- tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[arm/master] Implementing /info interpretor option
by atagar＠torproject.org 13 Sep '11

13 Sep '11

commit 6b4af377238ac7e863f4b001987d6d4786a003ad Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 12 20:23:03 2011 -0700 Implementing /info interpretor option This provides a reader friendly summary of relay information. Relayed can be queried this way by fingerprint, nickname, or IP address. --- src/cli/connections/connEntry.py | 2 +- src/cli/controller.py | 3 +- src/util/torInterpretor.py | 131 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/cli/connections/connEntry.py b/src/cli/connections/connEntry.py index de3fb01..02f7069 100644 --- a/src/cli/connections/connEntry.py +++ b/src/cli/connections/connEntry.py @@ -718,7 +718,7 @@ class ConnectionLine(entries.ConnectionPanelLine): dirPortLabel = "" if dirPort == "0" else "dirport: %s" % dirPort lines[2] = "nickname: %-25s orport: %-10s %s" % (nickname, orPort, dirPortLabel) - lines[3] = "published: %s %s" % (pubDate, pubTime) + lines[3] = "published: %s %s" % (pubTime, pubDate) lines[4] = "flags: %s" % flags.replace(" ", ", ") lines[5] = "exit policy: %s" % policyLabel diff --git a/src/cli/controller.py b/src/cli/controller.py index a0b465c..a841492 100644 --- a/src/cli/controller.py +++ b/src/cli/controller.py @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import cli.connections.connPanel from TorCtl import TorCtl -from util import connections, conf, enum, log, panel, sysTools, torConfig, torTools +from util import connections, conf, enum, hostnames, log, panel, sysTools, torConfig, torTools ARM_CONTROLLER = None @@ -568,6 +568,7 @@ def shutdownDaemons(): # joins on utility daemon threads - this might take a moment since the # internal threadpools being joined might be sleeping + hostnames.stop() resourceTrackers = sysTools.RESOURCE_TRACKERS.values() resolver = connections.getResolver("tor") if connections.isResolverAlive("tor") else None for tracker in resourceTrackers: tracker.stop() diff --git a/src/util/torInterpretor.py b/src/util/torInterpretor.py index 7eaec16..d6f9340 100644 --- a/src/util/torInterpretor.py +++ b/src/util/torInterpretor.py @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import readline import version -from util import enum, torTools +from util import connections, enum, hostnames, torTools INIT_MSG = """Arm %s Control Interpretor Enter \"/help\" for usage information and \"/quit\" to stop. @@ -269,6 +269,130 @@ class ControlInterpretor: outputEntry.append((lineText[match.end():] + "\n", OUTPUT_FORMAT)) printedLines.append(lineText) + def doInfo(self, arg, outputEntry): + """ + Performs the '/info' operation, looking up a relay by fingerprint, IP + address, or nickname and printing its descriptor and consensus entries in a + pretty fashion. + """ + + fingerprint, conn = None, torTools.getConn() + + # TODO: also recognize <ip>:<port> entries? + + # determines the fingerprint, leaving it unset and adding an error message + # if unsuccessful + if not arg: + outputEntry.append(("No fingerprint or nickname to look up", ERROR_FORMAT)) + elif len(arg) == 40 and re.match("^[0-9a-fA-F]+$", arg): + # we got a fingerprint (fourty character hex string) + fingerprint = arg + elif connections.isValidIpAddress(arg): + # we got an ip address, look up the fingerprint + fpMatches = conn.getRelayFingerprint(arg, getAllMatches = True) + + if len(fpMatches) == 0: + outputEntry.append(("No relays found at %s" % arg, ERROR_FORMAT)) + elif len(fpMatches) == 1: + fingerprint = fpMatches[0][1] + else: + outputEntry.append(("Multiple relays at %s, specify which by giving a port" % arg, ERROR_FORMAT)) + + for i in range(len(fpMatches)): + relayEntry = outputEntry[i] + outputEntry.append((" %i. or port: %-5s fingerprint: %s" % (i + 1, relayEntry[0], relayEntry[1]), ERROR_FORMAT)) + else: + # we got something