[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Apr 22 13:20:11 UTC 2014
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/16 ===
===========================================================================
version 38
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-04-22T12:21:45+00:00
double space
--- version 37
+++ version 38
@@ -146,10 +146,10 @@
Many people email the Tor Help Desk from behind restrictive university
firewalls that require them to connect using a proxy. Often these
firewalls, Cyberoam and Fortiguard are two examples, use Deep Packet
-Inspection and block Tor traffic. Unfortunately Tor Browser users can’t
+Inspection and block Tor traffic. Unfortunately Tor Browser users can’t
use a proxy to connect to the internet and also use a pluggable
transport. The Tor Browser team plans to include this capability in a
-future release [29].
+future release [29].
[29]: https://bugs.torproject.org/8402
version 37
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-04-22T12:16:59+00:00
credits
--- version 36
+++ version 37
@@ -168,8 +168,8 @@
| https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tbb-dev/2014-March/000026.html
-This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by XXX, XXX, and
-XXX.
+This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by Lunar, harmony, Matt
+Pagan, and cypherpunks.
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
version 36
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-04-22T12:15:17+00:00
add missing link/numerize/freeze
--- version 35
+++ version 36
@@ -15,138 +15,143 @@
Cutting out relays running version 0.2.2.x
------------------------------------------
-Tor relays running the now ancient Tor 0.2.2.x are scheduled to be removed from
-the consensus [XXX]. The change has already been merged in the
-master branch and will be out with the next Tor 0.2.5 alpha.
+Tor relays running the now ancient Tor 0.2.2.x are scheduled to be
+removed from the consensus [1]. The change has already been merged in
+the master branch and will be out with the next Tor 0.2.5 alpha.
-Even if most relay operators have been warned, the change has not yet been
-widely announced. But as three directory authorities are already
-not voting for the deprecated versions, the downtime of two others
-while cleaning up after the OpenSSL “Heartbleed” issue was sufficient
-to get these relays removed from the consensus [XXX], as Roger
-Dingledine explained [XXX].
+Even if most relay operators have been warned, the change has not yet
+been widely announced. But as three directory authorities are already
+not voting for the deprecated versions, the downtime of two others while
+cleaning up after the OpenSSL “Heartbleed” issue was sufficient to get
+these relays removed from the consensus [2], as Roger Dingledine
+explained [3].
-Eventually relays running versions prior to 0.2.3.16-alpha might also be removed
-from the consensus. “I think 0.2.3.16-alpha’s fix of #6033 makes that
-one a plausible ’not below this one’ cutoff”, Roger writes in the
-relevant Trac entry [XXX].
+Eventually relays running versions prior to 0.2.3.16-alpha might also be
+removed from the consensus. “I think 0.2.3.16-alpha’s fix of #6033 makes
+that one a plausible ’not below this one’ cutoff”, Roger writes in the
+relevant Trac entry [4].
Relay operators should always make sure to run a recommended Tor
-version [XXX]. The Tor Weather service [XXX] can be used by relay
-operators to get email notifications if an outdated version is
-detected.
+version [5]. The Tor Weather service [6] can be used by relay operators
+to get email notifications if an outdated version is detected.
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11149
- [XXX]: https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html?graph=versions&start=2014-04-01&end=2014-04-23#versions
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004422.html
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11149#comment:7
- [XXX]: https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#recommendedversions
- [XXX]: https://weather.torproject.org/subscribe/
+ [1]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11149
+ [2]: https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html?graph=versions&start=2014-04-01&end=2014-04-23#versions
+ [3]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004422.html
+ [4]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11149#comment:7
+ [5]: https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#recommendedversions
+ [6]: https://weather.torproject.org/subscribe/
Miscellaneous news
------------------
-Nathan Freitas announced [XXX] the third (and probably final) release
+Nathan Freitas announced [7] the third (and probably final) release
candidate for Orbot 13.0.6: “The big improvements in this build are a
fix for the disconnected UI/activity (Tor is on, but UI shows off), and
improvements to the transparent proxying iptables scripts”.
