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[tor/master] Make crypto_free_pk_env tolerate NULL arg in 0.2.1. Error-proofing against bug 988 backport
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 299a78c5fed3447a450cea3d4f686c2140c7aaed Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Nov 12 20:21:50 2010 -0500 Make crypto_free_pk_env tolerate NULL arg in 0.2.1. Error-proofing against bug 988 backport --- src/common/crypto.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index dffa2c7..c723c33 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -321,7 +321,8 @@ crypto_new_pk_env(void) void crypto_free_pk_env(crypto_pk_env_t *env) { - tor_assert(env); + if (!env) + return; if (--env->refs > 0) return;

1 0

[tor/master] Maintain separate server and client identity keys when appropriate.
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 59e565e2a258f6ca78273585187ff0ab9052cbe7 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun Oct 3 22:38:53 2010 -0700 Maintain separate server and client identity keys when appropriate. Fixes a bug described in ticket #988. Conflicts: src/or/main.c src/or/router.c --- src/or/connection_or.c | 5 ++- src/or/dirserv.c | 7 ++- src/or/hibernate.c | 4 +- src/or/main.c | 8 ++-- src/or/or.h | 9 ++- src/or/router.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 6 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index d402563..7817db8 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -961,6 +961,9 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, const char *safe_address = started_here ? conn->_base.address : safe_str(conn->_base.address); const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming"; + crypto_pk_env_t *our_identity = + started_here ? get_client_identity_key() : + get_server_identity_key(); int has_cert = 0, has_identity=0; check_no_tls_errors(); @@ -997,7 +1000,7 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, if (identity_rcvd) { has_identity = 1; crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd_out); - if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(get_identity_key(), identity_rcvd)<0) { + if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(our_identity, identity_rcvd)<0) { conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER; } else { conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER; diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index e367cb1..4677580 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -1520,7 +1520,8 @@ dirserv_regenerate_directory(void) { char *new_directory=NULL; - if (dirserv_dump_directory_to_string(&new_directory, get_identity_key())) { + if (dirserv_dump_directory_to_string(&new_directory, + get_server_identity_key())) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Error creating directory."); tor_free(new_directory); return NULL; @@ -1550,7 +1551,7 @@ generate_runningrouters(void) char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; size_t len; - crypto_pk_env_t *private_key = get_identity_key(); + crypto_pk_env_t *private_key = get_server_identity_key(); char *identity_pkey; /* Identity key, DER64-encoded. */ size_t identity_pkey_len; @@ -2441,7 +2442,7 @@ generate_v2_networkstatus_opinion(void) smartlist_t *routers = NULL; digestmap_t *omit_as_sybil = NULL; - private_key = get_identity_key(); + private_key = get_server_identity_key(); if (resolve_my_address(LOG_WARN, options, &addr, &hostname)<0) { log_warn(LD_NET, "Couldn't resolve my hostname"); diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.c b/src/or/hibernate.c index 9ec6375..04e06c8 100644 --- a/src/or/hibernate.c +++ b/src/or/hibernate.c @@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ accounting_set_wakeup_time(void) uint64_t time_to_exhaust_bw; int time_to_consider; - if (! identity_key_is_set()) { + if (! server_identity_key_is_set()) { if (init_keys() < 0) { log_err(LD_BUG, "Error initializing keys"); tor_assert(0); @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ accounting_set_wakeup_time(void) } format_iso_time(buf, interval_start_time); - crypto_pk_get_digest(get_identity_key(), digest); + crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest); d_env = crypto_new_digest_env(); crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, buf, ISO_TIME_LEN); diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 00fce80..466801c 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -874,8 +874,8 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) if (last_rotated_x509_certificate+MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL < now) { log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Rotating tls context."); if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options), - get_identity_key(), - is_server ? get_identity_key() : NULL, + get_client_identity_key(), + is_server ? get_server_identity_key() : NULL, MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Error reinitializing TLS context"); /* XXX is it a bug here, that we just keep going? -RD */ @@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ do_main_loop(void) /* load the private keys, if we're supposed to have them, and set up the * TLS context. */ - if (! identity_key_is_set()) { + if (! client_identity_key_is_set()) { if (init_keys() < 0) { log_err(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); return -1; @@ -2020,7 +2020,7 @@ do_list_fingerprint(void) log_err(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; can't display fingerprint"); return -1; } - if (!