January 2013 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.2.3] Reject create/begin/etc cells with {circ, stream}ID 0.
by nickm＠torproject.org 15 Jan '13

15 Jan '13

commit 4ccf09b1c21a858540453287e58a478a80a598ae Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 14 14:02:13 2013 -0500 Reject create/begin/etc cells with {circ,stream}ID 0. Otherwise, it's possible to create streams or circuits with these bogus IDs, leading to orphaned circuits or streams, or to ones that can cause bandwidth DOS problems. Fixes bug 7889; bugfix on all released Tors. --- changes/bug7889 | 8 ++++++++ src/or/command.c | 8 ++++++++ src/or/relay.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug7889 b/changes/bug7889 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce99a59 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug7889 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Reject bogus create and relay cells with 0 circuit ID or 0 stream + ID: these could be used to create unexpected streams and circuits + which would count as "present" to some parts of Tor but "absent" + to others, leading to zombie circuits and streams or to a + bandwidth DOS. Fixes bug 7889; bugfix on every released version of + Tor. Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed". + diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index d935b5b..8321e26 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -382,6 +382,14 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) return; } + if (cell->circ_id == 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received a create cell (type %d) from %s:%d with zero circID; " + " ignoring.", (int)cell->command, conn->_base.address, + conn->_base.port); + return; + } + /* If the high bit of the circuit ID is not as expected, close the * circ. */ id_is_high = cell->circ_id & (1<<15); diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 5f7fcd8..a17c333 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -1046,6 +1046,23 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; } + if (rh.stream_id == 0) { + switch (rh.command) { + case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN: + case RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED: + case RELAY_COMMAND_DATA: + case RELAY_COMMAND_END: + case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE: + case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVED: + case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR: + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Relay command %d with zero " + "stream_id. Dropping.", (int)rh.command); + return 0; + default: + ; + } + } + /* either conn is NULL, in which case we've got a control cell, or else * conn points to the recognized stream. */

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[tor/maint-0.2.3] Merge branch 'bug7889_023' into maint-0.2.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 15 Jan '13

15 Jan '13

commit ae15b55173abff1175e0f56759abd29e2870b16c Merge: 1625cdd 4ccf09b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 15 16:30:07 2013 -0500 Merge branch 'bug7889_023' into maint-0.2.3 changes/bug7889 | 8 ++++++++ src/or/command.c | 8 ++++++++ src/or/relay.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Clean up odds and ends
by nickm＠torproject.org 15 Jan '13

