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[torbutton/master] Optimize SafeCache pref lookup a bit.
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit 8788ca4dfe6f10484e41028e150cba69f3097779 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Thu Jun 30 17:51:08 2011 -0700 Optimize SafeCache pref lookup a bit. Also allow 3rd party caching by default. --- src/chrome/content/stanford-safecache.js | 40 +++++++++++++++--------------- 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/content/stanford-safecache.js b/src/chrome/content/stanford-safecache.js index fe5e087..bd67652 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/stanford-safecache.js +++ b/src/chrome/content/stanford-safecache.js @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ SSC_RequestListener.prototype = // Same-origin policy var referrer; if (parent && parent.hostname != channel.URI.host) { - //SSC_dump("Segmenting " + channel.URI.host + - //" content loaded by " + parent.host); + SSC_dump("Segmenting " + channel.URI.host + + " content loaded by " + parent.host); this.setCacheKey(channel, parent.hostname); referrer = parent.hostname; } else { @@ -124,15 +124,16 @@ SSC_RequestListener.prototype = if(!this.readCacheKey(channel.cacheKey)) { this.setCacheKey(channel, channel.URI.host); } else { - // SSC_dump("Existing cache key detected; leaving it unchanged."); + SSC_dump("Existing cache key detected; leaving it unchanged."); } } - // Always apply policy - if(parent && parent.hostname != channel.URI.host) { - //SSC_dump("Third party cache blocked for " + channel.URI.spec + - //" content loaded by " + parent.spec); - this.bypassCache(channel); + if (this.controller.getBlockThirdPartyCache()) { + if(parent && parent.hostname != channel.URI.host) { + //SSC_dump("Third party cache blocked for " + channel.URI.spec + + //" content loaded by " + parent.spec); + this.bypassCache(channel); + } } var cookie = null; @@ -311,33 +312,32 @@ SSC_RequestListener.prototype = * Master control object. Adds and removes the RequestListener */ function SSC_Controller() { + this.prefs = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/preferences-service;1"] + .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIPrefService); this.addListener(new SSC_RequestListener(this)); } SSC_Controller.prototype = { getEnabled: function() { - return (Components.classes["@mozilla.org/preferences-service;1"] - .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIPrefService) - .getIntPref(kSSC_ENABLED_PREF)); + return (this.prefs.getIntPref(kSSC_ENABLED_PREF)); }, getSafeCookieEnabled: function() { - return (Components.classes["@mozilla.org/preferences-service;1"] - .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIPrefService) - .getBoolPref(kSSC_SC_ENABLED_PREF)); + return (this.prefs.getBoolPref(kSSC_SC_ENABLED_PREF)); + }, + + getBlockThirdPartyCache: function() { + // Meh, no pref for now. Always allow. + return false; }, getTorButton: function() { - return (Components.classes["@mozilla.org/preferences-service;1"] - .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIPrefBranch) - .getBoolPref(kSSC_TORBUTTON_PREF)); + return (this.prefs.getBoolPref(kSSC_TORBUTTON_PREF)); }, getCookieJS: function() { - return (Components.classes["@mozilla.org/preferences-service;1"] - .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIPrefBranch) - .getBoolPref(kSSC_COOKIE_JS_PREF)); + return (this.prefs.getBoolPref(kSSC_COOKIE_JS_PREF)); }, addListener: function(listener) {

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[torbutton/master] Bug #3506: Try to avoid shrinking windows..
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit 347690b821898b8ac5a2bed63344e42eebcb90b1 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Thu Jun 30 11:05:26 2011 -0700 Bug #3506: Try to avoid shrinking windows.. --- src/chrome/content/torbutton.js | 25 +++++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js index e086a8d..efd2dfc 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js +++ b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js @@ -3563,7 +3563,7 @@ function torbutton_new_tab(event) // Returns true if the window wind is neither maximized, full screen, // ratpoisioned/evilwmed, nor minimized. function torbutton_is_windowed(wind) { - torbutton_log(2, "Window: ("+wind.outerHeight+","+wind.outerWidth+") ?= (" + torbutton_log(3, "Window: ("+wind.outerHeight+","+wind.outerWidth+") ?= (" +wind.screen.availHeight+","+wind.screen.availWidth+")"); if(wind.windowState == Components.interfaces.nsIDOMChromeWindow.STATE_MINIMIZED || wind.windowState == Components.interfaces.nsIDOMChromeWindow.STATE_MAXIMIZED) { @@ -3623,14 +3623,15 @@ function torbutton_check_round(browser) && m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.tor_enabled") && m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.resize_on_toggle")) { var bWin = browser.contentWindow; - torbutton_log(2, "About to resize load window: "+bWin.innerWidth+"x"+bWin.innerHeight+" in state "+window.windowState); + var height = Math.round((bWin.innerHeight)/50.0)*50; + var width = Math.round((bWin.innerWidth)/50.0)*50; - var height = Math.round(bWin.innerHeight/50.0)*50; - var width = Math.round(bWin.innerWidth/50.0)*50; + torbutton_log(3, "About to resize load window: "+bWin.innerWidth + +"x"+bWin.innerHeight+" -> "+width+"x"+height+" in state " + +window.windowState); - // This is fun. any attempt to resize the inner window actually resizes the outer width first. - // This hack seems to do the trick: - bWin.resizeTo(width,height); + // This is fun. any attempt to directly set the inner window actually resizes the outer width + // to that value instead. Must use resizeBy() instead of assignment or resizeTo() bWin.resizeBy(width-bWin.innerWidth,height-bWin.innerHeight); torbutton_log(3, "Resized window on load to: "+bWin.innerWidth+"x"+bWin.innerHeight+" in state "+window.windowState); @@ -3658,8 +3659,9 @@ function torbutton_set_window_size(bWin) { // at this point... bWin.innerWidth = 200; bWin.innerHeight = 200; - torbutton_log(2, "About to resize new window: "+window.outerWidth+"x"+window.outerHeight - +" in state "+window.windowState+" Have "+availWidth.value+"x"+availHeight.value); + torbutton_log(3, "About to resize new window: "+window.outerWidth+"x"+window.outerHeight + +" inner: "+bWin.innerWidth+"x"+bWin.innerHeight+ + " in state "+window.windowState+" Have "+availWidth.value+"x"+availHeight.value); var maxHeight = availHeight.value - (window.outerHeight - bWin.innerHeight) - 101; var maxWidth = availWidth.value - (window.outerWidth - bWin.innerWidth); @@ -3675,9 +3677,8 @@ function torbutton_set_window_size(bWin) { height = Math.floor(maxHeight/100.0)*100; - // This is fun. any attempt to resize the inner window actually resizes the outer width first. - // This hack seems to do the trick: - bWin.resizeTo(width,height); + // This is fun. any attempt to directly set the inner window actually resizes the outer width + // to that value instead. Must use resizeBy() instead of assignment or resizeTo() bWin.resizeBy(width-bWin.innerWidth,height-bWin.innerHeight); torbutton_log(3, "Resized new window from: "+bWin.innerWidth+"x"+bWin.innerHeight+" to "+width+"x"+height+" in state "+window.windowState); }

1 0

[torbutton/master] Squelch exception from app launcher in error console.
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit 81624d96f2427bf2f1be7893d0bd08c1f9b38f61 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Thu Jun 30 14:49:39 2011 -0700 Squelch exception from app launcher in error console. --- src/components/external-app-blocker.js | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/components/external-app-blocker.js b/src/components/external-app-blocker.js index f8f7ea5..a83f50c 100644 --- a/src/components/external-app-blocker.js +++ b/src/components/external-app-blocker.js @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ ExternalWrapper.prototype = var call; if(params.length) call = "("+params.join().replace(/(?:)/g,function(){return "p"+(++x)})+")"; else call = "()"; - if(method == "getTypeFromFile" || method == "getTypeFromExtension") { + if(method == "getTypeFromFile" || method == "getTypeFromExtension" || method == "getTypeFromURI") { // XXX: Due to https://developer.mozilla.org/en/Exception_logging_in_JavaScript // this is necessary to prevent error console noise on the return to C++ code. // It is not technically correct, but as far as I can tell, returning null