(k = get_identity_key())) { + if (!(k = get_server_identity_key())) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error: missing identity key."); return -1; } diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index f405113..a594d6f 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4205,9 +4205,12 @@ int rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, crypto_pk_env_t *get_onion_key(void); time_t get_onion_key_set_at(void); -void set_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k); -crypto_pk_env_t *get_identity_key(void); -int identity_key_is_set(void); +void set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k); +void set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k); +crypto_pk_env_t *get_client_identity_key(void); +crypto_pk_env_t *get_server_identity_key(void); +int client_identity_key_is_set(void); +int server_identity_key_is_set(void); authority_cert_t *get_my_v3_authority_cert(void); crypto_pk_env_t *get_my_v3_authority_signing_key(void); authority_cert_t *get_my_v3_legacy_cert(void); diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index dce2ad6..c53bb8b 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -31,11 +31,15 @@ static crypto_pk_env_t *onionkey=NULL; /** Previous private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells * generated by clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */ static crypto_pk_env_t *lastonionkey=NULL; -/** Private "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS +/** Private server "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS * certificates. Never changes. */ -static crypto_pk_env_t *identitykey=NULL; -/** Digest of identitykey. */ -static char identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; +static crypto_pk_env_t *server_identitykey=NULL; +/** Digest of server_identitykey. */ +static char server_identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; +/** Private client "identity key": used to sign bridges' and clients' + * outbound TLS certificates. Regenerated on startup and on IP address + * change. */ +static crypto_pk_env_t *client_identitykey=NULL; /** Signing key used for v3 directory material; only set for authorities. */ static crypto_pk_env_t *authority_signing_key = NULL; /** Key certificate to authenticate v3 directory material; only set for @@ -106,32 +110,59 @@ get_onion_key_set_at(void) return onionkey_set_at; } -/** Set the current identity key to k. +/** Set the current server identity key to k. */ void -set_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) +set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) { - if (identitykey) - crypto_free_pk_env(identitykey); - identitykey = k; - crypto_pk_get_digest(identitykey, identitykey_digest); + if (server_identitykey) + crypto_free_pk_env(server_identitykey); + server_identitykey = k; + crypto_pk_get_digest(server_identitykey, server_identitykey_digest); } -/** Returns the current identity key; requires that the identity key has been - * set. +/** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has + * been set. */ crypto_pk_env_t * -get_identity_key(void) +get_server_identity_key(void) { - tor_assert(identitykey); - return identitykey; + tor_assert(server_identitykey); + return server_identitykey; } -/** Return true iff the identity key has been set. */ +/** Return true iff the server identity key has been set. */ int -identity_key_is_set(void) +server_identity_key_is_set(void) { - return identitykey != NULL; + return server_identitykey != NULL; +} + +/** Set the current client identity key to k. + */ +void +set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) +{ + if (client_identitykey) + crypto_free_pk_env(client_identitykey); + client_identitykey = k; +} + +/** Returns the current client identity key; requires that the key has + * been set. + */ +crypto_pk_env_t * +get_client_identity_key(void) +{ + tor_assert(client_identitykey); + return client_identitykey; +} + +/** Return true iff the client identity key has been set. */ +int +client_identity_key_is_set(void) +{ + return client_identitykey != NULL; } /** Return the key certificate for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL @@ -456,10 +487,10 @@ init_keys(void) crypto_free_pk_env(prkey); return -1; } - set_identity_key(prkey); + set_client_identity_key(prkey); /* Create a TLS context. */ if (tor_tls_context_init(0, - get_identity_key(), + get_client_identity_key(), NULL, MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client."); @@ -496,13 +527,28 @@ init_keys(void) } } - /* 1. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */ + /* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */ keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_id_key"); log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir); prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR); tor_free(keydir); if (!prkey) return -1; - set_identity_key(prkey); + set_server_identity_key(prkey); + + /* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key; + * otherwise, set the server identity key as our client identity + * key. */ + if (public_server_mode(options)) { + set_client_identity_key(prkey); /* set above */ + } else { + if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env())) + return -1; + if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) { + crypto_free_pk_env(prkey); + return -1; + } + set_client_identity_key(prkey); + } /* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */ keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key"); @@ -540,8 +586,8 @@ init_keys(void) /* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */ if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options), - get_identity_key(), - get_identity_key(), + get_client_identity_key(), + get_server_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context"); return -1; @@ -553,7 +599,8 @@ init_keys(void) const char *m = NULL; routerinfo_t *ri; /* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */ - if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(options->Nickname, get_identity_key())) { + if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(options->Nickname, + get_server_identity_key())) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error adding own fingerprint to approved set"); return -1; } @@ -574,7 +621,8 @@ init_keys(void) /* 5. Dump fingerprint to 'fingerprint' */ keydir = get_datadir_fname("fingerprint"); log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Dumping fingerprint to \"%s\"...",keydir); - if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_identity_key(), fingerprint, 0)<0) { + if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(), + fingerprint, 0) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing fingerprint"); tor_free(keydir); return -1; @@ -612,7 +660,7 @@ init_keys(void) return -1; } /* 6b. [authdirserver only] add own key to approved directories. */ - crypto_pk_get_digest(get_identity_key(), digest); + crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest); type = ((options->V1AuthoritativeDir ? V1_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) | (options->V2AuthoritativeDir ? V2_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) | (options->V3AuthoritativeDir ? V3_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) | @@ -1130,11 +1178,12 @@ router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(edge_connection_t *conn) } /** Return true iff I'm a server and digest is equal to - * my identity digest. */ + * my server identity key digest. */ int router_digest_is_me(const char *digest) { - return identitykey && tor_memeq(identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + return (server_identitykey && + tor_memeq(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN)); } /** Return true iff I'm a server and digest is equal to @@ -1271,7 +1320,7 @@ router_rebuild_descriptor(int force) ri->cache_info.published_on = time(NULL); ri->onion_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_onion_key()); /* must invoke from * main thread */ - ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_identity_key()); + ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_server_identity_key()); if (crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey, ri->cache_info.identity_digest)<0) { routerinfo_free(ri); @@ -1363,7 +1412,7 @@ router_rebuild_descriptor(int force) DIGEST_LEN); ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(8192); if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, 8192, - ei, get_identity_key()) < 0) { + ei, get_server_identity_key()) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor."); routerinfo_free(ri); extrainfo_free(ei); @@ -1380,7 +1429,7 @@ router_rebuild_descriptor(int force) DIGEST_LEN); ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(8192); if (router_dump_router_to_string(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, 8192, - ri, get_identity_key())<0) { + ri, get_server_identity_key()) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor."); routerinfo_free(ri); extrainfo_free(ei); @@ -2029,8 +2078,10 @@ router_free_all(void) crypto_free_pk_env(onionkey); if (lastonionkey) crypto_free_pk_env(lastonionkey); - if (identitykey) - crypto_free_pk_env(identitykey); + if (server_identitykey) + crypto_free_pk_env(server_identitykey); + if (client_identitykey) + crypto_free_pk_env(client_identitykey); if (key_lock) tor_mutex_free(key_lock); if (desc_routerinfo)