else, treat it as a nickname + fingerprint = conn.getNicknameFingerprint(arg) + + if not fingerprint: + outputEntry.append(("No relay with the nickname of '%s' found" % arg, ERROR_FORMAT)) + + if fingerprint: + consensusEntry = conn.getConsensusEntry(fingerprint) + + # The nickname, address, and port lookups are all based on the consensus + # entry so if this succeeds we should be pretty confident that those + # queries will work too. + + if not consensusEntry: + outputEntry.append(("Unable to find consensus information for %s" % fingerprint, ERROR_FORMAT)) + return + + address, port = conn.getRelayAddress(fingerprint, (None, None)) + + # ... but not sure enough that we won't check + if not address or not port: return + + locale = conn.getInfo("ip-to-country/%s" % address, "??") + hostname = hostnames.resolve(address, 10) + + # TODO: Most of the following is copied from the _getDetailContent method + # of cli/connections/connEntry.py - useful bits should be refactored. + consensusLines = consensusEntry.split("\n") + + firstLineComp = consensusLines[0].split(" ") + if len(firstLineComp) >= 9: + _, nickname, _, _, pubDate, pubTime, _, orPort, _ = firstLineComp[:9] + else: nickname, pubDate, pubTime, orPort = "", "", "", "" + + flags = "unknown" + if len(consensusLines) >= 2 and consensusLines[1].startswith("s "): + flags = consensusLines[1][2:] + + exitPolicy = conn.getRelayExitPolicy(fingerprint) + + if exitPolicy: policyLabel = exitPolicy.getSummary() + else: policyLabel = "unknown" + + # fetches information from the descriptor if it's available + torVersion, platform, contact = "", "", "" + descriptorEntry = conn.getDescriptorEntry(fingerprint) + + if descriptorEntry: + for descLine in descriptorEntry.split("\n"): + if descLine.startswith("platform"): + # has the tor version and platform, ex: + # platform Tor 0.2.1.29 (r318f470bc5f2ad43) on Linux x86_64 + + torVersion = descLine[13:descLine.find(" ", 13)] + platform = descLine[descLine.rfind(" on ") + 4:] + elif descLine.startswith("contact"): + contact = descLine[8:] + + # clears up some highly common obscuring + for alias in (" at ", " AT "): contact = contact.replace(alias, "@") + for alias in (" dot ", " DOT "): contact = contact.replace(alias, ".") + + break # contact lines come after the platform + + headingAttr, infoAttr = (Attr.BOLD, Color.BLUE), () + + outputEntry.append(("%s (%s)\n" % (nickname, fingerprint), infoAttr)) + + outputEntry.append(("address: ", headingAttr)) + outputEntry.append(("%s:%s (%s, %s)\n" % (address, port, locale, hostname), infoAttr)) + + outputEntry.append(("published: ", headingAttr)) + outputEntry.append(("%s %s" % (pubTime, pubDate) + "\n", infoAttr)) + + if torVersion and platform: + outputEntry.append(("os: ", headingAttr)) + outputEntry.append((platform + "\n", infoAttr)) + + outputEntry.append(("version: ", headingAttr)) + outputEntry.append((torVersion + "\n", infoAttr)) + + outputEntry.append(("flags: ", headingAttr)) + outputEntry.append((flags.replace(" ", ", ") + "\n", infoAttr)) + + outputEntry.append(("exit policy: ", headingAttr)) + outputEntry.append((policyLabel + "\n", infoAttr)) + + if contact: + outputEntry.append(("contact: ", headingAttr)) + outputEntry.append((contact + "\n", infoAttr)) + def handleQuery(self, input): """ Processes the given input. Requests starting with a '/' are special @@ -308,6 +432,7 @@ class ControlInterpretor: if cmd == "/quit": raise InterpretorClosed() elif cmd == "/write": self.doWrite(arg, outputEntry) elif cmd == "/find": self.doFind(arg, outputEntry) + elif cmd == "/info": self.doInfo(arg, outputEntry) else: outputEntry.append(("Not yet implemented...", ERROR_FORMAT)) # TODO: implement @@ -393,6 +518,10 @@ def prompt(): # moves cursor to the next line and terminates (most commonly # KeyboardInterrupt and EOFErro) print + + # stop daemons + hostnames.stop() + break for line in outputEntry:

