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[tor/master] Note that circuit purpose changing can violate ExcludeNodes
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Apr '11

28 Apr '11

commit db2fd28308fb019e59280219cf95f09f5208092f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 28 16:44:40 2011 -0400 Note that circuit purpose changing can violate ExcludeNodes --- src/or/rendservice.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 88f1ba3..5b85394 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1352,6 +1352,9 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " "circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to " "general."); + /* XXX022-1090: This can wind up violating ExcludeNodes/ + * ExitNodes/ExcludeExitNodes restrictions. + */ TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; circuit_has_opened(circuit); return;

1 0

[tor/master] don't exit enclave to excluded relays
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Apr '11

28 Apr '11

commit 719b5b87dee4910bb3e2d29db6e2012416f60d3d Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:57:01 2011 -0500 don't exit enclave to excluded relays --- src/or/routerlist.c | 6 +++++- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 29e2e96..523596d 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1538,6 +1538,8 @@ routerlist_find_my_routerinfo(void) /** Find a router that's up, that has this IP address, and * that allows exit to this address:port, or return NULL if there * isn't a good one. + * Don't exit enclave to excluded relays -- it wouldn't actually + * hurt anything, but this way there are fewer confused users. */ routerinfo_t * router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) @@ -1545,6 +1547,7 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) uint32_t addr; struct in_addr in; tor_addr_t a; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (!tor_inet_aton(address, &in)) return NULL; /* it's not an IP already */ @@ -1557,7 +1560,8 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) if (router->addr == addr && router->is_running && compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&a, port, router->exit_policy) == - ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED) + ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED && + !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, router)) return router; }); return NULL;

1 0

[tor/master] handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Apr '11

28 Apr '11

commit 4906188b622872899f76cf01167cfef3e09cbffd Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:09:24 2011 -0500 handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post If we're picking a random directory node, never pick an excluded one. But if we've chosen a specific one (or all), allow it unless strictnodes is set (in which case warn so the user knows it's their fault). When warning that we won't connect to a strictly excluded node, log what it was we were trying to do at that node. When ExcludeNodes is set but StrictNodes is not set, we only use non-excluded nodes if we can, but fall back to using excluded nodes if none of those nodes is usable. --- src/or/directory.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 8f33a60..0c095fe 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -253,10 +253,13 @@ directories_have_accepted_server_descriptor(void) } /** Start a connection to every suitable directory authority, using - * connection purpose 'purpose' and uploading the payload 'payload' - * (length 'payload_len'). dir_purpose should be one of + * connection purpose dir_purpose and uploading payload + * (of length payload_len). The dir_purpose should be one of * 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR' or 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC'. * + * router_purpose describes the type of descriptor we're + * publishing, if we're publishing a descriptor -- e.g. general or bridge. + * * type specifies what sort of dir authorities (V1, V2, * HIDSERV, BRIDGE) we should upload to. * @@ -272,6 +275,7 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, const char *payload, size_t payload_len, size_t extrainfo_len) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); int post_via_tor; smartlist_t *dirservers = router_get_trusted_dir_servers(); int found = 0; @@ -287,6 +291,16 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, if ((type & ds->type) == 0) continue; + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, rs)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact authority '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping.", + ds->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + continue; + } + found = 1; /* at least one authority of this type was listed */ if (dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR) ds->has_accepted_serverdesc = 0; @@ -496,12 +510,14 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, time_t if_modified_since, const rend_data_t *rend_query) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerinfo_t *router; char address_buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN+1]; struct in_addr in; const char *address; tor_addr_t addr; router = router_get_by_digest(status->identity_digest); + if (!router && anonymized_connection) { log_info(LD_DIR, "Not sending anonymized request to directory '%s'; we " "don't have its router descriptor.", status->nickname); @@ -514,6 +530,17 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, address = address_buf; } tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); + + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact directory mirror '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping. This choice might make your Tor not work.", + status->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + return; + } + directory_initiate_command_rend(address, &addr, status->or_port, status->dir_port, status->version_supports_conditional_consensus, diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 5d9ab8c..29e2e96 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1070,6 +1070,7 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver(authority_type_t type, int flags) static routerstatus_t * router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerstatus_t *result; smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *trusted_direct, *trusted_tunnel; @@ -1079,10 +1080,13 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) int requireother = ! (flags & PDS_ALLOW_SELF); int fascistfirewall = ! (flags & PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL); int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!consensus) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); trusted_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1114,6 +1118,11 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) if ((type & EXTRAINFO_CACHE) && !router_supports_extrainfo(status->identity_digest, 0)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); @@ -1155,6 +1164,15 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) smartlist_free(trusted_tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; } @@ -1165,6 +1183,7 @@ static routerstatus_t * router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, int *n_busy_out) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *overloaded_direct, *overloaded_tunnel; routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); @@ -1175,10 +1194,13 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, const int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); const int no_serverdesc_fetching =(flags & PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH); int n_busy = 0; + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!trusted_dir_servers) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); overloaded_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1197,6 +1219,12 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, continue; if (requireother && me && router_digest_is_me(d->digest)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, + &d->fake_status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, d->addr); @@ -1243,6 +1271,15 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, smartlist_free(tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; }

