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[tor/release-0.2.2] Tweak bug2355_revert at suggestion from Roger
by arma＠torproject.org 19 Jun '11

19 Jun '11

commit 8e5dfe42a0230722bff07ba6ededcc0d2dbd53e7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Jun 19 20:58:46 2011 -0400 Tweak bug2355_revert at suggestion from Roger --- changes/bug2355_revert | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2355_revert b/changes/bug2355_revert index 0d2822a..2ded40a 100644 --- a/changes/bug2355_revert +++ b/changes/bug2355_revert @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ o Minor bugfixes: - Revert the UseBridges option to its behavior before 0.2.2.28-beta. When we changed the default behavior to "use bridges if any are - listed in the torrc", we broke a number of Vidalia users. + listed in the torrc", we broke a number of users who had bridges + in their torrc files but who didn't actually want to use them. Partial resolution for bug 3354.

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[tor/release-0.2.2] client-side DNS proxy server: reply NOTIMPL to unsupported queries
by arma＠torproject.org 19 Jun '11

19 Jun '11

commit 910472c5146ad3e436f1b5238570a2802662319b Author: intrigeri <intrigeri(a)boum.org> Date: Sun Jun 12 11:57:31 2011 +0200 client-side DNS proxy server: reply NOTIMPL to unsupported queries Fix for bug 3369. --- src/or/dnsserv.c | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/dnsserv.c b/src/or/dnsserv.c index 009ab5f..f2c473d 100644 --- a/src/or/dnsserv.c +++ b/src/or/dnsserv.c @@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ evdns_server_callback(struct evdns_server_request *req, void *_data) } if (!q) { log_info(LD_APP, "None of the questions we got were ones we're willing " - "to support. Sending NODATA."); - evdns_server_request_respond(req, DNS_ERR_NONE); + "to support. Sending NOTIMPL."); + evdns_server_request_respond(req, DNS_ERR_NOTIMPL); return; } if (q->type != EVDNS_TYPE_A) {

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[tor/release-0.2.2] changelog entry for bug3369
by arma＠torproject.org 19 Jun '11

19 Jun '11

commit e470f6a8866105c9f6b113aa8eafec5ee202c992 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jun 13 13:42:00 2011 -0400 changelog entry for bug3369 --- changes/bug3369 | 4 ++++ 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3369 b/changes/bug3369 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9c0d0e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3369 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - When asked about a DNS record type we don't support via a + client DNSPort, reply with NOTIMPL rather than an empty + reply. Patch by intrigeri. Fixes bug 3369; bugfix on 2.0.1-alpha.

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Make ControlSocketsGroupWritable work with User.
by arma＠torproject.org 19 Jun '11

