tor-commits December 2012

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1600 discussions

[tor/master] Remove the address argument from client cipher classification fns
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Dec '12

26 Dec '12

commit 63208aa1e53f5ffc3ecbe47402cc2736bbce6af0 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 28 12:35:02 2012 -0500 Remove the address argument from client cipher classification fns --- src/common/tortls.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 715b91b..4513689 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -1415,7 +1415,7 @@ prune_v2_cipher_list(void) * CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED. **/ static int -tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, const char *address) +tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) { int i, res; SSL_SESSION *session; @@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@ tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, const char *address) } s = smartlist_join_strings(elts, ":", 0, NULL); log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a %s V2/V3 cipher list from %s. It is: '%s'", - (res == CIPHERS_V2) ? "fictitious" : "real", address, s); + (res == CIPHERS_V2) ? "fictitious" : "real", ADDR(tor_tls), s); tor_free(s); smartlist_free(elts); } @@ -1502,9 +1502,9 @@ tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, const char *address) * a list that indicates that the client knows how to do the v2 TLS connection * handshake. */ static int -tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, const char *address) +tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) { - return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, address) >= CIPHERS_V2; + return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl) >= CIPHERS_V2; } /** Invoked when a TLS state changes: log the change at severity 'debug' */ @@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) } /* Now check the cipher list. */ - if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl, ADDR(tls))) { + if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl)) { if (tls->wasV2Handshake) return; /* We already turned this stuff off for the first handshake; * This is a renegotiation. */ @@ -2014,7 +2014,7 @@ tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls) /* There doesn't seem to be a clear OpenSSL API to clear mode flags. */ tls->ssl->mode &= ~SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN; #ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER - if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl, ADDR(tls))) { + if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl)) { /* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback, * we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code * was buggy. Fixing that. */

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[tor/master] Let servers choose better ciphersuites when clients support them
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Dec '12