1 0

[tor/master] the new entrynodes behavior is always strict
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Apr '11

28 Apr '11

commit 5d12495d982d076b74ca2c0c88b78b00d2810e71 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 04:21:25 2011 -0500 the new entrynodes behavior is always strict --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 36 +++++++++++------------------------- 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index ebbda21..86406cb 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4006,14 +4006,10 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options) SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, { add_an_entry_guard(ri, 0); }); - /* Finally, the remaining previously configured guards that are not in - * EntryNodes, unless we're strict in which case we drop them */ - if (options->StrictNodes) { - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e, - entry_guard_free(e)); - } else { - smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_not_on_list); - } + /* Finally, free the remaining previously configured guards that are not in + * EntryNodes. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e, + entry_guard_free(e)); smartlist_free(entry_routers); smartlist_free(entry_fps); @@ -4024,7 +4020,7 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options) /** Return 0 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the * directory to our entry guard list, or return 1 if we have a - * list already and we'd prefer to stick to it. + * list already and we must stick to it. */ int entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options) @@ -4036,18 +4032,6 @@ entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options) return 0; } -/* Are we dead set against changing our entry guard list, or would we - * change it if it means keeping Tor usable? */ -static int -entry_list_is_totally_static(or_options_t *options) -{ - if (options->EntryNodes && options->StrictNodes) - return 1; - if (options->UseBridges) - return 1; - return 0; -} - /** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards. If * state is non-NULL, this is for a specific circuit -- * make sure not to pick this circuit's exit or any node in the @@ -4092,6 +4076,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) continue; /* don't pick the same node for entry and exit */ if (consider_exit_family && smartlist_isin(exit_family, r)) continue; /* avoid relays that are family members of our exit */ +#if 0 /* since EntryNodes is always strict now, this clause is moot */ if (options->EntryNodes && !routerset_contains_router(options->EntryNodes, r)) { /* We've come to the end of our preferred entry nodes. */ @@ -4106,6 +4091,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) "No relays from EntryNodes available. Using others."); } } +#endif smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, r); if (!entry->made_contact) { /* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry @@ -4131,7 +4117,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) } if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < preferred_min) { - if (!entry_list_is_totally_static(options)) { + if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options)) { /* still no? try adding a new entry then */ /* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need * to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might @@ -4157,9 +4143,9 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) goto retry; } if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { - /* still no? if we're using bridges or have StrictNodes - * set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our - * bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */ + /* still no? if we're using bridges, + * and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our + * bridges, then be flexible about families. */ consider_exit_family = 0; goto retry; }

1 0

[tor/master] If ExitNodes and Exclude{Exit}Nodes overlap, obey Exclude{Exit}Nodes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Apr '11

