tor-commits January 2013

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[stem/master] Caching ExitPolicy's can_exit_to() results
by atagar＠torproject.org 14 Jan '13

14 Jan '13

commit 32b9de7c8e2690d4642ac72019c7ed684e3b3576 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Jan 13 21:12:08 2013 -0800 Caching ExitPolicy's can_exit_to() results That's odd. I wonder why I didn't add a cache here - can_exit_to() is a method that's highly likely to be called repeatedly so if we can get contant time lookups then great. --- stem/exit_policy.py | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/stem/exit_policy.py b/stem/exit_policy.py index e568deb..36c5c98 100644 --- a/stem/exit_policy.py +++ b/stem/exit_policy.py @@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ class ExitPolicy(object): self._input_rules = rules # input rules, only kept until self._rules is set self._is_allowed_default = True self._summary_representation = None + self._can_exit_to_cache = {} def can_exit_to(self, address = None, port = None): """ @@ -163,11 +164,17 @@ class ExitPolicy(object): :returns: **True** if exiting to this destination is allowed, **False** otherwise """ - for rule in self._get_rules(): - if rule.is_match(address, port): - return rule.is_accept + if not (address, port) in self._can_exit_to_cache: + result = self._is_allowed_default - return self._is_allowed_default + for rule in self._get_rules(): + if rule.is_match(address, port): + result = rule.is_accept + break + + self._can_exit_to_cache[(address, port)] = result + + return self._can_exit_to_cache[(address, port)] def is_exiting_allowed(self): """ @@ -285,6 +292,7 @@ class ExitPolicy(object): """ self._is_allowed_default = is_allowed_default + self._can_exit_to_cache = {} def _get_rules(self): if self._rules is None:

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[translation/vidalia_help_completed] Update translations for vidalia_help_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 14 Jan '13

14 Jan '13

commit ae0c5d0d079d48e3c408f0b8683fe179d7ea083c Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 14 05:15:43 2013 +0000 Update translations for vidalia_help_completed --- fr/config.po | 9 +++++---- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fr/config.po b/fr/config.po index 494a6a8..f78a70e 100644 --- a/fr/config.po +++ b/fr/config.po @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ # # Translators: +# <onizuka.xxxx(a)gmail.com>, 2013. # <pouicpouicpouic(a)gmail.com>, 2011. # runasand <runa.sandvik(a)gmail.com>, 2011. msgid "" @@ -7,14 +8,14 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2010-06-26 16:58+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-02-14 10:04+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: jvoisin <pouicpouicpouic(a)gmail.com>\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2013-01-14 05:09+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Onizuka <onizuka.xxxx(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" "Language: fr\n" -"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n > 1)\n" +"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n > 1);\n" #. type: Content of: <html><body><h1> #: en/config.html:16 @@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ msgstr "Paramètres avancés" msgid "" "The settings on the Advanced page should generally only be modified " "by more experienced users." -msgstr "Les paramètres de la page Avancée devraient être modifié, en règle générale, uniquement par des utilisateurs expérimentés." +msgstr "Les paramètres de la page Avancée devraient être modifiés, en règle générale, uniquement par des utilisateurs expérimentés." #. type: Content of: <html><body><ul><li> #: en/config.html:138

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[translation/vidalia_help] Update translations for vidalia_help
by translation＠torproject.org 14 Jan '13

14 Jan '13

commit 5383d48610cd6f4d3405dbe6dc3ba13ed352d4aa Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 14 05:15:31 2013 +0000 Update translations for vidalia_help --- fr/config.po | 9 +++++---- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fr/config.po b/fr/config.po index 494a6a8..f78a70e 100644 --- a/fr/config.po +++ b/fr/config.po @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ # # Translators: +# <onizuka.xxxx(a)gmail.com>, 2013. # <pouicpouicpouic(a)gmail.com>, 2011. # runasand <runa.sandvik(a)gmail.com>, 2011. msgid "" @@ -7,14 +8,14 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2010-06-26 16:58+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-02-14 10:04+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: jvoisin <pouicpouicpouic(a)gmail.com>\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2013-01-14 05:09+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Onizuka <onizuka.xxxx(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" "Language: fr\n" -"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n > 1)\n" +"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n > 1);\n" #. type: Content of: <html><body><h1> #: en/config.html:16 @@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ msgstr "Paramètres avancés" msgid "" "The settings on the Advanced page should generally only be modified " "by more experienced users." -msgstr "Les paramètres de la page Avancée devraient être modifié, en règle générale, uniquement par des utilisateurs expérimentés." +msgstr "Les paramètres de la page Avancée devraient être modifiés, en règle générale, uniquement par des utilisateurs expérimentés." #. type: Content of: <html><body><ul><li> #: en/config.html:138

