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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Don't crash when accountingmax is set in non-server Tors
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Oct '11

27 Oct '11

commit d0a91386e5b85c5a0db3981a294c7a75192f9c3a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Dec 3 13:37:13 2010 -0500 Don't crash when accountingmax is set in non-server Tors We use a hash of the identity key to seed a prng to tell when an accounting period should end. But thanks to the bug998 changes, clients no longer have server-identity keys to use as a long-term seed in accounting calculations. In any case, their identity keys (as used in TLS) were never never fixed. So we can just set the wakeup time from a random seed instead there. Still open is whether everybody should be random. This patch fixes bug 2235, which was introduced in 0.2.2.18-alpha. Diagnosed with help from boboper on irc. --- changes/bug2235 | 3 +++ src/or/hibernate.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2235 b/changes/bug2235 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c3bafa --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2235 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes + - Avoid crashes when AccountingMax is set on clients. Fixes bug 2235; + Bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. Diagnosed by boboper. diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.c b/src/or/hibernate.c index 04e06c8..dfc4edf 100644 --- a/src/or/hibernate.c +++ b/src/or/hibernate.c @@ -463,14 +463,19 @@ accounting_set_wakeup_time(void) } } - format_iso_time(buf, interval_start_time); - crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest); - - d_env = crypto_new_digest_env(); - crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, buf, ISO_TIME_LEN); - crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN); - crypto_digest_get_digest(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN); - crypto_free_digest_env(d_env); + if (server_identity_key_is_set()) { + format_iso_time(buf, interval_start_time); + + crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest); + + d_env = crypto_new_digest_env(); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, buf, ISO_TIME_LEN); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + crypto_digest_get_digest(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + crypto_free_digest_env(d_env); + } else { + crypto_rand(digest, DIGEST_LEN); + } if (!expected_bandwidth_usage) { char buf1[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Reinit keys at the start of options_act().
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Oct '11

27 Oct '11

commit 55d9e4b8bad18a99d51b0b6347cef46e730dceda Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 23 16:38:35 2011 -0400 Reinit keys at the start of options_act(). Previously we did this nearer to the end (in the old_options && transition_affects_workers() block). But other stuff cares about keys being consistent with options... particularly anything which tries to access a key, which can die in assert_identity_keys_ok(). Fixes bug 3228; bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. Conflicts: src/or/config.c --- changes/bug3228 | 3 +++ src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3228 b/changes/bug3228 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4aca810 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3228 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Resolve a crash that occured when setting BridgeRelay to 1 with + accounting enabled. Fixes bug 3228; bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 7d7f2c3..ea389ff 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1269,12 +1269,26 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) or_options_t *options = get_options(); int running_tor = options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR; char *msg; + const int transition_affects_workers = + old_options && options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options); if (running_tor && !have_lockfile()) { if (try_locking(options, 1) < 0) return -1; } + /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else: + keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */ + if (running_tor && + (transition_affects_workers || + (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && (!old_options || + !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir)))) { + if (init_keys() < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); + return -1; + } + } + if (consider_adding_dir_authorities(options, old_options) < 0) return -1; @@ -1368,14 +1382,10 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) geoip_remove_old_clients(time(NULL)+(2*60*60)); } - if (options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options)) { + if (transition_affects_workers) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Worker-related options changed. Rotating workers."); - if (init_keys() < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); - return -1; - } if (server_mode(options) && !server_mode(old_options)) { ip_address_changed(0); if (has_completed_circuit || !any_predicted_circuits(time(NULL))) @@ -1388,9 +1398,6 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) if (dns_reset()) return -1; } - - if (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir) - init_keys(); } /* Maybe load geoip file */

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix assert for relay/bridge state change
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Oct '11

