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[tor/master] make formal a constraint that's been true a while now
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 9f47cfc21a8fa91b98a48291c316121135fa3f17 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 05:39:26 2011 -0500 make formal a constraint that's been true a while now --- src/or/config.c | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index bd904dc..404e648 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -3189,6 +3189,12 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, REJECT("Servers must be able to freely connect to the rest " "of the Internet, so they must not set UseBridges."); + /* If both of these are set, we'll end up with funny behavior where we + * demand enough entrynodes be up and running else we won't build + * circuits, yet we never actually use them. */ + if (options->UseBridges && options->EntryNodes) + REJECT("You cannot set both UseBridges and EntryNodes."); + options->_AllowInvalid = 0; if (options->AllowInvalidNodes) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options->AllowInvalidNodes, const char *, cp, {

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[tor/master] the new entrynodes behavior is always strict
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 5d12495d982d076b74ca2c0c88b78b00d2810e71 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 04:21:25 2011 -0500 the new entrynodes behavior is always strict --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 36 +++++++++++------------------------- 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index ebbda21..86406cb 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4006,14 +4006,10 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options) SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, { add_an_entry_guard(ri, 0); }); - /* Finally, the remaining previously configured guards that are not in - * EntryNodes, unless we're strict in which case we drop them */ - if (options->StrictNodes) { - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e, - entry_guard_free(e)); - } else { - smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_not_on_list); - } + /* Finally, free the remaining previously configured guards that are not in + * EntryNodes. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e, + entry_guard_free(e)); smartlist_free(entry_routers); smartlist_free(entry_fps); @@ -4024,7 +4020,7 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options) /** Return 0 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the * directory to our entry guard list, or return 1 if we have a - * list already and we'd prefer to stick to it. + * list already and we must stick to it. */ int entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options) @@ -4036,18 +4032,6 @@ entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options) return 0; } -/* Are we dead set against changing our entry guard list, or would we - * change it if it means keeping Tor usable? */ -static int -entry_list_is_totally_static(or_options_t *options) -{ - if (options->EntryNodes && options->StrictNodes) - return 1; - if (options->UseBridges) - return 1; - return 0; -} - /** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards. If * state is non-NULL, this is for a specific circuit -- * make sure not to pick this circuit's exit or any node in the @@ -4092,6 +4076,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) continue; /* don't pick the same node for entry and exit */ if (consider_exit_family && smartlist_isin(exit_family, r)) continue; /* avoid relays that are family members of our exit */ +#if 0 /* since EntryNodes is always strict now, this clause is moot */ if (options->EntryNodes && !routerset_contains_router(options->EntryNodes, r)) { /* We've come to the end of our preferred entry nodes. */ @@ -4106,6 +4091,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) "No relays from EntryNodes available. Using others."); } } +#endif smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, r); if (!entry->made_contact) { /* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry @@ -4131,7 +4117,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) } if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < preferred_min) { - if (!entry_list_is_totally_static(options)) { + if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options)) { /* still no? try adding a new entry then */ /* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need * to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might @@ -4157,9 +4143,9 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) goto retry; } if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { - /* still no? if we're using bridges or have StrictNodes - * set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our - * bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */ + /* still no? if we're using bridges, + * and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our + * bridges, then be flexible about families. */ consider_exit_family = 0; goto retry; }

