Is this the wrong forum? It strikes me that this is the biggest attack, and the only one to have affected my servers ever in over decade running Tor Why so little noise about it? What research is going on? and any mitigation likely soon? My exit node, normally around No 2 and UK exit was crashed out by the assumed HSDir-shaping attack It last appeared as Running at 10:00 UTC From 10:05 to 12:14 UTC, Tor logged continuous: Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! At the peak, Tor suppressed roughly 390,000 similar warnings per minute Latest heartbeat recorded 44,690 open circuits Inbound ORPort population: 8,826 channels Sources: 6,831 unique peers across 2,849 IPv4 /24 networks Onionoo now reports Running=false, hence no current flags Both IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts remain externally reachable Tor is active, configuration is valid, RAM/FD/disk are healthy The attack has now largely subsided because the relay was removed from the consensus: Tor CPU is presently only ~17%, and the connection population is stable. Gerry -----Original Message----- From: gerard@bulger.co.uk <gerard@bulger.co.uk> Sent: 15 November 2026 12:25 To: 'support and questions about running Tor relays (exit, non-exit, bridge)' <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> Subject: RE: [tor-relays] HSDir attacks Update Updated relay contributionx to Tor 0.4.9.17 and restarted at 12:17 UTC. HSDir remained. Within five minutes it had 5,700 established ORPort connections from 4,654 unique IPv4 addresses, with Tor using approximately 70% CPU. Temperature was 6467°C and RSS approximately 731 MB. The same high-count source addresses seen before shutdown reappeared. No overload warning had yet been emitted by the fresh process, but the distributed connection attack clearly resumed immediately. Gerry -----Original Message----- From: DocGerry via tor-relays <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> Sent: 15 November 2026 12:14 To: 'support and questions about running Tor relays (exit, non-exit, bridge)' <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> Cc: gerard@bulger.co.uk Subject: [tor-relays] HSDir attacks I run a busy Tor exit which has not regained all its flags over the last two weeks. My webtunnels have been unaffected My small relay on underpowered old laptop really suffers and was set cooking to 95C from severe Tor circuit-creation load, consistent with the HSDir attack reports. "contribution", fingerprint 97AF9CDBEEFDFDF0632845A14319BFE6B4454794, Tor 0.4.9.15, regained HSDir cools but hours later day became severely overloaded. At 2026-11-15 11:52 UTC it had 8,484 established ORPort connections from 5,904 unique IPv4 addresses across 3,483 /24s, Tor at 71% CPU and 3.7 GB RSS, host temperature 95°C, and load average 3.75. Tor reported 12,631 open circuits and continuous too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests warnings, including 13,698 suppressed events in two minutes. General overload reported 260,729 dropped Ntor requests (1.2948%, threshold 0.5%). All is consistent with the distributed HSDir-targeted circuit attack. I turned it off to cool it down. Gerry _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list -- tor-relays@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to tor-relays-leave@lists.torproject.org
I ruined my second relay stats that was my first relay. It got guard and stable for the first time today. Attack started in an hour. Tor is active and transferring data now but tor metrics just shows its down. This is just so annoying. Is it really worth keeping these up when you get the attack right away when you get the flags.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 2026-11-16 17:07, kullikovana via tor-relays wrote:
I ruined my second relay stats that was my first relay. It got guard and stable for the first time today. Attack started in an hour. Tor is active and transferring data now but tor metrics just shows its down. This is just so annoying. Is it really worth keeping these up when you get the attack right away when you get the flags.
Add "DirCache 0" to your torrc to avoid the attacks. It will disqualify you from becoming a guard while it's set, but it will also prevent you from becoming an HSDir, which is the type of relay the attacker targets. The developers are working on a new release that should mitigate this. On 2026-11-16 13:14, DocGerry via tor-relays wrote:
Is this the wrong forum? It strikes me that this is the biggest attack, and the only one to have affected my servers ever in over decade running Tor
Why so little noise about it? What research is going on? and any mitigation likely soon?