1 0

[tor/master] Add some asserts to get_{tlsclient|server}_identity_key
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit dc557e8164003d6c09b620333902d7dae3762794 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Oct 21 13:54:12 2010 -0400 Add some asserts to get_{tlsclient|server}_identity_key We now require that: - Only actual servers should ever call get_server_identity_key - If you're being a client or bridge, the client and server keys should differ. - If you're being a public relay, the client and server keys should be the same. --- src/or/router.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index f7a50ae..96aca88 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -121,13 +121,32 @@ set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) crypto_pk_get_digest(server_identitykey, server_identitykey_digest); } +/** Make sure that we have set up our identity keys to match or not match as + * appropriate, and die with an assertion if we have not. */ +static void +assert_identity_keys_ok(void) +{ + tor_assert(client_identitykey); + if (public_server_mode(get_options())) { + /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be equal */ + tor_assert(server_identitykey); + tor_assert(0==crypto_pk_cmp_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey)); + } else { + /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be unequal */ + if (server_identitykey) + tor_assert(0!=crypto_pk_cmp_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey)); + } +} + /** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has - * been set. + * been set, and that we are running as a Tor server. */ crypto_pk_env_t * get_server_identity_key(void) { tor_assert(server_identitykey); + tor_assert(server_mode(get_options())); + assert_identity_keys_ok(); return server_identitykey; } @@ -155,6 +174,7 @@ crypto_pk_env_t * get_tlsclient_identity_key(void) { tor_assert(client_identitykey); + assert_identity_keys_ok(); return client_identitykey; }

1 0

[tor/master] Don't crash when accountingmax is set in non-server Tors
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit d0a91386e5b85c5a0db3981a294c7a75192f9c3a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Dec 3 13:37:13 2010 -0500 Don't crash when accountingmax is set in non-server Tors We use a hash of the identity key to seed a prng to tell when an accounting period should end. But thanks to the bug998 changes, clients no longer have server-identity keys to use as a long-term seed in accounting calculations. In any case, their identity keys (as used in TLS) were never never fixed. So we can just set the wakeup time from a random seed instead there. Still open is whether everybody should be random. This patch fixes bug 2235, which was introduced in 0.2.2.18-alpha. Diagnosed with help from boboper on irc. --- changes/bug2235 | 3 +++ src/or/hibernate.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2235 b/changes/bug2235 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c3bafa --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2235 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes + - Avoid crashes when AccountingMax is set on clients. Fixes bug 2235; + Bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. Diagnosed by boboper. diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.c b/src/or/hibernate.c index 04e06c8..dfc4edf 100644 --- a/src/or/hibernate.c +++ b/src/or/hibernate.c @@ -463,14 +463,19 @@ accounting_set_wakeup_time(void) } } - format_iso_time(buf, interval_start_time); - crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest); - - d_env = crypto_new_digest_env(); - crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, buf, ISO_TIME_LEN); - crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN); - crypto_digest_get_digest(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN); - crypto_free_digest_env(d_env); + if (server_identity_key_is_set()) { + format_iso_time(buf, interval_start_time); + + crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest); + + d_env = crypto_new_digest_env(); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, buf, ISO_TIME_LEN); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + crypto_digest_get_digest(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + crypto_free_digest_env(d_env); + } else { + crypto_rand(digest, DIGEST_LEN); + } if (!expected_bandwidth_usage) { char buf1[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];

1 0

[tor/master] Properly refcount client_identity_key
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 3a890b3b70d53ac864be682f50f07ba07b8f09ba Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 26 18:22:04 2010 +0200 Properly refcount client_identity_key In a2bb0bf we started using a separate client identity key. When we are in "public server mode" (that means not a bridge) we will use the same key. Reusing the key without doing the proper refcounting leads to a segfault on cleanup during shutdown. Fix that. Also introduce an assert that triggers if our refcount falls below 0. That should never happen. --- src/common/crypto.c | 1 + src/or/router.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index c723c33..a444cf1 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ crypto_free_pk_env(crypto_pk_env_t *env) if (--env->refs > 0) return; + tor_assert(env->refs == 0); if (env->key) RSA_free(env->key); diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 96aca88..c471599 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ init_keys(void) * otherwise, set the server identity key as our client identity * key. */ if (public_server_mode(options)) { - set_client_identity_key(prkey); /* set above */ + set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(prkey)); /* set above */ } else { if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env())) return -1;