28 Apr '11

commit 0ad3836f73cbb6f0aa8b643c43e799d69d378aea Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 04:35:08 2011 -0500 If ExitNodes and Exclude{Exit}Nodes overlap, obey Exclude{Exit}Nodes. Also, ExitNodes are always strict. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- src/or/routerlist.c | 4 +++ src/or/routerlist.h | 2 + 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 86406cb..b8a82e8 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2685,13 +2685,29 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, n_supported[i] = -1; continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down or bad exits */ } + + if (options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion && + routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, router)) { + n_supported[i] = -1; + continue; /* user asked us not to use it, no matter what */ + } + if (options->ExitNodes && + !routerset_contains_router(options->ExitNodes, router)) { + n_supported[i] = -1; + continue; /* not one of our chosen exit nodes */ + } + if (router_is_unreliable(router, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0) && - (!options->ExitNodes || - !routerset_contains_router(options->ExitNodes, router))) { + !options->ExitNodes) { /* FFFF Someday, differentiate between a routerset that names * routers, and a routerset that names countries, and only do this * check if they've asked for specific exit relays. Or if the country * they ask for is rare. Or something. */ + /* XXX022-1090 We need to pick a tradeoff here: if we throw it out because + * it's unreliable, users might end up with no exit options even + * though some options are up. If we don't throw it out, users who + * set ExitNodes will have partitioning problems because they'll be + * the only folks willing to use this node. */ n_supported[i] = -1; continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable, unless we have * ExitNodes set, in which case we asked for it */ @@ -2753,21 +2769,13 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, /* If any routers definitely support any pending connections, choose one * at random. */ if (best_support > 0) { - smartlist_t *supporting = smartlist_create(), *use = smartlist_create(); + smartlist_t *supporting = smartlist_create(); for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++) if (n_supported[i] == best_support) smartlist_add(supporting, smartlist_get(dir->routers, i)); - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, options->ExitNodes, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && options->ExitNodes && - !options->StrictNodes) { /* give up on exitnodes and try again */ - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, NULL, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - } - router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(use, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); - smartlist_free(use); + router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); smartlist_free(supporting); } else { /* Either there are no pending connections, or no routers even seem to @@ -2775,7 +2783,7 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, * at least one predicted exit port. */ int attempt; - smartlist_t *needed_ports, *supporting, *use; + smartlist_t *needed_ports, *supporting; if (best_support == -1) { if (need_uptime || need_capacity) { @@ -2792,7 +2800,6 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion ? " or are Excluded" : ""); } supporting = smartlist_create(); - use = smartlist_create(); needed_ports = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time(NULL)); for (attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) { /* try once to pick only from routers that satisfy a needed port, @@ -2807,25 +2814,13 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, } } - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, options->ExitNodes, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && options->ExitNodes && - !options->StrictNodes) { /* give up on exitnodes and try again */ - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, NULL, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - } - /* FFF sometimes the above results in null, when the requested - * exit node is considered down by the consensus. we should pick - * it anyway, since the user asked for it. */ - router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(use, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); + router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); if (router) break; smartlist_clear(supporting); - smartlist_clear(use); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH(needed_ports, uint16_t *, cp, tor_free(cp)); smartlist_free(needed_ports); - smartlist_free(use); smartlist_free(supporting); } @@ -2834,10 +2829,11 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose exit server '%s'", router->nickname); return router; } - if (options->ExitNodes && options->StrictNodes) { + if (options->ExitNodes) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "No specified exit routers seem to be running, and " - "StrictNodes is set: can't choose an exit."); + "No specified %sexit routers seem to be running: " + "can't choose an exit.", + options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion ? "non-excluded " : ""); } return NULL; } diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 523596d..a9a216b 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5473,12 +5473,14 @@ routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set) return set && smartlist_len(set->country_names); } +#if 0 /** Return true iff there are no entries in set. */ static int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set) { return !set || smartlist_len(set->list) == 0; } +#endif /** Helper. Return true iff set contains a router based on the other * provided fields. Return higher values for more specific subentries: a @@ -5594,6 +5596,7 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, } } +#if 0 /** Add to target every routerinfo_t from source except: * * 1) Don't add it if include is non-empty and the relay isn't in @@ -5624,6 +5627,7 @@ routersets_get_disjunction(smartlist_t *target, } }); } +#endif /** Remove every routerinfo_t from lst that is in routerset. */ void diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index cd0eb95..3bbdc42 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -175,9 +175,11 @@ int routerset_contains_extendinfo(const routerset_t *set, void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only); +#if 0 void routersets_get_disjunction(smartlist_t *target, const smartlist_t *source, const routerset_t *include, const routerset_t *exclude, int running_only); +#endif void routerset_subtract_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset); char *routerset_to_string(const routerset_t *routerset);

