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[tor/release-0.2.2] Instead of checking whether we have unremoved intro points, check for usable ones
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 748350ace11fa55758fb8bafe5e5556867dd9c23 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 20 16:49:41 2011 -0400 Instead of checking whether we have unremoved intro points, check for usable ones --- src/or/rendclient.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- src/or/rendclient.h | 1 + src/or/rendcommon.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 90304c3..d444611 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ #include "routerlist.h" static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( - const rend_data_t *rend_query, const int strict); + const rend_cache_entry_t *rend_query, + const int strict, const int warnings); /** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point: * send the introduction request. */ @@ -562,7 +563,7 @@ rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro, } } - if (smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) { + if (! rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(ent)) { log_info(LD_REND, "No more intro points remain for %s. Re-fetching descriptor.", escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); @@ -708,7 +709,7 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query) assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn), now); if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_data->onion_address, -1, &entry) == 1 && - smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) > 0) { + rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(entry)) { /* either this fetch worked, or it failed but there was a * valid entry from before which we should reuse */ log_info(LD_REND,"Rend desc is usable. Launching circuits."); @@ -743,13 +744,22 @@ extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) { extend_info_t *result; + rend_cache_entry_t *entry; + + if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) { + log_warn(LD_REND, + "Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.", + safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); + return NULL; + } + /* See if we can get a node that complies with ExcludeNodes */ - if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 1))) + if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(entry, 1, 1))) return result; /* If not, and StrictNodes is not set, see if we can return any old node */ if (!get_options()->StrictNodes) - return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 0); + return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(entry, 0, 1); return NULL; } @@ -757,23 +767,18 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) * iff strict is true. */ static extend_info_t * -rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, - const int strict) +rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry, + const int strict, + const int warnings) { int i; - rend_cache_entry_t *entry; + rend_intro_point_t *intro; routerinfo_t *router; or_options_t *options = get_options(); smartlist_t *usable_nodes; int n_excluded = 0; - if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) { - log_warn(LD_REND, - "Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.", - safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); - return NULL; - } /* We'll keep a separate list of the usable nodes. If this becomes empty, * no nodes are usable. */ usable_nodes = smartlist_create(); @@ -781,7 +786,7 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, again: if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) { - if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes) { + if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes && warnings) { /* We only want to warn if StrictNodes is really set. Otherwise * we're just about to retry anyways. */ @@ -822,6 +827,15 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, return extend_info_dup(intro->extend_info); } +/** Return true iff any introduction points still listed in entry are + * usable. */ +int +rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry) +{ + return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( + entry, get_options()->StrictNodes, 0) != NULL; +} + /** Client-side authorizations for hidden services; map of onion address to * rend_service_authorization_t*. */ static strmap_t *auth_hid_servs = NULL; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.h b/src/or/rendclient.h index 56ccde1..3f2e58e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.h +++ b/src/or/rendclient.h @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, void rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query); extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query); +int rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry); int rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, origin_circuit_t *rendcirc); diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index f4c8888..9d6a89e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ rend_cache_lookup_entry(const char *query, int version, rend_cache_entry_t **e) tor_assert((*e)->parsed && (*e)->parsed->intro_nodes); /* XXX023 hack for now, to return "not found" if there are no intro * points remaining. See bug 997. */ - if (smartlist_len((*e)->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) + if (! rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(*e)) return 0; return 1; }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge branch 'bug1090-manpage-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 8f6cb933b6a8ee63f2e208ec43933ad27afa2af0 Merge: c49f660 2ac768e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:44:55 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug1090-manpage-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed doc/tor.1.txt | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] better user-facing warnings for unexpected last hops
