- tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Instead of checking whether we have unremoved intro points, check for usable ones
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 748350ace11fa55758fb8bafe5e5556867dd9c23 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 20 16:49:41 2011 -0400 Instead of checking whether we have unremoved intro points, check for usable ones --- src/or/rendclient.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- src/or/rendclient.h | 1 + src/or/rendcommon.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 90304c3..d444611 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ #include "routerlist.h" static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( - const rend_data_t *rend_query, const int strict); + const rend_cache_entry_t *rend_query, + const int strict, const int warnings); /** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point: * send the introduction request. */ @@ -562,7 +563,7 @@ rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro, } } - if (smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) { + if (! rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(ent)) { log_info(LD_REND, "No more intro points remain for %s. Re-fetching descriptor.", escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); @@ -708,7 +709,7 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query) assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn), now); if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_data->onion_address, -1, &entry) == 1 && - smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) > 0) { + rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(entry)) { /* either this fetch worked, or it failed but there was a * valid entry from before which we should reuse */ log_info(LD_REND,"Rend desc is usable. Launching circuits."); @@ -743,13 +744,22 @@ extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) { extend_info_t *result; + rend_cache_entry_t *entry; + + if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) { + log_warn(LD_REND, + "Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.", + safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); + return NULL; + } + /* See if we can get a node that complies with ExcludeNodes */ - if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 1))) + if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(entry, 1, 1))) return result; /* If not, and StrictNodes is not set, see if we can return any old node */ if (!get_options()->StrictNodes) - return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 0); + return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(entry, 0, 1); return NULL; } @@ -757,23 +767,18 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) * iff strict is true. */ static extend_info_t * -rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, - const int strict) +rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry, + const int strict, + const int warnings) { int i; - rend_cache_entry_t *entry; + rend_intro_point_t *intro; routerinfo_t *router; or_options_t *options = get_options(); smartlist_t *usable_nodes; int n_excluded = 0; - if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) { - log_warn(LD_REND, - "Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.", - safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); - return NULL; - } /* We'll keep a separate list of the usable nodes. If this becomes empty, * no nodes are usable. */ usable_nodes = smartlist_create(); @@ -781,7 +786,7 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, again: if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) { - if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes) { + if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes && warnings) { /* We only want to warn if StrictNodes is really set. Otherwise * we're just about to retry anyways. */ @@ -822,6 +827,15 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, return extend_info_dup(intro->extend_info); } +/** Return true iff any introduction points still listed in entry are + * usable. */ +int +rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry) +{ + return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( + entry, get_options()->StrictNodes, 0) != NULL; +} + /** Client-side authorizations for hidden services; map of onion address to * rend_service_authorization_t*. */ static strmap_t *auth_hid_servs = NULL; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.h b/src/or/rendclient.h index 56ccde1..3f2e58e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.h +++ b/src/or/rendclient.h @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, void rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query); extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query); +int rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry); int rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, origin_circuit_t *rendcirc); diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index f4c8888..9d6a89e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ rend_cache_lookup_entry(const char *query, int version, rend_cache_entry_t **e) tor_assert((*e)->parsed && (*e)->parsed->intro_nodes); /* XXX023 hack for now, to return "not found" if there are no intro * points remaining. See bug 997. */ - if (smartlist_len((*e)->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) + if (! rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(*e)) return 0; return 1; }

1 0

[tor/master] explain an argument in a function comment
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 0c40dda3ad824d8a782dafae4c4233a949837df3 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:43:11 2011 -0400 explain an argument in a function comment --- src/or/rendclient.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index d444611..65e632f 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -764,7 +764,8 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) } /** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set - * iff strict is true. + * iff strict is true. If warnings is false, don't complain + * to the user when we're out of nodes, even if StrictNodes is true. */ static extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry,

1 0

[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug1090-manpage-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 8f6cb933b6a8ee63f2e208ec43933ad27afa2af0 Merge: c49f660 2ac768e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:44:55 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug1090-manpage-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed doc/tor.1.txt | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

1 0

[tor/master] If we have chosen an exit that shares a family with all bridges, fail the circuit
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 84f0e87c6a6629d047a39f658b7f7c96767219ca Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 18:20:19 2011 -0400 If we have chosen an exit that shares a family with all bridges, fail the circuit We could probably do something smarter here, but the situation is unusual enough that it's okay to just fail the circuit. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 7 +++++-- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 4832cae..c58509f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4130,15 +4130,18 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) need_capacity = 0; goto retry; } +#if 0 + /* Removing this retry logic: if we only allow one exit, and it is in the + same family as all our entries, then we are just plain not going to win + here. */ if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { /* still no? if we're using bridges, * and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges, then be flexible about families. */ - /* XXXX022-1090 This is probably not what people want. Better to choose - * a new exit. */ consider_exit_family = 0; goto retry; } +#endif /* live_entry_guards may be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */ }

1 0

[tor/master] warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f7a5bc16d689e8b919285c66cd0f07a6694bcc69 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 22:18:01 2011 -0400 warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream --- changes/bug1090-launch-warning | 5 +++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 13 ++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1090-launch-warning b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f3fbcb --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - Keep track of how many times we launch a new circuit to handle + a given stream. Too many launches could indicate an inconsistency + between our "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our + "attach our stream to one of the available circuits" logic. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index cc4a739..fd1cf6b 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1409,7 +1409,18 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn, extend_info_free(extend_info); - if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + /* We just caused a circuit to get built because of this stream. + * If this stream has caused a _lot_ of circuits to be built, that's + * a bad sign: we should tell the user. */ + if (conn->num_circuits_launched < NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD && + ++conn->num_circuits_launched == NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD) + log_warn(LD_BUG, "The application request to %s:%d has launched " + "%d circuits without finding one it likes.", + escaped_safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address), + conn->socks_request->port, + conn->num_circuits_launched); + } else { /* help predict this next time */ rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1); if (circ) { diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 50a1223..7d354c8 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1151,6 +1151,13 @@ typedef struct edge_connection_t { * already retried several times. */ uint8_t num_socks_retries; +#define NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD 10 + /** Number of times we've launched a circuit to handle this stream. If + * it gets too high, that could indicate an inconsistency between our + * "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our "attach our + * stream to one of the available circuits" logic. */ + unsigned int num_circuits_launched:4; + /** True iff this connection is for a DNS request only. */ unsigned int is_dns_request:1;

1 0

[tor/master] Fix a check-spaces complaint
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit e03e90bf591f649f7883807f99354634e837ee48 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:16:26 2011 +0200 Fix a check-spaces complaint --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 5f322ca..1ee57ab 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(or_options_t *options) if (len < 6) continue; /* malformed. */ dot = target + len - 6; /* dot now points to just before .exit */ - dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit, or NULL */ + dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit or NULL */ if (!dot) { nodename = tor_strndup(target, len-5); } else {

1 0

[tor/master] handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 4906188b622872899f76cf01167cfef3e09cbffd Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:09:24 2011 -0500 handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post If we're picking a random directory node, never pick an excluded one. But if we've chosen a specific one (or all), allow it unless strictnodes is set (in which case warn so the user knows it's their fault). When warning that we won't connect to a strictly excluded node, log what it was we were trying to do at that node. When ExcludeNodes is set but StrictNodes is not set, we only use non-excluded nodes if we can, but fall back to using excluded nodes if none of those nodes is usable. --- src/or/directory.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 8f33a60..0c095fe 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -253,10 +253,13 @@ directories_have_accepted_server_descriptor(void) } /** Start a connection to every suitable directory authority, using - * connection purpose 'purpose' and uploading the payload 'payload' - * (length 'payload_len'). dir_purpose should be one of + * connection purpose dir_purpose and uploading payload + * (of length payload_len). The dir_purpose should be one of * 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR' or 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC'. * + * router_purpose describes the type of descriptor we're + * publishing, if we're publishing a descriptor -- e.g. general or bridge. + * * type specifies what sort of dir authorities (V1, V2, * HIDSERV, BRIDGE) we should upload to. * @@ -272,6 +275,7 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, const char *payload, size_t payload_len, size_t extrainfo_len) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); int post_via_tor; smartlist_t *dirservers = router_get_trusted_dir_servers(); int found = 0; @@ -287,6 +291,16 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, if ((type & ds->type) == 0) continue; + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, rs)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact authority '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping.", + ds->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + continue; + } + found = 1; /* at least one authority of this type was listed */ if (dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR) ds->has_accepted_serverdesc = 0; @@ -496,12 +510,14 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, time_t if_modified_since, const rend_data_t *rend_query) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerinfo_t *router; char address_buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN+1]; struct in_addr in; const char *address; tor_addr_t addr; router = router_get_by_digest(status->identity_digest); + if (!router && anonymized_connection) { log_info(LD_DIR, "Not sending anonymized request to directory '%s'; we " "don't have its router descriptor.", status->nickname); @@ -514,6 +530,17 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, address = address_buf; } tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); + + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact directory mirror '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping. This choice might make your Tor not work.", + status->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + return; + } + directory_initiate_command_rend(address, &addr, status->or_port, status->dir_port, status->version_supports_conditional_consensus, diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 5d9ab8c..29e2e96 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1070,6 +1070,7 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver(authority_type_t type, int flags) static routerstatus_t * router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerstatus_t *result; smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *trusted_direct, *trusted_tunnel; @@ -1079,10 +1080,13 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) int requireother = ! (flags & PDS_ALLOW_SELF); int fascistfirewall = ! (flags & PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL); int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!consensus) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); trusted_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1114,6 +1118,11 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) if ((type & EXTRAINFO_CACHE) && !router_supports_extrainfo(status->identity_digest, 0)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); @@ -1155,6 +1164,15 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) smartlist_free(trusted_tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; } @@ -1165,6 +1183,7 @@ static routerstatus_t * router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, int *n_busy_out) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *overloaded_direct, *overloaded_tunnel; routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); @@ -1175,10 +1194,13 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, const int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); const int no_serverdesc_fetching =(flags & PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH); int n_busy = 0; + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!trusted_dir_servers) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); overloaded_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1197,6 +1219,12 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, continue; if (requireother && me && router_digest_is_me(d->digest)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, + &d->fake_status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, d->addr); @@ -1243,6 +1271,15 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, smartlist_free(tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; }

