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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix compile error in procmon.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jun '11

01 Jun '11

commit 1d8bcba067ef8d96ebe022f06459d55c308343ec Author: Gisle <gvanem(a)broadpark.no> Date: Wed Jun 1 11:11:12 2011 -0400 Fix compile error in procmon.c An elusive compile-error (MingW-gcc v4.50 on Win_XP); a missing comma (!) and a typo ('err_msg' at line 277 changed to 'errmsg'). Aso changed the format for 'err_code' at line 293 into a "%ld" to suppress a warning. How did this go unnoticed for ~1 month? Btw. This is my 1st ever 'git commit', so it better work. --- src/common/procmon.c | 8 ++++---- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/procmon.c b/src/common/procmon.c index 8fcc1af..5c10e9a 100644 --- a/src/common/procmon.c +++ b/src/common/procmon.c @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ tor_process_monitor_poll_cb(evutil_socket_t unused1, short unused2, if (!GetExitCodeProcess(procmon->hproc, &exit_code)) { char *errmsg = format_win32_error(GetLastError()); log_warn(procmon->log_domain, "Error \"%s\" occurred while polling " - "handle for monitored process %d; assuming it's dead." + "handle for monitored process %d; assuming it's dead.", errmsg, procmon->pid); tor_free(errmsg); its_dead_jim = 1; @@ -287,12 +287,12 @@ tor_process_monitor_poll_cb(evutil_socket_t unused1, short unused2, if (!its_dead_jim) log_info(procmon->log_domain, "Failed to open handle to monitored " - "process %d, and error code %d (%s) is not 'invalid " + "process %d, and error code %lu (%s) is not 'invalid " "parameter' -- assuming the process is still alive.", procmon->pid, - err_code, err_msg); + err_code, errmsg); - tor_free(err_msg); + tor_free(errmsg); } } #else

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[tor/master] stop asserting at boot
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jun '11

01 Jun '11

commit 56771f392e68eb2f78180daab0d8f17c9284ad11 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 23:50:37 2011 -0400 stop asserting at boot The patch for 3228 made us try to run init_keys() before we had loaded our state file, resulting in an assert inside init_keys. We had moved it too early in the function. Now it's later in the function, but still above the accounting calls. --- src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index f97e9b1..6635cac 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1180,18 +1180,6 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) return -1; } - /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else: - keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */ - if (running_tor && - (transition_affects_workers || - (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && (!old_options || - !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir)))) { - if (init_keys() < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); - return -1; - } - } - if (consider_adding_dir_authorities(options, old_options) < 0) return -1; @@ -1237,6 +1225,17 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) finish_daemon(options->DataDirectory); } + /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else: + keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */ + if (transition_affects_workers || + (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && (!old_options || + !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir))) { + if (init_keys() < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); + return -1; + } + } + /* Write our PID to the PID file. If we do not have write permissions we * will log a warning */ if (options->PidFile)

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[tor/master] Report wrong key sizes correctly
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jun '11

01 Jun '11

commit 0fd3ad75daf925e8192aa1d44b229b3b7c29829d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 1 11:07:08 2011 -0400 Report wrong key sizes correctly When we introduced NEED_KEY_1024 in routerparse.c back in 0.2.0.1-alpha, I forgot to add a *8 when logging the length of a bad-length key. Bugfix for 3318 on 0.2.0.1-alpha. --- changes/bug3318 | 3 +++ src/or/routerparse.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3318 b/changes/bug3318 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..38991c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3318 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Fix a log message that said "bits" while displaying a value in + bytes. Fixes bug 3318; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 1dcbc6a..3728e99 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -3767,7 +3767,7 @@ token_check_object(memarea_t *area, const char *kwd, case NEED_SKEY_1024: /* There must be a 1024-bit private key. */ if (tok->key && crypto_pk_keysize(tok->key) != PK_BYTES) { tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Wrong size on key for %s: %d bits", - kwd, (int)crypto_pk_keysize(tok->key)); + kwd, (int)crypto_pk_keysize(tok->key)*8); RET_ERR(ebuf); } /* fall through */

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jun '11

01 Jun '11

commit a610ebc3a6990261f1cd4ac7c498a3fe8a6c1a53 Merge: d0e7c54 0fd3ad7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 1 11:08:28 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' changes/bug3318 | 3 +++ src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ src/or/routerparse.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Report wrong key sizes correctly
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jun '11

01 Jun '11

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[torbutton/master] Bug 3101: Disable WebGL. Too many unknowns for now.
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 01 Jun '11