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[translation/vidalia_completed] Update translations for vidalia_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 14 Jan '13

14 Jan '13

commit 5271ba812972acfbac0e96266af1e6e427197eac Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 14 03:15:20 2013 +0000 Update translations for vidalia_completed --- fr/vidalia_fr.po | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fr/vidalia_fr.po b/fr/vidalia_fr.po index 9acac7b..5abf22b 100644 --- a/fr/vidalia_fr.po +++ b/fr/vidalia_fr.po @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2012-03-21 17:52+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2013-01-13 03:10+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2013-01-14 03:13+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Onizuka <onizuka.xxxx(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: translations(a)vidalia-project.net\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@ msgstr "Parcourir" msgctxt "GeneralPage" msgid "Start the Tor software when Vidalia starts" -msgstr "Lancer le logiciel Tor au démarrage du système" +msgstr "Lancer le logiciel Tor au démarrage de Vidalia" msgctxt "GeneralPage" msgid "Tor"

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[translation/vidalia] Update translations for vidalia
by translation＠torproject.org 14 Jan '13

14 Jan '13

commit 7f6c67587afbe46b9f093726246e6ef47a0cc805 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 14 03:15:16 2013 +0000 Update translations for vidalia --- fr/vidalia_fr.po | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fr/vidalia_fr.po b/fr/vidalia_fr.po index 9acac7b..5abf22b 100644 --- a/fr/vidalia_fr.po +++ b/fr/vidalia_fr.po @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2012-03-21 17:52+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2013-01-13 03:10+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2013-01-14 03:13+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Onizuka <onizuka.xxxx(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: translations(a)vidalia-project.net\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@ msgstr "Parcourir" msgctxt "GeneralPage" msgid "Start the Tor software when Vidalia starts" -msgstr "Lancer le logiciel Tor au démarrage du système" +msgstr "Lancer le logiciel Tor au démarrage de Vidalia" msgctxt "GeneralPage" msgid "Tor"

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[tor/master] Fix bug 7341.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jan '13