26 Dec '12

commit 175b2678d7dd0ff8b00b597169e4a9a0d8e86f12 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 28 13:31:17 2012 -0500 Let servers choose better ciphersuites when clients support them This implements the server-side of proposal 198 by detecting when clients lack the magic list of ciphersuites that indicates that they're lying faking some ciphers they don't really have. When clients lack this list, we can choose any cipher that we'd actually like. The newly allowed ciphersuites are, currently, "All ECDHE-RSA ciphers that openssl supports, except for ECDHE-RSA-RC4". The code to detect the cipher list relies on on (ab)use of SSL_set_session_secret_cb. --- changes/tls_ecdhe | 24 ++++++++++ src/common/tortls.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/common/tortls.h | 1 + src/or/connection_or.c | 9 +++- 4 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/tls_ecdhe b/changes/tls_ecdhe new file mode 100644 index 0000000..58a8f90 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/tls_ecdhe @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ + o Major features: + + - Servers can now enable the ECDHE TLS ciphersuites when + available and appropriate. These ciphersuites, when used with + the P-256 elliptic curve, let us negotiate forward-secure TLS + secret keys more safely and more efficiently than with our + previous use of Diffie Hellman modulo a 1024-bit prime. + + Enabling these ciphers was a little tricky, since for a long + time, clients had been claiming to support them without + actually doing so, in order to foil fingerprinting. But with + the client-side implementation of proposal 198 in + 0.2.3.17-beta, clients can now match the ciphers from recent + firefox versions *and* list the ciphers they actually mean, so + servers can believe such clients when they advertise ECDHE + support in their TLS ClientHello messages. + + This feature requires clients running 0.2.3.17-beta or later, + and requires both sides to be running OpenSSL 1.0.0 or later + with ECC support. OpenSSL 1.0.1, with the compile-time option + "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128", is highly recommended. + Implements the server side of proposal 198; closes ticket + 7200. + diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 4513689..bba8926 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -678,11 +678,42 @@ tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa, #undef SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE } -/** List of ciphers that servers should select from.*/ +/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when the client might be + * claiming extra unsupported ciphers in order to avoid fingerprinting. */ #define SERVER_CIPHER_LIST \ (TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":" \ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" \ SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) + +/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when we actually have + * our choice of what cipher to use. */ +const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] = +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CHC_SHA + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#endif +//#if TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +// TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ":" +//#endif + /* These next two are mandatory. */ + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":" + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA ":" +#endif + SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA; + /* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto * disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to * (SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA). If you do this, you won't be able to communicate @@ -1410,15 +1441,22 @@ prune_v2_cipher_list(void) v2_cipher_list_pruned = 1; } +/* Return the name of the negotiated ciphersuite in use on tls */ +const char * +tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + return SSL_get_cipher(tls->ssl); +} + /** Examine the client cipher list in ssl, and determine what kind of * client it is. Return one of CIPHERS_ERR, CIPHERS_V1, CIPHERS_V2, * CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED. **/ static int -tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) +tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers) { int i, res; - SSL_SESSION *session; tor_tls_t *tor_tls; if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!v2_cipher_list_pruned)) prune_v2_cipher_list(); @@ -1429,20 +1467,15 @@ tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) /* If we reached this point, we just got a client hello. See if there is * a cipher list. */ - if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) { - log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?"); - res = CIPHERS_ERR; - goto done; - } - if (!session->ciphers) { + if (!peer_ciphers) { log_info(LD_NET, "No ciphers on session"); res = CIPHERS_ERR; goto done; } /* Now we need to see if there are any ciphers whose presence means we're * dealing with an updated Tor. */ - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(session->ciphers); ++i) { - SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(session->ciphers, i); + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) { + SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i); const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); if (strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) && strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) && @@ -1458,8 +1491,8 @@ tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) v2_or_higher: { const uint16_t *v2_cipher = v2_cipher_list; - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(session->ciphers); ++i) { - SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(session->ciphers, i); + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) { + SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i); uint16_t id = cipher->id & 0xffff; if (id == 0x00ff) /* extended renegotiation indicator. */ continue; @@ -1480,8 +1513,8 @@ tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) { smartlist_t *elts = smartlist_new(); char *s; - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(session->ciphers); ++i) { - SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(session->ciphers, i); + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) { + SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i); const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); smartlist_add(elts, (char*)ciphername); } @@ -1504,8 +1537,56 @@ tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) static int tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) { - return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl) >= CIPHERS_V2; + SSL_SESSION *session; + if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) { + log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?"); + return CIPHERS_ERR; + } + + return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, session->ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2; +} + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0) +/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers + * the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite. + * + * We can't abuse an info_cb for this, since by the time one of the + * client_hello info_cbs is called, we've already picked which ciphersuite to + * use. + * + * Technically, this function is an abuse of this callback, since the point of + * a session_secret_cb is to try to set up and/or verify a shared-secret for + * authentication on the fly. But as long as we return 0, we won't actually be + * setting up a shared secret, and all will be fine. + */ +static int +tor_tls_session_secret_cb(SSL *ssl, void *secret, int *secret_len, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, + SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg) +{ + (void) secret; + (void) secret_len; + (void) peer_ciphers; + (void) cipher; + (void) arg; + + if (tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, peer_ciphers) == + CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED) { + SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST); + } + + SSL_set_session_secret_cb(ssl, NULL, NULL); + + return 0; +} +static void +tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL); } +#else +#define tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tls) STMT_NIL +#endif /** Invoked when a TLS state changes: log the change at severity 'debug' */ static void @@ -1773,6 +1854,9 @@ tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer) SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback); } + if (isServer) + tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(result); + /* Not expected to get called. */ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating tor_tls_t object"); return result; diff --git a/src/common/tortls.h b/src/common/tortls.h index 7bc6c8e..8881827 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.h +++ b/src/common/tortls.h @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ int tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, const tor_cert_t *cert, const tor_cert_t *signing_cert, int check_rsa_1024); +const char *tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls); #endif diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 7ac4d1e..c2e4375 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1317,7 +1317,8 @@ connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn) if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) { if (tor_tls_received_v3_certificate(conn->tls)) { log_info(LD_OR, "Client got a v3 cert! Moving on to v3 " - "handshake."); + "handshake with ciphersuite %s", + tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(conn->tls)); return connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(conn); } else { log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (client-side)." @@ -1641,10 +1642,12 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn) char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN]; int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn); - log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"%s tls handshake on %p with %s done. verifying.", + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"%s tls handshake on %p with %s done, using " + "ciphersuite %s. verifying.", started_here?"outgoing":"incoming", conn, - safe_str_client(conn->base_.address)); + safe_str_client(conn->base_.address), + tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(conn->tls)); directory_set_dirty();