- [XXX]: https://lists.mayfirst.org/pipermail/guardian-dev/2014-April/003436.html
+ [7]: https://lists.mayfirst.org/pipermail/guardian-dev/2014-April/003436.html
-The Tails developers put out two calls for testing: the first [XXX] is
-for the first release candidate of Tails 1.0; while the second [XXX] is
-for UEFI support, which “allows you to start Tails using a USB stick on
+The Tails developers put out two calls for testing: the first [8] is for
+the first release candidate of Tails 1.0; while the second [9] is for
+UEFI support, which “allows you to start Tails using a USB stick on
recent hardware, and especially on Mac”. “Test wildly”, and report any
bugs you find!
- [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/news/test_1.0-rc1/index.en.html
- [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/news/test_UEFI/index.en.html
+ [8]: https://tails.boum.org/news/test_1.0-rc1/index.en.html
+ [9]: https://tails.boum.org/news/test_UEFI/index.en.html
-Andrea Shepard sent [XXX] a list of 1777 fingerprints for relays “which have
-ever turned up as potentially exposed by Heartbleed”. It appears that enough
-directory authority operators now reject relays known to be problematic [XXX]: sssheep
-reported [XXX] that the still-vulnerable section of the network was down to 0.01% of the consensus weight.
+Andrea Shepard sent [10] a list of 1777 fingerprints for relays “which
+have ever turned up as potentially exposed by Heartbleed”. It appears
+that enough directory authority operators now reject relays known to be
+problematic [11]: sssheep reported [12] that the still-vulnerable
+section of the network was down to 0.01% of the consensus weight.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004340.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004362.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-April/032762.html
+ [10]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004340.html
+ [11]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004362.html
+ [12]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-April/032762.html
-Mick drew attention [XXX] to the fact that in its current state,
-arm [XXX] — the command-line relay status monitor — wrongly advises
-relay operators to run it with the same user as Tor, in order to access
+Mick drew attention [13] to the fact that in its current state, arm [14]
+— the command-line relay status monitor — wrongly advises relay
+operators to run it with the same user as Tor, in order to access
information about the relay’s connections. This is in fact a very bad
-idea, and a ticket [XXX] is already open to address this issue. Lunar
-detailed [XXX] the correct method of doing this, which is also explained
+idea, and a ticket [15] is already open to address this issue. Lunar
+detailed [16] the correct method of doing this, which is also explained
in the ticket.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004414.html
- [XXX]: https://www.atagar.com/arm/
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/10702
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004412.html
+ [13]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004414.html
+ [14]: https://www.atagar.com/arm/
+ [15]: https://bugs.torproject.org/10702
+ [16]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004412.html
-On the tor-relays mailing list, David Stainton mentioned [XXX] his Tor role [XXX]
-for the Ansible [XXX] automation tool. David hoped that “relay operators will
-find this useful for deploying and maintaining large numbers of Tor relays
-and bridges”. The documentation specifies that it currently works with Debian
-and Ubuntu systems, and contains several configuration examples.
+On the tor-relays mailing list, David Stainton mentioned [17] his Tor
+role [18] for the Ansible [19] automation tool. David hoped that “relay
+operators will find this useful for deploying and maintaining large
+numbers of Tor relays and bridges”. The documentation specifies that it
+currently works with Debian and Ubuntu systems, and contains several
+configuration examples.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004373.html
- [XXX]: http://www.ansible.com/
+ [17]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004373.html
+ [18]: https://github.com/david415/ansible-tor
+ [19]: http://www.ansible.com/
-David Fifield continues his progress on meek [XXX], a pluggable transport “that
-routes your traffic through a third-party web service in a way that should be
-difficult to block”. David sent a call for wider testing [XXX] of experimental
-Tor Browser builds and a call for reviews of the code [XXX]. “There are a
-lot of components that make up the meek transport. […] This is your chance
-to get in on the ground floor of a new transport!”
+David Fifield continued his progress on meek [20], a pluggable transport
+“that routes your traffic through a third-party web service in a way
+that should be difficult to block”. David sent a call for wider
+testing [21] of experimental Tor Browser builds and a call for reviews
+of the code [22]. “There are a lot of components that make up the meek
+transport […] This is your chance to get in on the ground floor of a
+new transport!”
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006718.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006719.html
+ [20]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek
+ [21]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006718.html
+ [22]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006719.html
-Ximin Luo raised [XXX] several points regarding how “indirect” pluggable
-transports like flashproxy [XXX] or meek are currently handled by Tor. Whereas
-obfs3 or ScrambleSuit connect directly to the specified peer, transforming the
-data flow along the way, Ximin describes meek and flashproxy as providing “the
-metaphor of connecting to a global homogeneous service”. The latter being
-“incompatible with the metaphor of connecting to a specific endpoint”.