27 Oct '11

commit 908289894419b8fa331197948cb048f08ff5d035 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 25 15:28:58 2011 +0100 Fix assert for relay/bridge state change When we added support for separate client tls certs on bridges in a2bb0bfdd5 we forgot to correctly initialize this when changing from relay to bridge or vice versa while Tor is running. Fix that by always initializing keys when the state changes. Fixes bug 2433. Conflicts: src/or/config.c --- changes/bug2433 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2433 b/changes/bug2433 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e47c4f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2433 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Don't assert when changing from bridge to relay or vice versa with a controller. + The assert happened because we didn't properly initialize our keys in this case. + Bugfix on 0.2.2.18, fixes bug 2433. Issue first discovered by bastik. + diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index fbfa771..7d7f2c3 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1371,11 +1371,12 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) if (options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options)) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Worker-related options changed. Rotating workers."); + + if (init_keys() < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); + return -1; + } if (server_mode(options) && !server_mode(old_options)) { - if (init_keys() < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); - return -1; - } ip_address_changed(0); if (has_completed_circuit || !any_predicted_circuits(time(NULL))) inform_testing_reachability(); @@ -3763,6 +3764,7 @@ options_transition_affects_workers(or_options_t *old_options, new_options->ServerDNSSearchDomains || old_options->SafeLogging != new_options->SafeLogging || old_options->ClientOnly != new_options->ClientOnly || + public_server_mode(old_options) != public_server_mode(new_options) || !config_lines_eq(old_options->Logs, new_options->Logs)) return 1;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Oct '11

27 Oct '11

commit 41d9d3f90437ae9dbde1590faf0ffc412c68df19 Merge: 4a1a89b cecc5b7 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 26 16:34:45 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Refactor tor_tls_context_new:
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Oct '11

27 Oct '11

commit 878164011108c16574d6ce1d9530fe83a3109bad Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Oct 1 14:06:57 2010 -0700 Refactor tor_tls_context_new: * Make tor_tls_context_new internal to tortls.c, and return the new tor_tls_context_t from it. * Add a public tor_tls_context_init wrapper function to replace it. Conflicts: src/or/main.c src/or/router.c --- src/common/tortls.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- src/common/tortls.h | 3 ++- src/or/main.c | 3 +-- src/or/router.c | 5 ++--- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 7735618..d3435e7 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ static X509* tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa, const char *cname_sign, unsigned int lifetime); static void tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls); +static tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, + unsigned int key_lifetime); /** Global tls context. We keep it here because nobody else needs to * touch it. */ @@ -591,13 +593,38 @@ tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx) /** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes. * identity should be set to the identity key used to sign the - * certificate, and nickname set to the nickname to use. + * certificate. * * You can call this function multiple times. Each time you call it, * it generates new certificates; all new connections will use * the new SSL context. */ int +tor_tls_context_init(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime) +{ + tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity, + key_lifetime); + tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = global_tls_context; + + if (new_ctx != NULL) { + global_tls_context = new_ctx; + + /* Free the old context if one existed. */ + if (old_ctx != NULL) { + /* This is safe even if there are open connections: we reference- + * count tor_tls_context_t objects. */ + tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx); + } + } + + return ((new_ctx != NULL) ? 0 : -1); +} + +/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes. + * identity should be set to the identity key used to sign the + * certificate. + */ +static tor_tls_context_t * tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime) { crypto_pk_env_t *rsa = NULL; @@ -692,18 +719,12 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime) always_accept_verify_cb); /* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */ SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER); - /* Free the old context if one exists. */ - if (global_tls_context) { - /* This is safe even if there are open connections: OpenSSL does - * reference counting with SSL and SSL_CTX objects. */ - tor_tls_context_decref(global_tls_context); - } - global_tls_context = result; + if (rsa) crypto_free_pk_env(rsa); tor_free(nickname); tor_free(nn2); - return 0; + return result; error: tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "creating TLS context"); @@ -719,7 +740,7 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime) X509_free(cert); if (idcert) X509_free(idcert); - return -1; + return NULL; } #ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER diff --git a/src/common/tortls.h b/src/common/tortls.h index 9644b87..3f80d99 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.h +++ b/src/common/tortls.h @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ typedef struct tor_tls_t tor_tls_t; const char *tor_tls_err_to_string(int err); void tor_tls_free_all(void); -int tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa, unsigned int key_lifetime); +int tor_tls_context_init(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, + unsigned int key_lifetime); tor_tls_t *tor_tls_new(int sock, int is_server); void tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address); void tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls, diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 3c879dc..fe1f42e 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -872,8 +872,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) last_rotated_x509_certificate = now; if (last_rotated_x509_certificate+MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL < now) { log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Rotating tls context."); - if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), - MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { + if (tor_tls_context_init(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Error reinitializing TLS context"); /* XXX is it a bug here, that we just keep going? -RD */ } diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 45eeca0..9afa983 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -458,8 +458,7 @@ init_keys(void) } set_identity_key(prkey); /* Create a TLS context; default the client nickname to "client". */ - if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), - MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { + if (tor_tls_context_init(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client."); return -1; } @@ -537,7 +536,7 @@ init_keys(void) tor_free(keydir); /* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */ - if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), + if (tor_tls_context_init(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context"); return -1;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Add public_server_mode function.
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Oct '11

