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[tor/master] Refetch an HS's desc if we don't have a usable one
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 6803c1c371b9cfea30c32dc9eaf3f976614a103c Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Sep 28 20:00:24 2011 -0700 Refetch an HS's desc if we don't have a usable one Previously, we wouldn't refetch an HS's descriptor unless we didn't have one at all. That was equivalent to refetching iff we didn't have a usable one, but the next commit will make us keep some non-usable HS descriptors around in our cache. Code bugfix on the release that introduced the v2 HS directory system, because rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc's documentation comment should have described what it actually did, not what its behaviour happened to be equivalent to; no behaviour change in this commit. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 7 ++++--- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 533dfb8..773ac8d 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -574,10 +574,11 @@ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query) "service descriptor, but are not fetching service descriptors."); return; } - /* Before fetching, check if we already have the descriptor here. */ - if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &e) > 0) { + /* Before fetching, check if we already have a usable descriptor here. */ + if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &e) > 0 && + rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(e)) { log_info(LD_REND, "We would fetch a v2 rendezvous descriptor, but we " - "already have that descriptor here. Not fetching."); + "already have a usable descriptor here. Not fetching."); return; } log_debug(LD_REND, "Fetching v2 rendezvous descriptor for service %s",

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[tor/master] Clear the timed_out flag when an HS connection attempt ends
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 34a6b8b7e588b6f10e6e87cf876ef6ada49f8b8a Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Sep 17 03:23:26 2011 -0700 Clear the timed_out flag when an HS connection attempt ends --- changes/bug1297b | 8 ++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 7 +++++++ src/or/connection_edge.c | 12 ++++++++++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/rendclient.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b0169d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + + - When one of a hidden service's introduction points times out, + consider trying it again during the next attempt to connect to + the HS. Previously, we would not try it again unless a newly + fetched descriptor contained it. Required by fixes for bugs + 1297 and 3825. + diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 0ad8b3b..f2fd6fe 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1464,6 +1464,13 @@ link_apconn_to_circ(edge_connection_t *apconn, origin_circuit_t *circ, /* assert_connection_ok(conn, time(NULL)); */ circ->p_streams = apconn; + if (connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(apconn)) { + /* We are attaching a stream to a rendezvous circuit. That means + * that an attempt to connect to a hidden service just + * succeeded. Tell rendclient.c. */ + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(apconn->rend_data->onion_address); + } + if (cpath) { /* we were given one; use it */ tor_assert(cpath_is_on_circuit(circ, cpath)); apconn->cpath_layer = cpath; diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 8609b02..0c5ebde 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -68,6 +68,18 @@ _connection_mark_unattached_ap(edge_connection_t *conn, int endreason, tor_assert(conn->_base.type == CONN_TYPE_AP); conn->edge_has_sent_end = 1; /* no circ yet */ + /* If this is a rendezvous stream and it is failing without ever + * being attached to a circuit, assume that an attempt to connect to + * the destination hidden service has just ended. + * + * XXX023 This condition doesn't limit to only streams failing + * without ever being attached. That sloppiness should be harmless, + * but we should fix it someday anyway. */ + if ((conn->on_circuit != NULL || conn->edge_has_sent_end) && + connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn)) { + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(conn->rend_data->onion_address); + } + if (conn->_base.marked_for_close) { /* This call will warn as appropriate. */ _connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn), line, file); diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 013d544..3c1c116 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -881,10 +881,33 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query) "unavailable (try again later).", safe_str_client(query)); connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED); + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(query); } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(_conn); } +/** Clear temporary state used only during an attempt to connect to + * the hidden service named onion_address. Called when a + * connection attempt has ended; may be called occasionally at other + * times, and should be reasonably harmless. */ +void +rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(const char *onion_address) +{ + rend_cache_entry_t *cache_entry = NULL; + rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &cache_entry); + + log_info(LD_REND, "Connection attempt for %s has ended; " + "cleaning up temporary state.", + safe_str_client(onion_address)); + + /* Clear the timed_out flag on all remaining intro points for this HS. */ + if (cache_entry != NULL) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cache_entry->parsed->intro_nodes, + rend_intro_point_t *, ip, + ip->timed_out = 0; ); + } +} + /** Return a newly allocated extend_info_t* for a randomly chosen introduction * point for the named hidden service. Return NULL if all introduction points * have been tried and failed. diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.h b/src/or/rendclient.h index 3421e07..46779b7 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.h +++ b/src/or/rendclient.h @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, size_t request_len); void rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query); +void rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(const char *onion_address); + extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query); int rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry);