14 Jan '13

commit 3458d904f62b2d97dce5fea6f85285ea34851724 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Fri Dec 7 18:57:51 2012 -0800 Fix bug 7341. Fix cannibalize, rend circ and intro circ timeout handling. --- changes/bug7341 | 7 +++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 3 + src/or/circuituse.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- src/or/rendclient.c | 35 +++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug7341 b/changes/bug7341 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f046d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug7341 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + + o Minor features: + - Improve circuit build timeout handling for hidden services. + In particular: adjust build timeouts more accurately depending + upon the number of hop-RTTs that a particular circuit type + undergoes. Additionally, launch intro circuits in parallel + if they timeout, and take the first one to reply as valid. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 12d6ea3..7d94b2b 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2567,6 +2567,9 @@ circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit) { int err_reason = 0; warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit); + + tor_gettimeofday(&circ->base_.timestamp_began); + circuit_append_new_exit(circ, exit); circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING); if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ))<0) { diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index e414df1..ffcebfd 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -280,17 +280,19 @@ circuit_get_best(const entry_connection_t *conn, if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) continue; origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - if (!circuit_is_acceptable(origin_circ,conn,must_be_open,purpose, - need_uptime,need_internal,now.tv_sec)) - continue; + /* Log an info message if we're going to launch a new intro circ in + * parallel */ if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT && - !must_be_open && circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN && - tv_mdiff(&now, &circ->timestamp_began) > circ_times.timeout_ms) { - intro_going_on_but_too_old = 1; - continue; + !must_be_open && origin_circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out) { + intro_going_on_but_too_old = 1; + continue; } + if (!circuit_is_acceptable(origin_circ,conn,must_be_open,purpose, + need_uptime,need_internal,now.tv_sec)) + continue; + /* now this is an acceptable circ to hand back. but that doesn't * mean it's the *best* circ to hand back. try to decide. */ @@ -367,8 +369,8 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) * circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout() if we haven't computed * custom timeouts yet */ struct timeval general_cutoff, begindir_cutoff, fourhop_cutoff, - cannibalize_cutoff, close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff, - hs_extremely_old_cutoff; + close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff, hs_extremely_old_cutoff, + cannibalized_cutoff, c_intro_cutoff, s_intro_cutoff, stream_cutoff; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); struct timeval now; cpath_build_state_t *build_state; @@ -407,10 +409,51 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) timersub(&now, &diff, &target); \ } while (0) + /** + * OP --a--> A --b--> B --c--> C + * OP --a--> A --b--> B --c--> C --d--> D + * + * Let h = a = b = c = d + * + * Three hops (general_cutoff) + * RTTs = 3a + 2b + c + * RTTs = 6h + * Cannibalized: + * RTTs = a+b+c+d + * RTTs = 4h + * Four hops: + * RTTs = 4a + 3b + 2c + d + * RTTs = 10h + * Client INTRODUCE1+ACK: // XXX: correct? + * RTTs = 5a + 4b + 3c + 2d + * RTTs = 14h + * Server intro: + * RTTs = 4a + 3b + 2c + * RTTs = 9h + */ SET_CUTOFF(general_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms); SET_CUTOFF(begindir_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms); - SET_CUTOFF(fourhop_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (4/3.0)); - SET_CUTOFF(cannibalize_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms / 2.0); + + /* > 3hop circs seem to have a 1.0 second delay on their cannibalized + * 4th hop. */ + SET_CUTOFF(fourhop_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (10/6.0) + 1000); + + /* CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND behaves more like a RELAY cell. + * Use the stream cutoff (more or less). */ + SET_CUTOFF(stream_cutoff, MAX(options->CircuitStreamTimeout,15)*1000 + 1000); + + /* Be lenient with cannibalized circs. They already survived the official + * CBT, and they're usually not perf-critical. */ + SET_CUTOFF(cannibalized_cutoff, + MAX(circ_times.close_ms*(4/6.0), + options->CircuitStreamTimeout * 1000) + 1000); + + // Intro circs have an extra round trip (and are also 4 hops long) + SET_CUTOFF(c_intro_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (14/6.0) + 1000); + + // Server intro circs have an extra round trip + SET_CUTOFF(s_intro_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (9/6.0) + 1000); + SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms); SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000); @@ -441,13 +484,20 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) build_state = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state; if (build_state && build_state->onehop_tunnel) cutoff = begindir_cutoff; - else if (build_state && build_state->desired_path_len == 4 - && !TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened) - cutoff = fourhop_cutoff; - else if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened) - cutoff = cannibalize_cutoff; else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) cutoff = close_cutoff; + else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING || + victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) + cutoff = c_intro_cutoff; + else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO) + cutoff = s_intro_cutoff; + else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) + cutoff = stream_cutoff; + else if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened && + victim->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) + cutoff = cannibalized_cutoff; + else if (build_state && build_state->desired_path_len >= 4) + cutoff = fourhop_cutoff; else cutoff = general_cutoff; @@ -520,8 +570,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) default: /* most open circuits can be left alone. */ continue; /* yes, continue inside a switch refers to the nearest * enclosing loop. C is smart. */ - case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND: - case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO: break; /* too old, need to die */ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: @@ -533,6 +581,14 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) victim->timestamp_dirty > cutoff.tv_sec) continue; break; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: + /* We keep old introducing circuits around for + * a while in parallel, and they can end up "opened". + * We decide below if we're going to mark them timed + * out and eventually close them. + */ + break; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT: /* rend and intro circs become dirty each time they @@ -621,6 +677,9 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->pending_final_cpath == NULL) break; + /* fallthrough! */ + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: + /* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit() will relaunch for us */ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: /* If we have reached this line, we want to spare the circ for now. */ @@ -653,15 +712,23 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) } if (victim->n_chan) - log_info(LD_CIRC,"Abandoning circ %s:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)", + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Abandoning circ %u %s:%hd (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %hhd, " + "len %d)", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier, channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(victim->n_chan), victim->n_circ_id, + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened, victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), - victim->purpose); + victim->purpose, + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len); else - log_info(LD_CIRC,"Abandoning circ %d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)", - victim->n_circ_id, victim->state, - circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), victim->purpose); + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Abandoning circ %u %hd (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %hhd, len %d)", + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier, + victim->n_circ_id, TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened, + victim->state, + circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), victim->purpose, + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len); circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC,TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)); if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) @@ -2101,28 +2168,12 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn) if (retval > 0) { /* one has already sent the intro. keep waiting. */ - circuit_t *c = NULL; tor_assert(introcirc); log_info(LD_REND, "Intro circ %d present and awaiting ack (rend %d). " "Stalling. (stream %d sec old)", introcirc->base_.n_circ_id, rendcirc ? rendcirc->base_.n_circ_id : 0, conn_age); - /* abort parallel intro circs, if any */ - for (c = global_circuitlist; c; c = c->next) { - if (c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && - !c->marked_for_close && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c)) { - origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(c); - if (oc->rend_data && - !rend_cmp_service_ids( - ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data->onion_address, - oc->rend_data->onion_address)) { - log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Closing introduction circuit that we " - "built in parallel."); - circuit_mark_for_close(c, END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT); - } - } - } return 0; } diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 0bed615..2219fe8 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -66,6 +66,11 @@ rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ) circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); return -1; } + + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it, + * and the rend cookie also means we've used the circ. */ + circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); + if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ), RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS, circ->rend_data->rend_cookie, @@ -100,6 +105,7 @@ rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ) circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); return -1; } + // XXX: should we not re-extend if hs_circ_has_timed_out? if (circ->remaining_relay_early_cells) { log_info(LD_REND, "Re-extending circ %d, this time to %s.", @@ -338,6 +344,32 @@ rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ) } } +/** + * Called to close other intro circuits we launched in parallel + * due to timeout. + */ +static void +rend_client_close_other_intros(const char *onion_address) +{ + circuit_t *c; + /* abort parallel intro circs, if any */ + for (c = circuit_get_global_list_(); c; c = c->next) { + if ((c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING || + c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) && + !c->marked_for_close && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c)) { + origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(c); + if (oc->rend_data && + !rend_cmp_service_ids(onion_address, + oc->rend_data->onion_address)) { + log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Closing introduction circuit %d that we " + "built in parallel (Purpose %d).", oc->global_identifier, + c->purpose); + circuit_mark_for_close(c, END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT); + } + } + } +} + /** Called when get an ACK or a NAK for a REND_INTRODUCE1 cell. */ int @@ -389,6 +421,9 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED); circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); + + /* close any other intros launched in parallel */ + rend_client_close_other_intros(circ->rend_data->onion_address); } else { /* It's a NAK; the introduction point didn't relay our request. */ circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);