27 Oct '11

commit 07ab559a8e9932fbed1e00e3210a1bb855cf1508 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Oct 1 00:07:10 2010 -0700 Add public_server_mode function. --- src/or/or.h | 1 + src/or/router.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 0f5b2bb..f405113 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4239,6 +4239,7 @@ int authdir_mode_tests_reachability(or_options_t *options); int authdir_mode_bridge(or_options_t *options); int server_mode(or_options_t *options); +int public_server_mode(or_options_t *options); int advertised_server_mode(void); int proxy_mode(or_options_t *options); void consider_publishable_server(int force); diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 2afde74..45eeca0 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -954,6 +954,15 @@ server_mode(or_options_t *options) return (options->ORPort != 0 || options->ORListenAddress); } +/** Return true iff we are trying to be a non-bridge server. + */ +int +public_server_mode(or_options_t *options) +{ + if (!server_mode(options)) return 0; + return (!options->BridgeRelay); +} + /** Remember if we've advertised ourselves to the dirservers. */ static int server_is_advertised=0;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Maintain separate server and client TLS contexts.
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Oct '11

27 Oct '11

commit 9976df9e5619b89339390c322138f7228b8fa715 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun Oct 3 18:14:08 2010 -0700 Maintain separate server and client TLS contexts. Fixes bug #988. Conflicts: src/or/main.c src/or/router.c --- src/common/tortls.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- src/common/tortls.h | 4 ++- src/or/main.c | 10 ++++-- src/or/router.c | 13 +++++-- 4 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index d3435e7..c78a9ec 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -184,12 +184,16 @@ static X509* tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa, const char *cname_sign, unsigned int lifetime); static void tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls); +static int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, + crypto_pk_env_t *identity, + unsigned int key_lifetime); static tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime); -/** Global tls context. We keep it here because nobody else needs to - * touch it. */ -static tor_tls_context_t *global_tls_context = NULL; +/** Global TLS contexts. We keep them here because nobody else needs + * to touch them. */ +static tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context = NULL; +static tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context = NULL; /** True iff tor_tls_init() has been called. */ static int tls_library_is_initialized = 0; @@ -402,9 +406,15 @@ tor_tls_init(void) void tor_tls_free_all(void) { - if (global_tls_context) { - tor_tls_context_decref(global_tls_context); - global_tls_context = NULL; + if (server_tls_context) { + tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server_tls_context; + server_tls_context = NULL; + tor_tls_context_decref(ctx); + } + if (client_tls_context) { + tor_tls_context_t *ctx = client_tls_context; + client_tls_context = NULL; + tor_tls_context_decref(ctx); } if (!HT_EMPTY(&tlsmap_root)) { log_warn(LD_MM, "Still have entries in the tlsmap at shutdown."); @@ -591,6 +601,63 @@ tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx) ++ctx->refcnt; } +/** Create new global client and server TLS contexts. + * + * If server_identity is NULL, this will not generate a server + * TLS context. If is_public_server is non-zero, this will use + * the same TLS context for incoming and outgoing connections, and + * ignore client_identity. */ +int +tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server, + crypto_pk_env_t *client_identity, + crypto_pk_env_t *server_identity, + unsigned int key_lifetime) +{ + int rv1 = 0; + int rv2 = 0; + + if (is_public_server) { + tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx; + tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx; + + tor_assert(server_identity != NULL); + + rv1 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&server_tls_context, + server_identity, + key_lifetime); + + if (rv1 >= 0) { + new_ctx = server_tls_context; + tor_tls_context_incref(new_ctx); + old_ctx = client_tls_context; + client_tls_context = new_ctx; + + if (old_ctx != NULL) { + tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx); + } + } + } else { + if (server_identity != NULL) { + rv1 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&server_tls_context, + server_identity, + key_lifetime); + } else { + tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = server_tls_context; + server_tls_context = NULL; + + if (old_ctx != NULL) { + tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx); + } + } + + rv2 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&client_tls_context, + client_identity, + key_lifetime); + } + + return rv1 < rv2 ? rv1 : rv2; +} + /** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes. * identity should be set to the identity key used to sign the * certificate. @@ -599,15 +666,17 @@ tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx) * it generates new certificates; all new connections will use * the new SSL context. */ -int -tor_tls_context_init(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime) +static int +tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, + crypto_pk_env_t *identity, + unsigned int key_lifetime) { tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity, key_lifetime); - tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = global_tls_context; + tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = *ppcontext; if (new_ctx != NULL) { - global_tls_context = new_ctx; + *ppcontext = new_ctx; /* Free the old context if one existed. */ if (old_ctx != NULL) { @@ -920,10 +989,12 @@ tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer) { BIO *bio = NULL; tor_tls_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tor_tls_context_t *context = isServer ? server_tls_context : + client_tls_context; - tor_assert(global_tls_context); /* make sure somebody made it first */ - if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(global_tls_context->ctx))) { - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "generating TLS context"); + tor_assert(context); /* make sure somebody made it first */ + if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(context->ctx))) { + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "creating SSL object"); tor_free(result); return NULL; } @@ -962,8 +1033,8 @@ tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer) } HT_INSERT(tlsmap, &tlsmap_root, result); SSL_set_bio(result->ssl, bio, bio); - tor_tls_context_incref(global_tls_context); - result->context = global_tls_context; + tor_tls_context_incref(context); + result->context = context; result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; result->isServer = isServer; result->wantwrite_n = 0; diff --git a/src/common/tortls.h b/src/common/tortls.h index 3f80d99..55fee81 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.h +++ b/src/common/tortls.h @@ -50,7 +50,9 @@ typedef struct tor_tls_t tor_tls_t; const char *tor_tls_err_to_string(int err); void tor_tls_free_all(void); -int tor_tls_context_init(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, +int tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server, + crypto_pk_env_t *client_identity, + crypto_pk_env_t *server_identity, unsigned int key_lifetime); tor_tls_t *tor_tls_new(int sock, int is_server); void tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address); diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index fe1f42e..00fce80 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -816,6 +816,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) static time_t time_to_dump_geoip_stats = 0; static time_t time_to_retry_dns_init = 0; or_options_t *options = get_options(); + int is_server = server_mode(options); int i; int have_dir_info; @@ -837,7 +838,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) * shut down and restart all cpuworkers, and update the directory if * necessary. */ - if (server_mode(options) && + if (is_server && get_onion_key_set_at()+MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME < now) { log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Rotating onion key."); rotate_onion_key(); @@ -872,7 +873,10 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) last_rotated_x509_certificate = now; if (last_rotated_x509_certificate+MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL < now) { log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Rotating tls context."); - if (tor_tls_context_init(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { + if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options), + get_identity_key(), + is_server ? get_identity_key() : NULL, + MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Error reinitializing TLS context"); /* XXX is it a bug here, that we just keep going? -RD */ } @@ -1110,7 +1114,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) /** 9. and if we're a server, check whether our DNS is telling stories to * us. */ - if (server_mode(options) && time_to_check_for_correct_dns < now) { + if (is_server && time_to_check_for_correct_dns < now) { if (!time_to_check_for_correct_dns) { time_to_check_for_correct_dns = now + 60 + crypto_rand_int(120); } else { diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 9afa983..dce2ad6 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -457,8 +457,11 @@ init_keys(void) return -1; } set_identity_key(prkey); - /* Create a TLS context; default the client nickname to "client". */ - if (tor_tls_context_init(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { + /* Create a TLS context. */ + if (tor_tls_context_init(0, + get_identity_key(), + NULL, + MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client."); return -1; } @@ -536,8 +539,10 @@ init_keys(void) tor_free(keydir); /* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */ - if (tor_tls_context_init(get_identity_key(), - MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { + if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options), + get_identity_key(), + get_identity_key(), + MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context"); return -1; }

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Make crypto_free_pk_env tolerate NULL arg in 0.2.1. Error-proofing against bug 988 backport
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Oct '11

27 Oct '11

commit 299a78c5fed3447a450cea3d4f686c2140c7aaed Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Nov 12 20:21:50 2010 -0500 Make crypto_free_pk_env tolerate NULL arg in 0.2.1. Error-proofing against bug 988 backport --- src/common/crypto.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index dffa2c7..c723c33 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -321,7 +321,8 @@ crypto_new_pk_env(void) void crypto_free_pk_env(crypto_pk_env_t *env) { - tor_assert(env); + if (!env) + return; if (--env->refs > 0) return;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Maintain separate server and client identity keys when appropriate.
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Oct '11

