -407,6 +414,7 @@ test_router_pick_directory_server_impl(void *arg) rs = NULL; node_router1->is_valid = 1; mark_node_unused_as_guard(node_router2); +#endif /* Manipulate overloaded */ @@ -469,8 +477,10 @@ test_router_pick_directory_server_impl(void *arg) done: UNMOCK(usable_consensus_flavor); +#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY_GUARD_ALGORITHM UNMOCK(is_node_used_as_guard); clear_mock_guard_list(); +#endif if (router1_id) tor_free(router1_id);

1 0

[tor/master] Fix a signed/unsigned warning on 32-bit
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 2b4bfe62ee74b927d65923f5d07fe04f51f8779a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 30 14:25:16 2016 -0500 Fix a signed/unsigned warning on 32-bit --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 78257ca..ac62155 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -1665,7 +1665,7 @@ entry_guards_update_primary(guard_selection_t *gs) * Return the number of seconds after the last attempt at which we should * retry a guard that has been failing since failing_since. */ -static unsigned +static int get_retry_schedule(time_t failing_since, time_t now, int is_primary) { @@ -1712,7 +1712,7 @@ entry_guard_consider_retry(entry_guard_t *guard) return; /* No retry needed. */ const time_t now = approx_time(); - const unsigned delay = + const int delay = get_retry_schedule(guard->failing_since, now, guard->is_primary); const time_t last_attempt = guard->last_tried_to_connect;

1 0

[tor/master] Tests for restricted-circuit cases of upgrade_waiting_circuits()
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 7361e1b499f3b2dc4a24192eed47d0adb668c25a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 30 13:28:44 2016 -0500 Tests for restricted-circuit cases of upgrade_waiting_circuits() --- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index 1fbb8f8..84fdf07 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -3079,6 +3079,45 @@ test_entry_guard_upgrade_blocked_by_better_circ_complete(void *arg) } static void +test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_restricted_circ_complete(void *arg) +{ + upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg; + + /* Once more, let circ1 become complete. But this time, we'll claim + * that circ2 was restricted to not use the same guard as circ1. */ + data->guard2_state->restrictions = + tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t)); + memcpy(data->guard2_state->restrictions->exclude_id, + data->guard1->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + + smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new(); + int r; + r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs, + data->all_origin_circuits, + result); + tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 1); + origin_circuit_t *oc = smartlist_get(result, 0); + tt_ptr_op(oc, OP_EQ, data->circ1); + tt_ptr_op(data->guard1_state, OP_NE, NULL); + tt_int_op(data->guard1_state->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE); + + /* Now, we try again. Since circ2 has a restriction that circ1 doesn't obey, + * circ2 _is_ eligible for upgrade. */ + smartlist_clear(result); + r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs, + data->all_origin_circuits, + result); + tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 1); + origin_circuit_t *oc2 = smartlist_get(result, 0); + tt_ptr_op(oc2, OP_EQ, data->circ2); + + done: + smartlist_free(result); +} + +static void test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_complete(void *arg) { upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg; @@ -3140,6 +3179,43 @@ test_entry_guard_upgrade_blocked_by_better_circ_pending(void *arg) } static void +test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_restricted_circ_pending(void *arg) +{ + upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg; + /* circ2 is done, but circ1 is still pending. But when there is a + restriction on circ2 that circ1 can't satisfy, circ1 can't block + circ2. */ + + /* XXXX Prop271 -- this is a kludge. I'm making sure circ1 _is_ better, + * by messing with the guards' confirmed_idx */ + make_guard_confirmed(data->gs, data->guard1); + { + int tmp; + tmp = data->guard1->confirmed_idx; + data->guard1->confirmed_idx = data->guard2->confirmed_idx; + data->guard2->confirmed_idx = tmp; + } + + data->guard2_state->restrictions = + tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t)); + memcpy(data->guard2_state->restrictions->exclude_id, + data->guard1->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + + smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new(); + int r; + r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs, + data->all_origin_circuits, + result); + tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 1); + origin_circuit_t *oc = smartlist_get(result, 0); + tt_ptr_op(oc, OP_EQ, data->circ2); + + done: + smartlist_free(result); +} + +static void test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_pending(void *arg) { upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg; @@ -3283,8 +3359,12 @@ struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = { UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_blocked_by_live_primary_guards, "c1-done c2-done"), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_blocked_by_lack_of_waiting_circuits, ""), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_blocked_by_better_circ_complete, "c1-done c2-done"), + UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_restricted_circ_complete, + "c1-done c2-done"), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_complete, "c1-done c2-done"), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_blocked_by_better_circ_pending, "c2-done"), + UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_restricted_circ_pending, + "c2-done"), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_pending, "c1-done"), { "should_expire_waiting", test_enty_guard_should_expire_waiting, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },

1 0

[tor/master] Trivial documentation improvements.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Dec '16

16 Dec '16

commit 7ab2678074e5d49628d948fadb80c5904950236c Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue Dec 6 14:34:48 2016 -0500 Trivial documentation improvements. --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 13 ++++++------- src/or/entrynodes.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- src/or/entrynodes.h | 9 ++++++--- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index b25f817..ab38b54 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -562,7 +562,6 @@ circuit_get_global_list,(void)) return global_circuitlist; } -/** */ /** Return a pointer to the global list of origin circuits. */ smartlist_t * circuit_get_global_origin_circuit_list(void) @@ -1758,17 +1757,17 @@ circuit_find_circuits_to_upgrade_from_guard_wait(void) if (! circuits_pending_other_guards || smartlist_len(circuits_pending_other_guards)==0) return NULL; - /* Only if we have some origin circuiuts should we run the algorithm. - */ + /* Only if we have some origin circuits should we run the algorithm. */ if (!global_origin_circuit_list) return NULL; /* Okay; we can pass our circuit list to entrynodes.c.*/ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new(); - int r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(get_guard_selection_info(), - global_origin_circuit_list, - result); - if (r && smartlist_len(result)) { + int circuits_upgraded = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits( + get_guard_selection_info(), + global_origin_circuit_list, + result); + if (circuits_upgraded && smartlist_len(result)) { return result; } else { smartlist_free(result); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 76070a3..a28603d 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -142,7 +142,9 @@ #include "transports.h" #include "statefile.h" +/** A list of existing guard selection contexts. */ static smartlist_t *guard_contexts = NULL; +/** The currently enabled guard selection context. */ static guard_selection_t *curr_guard_context = NULL; /** A value of 1 means that at least one context has changed, @@ -593,7 +595,8 @@ choose_guard_selection(const or_options_t *options, "rest of the world.", (int)(exclude_frac * 100)); } - /* Easy case: no previous selection */ + /* Easy case: no previous selection. Just check if we are in restricted or + normal guard selection. */ if (old_selection == NULL) { if (n_passing_filter >= meaningful_threshold_mid) { *type_out = GS_TYPE_NORMAL; @@ -768,8 +771,9 @@ entry_guard_add_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs, /** * Backend: adds a new sampled guard to gs, with given identity, - * nickname, and ORPort. rsa_id_digest and bridge_addrport are - * optional, but we need one of them. nickname is optional. + * nickname, and ORPort. rsa_id_digest and bridge_addrport are optional, but + * we need one of them. nickname is optional. The caller is responsible for + * maintaining the size limit of the SAMPLED_GUARDS set. */ static entry_guard_t * entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(guard_selection_t *gs, @@ -2171,7 +2175,8 @@ entry_guards_all_primary_guards_are_down(guard_selection_t *gs) } /** Wrapper for entry_guard_has_higher_priority that compares the - * guard-priorities of a pair of circuits. + * guard-priorities of a pair of circuits. Return 1 if a has higher + * priority than b. * * If a restriction is provided in rst, then do not consider * a to have higher priority if it violates the restriction. @@ -4180,6 +4185,8 @@ choose_random_entry_impl(guard_selection_t *gs, } #endif +/** Check the pathbias use success count of node and disable it if it + * goes over our thresholds. */ static void pathbias_check_use_success_count(entry_guard_t *node) { @@ -4201,6 +4208,8 @@ pathbias_check_use_success_count(entry_guard_t *node) } } +/** Check the pathbias close count of node and disable it if it goes + * over our thresholds. */ static void pathbias_check_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *node) { diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index 3250be1..116e5ab 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -402,11 +402,14 @@ int entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, entry_guard_restriction_t *rst, const node_t **chosen_node_out, circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out); + +/* We just connected to an entry guard. What should we do with the circuit? */ typedef enum { - GUARD_USABLE_NEVER = -1, - GUARD_MAYBE_USABLE_LATER = 0, - GUARD_USABLE_NOW = 1, + GUARD_USABLE_NEVER = -1, /* Never use the circuit */ + GUARD_MAYBE_USABLE_LATER = 0, /* Keep it. We might use it in the future */ + GUARD_USABLE_NOW = 1, /* Use it right now */ } guard_usable_t; + guard_usable_t entry_guard_succeeded(circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_p); void entry_guard_failed(circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_p); void entry_guard_cancel(circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_p);

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tor-commits December 2016