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[tor/master] Bug 7691: Send a probe cell down certain types of circs.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jan '13

14 Jan '13

commit 15fdfc2993777497883df8945c1c9138bea2b33a Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Wed Dec 12 11:53:18 2012 -0800 Bug 7691: Send a probe cell down certain types of circs. In general, if we tried to use a circ for a stream, but then decided to place that stream on a different circuit, we need to probe the original circuit before deciding it was a "success". We also need to do the same for cannibalized circuits that go unused. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 160 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 3 +- src/or/circuitlist.c | 8 ++- src/or/circuituse.c | 31 ++++++---- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- src/or/connection_edge.h | 1 + src/or/or.h | 12 +++- src/or/relay.c | 22 ++++++- 8 files changed, 218 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 7d94b2b..73bd3d4 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ #include "routerparse.h" #include "routerset.h" #include "crypto.h" +#include "connection_edge.h" #ifndef MIN #define MIN(a,b) ((a)<(b)?(a):(b)) @@ -1504,6 +1505,149 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) } /** + * Send a probe down a circuit that wasn't usable. + * + * Returns -1 if we couldn't probe, 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) +{ + /* Based on connection_ap_handshake_send_begin() */ + char payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; + int payload_len; + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + crypt_path_t *cpath_layer = NULL; + // XXX: Generate a random 0.a.b.c adddress + const char *probe_nonce = "0.1.2.3"; + + tor_assert(ocirc); + + cpath_layer = ocirc->cpath->prev; + + if (cpath_layer->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) { + /* This can happen for cannibalized circuits. Their + * last hop isn't yet open */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Got pathbias probe request for unopened circuit %d. " + "Opened %d, len %d", ocirc->global_identifier, + ocirc->has_opened, ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len); + return -1; + } + + /* We already went down this road. */ + if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING && + ocirc->pathbias_probe_id) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Got pathbias probe request for circuit %d with " + "outstanding probe", ocirc->global_identifier); + return -1; + } + + circuit_change_purpose(circ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); + + /* Update timestamp for circuit_expire_building to kill us */ + tor_gettimeofday(&circ->timestamp_began); + + tor_snprintf(payload,RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, "%s:25", probe_nonce); + tor_addr_parse(&ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce, probe_nonce); + + payload_len = (int)strlen(payload)+1; + + // XXX: need this? Can we assume ipv4 will always be supported? + // If not, how do we tell? + //if (payload_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 4 && edge_conn->begincell_flags) { + // set_uint32(payload + payload_len, htonl(edge_conn->begincell_flags)); + // payload_len += 4; + //} + + /* Generate+Store stream id, make sure it's non-zero */ + ocirc->pathbias_probe_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(ocirc); + + if (ocirc->pathbias_probe_id==0) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, + "Ran out of stream IDs on circuit %u during " + "pathbias probe attempt.", ocirc->global_identifier); + return -1; + } + + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Sending pathbias testing cell to %s:25 on stream %d for circ %d.", + probe_nonce, ocirc->pathbias_probe_id, ocirc->global_identifier); + + /* Send a test relay cell */ + if (relay_send_command_from_edge(ocirc->pathbias_probe_id, circ, + RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN, payload, + payload_len, cpath_layer) < 0) { + log_notice(LD_CIRC, + "Failed to send pathbias probe cell on circuit %d.", + ocirc->global_identifier); + return -1; + } + + /* Mark it freshly dirty so it doesn't get expired in the meantime */ + circ->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Check the response to a pathbias probe. + * + * If the response is valid, return 0. Otherwise return < 0. + */ +int +pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell) +{ + /* Based on connection_edge_process_relay_cell() */ + relay_header_t rh; + int reason; + uint32_t ipv4_host; + tor_addr_t host; + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(ocirc); + tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); + + relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); + + reason = rh.length > 0 ? + get_uint8(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) : END_STREAM_REASON_MISC; + + if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_END && + reason == END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY && + ocirc->pathbias_probe_id == rh.stream_id) { + + /* Check length+extract host: It is in network order after the reason code. + * See connection_edge_end(). */ + if (rh.length != 9) { /* reason+ipv4+dns_ttl */ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Path bias probe response length field is insane (%d).", + rh.length); + return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + + ipv4_host = get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+1); + tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&host, ipv4_host); + + /* Check nonce */ + if (memcmp(&host, &ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce, sizeof(tor_addr_t)) == 0) { + ocirc->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED; + circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Got valid path bias probe back for circ %d, stream %d.", + ocirc->global_identifier, ocirc->pathbias_probe_id); + return 0; + } + } + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Got another cell back back on pathbias probe circuit %d: " + "Command: %d, Reason: %d, Stream-id: %d", + ocirc->global_identifier, rh.command, reason, rh.stream_id); + return -1; +} + +/** * Check if a circuit was used and/or closed successfully. * * If we attempted to use the circuit to carry a stream but failed @@ -1512,18 +1656,26 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) * * If we *have* successfully used the circuit, or it appears to * have been closed by us locally, count it as a success. + * + * Returns 0 if we're done making decisions with the circ, + * or -1 if we want to probe it first. */ -void +int pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason) { circuit_t *circ = &ocirc->base_; if (!pathbias_should_count(ocirc)) { - return; + return 0; } if (ocirc->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) { if (circ->timestamp_dirty) { + if (pathbias_send_usable_probe(circ) == 0) + return -1; + else + pathbias_count_unusable(ocirc); + /* Any circuit where there were attempted streams but no successful * streams could be bias */ log_info(LD_CIRC, @@ -1533,7 +1685,7 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason) reason, circ->purpose, ocirc->has_opened, circuit_state_to_string(circ->state), ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len); - pathbias_count_unusable(ocirc); + } else { if (reason & END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE) { /* Unused remote circ close reasons all could be bias */ @@ -1569,6 +1721,8 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason) } else if (ocirc->path_state == PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) { pathbias_count_successful_close(ocirc); } + + return 0; } /** diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h index 029bdaa..b1cedec 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ const node_t *choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, double pathbias_get_extreme_rate(const