27 Oct '11

commit 59e565e2a258f6ca78273585187ff0ab9052cbe7 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun Oct 3 22:38:53 2010 -0700 Maintain separate server and client identity keys when appropriate. Fixes a bug described in ticket #988. Conflicts: src/or/main.c src/or/router.c --- src/or/connection_or.c | 5 ++- src/or/dirserv.c | 7 ++- src/or/hibernate.c | 4 +- src/or/main.c | 8 ++-- src/or/or.h | 9 ++- src/or/router.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 6 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index d402563..7817db8 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -961,6 +961,9 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, const char *safe_address = started_here ? conn->_base.address : safe_str(conn->_base.address); const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming"; + crypto_pk_env_t *our_identity = + started_here ? get_client_identity_key() : + get_server_identity_key(); int has_cert = 0, has_identity=0; check_no_tls_errors(); @@ -997,7 +1000,7 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, if (identity_rcvd) { has_identity = 1; crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd_out); - if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(get_identity_key(), identity_rcvd)<0) { + if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(our_identity, identity_rcvd)<0) { conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER; } else { conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER; diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index e367cb1..4677580 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -1520,7 +1520,8 @@ dirserv_regenerate_directory(void) { char *new_directory=NULL; - if (dirserv_dump_directory_to_string(&new_directory, get_identity_key())) { + if (dirserv_dump_directory_to_string(&new_directory, + get_server_identity_key())) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Error creating directory."); tor_free(new_directory); return NULL; @@ -1550,7 +1551,7 @@ generate_runningrouters(void) char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; size_t len; - crypto_pk_env_t *private_key = get_identity_key(); + crypto_pk_env_t *private_key = get_server_identity_key(); char *identity_pkey; /* Identity key, DER64-encoded. */ size_t identity_pkey_len; @@ -2441,7 +2442,7 @@ generate_v2_networkstatus_opinion(void) smartlist_t *routers = NULL; digestmap_t *omit_as_sybil = NULL; - private_key = get_identity_key(); + private_key = get_server_identity_key(); if (resolve_my_address(LOG_WARN, options, &addr, &hostname)<0) { log_warn(LD_NET, "Couldn't resolve my hostname"); diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.c b/src/or/hibernate.c index 9ec6375..04e06c8 100644 --- a/src/or/hibernate.c +++ b/src/or/hibernate.c @@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ accounting_set_wakeup_time(void) uint64_t time_to_exhaust_bw; int time_to_consider; - if (! identity_key_is_set()) { + if (! server_identity_key_is_set()) { if (init_keys() < 0) { log_err(LD_BUG, "Error initializing keys"); tor_assert(0); @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ accounting_set_wakeup_time(void) } format_iso_time(buf, interval_start_time); - crypto_pk_get_digest(get_identity_key(), digest); + crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest); d_env = crypto_new_digest_env(); crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, buf, ISO_TIME_LEN); diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 00fce80..466801c 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -874,8 +874,8 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) if (last_rotated_x509_certificate+MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL < now) { log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Rotating tls context."); if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options), - get_identity_key(), - is_server ? get_identity_key() : NULL, + get_client_identity_key(), + is_server ? get_server_identity_key() : NULL, MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Error reinitializing TLS context"); /* XXX is it a bug here, that we just keep going? -RD */ @@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ do_main_loop(void) /* load the private keys, if we're supposed to have them, and set up the * TLS context. */ - if (! identity_key_is_set()) { + if (! client_identity_key_is_set()) { if (init_keys() < 0) { log_err(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); return -1; @@ -2020,7 +2020,7 @@ do_list_fingerprint(void) log_err(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; can't display fingerprint"); return -1; } - if (!(k = get_identity_key())) { + if (!(k = get_server_identity_key())) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error: missing identity key."); return -1; } diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index f405113..a594d6f 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4205,9 +4205,12 @@ int rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, crypto_pk_env_t *get_onion_key(void); time_t get_onion_key_set_at(void); -void set_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k); -crypto_pk_env_t *get_identity_key(void); -int identity_key_is_set(void); +void set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k); +void set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k); +crypto_pk_env_t *get_client_identity_key(void); +crypto_pk_env_t *get_server_identity_key(void); +int client_identity_key_is_set(void); +int server_identity_key_is_set(void); authority_cert_t *get_my_v3_authority_cert(void); crypto_pk_env_t *get_my_v3_authority_signing_key(void); authority_cert_t *get_my_v3_legacy_cert(void); diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index dce2ad6..c53bb8b 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -31,11 +31,15 @@ static crypto_pk_env_t *onionkey=NULL; /** Previous private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells * generated by clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */ static crypto_pk_env_t *lastonionkey=NULL; -/** Private "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS +/** Private server "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS * certificates. Never changes. */ -static crypto_pk_env_t *identitykey=NULL; -/** Digest of identitykey. */ -static char identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; +static crypto_pk_env_t *server_identitykey=NULL; +/** Digest of server_identitykey. */ +static char server_identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; +/** Private client "identity key": used to sign bridges' and clients' + * outbound TLS certificates. Regenerated on startup and on IP address + * change. */ +static crypto_pk_env_t *client_identitykey=NULL; /** Signing key used for v3 directory material; only set for authorities. */ static crypto_pk_env_t *authority_signing_key = NULL; /** Key certificate to authenticate v3 directory material; only set for @@ -106,32 +110,59 @@ get_onion_key_set_at(void) return onionkey_set_at; } -/** Set the current identity key to k. +/** Set the current server identity key