There's a lot of noise. We're all being affected, and mitigations are in the works right now. We should be able to expect more rapid updates soon as the developers have begun prioritizing this. Trust me, I'm feeling the pain two. I've already permanently lost one relay due to this (shut down by the provider due to excessive resource use), and two others are on the chopping block right now, suspended. A fix was released recently in .16 and another smaller fix in .17, but the first fix turned out to have been incomplete, and the attacker took just a few days to figure out how to bypass it. Hopefully .18 will come with a more complete and effective mitigation. Regards, forest -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEARYKAB0WIQQtr8ZXhq/o01Qf/pow+TRLM+X4xgUCavurPgAKCRAw+TRLM+X4 xv/7AQCwBEbCW8hYMEKI3eF4ndj1KaSli75U7Tz65LzJPsd+RQEA2rtnUrYpU08C FYdQAXWsvdWBT6qs/D7JUp9fVwoAIQ8= =6z62 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
What the hell is going on? My speeds are just going down and down. Other relay was doing 500-700gb every single day and other one over 2tb when i got stable before attacks. Now speeds are like 20/20mbit if that with both relays. Just going lower and lower last couple of days.
Traffic on my relays have also dropped to a fraction of their normal load despite retaining HSDir / Guard. On 17/11/26 13:41, kullikovana via tor-relays wrote:
What the hell is going on? My speeds are just going down and down. Other relay was doing 500-700gb every single day and other one over 2tb when i got stable before attacks. Now speeds are like 20/20mbit if that with both relays. Just going lower and lower last couple of days. _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list -- tor-relays@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to tor-relays-leave@lists.torproject.org
Yeh i might go to dir 0. New problem i have my both relays are snails. Both are transferring under 10mbit. My consensus have collapsed. This is a joke. If i had use for these small relays i would quit tonight. I dont have any idea what is going on. I tried both of theyre speeds outside of tor and they are fine. I havent changed any settings. The relay that got attacked yesterday was so solid. I have the "too much traffic 100mbit" limit and its set on 100mbit and it was pushing 600-750gb. 99.9% of time sometimes even close to 900gb. Sent with Proton Mail secure email. On Tuesday, November 17th, 2026 at 9:37 AM, forest via tor-relays <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> wrote:
On 2026-11-16 17:07, kullikovana via tor-relays wrote:
I ruined my second relay stats that was my first relay. It got guard and stable for the first time today. Attack started in an hour. Tor is active and transferring data now but tor metrics just shows its down. This is just so annoying. Is it really worth keeping these up when you get the attack right away when you get the flags.
Add "DirCache 0" to your torrc to avoid the attacks. It will disqualify you from becoming a guard while it's set, but it will also prevent you from becoming an HSDir, which is the type of relay the attacker targets.
The developers are working on a new release that should mitigate this.
On 2026-11-16 13:14, DocGerry via tor-relays wrote:
Is this the wrong forum? It strikes me that this is the biggest attack, and the only one to have affected my servers ever in over decade running Tor
Why so little noise about it? What research is going on? and any mitigation likely soon?
There's a lot of noise. We're all being affected, and mitigations are in the works right now. We should be able to expect more rapid updates soon as the developers have begun prioritizing this.
Trust me, I'm feeling the pain two. I've already permanently lost one relay due to this (shut down by the provider due to excessive resource use), and two others are on the chopping block right now, suspended.
A fix was released recently in .16 and another smaller fix in .17, but the first fix turned out to have been incomplete, and the attacker took just a few days to figure out how to bypass it. Hopefully .18 will come with a more complete and effective mitigation.
Regards, forest
Whoever is causing this nonsense, please do not let them win!! Dawn
On Nov 17, 2026 at 10:35 AM, kullikovana via tor-relays <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> wrote:
Yeh i might go to dir 0. New problem i have my both relays are snails. Both are transferring under 10mbit. My consensus have collapsed. This is a joke. If i had use for these small relays i would quit tonight. I dont have any idea what is going on. I tried both of theyre speeds outside of tor and they are fine. I havent changed any settings. The relay that got attacked yesterday was so solid. I have the "too much traffic 100mbit" limit and its set on 100mbit and it was pushing 600-750gb. 99.9% of time sometimes even close to 900gb.
Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
On Tuesday, November 17th, 2026 at 9:37 AM, forest via tor-relays <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> wrote:
On 2026-11-16 17:07, kullikovana via tor-relays wrote:
I ruined my second relay stats that was my first relay. It got guard and stable for the first time today. Attack started in an hour. Tor is active and transferring data now but tor metrics just shows its down. This is just so annoying. Is it really worth keeping these up when you get the attack right away when you get the flags.
Add "DirCache 0" to your torrc to avoid the attacks. It will disqualify you from becoming a guard while it's set, but it will also prevent you from becoming an HSDir, which is the type of relay the attacker targets.