19 Jun '11

commit 54d7d31cba84232b50fef4287951b2c4bfa746c2 Author: Jérémy Bobbio <lunar(a)debian.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 12:18:32 2011 -0400 Make ControlSocketsGroupWritable work with User. Original message from bug3393: check_private_dir() to ensure that ControlSocketsGroupWritable is safe to use. Unfortunately, check_private_dir() only checks against the currently running user… which can be root until privileges are dropped to the user and group configured by the User config option. The attached patch fixes the issue by adding a new effective_user argument to check_private_dir() and updating the callers. It might not be the best way to fix the issue, but it did in my tests. (Code by lunar; changelog by nickm) --- src/common/util.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/common/util.h | 3 ++- src/or/config.c | 6 ++++-- src/or/connection.c | 2 +- src/or/geoip.c | 6 +++--- src/or/rendservice.c | 2 +- src/or/rephist.c | 4 ++-- src/or/router.c | 4 ++-- 8 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 6f323dd..36aa9cc 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -1677,15 +1677,20 @@ file_status(const char *fname) * is group-readable, but in all cases we create the directory mode 0700. * If CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY is set, then we don't alter the directory permissions * if they are too permissive: we just return -1. + * When effective_user is not NULL, check permissions against the given user and + * its primary group. */ int -check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) +check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, const char *effective_user) { int r; struct stat st; char *f; #ifndef MS_WINDOWS int mask; + struct passwd *pw = NULL; + uid_t running_uid; + gid_t running_gid; #endif tor_assert(dirname); @@ -1724,33 +1729,47 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) return -1; } #ifndef MS_WINDOWS - if (st.st_uid != getuid()) { + if (effective_user) { + /* Lookup the user and group information, if we have a problem, bail out. */ + pw = getpwnam(effective_user); + if (pw == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Error setting configured user: %s not found", effective_user); + return -1; + } + running_uid = pw->pw_uid; + running_gid = pw->pw_gid; + } else { + running_uid = getuid(); + running_gid = getgid(); + } + + if (st.st_uid != running_uid) { struct passwd *pw = NULL; char *process_ownername = NULL; - pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + pw = getpwuid(running_uid); process_ownername = pw ? tor_strdup(pw->pw_name) : tor_strdup("<unknown>"); pw = getpwuid(st.st_uid); log_warn(LD_FS, "%s is not owned by this user (%s, %d) but by " "%s (%d). Perhaps you are running Tor as the wrong user?", - dirname, process_ownername, (int)getuid(), + dirname, process_ownername, (int)running_uid, pw ? pw->pw_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_uid); tor_free(process_ownername); return -1; } - if ((check & CPD_GROUP_OK) && st.st_gid != getgid()) { + if ((check & CPD_GROUP_OK) && st.st_gid != running_gid) { struct group *gr; char *process_groupname = NULL; - gr = getgrgid(getgid()); + gr = getgrgid(running_gid); process_groupname = gr ? tor_strdup(gr->gr_name) : tor_strdup("<unknown>"); gr = getgrgid(st.st_gid); log_warn(LD_FS, "%s is not owned by this group (%s, %d) but by group " "%s (%d). Are you running Tor as the wrong user?", - dirname, process_groupname, (int)getgid(), + dirname, process_groupname, (int)running_gid, gr ? gr->gr_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_gid); tor_free(process_groupname); diff --git a/src/common/util.h b/src/common/util.h index d657db6..b9db25c 100644 --- a/src/common/util.h +++ b/src/common/util.h @@ -292,7 +292,8 @@ typedef unsigned int cpd_check_t; #define CPD_CHECK 2 #define CPD_GROUP_OK 4 #define CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY 8 -int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check); +int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, + const char *effective_user); #define OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE (O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC) #define OPEN_FLAGS_APPEND (O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND) typedef struct open_file_t open_file_t; diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 44cecf3..8ab23a3 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1025,7 +1025,8 @@ options_act_reversible(or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) /* Ensure data directory is private; create if possible. */ if (check_private_dir(options->DataDirectory, - running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK)<0) { + running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK, + options->User)<0) { tor_asprintf(msg, "Couldn't access/create private data directory \"%s\"", options->DataDirectory); @@ -1038,7 +1039,8 @@ options_act_reversible(or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) char *fn = tor_malloc(len); tor_snprintf(fn, len, "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"cached-status", options->DataDirectory); - if (check_private_dir(fn, running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK) < 0) { + if (check_private_dir(fn, running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK, + options->User) < 0) { tor_asprintf(msg, "Couldn't access/create private data directory \"%s\"", fn); tor_free(fn); diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 3f4ca1d..a9e3a74 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ check_location_for_unix_socket(or_options_t *options, const char *path) if (options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) flags |= CPD_GROUP_OK; - if (check_private_dir(p, flags) < 0) { + if (check_private_dir(p, flags, options->User) < 0) { char *escpath, *escdir; escpath = esc_for_log(path); escdir = esc_for_log(p); diff --git a/src/or/geoip.c b/src/or/geoip.c index 5bb2410..c621ea8 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.c +++ b/src/or/geoip.c @@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ geoip_dirreq_stats_write(time_t now) geoip_remove_old_clients(start_of_dirreq_stats_interval); statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "dirreq-stats"); data_v2 = geoip_get_client_history(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS_V2); @@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ geoip_bridge_stats_write(time_t now) /* Write it to disk. */ statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "bridge-stats"); @@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@ geoip_entry_stats_write(time_t now) geoip_remove_old_clients(start_of_entry_stats_interval); statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "entry-stats"); data = geoip_get_client_history(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT); diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index a10e43f..d9a9364 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ rend_service_load_keys(void) s->directory); /* Check/create directory */ - if (check_private_dir(s->directory, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(s->directory, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) return -1; /* Load key */ diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 54593a0..b7341f3 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -2307,7 +2307,7 @@ rep_hist_exit_stats_write(time_t now) /* Try to write to disk. */ statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) { + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) { log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to create stats/ directory!"); goto done; } @@ -2497,7 +2497,7 @@ rep_hist_buffer_stats_write(time_t now) smartlist_clear(circuits_for_buffer_stats); /* write to file */ statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "buffer-stats"); out = start_writing_to_stdio_file(filename, OPEN_FLAGS_APPEND, diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 68e29bb..2165e6e 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -533,12 +533,12 @@ init_keys(void) return 0; } /* Make sure DataDirectory exists, and is private. */ - if (check_private_dir(options->DataDirectory, CPD_CREATE)) { + if (check_private_dir(options->DataDirectory, CPD_CREATE, options->User)) { return -1; } /* Check the key directory. */ keydir = get_datadir_fname("keys"); - if (check_private_dir(keydir, CPD_CREATE)) { + if (check_private_dir(keydir, CPD_CREATE, options->User)) { tor_free(keydir); return -1; }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Add changes file for bug3393
by arma＠torproject.org 19 Jun '11