to k. */ void -set_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) +set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) { - if (identitykey) - crypto_free_pk_env(identitykey); - identitykey = k; - crypto_pk_get_digest(identitykey, identitykey_digest); + if (server_identitykey) + crypto_free_pk_env(server_identitykey); + server_identitykey = k; + crypto_pk_get_digest(server_identitykey, server_identitykey_digest); } -/** Returns the current identity key; requires that the identity key has been - * set. +/** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has + * been set. */ crypto_pk_env_t * -get_identity_key(void) +get_server_identity_key(void) { - tor_assert(identitykey); - return identitykey; + tor_assert(server_identitykey); + return server_identitykey; } -/** Return true iff the identity key has been set. */ +/** Return true iff the server identity key has been set. */ int -identity_key_is_set(void) +server_identity_key_is_set(void) { - return identitykey != NULL; + return server_identitykey != NULL; +} + +/** Set the current client identity key to k. + */ +void +set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) +{ + if (client_identitykey) + crypto_free_pk_env(client_identitykey); + client_identitykey = k; +} + +/** Returns the current client identity key; requires that the key has + * been set. + */ +crypto_pk_env_t * +get_client_identity_key(void) +{ + tor_assert(client_identitykey); + return client_identitykey; +} + +/** Return true iff the client identity key has been set. */ +int +client_identity_key_is_set(void) +{ + return client_identitykey != NULL; } /** Return the key certificate for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL @@ -456,10 +487,10 @@ init_keys(void) crypto_free_pk_env(prkey); return -1; } - set_identity_key(prkey); + set_client_identity_key(prkey); /* Create a TLS context. */ if (tor_tls_context_init(0, - get_identity_key(), + get_client_identity_key(), NULL, MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client."); @@ -496,13 +527,28 @@ init_keys(void) } } - /* 1. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */ + /* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */ keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_id_key"); log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir); prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR); tor_free(keydir); if (!prkey) return -1; - set_identity_key(prkey); + set_server_identity_key(prkey); + + /* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key; + * otherwise, set the server identity key as our client identity + * key. */ + if (public_server_mode(options)) { + set_client_identity_key(prkey); /* set above */ + } else { + if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env())) + return -1; + if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) { + crypto_free_pk_env(prkey); + return -1; + } + set_client_identity_key(prkey); + } /* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */ keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key"); @@ -540,8 +586,8 @@ init_keys(void) /* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */ if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options), - get_identity_key(), - get_identity_key(), + get_client_identity_key(), + get_server_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context"); return -1; @@ -553,7 +599,8 @@ init_keys(void) const char *m = NULL; routerinfo_t *ri; /* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */ - if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(options->Nickname, get_identity_key())) { + if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(options->Nickname, + get_server_identity_key())) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error adding own fingerprint to approved set"); return -1; } @@ -574,7 +621,8 @@ init_keys(void) /* 5. Dump fingerprint to 'fingerprint' */ keydir = get_datadir_fname("fingerprint"); log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Dumping fingerprint to \"%s\"...",keydir); - if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_identity_key(), fingerprint, 0)<0) { + if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(), + fingerprint, 0) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing fingerprint"); tor_free(keydir); return -1; @@ -612,7 +660,7 @@ init_keys(void) return -1; } /* 6b. [authdirserver only] add own key to approved directories. */ - crypto_pk_get_digest(get_identity_key(), digest); + crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest); type = ((options->V1AuthoritativeDir ? V1_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) | (options->V2AuthoritativeDir ? V2_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) | (options->V3AuthoritativeDir ? V3_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) | @@ -1130,11 +1178,12 @@ router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(edge_connection_t *conn) } /** Return true iff I'm a server and digest is equal to - * my identity digest. */ + * my server identity key digest. */ int router_digest_is_me(const char *digest) { - return identitykey && tor_memeq(identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + return (server_identitykey && + tor_memeq(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN)); } /** Return true iff I'm a server and digest is equal to @@ -1271,7 +1320,7 @@ router_rebuild_descriptor(int force) ri->cache_info.published_on = time(NULL); ri->onion_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_onion_key()); /* must invoke from * main thread */ - ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_identity_key()); + ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_server_identity_key()); if (crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey, ri->cache_info.identity_digest)<0) { routerinfo_free(ri); @@ -1363,7 +1412,7 @@ router_rebuild_descriptor(int force) DIGEST_LEN); ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(8192); if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, 8192, - ei, get_identity_key()) < 0) { + ei, get_server_identity_key()) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor."); routerinfo_free(ri); extrainfo_free(ei); @@ -1380,7 +1429,7 @@ router_rebuild_descriptor(int force) DIGEST_LEN); ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(8192); if (router_dump_router_to_string(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, 8192, - ri, get_identity_key())<0) { + ri, get_server_identity_key()) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor."); routerinfo_free(ri); extrainfo_free(ei); @@ -2029,8 +2078,10 @@ router_free_all(void) crypto_free_pk_env(onionkey); if (lastonionkey) crypto_free_pk_env(lastonionkey); - if (identitykey) - crypto_free_pk_env(identitykey); + if (server_identitykey) + crypto_free_pk_env(server_identitykey); + if (client_identitykey) + crypto_free_pk_env(client_identitykey); if (key_lock) tor_mutex_free(key_lock); if (desc_routerinfo)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Rename get_client_identity_key to get_tlsclient_identity_key
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Oct '11