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[tor/master] Detect and remove unreachable intro points
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit fbea8c8ef1e2f549e84ee681a9640c3006f7ad64 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Sep 17 03:53:07 2011 -0700 Detect and remove unreachable intro points --- changes/bug3825a | 8 ++++++++ src/or/circuitlist.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/or/or.h | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ src/or/rendclient.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3825a b/changes/bug3825a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6606e36 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3825a @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + + - When one of a hidden service's introduction points appears to be + unreachable, stop trying it. Previously, we would keep trying + to build circuits to the introduction point until we lost the + descriptor, usually because the user gave up and restarted Tor. + Partly fixes bug 3825. + diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 2fc645a..b25a71e 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -1121,6 +1121,9 @@ circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(void) * to note stats. * - If purpose is C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, report the intro point * failure we just had to the hidden service client module. + * - If purpose is C_INTRODUCING and reason isn't TIMEOUT, + * report to the hidden service client module that the intro point + * we just tried may be unreachable. * - Send appropriate destroys and edge_destroys for conns and * streams attached to circ. * - If circ->rend_splice is set (we are the midpoint of a joined @@ -1203,6 +1206,19 @@ _circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line, timed_out ? INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT : INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC); + } else if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && + reason != END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT) { + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + tor_assert(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit); + tor_assert(ocirc->rend_data); + log_info(LD_REND, "Failed intro circ %s to %s " + "(building circuit to intro point). " + "Marking intro point as possibly unreachable.", + safe_str_client(ocirc->rend_data->onion_address), + safe_str_client(build_state_get_exit_nickname(ocirc->build_state))); + rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit, + ocirc->rend_data, + INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_UNREACHABLE); } if (circ->n_conn) { circuit_clear_cell_queue(circ, circ->n_conn); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 32d4b11..f884c12 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3456,6 +3456,11 @@ typedef struct rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t { char *desc_str; /**< Descriptor string. */ } rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t; +/** The maximum number of non-circuit-build-timeout failures a hidden + * service client will tolerate while trying to build a circuit to an + * introduction point. See also rend_intro_point_t.unreachable_count. */ +#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES 5 + /** Introduction point information. Used both in rend_service_t (on * the service side) and in rend_service_descriptor_t (on both the * client and service side). */ @@ -3470,6 +3475,11 @@ typedef struct rend_intro_point_t { * hidden service connection attempt, but it may be tried again * during a future connection attempt. */ unsigned int timed_out : 1; + + /** (Client side only) The number of times we have failed to build a + * circuit to this intro point for some reason other than our + * circuit-build timeout. See also MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES. */ + unsigned int unreachable_count : 3; } rend_intro_point_t; /** Information used to connect to a hidden service. Used on both the diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 3c1c116..0a9e2a6 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -662,6 +662,11 @@ rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(void) * current hidden service connection attempt has ended or it has * appeared in a newly fetched rendezvous descriptor. * + * If failure_type is INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_UNREACHABLE, + * increment the intro point's reachability-failure count; if it has + * now failed MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES or more times, + * remove the intro point from (our parsed copy of) the HS descriptor. + * * Return -1 if error, 0 if no usable intro points remain or service * unrecognized, 1 if recognized and some intro points remain. */ @@ -704,6 +709,20 @@ rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(extend_info_t *failed_intro, case INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT: intro->timed_out = 1; break; + case INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_UNREACHABLE: + ++(intro->unreachable_count); + { + int zap_intro_point = + intro->unreachable_count >= MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES; + log_info(LD_REND, "Failed to reach this intro point %u times.%s", + intro->unreachable_count, + zap_intro_point ? " Removing from descriptor.": ""); + if (zap_intro_point) { + rend_intro_point_free(intro); + smartlist_del(ent->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + } + } + break; } break; } diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.h b/src/or/rendclient.h index 46779b7..d87cb1f 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.h +++ b/src/or/rendclient.h @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ void rend_client_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(void); #define INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC 0 #define INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT 1 +#define INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_UNREACHABLE 2 int rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(extend_info_t *failed_intro, const rend_data_t *rend_query,