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[tor/master] Add benchmark for DH handshake and ECDH-P-224/56 handshake
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Dec '12

26 Dec '12

commit 2f8fd53750737e4402adc0b896f00f789fb38181 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 28 14:14:35 2012 -0500 Add benchmark for DH handshake and ECDH-P-224/56 handshake --- changes/dh_benchmarks | 3 + src/test/bench.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/dh_benchmarks b/changes/dh_benchmarks new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2301995 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/dh_benchmarks @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor features (testing): + - Add benchmarks for DH (1024-bit multiplicative group) and ECDH + (P-256) diffie-hellman handshakes to src/or/bench. diff --git a/src/test/bench.c b/src/test/bench.c index 2e65d0b..da1ae9b 100644 --- a/src/test/bench.c +++ b/src/test/bench.c @@ -18,6 +18,15 @@ const char tor_git_revision[] = ""; #include "or.h" #include "relay.h" +#include <openssl/opensslv.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#include <openssl/ec.h> +#include <openssl/ecdh.h> +#include <openssl/obj_mac.h> +#endif +#endif #if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && defined(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID) static uint64_t nanostart; @@ -248,6 +257,91 @@ bench_cell_ops(void) tor_free(cell); } +static void +bench_dh(void) +{ + const int iters = 1<<10; + int i; + uint64_t start, end; + + reset_perftime(); + start = perftime(); + for (i = 0; i < iters; ++i) { + char dh_pubkey_a[DH_BYTES], dh_pubkey_b[DH_BYTES]; + char secret_a[DH_BYTES], secret_b[DH_BYTES]; + ssize_t slen_a, slen_b; + crypto_dh_t *dh_a = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_TLS); + crypto_dh_t *dh_b = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_TLS); + crypto_dh_generate_public(dh_a); + crypto_dh_generate_public(dh_b); + crypto_dh_get_public(dh_a, dh_pubkey_a, sizeof(dh_pubkey_a)); + crypto_dh_get_public(dh_b, dh_pubkey_b, sizeof(dh_pubkey_b)); + slen_a = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_NOTICE, + dh_a, dh_pubkey_b, sizeof(dh_pubkey_b), + secret_a, sizeof(secret_a)); + slen_b = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_NOTICE, + dh_b, dh_pubkey_a, sizeof(dh_pubkey_a), + secret_b, sizeof(secret_b)); + tor_assert(slen_a == slen_b); + tor_assert(!memcmp(secret_a, secret_b, slen_a)); + crypto_dh_free(dh_a); + crypto_dh_free(dh_b); + } + end = perftime(); + printf("Complete DH handshakes (1024 bit, public and private ops):\n" + " %f millisec each.\n", NANOCOUNT(start, end, iters)/1e6); +} + +#if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) \ + && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)) +#define HAVE_EC_BENCHMARKS +static void +bench_ecdh_impl(int nid, const char *name) +{ + const int iters = 1<<10; + int i; + uint64_t start, end; + + reset_perftime(); + start = perftime(); + for (i = 0; i < iters; ++i) { + char secret_a[DH_BYTES], secret_b[DH_BYTES]; + ssize_t slen_a, slen_b; + EC_KEY *dh_a = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); + EC_KEY *dh_b = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); + + EC_KEY_generate_key(dh_a); + EC_KEY_generate_key(dh_b); + slen_a = ECDH_compute_key(secret_a, DH_BYTES, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(dh_b), dh_a, + NULL); + slen_b = ECDH_compute_key(secret_b, DH_BYTES, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(dh_a), dh_b, + NULL); + + tor_assert(slen_a == slen_b); + tor_assert(!memcmp(secret_a, secret_b, slen_a)); + EC_KEY_free(dh_a); + EC_KEY_free(dh_b); + } + end = perftime(); + printf("Complete ECDH %s handshakes (2 public and 2 private ops):\n" + " %f millisec each.\n", name, NANOCOUNT(start, end, iters)/1e6); +} + +static void +bench_ecdh_p256(void) +{ + bench_ecdh_impl(NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "P-256"); +} + +static void +bench_ecdh_p224(void) +{ + bench_ecdh_impl(NID_secp224r1, "P-224"); +} +#endif + typedef void (*bench_fn)(void); typedef struct benchmark_t { @@ -263,6 +357,11 @@ static struct benchmark_t benchmarks[] = { ENT(aes), ENT(cell_aes), ENT(cell_ops), + ENT(dh), +#ifdef HAVE_EC_BENCHMARKS + ENT(ecdh_p256), + ENT(ecdh_p224), +#endif {NULL,NULL,0} };