The developers are working on a new release that should mitigate this.
On 2026-11-16 13:14, DocGerry via tor-relays wrote:
Is this the wrong forum? It strikes me that this is the biggest attack, and the only one to have affected my servers ever in over decade running Tor
Why so little noise about it? What research is going on? and any mitigation likely soon?
There's a lot of noise. We're all being affected, and mitigations are in the works right now. We should be able to expect more rapid updates soon as the developers have begun prioritizing this.
Trust me, I'm feeling the pain two. I've already permanently lost one relay due to this (shut down by the provider due to excessive resource use), and two others are on the chopping block right now, suspended.
A fix was released recently in .16 and another smaller fix in .17, but the first fix turned out to have been incomplete, and the attacker took just a few days to figure out how to bypass it. Hopefully .18 will come with a more complete and effective mitigation.
Regards, forest
tor-relays mailing list -- tor-relays@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to tor-relays-leave@lists.torproject.org
They win when we lose the HSDir flag. Then I assume requests go to the servers they control so they can inspect them, I assume that is the ploy. ? A Government. Gerry From: dawn.belle.flood via tor-relays <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> Sent: 17 November 2026 16:57 To: kullikovana via tor-relays <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> Cc: dawn.belle.flood <dawn.belle.flood@gmail.com> Subject: [tor-relays] Re: HSDir attacks Whoever is causing this nonsense, please do not let them win!! Dawn On Nov 17, 2026 at 10:35 AM, kullikovana via tor-relays <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> > wrote: Yeh i might go to dir 0. New problem i have my both relays are snails. Both are transferring under 10mbit. My consensus have collapsed. This is a joke. If i had use for these small relays i would quit tonight. I dont have any idea what is going on. I tried both of theyre speeds outside of tor and they are fine. I havent changed any settings. The relay that got attacked yesterday was so solid. I have the "too much traffic 100mbit" limit and its set on 100mbit and it was pushing 600-750gb. 99.9% of time sometimes even close to 900gb. Sent with Proton Mail secure email. On Tuesday, November 17th, 2026 at 9:37 AM, forest via tor-relays <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> wrote:
On 2026-11-16 17:07, kullikovana via tor-relays wrote:
I ruined my second relay stats that was my first relay. It got guard and stable for the first time today. Attack started in an hour. Tor is active and transferring data now but tor metrics just shows its down. This is just so annoying. Is it really worth keeping these up when you get the attack right away when you get the flags.
Add "DirCache 0" to your torrc to avoid the attacks. It will disqualify you from becoming a guard while it's set, but it will also prevent you from becoming an HSDir, which is the type of relay the attacker targets.
The developers are working on a new release that should mitigate this.
On 2026-11-16 13:14, DocGerry via tor-relays wrote:
Is this the wrong forum? It strikes me that this is the biggest attack, and the only one to have affected my servers ever in over decade running Tor
Why so little noise about it? What research is going on? and any mitigation likely soon?
There's a lot of noise. We're all being affected, and mitigations are in the works right now. We should be able to expect more rapid updates soon as the developers have begun prioritizing this.
Trust me, I'm feeling the pain two. I've already permanently lost one relay due to this (shut down by the provider due to excessive resource use), and two others are on the chopping block right now, suspended.
A fix was released recently in .16 and another smaller fix in .17, but the first fix turned out to have been incomplete, and the attacker took just a few days to figure out how to bypass it. Hopefully .18 will come with a more complete and effective mitigation.
Regards, forest
tor-relays mailing list -- tor-relays@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to tor-relays-leave@lists.torproject.org
Yes, this is HSDir shaping, being used to deanonymize visitors to perhaps 1/2 a dozen to a dozen hidden services. And the solution is simple: The HSDir flag needs to be sticky until 12:00 the next day, EVEN IF THE ROUTER WOLUD BE CALLED "down". Yes, this enables a DOS of targeted hidden services but any public service has DOS vulnerabilities. That the Tor project refuses to acknowledge this, and that they are under attack by a nation-state class adversary who wants to denanoymize visitors, is well, ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
On Nov 17, 2026, at 9:09 AM, DocGerry via tor-relays <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> wrote:
They win when we lose the HSDir flag. Then I assume requests go to the servers they control so they can inspect them, I assume that is the ploy. ? A Government. Gerry
participants (6)
-
dawn.belle.flood -
forest -
gerard@bulger.co.uk -
Jack -
kullikovana -
Nick Weaver