27 Oct '11

commit 2a2301e41117ad8439dbe8039085202fa0d6f6ed Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Oct 21 13:53:31 2010 -0400 Rename get_client_identity_key to get_tlsclient_identity_key --- src/or/connection_or.c | 2 +- src/or/main.c | 2 +- src/or/or.h | 2 +- src/or/router.c | 10 +++++----- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 7817db8..95cc02e 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, started_here ? conn->_base.address : safe_str(conn->_base.address); const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming"; crypto_pk_env_t *our_identity = - started_here ? get_client_identity_key() : + started_here ? get_tlsclient_identity_key() : get_server_identity_key(); int has_cert = 0, has_identity=0; diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 466801c..ba704f5 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) if (last_rotated_x509_certificate+MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL < now) { log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Rotating tls context."); if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options), - get_client_identity_key(), + get_tlsclient_identity_key(), is_server ? get_server_identity_key() : NULL, MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Error reinitializing TLS context"); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index a594d6f..4105ff4 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4207,7 +4207,7 @@ crypto_pk_env_t *get_onion_key(void); time_t get_onion_key_set_at(void); void set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k); void set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k); -crypto_pk_env_t *get_client_identity_key(void); +crypto_pk_env_t *get_tlsclient_identity_key(void); crypto_pk_env_t *get_server_identity_key(void); int client_identity_key_is_set(void); int server_identity_key_is_set(void); diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index c53bb8b..f7a50ae 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -148,11 +148,11 @@ set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) client_identitykey = k; } -/** Returns the current client identity key; requires that the key has - * been set. +/** Returns the current client identity key for use on outgoing TLS + * connections; requires that the key has been set. */ crypto_pk_env_t * -get_client_identity_key(void) +get_tlsclient_identity_key(void) { tor_assert(client_identitykey); return client_identitykey; @@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ init_keys(void) set_client_identity_key(prkey); /* Create a TLS context. */ if (tor_tls_context_init(0, - get_client_identity_key(), + get_tlsclient_identity_key(), NULL, MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client."); @@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ init_keys(void) /* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */ if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options), - get_client_identity_key(), + get_tlsclient_identity_key(), get_server_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context");

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