-Solutions on how to make the design, code, and configuration better are up for
-discussion.
+Ximin Luo raised [23] several points regarding how “indirect” pluggable
+transports like flashproxy [24] or meek are currently handled by Tor.
+Whereas obfs3 or ScrambleSuit connect directly to the specified peer,
+transforming the data flow along the way, Ximin describes meek and
+flashproxy as providing “the metaphor of connecting to a global
+homogeneous service”. The latter being “incompatible with the metaphor
+of connecting to a specific endpoint”. Solutions on how to make the
+design, code, and configuration better are up for discussion.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006689.html
- [XXX]: http://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/
+ [23]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006689.html
+ [24]: http://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/
-Nicolas Vigier submitted his status report for March [XXX].
+Nicolas Vigier submitted his status report for March [25].
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000510.html
+ [25]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000510.html
-Philipp Winter relayed [XXX] the call for papers for the 4th USENIX Workshop on
-Free and Open Communications on the Internet [XXX]. The workshop will be held
-on August 18th, and should bring together the wider community of researchers
-and practitioners interested in Tor and other ways to study, detect, or
-circumvent censorship. Papers have to be submitted before May 13th.
+Philipp Winter relayed [26] the call for papers for the 4th USENIX
+Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet [27]. The
+workshop will be held on August 18th, and should bring together the
+wider community of researchers and practitioners interested in Tor and
+other ways to study, detect, or circumvent censorship. Papers have to be
+submitted before May 13th.
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/call-papers-foci14-workshop
- [XXX]: https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci14/call-for-papers
+ [26]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/call-papers-foci14-workshop
+ [27]: https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci14/call-for-papers
-Fabio Pietrosanti wondered [XXX] whether anyone had “ever tried to start
+Fabio Pietrosanti wondered [28] whether anyone had “ever tried to start
Tor from a Python application using Ctypes”, making it possible to
“sandbox the Python application using AppArmor without enabling any kind
of execve() call”.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006723.html
+ [28]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006723.html
Tor help desk roundup
---------------------
-Many people email the Tor Help Desk from behind restrictive university firewalls
-that require them to connect using a proxy. Often these firewalls, Cyberoam and
-Fortiguard are two examples, use Deep Packet Inspection and block Tor traffic.
-Unfortunately Tor Browser users can’t use a proxy to connect to the internet and
-also use a pluggable transport. The Tor Browser team plans to include this
-capability in a future release [XXX].
+Many people email the Tor Help Desk from behind restrictive university
+firewalls that require them to connect using a proxy. Often these
+firewalls, Cyberoam and Fortiguard are two examples, use Deep Packet
+Inspection and block Tor traffic. Unfortunately Tor Browser users can’t
+use a proxy to connect to the internet and also use a pluggable
+transport. The Tor Browser team plans to include this capability in a
+future release [29].
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/8402
+ [29]: https://bugs.torproject.org/8402
Upcoming events
---------------
@@ -168,10 +173,10 @@
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
-important news. Please see the project page [XXX], write down your
-name and subscribe to the team mailing list [XXX] if you want to
+important news. Please see the project page [30], write down your
+name and subscribe to the team mailing list [31] if you want to
get involved!
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
+ [30]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
+ [31]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
}}}
version 35
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-04-22T12:03:10+00:00
language fixes
--- version 34
+++ version 35
@@ -10,30 +10,30 @@
========================================================================
Welcome to the sixteenth issue of Tor Weekly News in 2014, the weekly
-newsletter that covers what is happening in the XXX Tor community.
+newsletter that covers what is happening in the Tor community.
Cutting out relays running version 0.2.2.x
------------------------------------------
-Tor relays running ancient Tor 0.2.2.x are scheduled to be removed from
+Tor relays running the now ancient Tor 0.2.2.x are scheduled to be removed from
the consensus [XXX]. The change has already been merged in the
master branch and will be out with the next Tor 0.2.5 alpha.
-Even if most relay operators have been warned, the change has not been
-yet announced widely. But as three directory authorities are already
+Even if most relay operators have been warned, the change has not yet been
+widely announced. But as three directory authorities are already
not voting for the deprecated versions, the downtime of two others
-while cleaning up after the OpenSSL “heartbleed” issue was sufficient
-to get these relays removed from the consensus [XXX] explained [XXX] Roger
-Dingledine.