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r25065: {} my talk at lookout (projects/presentations)
by Runa Sandvik 12 Sep '11

12 Sep '11

Author: runa Date: 2011-09-12 21:14:14 +0000 (Mon, 12 Sep 2011) New Revision: 25065 Added: projects/presentations/2011-tor-online-anonymity-privacy-security-Lookout.pdf projects/presentations/2011-tor-online-anonymity-privacy-security-Lookout.tex Log: my talk at lookout Added: projects/presentations/2011-tor-online-anonymity-privacy-security-Lookout.pdf =================================================================== (Binary files differ) Property changes on: projects/presentations/2011-tor-online-anonymity-privacy-security-Lookout.pdf ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:mime-type + application/octet-stream Added: projects/presentations/2011-tor-online-anonymity-privacy-security-Lookout.tex =================================================================== --- projects/presentations/2011-tor-online-anonymity-privacy-security-Lookout.tex (rev 0) +++ projects/presentations/2011-tor-online-anonymity-privacy-security-Lookout.tex 2011-09-12 21:14:14 UTC (rev 25065) @@ -0,0 +1,328 @@ +\documentclass{beamer} +\mode<presentation> +\usetheme{Boadilla} +\title{Tor: Online anonymity, privacy, and security.} +\author{Runa A. Sandvik \\ runa(a)torproject.org} +\date{12 September 2011} +\begin{document} + +\begin{frame} +\maketitle +\begin{center} +\includegraphics[height=3cm]{../images/2009-tor-logo} +\end{center} +\end{frame} + +% Introduce myself, just to be nice +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{About Runa} +\begin{itemize} +\item Studied at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology +\item Worked for the Tor Project during Google Summer of Code in 2009 +\item Developer, security researcher, translation coordinator +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +% And here's what we'll talk about +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{What are we talking about?} +\begin{itemize} +\item Crash course on anonymous communications +\item Quick overview of Tor +\item Tor and circumvention +\item Future work +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{The Tor Project, Inc.} +501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to the research and development of technologies for online anonymity and privacy +\begin{center} +\includegraphics[height=5cm]{../images/2009-oval_sticker_new} +\end{center} +\end{frame} + +% Crash course on anonymous communications +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{What is anonymity?} +\includegraphics[width=10cm]{../images/2llg3ts} +\end{frame} + +% What is the threat model here? +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Threat model: what can the attacker do?} +\begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm} +\only<1>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{../images/single_hop_relay}} +\only<2>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{../images/evil_single_hop_relay}} +\only<3>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{../images/data_snooping_single_hop_relay}} +\end{overlayarea} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Anonymity isn't cryptography} +\begin{itemize} +\item Cryptography protects the contents in transit +\item You still know who is talking to whom, how often, and how much data is sent. +\end{itemize} +\begin{center} +\includegraphics[width=5cm]{../images/encryption-cc-by-sa} +\end{center} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Anonymity isn't steganography} +Attacker can tell Alice is talking to someone, how often, and how much data is sent. +\bigskip + +\begin{center} +\includegraphics[width=5cm]{../images/steganography-cc-by-sa} +\end{center} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Anonymity isn't just wishful thinking...} +\begin{itemize} +\item "You can't prove it was me!" +\pause \item "Promise you won't look" +\pause \item "Promise you won't remember" +\pause \item "Promise you won't tell" +\pause \item "I didn't write my name on it!" +\pause \item "Isn't the Internet already anonymous?" +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Anonymous communication} +\begin{itemize} +\item People have to hide in a crowd of other people ("anonymity loves company") +\item The goal of the system is to make all users look as similar as possible, to give a bigger crowd +\item Hide who is communicating with whom +\item Layered encryption and random delays hide correlation between input traffic and output traffic +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups} +\begin{itemize} +\item Private citizens: it's privacy +\item Businesses: it's network security +\item Governments: it's traffic-analysis resistance +\item Human rights activists: it's reachability +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{What is Tor?} +\begin{itemize} +\item Online anonymity software and network +\pause \item Open source, freely available (3-clause BSD license) +\pause \item Active research environment: \\ +Rice, UMN, NSF, NRL, Drexel, Waterloo, Cambridge UK, Bamberg Germany, Boston Univ, Harvard, MIT, RPI, Georgia Tech +\pause \item Funding from US DoD, EFF, Voice of America, Google, NLNet, +Human Rights Watch \\ +\pause \item Increasingly diverse toolset: \\ +Tor, Torbutton, Tor Browser Bundle, TAILS Anonymous Operating System, +Tor Weather, GetTor, Thandy, Orbot, Tor Check, Arm, Torouter, Tor Cloud +and more +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +% And what makes Tor different? +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{How is Tor different from other systems?