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit b8b557dcb2bf719976858589345f08fffbab13e3 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 22:48:00 2011 -0400 better user-facing warnings for unexpected last hops these still aren't perfect, but we won't know how to correct them until we start experiencing surprised users. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 6401e71..90572d5 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2878,7 +2878,6 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerset_t *rs = options->ExcludeNodes; const char *description; - int domain = LD_CIRC; uint8_t purpose = circ->_base.purpose; if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) @@ -2914,7 +2913,6 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED: description = "chosen rendezvous point"; - domain = LD_BUG; break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; @@ -2924,18 +2922,24 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(rs, exit)) { /* We should never get here if StrictNodes is set to 1. */ - if (options->StrictNodes) - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using an excluded node with StrictNodes set. " - "Please report the following log message to the " - "developers."); - log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in " - "ExcludeNodes%s, because no other options were available. To " - "prevent this, set the StrictNodes configuration option." - "(Circuit purpose is %d)", - description,exit->nickname, - rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", - (int)purpose); - circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ); + if (options->StrictNodes) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in ExcludeNodes%s, " + "even though StrictNodes is set. Please report. " + "(Circuit purpose: %s)", + description, exit->nickname, + rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", + circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); + } else { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in " + "ExcludeNodes%s, because no better options were available. To " + "prevent this (and possibly break your Tor functionality), " + "set the StrictNodes configuration option. " + "(Circuit purpose: %s)", + description, exit->nickname, + rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", + circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); + } + circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, LD_CIRC, circ); } return;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f7a5bc16d689e8b919285c66cd0f07a6694bcc69 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 22:18:01 2011 -0400 warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream --- changes/bug1090-launch-warning | 5 +++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 13 ++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1090-launch-warning b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f3fbcb --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - Keep track of how many times we launch a new circuit to handle + a given stream. Too many launches could indicate an inconsistency + between our "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our + "attach our stream to one of the available circuits" logic. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index cc4a739..fd1cf6b 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1409,7 +1409,18 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn, extend_info_free(extend_info); - if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + /* We just caused a circuit to get built because of this stream. + * If this stream has caused a _lot_ of circuits to be built, that's + * a bad sign: we should tell the user. */ + if (conn->num_circuits_launched < NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD && + ++conn->num_circuits_launched == NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD) + log_warn(LD_BUG, "The application request to %s:%d has launched " + "%d circuits without finding one it likes.", + escaped_safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address), + conn->socks_request->port, + conn->num_circuits_launched); + } else { /* help predict this next time */ rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1); if (circ) { diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 50a1223..7d354c8 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1151,6 +1151,13 @@ typedef struct edge_connection_t { * already retried several times. */ uint8_t num_socks_retries; +#define NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD 10 + /** Number of times we've launched a circuit to handle this stream. If + * it gets too high, that could indicate an inconsistency between our + * "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our "attach our + * stream to one of the available circuits" logic. */ + unsigned int num_circuits_launched:4; + /** True iff this connection is for a DNS request only. */ unsigned int is_dns_request:1;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] When cannibalizing a circuit, make sure it has no ExcludeNodes on it
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 6afad6b691d577fba2fe88f2fe9ed76a2f80002d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 19:58:28 2011 -0400 When cannibalizing a circuit, make sure it has no ExcludeNodes on it This could happen if StrictNodes was 0 and we were forced to pick an excluded node as the last hop of the circuit. --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 42073fb..ce324ca 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -923,6 +923,7 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, int need_uptime = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME) != 0; int need_capacity = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY) != 0; int internal = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) != 0; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* Make sure we're not trying to create a onehop circ by * cannibalization. */ @@ -933,11 +934,6 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, "capacity %d, internal %d", purpose, need_uptime, need_capacity, internal); - /* XXX022-1090 We should make sure that when we cannibalize a circuit, it - * contains no excluded nodes. (This is possible if StrictNodes is 0, and - * we thought we needed to use an excluded exit node for, say, a directory - * operation.) -NM */ - for (_circ=global_circuitlist; _circ; _circ = _circ->next) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(_circ) && _circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN && @@ -966,6 +962,19 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, hop=hop->next; } while (hop!=circ->cpath); } + if (options->ExcludeNodes) { + /* Make sure no existing nodes in the circuit are excluded for + * general use. (This may be possible if StrictNodes is 0, and we + * thought we needed to use an otherwise excluded node for, say, a + * directory operation.) */ + crypt_path_t *hop = circ->cpath; + do { + if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, + hop->extend_info)) + goto next; + hop = hop->next; + } while (hop != circ->cpath); + } if (!best || (best->build_state->need_uptime && !need_uptime)) best = circ; next: ;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Note another place that we need to fix a 1090 issue.
