Summary: - Our guard relay family has been under a sustained circuit-building DoS wave since 2026-06-25 23:00 UTC, still ongoing: open circuits at 20x peak and 8x sustained, onionskin load 7x, stream creation 12x -- but bandwidth only +20%. Millions of near-idle circuits. See the attached charts (fleet open circuits, onionskin processing, and bandwidth, Jun 10 - Jul 10). - Every location and provider we run (EU + NA) was hit simultaneously with the same onset time, and the load arrives over existing OR connections (established TCP counts stayed flat). There is an onion-service introduction component. Looks network-wide or family-targeted, not host-specific. - Impact contained so far: tor's DoS defenses engaged, brief onionskin drops on a small subset of relays, consensus flags dipped ~5%, zero TCP port exhaustion and zero global rate-limit events. - EU servers shed 10-20% of real traffic, which are commonly closer to capacity, while NA absorbed more and have never been at capacity. - Jun 25 - Jul 10, full event window vs prior 15 days: open circuits +719% (the 8x sustained figure), onionskins processed +639%, stream creation +1126%, bandwidth +20% Details, chronological (times UTC; metrics from MetricsPort, fleet-wide): - Jun 22, 12:00-24:00 -- 12h precursor burst: open circuits ~8x normal, then two quiet days. - Jun 25, 23:00 -- onset: onionskin processing ~2.5x within 30 minutes; open circuits ~6x within 3 hours. - Jun 26-27 -- first major waves: introduce2_rejected bursts an order of magnitude above normal (peak Jun 27 03:00); conn_rejected ~5x baseline with bursts to ~10x. - Jun 26-28 -- overload symptoms: brief onionskin drops on a small subset of relays; tor's OOM handler ~10x more active; Stable/Fast/Running flag counts dip ~5% (Guard -3%). - Jul 5, 08:00 -- the 20x peak: open circuits hit ~20x baseline, the event's maximum so far. - Jul 6-10 -- slow decay: still ~5-6x baseline as of Jul 10. The symptom class matches the 2022-2023 network DDoS -- circuit creation floods overloading non-exit relays' onionskin processing, plus an onion-service introduction component: https://forum.torproject.org/t/tor-relays-dos-attacks-status-update/5333 https://blog.torproject.org/tor-network-ddos-attack/ Metrics to compare on your relays: tor_relay_circuits_total{state="opened"} tor_relay_load_onionskins_total tor_relay_streams_total tor_relay_dos_total (by type) Is anyone else seeing this since Jun 25? Happy to share more detail.