+while cleaning up after the OpenSSL “Heartbleed” issue was sufficient
+to get these relays removed from the consensus [XXX], as Roger
+Dingledine explained [XXX].
-Eventually relays running version prior 0.2.3.16-alpha might be removed
-from the consensus. “I think 0.2.3.16-alpha's fix of #6033 makes that
-one a plausible 'not below this one' cutoff”, Roger writes in the
-respective Trac entry [XXX].
+Eventually relays running versions prior to 0.2.3.16-alpha might also be removed
+from the consensus. “I think 0.2.3.16-alpha’s fix of #6033 makes that
+one a plausible ’not below this one’ cutoff”, Roger writes in the
+relevant Trac entry [XXX].
Relay operators should always make sure to run a recommended Tor
version [XXX]. The Tor Weather service [XXX] can be used by relay
-operators to get email notifications if an outdated tor version is
+operators to get email notifications if an outdated version is
detected.
[XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/11149
@@ -64,9 +64,8 @@
Andrea Shepard sent [XXX] a list of 1777 fingerprints for relays “which have
ever turned up as potentially exposed by Heartbleed”. It appears that enough
-directory authority operators rejects known problematic relays [XXX]: sssheep
-reported [XXX] that the network was down to 0.01% of the consensus weight still
-vulnerable.
+directory authority operators now reject relays known to be problematic [XXX]: sssheep
+reported [XXX] that the still-vulnerable section of the network was down to 0.01% of the consensus weight.
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004340.html
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004362.html
@@ -86,10 +85,10 @@
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004412.html
On the tor-relays mailing list, David Stainton mentioned [XXX] his Tor role [XXX]
-for the Ansible [XXX] automation tool. David hope that “relay operators will
+for the Ansible [XXX] automation tool. David hoped that “relay operators will
find this useful for deploying and maintaining large numbers of Tor relays
and bridges”. The documentation specifies that it currently works with Debian
-and Ubuntu systems and contain several configuration examples.
+and Ubuntu systems, and contains several configuration examples.
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004373.html
[XXX]: http://www.ansible.com/
@@ -107,12 +106,12 @@
Ximin Luo raised [XXX] several points regarding how “indirect” pluggable
transports like flashproxy [XXX] or meek are currently handled by Tor. Whereas
-obfs3 or ScrambleSuit connect directly to the specified peer transforming the
+obfs3 or ScrambleSuit connect directly to the specified peer, transforming the
data flow along the way, Ximin describes meek and flashproxy as providing “the
metaphor of connecting to a global homogeneous service”. The latter being
“incompatible with the metaphor of connecting to a specific endpoint”.
Solutions on how to make the design, code, and configuration better are up for
-discussions.
+discussion.
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006689.html
[XXX]: http://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/
@@ -121,11 +120,11 @@
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-April/000510.html
-Philipp Winter relayed [XXX] the call for papers of the 4th USENIX Workshop on
+Philipp Winter relayed [XXX] the call for papers for the 4th USENIX Workshop on
Free and Open Communications on the Internet [XXX]. The workshop will be held
-on August 18th and should bring together the larger community of researchers
-and practitioner interested in Tor and how other ways to study, detect, or
-circumvent censorship. Papers have to be submitted before May 13rd.
+on August 18th, and should bring together the wider community of researchers
+and practitioners interested in Tor and other ways to study, detect, or
+circumvent censorship. Papers have to be submitted before May 13th.
[XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/call-papers-foci14-workshop
[XXX]: https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci14/call-for-papers
@@ -143,7 +142,7 @@
Many people email the Tor Help Desk from behind restrictive university firewalls
that require them to connect using a proxy. Often these firewalls, Cyberoam and
Fortiguard are two examples, use Deep Packet Inspection and block Tor traffic.
-Unfortunately Tor Browser users can't use a proxy to connect to the internet and
+Unfortunately Tor Browser users can’t use a proxy to connect to the internet and
also use a pluggable transport. The Tor Browser team plans to include this
capability in a future release [XXX].
version 34
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-04-22T11:54:54+00:00
apparently no Tor.SE this week
--- version 33
+++ version 34
@@ -147,15 +147,7 @@
also use a pluggable transport. The Tor Browser team plans to include this
capability in a future release [XXX].
-[XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/8402
-
-
-News from Tor StackExchange
----------------------------
-
-Text with cited source [XXX].