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ed7c267743f2471a5a16c5ec437efda665f4c6af Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 17:08:29 2011 -0400 Note another place that we need to fix a 1090 issue. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 4c74426..1f5eb70 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -789,6 +789,9 @@ addressmap_ent_remove(const char *address, addressmap_entry_t *ent) static void clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname) { + /* XXXX022-1090 We need a variant of this that clears all mappings no longer + permitted because of changes to the ExcludeNodes, ExitNodes, or + ExcludeExitNodes settings. */ char *suffix; size_t suffix_len; if (!addressmap || !exitname)

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] Explain the "using anyway" log message better
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 92ec36a061de17dd4e378d5ce34d82f91eee9f86 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:01:23 2011 +0200 Explain the "using anyway" log message better Also add a request to report any cases where we are not honoring StrictNodes to the developers: These should now all be bugs. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index c58509f..681f524 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2896,7 +2896,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: if (circ->build_state->is_internal) return; - description = "Requested exit node"; + description = "requested exit node"; rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: @@ -2911,22 +2911,28 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED: - description = "Chosen rendezvous point"; + description = "chosen rendezvous point"; domain = LD_BUG; break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; - description = "Controller-selected circuit target"; + description = "controller-selected circuit target"; break; } if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(rs, exit)) { - log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain, "%s '%s' is in ExcludeNodes%s. Using anyway " - "(circuit purpose %d).", + /* We should never get here if StrictNodes is set to 1. */ + if (options->StrictNodes) + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using an excluded node with StrictNodes set. " + "Please report the following log message to the " + "developers."); + log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in " + "ExcludeNodes%s, because no other options were available. To " + "prevent this, set the StrictNodes configuration option." + "(Circuit purpose is %d)", description,exit->nickname, rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", (int)purpose); - /* XXX022-1090 "using anyway" is freaking people out -RD */ circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ); }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Check transition of circuit purpose from INTRO->GENERAL if nodes are constrained
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 79a3b3cd3719b3b87b0edbab62b256e42c7b42de Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 20:06:31 2011 -0400 Check transition of circuit purpose from INTRO->GENERAL if nodes are constrained This looked at first like another fun way around our node selection logic: if we had introduction circuits, and we wound up building too many, we would turn extras into general-purpose circuits. But when we did so, we wouldn't necessarily check whether the general-purpose circuits conformed to our node constraints. For example, the last node could totally be in ExcludedExitNodes and we wouldn't have cared... ...except that the circuit should already be internal, so it won't get user streams attached to it, so the transition should generally be allowed. Add an assert to make sure we're right about this, and have it not check whether ExitNodes is set, since that's irrelevant to internal circuits. --- src/or/rendservice.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 5b85394..cd8f9ea 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1347,17 +1347,26 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) } /* If we already have enough introduction circuits for this service, - * redefine this one as a general circuit. */ + * redefine this one as a general circuit or close it, depending. */ if (count_established_intro_points(serviceid) > NUM_INTRO_POINTS) { - log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " - "circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to " - "general."); - /* XXX022-1090: This can wind up violating ExcludeNodes/ - * ExitNodes/ExcludeExitNodes restrictions. - */ - TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; - circuit_has_opened(circuit); - return; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + if (options->ExcludeNodes) { + /* XXXX in some future version, we can test whether the transition is + allowed or not given the actual nodes in the circuit. But for now, + this case, we might as well close the thing. */ + log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " + "circuit, but we already have enough. Closing it."); + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), END_CIRC_REASON_NONE); + return; + } else { + tor_assert(circuit->build_state->is_internal); + log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " + "circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to " + "general; leaving as internal."); + TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; + circuit_has_opened(circuit); + return; + } } log_info(LD_REND,

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[tor/release-0.2.2] revert most of ef81649d2fc