or_options_t *options); int pathbias_get_dropguards(const or_options_t *options); void pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ); -void pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason); +int pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason); +int pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell); #endif diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 1a73062..90719d2 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -414,6 +414,8 @@ circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose) return "MEASURE_TIMEOUT"; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: return "CONTROLLER"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING: + return "PATH_BIAS_TESTING"; default: tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "UNKNOWN_%d", (int)purpose); @@ -441,6 +443,7 @@ circuit_purpose_to_controller_hs_state_string(uint8_t purpose) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING: return NULL; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT: @@ -1356,7 +1359,10 @@ circuit_mark_for_close_(circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line, } if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { - pathbias_check_close(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), reason); + if (pathbias_check_close(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), reason) == -1) { + /* Don't close it yet, we need to test it first */ + return; + } /* We don't send reasons when closing circuits at the origin. */ reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE; diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index ffcebfd..de62100 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -493,6 +493,8 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) cutoff = s_intro_cutoff; else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) cutoff = stream_cutoff; + else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING) + cutoff = close_cutoff; else if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened && victim->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) cutoff = cannibalized_cutoff; @@ -581,6 +583,11 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) victim->timestamp_dirty > cutoff.tv_sec) continue; break; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING: + /* Open path bias testing circuits are given a long + * time to complete the test, but not forever */ + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED; + break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: /* We keep old introducing circuits around for * a while in parallel, and they can end up "opened". @@ -652,6 +659,18 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) circuit_build_times_set_timeout(&circ_times); } } + + if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened && + victim->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING) { + /* For path bias: we want to let these guys live for a while + * so we get a chance to test them. */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Allowing cannibalized circuit %d time to finish building as a " + "pathbias testing circ.", + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier); + circuit_change_purpose(victim, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); + continue; /* It now should have a longer timeout next time */ + } } /* If this is a hidden service client circuit which is far enough @@ -1232,18 +1251,6 @@ circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ) { control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_BUILT, 0); - /* Cannibalized circuits count as used for path bias. - * (PURPOSE_GENERAL circs especially, since they are - * marked dirty and often go unused after preemptive - * building). */ - // XXX: Cannibalized now use RELAY_EARLY, which is visible - // to taggers end-to-end! We really need to probe these instead. - // Don't forget to remove this check once that's done! - if (circ->has_opened && - circ->build_state->desired_path_len > DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN) { - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED; - } - /* Remember that this circuit has finished building. Now if we start * it building again later (e.g. by extending it), we will know not * to consider its build time. */ diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index a0ebfd1..272955f 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1661,7 +1661,7 @@ connection_ap_process_natd(entry_connection_t *conn) /** Iterate over the two bytes of stream_id until we get one that is not * already in use; return it. Return 0 if can't get a unique stream_id. */ -static streamid_t +streamid_t get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(origin_circuit_t *circ) { edge_connection_t *tmpconn; diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.h b/src/or/connection_edge.h index 9f38951..82cd95b 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.h +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.h @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ int connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(const entry_connection_t *conn, origin_circuit_t *circ, int dry_run); void circuit_clear_isolation(origin_circuit_t *circ); +streamid_t get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(origin_circuit_t *circ); /** @name Begin-cell flags * diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 7b8ff70..4b4806c 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -522,7 +522,9 @@ typedef enum { #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING 18 /** A controller made this circuit and Tor should not use it. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER 19 -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 19 +/** This circuit is used for path bias probing only */ +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING 20 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 20 /** A catch-all for unrecognized purposes. Currently we don't expect * to make or see any circuits with this purpose. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN 255 @@ -2887,6 +2889,14 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * debug why we are not seeing first hops in some cases. */ path_state_t path_state : 3; + /** For path probing. Store the temporary probe stream ID + * for response comparison */ + streamid_t pathbias_probe_id; + + /** For path probing. Store the temporary probe address nonce + * for response comparison. */ + tor_addr_t pathbias_probe_nonce; + /** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out * according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has * been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index f58c5c9..a942e44 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -186,7 +186,17 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, } if (recognized) { - edge_connection_t *conn = relay_lookup_conn(circ, cell, cell_direction, + edge_connection_t *conn = NULL; + + if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING) { + pathbias_check_probe_response(circ, cell); + + /* We need to drop this cell no matter what to avoid code that expects + * a certain purpose (such as the hidserv code). */ + return 0; + } + + conn = relay_lookup_conn(circ, cell, cell_direction, layer_hint); if (cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) { ++stats_n_relay_cells_delivered; @@ -222,7 +232,15 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, } else { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Dropping unrecognized inbound cell on origin circuit."); - return 0; + /* If we see unrecognized cells on path bias testing circs, + * it's bad mojo. Those circuits need to die. + * XXX: Shouldn't they always die? */ + if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING) { + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED; + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } else { + return 0; + } } if (!chan) {