01 Jun '11

commit 00d5bc28bf82c9fb049368b78cff8f43d775c299 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Wed Jun 1 00:31:09 2011 -0700 Bug 3101: Disable WebGL. Too many unknowns for now. I think these folks may be right, at least for the short term: http://www.contextis.com/resources/blog/webgl/ Remote fonts were a minefield of exploits, and the vulnerability surface there was like 1% of OpenGL. After a few releases, we can revisit the remaining fingerprinting issues and consider re-enabling. --- src/chrome/content/torbutton.js | 5 +++++ src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js | 1 + src/install.rdf | 2 +- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js index 9f5c5fe..401443a 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js +++ b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js @@ -1403,6 +1403,11 @@ function torbutton_update_status(mode, force_update) { !mode, mode, changed); } + if (m_tb_ff4) { + torbutton_setBoolPref("webgl.disabled", "webgl_disabled", mode, mode, + changed); + } + if(m_tb_ff35) { // Disable geolocation torbutton_setBoolPref("geo.enabled", "geo_enabled", !mode, mode, diff --git a/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js b/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js index 58c8abe..fd88a1e 100644 --- a/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js +++ b/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ pref("extensions.torbutton.saved.buildID_override",""); pref("extensions.torbutton.saved.useragent_vendor", ""); pref("extensions.torbutton.saved.useragent_vendorSub",""); pref("extensions.torbutton.saved.transparentTor",false); +pref("extensions.torbutton.saved.webgl_disabled", false); // network.dns.disablePrefetch is a hidden option. It has no default value: //pref("extensions.torbutton.saved.dns_prefetch", false); diff --git a/src/install.rdf b/src/install.rdf index 540e053..0d4c9f7 100644 --- a/src/install.rdf +++ b/src/install.rdf @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ <em:name>Torbutton</em:name> <em:creator>Mike Perry & Kory Kirk</em:creator> <em:id>{e0204bd5-9d31-402b-a99d-a6aa8ffebdca}</em:id> - <em:version>1.3.3-alpha</em:version> + <em:version>1.4.0rc1-pre1</em:version> <em:homepageURL>https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/</em:homepageURL> <em:optionsURL>chrome://torbutton/content/preferences.xul</em:optionsURL> <em:iconURL>chrome://torbutton/skin/tor.png</em:iconURL>

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r24798: {projects} update some of the 2011 slide masters to be readable if you' (projects/presentations)
by Andrew Lewman 01 Jun '11

01 Jun '11

Author: phobos Date: 2011-06-01 02:26:46 +0000 (Wed, 01 Jun 2011) New Revision: 24798 Modified: projects/presentations/2011-slide-masters.odp projects/presentations/2011-slide-masters.pdf Log: update some of the 2011 slide masters to be readable if you're in the back of a large room. Modified: projects/presentations/2011-slide-masters.odp =================================================================== (Binary files differ) Modified: projects/presentations/2011-slide-masters.pdf =================================================================== (Binary files differ)

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r24797: {website} link to our version, not amo. (website/trunk/torbutton/en)
by Andrew Lewman 31 May '11

31 May '11

Author: phobos Date: 2011-05-31 20:56:11 +0000 (Tue, 31 May 2011) New Revision: 24797 Modified: website/trunk/torbutton/en/index.wml Log: link to our version, not amo. Modified: website/trunk/torbutton/en/index.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/torbutton/en/index.wml 2011-05-31 20:55:12 UTC (rev 24796) +++ website/trunk/torbutton/en/index.wml 2011-05-31 20:56:11 UTC (rev 24797) @@ -94,9 +94,7 @@ Install Stable: Click to <a href="https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbutton/torbutton-current.xpi" hash="<version-hash-torbutton>" onclick="return - install(event);">install from this website</a> or <a - href="https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/downloads/latest/2275/addon-2275-l…">install - from Mozilla's Add-On site</a> + install(event);">install from this website</a>. Install Alpha: Click to <a href="https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbutton/torbutton-current-alpha.xpi" hash="<version-hash-torbutton-alpha>"

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r24796: {website} local doesn't exist, it's on archive. (website/trunk/torbutton/en)
by Andrew Lewman 31 May '11

31 May '11

Author: phobos Date: 2011-05-31 20:55:12 +0000 (Tue, 31 May 2011) New Revision: 24796 Modified: website/trunk/torbutton/en/index.wml Log: local doesn't exist, it's on archive. Modified: website/trunk/torbutton/en/index.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/torbutton/en/index.wml 2011-05-31 20:34:13 UTC (rev 24795) +++ website/trunk/torbutton/en/index.wml 2011-05-31 20:55:12 UTC (rev 24796) @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ <a href="/jsreq.html" title="Ref: 14938 (googleCA)" onClick="addOpenSearch('googleuk_web','png','General','14445','g');return false">Google UK</a>. - Past Releases: <a href="../dist/torbutton/">Local</a> + Past Releases: <a href="https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-archive/torbutton/">Tor Archive</a> Developer Documentation: <a href="en/design/index.html.en">Torbutton Design Document</a> and <a href="en/design/MozillaBrownBag.pdf">Slides (Not actively updated)</a>

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r24795: {website} minor faq cleanups (website/trunk/docs/en)
by Roger Dingledine 31 May '11

31 May '11

Author: arma Date: 2011-05-31 20:34:13 +0000 (Tue, 31 May 2011) New Revision: 24795 Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: minor faq cleanups Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-05-30 12:13:48 UTC (rev 24794) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-05-31 20:34:13 UTC (rev 24795) @@ -157,15 +157,17 @@ Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure. The provider knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet. They can see your -traffic as it passes through their server. In some cases, they can see your +traffic as it passes through their server. In some cases, they can even see +inside your encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce stores. You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your traffic -stream, and isn't recording your personal details. +stream, and recording your personal details. Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before sending -it on to the destination. Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are +it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption for +each of the three relays, Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are sending into it. It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted through the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world, completely intact. The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your local @@ -1256,7 +1258,7 @@ Right now, there are a small number of places in the world that filter connections to the Tor network. So getting a lot of bridges running right now is mostly a backup measure, a) in case the Tor network does - get blocked somewhere, and b) for people who want an extra layer of + get blocked in more places, and b) for people who want an extra layer of security because they're worried somebody will recognize that it's a public Tor relay IP address they're contacting.

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