15 Jan '13

commit 6e4a4002c5f988615299f0160ff4bbfb9dfdda3e Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 15 15:40:17 2013 -0500 Clean up odds and ends --- src/common/compat.h | 3 +- src/common/crypto_curve25519.c | 1 + src/or/circuitbuild.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------ src/or/circuituse.c | 6 ++-- src/or/onion.c | 4 +- src/or/or.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/compat.h b/src/common/compat.h index f597c12..af6bc75 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.h +++ b/src/common/compat.h @@ -546,7 +546,8 @@ const char *tor_socket_strerror(int e); #endif #define ERRNO_IS_EINPROGRESS(e) ((e) == EINPROGRESS) #define ERRNO_IS_CONN_EINPROGRESS(e) ((e) == EINPROGRESS) -#define ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_EAGAIN(e) (ERRNO_IS_EAGAIN(e) || (e) == ECONNABORTED) +#define ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_EAGAIN(e) \ + (ERRNO_IS_EAGAIN(e) || (e) == ECONNABORTED) #define ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_RESOURCE_LIMIT(e) \ ((e) == EMFILE || (e) == ENFILE || (e) == ENOBUFS || (e) == ENOMEM) #define ERRNO_IS_EADDRINUSE(e) ((e) == EADDRINUSE) diff --git a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c index aead4f8..e9d24d6 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c @@ -208,3 +208,4 @@ curve25519_public_from_base64(curve25519_public_key_t *pkey, return -1; } } + diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index e934acc..12b58e1 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) } /* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias - * build success.. They get counted under use success */ + * "build" success, since they get counted under "use" success. */ if (!circ->has_opened) { if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( @@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) * are not possible to differentiate from unresponsive servers. * * The probe is sent at the end of the circuit lifetime for two - * reasons: to prevent cyptographic taggers from being able to + * reasons: to prevent cryptographic taggers from being able to * drop cells to cause timeouts, and to prevent easy recognition * of probes before any real client traffic happens. * @@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) circuit_change_purpose(circ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); - /* Update timestamp for circuit_expire_building to kill us */ + /* Update timestamp for when circuit_expire_building() should kill us */ tor_gettimeofday(&circ->timestamp_began); /* Generate a random address for the nonce */ @@ -1596,8 +1596,8 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN, payload, payload_len, cpath_layer) < 0) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, - "Failed to send pathbias probe cell on circuit %d.", - ocirc->global_identifier); + "Failed to send pathbias probe cell on circuit %d.", + ocirc->global_identifier); return -1; } @@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason) } else { if (reason & END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE) { - /* Unused remote circ close reasons all could be bias */ + /* Remote circ close reasons on an unused circuit all could be bias */ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Circuit %d remote-closed without successful use for reason %d. " "Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len %d.", @@ -1836,6 +1836,8 @@ pathbias_count_unusable(origin_circuit_t *circ) /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here. * No need to log that case. */ + /* XXX note cut-and-paste code in this function compared to nearby + * functions. Would be nice to refactor. -RD */ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Stream-failing circuit has no known guard. " "Circuit is a %s currently %s", @@ -1886,11 +1888,11 @@ pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ) double pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard) { - circuit_t *circ = global_circuitlist; + circuit_t *circ; int open_circuits = 0; - /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt */ - for ( ; circ; circ = circ->next) { + /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt. */ + for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL; if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) || /* didn't originate here */ circ->marked_for_close) /* already counted */ @@ -1903,8 +1905,8 @@ pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard) if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED && fast_memeq(guard->identity, - ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, - DIGEST_LEN)) { + ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, + DIGEST_LEN)) { open_circuits++; } } @@ -1928,9 +1930,10 @@ pathbias_get_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) } /** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to - * 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we should - * eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the - * guard looks fine. */ + * guard, first checking if the failure rate is high enough that + * we should eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; + * return 0 if the guard looks fine. + */ static int entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) { @@ -1949,7 +1952,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) if (!guard->path_bias_disabled) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Your Guard %s=%s is failing an extremely large amount of " - "circuits. To avoid potential route manipluation attacks, " + "circuits. To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, " "Tor has disabled use of this guard. " "Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld " "were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For " @@ -1992,7 +1995,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) "Your Guard %s=%s is failing a very large amount of " "circuits. Most likely this means the Tor network is " "overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against " - "you or the potentially the guard itself. " + "you or potentially the guard itself. " "Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld " "were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For " "reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", @@ -2058,10 +2061,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) return 0; } -/** A created or extended cell came back to us on the circuit, and it included - * reply_cell as its body. (If reply_type is CELL_CREATED, the body - * contains (the second DH key, plus KH). If reply_type is - * CELL_CREATED_FAST, the body contains a secret y and a hash H(x|y).) +/** A "created" cell reply came back to us on circuit circ. + * (The body of reply varies depending on what sort of handshake + * this is.) * * Calculate the appropriate keys and digests, make sure KH is * correct, and initialize this hop of the cpath. @@ -2117,9 +2119,9 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, /** We received a relay truncated cell on circ. * - * Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated + * Since we don't send truncates currently, getting a truncated * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now, - * just give up: for circ to close, and return 0. + * just give up: force circ to close, and return 0. */ int circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer, int reason) @@ -2130,7 +2132,7 @@ circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer, int reason) tor_assert(circ); tor_assert(layer); - /* XXX Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated + /* XXX Since we don't send truncates currently, getting a truncated * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now, * just give up. */ @@ -2223,15 +2225,18 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, return 0; } -/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose purpose. - * Default length is 3 + the number of endpoints that would give something - * away. If the routerlist routers doesn't have enough routers +/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose purpose: three + the + * number of endpoints that would give something away about our destination. + * + * If the routerlist nodes doesn't have enough routers * to handle the desired path length, return as large a path length as * is feasible, except if it's less than 2, in which case return -1. + * XXX ^^ I think this behavior is a hold-over from back when we had only a + * few relays in the network, and certainly back before guards existed. + * We should very likely get rid of it. -RD */ static int -new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, - smartlist_t *nodes) +new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, smartlist_t *nodes) { int num_acceptable_routers; int routelen; diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index bdaf7d8..ada2d69 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -452,15 +452,15 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) SET_CUTOFF(stream_cutoff, MAX(options->CircuitStreamTimeout,15)*1000 + 1000); /* Be lenient with cannibalized circs. They already survived the official - * CBT, and they're usually not perf-critical. */ + * CBT, and they're usually not performance-critical. */ SET_CUTOFF(cannibalized_cutoff, MAX(circ_times.close_ms*(4/6.0), options->CircuitStreamTimeout * 1000) + 1000); - // Intro circs have an extra round trip (and are also 4 hops long) + /* Intro circs have an extra round trip (and are also 4 hops long) */ SET_CUTOFF(c_intro_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (14/6.0) + 1000); - // Server intro circs have an extra round trip + /* Server intro circs have an extra round trip */ SET_CUTOFF(s_intro_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (9/6.0) + 1000); SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms); diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c index 329b01c..1043936 100644 --- a/src/or/onion.c +++ b/src/or/onion.c @@ -374,10 +374,10 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(int type, /** Perform the final (client-side) step of a circuit-creation handshake of * type type, using our state in handshake_state and the - * server's response in reply On success, generate keys_out_len + * server's response in reply. On success, generate keys_out_len * bytes worth of key material in keys_out_len, set * rend_authenticator_out to the "KH" field that can be used to - * establish introduction points at this hop, and return 0. On failure, + * establish introduction points at this hop, and return 0. On failure, * return -1. */ int onion_skin_client_handshake(int type, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index eb0dc81..9f5bec7 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2578,7 +2578,7 @@ typedef enum { struct fast_handshake_state_t; struct ntor_handshake_state_t; -#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP 0x0000 +#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP 0x0000 #define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST 0x0001 #define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR 0x0002 typedef struct {