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[tor/master] If ExitNodes and Exclude{Exit}Nodes overlap, obey Exclude{Exit}Nodes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 0ad3836f73cbb6f0aa8b643c43e799d69d378aea Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 04:35:08 2011 -0500 If ExitNodes and Exclude{Exit}Nodes overlap, obey Exclude{Exit}Nodes. Also, ExitNodes are always strict. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- src/or/routerlist.c | 4 +++ src/or/routerlist.h | 2 + 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 86406cb..b8a82e8 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2685,13 +2685,29 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, n_supported[i] = -1; continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down or bad exits */ } + + if (options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion && + routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, router)) { + n_supported[i] = -1; + continue; /* user asked us not to use it, no matter what */ + } + if (options->ExitNodes && + !routerset_contains_router(options->ExitNodes, router)) { + n_supported[i] = -1; + continue; /* not one of our chosen exit nodes */ + } + if (router_is_unreliable(router, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0) && - (!options->ExitNodes || - !routerset_contains_router(options->ExitNodes, router))) { + !options->ExitNodes) { /* FFFF Someday, differentiate between a routerset that names * routers, and a routerset that names countries, and only do this * check if they've asked for specific exit relays. Or if the country * they ask for is rare. Or something. */ + /* XXX022-1090 We need to pick a tradeoff here: if we throw it out because + * it's unreliable, users might end up with no exit options even + * though some options are up. If we don't throw it out, users who + * set ExitNodes will have partitioning problems because they'll be + * the only folks willing to use this node. */ n_supported[i] = -1; continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable, unless we have * ExitNodes set, in which case we asked for it */ @@ -2753,21 +2769,13 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, /* If any routers definitely support any pending connections, choose one * at random. */ if (best_support > 0) { - smartlist_t *supporting = smartlist_create(), *use = smartlist_create(); + smartlist_t *supporting = smartlist_create(); for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++) if (n_supported[i] == best_support) smartlist_add(supporting, smartlist_get(dir->routers, i)); - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, options->ExitNodes, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && options->ExitNodes && - !options->StrictNodes) { /* give up on exitnodes and try again */ - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, NULL, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - } - router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(use, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); - smartlist_free(use); + router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); smartlist_free(supporting); } else { /* Either there are no pending connections, or no routers even seem to @@ -2775,7 +2783,7 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, * at least one predicted exit port. */ int attempt; - smartlist_t *needed_ports, *supporting, *use; + smartlist_t *needed_ports, *supporting; if (best_support == -1) { if (need_uptime || need_capacity) { @@ -2792,7 +2800,6 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion ? " or are Excluded" : ""); } supporting = smartlist_create(); - use = smartlist_create(); needed_ports = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time(NULL)); for (attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) { /* try once to pick only from routers that satisfy a needed port, @@ -2807,25 +2814,13 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, } } - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, options->ExitNodes, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && options->ExitNodes && - !options->StrictNodes) { /* give up on exitnodes and try again */ - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, NULL, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - } - /* FFF sometimes the above results in null, when the requested - * exit node is considered down by the consensus. we should pick - * it anyway, since the user asked for it. */ - router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(use, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); + router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); if (router) break; smartlist_clear(supporting); - smartlist_clear(use); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH(needed_ports, uint16_t *, cp, tor_free(cp)); smartlist_free(needed_ports); - smartlist_free(use); smartlist_free(supporting); } @@ -2834,10 +2829,11 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose exit server '%s'", router->nickname); return router; } - if (options->ExitNodes && options->StrictNodes) { + if (options->ExitNodes) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "No specified exit routers seem to be running, and " - "StrictNodes is set: can't choose an exit."); + "No specified %sexit routers seem to be running: " + "can't choose an exit.", + options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion ? "non-excluded " : ""); } return NULL; } diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 523596d..a9a216b 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5473,12 +5473,14 @@ routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set) return set && smartlist_len(set->country_names); } +#if 0 /** Return true iff there are no entries in set. */ static int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set) { return !set || smartlist_len(set->list) == 0; } +#endif /** Helper. Return true iff set contains a router based on the other * provided fields. Return higher values for more specific subentries: a @@ -5594,6 +5596,7 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, } } +#if 0 /** Add to target every routerinfo_t from source except: * * 1) Don't add it if include is non-empty and the relay isn't in @@ -5624,6 +5627,7 @@ routersets_get_disjunction(smartlist_t *target, } }); } +#endif /** Remove every routerinfo_t from lst that is in routerset. */ void diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index cd0eb95..3bbdc42 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -175,9 +175,11 @@ int routerset_contains_extendinfo(const routerset_t *set, void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only); +#if 0 void routersets_get_disjunction(smartlist_t *target, const smartlist_t *source, const routerset_t *include, const routerset_t *exclude, int running_only); +#endif void routerset_subtract_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset); char *routerset_to_string(const routerset_t *routerset);