} +\begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm} +\only<1>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{../../website/images/htw1}} +\only<2>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{../../website/images/htw2}} +\only<3>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{../../website/images/htw3}} +\end{overlayarea} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Tor uses a simple centralized directory protocol} +\begin{itemize} +\item Relays publish self-signed descriptors to directory authorities +\item Authorities publish a consensus list of all relay descriptors +\item Clients download latest consensus from a directory authority or a directory cache +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Bridges versus relays} +\begin{itemize} +\item A step forward in the blocking resistance race +\item Bridge relays (or "bridges" for short) are Tor relays that aren't listed in the main Tor directory +\item To use a bridge, you will need to locate one first (can be done using bridges.torproject.org, email, social media etc) +\item A bridge will act as the first hop in the circuit +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Hidden services} +\begin{itemize} +\item Tor makes it possible for users to hide their locations while offering various kinds of services, such a website or an im server +\item Using Tor "rendezvous points," other Tor users can connect to these hidden services, each without knowing the other's network identity +\item A hidden service will have an address that ends in .onion, e.g. http://duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion/ +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Encryption} +\begin{itemize} +\item Tor uses the 128-bit AES cipher in counter mode to generate a cipher stream +\item And the signing keys are 1024-bit RSA +\item We used to use a 1024-bit safe prime from RFC 2409, section 6.2 as the DH parameter... +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../images/direct-users-2010-12-01-off-300-2011-01-15-ir} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../images/bridge-users-2010-11-01-300-2011-01-14-ir} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Encryption} +\begin{itemize} +\item But then we made the DH parameter we use for TLS match the one from Apache's mod\_ssl... +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../images/direct-users-2011-01-01-off-300-2011-03-01-ir.png} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../images/bridge-users-2011-01-01-300-2011-03-01-ir.png} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Keys} +\begin{itemize} +\item Each relay maintains a long-term identity key and a short term onion key: +\begin{itemize} +\item The identity key is used to sign relay descriptors +\item The directory authorities also use the identity key to sign the consensus +\item The onion key is used to decrypt requests from clients to set up a circuit and negotiate ephemeral keys +\item The TLS protocol also establishes a short-term link key when communicating between relays +\end{itemize} +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Cells} +\includegraphics[width=10cm]{../images/cell-struct.png} +\begin{itemize} +\item Traffic passes along circuits in the Tor network in fixed-size +cells (512 bytes): +\begin{itemize} +\item The header includes a circuit identifier that specifies which +circuit the cell refers to +\item The command describes what to do with the cells payload +\item The entire contents of the header and payload is +encrypted/decrypted together as the relay cell moves along the circuit +\end{itemize} +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Tor on the wire} +\includegraphics[width=12cm]{../images/tor-keys3} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{How many people use Tor daily?} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../images/direct-users-2010-09-11-off-300-2011-09-11-all} +\end{frame} + +% Tor and circumvention +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Attackers can block access to the network} +\begin{itemize} +\item By blocking access to the directory authorities +\item By blocking access to all the relays in the network +\item By blocking access to all known bridges in the network +\item By preventing users from finding the software +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +% China +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Tor and circumvention in China} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../images/direct-users-2010-09-11-off-300-2011-09-11-cn} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Tor and circumvention in China} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../images/bridge-users-2010-09-11-300-2011-09-11-cn} +\end{frame} + +% Egypt +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Tor and circumvention in Egypt} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../images/direct-users-2010-09-11-off-300-2011-09-11-eg} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Tor and circumvention in Egypt} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../images/bridge-users-2010-09-11-300-2011-09-11-eg} +\end{frame} + +% Libya +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Tor and circumvention in Libya} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../images/direct-users-2010-09-11-off-300-2011-09-11-ly} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Tor and circumvention in Libya} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../images/bridge-users-2010-09-11-300-2011-09-11-ly} +\end{frame} + +% Future work +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Future work, part 1} +\begin{itemize} +\item The Torouter project: hardware project to provide an easy to setup Tor bridge or relay +\item The Tor Cloud project: provides bridge-by-default and relay-by-default images for Amazon EC2 +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Future work, part 2} +\begin{itemize} +\item Pluggable transports: a plug-in system that can evade many censorship systems by disguising Tor traffic as, for example, standard HTTP traffic +\item Obfuscated proxy: protocol obfuscation for TCP protocols prevent third party from identifying protocol based on message contents +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Future work, part 3} +\begin{itemize} +\item Censorship resistance research: reachability testing of the Tor network from within certain countries +\item IPv6: goal for Tor 0.2.3.x is for bridges to handle IPv6-only clients and exits can handle IPv6 addresses +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +% Demonstration of TBB +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Time for a demo} +Demonstration of Tor Browser Bundle +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{} +\begin{center} +\large Questions? \\ +\vspace{10 mm} +runa(a)torproject.org \\ +https://www.torproject.org/ +\end{center} +\end{frame} + +\end{document}