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[tor/master] Make ECDHE group configurable: 224 for public, 256 for bridges (default)
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Dec '12

26 Dec '12

commit 25afecdbf999eb91ed9216be1f8b8cdf0f78135b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 25 20:04:54 2012 -0500 Make ECDHE group configurable: 224 for public, 256 for bridges (default) --- changes/tls_ecdhe | 12 +++++++----- doc/tor.1.txt | 6 ++++++ src/common/tortls.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ src/common/tortls.h | 7 ++++++- src/or/config.c | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/or.h | 2 ++ src/or/router.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 7 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/tls_ecdhe b/changes/tls_ecdhe index 58a8f90..48c6384 100644 --- a/changes/tls_ecdhe +++ b/changes/tls_ecdhe @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ o Major features: - - Servers can now enable the ECDHE TLS ciphersuites when - available and appropriate. These ciphersuites, when used with - the P-256 elliptic curve, let us negotiate forward-secure TLS - secret keys more safely and more efficiently than with our - previous use of Diffie Hellman modulo a 1024-bit prime. + - Servers can now enable the ECDHE TLS ciphersuites when available + and appropriate. These ciphersuites let us negotiate forward- + secure TLS secret keys more safely and more efficiently than with + our previous use of Diffie Hellman modulo a 1024-bit prime. + By default, public servers prefer the (faster) P224 group, and + bridges prefer the (more common) P256 group; you can override this + with the TLSECGroup option. Enabling these ciphers was a little tricky, since for a long time, clients had been claiming to support them without diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 85b7f4c..7d1742c 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1527,6 +1527,12 @@ is non-zero): **GeoIPv6File** __filename__:: A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics. +**TLSECGroup** **P224**|**P256**:: + What EC group should we try to use for incoming TLS connections? + P224 is faster, but makes us stand out more. Has no effect if + we're a client, or if our OpenSSL version lacks support for ECDHE. + (Default: P224 for public servers; P256 for bridges.) + **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**:: When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0) diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 47b8f28..ce6c7d6 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -236,9 +236,11 @@ static X509* tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa, static int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, + unsigned int flags, int is_client); static tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, + unsigned int flags, int is_client); static int check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert, int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance); @@ -1098,17 +1100,20 @@ tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx) /** Create new global client and server TLS contexts. * * If server_identity is NULL, this will not generate a server - * TLS context. If is_public_server is non-zero, this will use + * TLS context. If TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER is set in flags, use * the same TLS context for incoming and outgoing connections, and - * ignore client_identity. */ + * ignore client_identity. If one of TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P{224,256} + * is set in flags, use that ECDHE group if possible; otherwise use + * the default ECDHE group. */ int -tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server, +tor_tls_context_init(unsigned flags, crypto_pk_t *client_identity, crypto_pk_t *server_identity, unsigned int key_lifetime) { int rv1 = 0; int rv2 = 0; + const int is_public_server = flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER; if (is_public_server) { tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx; @@ -1118,7 +1123,7 @@ tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server, rv1 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&server_tls_context, server_identity, - key_lifetime, 0); + key_lifetime, flags, 0); if (rv1 >= 0) { new_ctx = server_tls_context; @@ -1135,6 +1140,7 @@ tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server, rv1 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&server_tls_context, server_identity, key_lifetime, + flags, 0); } else { tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = server_tls_context; @@ -1148,6 +1154,7 @@ tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server, rv2 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&client_tls_context, client_identity, key_lifetime, + flags, 1); } @@ -1164,10 +1171,12 @@ static int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, + unsigned int flags, int is_client) { tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity, key_lifetime, + flags, is_client); tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = *ppcontext; @@ -1191,7 +1200,7 @@ tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, */ static tor_tls_context_t * tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, - int is_client) + unsigned flags, int is_client) { crypto_pk_t *rsa = NULL, *rsa_auth = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; @@ -1362,9 +1371,18 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, #if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && \ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)) if (! is_client) { + int nid; EC_KEY *ec_key; + if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224) + nid = NID_secp224r1; + else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256) + nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; + else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER) + nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; + else + nid = NID_secp224r1; /* Use P-256 for ECDHE. */ - ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); if (ec_key != NULL) /*XXXX Handle errors? */ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(result->ctx, ec_key); EC_KEY_free(ec_key); diff --git a/src/common/tortls.h b/src/common/tortls.h index 8881827..df3ab87 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.h +++ b/src/common/tortls.h @@ -54,7 +54,12 @@ const char *tor_tls_err_to_string(int err); void tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz); void tor_tls_free_all(void); -int tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server, + +#define TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER (1u<<0) +#define TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256 (1u<<1) +#define TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224 (1u<<2) + +int tor_tls_context_init(unsigned flags, crypto_pk_t *client_identity, crypto_pk_t *server_identity, unsigned int key_lifetime); diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 1df10e1..b81edf7 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { OBSOLETE("TestVia"), V(TokenBucketRefillInterval, MSEC_INTERVAL, "100 msec"), V(Tor2webMode, BOOL, "0"), + V(TLSECGroup, STRING, NULL), V(TrackHostExits, CSV, NULL), V(TrackHostExitsExpire, INTERVAL, "30 minutes"), OBSOLETE("TrafficShaping"), @@ -1193,6 +1194,9 @@ options_transition_requires_fresh_tls_context(const or_options_t *old_options, return 1; } + if (!opt_streq(old_options->TLSECGroup, new_options->TLSECGroup)) + return 1; + return 0; } @@ -2301,6 +2305,12 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, } } + if (options->TLSECGroup && (strcasecmp(options->TLSECGroup, "P256") && + strcasecmp(options->TLSECGroup, "P224"))) { + COMPLAIN("Unrecognized TLSECGroup: Falling back to the default."); + tor_free(options->TLSECGroup); + } + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes) { COMPLAIN("You have asked to exclude certain relays from all positions " "in your circuits. Expect hidden services and other Tor " diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 3a8e50c..a65ca44 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3854,6 +3854,8 @@ typedef struct { int IPv6Exit; /**< Do we support exiting to IPv6 addresses? */ + char *TLSECGroup; /**< One of "P256", "P224", or nil for auto */ + } or_options_t; /** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */ diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 5786103..c7380cb 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -491,7 +491,18 @@ v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void) int router_initialize_tls_context(void) { - return tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(get_options()), + unsigned int flags = 0; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + if (public_server_mode(options)) + flags |= TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER; + if (options->TLSECGroup) { + if (!strcasecmp(options->TLSECGroup, "P256")) + flags |= TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256; + else if (!strcasecmp(options->TLSECGroup, "P224")) + flags |= TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224; + } + + return tor_tls_context_init(flags, get_tlsclient_identity_key(), server_mode(get_options()) ? get_server_identity_key() : NULL,