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'small_typo_fixes'
by nickm＠torproject.org 15 Jan '13

15 Jan '13

commit c134bb5a8d10d0f422b790ce8b587cf7188aa57e Merge: 0301a1d 6e4a400 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 15 16:01:38 2013 -0500 Merge branch 'small_typo_fixes' src/common/compat.h | 3 +- src/common/crypto_curve25519.c | 1 + src/or/circuitbuild.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------ src/or/circuituse.c | 6 ++-- src/or/onion.c | 4 +- src/or/or.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Bump to 0.2.4.9-alpha-dev
by nickm＠torproject.org 15 Jan '13

15 Jan '13

commit 0301a1df6c96888680ff8f310af818f239e93f13 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 15 16:01:02 2013 -0500 Bump to 0.2.4.9-alpha-dev --- ChangeLog | 3 +++ configure.ac | 2 +- contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +- src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index dc583f2..7c5a490 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +Changes in version 0.2.4.10-alpha - 2013-0?-?? + + Changes in version 0.2.4.9-alpha - 2013-01-15 Tor 0.2.4.9-alpha provides a quick fix to make the new ntor handshake work more robustly. diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 40105df..ff6df2f 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2012, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information -AC_INIT([tor],[0.2.4.9-alpha]) +AC_INIT([tor],[0.2.4.9-alpha-dev]) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/or/main.c]) AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE m4_ifdef([AM_SILENT_RULES], [AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])]) diff --git a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in index a0c4070..c15a1a7 100644 --- a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ !include "LogicLib.nsh" !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.2.4.9-alpha" +!define VERSION "0.2.4.9-alpha-dev" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index 1352e71..4584228 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.2.4.9-alpha" +#define VERSION "0.2.4.9-alpha-dev"

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r26005: {website} newest is 0.2.4.9-alpha (in website/trunk: . include)
by Roger Dingledine 15 Jan '13