1 0

[tor/master] Rename get_client_identity_key to get_tlsclient_identity_key
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 2a2301e41117ad8439dbe8039085202fa0d6f6ed Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Oct 21 13:53:31 2010 -0400 Rename get_client_identity_key to get_tlsclient_identity_key --- src/or/connection_or.c | 2 +- src/or/main.c | 2 +- src/or/or.h | 2 +- src/or/router.c | 10 +++++----- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 7817db8..95cc02e 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, started_here ? conn->_base.address : safe_str(conn->_base.address); const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming"; crypto_pk_env_t *our_identity = - started_here ? get_client_identity_key() : + started_here ? get_tlsclient_identity_key() : get_server_identity_key(); int has_cert = 0, has_identity=0; diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 466801c..ba704f5 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) if (last_rotated_x509_certificate+MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL < now) { log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Rotating tls context."); if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options), - get_client_identity_key(), + get_tlsclient_identity_key(), is_server ? get_server_identity_key() : NULL, MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Error reinitializing TLS context"); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index a594d6f..4105ff4 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4207,7 +4207,7 @@ crypto_pk_env_t *get_onion_key(void); time_t get_onion_key_set_at(void); void set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k); void set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k); -crypto_pk_env_t *get_client_identity_key(void); +crypto_pk_env_t *get_tlsclient_identity_key(void); crypto_pk_env_t *get_server_identity_key(void); int client_identity_key_is_set(void); int server_identity_key_is_set(void); diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index c53bb8b..f7a50ae 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -148,11 +148,11 @@ set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) client_identitykey = k; } -/** Returns the current client identity key; requires that the key has - * been set. +/** Returns the current client identity key for use on outgoing TLS + * connections; requires that the key has been set. */ crypto_pk_env_t * -get_client_identity_key(void) +get_tlsclient_identity_key(void) { tor_assert(client_identitykey); return client_identitykey; @@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ init_keys(void) set_client_identity_key(prkey); /* Create a TLS context. */ if (tor_tls_context_init(0, - get_client_identity_key(), + get_tlsclient_identity_key(), NULL, MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client."); @@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ init_keys(void) /* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */ if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options), - get_client_identity_key(), + get_tlsclient_identity_key(), get_server_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context");

1 0

[tor/master] Reinit keys at the start of options_act().
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 55d9e4b8bad18a99d51b0b6347cef46e730dceda Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 23 16:38:35 2011 -0400 Reinit keys at the start of options_act(). Previously we did this nearer to the end (in the old_options && transition_affects_workers() block). But other stuff cares about keys being consistent with options... particularly anything which tries to access a key, which can die in assert_identity_keys_ok(). Fixes bug 3228; bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. Conflicts: src/or/config.c --- changes/bug3228 | 3 +++ src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3228 b/changes/bug3228 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4aca810 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3228 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Resolve a crash that occured when setting BridgeRelay to 1 with + accounting enabled. Fixes bug 3228; bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 7d7f2c3..ea389ff 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1269,12 +1269,26 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) or_options_t *options = get_options(); int running_tor = options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR; char *msg; + const int transition_affects_workers = + old_options && options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options); if (running_tor && !have_lockfile()) { if (try_locking(options, 1) < 0) return -1; } + /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else: + keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */ + if (running_tor && + (transition_affects_workers || + (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && (!old_options || + !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir)))) { + if (init_keys() < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); + return -1; + } + } + if (consider_adding_dir_authorities(options, old_options) < 0) return -1; @@ -1368,14 +1382,10 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) geoip_remove_old_clients(time(NULL)+(2*60*60)); } - if (options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options)) { + if (transition_affects_workers) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Worker-related options changed. Rotating workers."); - if (init_keys() < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); - return -1; - } if (server_mode(options) && !server_mode(old_options)) { ip_address_changed(0); if (has_completed_circuit || !any_predicted_circuits(time(NULL))) @@ -1388,9 +1398,6 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) if (dns_reset()) return -1; } - - if (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir) - init_keys(); } /* Maybe load geoip file */