-
- [XXX]:
+ [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/8402
Upcoming events
---------------
version 33
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-04-22T11:53:41+00:00
add last item
--- version 32
+++ version 33
@@ -130,6 +130,13 @@
[XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/call-papers-foci14-workshop
[XXX]: https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci14/call-for-papers
+Fabio Pietrosanti wondered [XXX] whether anyone had “ever tried to start
+Tor from a Python application using Ctypes”, making it possible to
+“sandbox the Python application using AppArmor without enabling any kind
+of execve() call”.
+
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006723.html
+
Tor help desk roundup
---------------------
@@ -176,8 +183,4 @@
[XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
-}}}
-
-Possible items:
-
- * Starting Tor from Python using Ctypes improving Sandboxing? https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006723.html (maybe)+}}}
version 32
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-04-22T11:49:24+00:00
write in tails calls for testing
--- version 31
+++ version 32
@@ -43,33 +43,6 @@
[XXX]: https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#recommendedversions
[XXX]: https://weather.torproject.org/subscribe/
-Feature XXX
------------
-
-Feature 1 with cited source [XXX]
-
- [XXX]:
-
-Removal of old v0.2.2.x Tor relays
------------------------------------
-
-
- [XXX]
-
- [XXX]:
-
-Monthly status reports for XXX month 2014
------------------------------------------
-
-The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
-month of XXX has begun. XXX released his report first [XXX], followed
-by reports from name 2 [XXX], name 3 [XXX], and name 4 [XXX].
-
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
-
Miscellaneous news
------------------
@@ -79,6 +52,15 @@
improvements to the transparent proxying iptables scripts”.
[XXX]: https://lists.mayfirst.org/pipermail/guardian-dev/2014-April/003436.html
+
+The Tails developers put out two calls for testing: the first [XXX] is
+for the first release candidate of Tails 1.0; while the second [XXX] is
+for UEFI support, which “allows you to start Tails using a USB stick on
+recent hardware, and especially on Mac”. “Test wildly”, and report any
+bugs you find!
+
+ [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/news/test_1.0-rc1/index.en.html
+ [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/news/test_UEFI/index.en.html
Andrea Shepard sent [XXX] a list of 1777 fingerprints for relays “which have
ever turned up as potentially exposed by Heartbleed”. It appears that enough
@@ -198,6 +180,4 @@
Possible items:
- * Starting Tor from Python using Ctypes improving Sandboxing? https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006723.html (maybe)
- * Call for testing: UEFI support in Tails https://tails.boum.org/news/test_UEFI/index.en.html
- * Call for testing: Tails 1.0~rc1 https://tails.boum.org/news/test_1.0-rc1/index.en.html
+ * Starting Tor from Python using Ctypes improving Sandboxing? https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006723.html (maybe)
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/17 ===
===========================================================================
version 1
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-04-22T12:40:47+00:00
import template
---
+++ version 1
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+''43rd issue of Tor Weekly News. Covering what's happening from April 22nd, 2014 to April 29th, 2014. To be released on April 30th, 2014.''
+
+'''Editor:'''
+
+'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — April 30th, 2014
+
+{{{
+========================================================================
+Tor Weekly News April 30th, 2014
+========================================================================
+
+Welcome to the seventeenth issue of Tor Weekly News in 2014, the weekly
+newsletter that covers what is happening in the XXX Tor community.
+
+Feature XXX
+-----------
+
+Feature 1 with cited source [XXX]
+
+ [XXX]:
+
+Monthly status reports for XXX month 2014
+-----------------------------------------
+
+The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
+month of XXX has begun. XXX released his report first [XXX], followed
+by reports from name 2 [XXX], name 3 [XXX], and name 4 [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+
+Miscellaneous news
+------------------
+
+Item 1 with cited source [XXX].
+
+Item 2 with cited source [XXX].
+
+Item 3 with cited source [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+
+Tor help desk roundup
+---------------------
+
+Summary of some questions sent to the Tor help desk.
+
+News from Tor StackExchange
+---------------------------
+
+Text with cited source [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]:
+
+Upcoming events
+---------------
+
+Jul XX-XX | Event XXX brief description
+ | Event City, Event Country
+ | Event website URL
+ |
+Jul XX-XX | Event XXX brief description
+ | Event City, Event Country
+ | Event website URL
+
+
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