1 0

[tor/master] refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Apr '11

28 Apr '11

commit 82178a81f6748c9b26bdc8a5da36dd34b689281b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 17 18:52:18 2009 -0400 refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes Make hidden services more flaky for people who set both ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. Not recommended, especially for hidden service operators. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/or/rendservice.c | 14 +++++++++++- 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 8ac909f..90304c3 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ #include "rephist.h" #include "routerlist.h" +static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( + const rend_data_t *rend_query, const int strict); + /** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point: * send the introduction request. */ void @@ -739,10 +742,31 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query) extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) { + extend_info_t *result; + /* See if we can get a node that complies with ExcludeNodes */ + if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 1))) + return result; + /* If not, and StrictNodes is not set, see if we can return any old node + */ + if (!get_options()->StrictNodes) + return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 0); + return NULL; +} + +/** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set + * iff strict is true. + */ +static extend_info_t * +rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, + const int strict) +{ int i; rend_cache_entry_t *entry; rend_intro_point_t *intro; routerinfo_t *router; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + smartlist_t *usable_nodes; + int n_excluded = 0; if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) { log_warn(LD_REND, @@ -750,13 +774,26 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); return NULL; } + /* We'll keep a separate list of the usable nodes. If this becomes empty, + * no nodes are usable. */ + usable_nodes = smartlist_create(); + smartlist_add_all(usable_nodes, entry->parsed->intro_nodes); again: - if (smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) + if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) { + if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes) { + /* We only want to warn if StrictNodes is really set. Otherwise + * we're just about to retry anyways. + */ + log_warn(LD_REND, "All introduction points for hidden service are " + "at excluded relays, and StrictNodes is set. Skipping."); + } + smartlist_free(usable_nodes); return NULL; + } - i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes)); - intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_nodes)); + intro = smartlist_get(usable_nodes, i); /* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */ if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) { if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest)) @@ -766,13 +803,22 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) if (!router) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.", intro->extend_info->nickname); - rend_intro_point_free(intro); - smartlist_del(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); goto again; } extend_info_free(intro->extend_info); intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_router(router); } + /* Check if we should refuse to talk to this router. */ + if (options->ExcludeNodes && strict && + routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, + intro->extend_info)) { + n_excluded++; + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); + goto again; + } + + smartlist_free(usable_nodes); return extend_info_dup(intro->extend_info); } diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 4503982..88f1ba3 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -848,6 +848,7 @@ clean_accepted_intros(rend_service_t *service, time_t now) /** Respond to an INTRODUCE2 cell by launching a circuit to the chosen * rendezvous point. */ + /* XXX022 this function sure could use some organizing. -RD */ int rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) @@ -875,6 +876,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, time_t now = time(NULL); char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN]; time_t *access_time; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, @@ -1047,6 +1050,15 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, goto err; } + /* Check if we'd refuse to talk to this router */ + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, extend_info)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client asked to rendezvous at a relay that we " + "exclude, and StrictNodes is set. Refusing service."); + reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; /* XXX might leak why we refused */ + goto err; + } + r_cookie = ptr; base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4); @@ -1394,7 +1406,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) /** Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell; mark the circuit as a * live introduction point, and note that the service descriptor is - * now out-of-date.*/ + * now out-of-date. */ int rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,

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[tor/master] If EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes overlap, obey ExcludeNodes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Apr '11