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r25064: {} images for my presentation (projects/presentations/images)
by Runa Sandvik 12 Sep '11

12 Sep '11

Author: runa Date: 2011-09-12 20:56:51 +0000 (Mon, 12 Sep 2011) New Revision: 25064 Added: projects/presentations/images/bridge-users-2010-09-11-300-2011-09-11-cn.png projects/presentations/images/bridge-users-2010-09-11-300-2011-09-11-eg.png projects/presentations/images/bridge-users-2010-09-11-300-2011-09-11-ly.png projects/presentations/images/bridge-users-2010-11-01-300-2011-01-14-ir.png projects/presentations/images/bridge-users-2011-01-01-300-2011-03-01-ir.png projects/presentations/images/cell-struct.png projects/presentations/images/direct-users-2010-09-11-off-300-2011-09-11-all.png projects/presentations/images/direct-users-2010-09-11-off-300-2011-09-11-cn.png projects/presentations/images/direct-users-2010-09-11-off-300-2011-09-11-eg.png projects/presentations/images/direct-users-2010-09-11-off-300-2011-09-11-ly.png projects/presentations/images/direct-users-2010-12-01-off-300-2011-01-15-ir.png projects/presentations/images/direct-users-2011-01-01-off-300-2011-03-01-ir.png projects/presentations/images/onion.jpg Log: images for my presentation Added: projects/presentations/images/bridge-users-2010-09-11-300-2011-09-11-cn.png =================================================================== (Binary files differ) Property changes on: projects/presentations/images/bridge-users-2010-09-11-300-2011-09-11-cn.png ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:mime-type + application/octet-stream Added: projects/presentations/images/bridge-users-2010-09-11-300-2011-09-11-eg.png =================================================================== (Binary files differ) Property changes on: projects/presentations/images/bridge-users-2010-09-11-300-2011-09-11-eg.png ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:mime-type + application/octet-stream Added: projects/presentations/images/bridge-users-2010-09-11-300-2011-09-11-ly.png =================================================================== 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[arm/master] Util function for getting a relay's exit policy
by atagar＠torproject.org 12 Sep '11