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[tor/master] Fix assert for relay/bridge state change
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 908289894419b8fa331197948cb048f08ff5d035 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 25 15:28:58 2011 +0100 Fix assert for relay/bridge state change When we added support for separate client tls certs on bridges in a2bb0bfdd5 we forgot to correctly initialize this when changing from relay to bridge or vice versa while Tor is running. Fix that by always initializing keys when the state changes. Fixes bug 2433. Conflicts: src/or/config.c --- changes/bug2433 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2433 b/changes/bug2433 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e47c4f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2433 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Don't assert when changing from bridge to relay or vice versa with a controller. + The assert happened because we didn't properly initialize our keys in this case. + Bugfix on 0.2.2.18, fixes bug 2433. Issue first discovered by bastik. + diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index fbfa771..7d7f2c3 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1371,11 +1371,12 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) if (options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options)) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Worker-related options changed. Rotating workers."); + + if (init_keys() < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); + return -1; + } if (server_mode(options) && !server_mode(old_options)) { - if (init_keys() < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); - return -1; - } ip_address_changed(0); if (has_completed_circuit || !any_predicted_circuits(time(NULL))) inform_testing_reachability(); @@ -3763,6 +3764,7 @@ options_transition_affects_workers(or_options_t *old_options, new_options->ServerDNSSearchDomains || old_options->SafeLogging != new_options->SafeLogging || old_options->ClientOnly != new_options->ClientOnly || + public_server_mode(old_options) != public_server_mode(new_options) || !config_lines_eq(old_options->Logs, new_options->Logs)) return 1;

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[tor/master] Don't crash a bridge authority on SIGHUP if it's not in the consensus
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit 62c29a93ba78ad6ae91b87755ed8cc0283d27e56 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Feb 16 04:12:37 2011 -0800 Don't crash a bridge authority on SIGHUP if it's not in the consensus Fixes bug 2572. --- changes/bug2572 | 5 +++++ src/or/router.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2572 b/changes/bug2572 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a5cca28 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2572 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Don't crash a bridge authority on SIGHUP if it can't force itself + into its routerlist. Fixes bug 2572. + + diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index c471599..7354267 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ init_keys(void) /* 4. Build our router descriptor. */ /* Must be called after keys are initialized. */ mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor(); - if (authdir_mode(options)) { + if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)) { const char *m = NULL; routerinfo_t *ri; /* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */

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[tor/master] stop asserting at boot
by arma＠torproject.org 26 Oct '11

26 Oct '11

commit cecc5b7aa1030eddcf1a613d103b81f5cb98e959 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 23:50:37 2011 -0400 stop asserting at boot The patch for 3228 made us try to run init_keys() before we had loaded our state file, resulting in an assert inside init_keys. We had moved it too early in the function. Now it's later in the function, but still above the accounting calls. --- src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index ea389ff..16b5e9c 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1277,18 +1277,6 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) return -1; } - /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else: - keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */ - if (running_tor && - (transition_affects_workers || - (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && (!old_options || - !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir)))) { - if (init_keys() < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); - return -1; - } - } - if (consider_adding_dir_authorities(options, old_options) < 0) return -1; @@ -1333,6 +1321,17 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) finish_daemon(options->DataDirectory); } + /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else: + keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */ + if (transition_affects_workers || + (options->V3AuthoritativeDir && (!old_options || + !old_options->V3AuthoritativeDir))) { + if (init_keys() < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting"); + return -1; + } + } + /* Write our PID to the PID file. If we do not have write permissions we * will log a warning */ if (running_tor && options->PidFile)

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