19 Jun '11

commit e70e8367c9bb3ff04645454e9dfe694ac6762dc3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 13:45:12 2011 -0400 Add changes file for bug3393 --- changes/bug3393 | 5 +++++ 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3393 b/changes/bug3393 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..677bcb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3393 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Fix a bug when using ControlSocketsGroupWritable with User. The + directory's group would be checked against the current group, not + the configured group. Patch by Jérémy Bobbio. Fixes bug3393; bugfix + on Tor 0.2.2.26-beta. \ No newline at end of file

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Make send_control_event_impl's behaviour sane
by arma＠torproject.org 19 Jun '11

19 Jun '11

commit 227896e447625b0718690d7228f1239a0fc399d1 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 16 03:39:37 2011 -0700 Make send_control_event_impl's behaviour sane --- changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf | 7 ++++++- src/or/control.c | 33 +++++++++------------------------ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf index b6fa092..e191eac 100644 --- a/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf +++ b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf @@ -6,5 +6,10 @@ CRLF or (b) the resulting string is over 1023 characters long or (c) the format string does not end with CRLF ''and'' the resulting string is 1021 characters long or longer. Bugfix on - 0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes bug 3407. + 0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes part of bug 3407. + + - Make send_control_event_impl's behaviour sane. Its callers + expect it to always emit a CRLF at the end of the string; it + might emit extra control characters as well. Bugfix on + 0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes another part of bug 3407. diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 2170a9b..e7d2044 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -602,43 +602,28 @@ send_control_event_string(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, /** Helper for send_control_event and control_event_status: * Send an event to all v1 controllers that are listening for code * event. The event's body is created by the printf-style format in - * format, and other arguments as provided. - * - * Currently the length of the message is limited to 10064 (including the - * ending \\r\\n\\0). */ + * format, and other arguments as provided. */ static void send_control_event_impl(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, const char *format, va_list ap) { - /* This is just a little longer than the longest allowed log message */ -#define SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE 10064 - int r; - char buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE]; - size_t len; + char *buf = NULL; + int len; - r = tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap); - if (r<0) { + len = tor_vasprintf(&buf, format, ap); + if (len < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to format event for controller."); return; } - len = strlen(buf); - if (fast_memcmp("\r\n\0", buf+len-2, 3)) { - /* if it is not properly terminated, do it now */ - buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE-1] = '\0'; - buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE-2] = '\n'; - buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE-3] = '\r'; - } - send_control_event_string(event, which|ALL_FORMATS, buf); + + tor_free(buf); } /** Send an event to all v1 controllers that are listening for code * event. The event's body is created by the printf-style format in - * format, and other arguments as provided. - * - * Currently the length of the message is limited to 10064 (including the - * ending \\n\\r\\0. */ + * format, and other arguments as provided. */ static void send_control_event(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, const char *format, ...)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Abandon rendezvous circuits on SIGNAL NEWNYM
by arma＠torproject.org 19 Jun '11