1 0

[arm/master] fix: fallback config descriptions not installed
by atagar＠torproject.org 30 Jun '11

30 Jun '11

commit 2a43cc028d97fcfcbd9e72900ed40026a78050e7 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 29 18:51:53 2011 -0700 fix: fallback config descriptions not installed The fallback descriptions for Tor's configuration options (which are used when the man page is unavailable) weren't being copied when arm's installed. This resulted in an error message and no config descriptions if the man page was unavailable. Caught by ioerror --- setup.py | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/setup.py b/setup.py index cdda907..9a9efdd 100644 --- a/setup.py +++ b/setup.py @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ setup(name='arm', data_files=[("/usr/bin", ["arm"]), ("/usr/share/man/man1", [manFilename]), (docPath, ["armrc.sample"]), - ("/usr/share/arm", ["src/settings.cfg", "src/uninstall"])], + ("/usr/share/arm", ["src/settings.cfg", "src/uninstall", "src/torConfigDesc.txt"])], ) # Cleans up the temporary compressed man page.

1 0

[arm/master] Moving extra resources into /src/resources
by atagar＠torproject.org 30 Jun '11

30 Jun '11

commit 2aa2c2a81867158bbb05cdea37745443f9756922 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 29 19:23:07 2011 -0700 Moving extra resources into /src/resources I'm about to add more miscellaneous resources so moving non-source files that the user shouldn't need to worry about into '/src/resources'. --- arm.1 | 74 --- setup.py | 10 +- src/resources/arm.1 | 74 +++ src/resources/torConfigDesc.txt | 1123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/starter.py | 2 +- src/torConfigDesc.txt | 1123 --------------------------------------- 6 files changed, 1204 insertions(+), 1202 deletions(-) diff --git a/arm.1 b/arm.1 deleted file mode 100644 index 7edb5ef..0000000 --- a/arm.1 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -.TH arm 1 "27 August 2010" -.SH NAME -arm - Terminal Tor status monitor - -.SH SYNOPSIS -arm [\fIOPTION\fR] - -.SH DESCRIPTION -The anonymizing relay monitor (arm) is a terminal status monitor for Tor -relays, intended for command-line aficionados, ssh connections, and anyone -stuck with a tty terminal. This works much like top does for system usage, -providing real time statistics for: - * bandwidth, cpu, and memory usage - * relay's current configuration - * logged events - * connection details (ip, hostname, fingerprint, and consensus data) - * etc - -Defaults and interface properties are configurable via a user provided -configuration file (for an example see the provided \fBarmrc.sample\fR). -Releases and information are available at \fIhttp://www.atagar.com/arm\fR. - -.SH OPTIONS -.TP -\fB\-i\fR, \fB\-\-interface [ADDRESS:]PORT\fR -tor control port arm should attach to (default is \fB127.0.0.1:9051\fR) - -.TP -\fB\-c\fR, \fB\-\-config CONFIG_PATH\fR -user provided configuration file (default is \fB~/.arm/armrc\fR) - -.TP -\fB\-d\fR, \fB\-\-debug\fR -writes all arm logs to ~/.arm/log - -.TP -\fB\-b\fR, \fB\-\-blind\fR -disable connection lookups (netstat, lsof, and ss), dropping the parts of the -interface that rely on this information - -.TP -\fB\-e\fR, \fB\-\-event EVENT_FLAGS\fR -flags for tor, arm, and torctl events to be logged (default is \fBN3\fR) - - d DEBUG a ADDRMAP k DESCCHANGED s STREAM - i INFO f AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS g GUARD r STREAM_BW - n NOTICE h BUILDTIMEOUT_SET l NEWCONSENSUS t STATUS_CLIENT - w WARN b BW m NEWDESC u STATUS_GENERAL - e ERR c CIRC p NS v STATUS_SERVER - j CLIENTS_SEEN q ORCONN - DINWE tor runlevel+ A All Events - 12345 arm runlevel+ X No Events - 67890 torctl runlevel+ U Unknown Events - -.TP -\fB\-v\fR, \fB\-\-version\fR -provides version information - -.TP -\fB\-h\fR, \fB\-\-help\fR -provides usage information - -.SH FILES -.TP -\fB~/.armrc\fR -Your personal arm configuration file - -.TP -\fB/usr/share/doc/arm/armrc.sample\fR -Sample armrc configuration file that documents all options - -.SH AUTHOR -Written by Damian Johnson (atagar(a)torproject.org) - diff --git a/setup.py b/setup.py index 9a9efdd..47b9af8 100644 --- a/setup.py +++ b/setup.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import os import sys import gzip +import glob import tempfile from src.version import VERSION from distutils.core import setup @@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ except ValueError: pass # --docPath flag not found # install-purelib=/usr/share # which would mean a bit more unnecessary clutter. -manFilename = "arm.1" +manFilename = "src/resoureces/arm.1" if "install" in sys.argv: sys.argv += ["--install-purelib", "/usr/share"] @@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ if "install" in sys.argv: # page instead. try: - manInputFile = open('arm.1', 'r') + manInputFile = open('src/resources/arm.1', 'r') manContents = manInputFile.read() manInputFile.close() @@ -90,11 +91,12 @@ setup(name='arm', data_files=[("/usr/bin", ["arm"]), ("/usr/share/man/man1", [manFilename]), (docPath, ["armrc.sample"]), - ("/usr/share/arm", ["src/settings.cfg", "src/uninstall", "src/torConfigDesc.txt"])], + ("/usr/share/arm", ["src/settings.cfg", "src/uninstall"]), + ("/usr/share/arm/resources", glob.glob("src/resources/*"))], ) # Cleans up the temporary compressed man page. -if manFilename != 'arm.1' and os.path.isfile(manFilename): +if manFilename != 'src/resoureces/arm.1' and os.path.isfile(manFilename): if "-q" not in sys.argv: print "Removing %s" % manFilename os.remove(manFilename) diff --git a/src/resources/arm.1 b/src/resources/arm.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7edb5ef --- /dev/null +++ b/src/resources/arm.1 @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +.TH arm 1 "27 August 2010" +.SH NAME +arm - Terminal Tor status monitor + +.SH SYNOPSIS +arm [\fIOPTION\fR] + +.SH DESCRIPTION +The anonymizing relay monitor (arm) is a terminal status monitor for Tor +relays, intended for command-line aficionados, ssh connections, and anyone +stuck with a tty terminal. This works much like top does for system usage, +providing real time statistics for: + * bandwidth, cpu, and memory usage + * relay's current configuration + * logged events + * connection details (ip, hostname, fingerprint, and consensus data) + * etc + +Defaults and interface properties are configurable via a user provided +configuration file (for an example see the provided \fBarmrc.sample\fR). +Releases and information are available at \fIhttp://www.atagar.com/arm\fR. + +.SH OPTIONS +.TP +\fB\-i\fR, \fB\-\-interface [ADDRESS:]PORT\fR +tor control port arm should attach to (default is \fB127.0.0.1:9051\fR) + +.TP +\fB\-c\fR, \fB\-\-config CONFIG_PATH\fR +user provided configuration file (default is \fB~/.arm/armrc\fR) + +.TP +\fB\-d\fR, \fB\-\-debug\fR +writes all arm logs to ~/.arm/log + +.TP +\fB\-b\fR, \fB\-\-blind\fR +disable connection lookups (netstat, lsof, and ss), dropping the parts of the +interface that rely on this information + +.TP +\fB\-e\fR, \fB\-\-event EVENT_FLAGS\fR +flags for tor, arm, and torctl events to be logged (default is \fBN3\fR) + + d DEBUG a ADDRMAP k DESCCHANGED s STREAM + i INFO f AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS g GUARD r STREAM_BW + n NOTICE h BUILDTIMEOUT_SET l NEWCONSENSUS t STATUS_CLIENT + w WARN b BW m NEWDESC u STATUS_GENERAL + e ERR c CIRC p NS v STATUS_SERVER + j CLIENTS_SEEN q ORCONN + DINWE tor runlevel+ A All Events + 12345 arm runlevel+ X No Events + 67890 torctl runlevel+ U Unknown Events + +.TP +\fB\-v\fR, \fB\-\-version\fR +provides version information + +.TP +\fB\-h\fR, \fB\-\-help\fR +provides usage information + +.SH FILES +.TP +\fB~/.armrc\fR +Your personal arm configuration file + +.TP +\fB/usr/share/doc/arm/armrc.sample\fR +Sample armrc configuration file that documents all options + +.SH AUTHOR +Written by Damian Johnson (atagar(a)torproject.org) + diff --git a/src/resources/torConfigDesc.txt b/src/resources/torConfigDesc.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9fa83e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/resources/torConfigDesc.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1123 @@ +Tor Version 0.2.2.13-alpha +General +index: 46 +acceldir +DIR +Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 45 +accelname +NAME +When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine. Names can be verified with the openssl engine command. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 119 +accountingmax +N bytes|KB|MB|GB|TB +Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 GB. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available". +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 120 +accountingstart +day|week|month [day] HH:MM +Specify how long accounting periods last. If month is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM on the dayth day of one month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and 28.) If week is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM of the dayth day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If day is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM each day to the same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to "month 1 0:00".) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 104 +address +address +The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g. moria.mit.edu) You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP address. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 89 +allowdotexit +0|1 +If enabled, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the SocksPort/TransPort/NatdPort into "www.google.com" addresses that exit from the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking websites and exit relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 51 +allowinvalidnodes +entry|exit|middle|introduction|rendezvous|... +If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 88 +allownonrfc953hostnames +0|1 +When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 105 +allowsinglehopexits +0|1 +This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is the only hop in the circuit. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 20 +alternatebridgeauthority +[nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint +As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place. Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 18 +alternatedirauthority +[nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 19 +alternatehsauthority +[nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 106 +assumereachable +0|1 +This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1, don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor immediately. If AuthoritativeDirectory is also set, this option instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list all connected servers as running. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 154 +authdirbaddir +AddressPattern... +Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadDirs is set. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 155 +authdirbadexit +AddressPattern... +Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadExits is set. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 156 +authdirinvalid +AddressPattern... +Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this authority publishes. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 158 +authdirlistbaddirs +0|1 +Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad; otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared directory.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 159 +authdirlistbadexits +0|1 +Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 161 +authdirmaxserversperaddr +NUM +Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit". (Default: 2) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 162 +authdirmaxserversperauthaddr +NUM +Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 157 +authdirreject +AddressPattern... +Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will never be listed at all in any network status document that this authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor submitted for publication by this authority. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 160 +authdirrejectunlisted +0|1 +Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects all uploaded server descriptors that aren't explicitly listed in the fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil attack. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 135 +authoritativedirectory +0|1 +When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at tor-ops(a)torproject.org if you think you should be a directory. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 95 +automaphostsonresolve +0|1 +When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address that ends with one of the suffixes in AutomapHostsSuffixes, we map an unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address. This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 96 +automaphostssuffixes +SUFFIX,SUFFIX,... +A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with AutomapHostsOnResolve. The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 47 +avoiddiskwrites +0|1 +If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise. This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 1 +bandwidthburst +N bytes|KB|MB|GB +Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 0 +bandwidthrate +N bytes|KB|MB|GB +A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. (Default: 5 MB) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 53 +bridge +IP:ORPort [fingerprint] +When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint" is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 144 +bridgeauthoritativedir +0|1 +When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 127 +bridgerecordusagebycountry +0|1 +When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 107 +bridgerelay +0|1 +Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections from bridge users to the Tor network. Mainly it influences how the relay will cache and serve directory information. Usually used in combination with PublishServerDescriptor. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 130 +cellstatistics +0|1 +When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 54 +circuitbuildtimeout +NUM +Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't open in that time, give up on it. (Default: 1 minute.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 55 +circuitidletimeout +NUM +If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we're receiving, it won't forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1 hour.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 50 +circuitpriorityhalflife +NUM1 +If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which circuit's cell to deliver or relay next. When the value is 0, we round-robin between the active circuits on a connection, delivering one cell from each in turn. When the value is positive, we prefer delivering cells from whichever connection has the lowest weighted cell count, where cells are weighted exponentially according to the supplied CircuitPriorityHalflife value (in seconds). If this option is not set at all, we use the behavior recommended in the current consensus networkstatus. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn't have to mess with it. (Default: not set.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 56 +circuitstreamtimeout +NUM +If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit. If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a number like 60. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 99 +clientdnsrejectinternaladdresses +0|1 +If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't turn it off unless you know what you're doing. (Default: 1). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 57 +clientonly +0|1 +If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is configured. (Usually, you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a useful server.) (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 152 +consensusparams +STRING +STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 7 +constrainedsockets +0|1 +If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all sockets to the size specified in ConstrainedSockSize. This is useful for virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are likely experiencing this problem. + +The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; this configuration option is a second-resort. + +The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates the problem. + +You should not enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip time on long paths. (Default: 0.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 8 +constrainedsocksize +N bytes|KB +When ConstrainedSockets is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 108 +contactinfo +email_address +Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it's an email address. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 10 +controllistenaddress +IP[:PORT] +Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're doing, since giving attackers access to your control listener is really dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 9 +controlport +Port +If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of HashedControlPassword or CookieAuthentication, setting this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control it. This option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 11 +controlsocket +Path +Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 13 +cookieauthentication +0|1 +If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem security. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 14 +cookieauthfile +Path +If set, this option overrides the default location and file name for Tor's cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 15 +cookieauthfilegroupreadable +0|1|Groupname +If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 16 +datadirectory +DIR +Store working data in DIR (Default: /usr/local/var/lib/tor) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 153 +dirallowprivateaddresses +0|1 +If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address" elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 147 +dirlistenaddress +IP[:PORT] +Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 148 +dirpolicy +policy,policy,... +Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 146 +dirport +PORT +Advertise the directory service on this port. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 136 +dirportfrontpage +FILENAME +When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in contrib/tor-exit-notice.html. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 131 +dirreqstatistics +0|1 +When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number and response time of network status requests to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 17 +dirserver +[nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint +Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1) directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs" flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is not set. Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=port" is given, Tor will use the given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a flag "v3ident=fp" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint fp. + +If no dirserver line is given, Tor will use the default directory servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you won't believe the same authorities they do. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 21 +disableallswap +0|1 +If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages, so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X and Solaris are currently not supported. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it should work on *BSD systems (untested). This option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you should use the User option to properly reduce Tor's privileges. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 98 +dnslistenaddress +IP[:PORT] +Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 97 +dnsport +PORT +If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves them anonymously. (Default: 0). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 100 +downloadextrainfo +0|1 +If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents contain information about servers other than the information in their regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 74 +enforcedistinctsubnets +0|1 +If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 60 +entrynodes +node,node,... +A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 132 +entrystatistics +0|1 +When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 59 +excludeexitnodes +node,node,... +A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this list. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 58 +excludenodes +node,node,... +A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example: ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 52 +excludesinglehoprelays +0|1 +This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally included. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 61 +exitnodes +node,node,... +A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 109 +exitpolicy +policy,policy,... +Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form "accept|reject ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]". If /MASK is omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving a host or network you can also use "*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). PORT can be a single port number, an interval of ports "FROM_PORT-TO_PORT", or "*". If PORT is omitted, that means "*". + +For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept anything else. + +To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address. These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you've done that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details about internal and reserved IP address space. + +This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put it all on one line. + +Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is: + + reject *:25 + reject *:119 + reject *:135-139 + reject *:445 + reject *:563 + reject *:1214 + reject *:4661-4666 + reject *:6346-6429 + reject *:6699 + reject *:6881-6999 + accept *:* +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 110 +exitpolicyrejectprivate +0|1 +Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address, at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 133 +exitportstatistics +0|1 +When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of relayed bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 134 +extrainfostatistics +0|1 +When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 101 +fallbacknetworkstatusfile +FILENAME +If Tor doesn't have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn't need to put load on the authorities. (Default: None). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 63 +fascistfirewall +0|1 +If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see FirewallPorts). This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use ReachableAddresses instead. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 90 +fastfirsthoppk +0|1 +When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower. + +Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it's operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it doesn't yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 22 +fetchdirinfoearly +0|1 +If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for fetching early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 23 +fetchdirinfoextraearly +0|1 +If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 24 +fetchhidservdescriptors +0|1 +If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 25 +fetchserverdescriptors +0|1 +If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 26 +fetchuselessdescriptors +0|1 +If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is useful if you're using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 64 +firewallports +PORTS +A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when FascistFirewall is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 129 +geoipfile +filename +A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 44 +hardwareaccel +0|1 +If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when available. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 12 +hashedcontrolpassword +hashed_password +Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other process knows the password whose one-way hash is hashed_password. You can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password password". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more than one HashedControlPassword line. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Hidden Service +index: 171 +hiddenserviceauthorizeclient +auth-type client-name,client-name,... +If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in their configuration file using HidServAuth. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Hidden Service +index: 167 +hiddenservicedir +DIRECTORY +Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to specify multiple services. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Hidden Service +index: 168 +hiddenserviceport +VIRTPORT [TARGET] +Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Hidden Service +index: 170 +hiddenserviceversion +version,version,... +A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 65 +hidservauth +onion-address auth-cookie [service-name] +Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22 characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden services can be configured to require authorization using the HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient option. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 143 +hidservdirectoryv2 +0|1 +When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 142 +hsauthoritativedir +0|1 +When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor also accepts and serves hidden service descriptors. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 27 +httpproxy +host[:port] +Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80 if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory servers. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 28 +httpproxyauthenticator +username:password +If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you want it to support others. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 29 +httpsproxy +host[:port] +Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting directly to servers. You may want to set FascistFirewall to restrict the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only allows connecting to certain ports. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 30 +httpsproxyauthenticator +username:password +If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you want it to support others. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 35 +keepaliveperiod +NUM +To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 37 +log +minSeverity[-maxSeverity] file FILENAME +As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file. Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity level. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 69 +longlivedports +PORTS +A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 70 +mapaddress +address newaddress +When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to www.indymedia.org to exit via torserver (where torserver is the nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit". +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 2 +maxadvertisedbandwidth +N bytes|KB|MB|GB +If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server without impacting network performance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 72 +maxcircuitdirtiness +NUM +Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago, but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10 minutes) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 111 +maxonionspending +NUM +If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 145 +minuptimehidservdirectoryv2 +N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks +Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 112 +myfamily +node,node,... +Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 141 +namingauthoritativedirectory +0|1 +When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See approved-routers in the FILES section below. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 94 +natdlistenaddress +IP[:PORT] +Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 93 +natdport +PORT +Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.) to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is only for people who cannot use TransPort. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 71 +newcircuitperiod +NUM +Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 seconds) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 113 +nickname +name +Set the server's nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9]. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 73 +nodefamily +node,node,... +The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames, constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed when a server doesn't list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option can be used multiple times. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 114 +numcpus +num +How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 84 +numentryguards +NUM +If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 116 +orlistenaddress +IP[:PORT] +Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 115 +orport +PORT +Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 38 +outboundbindaddress +IP +Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 6 +perconnbwburst +N bytes|KB|MB|GB +If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 5 +perconnbwrate +N bytes|KB|MB|GB +If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 39 +pidfile +FILE +On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove FILE. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 49 +prefertunneleddirconns +0|1 +If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don't support tunneled directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 40 +protocolwarnings +0|1 +If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties not following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity 'info'. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Hidden Service +index: 169 +publishhidservdescriptors +0|1 +If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 117 +publishserverdescriptor +0|1|v1|v2|v3|bridge|hidserv,... +This option is only considered if you have an ORPort defined. You can choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. If set to 0, Tor will act as a server but it will not publish its descriptor to the directory authorities. (This is useful if you're testing out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptor to all directory authorities of the type(s) specified. The value "1" is the default, which means "publish to the appropriate authorities". +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 66 +reachableaddresses +ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]... +A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For example, 'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept *:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port 80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept *:*'.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 67 +reachablediraddresses +ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]... +Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of ReachableAddresses is used. If HTTPProxy is set then these connections will go through that proxy. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 68 +reachableoraddresses +ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]... +Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not set explicitly then the value of ReachableAddresses is used. If HTTPSProxy is set then these connections will go through that proxy. + +The separation between ReachableORAddresses and ReachableDirAddresses is only interesting when you are connecting through proxies (see HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy). Most proxies limit TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory information) to port 80. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 150 +recommendedclientversions +STRING +STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2 directories. If this is not set then the value of RecommendedVersions is used. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 151 +recommendedserverversions +STRING +STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2 directories. If this is not set then the value of RecommendedVersions is used. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 149 +recommendedversions +STRING +STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 103 +rejectplaintextports +port,port,... +Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 4 +relaybandwidthburst +N bytes|KB|MB|GB +Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 3 +relaybandwidthrate +N bytes|KB|MB|GB +If defined, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Hidden Service +index: 172 +rendpostperiod +N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks +Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 20 minutes) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 41 +runasdaemon +0|1 +If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 42 +safelogging +0|1|relay +Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g. addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can still be useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying information about what sites a user might have visited. + +If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but all messages generated when acting as a client are not. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 85 +safesocks +0|1 +When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol ones that only provide an IP address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first. Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS. (Defaults to 0.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 122 +serverdnsallowbrokenconfig +0|1 +If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers. Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 126 +serverdnsallownonrfc953hostnames +0|1 +When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 124 +serverdnsdetecthijacking +0|1 +When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 128 +serverdnsrandomizecase +0|1 +When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies. This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack. For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 121 +serverdnsresolvconffile +filename +Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in filename. The file format is the same as the standard Unix "resolv.conf" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options, only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 123 +serverdnssearchdomains +0|1 +If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain. For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 125 +serverdnstestaddresses +address,address,... +When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these valid addresses aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless, and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject :". This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Relay +index: 118 +shutdownwaitlength +NUM +When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down: we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After NUM seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi- ately. (Default: 30 seconds) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 31 +socks4proxy +host[:port] +Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port (or host:1080 if port is not specified). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 32 +socks5proxy +host[:port] +Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port (or host:1080 if port is not specified). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 34 +socks5proxypassword +password +If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and 255 characters. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 33 +socks5proxyusername +username + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 76 +sockslistenaddress +IP[:PORT] +Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 77 +sockspolicy +policy,policy,... +Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies below. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 75 +socksport +PORT +Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application connections. (Default: 9050) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 78 +sockstimeout +NUM +Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default: 2 minutes.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 62 +strictnodes +0|1 +If 1 and EntryNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in EntryNodes for the first hop of a normal circuit. If 1 and ExitNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in ExitNodes for the last hop of a normal exit circuit. Note that Tor might still use these nodes for non-exit circuits such as one-hop directory fetches or hidden service support circuits. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Testing +index: 177 +testingauthdirtimetolearnreachability +N minutes|hours +After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Testing +index: 178 +testingestimateddescriptorpropagationtime +N minutes|hours +Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this time. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 10 minutes) + +SIGNALS +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Testing +index: 173 +testingtornetwork +0|1 +If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below, so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running. (Default: 0) + + ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1 + DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1 + EnforceDistinctSubnets 0 + AssumeReachable 1 + AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0 + AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0 + ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0 + ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0 + V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes + V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds + V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds + TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes + TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds + TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds + TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes + TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Testing +index: 176 +testingv3authinitialdistdelay +N minutes|hours +Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Testing +index: 175 +testingv3authinitialvotedelay +N minutes|hours +Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Testing +index: 174 +testingv3authinitialvotinginterval +N minutes|hours +Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 86 +testsocks +0|1 +When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking DNS requests. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 79 +trackhostexits +host,.domain,... +For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is treated as matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it means match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 80 +trackhostexitsexpire +NUM +Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is 1800 seconds (30 minutes). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 92 +translistenaddress +IP[:PORT] +Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an entire network. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 91 +transport +PORT +If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on PORT (by convention, 9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or Linux's IPTables. If you're planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for a network, you'll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the default setting. You'll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for the network you'd like to proxy. (Default: 0). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 48 +tunneldirconns +0|1 +If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort. (Default: 1) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 81 +updatebridgesfromauthority +0|1 +When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 82 +usebridges +0|1 +When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge" config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory guards. (Default: 0) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 83 +useentryguards +0|1 +If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +General +index: 43 +user +UID +On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 137 +v1authoritativedirectory +0|1 +When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 138 +v2authoritativedirectory +0|1 +When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 165 +v3authdistdelay +N minutes|hours +V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server's preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 166 +v3authnintervalsvalid +NUM +V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the server's preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at least 2. (Default: 3.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 139 +v3authoritativedirectory +0|1 +When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at least 0.2.0.x). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 164 +v3authvotedelay +N minutes|hours +V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server's preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Authority +index: 163 +v3authvotinginterval +N minutes|hours +V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred voting interval. Note that voting will actually happen at an interval chosen by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Directory +index: 140 +versioningauthoritativedirectory +0|1 +When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2 authorities provide this service optionally. See RecommendedVersions, RecommendedClientVersions, and RecommendedServerVersions. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 87 +virtualaddrnetwork +Address/bits +When a controller asks for a virtual (unused) address with the MAPADDRESS command, Tor picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default: 127.192.0.0/10) + +When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or "172.16.0.0/12". The default VirtualAddrNetwork address range on a properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Client +index: 102 +warnplaintextports +port,port,... +Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default: 23,109,110,143). diff --git a/src/starter.py b/src/starter.py index 005b43f..1b6049a 100644 --- a/src/starter.py +++ b/src/starter.py @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ def _loadConfigurationDescriptions(pathPrefix): if not isConfigDescriptionsLoaded: try: loadStartTime = time.time() - loadedVersion = util.torConfig.loadOptionDescriptions(pathPrefix + CONFIG_DESC_FILENAME, False) + loadedVersion = util.torConfig.loadOptionDescriptions(pathPrefix + "/resources/" + CONFIG_DESC_FILENAME, False) isConfigDescriptionsLoaded = True msg = DESC_INTERNAL_LOAD_SUCCESS_MSG % loadedVersion diff --git a/src/torConfigDesc.txt b/src/torConfigDesc.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 9fa83e0..0000000 --- a/src/torConfigDesc.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1123 +0,0 @@ -Tor Version 0.2.2.13-alpha -General -index: 46 -acceldir -DIR -Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 45 -accelname -NAME -When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine. Names can be verified with the openssl engine command. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 119 -accountingmax -N bytes|KB|MB|GB|TB -Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 GB. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available". --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 120 -accountingstart -day|week|month [day] HH:MM -Specify how long accounting periods last. If month is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM on the dayth day of one month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and 28.) If week is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM of the dayth day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If day is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM each day to the same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to "month 1 0:00".) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 104 -address -address -The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g. moria.mit.edu) You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP address. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 89 -allowdotexit -0|1 -If enabled, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the SocksPort/TransPort/NatdPort into "www.google.com" addresses that exit from the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking websites and exit relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 51 -allowinvalidnodes -entry|exit|middle|introduction|rendezvous|... -If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 88 -allownonrfc953hostnames -0|1 -When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 105 -allowsinglehopexits -0|1 -This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is the only hop in the circuit. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 20 -alternatebridgeauthority -[nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint -As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place. Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 18 -alternatedirauthority -[nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 19 -alternatehsauthority -[nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 106 -assumereachable -0|1 -This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1, don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor immediately. If AuthoritativeDirectory is also set, this option instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list all connected servers as running. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 154 -authdirbaddir -AddressPattern... -Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadDirs is set. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 155 -authdirbadexit -AddressPattern... -Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadExits is set. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 156 -authdirinvalid -AddressPattern... -Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this authority publishes. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 158 -authdirlistbaddirs -0|1 -Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad; otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared directory.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 159 -authdirlistbadexits -0|1 -Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 161 -authdirmaxserversperaddr -NUM -Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit". (Default: 2) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 162 -authdirmaxserversperauthaddr -NUM -Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 157 -authdirreject -AddressPattern... -Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will never be listed at all in any network status document that this authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor submitted for publication by this authority. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 160 -authdirrejectunlisted -0|1 -Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects all uploaded server descriptors that aren't explicitly listed in the fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil attack. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 135 -authoritativedirectory -0|1 -When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at tor-ops(a)torproject.org if you think you should be a directory. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 95 -automaphostsonresolve -0|1 -When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address that ends with one of the suffixes in AutomapHostsSuffixes, we map an unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address. This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 96 -automaphostssuffixes -SUFFIX,SUFFIX,... -A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with AutomapHostsOnResolve. The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 47 -avoiddiskwrites -0|1 -If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise. This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 1 -bandwidthburst -N bytes|KB|MB|GB -Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 0 -bandwidthrate -N bytes|KB|MB|GB -A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. (Default: 5 MB) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 53 -bridge -IP:ORPort [fingerprint] -When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint" is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 144 -bridgeauthoritativedir -0|1 -When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 127 -bridgerecordusagebycountry -0|1 -When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 107 -bridgerelay -0|1 -Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections from bridge users to the Tor network. Mainly it influences how the relay will cache and serve directory information. Usually used in combination with PublishServerDescriptor. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 130 -cellstatistics -0|1 -When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 54 -circuitbuildtimeout -NUM -Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't open in that time, give up on it. (Default: 1 minute.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 55 -circuitidletimeout -NUM -If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we're receiving, it won't forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1 hour.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 50 -circuitpriorityhalflife -NUM1 -If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which circuit's cell to deliver or relay next. When the value is 0, we round-robin between the active circuits on a connection, delivering one cell from each in turn. When the value is positive, we prefer delivering cells from whichever connection has the lowest weighted cell count, where cells are weighted exponentially according to the supplied CircuitPriorityHalflife value (in seconds). If this option is not set at all, we use the behavior recommended in the current consensus networkstatus. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn't have to mess with it. (Default: not set.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 56 -circuitstreamtimeout -NUM -If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit. If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a number like 60. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 99 -clientdnsrejectinternaladdresses -0|1 -If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't turn it off unless you know what you're doing. (Default: 1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 57 -clientonly -0|1 -If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is configured. (Usually, you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a useful server.) (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 152 -consensusparams -STRING -STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 7 -constrainedsockets -0|1 -If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all sockets to the size specified in ConstrainedSockSize. This is useful for virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are likely experiencing this problem. - -The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; this configuration option is a second-resort. - -The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates the problem. - -You should not enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip time on long paths. (Default: 0.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 8 -constrainedsocksize -N bytes|KB -When ConstrainedSockets is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 108 -contactinfo -email_address -Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it's an email address. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 10 -controllistenaddress -IP[:PORT] -Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're doing, since giving attackers access to your control listener is really dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 9 -controlport -Port -If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of HashedControlPassword or CookieAuthentication, setting this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control it. This option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 11 -controlsocket -Path -Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 13 -cookieauthentication -0|1 -If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem security. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 14 -cookieauthfile -Path -If set, this option overrides the default location and file name for Tor's cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 15 -cookieauthfilegroupreadable -0|1|Groupname -If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 16 -datadirectory -DIR -Store working data in DIR (Default: /usr/local/var/lib/tor) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 153 -dirallowprivateaddresses -0|1 -If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address" elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 147 -dirlistenaddress -IP[:PORT] -Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 148 -dirpolicy -policy,policy,... -Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 146 -dirport -PORT -Advertise the directory service on this port. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 136 -dirportfrontpage -FILENAME -When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in contrib/tor-exit-notice.html. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 131 -dirreqstatistics -0|1 -When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number and response time of network status requests to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 17 -dirserver -[nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint -Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1) directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs" flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is not set. Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=port" is given, Tor will use the given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a flag "v3ident=fp" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint fp. - -If no dirserver line is given, Tor will use the default directory servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you won't believe the same authorities they do. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 21 -disableallswap -0|1 -If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages, so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X and Solaris are currently not supported. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it should work on *BSD systems (untested). This option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you should use the User option to properly reduce Tor's privileges. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 98 -dnslistenaddress -IP[:PORT] -Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 97 -dnsport -PORT -If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves them anonymously. (Default: 0). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 100 -downloadextrainfo -0|1 -If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents contain information about servers other than the information in their regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 74 -enforcedistinctsubnets -0|1 -If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 60 -entrynodes -node,node,... -A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 132 -entrystatistics -0|1 -When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 59 -excludeexitnodes -node,node,... -A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this list. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 58 -excludenodes -node,node,... -A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example: ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 52 -excludesinglehoprelays -0|1 -This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally included. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 61 -exitnodes -node,node,... -A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 109 -exitpolicy -policy,policy,... -Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form "accept|reject ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]". If /MASK is omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving a host or network you can also use "*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). PORT can be a single port number, an interval of ports "FROM_PORT-TO_PORT", or "*". If PORT is omitted, that means "*". - -For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept anything else. - -To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address. These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you've done that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details about internal and reserved IP address space. - -This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put it all on one line. - -Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is: - - reject *:25 - reject *:119 - reject *:135-139 - reject *:445 - reject *:563 - reject *:1214 - reject *:4661-4666 - reject *:6346-6429 - reject *:6699 - reject *:6881-6999 - accept *:* --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 110 -exitpolicyrejectprivate -0|1 -Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address, at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 133 -exitportstatistics -0|1 -When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of relayed bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 134 -extrainfostatistics -0|1 -When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 101 -fallbacknetworkstatusfile -FILENAME -If Tor doesn't have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn't need to put load on the authorities. (Default: None). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 63 -fascistfirewall -0|1 -If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see FirewallPorts). This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use ReachableAddresses instead. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 90 -fastfirsthoppk -0|1 -When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower. - -Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it's operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it doesn't yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 22 -fetchdirinfoearly -0|1 -If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for fetching early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 23 -fetchdirinfoextraearly -0|1 -If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 24 -fetchhidservdescriptors -0|1 -If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 25 -fetchserverdescriptors -0|1 -If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 26 -fetchuselessdescriptors -0|1 -If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is useful if you're using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 64 -firewallports -PORTS -A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when FascistFirewall is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 129 -geoipfile -filename -A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 44 -hardwareaccel -0|1 -If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when available. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 12 -hashedcontrolpassword -hashed_password -Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other process knows the password whose one-way hash is hashed_password. You can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password password". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more than one HashedControlPassword line. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Hidden Service -index: 171 -hiddenserviceauthorizeclient -auth-type client-name,client-name,... -If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in their configuration file using HidServAuth. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Hidden Service -index: 167 -hiddenservicedir -DIRECTORY -Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to specify multiple services. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Hidden Service -index: 168 -hiddenserviceport -VIRTPORT [TARGET] -Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Hidden Service -index: 170 -hiddenserviceversion -version,version,... -A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 65 -hidservauth -onion-address auth-cookie [service-name] -Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22 characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden services can be configured to require authorization using the HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient option. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 143 -hidservdirectoryv2 -0|1 -When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 142 -hsauthoritativedir -0|1 -When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor also accepts and serves hidden service descriptors. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 27 -httpproxy -host[:port] -Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80 if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory servers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 28 -httpproxyauthenticator -username:password -If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you want it to support others. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 29 -httpsproxy -host[:port] -Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting directly to servers. You may want to set FascistFirewall to restrict the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only allows connecting to certain ports. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 30 -httpsproxyauthenticator -username:password -If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you want it to support others. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 35 -keepaliveperiod -NUM -To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 37 -log -minSeverity[-maxSeverity] file FILENAME -As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file. Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity level. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 69 -longlivedports -PORTS -A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 70 -mapaddress -address newaddress -When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to www.indymedia.org to exit via torserver (where torserver is the nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit". --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 2 -maxadvertisedbandwidth -N bytes|KB|MB|GB -If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server without impacting network performance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 72 -maxcircuitdirtiness -NUM -Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago, but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10 minutes) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 111 -maxonionspending -NUM -If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 145 -minuptimehidservdirectoryv2 -N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks -Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 112 -myfamily -node,node,... -Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 141 -namingauthoritativedirectory -0|1 -When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See approved-routers in the FILES section below. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 94 -natdlistenaddress -IP[:PORT] -Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 93 -natdport -PORT -Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.) to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is only for people who cannot use TransPort. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 71 -newcircuitperiod -NUM -Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 seconds) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 113 -nickname -name -Set the server's nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9]. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 73 -nodefamily -node,node,... -The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames, constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed when a server doesn't list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option can be used multiple times. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 114 -numcpus -num -How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 84 -numentryguards -NUM -If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 116 -orlistenaddress -IP[:PORT] -Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 115 -orport -PORT -Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 38 -outboundbindaddress -IP -Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 6 -perconnbwburst -N bytes|KB|MB|GB -If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 5 -perconnbwrate -N bytes|KB|MB|GB -If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 39 -pidfile -FILE -On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove FILE. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 49 -prefertunneleddirconns -0|1 -If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don't support tunneled directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 40 -protocolwarnings -0|1 -If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties not following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity 'info'. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Hidden Service -index: 169 -publishhidservdescriptors -0|1 -If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 117 -publishserverdescriptor -0|1|v1|v2|v3|bridge|hidserv,... -This option is only considered if you have an ORPort defined. You can choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. If set to 0, Tor will act as a server but it will not publish its descriptor to the directory authorities. (This is useful if you're testing out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptor to all directory authorities of the type(s) specified. The value "1" is the default, which means "publish to the appropriate authorities". --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 66 -reachableaddresses -ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]... -A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For example, 'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept *:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port 80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept *:*'.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 67 -reachablediraddresses -ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]... -Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of ReachableAddresses is used. If HTTPProxy is set then these connections will go through that proxy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 68 -reachableoraddresses -ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]... -Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not set explicitly then the value of ReachableAddresses is used. If HTTPSProxy is set then these connections will go through that proxy. - -The separation between ReachableORAddresses and ReachableDirAddresses is only interesting when you are connecting through proxies (see HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy). Most proxies limit TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory information) to port 80. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 150 -recommendedclientversions -STRING -STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2 directories. If this is not set then the value of RecommendedVersions is used. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 151 -recommendedserverversions -STRING -STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2 directories. If this is not set then the value of RecommendedVersions is used. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 149 -recommendedversions -STRING -STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 103 -rejectplaintextports -port,port,... -Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 4 -relaybandwidthburst -N bytes|KB|MB|GB -Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 3 -relaybandwidthrate -N bytes|KB|MB|GB -If defined, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Hidden Service -index: 172 -rendpostperiod -N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks -Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 20 minutes) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 41 -runasdaemon -0|1 -If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 42 -safelogging -0|1|relay -Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g. addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can still be useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying information about what sites a user might have visited. - -If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but all messages generated when acting as a client are not. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 85 -safesocks -0|1 -When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol ones that only provide an IP address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first. Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS. (Defaults to 0.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 122 -serverdnsallowbrokenconfig -0|1 -If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers. Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 126 -serverdnsallownonrfc953hostnames -0|1 -When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 124 -serverdnsdetecthijacking -0|1 -When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 128 -serverdnsrandomizecase -0|1 -When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies. This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack. For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 121 -serverdnsresolvconffile -filename -Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in filename. The file format is the same as the standard Unix "resolv.conf" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options, only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 123 -serverdnssearchdomains -0|1 -If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain. For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 125 -serverdnstestaddresses -address,address,... -When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these valid addresses aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless, and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject :". This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Relay -index: 118 -shutdownwaitlength -NUM -When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down: we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After NUM seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi- ately. (Default: 30 seconds) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 31 -socks4proxy -host[:port] -Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port (or host:1080 if port is not specified). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 32 -socks5proxy -host[:port] -Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port (or host:1080 if port is not specified). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 34 -socks5proxypassword -password -If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and 255 characters. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 33 -socks5proxyusername -username - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 76 -sockslistenaddress -IP[:PORT] -Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 77 -sockspolicy -policy,policy,... -Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies below. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 75 -socksport -PORT -Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application connections. (Default: 9050) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 78 -sockstimeout -NUM -Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default: 2 minutes.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 62 -strictnodes -0|1 -If 1 and EntryNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in EntryNodes for the first hop of a normal circuit. If 1 and ExitNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in ExitNodes for the last hop of a normal exit circuit. Note that Tor might still use these nodes for non-exit circuits such as one-hop directory fetches or hidden service support circuits. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Testing -index: 177 -testingauthdirtimetolearnreachability -N minutes|hours -After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Testing -index: 178 -testingestimateddescriptorpropagationtime -N minutes|hours -Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this time. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 10 minutes) - -SIGNALS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Testing -index: 173 -testingtornetwork -0|1 -If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below, so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running. (Default: 0) - - ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1 - DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1 - EnforceDistinctSubnets 0 - AssumeReachable 1 - AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0 - AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0 - ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0 - ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0 - V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes - V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds - V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds - TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes - TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds - TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds - TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes - TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Testing -index: 176 -testingv3authinitialdistdelay -N minutes|hours -Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Testing -index: 175 -testingv3authinitialvotedelay -N minutes|hours -Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Testing -index: 174 -testingv3authinitialvotinginterval -N minutes|hours -Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 86 -testsocks -0|1 -When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking DNS requests. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 79 -trackhostexits -host,.domain,... -For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is treated as matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it means match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 80 -trackhostexitsexpire -NUM -Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is 1800 seconds (30 minutes). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 92 -translistenaddress -IP[:PORT] -Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an entire network. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 91 -transport -PORT -If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on PORT (by convention, 9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or Linux's IPTables. If you're planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for a network, you'll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the default setting. You'll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for the network you'd like to proxy. (Default: 0). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 48 -tunneldirconns -0|1 -If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort. (Default: 1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 81 -updatebridgesfromauthority -0|1 -When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 82 -usebridges -0|1 -When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge" config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory guards. (Default: 0) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 83 -useentryguards -0|1 -If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -General -index: 43 -user -UID -On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 137 -v1authoritativedirectory -0|1 -When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 138 -v2authoritativedirectory -0|1 -When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 165 -v3authdistdelay -N minutes|hours -V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server's preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 166 -v3authnintervalsvalid -NUM -V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the server's preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at least 2. (Default: 3.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 139 -v3authoritativedirectory -0|1 -When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at least 0.2.0.x). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 164 -v3authvotedelay -N minutes|hours -V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server's preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Authority -index: 163 -v3authvotinginterval -N minutes|hours -V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred voting interval. Note that voting will actually happen at an interval chosen by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Directory -index: 140 -versioningauthoritativedirectory -0|1 -When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2 authorities provide this service optionally. See RecommendedVersions, RecommendedClientVersions, and RecommendedServerVersions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 87 -virtualaddrnetwork -Address/bits -When a controller asks for a virtual (unused) address with the MAPADDRESS command, Tor picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default: 127.192.0.0/10) - -When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or "172.16.0.0/12". The default VirtualAddrNetwork address range on a properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Client -index: 102 -warnplaintextports -port,port,... -Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default: 23,109,110,143).