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[tor/master] Add an XXX022-1090 to note consider_exit_fmily b0rkenness
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit affdec8d044513fb87a6dd8931be49974326e8e7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 25 15:02:37 2011 -0400 Add an XXX022-1090 to note consider_exit_fmily b0rkenness --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 4fa87c0..b6627a0 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4142,6 +4142,8 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) /* still no? if we're using bridges, * and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges, then be flexible about families. */ + /* XXXX022-1090 This is probably not what people want. Better to choose + * a new exit. */ consider_exit_family = 0; goto retry; }

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[tor/master] three more cases where maybe we want to exclude
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 5710ea64757cf0b36ab6d97409bbb9213116f949 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 06:19:15 2011 -0500 three more cases where maybe we want to exclude --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 1 + src/or/router.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index b8a82e8..4fa87c0 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4570,6 +4570,7 @@ launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge) return; /* it's already on the way */ address = tor_dup_addr(&bridge->addr); + /* XXX022-1090 if we ExcludeNodes this bridge, should this step fail? -RD */ directory_initiate_command(address, &bridge->addr, bridge->port, 0, 0, /* does not matter */ diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index c15b9b2..6993e1e 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -857,6 +857,7 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) log_info(LD_CIRC, "Testing %s of my ORPort: %s:%d.", !orport_reachable ? "reachability" : "bandwidth", me->address, me->or_port); + /* XXX022-1090 If we ExcludeNodes ourself, should this fail? -RD */ circuit_launch_by_router(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING, me, CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY|CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL); } @@ -867,6 +868,7 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) CONN_TYPE_DIR, &addr, me->dir_port, DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC)) { /* ask myself, via tor, for my server descriptor. */ + /* XXX022-1090 If we ExcludeNodes ourself, should this fail? -RD */ directory_initiate_command(me->address, &addr, me->or_port, me->dir_port, 0, /* does not matter */

1 0

[tor/master] note another case where strictnodes is considered for exits
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit bcea155ce0999d19b596a24edd359d1fc0dbe380 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 04:36:24 2011 -0500 note another case where strictnodes is considered for exits --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 72e2c8a..fff42be 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -2969,6 +2969,8 @@ connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn) * * If excluded_means_no is 1 and Exclude*Nodes is set and excludes * this relay, return 0. + * XXX022-1090 This StrictNodes business needs more work, a la bug 1090. See + * also git commit ef81649d. */ int connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit,

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[tor/master] If we're excluded, and StrictNodes is set, do not do self-tests.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ca74badbe95be77bd990c9c4f9c1b26052d4159e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 28 14:14:45 2011 -0400 If we're excluded, and StrictNodes is set, do not do self-tests. --- src/or/router.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 6993e1e..64cb079 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -850,14 +850,33 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); int orport_reachable = check_whether_orport_reachable(); tor_addr_t addr; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (!me) return; + if (routerset_contains_router(options->ExcludeNodes, me) && + options->StrictNodes) { + /* If we've excluded ourself, and StrictNodes is set, we can't test + * ourself. */ + if (test_or || test_dir) { +#define SELF_EXCLUDED_WARN_INTERVAL 3600 + static ratelim_t warning_limit=RATELIM_INIT(SELF_EXCLUDED_WARN_INTERVAL); + char *msg; + if ((msg = rate_limit_log(&warning_limit, approx_time()))) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Can't peform self-tests for this relay: we have " + "listed ourself in ExcludeNodes, and StrictNodes is set. " + "We will cannot learn whether we are usable, and will not " + "be able to advertise ourself.%s", msg); + tor_free(msg); + } + } + return; + } + if (test_or && (!orport_reachable || !circuit_enough_testing_circs())) { log_info(LD_CIRC, "Testing %s of my ORPort: %s:%d.", !orport_reachable ? "reachability" : "bandwidth", me->address, me->or_port); - /* XXX022-1090 If we ExcludeNodes ourself, should this fail? -RD */ circuit_launch_by_router(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING, me, CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY|CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL); } @@ -868,7 +887,6 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) CONN_TYPE_DIR, &addr, me->dir_port, DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC)) { /* ask myself, via tor, for my server descriptor. */ - /* XXX022-1090 If we ExcludeNodes ourself, should this fail? -RD */ directory_initiate_command(me->address, &addr, me->or_port, me->dir_port, 0, /* does not matter */