1 0

[tor/master] Bug 7691 review fixes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jan '13

14 Jan '13

commit d05ff310a5547b15433314617d6f1b9e9ccfe5b8 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Tue Jan 8 18:07:34 2013 -0800 Bug 7691 review fixes. Also add in the random nonce generation. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 2 +- src/or/or.h | 4 +- 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 73bd3d4..b304aeb 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1505,7 +1505,19 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) } /** - * Send a probe down a circuit that wasn't usable. + * Send a probe down a circuit that the client attempted to use, + * but for which the stream timed out/failed. The probe is a + * RELAY_BEGIN cell with a 0.a.b.c destination address, which + * the exit will reject and reply back, echoing that address. + * + * The reason for such probes is because it is possible to bias + * a user's paths simply by causing timeouts, and these timeouts + * are not possible to differentiate from unresponsive servers. + * + * The probe is sent at the end of the circuit lifetime for two + * reasons: to prevent cyptographic taggers from being able to + * drop cells to cause timeouts, and to prevent easy recognition + * of probes before any real client traffic happens. * * Returns -1 if we couldn't probe, 0 otherwise. */ @@ -1517,8 +1529,7 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) int payload_len; origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); crypt_path_t *cpath_layer = NULL; - // XXX: Generate a random 0.a.b.c adddress - const char *probe_nonce = "0.1.2.3"; + char *probe_nonce = NULL; tor_assert(ocirc); @@ -1548,9 +1559,13 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) /* Update timestamp for circuit_expire_building to kill us */ tor_gettimeofday(&circ->timestamp_began); - tor_snprintf(payload,RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, "%s:25", probe_nonce); - tor_addr_parse(&ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce, probe_nonce); + /* Generate a random address for the nonce */ + crypto_rand((char*)&ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce, + sizeof(ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce)); + ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce &= 0x00ffffff; + probe_nonce = tor_dup_ip(ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce); + tor_snprintf(payload,RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, "%s:25", probe_nonce); payload_len = (int)strlen(payload)+1; // XXX: need this? Can we assume ipv4 will always be supported? @@ -1567,12 +1582,14 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Ran out of stream IDs on circuit %u during " "pathbias probe attempt.", ocirc->global_identifier); + tor_free(probe_nonce); return -1; } log_info(LD_CIRC, "Sending pathbias testing cell to %s:25 on stream %d for circ %d.", probe_nonce, ocirc->pathbias_probe_id, ocirc->global_identifier); + tor_free(probe_nonce); /* Send a test relay cell */ if (relay_send_command_from_edge(ocirc->pathbias_probe_id, circ, @@ -1591,18 +1608,19 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) } /** - * Check the response to a pathbias probe. + * Check the response to a pathbias probe, to ensure the + * cell is recognized and the nonce and other probe + * characteristics are as expected. * * If the response is valid, return 0. Otherwise return < 0. */ int -pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell) +pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, const cell_t *cell) { /* Based on connection_edge_process_relay_cell() */ relay_header_t rh; int reason; uint32_t ipv4_host; - tor_addr_t host; origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); tor_assert(cell); @@ -1620,24 +1638,28 @@ pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell) /* Check length+extract host: It is in network order after the reason code. * See connection_edge_end(). */ - if (rh.length != 9) { /* reason+ipv4+dns_ttl */ - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Path bias probe response length field is insane (%d).", - rh.length); + if (rh.length < 9) { /* reason+ipv4+dns_ttl */ + log_notice(LD_PROTOCOL, + "Short path bias probe response length field (%d).", rh.length); return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; } - ipv4_host = get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+1); - tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&host, ipv4_host); + ipv4_host = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+1)); /* Check nonce */ - if (memcmp(&host, &ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce, sizeof(tor_addr_t)) == 0) { + if (ipv4_host == ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce) { ocirc->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED; circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got valid path bias probe back for circ %d, stream %d.", ocirc->global_identifier, ocirc->pathbias_probe_id); return 0; + } else { + log_notice(LD_CIRC, + "Got strange probe value 0x%x vs 0x%x back for circ %d, " + "stream %d.", ipv4_host, ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce, + ocirc->global_identifier, ocirc->pathbias_probe_id); + return -1; } } log_info(LD_CIRC, diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h index b1cedec..8d2b986 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ double pathbias_get_extreme_rate(const or_options_t *options); int pathbias_get_dropguards(const or_options_t *options); void pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ); int pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason); -int pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell); +int pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, const cell_t *cell); #endif diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 4b4806c..eb0dc81 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2894,8 +2894,8 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { streamid_t pathbias_probe_id; /** For path probing. Store the temporary probe address nonce - * for response comparison. */ - tor_addr_t pathbias_probe_nonce; + * (in host byte order) for response comparison. */ + uint32_t pathbias_probe_nonce; /** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out * according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has