1 0

[tor/master] Inform the user if they're passing up a 10x ECDH speedup.
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Dec '12

26 Dec '12

commit c8b3bdb78215d4d7821d9bfa15bb8f7786403ce9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 25 17:39:09 2012 -0500 Inform the user if they're passing up a 10x ECDH speedup. --- src/common/tortls.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index bba8926..47b8f28 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -526,6 +526,38 @@ tor_tls_init(void) SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION), version); } +#if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && \ + !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && \ + OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) + if (version >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) { + /* Warn if we could *almost* be running with much faster ECDH. + If we're built for a 64-bit target, using OpenSSL 1.0.1, but we + don't have one of the built-in __uint128-based speedups, we are + just one build operation away from an accelerated handshake. + + (We could be looking at OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 instead of + doing this test, but that gives compile-time options, not runtime + behavior.) + */ + EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + const EC_GROUP *g = key ? EC_KEY_get0_group(key) : NULL; + const EC_METHOD *m = g ? EC_GROUP_method_of(g) : NULL; + const int warn = (m == EC_GFp_simple_method() || + m == EC_GFp_mont_method() || + m == EC_GFp_nist_method()); + EC_KEY_free(key); + + if (warn) + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with " + "OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, but with a version of OpenSSL " + "that apparently lacks accelerated support for the NIST " + "P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with such " + "support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option " + "when configuring it) would make ECDH about 5-10x " + "faster."); + } +#endif + tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); tls_library_is_initialized = 1;