1 0

[tor/master] Note that circuit purpose changing can violate ExcludeNodes
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit db2fd28308fb019e59280219cf95f09f5208092f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 28 16:44:40 2011 -0400 Note that circuit purpose changing can violate ExcludeNodes --- src/or/rendservice.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 88f1ba3..5b85394 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1352,6 +1352,9 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " "circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to " "general."); + /* XXX022-1090: This can wind up violating ExcludeNodes/ + * ExitNodes/ExcludeExitNodes restrictions. + */ TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; circuit_has_opened(circuit); return;

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[tor/master] If EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes overlap, obey ExcludeNodes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ad3da535366aeb9b7441f4881899758bc7475168 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 17 18:54:20 2009 -0400 If EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes overlap, obey ExcludeNodes. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 6 ++++-- src/or/config.c | 3 ++- src/or/or.h | 4 ++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 13 ++++++++----- src/or/routerlist.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 2d4d5c0..ebbda21 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2938,6 +2938,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) description,exit->nickname, rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", (int)purpose); + /* XXX022-1090 "using anyway" is freaking people out -RD */ circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ); } @@ -3979,7 +3980,8 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options) * Perhaps we should do this calculation once whenever the list of routers * changes or the entrynodes setting changes. */ - routerset_get_all_routers(entry_routers, options->EntryNodes, 0); + routerset_get_all_routers(entry_routers, options->EntryNodes, + options->ExcludeNodes, 0); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, smartlist_add(entry_fps,ri->cache_info.identity_digest)); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, { @@ -4155,7 +4157,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) goto retry; } if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { - /* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes + /* still no? if we're using bridges or have StrictNodes * set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */ consider_exit_family = 0; diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 9675c73..bd904dc 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1412,7 +1412,8 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) /* Check if we need to parse and add the EntryNodes config option. */ if (options->EntryNodes && (!old_options || - (!routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes)))) + !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes))) entry_nodes_should_be_added(); /* Since our options changed, we might need to regenerate and upload our diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 06e6d7f..50a1223 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2387,7 +2387,7 @@ typedef struct { * ORs not to consider as exits. */ /** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */ - struct routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; + routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our * process for all current and future memory. */ @@ -3487,7 +3487,7 @@ typedef struct trusted_dir_server_t { #define ROUTER_MAX_DECLARED_BANDWIDTH INT32_MAX -/* Flags for pick_directory_server and pick_trusteddirserver. */ +/* Flags for pick_directory_server() and pick_trusteddirserver(). */ /** Flag to indicate that we should not automatically be willing to use * ourself to answer a directory request. * Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/ diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index c02654f..5d9ab8c 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5516,10 +5516,11 @@ routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, routerstatus_t *rs) } /** Add every known routerinfo_t that is a member of routerset to - * out. If running_only, only add the running ones. */ + * out, but never add any that are part of excludeset. + * If running_only, only add the running ones. */ void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, - int running_only) + const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only) { tor_assert(out); if (!routerset || !routerset->list) @@ -5529,12 +5530,13 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, if (routerset_is_list(routerset)) { /* No routers are specified by type; all are given by name or digest. - * we can do a lookup in O(len(list)). */ + * we can do a lookup in O(len(routerset)). */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routerset->list, const char *, name, { routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(name, 1); if (router) { if (!running_only || router->is_running) - smartlist_add(out, router); + if (!routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) + smartlist_add(out, router); } }); } else { @@ -5544,7 +5546,8 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rl->routers, routerinfo_t *, router, { if (running_only && !router->is_running) continue; - if (routerset_contains_router(routerset, router)) + if (routerset_contains_router(routerset, router) && + !routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) smartlist_add(out, router); }); } diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index ca42811..cd0eb95 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ int routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, int routerset_contains_extendinfo(const routerset_t *set, const extend_info_t *ei); void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, + const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only); void routersets_get_disjunction(smartlist_t *target, const smartlist_t *source, const routerset_t *include,

