Is this the wrong forum? It strikes me that this is the biggest attack, and the only one to have affected my servers ever in over decade running Tor Why so little noise about it? What research is going on? and any mitigation likely soon? My exit node, normally around No 2 and UK exit was crashed out by the assumed HSDir-shaping attack It last appeared as Running at 10:00 UTC From 10:05 to 12:14 UTC, Tor logged continuous: Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! At the peak, Tor suppressed roughly 390,000 similar warnings per minute Latest heartbeat recorded 44,690 open circuits Inbound ORPort population: 8,826 channels Sources: 6,831 unique peers across 2,849 IPv4 /24 networks Onionoo now reports Running=false, hence no current flags Both IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts remain externally reachable Tor is active, configuration is valid, RAM/FD/disk are healthy The attack has now largely subsided because the relay was removed from the consensus: Tor CPU is presently only ~17%, and the connection population is stable. Gerry -----Original Message----- From: gerard@bulger.co.uk <gerard@bulger.co.uk> Sent: 15 November 2026 12:25 To: 'support and questions about running Tor relays (exit, non-exit, bridge)' <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> Subject: RE: [tor-relays] HSDir attacks Update Updated relay contributionx to Tor 0.4.9.17 and restarted at 12:17 UTC. HSDir remained. Within five minutes it had 5,700 established ORPort connections from 4,654 unique IPv4 addresses, with Tor using approximately 70% CPU. Temperature was 6467°C and RSS approximately 731 MB. The same high-count source addresses seen before shutdown reappeared. No overload warning had yet been emitted by the fresh process, but the distributed connection attack clearly resumed immediately. Gerry -----Original Message----- From: DocGerry via tor-relays <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> Sent: 15 November 2026 12:14 To: 'support and questions about running Tor relays (exit, non-exit, bridge)' <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> Cc: gerard@bulger.co.uk Subject: [tor-relays] HSDir attacks I run a busy Tor exit which has not regained all its flags over the last two weeks. My webtunnels have been unaffected My small relay on underpowered old laptop really suffers and was set cooking to 95C from severe Tor circuit-creation load, consistent with the HSDir attack reports. "contribution", fingerprint 97AF9CDBEEFDFDF0632845A14319BFE6B4454794, Tor 0.4.9.15, regained HSDir cools but hours later day became severely overloaded. At 2026-11-15 11:52 UTC it had 8,484 established ORPort connections from 5,904 unique IPv4 addresses across 3,483 /24s, Tor at 71% CPU and 3.7 GB RSS, host temperature 95°C, and load average 3.75. Tor reported 12,631 open circuits and continuous too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests warnings, including 13,698 suppressed events in two minutes. General overload reported 260,729 dropped Ntor requests (1.2948%, threshold 0.5%). All is consistent with the distributed HSDir-targeted circuit attack. I turned it off to cool it down. Gerry _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list -- tor-relays@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to tor-relays-leave@lists.torproject.org