1 0

[tor/master] Bug 7341 code review fixes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jan '13

14 Jan '13

commit f60c25cd259a118669f7b79f273c116cea53b7dd Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Tue Jan 8 17:19:15 2013 -0800 Bug 7341 code review fixes. --- src/or/circuituse.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index de62100..bdaf7d8 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -410,6 +410,15 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) } while (0) /** + * Because circuit build timeout is calculated only based on 3 hop + * general purpose circuit construction, we need to scale the timeout + * to make it properly apply to longer circuits, and circuits of + * certain usage types. The following diagram illustrates how we + * derive the scaling below. In short, we calculate the number + * of times our telescoping-based circuit construction causes cells + * to traverse each link for the circuit purpose types in question, + * and then assume each link is equivalent. + * * OP --a--> A --b--> B --c--> C * OP --a--> A --b--> B --c--> C --d--> D * @@ -665,8 +674,8 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) /* For path bias: we want to let these guys live for a while * so we get a chance to test them. */ log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Allowing cannibalized circuit %d time to finish building as a " - "pathbias testing circ.", + "Allowing cannibalized circuit %d time to finish building " + "as a pathbias testing circ.", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier); circuit_change_purpose(victim, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); continue; /* It now should have a longer timeout next time */ @@ -732,7 +741,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) if (victim->n_chan) log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Abandoning circ %u %s:%hd (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %hhd, " + "Abandoning circ %u %s:%d (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %d, " "len %d)", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier, channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(victim->n_chan), victim->n_circ_id, @@ -742,7 +751,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len); else log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Abandoning circ %u %hd (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %hhd, len %d)", + "Abandoning circ %u %d (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %d, len %d)", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier, victim->n_circ_id, TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened, victim->state,

1 0

[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'mikeperry/bug7691-rebased'
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jan '13

14 Jan '13

commit d357b97b6d7dcd98229218549245fcc3fcbee8f7 Merge: dab25eb d05ff31 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Jan 13 21:48:33 2013 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'mikeperry/bug7691-rebased' changes/bug7341 | 7 ++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 3 +- src/or/circuitlist.c | 8 ++- src/or/circuituse.c | 169 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- src/or/connection_edge.h | 1 + src/or/or.h | 12 +++- src/or/relay.c | 22 +++++- src/or/rendclient.c | 35 +++++++++ 10 files changed, 384 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)

1 0

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