1 0

[tor/master] Be more noncomittal about performance improvement of uint128 backend.
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Dec '12

26 Dec '12

commit ddbe28919ab7056a81db920426b12285f0166dd8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 25 21:08:42 2012 -0500 Be more noncomittal about performance improvement of uint128 backend. --- src/common/tortls.c | 3 +-- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index ce6c7d6..f0c4c7d 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -555,8 +555,7 @@ tor_tls_init(void) "that apparently lacks accelerated support for the NIST " "P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with such " "support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option " - "when configuring it) would make ECDH about 5-10x " - "faster."); + "when configuring it) would make ECDH much faster."); } #endif

1 0

[tor/master] Merge branch 'tls_ecdhe_rebased_v2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Dec '12

26 Dec '12

commit 3eb39005106209240832b96e9292385747f703fa Merge: 747d284 ddbe289 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 25 22:10:57 2012 -0500 Merge branch 'tls_ecdhe_rebased_v2' changes/dh_benchmarks | 3 + changes/tls_ecdhe | 26 ++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 6 + src/common/tortls.c | 339 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- src/common/tortls.h | 8 +- src/or/config.c | 10 ++ src/or/connection_or.c | 9 +- src/or/or.h | 2 + src/or/router.c | 13 ++- src/test/bench.c | 99 ++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 480 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

1 0

[tor/master] One last fix for a warning on non-EC systems
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Dec '12

26 Dec '12

commit 68dae4cf3563e536e0693648cefcd0c69e512bff Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 25 22:12:18 2012 -0500 One last fix for a warning on non-EC systems --- src/common/tortls.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index f0c4c7d..1010425 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -1386,6 +1386,8 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(result->ctx, ec_key); EC_KEY_free(ec_key); } +#else + (void)flags; #endif SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb);

1 0

[translation/vidalia_completed] Update translations for vidalia_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 26 Dec '12

26 Dec '12

commit b3024fa32999a7e53a7da3eb56971a41f5db2750 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 26 02:45:21 2012 +0000 Update translations for vidalia_completed --- es/vidalia_es.po | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/es/vidalia_es.po b/es/vidalia_es.po index 0b8bae7..55b10a4 100644 --- a/es/vidalia_es.po +++ b/es/vidalia_es.po @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2012-03-21 17:52+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-12-25 22:28+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-12-26 02:38+0000\n" "Last-Translator: strel <strelnic(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: Spanish (http://www.transifex.com/projects/p/torproject/language/es/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -1671,7 +1671,7 @@ msgstr "Ayuda" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "New Identity" -msgstr "Nueva identidad (en la red Tor)" +msgstr "Nueva identidad" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "Ctrl+T"

1 0

[translation/vidalia] Update translations for vidalia
by translation＠torproject.org 26 Dec '12

26 Dec '12

commit 3073c465d5c0640a19d5bb0140c94de9e740389f Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 26 02:45:15 2012 +0000 Update translations for vidalia --- es/vidalia_es.po | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/es/vidalia_es.po b/es/vidalia_es.po index 0b8bae7..55b10a4 100644 --- a/es/vidalia_es.po +++ b/es/vidalia_es.po @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2012-03-21 17:52+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-12-25 22:28+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-12-26 02:38+0000\n" "Last-Translator: strel <strelnic(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: Spanish (http://www.transifex.com/projects/p/torproject/language/es/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -1671,7 +1671,7 @@ msgstr "Ayuda" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "New Identity" -msgstr "Nueva identidad (en la red Tor)" +msgstr "Nueva identidad" msgctxt "MainWindow" msgid "Ctrl+T"

1 0

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