12 Sep '11

commit 2828ee86dee7028bc2a1265a26204f54af45c181 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 12 10:07:52 2011 -0700 Util function for getting a relay's exit policy Function that fetches a relay's exit policy, first using the descriptor and falling back to its consensus entry. I'm a little concerned that obsolete descriptor data can throw this off but not sure of a better method for doing this... --- src/util/torTools.py | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/util/torTools.py b/src/util/torTools.py index c81847c..7c14d18 100644 --- a/src/util/torTools.py +++ b/src/util/torTools.py @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import Queue from TorCtl import TorCtl, TorUtil -from util import enum, log, procTools, sysTools, uiTools +from util import connections, enum, log, procTools, sysTools, uiTools # enums for tor's controller state: # INIT - attached to a new controller @@ -1117,10 +1117,10 @@ class Controller(TorCtl.PostEventListener): isPrivateRejected = self.getOption("ExitPolicyRejectPrivate", True) if isPrivateRejected: - result = ExitPolicy("reject private", result) - myAddress = self.getInfo("address") if myAddress: result = ExitPolicy("reject %s" % myAddress, result) + + result = ExitPolicy("reject private", result) else: # no ORPort is set so all relaying is disabled result = ExitPolicy("reject *:*", None) @@ -1250,6 +1250,78 @@ class Controller(TorCtl.PostEventListener): return result + def getRelayExitPolicy(self, relayFingerprint, allowImprecision = True): + """ + Provides the ExitPolicy instance associated with the given relay. The tor + consensus entries don't indicate if private addresses are rejected or + address-specific policies, so this is only used as a fallback if a recent + descriptor is unavailable. This returns None if unable to determine the + policy. + + Arguments: + relayFingerprint - fingerprint of the relay + allowImprecision - make use of consensus policies as a fallback + """ + + self.connLock.acquire() + + result = None + if self.isAlive(): + # attempts to fetch the policy via the descriptor + descriptor = self.getDescriptorEntry(relayFingerprint) + + if descriptor: + exitPolicyEntries = [] + for line in descriptor.split("\n"): + if line.startswith("accept ") or line.startswith("reject "): + exitPolicyEntries.append(line) + + # construct the policy chain + for entry in reversed(exitPolicyEntries): + result = ExitPolicy(entry, result) + elif allowImprecision: + # Falls back to using the consensus entry, which is both less precise + # and unavailable with older tor versions. This assumes that the relay + # has ExitPolicyRejectPrivate set and won't include address-specific + # policies. + + consensusLine, relayAddress = None, None + + nsEntry = self.getConsensusEntry(relayFingerprint) + if nsEntry: + for line in nsEntry.split("\n"): + if line.startswith("r "): + # fetch the relay's public address, which we'll need for the + # ExitPolicyRejectPrivate policy entry + + lineComp = line.split(" ") + if len(lineComp) >= 7 and connections.isValidIpAddress(lineComp[6]): + relayAddress = lineComp[6] + elif line.startswith("p "): + consensusLine = line + break + + if consensusLine: + acceptance, ports = consensusLine.split(" ")[1:] + + # starts with a reject-all for whitelists and accept-all for blacklists + if acceptance == "accept": + result = ExitPolicy("reject *:*", None) + else: + result = ExitPolicy("accept *:*", None) + + # adds each of the ports listed in the consensus + for port in reversed(ports.split(",")): + result = ExitPolicy("%s *:%s" % (acceptance, port), result) + + # adds ExitPolicyRejectPrivate since this is the default + if relayAddress: result = ExitPolicy("reject %s" % relayAddress, result) + result = ExitPolicy("reject private", result) + + self.connLock.release() + + return result + def getRelayAddress(self, relayFingerprint, default = None): """ Provides the (IP Address, ORPort) tuple for a given relay. If the lookup

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[arm/master] Previous cookie path change broke general uses
by atagar＠torproject.org 12 Sep '11

12 Sep '11

commit e5fa6d9b99f7eabac6d86e1d4952173d4aad70f5 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 12 08:36:26 2011 -0700 Previous cookie path change broke general uses The hack to account for os.path.join's dumb implementation broke the general use case where the user *doesn't* have a path prefix by making it relative... oops. --- src/starter.py | 9 +++++---- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/starter.py b/src/starter.py index e4e7096..dd5f5c9 100644 --- a/src/starter.py +++ b/src/starter.py @@ -233,10 +233,11 @@ def _torCtlConnect(controlAddr="127.0.0.1", controlPort=9051, passphrase=None, i # with the second argument then it will swallow the prefix. Ie... # os.path.join("/tmp", "/foo") => "/foo" - pathSuffix = conn._cookiePath - if pathSuffix.startswith("/"): pathSuffix = pathSuffix[1:] - - conn._cookiePath = os.path.join(pathPrefix, pathSuffix) + if pathPrefix: + pathSuffix = conn._cookiePath + if pathSuffix.startswith("/"): pathSuffix = pathSuffix[1:] + + conn._cookiePath = os.path.join(pathPrefix, pathSuffix) conn.authenticate(authValue) return conn