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[tor/master] Fix comment typo
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit e07307214e73f4b3d030b832c84f7556f3c140e8 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Sep 20 03:42:40 2011 -0700 Fix comment typo --- src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 0a9e2a6..f549593 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query) return 0; } - /* Remember, that we are requesting a descriptor from this hidden service + /* Remember that we are requesting a descriptor from this hidden service * directory now. */ lookup_last_hid_serv_request(hs_dir, desc_id_base32, now, 1);

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[tor/master] Record the HS's address in last_hid_serv_request keys
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit bcfc383dc94ac90895880d5c9a740df7f163b41d Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Sep 20 03:50:45 2011 -0700 Record the HS's address in last_hid_serv_request keys --- src/or/rendclient.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index f549593..9088b92 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -385,9 +385,12 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, #define REND_HID_SERV_DIR_REQUERY_PERIOD (15 * 60) /** Contains the last request times to hidden service directories for - * certain queries; keys are strings consisting of base32-encoded - * hidden service directory identities and base32-encoded descriptor IDs; - * values are pointers to timestamps of the last requests. */ + * certain queries; each key is a string consisting of the + * concatenation of a base32-encoded HS directory identity digest, a + * base32-encoded HS descriptor ID, and a hidden service address + * (without the ".onion" part); each value is a pointer to a time_t + * holding the time of the last request for that descriptor ID to that + * HS directory. */ static strmap_t *last_hid_serv_requests_ = NULL; /** Returns last_hid_serv_requests_, initializing it to a new strmap if @@ -400,23 +403,34 @@ get_last_hid_serv_requests(void) return last_hid_serv_requests_; } +#define LAST_HID_SERV_REQUEST_KEY_LEN (REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + \ + REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + \ + REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32) + /** Look up the last request time to hidden service directory hs_dir - * for descriptor ID desc_id_base32. If set is non-zero, + * for descriptor ID desc_id_base32 for the service specified in + * rend_query. If set is non-zero, * assign the current time now and return that. Otherwise, return * the most recent request time, or 0 if no such request has been sent * before. */ static time_t lookup_last_hid_serv_request(routerstatus_t *hs_dir, - const char *desc_id_base32, time_t now, int set) + const char *desc_id_base32, + const rend_data_t *rend_query, + time_t now, int set) { char hsdir_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; - char hsdir_desc_comb_id[2 * REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; + char hsdir_desc_comb_id[LAST_HID_SERV_REQUEST_KEY_LEN + 1]; time_t *last_request_ptr; strmap_t *last_hid_serv_requests = get_last_hid_serv_requests(); base32_encode(hsdir_id_base32, sizeof(hsdir_id_base32), hs_dir->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); - tor_snprintf(hsdir_desc_comb_id, sizeof(hsdir_desc_comb_id), "%s%s", - hsdir_id_base32, desc_id_base32); + tor_snprintf(hsdir_desc_comb_id, sizeof(hsdir_desc_comb_id), "%s%s%s", + hsdir_id_base32, + desc_id_base32, + rend_query->onion_address); + /* XXX023 tor_assert(strlen(hsdir_desc_comb_id) == + LAST_HID_SERV_REQUEST_KEY_LEN); */ if (set) { time_t *oldptr; last_request_ptr = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(time_t)); @@ -476,12 +490,11 @@ rend_client_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(void) } /** Determine the responsible hidden service directories for desc_id - * and fetch the descriptor belonging to that ID from one of them. Only - * send a request to hidden service directories that we did not try within - * the last REND_HID_SERV_DIR_REQUERY_PERIOD seconds; on success, return 1, + * and fetch the descriptor with that ID from one of them. Only + * send a request to a hidden service directory that we have not yet tried + * during this attempt to connect to this hidden service; on success, return 1, * in the case that no hidden service directory is left to ask for the - * descriptor, return 0, and in case of a failure -1. query is only - * passed for pretty log statements. */ + * descriptor, return 0, and in case of a failure -1. */ static int directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query) { @@ -504,7 +517,7 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query) directory_clean_last_hid_serv_requests(); /* Clean request history first. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(responsible_dirs, routerstatus_t *, dir, { - if (lookup_last_hid_serv_request(dir, desc_id_base32, 0, 0) + + if (lookup_last_hid_serv_request(dir, desc_id_base32, rend_query, 0, 0) + REND_HID_SERV_DIR_REQUERY_PERIOD >= now || !router_get_by_digest(dir->identity_digest)) SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(responsible_dirs, dir); @@ -521,7 +534,7 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query) /* Remember that we are requesting a descriptor from this hidden service * directory now. */ - lookup_last_hid_serv_request(hs_dir, desc_id_base32, now, 1); + lookup_last_hid_serv_request(hs_dir, desc_id_base32, rend_query, now, 1); /* Encode descriptor cookie for logging purposes. */ if (rend_query->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {

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[tor/master] Rephrase the log messages emitted if the TestSocks check is positive
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 13f0d22df0e2dc08749d1841f66567dc252c6957 Author: Fabian Keil <fk(a)fabiankeil.de> Date: Wed Sep 28 18:00:59 2011 +0200 Rephrase the log messages emitted if the TestSocks check is positive Previously Tor would always claim to have been given a hostname by the client, while actually only verifying that the client is using SOCKS4A or SOCKS5 with hostnames. Both protocol versions allow IP addresses, too, in which case the log messages were wrong. Fixes #4094. --- src/or/buffers.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index 85d58e8..1025ced 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -1873,9 +1873,9 @@ parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, } if (log_sockstype) log_notice(LD_APP, - "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) gave " - "Tor a hostname, which means Tor will do the DNS resolve " - "for you. This is good.", req->port); + "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) instructed " + "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " + "necessary. This is good.", req->port); return 1; default: /* unsupported */ log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: unsupported address type %d. Rejecting.", @@ -1974,9 +1974,9 @@ parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, if (log_sockstype) log_notice(LD_APP, - "Your application (using socks4a to port %d) gave " - "Tor a hostname, which means Tor will do the DNS resolve " - "for you. This is good.", req->port); + "Your application (using socks4a to port %d) instructed " + "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " + "necessary. This is good.", req->port); } log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success."); strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf,

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[tor/master] Add changes file for bug 4094
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit a7f93b509c9c24a4af6abdd946007bdf2d497d87 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Oct 3 12:58:07 2011 -0400 Add changes file for bug 4094 --- changes/bug4094 | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug4094 b/changes/bug4094 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9c40d41 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug4094 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Rephrase the log message emitted if the TestSocks check is + successful. Patch from Fabian Keil; fixes bug 4094.