15 Jan '13

Author: arma Date: 2013-01-15 20:58:38 +0000 (Tue, 15 Jan 2013) New Revision: 26005 Modified: website/trunk/Makefile website/trunk/include/versions.wmi Log: newest is 0.2.4.9-alpha Modified: website/trunk/Makefile =================================================================== --- website/trunk/Makefile 2013-01-15 01:52:01 UTC (rev 26004) +++ website/trunk/Makefile 2013-01-15 20:58:38 UTC (rev 26005) @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ # 5. ./publish export STABLETAG=tor-0.2.3.25 -export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.4.8-alpha +export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.4.9-alpha WMLBASE=. SUBDIRS=docs eff projects press about download getinvolved donate torbutton Modified: website/trunk/include/versions.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/include/versions.wmi 2013-01-15 01:52:01 UTC (rev 26004) +++ website/trunk/include/versions.wmi 2013-01-15 20:58:38 UTC (rev 26005) @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ <define-tag version-stable whitespace=delete>0.2.3.25</define-tag> -<define-tag version-alpha whitespace=delete>0.2.4.8-alpha</define-tag> +<define-tag version-alpha whitespace=delete>0.2.4.9-alpha</define-tag> <define-tag version-win32-stable whitespace=delete>0.2.3.25</define-tag> <define-tag version-win32-alpha whitespace=delete>0.2.4.7-alpha</define-tag>

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[translation/torbirdy_completed] Update translations for torbirdy_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 15 Jan '13

15 Jan '13

commit a6c9d148d37d0b729cbfdc7119c3e7e7f05e4c4b Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 15 20:46:07 2013 +0000 Update translations for torbirdy_completed --- it/torbirdy.dtd | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/it/torbirdy.dtd b/it/torbirdy.dtd index 4490083..ed3d316 100644 --- a/it/torbirdy.dtd +++ b/it/torbirdy.dtd @@ -33,8 +33,14 @@ <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.imap.key "i"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.startup_folder.label "Seleziona l'ultima casella di posta all'avvio [default: disabilitato, verrà selezionato Local Folders]"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.startup_folder.key "l"> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.timezone.label "Non impostare il fuso orario di Thunderbird a UTC [default: impostato a UTC]"> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.timezone.key "z"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.enigmail_throwkeyid.label "Disabilita GPG '--throw-keyids' [default: abilitato]"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.enigmail_throwkeyid.key "g"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.account_specific "Specifico Account"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.select_account.key "C"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.select_account.label "Seleziona un account:"> + +<!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.usetor.label "Usa Tor Onion Router"> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.usejondo.label "Usa JonDo (Premium)"> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.preferences.label "Apri le preferenze di TorBirdy">

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[translation/torbirdy] Update translations for torbirdy
by translation＠torproject.org 15 Jan '13

15 Jan '13

commit 084ed0f4aea3cc380c7d61d8fc11f058221196a4 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 15 20:46:05 2013 +0000 Update translations for torbirdy --- it/torbirdy.dtd | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/it/torbirdy.dtd b/it/torbirdy.dtd index b88a12d..ed3d316 100644 --- a/it/torbirdy.dtd +++ b/it/torbirdy.dtd @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.startup_folder.label "Seleziona l'ultima casella di posta all'avvio [default: disabilitato, verrà selezionato Local Folders]"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.startup_folder.key "l"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.timezone.label "Non impostare il fuso orario di Thunderbird a UTC [default: impostato a UTC]"> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.timezone.key ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.timezone.key "z"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.enigmail_throwkeyid.label "Disabilita GPG '--throw-keyids' [default: abilitato]"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.enigmail_throwkeyid.key "g"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.account_specific "Specifico Account">

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[translation/tsum_completed] Update translations for tsum_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 15 Jan '13