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[tor/master] refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 82178a81f6748c9b26bdc8a5da36dd34b689281b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 17 18:52:18 2009 -0400 refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes Make hidden services more flaky for people who set both ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. Not recommended, especially for hidden service operators. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/or/rendservice.c | 14 +++++++++++- 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 8ac909f..90304c3 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ #include "rephist.h" #include "routerlist.h" +static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( + const rend_data_t *rend_query, const int strict); + /** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point: * send the introduction request. */ void @@ -739,10 +742,31 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query) extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) { + extend_info_t *result; + /* See if we can get a node that complies with ExcludeNodes */ + if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 1))) + return result; + /* If not, and StrictNodes is not set, see if we can return any old node + */ + if (!get_options()->StrictNodes) + return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 0); + return NULL; +} + +/** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set + * iff strict is true. + */ +static extend_info_t * +rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, + const int strict) +{ int i; rend_cache_entry_t *entry; rend_intro_point_t *intro; routerinfo_t *router; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + smartlist_t *usable_nodes; + int n_excluded = 0; if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) { log_warn(LD_REND, @@ -750,13 +774,26 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); return NULL; } + /* We'll keep a separate list of the usable nodes. If this becomes empty, + * no nodes are usable. */ + usable_nodes = smartlist_create(); + smartlist_add_all(usable_nodes, entry->parsed->intro_nodes); again: - if (smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) + if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) { + if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes) { + /* We only want to warn if StrictNodes is really set. Otherwise + * we're just about to retry anyways. + */ + log_warn(LD_REND, "All introduction points for hidden service are " + "at excluded relays, and StrictNodes is set. Skipping."); + } + smartlist_free(usable_nodes); return NULL; + } - i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes)); - intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_nodes)); + intro = smartlist_get(usable_nodes, i); /* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */ if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) { if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest)) @@ -766,13 +803,22 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) if (!router) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.", intro->extend_info->nickname); - rend_intro_point_free(intro); - smartlist_del(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); goto again; } extend_info_free(intro->extend_info); intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_router(router); } + /* Check if we should refuse to talk to this router. */ + if (options->ExcludeNodes && strict && + routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, + intro->extend_info)) { + n_excluded++; + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); + goto again; + } + + smartlist_free(usable_nodes); return extend_info_dup(intro->extend_info); } diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 4503982..88f1ba3 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -848,6 +848,7 @@ clean_accepted_intros(rend_service_t *service, time_t now) /** Respond to an INTRODUCE2 cell by launching a circuit to the chosen * rendezvous point. */ + /* XXX022 this function sure could use some organizing. -RD */ int rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) @@ -875,6 +876,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, time_t now = time(NULL); char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN]; time_t *access_time; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, @@ -1047,6 +1050,15 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, goto err; } + /* Check if we'd refuse to talk to this router */ + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, extend_info)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client asked to rendezvous at a relay that we " + "exclude, and StrictNodes is set. Refusing service."); + reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; /* XXX might leak why we refused */ + goto err; + } + r_cookie = ptr; base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4); @@ -1394,7 +1406,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) /** Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell; mark the circuit as a * live introduction point, and note that the service descriptor is - * now out-of-date.*/ + * now out-of-date. */ int rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,

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