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[arm/master] Adding hotfix sig to its changelog entries
by atagar＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 095c7d330b2f068dd68877b69fefca10b1bbab5d Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 29 09:14:28 2011 -0700 Adding hotfix sig to its changelog entries --- ChangeLog | 8 ++++---- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 287ab57..fccf083 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -37,10 +37,10 @@ Besides the normal bug fixes and minor features, this release introduces the con * fix: listener wasn't registering GUARD events * fix: dropping nonexistent ORCONN attributes * fix: clarifying the missing torrc message - * fix (9/29/11): dropping gtk/cagraph requirements (caught by monochromec, vinc3nt, and Bill White) - * fix (9/29/11): crash from esc in interpretor panel prompt (caught by Sebastian, https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4098) - * fix (9/29/11): deduplicating 'Circuit build timeout' and 'looks like we don't need to wait so long' messages (patch by StrangeCharm, https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4096) - * fix (9/29/11): forcing redraw on ctrl+L reguardless of need (caught by np, https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2830) + * fix (9/29/11, edcde43): dropping gtk/cagraph requirements (caught by monochromec, vinc3nt, and Bill White) + * fix (9/29/11, edcde43): crash from esc in interpretor panel prompt (caught by Sebastian, https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4098) + * fix (9/29/11, edcde43): deduplicating 'Circuit build timeout' and 'looks like we don't need to wait so long' messages (patch by StrangeCharm, https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4096) + * fix (9/29/11, edcde43): forcing redraw on ctrl+L reguardless of need (caught by np, https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2830) 7/16/11 - version 1.4.3 (6cf4836) This completes the codebase refactoring project that's been a year in the works and provides numerous performance and usability improvements. Most notably this includes a setup wizard for new relays, menuing interface, gui prototype, substantial performance improvements, and support for Mac OSX.

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[arm/master] fix: clearing contents to force curses to refresh
by atagar＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 2b3a9d7f2fc921ccd01dc43b641e98cb056ca799 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Oct 2 19:56:41 2011 -0700 fix: clearing contents to force curses to refresh Evidently it isn't enough for panels to clear their contents, so also requesting a clear of the uppermost stdscr. Fix suggested by np... https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2830#comment:9 --- src/cli/controller.py | 5 +++++ 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/cli/controller.py b/src/cli/controller.py index 762f955..aebc6f3 100644 --- a/src/cli/controller.py +++ b/src/cli/controller.py @@ -341,6 +341,11 @@ class Controller: panelImpl.setTop(occupiedContent) occupiedContent += panelImpl.getHeight() + # apparently curses may cache display contents unless we explicitely + # request a redraw here... + # https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2830#comment:9 + if force: self._screen.clear() + for panelImpl in displayPanels: panelImpl.redraw(force)

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[torbutton/master] Use nsIPrefLocalizedString only when required in torbutton_get_general_useragent_locale()
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 02 Oct '11

02 Oct '11

commit 74a816cad78fc360e95ecc3cb9574f0997acef09 Author: Jérémy Bobbio <lunar(a)debian.org> Date: Sun Oct 2 10:37:58 2011 +0200 Use nsIPrefLocalizedString only when required in torbutton_get_general_useragent_locale() Otherwise, Firefox throws an uncatcheable NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED exception. At least in TBB. Strange, strange. Fix issue introduced in 84e8dbc9. --- src/chrome/content/torbutton.js | 8 ++++++-- 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js index a9b8b59..e91ae2a 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js +++ b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js @@ -1222,8 +1222,12 @@ function torbutton_set_timezone(mode, startup) { function torbutton_get_general_useragent_locale() { try { - return m_tb_prefs.getComplexValue("general.useragent.locale", - Components.interfaces.nsIPrefLocalizedString).data; + var locale = m_tb_prefs.getCharPref("general.useragent.locale"); + if (/chrome:\/\//.test(locale)) { + return m_tb_prefs.getComplexValue("general.useragent.locale", + Components.interfaces.nsIPrefLocalizedString).data; + } + return locale; } catch(err) { torbutton_log(4, "Error while getting general.useragent.locale:" + err); return 'en-US';

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