15 Jan '13

commit 966965d1223b760fe275d6d551187d0d48c65a64 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 15 19:45:16 2013 +0000 Update translations for tsum_completed --- es/short-user-manual_es_noimg.xhtml | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/es/short-user-manual_es_noimg.xhtml b/es/short-user-manual_es_noimg.xhtml index 05a4a89..eb939da 100644 --- a/es/short-user-manual_es_noimg.xhtml +++ b/es/short-user-manual_es_noimg.xhtml @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ sub 2048R/EB399FD7 2003-10-16 <ol style="list-style-type: decimal"> <li>Abra el Panel de Control de Vidalia y haga clic en Preferencias.</li> <li>Haga clic en Red y seleccione Uso un proxy para acceder a Internet (en este caso para rebotar la conexión). </li> - <li>En el campo Dirección, introduzca la dirección del proxy abierto. Esta puede ser un nombre de servidor o una dirección IP.</li> + <li>En el campo Dirección, introduzca la dirección del proxy abierto (en Internet). Esta puede ser un nombre de servidor o una dirección IP.</li> <li>Introduzca el puerto del proxy.</li> <li>Generalmente (en un proxy abierto) no necesita un nombre de usuario y contraseña. Si se le solicita, introduzca la información en los campos adecuados.</li> <li>Elija el Tipo de proxy del que se trate entre HTTP/HTTPS, SOCKS4, o SOCKS5.</li>

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[translation/tsum] Update translations for tsum
by translation＠torproject.org 15 Jan '13

15 Jan '13

commit e76ea6f87b170661d377b20bc25a8a7bd7bdd2f9 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 15 19:45:14 2013 +0000 Update translations for tsum --- es/short-user-manual_es_noimg.xhtml | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/es/short-user-manual_es_noimg.xhtml b/es/short-user-manual_es_noimg.xhtml index e25f8fb..eb939da 100644 --- a/es/short-user-manual_es_noimg.xhtml +++ b/es/short-user-manual_es_noimg.xhtml @@ -76,12 +76,12 @@ sub 2048R/EB399FD7 2003-10-16 <h3 id="how-to-use-a-bridge">Cómo usar un bridge</h3> Una vez que ha configurado los bridges a utilizar, abra el Panel de Control de Vidalia y haga clic en Preferencias, luego en Red y marque la casilla que dice Mi proveedor de Internet (ISP) bloquea las conexiones con la red Tor. Introduzca los repetidores puente en el campo de debajo, pulse Aceptar y reinicie Tor de nuevo. <h3 id="how-to-use-an-open-proxy">Cómo usar un proxy abierto</h3> - Si usar un bridge (repetidor puente, acceso a Tor de publicitación restringida) no funciona, intente configurar Tor para usar cualquier proxy abierto (en Internet) HTTPS o SOCKS para obtener acceso indirecto a la red Tor. Esto significa que incluso si Tor es bloqueado por su red local (o su ISP), los proxys abiertos le pueden dar el acceso a la red Tor y a una Internet sin censura (o a contenidos alojados en la red Tor). + Si usar un bridge (repetidor puente, acceso a Tor de publicitación restringida) no funciona, intente configurar Tor para usar cualquier proxy abierto (en Internet) HTTPS o SOCKS para obtener acceso indirecto a la red Tor. Esto significa que incluso si Tor es bloqueado por su red local (o su ISP), los proxys abiertos le pueden dar acceso a la red Tor con seguridad, y a una Internet sin censura. Los pasos siguientes asumen que tiene una configuración de Tor/Vidalia funcional, y que ha encontrado una lista de proxys HTTPS, SOCKS4, o SOCKS5. <ol style="list-style-type: decimal"> <li>Abra el Panel de Control de Vidalia y haga clic en Preferencias.</li> <li>Haga clic en Red y seleccione Uso un proxy para acceder a Internet (en este caso para rebotar la conexión). </li> - <li>En el campo Dirección, introduzca la dirección del proxy abierto. Esta puede ser un nombre de servidor o una dirección IP.</li> + <li>En el campo Dirección, introduzca la dirección del proxy abierto (en Internet). Esta puede ser un nombre de servidor o una dirección IP.</li> <li>Introduzca el puerto del proxy.</li> <li>Generalmente (en un proxy abierto) no necesita un nombre de usuario y contraseña. Si se le solicita, introduzca la información en los campos adecuados.</li> <li>Elija el Tipo de proxy del que se trate entre HTTP/HTTPS, SOCKS4, o SOCKS5.</li>

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