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[arm/master] fix: missing menu source from installs
by atagar＠torproject.org 30 Jun '11

30 Jun '11

commit fe34ca335acc492e06952aad9b8cf924c40cef4b Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 29 19:27:01 2011 -0700 fix: missing menu source from installs Forgot to add the menu to setup.py, causing arm to crash due to missing the resources. --- setup.py | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/setup.py b/setup.py index 47b9af8..1eec903 100644 --- a/setup.py +++ b/setup.py @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ if "install" in sys.argv: # When installing we include a bundled copy of TorCtl. However, when creating # a deb we have a dependency on the python-torctl package instead: # http://packages.debian.org/unstable/main/python-torctl -installPackages = ['arm', 'arm.cli', 'arm.cli.graphing', 'arm.cli.connections', 'arm.util'] +installPackages = ['arm', 'arm.cli', 'arm.cli.graphing', 'arm.cli.connections', 'arm.cli.menu', 'arm.util'] if not isDebInstall: installPackages.append('arm.TorCtl') setup(name='arm',

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[arm/master] Adding exit notice to resources
by atagar＠torproject.org 30 Jun '11

30 Jun '11

commit 3f52b976a61e47ea8fe1403ff0b38723646ffa3b Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 29 20:13:06 2011 -0700 Adding exit notice to resources The relay setup wizard will have an option for presenting an exit notice, so adding those resources. --- setup.py | 23 +++- src/resources/exitNotice/exit-noice.html | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++ src/resources/exitNotice/how_tor_works_thumb.png | Bin 0 -> 8147 bytes 3 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/setup.py b/setup.py index 1eec903..6e31f44 100644 --- a/setup.py +++ b/setup.py @@ -2,11 +2,28 @@ import os import sys import gzip -import glob import tempfile from src.version import VERSION from distutils.core import setup +def getResources(dst, sourceDir): + """ + Provides a list of tuples of the form... + [(destination, (file1, file2...)), ...] + + for the given contents of the src directory (that's right, distutils isn't + smart enough to know how to copy directories). + """ + + results = [] + + for root, _, files in os.walk(os.path.join("src", sourceDir)): + if files: + fileListing = tuple([os.path.join(root, file) for file in files]) + results.append((os.path.join(dst, root[4:]), fileListing)) + + return results + # Use 'tor-arm' instead of 'arm' in the path for the sample armrc if we're # building for debian. @@ -91,8 +108,8 @@ setup(name='arm', data_files=[("/usr/bin", ["arm"]), ("/usr/share/man/man1", [manFilename]), (docPath, ["armrc.sample"]), - ("/usr/share/arm", ["src/settings.cfg", "src/uninstall"]), - ("/usr/share/arm/resources", glob.glob("src/resources/*"))], + ("/usr/share/arm", ["src/settings.cfg", "src/uninstall"])] + + getResources("/usr/share/arm", "resources"), ) # Cleans up the temporary compressed man page. diff --git a/src/resources/exitNotice/exit-noice.html b/src/resources/exitNotice/exit-noice.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7475984 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/resources/exitNotice/exit-noice.html @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +<?xml version="1.0"?> +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<title>This is a Tor Exit Router</title> + + + +</head> +<body> + +This is a +Tor Exit Router + + +Most likely you are accessing this website because you had some issue with +the traffic coming from this IP. This router is part of the <a +href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor Anonymity Network</a>, which is +dedicated to <a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview">providing +privacy</a> to people who need it most: average computer users. This +router IP should be generating no other traffic, unless it has been +compromised. + + + +<a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview"> +<img src="how_tor_works_thumb.png" alt="How Tor works" style="border-style:none"/> +</a> + + +Tor sees use by <a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers">many +important segments of the population</a>, including whistle blowers, +journalists, Chinese dissidents skirting the Great Firewall and oppressive +censorship, abuse victims, stalker targets, the US military, and law +enforcement, just to name a few. While Tor is not designed for malicious +computer users, it is true that they can use the network for malicious ends. +In reality however, the actual amount of <a +href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse">abuse</a> is quite low. This +is largely because criminals and hackers have significantly better access to +privacy and anonymity than do the regular users whom they prey upon. Criminals +can and do <a +href="http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/08/web_fraud_20_tools.html">build, +sell, and trade</a> far larger and <a +href="http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/08/web_fraud_20_distribut…">more +powerful networks</a> than Tor on a daily basis. Thus, in the mind of this +operator, the social need for easily accessible censorship-resistant private, +anonymous communication trumps the risk of unskilled bad actors, who are +almost always more easily uncovered by traditional police work than by +extensive monitoring and surveillance anyway. + + +In terms of applicable law, the best way to understand Tor is to consider it a +network of routers operating as common carriers, much like the Internet +backbone. However, unlike the Internet backbone routers, Tor routers +explicitly do not contain identifiable routing information about the source of +a packet, and no single Tor node can determine both the origin and destination +of a given transmission. + + +As such, there is little the operator of this router can do to help you track +the connection further. This router maintains no logs of any of the Tor +traffic, so there is little that can be done to trace either legitimate or +illegitimate traffic (or to filter one from the other). Attempts to +seize this router will accomplish nothing. + + + + +Furthermore, this machine also serves as a carrier of email, which means that +its contents are further protected under the ECPA. <a +href="http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00002707----000…">18 +USC 2707</a> explicitly allows for civil remedies ($1000/account +plus legal fees) +in the event of a seizure executed without good faith or probable cause (it +should be clear at this point that traffic with this originating IP address +should not constitute probable cause to seize the machine). Similar +considerations exist for 1st amendment content on this machine. + + + + +If you are a representative of a company who feels that this router is being +used to violate the DMCA, please be aware that this machine does not host or +contain any illegal content. Also be aware that network infrastructure +maintainers are not liable for the type of content that passes over their +equipment, in accordance with <a +href="http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode17/usc_sec_17_00000512----000…">DMCA +"safe harbor" provisions</a>. In other words, you will have just as much luck +sending a takedown notice to the Internet backbone providers. Please consult +<a href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-dmca-response">EFF's prepared +response</a> for more information on this matter. + +For more information, please consult the following documentation: + +<ol> +<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview">Tor Overview</a></li> +<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse">Tor Abuse FAQ</a></li> +<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq">Tor Legal FAQ</a></li> +</ol> + + +That being said, if you still have a complaint about the router, you may +email the <a href="mailto:FIXME_YOUR_EMAIL_ADDRESS">maintainer</a>. If +complaints are related to a particular service that is being abused, I will +consider removing that service from my exit policy, which would prevent my +router from allowing that traffic to exit through it. I can only do this on an +IP+destination port basis, however. Common P2P ports are +already blocked. + + +You also have the option of blocking this IP address and others on +the Tor network if you so desire. The Tor project provides a <a +href="https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py">web service</a> +to fetch a list of all IP addresses of Tor exit nodes that allow exiting to a +specified IP:port combination, and an official <a +href="https://www.torproject.org/tordnsel/dist/">DNSRBL</a> is also available to +determine if a given IP address is actually a Tor exit server. Please +be considerate +when using these options. It would be unfortunate to deny all Tor users access +to your site indefinitely simply because of a few bad apples. + +</body> +</html> diff --git a/src/resources/exitNotice/how_tor_works_thumb.png b/src/resources/exitNotice/how_tor_works_thumb.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9ffe0d Binary files /dev/null and b/src/resources/exitNotice/how_tor_works_thumb.png differ

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[arm/master] fix: newnym without a tor instance crashed
by atagar＠torproject.org 30 Jun '11

30 Jun '11

commit 788b34d214fc1532c444a4c97d54fabc71c3e18d Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 29 20:28:48 2011 -0700 fix: newnym without a tor instance crashed If we've never had a tor instance then a missing attribute could cause arm to crash when a newnym was requested. Also, we shouldn't be indicating that newnym is available if there's no tor instance. Fixed both. --- src/util/torTools.py | 5 ++++- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/util/torTools.py b/src/util/torTools.py index c44160e..7e9fa37 100644 --- a/src/util/torTools.py +++ b/src/util/torTools.py @@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ class Controller(TorCtl.PostEventListener): self._isReset = False # internal flag for tracking resets self._status = State.CLOSED # current status of the attached control port self._statusTime = 0 # unix time-stamp for the duration of the status + self._lastNewnym = 0 # time we last sent a NEWNYM signal self.lastHeartbeat = 0 # time of the last tor event # Status signaling for when tor starts, stops, or is reset is done via @@ -742,7 +743,9 @@ class Controller(TorCtl.PostEventListener): True if Tor will immediately respect a newnym request, false otherwise. """ - return self.getNewnymWait() == 0 + if self.isAlive(): + return self.getNewnymWait() == 0 + else: return False def getNewnymWait(self): """

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[torbutton/master] Bug #1282: Turns out window.screen.availHeight lies.
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 30 Jun '11

30 Jun '11

commit f2b3ddc18d4e602c17627968edc3244536d7f5fb Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Wed Jun 29 19:57:35 2011 -0700 Bug #1282: Turns out window.screen.availHeight lies. Need to use nsIScreenManager. --- src/chrome/content/torbutton.js | 12 +++++++++--- 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js index 9c720e1..e086a8d 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js +++ b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js @@ -3649,14 +3649,20 @@ function torbutton_set_window_size(bWin) { if (m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.resize_new_windows") && m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.tor_enabled") && torbutton_is_windowed(window)) { + var screenMan = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/gfx/screenmanager;1"] + .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIScreenManager); + var junk = {}, availWidth = {}, availHeight = {}; + screenMan.primaryScreen.GetRect(junk, junk, availWidth, availHeight); + // We need to set the inner width to an initial value because it has none // at this point... bWin.innerWidth = 200; bWin.innerHeight = 200; - torbutton_log(2, "About to resize new window: "+window.outerWidth+"x"+window.outerHeight+" in state "+window.windowState); + torbutton_log(2, "About to resize new window: "+window.outerWidth+"x"+window.outerHeight + +" in state "+window.windowState+" Have "+availWidth.value+"x"+availHeight.value); - var maxHeight = window.screen.availHeight - (window.outerHeight - bWin.innerHeight) - 1; - var maxWidth = window.screen.availWidth - (window.outerWidth - bWin.innerWidth) -1; + var maxHeight = availHeight.value - (window.outerHeight - bWin.innerHeight) - 101; + var maxWidth = availWidth.value - (window.outerWidth - bWin.innerWidth); var width; var height;

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[torbutton/master] Make icon tooltip state current tor status.
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 30 Jun '11

30 Jun '11

commit 3110f276150c36e8b692f464ca6092c1229e8805 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Wed Jun 29 18:06:29 2011 -0700 Make icon tooltip state current tor status. Since clicking on torbutton no longer toggles Tor state, we should just display the current state in the tooltip. --- src/chrome/content/torbutton.js | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js index e620fec..9c720e1 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js +++ b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js @@ -939,11 +939,11 @@ function torbutton_update_toolbutton(mode) var tooltip = ""; if (mode) { - tooltip = o_stringbundle.GetStringFromName("torbutton.button.tooltip.enabled"); + tooltip = o_stringbundle.GetStringFromName("torbutton.panel.label.enabled"); o_toolbutton.setAttribute('tbstatus', 'on'); o_toolbutton.setAttribute('tooltiptext', tooltip); } else { - tooltip = o_stringbundle.GetStringFromName("torbutton.button.tooltip.disabled"); + tooltip = o_stringbundle.GetStringFromName("torbutton.panel.label.disabled"); o_toolbutton.setAttribute('tbstatus', 'off'); o_toolbutton.setAttribute('tooltiptext', tooltip); }

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