28 Apr '11

commit ad3da535366aeb9b7441f4881899758bc7475168 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 17 18:54:20 2009 -0400 If EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes overlap, obey ExcludeNodes. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 6 ++++-- src/or/config.c | 3 ++- src/or/or.h | 4 ++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 13 ++++++++----- src/or/routerlist.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 2d4d5c0..ebbda21 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2938,6 +2938,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) description,exit->nickname, rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", (int)purpose); + /* XXX022-1090 "using anyway" is freaking people out -RD */ circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ); } @@ -3979,7 +3980,8 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options) * Perhaps we should do this calculation once whenever the list of routers * changes or the entrynodes setting changes. */ - routerset_get_all_routers(entry_routers, options->EntryNodes, 0); + routerset_get_all_routers(entry_routers, options->EntryNodes, + options->ExcludeNodes, 0); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, smartlist_add(entry_fps,ri->cache_info.identity_digest)); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, { @@ -4155,7 +4157,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) goto retry; } if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { - /* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes + /* still no? if we're using bridges or have StrictNodes * set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */ consider_exit_family = 0; diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 9675c73..bd904dc 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1412,7 +1412,8 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) /* Check if we need to parse and add the EntryNodes config option. */ if (options->EntryNodes && (!old_options || - (!routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes)))) + !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes))) entry_nodes_should_be_added(); /* Since our options changed, we might need to regenerate and upload our diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 06e6d7f..50a1223 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2387,7 +2387,7 @@ typedef struct { * ORs not to consider as exits. */ /** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */ - struct routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; + routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our * process for all current and future memory. */ @@ -3487,7 +3487,7 @@ typedef struct trusted_dir_server_t { #define ROUTER_MAX_DECLARED_BANDWIDTH INT32_MAX -/* Flags for pick_directory_server and pick_trusteddirserver. */ +/* Flags for pick_directory_server() and pick_trusteddirserver(). */ /** Flag to indicate that we should not automatically be willing to use * ourself to answer a directory request. * Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/ diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index c02654f..5d9ab8c 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5516,10 +5516,11 @@ routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, routerstatus_t *rs) } /** Add every known routerinfo_t that is a member of routerset to - * out. If running_only, only add the running ones. */ + * out, but never add any that are part of excludeset. + * If running_only, only add the running ones. */ void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, - int running_only) + const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only) { tor_assert(out); if (!routerset || !routerset->list) @@ -5529,12 +5530,13 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, if (routerset_is_list(routerset)) { /* No routers are specified by type; all are given by name or digest. - * we can do a lookup in O(len(list)). */ + * we can do a lookup in O(len(routerset)). */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routerset->list, const char *, name, { routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(name, 1); if (router) { if (!running_only || router->is_running) - smartlist_add(out, router); + if (!routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) + smartlist_add(out, router); } }); } else { @@ -5544,7 +5546,8 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rl->routers, routerinfo_t *, router, { if (running_only && !router->is_running) continue; - if (routerset_contains_router(routerset, router)) + if (routerset_contains_router(routerset, router) && + !routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) smartlist_add(out, router); }); } diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index ca42811..cd0eb95 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ int routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, int routerset_contains_extendinfo(const routerset_t *set, const extend_info_t *ei); void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, + const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only); void routersets_get_disjunction(smartlist_t *target, const smartlist_t *source, const routerset_t *include,

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[tor/release-0.2.2] minor tweaks to manpage
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 0f48e8fa9ad68f56c7b1076872848bd0f1e524b2 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 14:04:50 2011 -0400 minor tweaks to manpage --- doc/tor.1.txt | 12 +++++++----- 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 866a702..04a0537 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. Note that any node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this - list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below + list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below. **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: @@ -527,18 +527,20 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches, - those used for self-tests, and so on) that end at a non-exit node. To + those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end + at a non-exit node. To keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. + + The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. + + - The .exit address notation, if enabled, overrides this option. + The .exit address notation, if enabled via AllowDotExit, overrides + this option. **EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: A list of identity fingerprints and nicknames of nodes to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. (Country codes and - address patterns are not yet supported.) This includes all + address patterns are not yet supported.) Normal circuits include all circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. + @@ -553,7 +555,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is *necessary* to - perform self-tests, connect to + perform relay reachability self-tests, connect to a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit request, upload directory information, or download directory information. (Default: 0)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug1090-part1-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 99621bc5a629a81a5a823ce21ac3d967443d0e12 Merge: 8f6cb93 0c40dda Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:45:28 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug1090-part1-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed src/or/rendclient.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.2' into release-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

1 0