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[arm/master] Accounting for os.path.join being stupid
by atagar＠torproject.org 12 Sep '11

12 Sep '11

commit 45b47166af00edc4e59c46548c2e52672042b9e3 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 12 08:27:01 2011 -0700 Accounting for os.path.join being stupid The os.path.join function simply doesn't work if the second argument is an absolute path. That is stupid. Working around this by making its second argument relative. --- src/starter.py | 10 +++++++++- 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/starter.py b/src/starter.py index 6953cf4..e4e7096 100644 --- a/src/starter.py +++ b/src/starter.py @@ -228,7 +228,15 @@ def _torCtlConnect(controlAddr="127.0.0.1", controlPort=9051, passphrase=None, i # appends the path prefix if it's set if authType == TorCtl.TorCtl.AUTH_TYPE.COOKIE: pathPrefix = util.torTools.getConn().getPathPrefix() - authValue = os.path.join(pathPrefix, authValue) + + # The os.path.join function is kinda stupid. If given an absolute path + # with the second argument then it will swallow the prefix. Ie... + # os.path.join("/tmp", "/foo") => "/foo" + + pathSuffix = conn._cookiePath + if pathSuffix.startswith("/"): pathSuffix = pathSuffix[1:] + + conn._cookiePath = os.path.join(pathPrefix, pathSuffix) conn.authenticate(authValue) return conn

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[tor/release-0.2.2] fold in recent changelog entries
by arma＠torproject.org 12 Sep '11

12 Sep '11

commit 9d1ea45b583853ab8b1e60eb5a4dd3aac7803729 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 12 06:04:08 2011 -0400 fold in recent changelog entries --- ChangeLog | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- changes/bug2442 | 8 -------- changes/bug2442b | 8 -------- changes/geoip-september2011 | 3 --- changes/typo-fix-ohkah8Ah | 9 --------- 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index ddc3b5c..ba1d375 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.33 - 2011-09-?? - Add a VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2 configuration option to allow directory authorities to abstain from voting on assignment of the HSDir consensus flag. Related to bug 2649. + - Update to the September 6 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. + - Change the default required uptime for a relay to be accepted as + a HSDir from 24 hours to 25 hours. Improves on 0.2.0.10-alpha; + resolves ticket 2649. o Minor bugfixes: - Correct the man page to explain that HashedControlPassword and @@ -27,9 +31,20 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.33 - 2011-09-?? is sufficient to authenticate to Tor. Bugfix on 0.2.0.7-alpha, when we decided to allow these config options to both be set. Issue raised by bug 3898. - - Change the default required uptime for a relay to be accepted as - a HSDir from 24 hours to 25 hours. Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha; - fixes bug 2649. + - Demote the 'replay detected' log message emitted when a hidden + service receives the same Diffie-Hellman public key in two different + INTRODUCE2 cells to info level. A normal Tor client can cause that + log message during its normal operation. Bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha; + fixes part of bug 2442. + - Demote the 'INTRODUCE2 cell is too {old,new}' log message to info + level. There is nothing that a hidden service's operator can do + to fix its clients' clocks. Bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha; fixes part + of bug 2442. + - Clarify a log message specifying the characters permitted in + HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient client names. Previously, the log + message said that "[A-Za-z0-9+-_]" were permitted; that could have + given the impression that every ASCII character between "+" and "_" + was permitted. Now we say "[A-Za-z0-9+_-]". Bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha. o Build fixes: - Provide a substitute implementation of lround() for MSVC, which diff --git a/changes/bug2442 b/changes/bug2442 deleted file mode 100644 index cbcc22b..0000000 --- a/changes/bug2442 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ - * Minor bugfixes: - - - Demote the 'replay detected' log message emitted when a hidden - service receives the same Diffie-Hellman public key in two - different INTRODUCE2 cells to info level. A normal Tor client - can cause that log message during its normal operation. Bugfix - on 0.2.1.6-alpha; fixes part of bug 2442. - diff --git a/changes/bug2442b b/changes/bug2442b deleted file mode 100644 index 02e1636..0000000 --- a/changes/bug2442b +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ - * Minor bugfixes: - - - Demote the 'INTRODUCE2 cell is too {old,new}' log message to - info level. There is nothing that a hidden service's operator - can do to fix its clients' clocks. Bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha; - fixes part of bug 2442. - - diff --git a/changes/geoip-september2011 b/changes/geoip-september2011 deleted file mode 100644 index c41314b..0000000 --- a/changes/geoip-september2011 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Update to the September 6 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. - diff --git a/changes/typo-fix-ohkah8Ah b/changes/typo-fix-ohkah8Ah deleted file mode 100644 index 9b4e5c0..0000000 --- a/changes/typo-fix-ohkah8Ah +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - * Minor bugfixes: - - - Clarify a log message specifying the characters permitted in - HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient client names. Previously, the log - message said that "[A-Za-z0-9+-_]" were permitted; that could - have given the impression that every ASCII character between "+" - and "_" was permitted. Now we say "[A-Za-z0-9+_-]". Bugfix on - 0.2.1.5-alpha. -