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f962dda8c188ebe17be1ad7d6548f303b6425943 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 19:55:34 2011 -0400 revert most of ef81649d2fc Now we believe it to be the case that we never build a circuit for our stream that has an unsuitable exit, so we'll never need to use such a circuit. The risk is that we have some code that builds the circuit, but now we refuse to use it, meaning we just build a bazillion circuits and ignore them all. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +- src/or/circuituse.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ src/or/connection_edge.c | 19 ++----------------- src/or/connection_edge.h | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index b963f1a..6401e71 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2728,7 +2728,7 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, { if (!ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(conn)) continue; /* Skip everything but APs in CIRCUIT_WAIT */ - if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), router, 1)) { + if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), router)) { ++n_supported[i]; // log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is supported. n_supported[%d] now %d.", // router->nickname, i, n_supported[i]); diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 530941c..cc4a739 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn, return 0; } } - if (exitrouter && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter, 0)) { + if (exitrouter && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter)) { /* can't exit from this router */ return 0; } @@ -166,6 +166,10 @@ circuit_is_better(circuit_t *a, circuit_t *b, uint8_t purpose) return 1; if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(b) && TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(b)->build_state->is_internal) + /* XXX023 what the heck is this internal thing doing here. I + * think we can get rid of it. circuit_is_acceptable() already + * makes sure that is_internal is exactly what we need it to + * be. -RD */ return 1; } break; @@ -511,7 +515,7 @@ circuit_stream_is_being_handled(edge_connection_t *conn, if (exitrouter && (!need_uptime || build_state->need_uptime)) { int ok; if (conn) { - ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter, 0); + ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter); } else { addr_policy_result_t r = compare_addr_to_addr_policy( 0, port, exitrouter->exit_policy); @@ -1291,9 +1295,10 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn, * refactor into a single function? */ routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional; - if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router, 0)) { + if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router)) { log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP, - "Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. %s.", + "Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or " + "would refuse request. %s.", conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing"); if (opt) { conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0; @@ -1611,9 +1616,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(edge_connection_t *conn) } return -1; } - if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router, 0)) { + if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router)) { log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP, - "Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. %s.", + "Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or " + "would refuse request. %s.", conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing"); if (opt) { conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0; diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 1ee57ab..082cd5f 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -3044,15 +3044,9 @@ connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn) * to exit from it, or 0 if it probably will not allow it. * (We might be uncertain if conn's destination address has not yet been * resolved.) - * - * If excluded_means_no is 1 and Exclude*Nodes is set and excludes - * this relay, return 0. - * XXX022-1090 This StrictNodes business needs more work, a la bug 1090. See - * also git commit ef81649d. */ int -connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit, - int excluded_means_no) +connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit) { or_options_t *options = get_options(); @@ -3102,17 +3096,8 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit, return 0; } if (options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion && - (options->StrictNodes || excluded_means_no) && routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, exit)) { - /* If we are trying to avoid this node as exit, and we have StrictNodes - * set, then this is not a suitable exit. Refuse it. - * - * If we don't have StrictNodes set, then this function gets called in - * two contexts. First, we've got a circuit open and we want to know - * whether we can use it. In that case, we somehow built this circuit - * despite having the last hop in ExcludeExitNodes, so we should be - * willing to use it. Second, we are evaluating whether this is an - * acceptable exit for a new circuit. In that case, skip it. */ + /* Not a suitable exit. Refuse it. */ return 0; } diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.h b/src/or/connection_edge.h index c4ae467..70d0dd2 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.h +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.h @@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ int connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ); int connection_exit_begin_resolve(cell_t *cell, or_circuit_t *circ); void connection_exit_connect(edge_connection_t *conn); int connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn); -int connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit, - int excluded_means_no); +int connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit); void connection_ap_expire_beginning(void); void connection_ap_attach_pending(void); void connection_ap_fail_onehop(const char *failed_digest,

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Fix a log msg
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 8e2904e269e039713c2b2e7be10b82e11f239cd0 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:03:50 2011 +0200 Fix a log msg --- src/or/router.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 64cb079..0ef4728 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) if ((msg = rate_limit_log(&warning_limit, approx_time()))) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Can't peform self-tests for this relay: we have " "listed ourself in ExcludeNodes, and StrictNodes is set. " - "We will cannot learn whether we are usable, and will not " + "We cannot learn whether we are usable, and will not " "be able to advertise ourself.%s", msg); tor_free(msg); }

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