19 Jun '11

commit 010b8dd4f6e8e3c3d2e44ff589ff61cbf64b952a Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 9 19:56:40 2011 -0700 Abandon rendezvous circuits on SIGNAL NEWNYM --- changes/abandon-rend-circs-on-newnym | 8 ++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/abandon-rend-circs-on-newnym b/changes/abandon-rend-circs-on-newnym new file mode 100644 index 0000000..67cb2dc --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/abandon-rend-circs-on-newnym @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Security fixes: + - Don't attach new streams to old rendezvous circuits after SIGNAL + NEWNYM. Previously, we would keep using an existing rendezvous + circuit if it remained open (i.e. if it were kept open by a + long-lived stream or if a new stream were attached to it before + Tor could notice that it was old and no longer in use and close + it). Bugfix on 0.1.1.15-rc; fixes bug 3375. + diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 41c1899..48fc198 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn, return 0; } - if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) + if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || + purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) if (circ->timestamp_dirty && circ->timestamp_dirty+get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness <= now) return 0;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] log when we finish ssl handshake and move to renegotiation
by arma＠torproject.org 19 Jun '11

19 Jun '11

commit 64bfbcb918a59edf8e7167954171f311d032fc4b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jun 17 03:31:59 2011 -0400 log when we finish ssl handshake and move to renegotiation debug-level since it will be quite common. logged at both client and server side. this step should help us track what's going on with people filtering tor connections by our ssl habits. --- src/or/connection_or.c | 5 ++++- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index ed174c9..c019f65 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -929,13 +929,16 @@ connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn) if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) { if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) { if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) { - // log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was TLS_HANDSHAKING."); + log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (client-side). " + "Requesting renegotiation."); conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING; goto again; } // log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was %d.", conn->_base.state); } else { /* improved handshake, but not a client. */ + log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (server-side). " + "Expecting renegotiation."); tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls, connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb, conn);

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug3369' into maint-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 19 Jun '11

19 Jun '11

commit a25c0a5bf81768c4d4f6fe377cea48f47333a8c8 Merge: e70e836 e470f6a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 13:46:10 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug3369' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug3369 | 4 ++++ src/or/dnsserv.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane
by arma＠torproject.org 19 Jun '11

19 Jun '11

commit 68cd0a9abeab126b3d954f060d922fd71cb945f7 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Jun 15 21:16:44 2011 -0700 Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane --- changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/control.c | 29 +++++++++++------------------ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6fa092 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + * Code simplifications and refactoring: + + - Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane. Its callers + expect it to emit a CRLF iff the format string ends with CRLF; + it actually emits a CRLF iff (a) the format string ends with + CRLF or (b) the resulting string is over 1023 characters long or + (c) the format string does not end with CRLF ''and'' the + resulting string is 1021 characters long or longer. Bugfix on + 0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes bug 3407. + diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 5d2d135..2308cd6 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -481,33 +481,26 @@ decode_escaped_string(const char *start, size_t in_len_max, } /** Acts like sprintf, but writes its formatted string to the end of - * conn-\>outbuf. The message may be truncated if it is too long, - * but it will always end with a CRLF sequence. - * - * Currently the length of the message is limited to 1024 (including the - * ending CR LF NUL ("\\r\\n\\0"). */ + * conn-\>outbuf. */ static void connection_printf_to_buf(control_connection_t *conn, const char *format, ...) { -#define CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE 1024 va_list ap; - char buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE]; - int r; - size_t len; + char *buf = NULL; + int len; + va_start(ap,format); - r = tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap); + len = tor_vasprintf(&buf, format, ap); va_end(ap); - if (r<0) { + + if (len < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to format string for controller."); return; } - len = strlen(buf); - if (fast_memcmp("\r\n\0", buf+len-2, 3)) { - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-1] = '\0'; - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-2] = '\n'; - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-3] = '\r'; - } - connection_write_to_buf(buf, len, TO_CONN(conn)); + + connection_write_to_buf(buf, (size_t)len, TO_CONN(conn)); + + tor_free(buf); } /** Write all of the open control ports to ControlPortWriteToFile */

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