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.2' into release-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 12 Sep '11

12 Sep '11

commit 6d6e87f6116f98e2e8e310bed08776718739d3ac Merge: bcd99a2 d679ef6 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 12 05:55:17 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.2' into release-0.2.2 changes/bug2442 | 8 + changes/bug2442b | 8 + changes/geoip-september2011 | 3 + changes/typo-fix-ohkah8Ah | 9 + src/config/geoip | 5974 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- src/or/or.h | 7 +- src/or/rendservice.c | 15 +- 7 files changed, 4179 insertions(+), 1845 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Demote HS 'replay detected' log message for DH public keys to info level
by arma＠torproject.org 12 Sep '11

12 Sep '11

commit b10735903b8135c9295e356ad7ea2222a339ab14 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Sep 10 20:54:26 2011 -0400 Demote HS 'replay detected' log message for DH public keys to info level --- changes/bug2442 | 8 ++++++++ src/or/rendservice.c | 9 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2442 b/changes/bug2442 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cbcc22b --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2442 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + * Minor bugfixes: + + - Demote the 'replay detected' log message emitted when a hidden + service receives the same Diffie-Hellman public key in two + different INTRODUCE2 cells to info level. A normal Tor client + can cause that log message during its normal operation. Bugfix + on 0.2.1.6-alpha; fixes part of bug 2442. + diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 926f380..5f55537 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1123,7 +1123,14 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, * part 1. */ access_time = digestmap_get(service->accepted_intros, diffie_hellman_hash); if (access_time != NULL) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Possible replay detected! We received an " + /* A Tor client will send a new INTRODUCE1 cell with the same rend + * cookie and DH public key as its previous one if its intro circ + * times out while in state CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT . + * If we received the first INTRODUCE1 cell (the intro-point relay + * converts it into an INTRODUCE2 cell), we are already trying to + * connect to that rend point (and may have already succeeded); + * drop this cell. */ + log_info(LD_REND, "We received an " "INTRODUCE2 cell with same first part of " "Diffie-Hellman handshake %d seconds ago. Dropping " "cell.",

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Demote 'INTRODUCE2 cell is too {old, new}' message to info level
by arma＠torproject.org 12 Sep '11

12 Sep '11

commit 8ea6d29fe468dc91d1c7dfc45ad5b4196e89ebdd Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Sep 10 21:40:09 2011 -0400 Demote 'INTRODUCE2 cell is too {old,new}' message to info level --- changes/bug2442b | 8 ++++++++ src/or/rendservice.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2442b b/changes/bug2442b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02e1636 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2442b @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + * Minor bugfixes: + + - Demote the 'INTRODUCE2 cell is too {old,new}' log message to + info level. There is nothing that a hidden service's operator + can do to fix its clients' clocks. Bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha; + fixes part of bug 2442. + + diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 5f55537..6ed9650 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1019,7 +1019,9 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, v3_shift += 4; if ((now - ts) < -1 * REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL / 2 || (now - ts) > REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL / 2) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 cell is too %s. Discarding.", + /* This is far more likely to mean that a client's clock is + * skewed than that a replay attack is in progress. */ + log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 cell is too %s. Discarding.", (now - ts) < 0 ? "old" : "new"); return -1; }

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