1 0

[tor/master] slight tweak on circuit_conforms_to_options
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 7e2e8074d52f9ace76d98a62d67a4bf781f06c3b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:22:53 2011 -0500 slight tweak on circuit_conforms_to_options this function really needs to get a total rewrite (or die) For now, use #if 0 to disable it. --- src/or/circuituse.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- src/or/circuituse.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index cdf49e3..7b20f7f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -242,33 +242,34 @@ circuit_get_best(edge_connection_t *conn, int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose, return best ? TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(best) : NULL; } +#if 0 /** Check whether, according to the policies in options, the * circuit circ makes sense. */ -/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes. It should check more. */ +/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes; it should check more. + * Also, it doesn't have the right definition of an exit circuit. Also, + * it's never called. */ int circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ, const or_options_t *options) { const crypt_path_t *cpath, *cpath_next = NULL; - for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath && cpath_next != circ->cpath; - cpath = cpath_next) { + /* first check if it includes any excluded nodes */ + for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath_next != circ->cpath; cpath = cpath_next) { cpath_next = cpath->next; - if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, cpath->extend_info)) return 0; + } - if (cpath->next == circ->cpath) { - /* This is apparently the exit node. */ + /* then consider the final hop */ + if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes, + circ->cpath->prev->extend_info)) + return 0; - if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes, - cpath->extend_info)) - return 0; - } - } return 1; } +#endif /** Close all circuits that start at us, aren't open, and were born * at least CircuitBuildTimeout seconds ago. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.h b/src/or/circuituse.h index a121099..9f393ab 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.h +++ b/src/or/circuituse.h @@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ void circuit_expire_building(void); void circuit_remove_handled_ports(smartlist_t *needed_ports); int circuit_stream_is_being_handled(edge_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port, int min); +#if 0 int circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ, const or_options_t *options); +#endif void circuit_build_needed_circs(time_t now); void circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn);

1 0

[tor/master] don't exit enclave to excluded relays
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 719b5b87dee4910bb3e2d29db6e2012416f60d3d Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:57:01 2011 -0500 don't exit enclave to excluded relays --- src/or/routerlist.c | 6 +++++- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 29e2e96..523596d 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1538,6 +1538,8 @@ routerlist_find_my_routerinfo(void) /** Find a router that's up, that has this IP address, and * that allows exit to this address:port, or return NULL if there * isn't a good one. + * Don't exit enclave to excluded relays -- it wouldn't actually + * hurt anything, but this way there are fewer confused users. */ routerinfo_t * router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) @@ -1545,6 +1547,7 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) uint32_t addr; struct in_addr in; tor_addr_t a; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (!tor_inet_aton(address, &in)) return NULL; /* it's not an IP already */ @@ -1557,7 +1560,8 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) if (router->addr == addr && router->is_running && compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&a, port, router->exit_policy) == - ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED) + ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED && + !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, router)) return router; }); return NULL;

1 0

[tor/master] refuse moria1.exit if moria1 is excluded
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 2b5c39211c2259404ab9bc23a1788b6d529e838f Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 05:29:28 2011 -0500 refuse moria1.exit if moria1 is excluded add a note reminding us to do this for foo.moria1.exit if we decide to. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index fff42be..4c74426 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1610,6 +1610,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, tor_assert(!automap); if (s) { if (s[1] != '\0') { + /* XXX022-1090 we should look this up as a relay and see if it's + * in our excluded set, and refuse it here if so. But first, + * figure out what's up with this 'remapped_to_exit' business + * and whether that needs careful treatment. -RD */ conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(s+1); if (remapped_to_exit) /* 5 tries before it expires the addressmap */ conn->chosen_exit_retries = TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES; @@ -1627,11 +1631,14 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(socks->address); r = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); *socks->address = 0; - if (r) { + if (r && (!options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion || + !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, + r))) { strlcpy(socks->address, r->address, sizeof(socks->address)); } else { log_warn(LD_APP, - "Unrecognized server in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + "%s relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + r ? "Excluded" : "Unrecognized", safe_str_client(socks->address)); connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); return -1;

1 0