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[tor/master] We no longer need to detect openssl without RAND_poll()
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Jan '12

10 Jan '12

commit 5741aef3dc0dc245ab930c21b277a5a829c9970d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jan 5 15:08:05 2012 -0500 We no longer need to detect openssl without RAND_poll() We require openssl 0.9.7 or later, and RAND_poll() was first added in openssl 0.9.6. --- changes/readable_ssl_versions | 2 ++ src/common/crypto.c | 10 +--------- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/readable_ssl_versions b/changes/readable_ssl_versions index 8c8e06c..f34998c 100644 --- a/changes/readable_ssl_versions +++ b/changes/readable_ssl_versions @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ o Code simplification and refactoring: - Use macros to indicate OpenSSL versions, so we don't need to worry about accidental hexadecimal bit shifts. + - Remove some workaround code for OpenSSL 0.9.6, which is no longer + supported. diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index aa8ceed..35d6dfa 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2360,12 +2360,6 @@ crypto_dh_free(crypto_dh_env_t *dh) * work for us too. */ #define ADD_ENTROPY 32 -/** True iff we should use OpenSSL's RAND_poll function to add entropy to its - * pool. - * - * Use RAND_poll if OpenSSL is 0.9.6 release or later. */ -#define HAVE_RAND_POLL (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_NOPATCH(0,9,6)) - /** True iff it's safe to use RAND_poll after setup. * * Versions of OpenSSL prior to 0.9.7k and 0.9.8c had a bug where RAND_poll @@ -2409,8 +2403,7 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup) size_t n; #endif -#if HAVE_RAND_POLL - /* OpenSSL 0.9.6 adds a RAND_poll function that knows about more kinds of + /* OpenSSL has a RAND_poll function that knows about more kinds of * entropy than we do. We'll try calling that, *and* calling our own entropy * functions. If one succeeds, we'll accept the RNG as seeded. */ if (startup || RAND_POLL_IS_SAFE) { @@ -2418,7 +2411,6 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup) if (rand_poll_status == 0) log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "RAND_poll() failed."); } -#endif #ifdef MS_WINDOWS if (!provider_set) {

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[tor/master] Add macros to construct openssl version numbers
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Jan '12

10 Jan '12

commit 85c7d7659ea1b9c99c13596e943260ad2e396483 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jan 5 15:05:17 2012 -0500 Add macros to construct openssl version numbers It's a pain to convert 0x0090813f to and from 0.9.8s-release on the fly, so these macros should help. --- changes/readable_ssl_versions | 4 ++++ src/common/aes.c | 3 ++- src/common/crypto.c | 19 +++++++++---------- src/common/crypto.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/tortls.c | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- 5 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/readable_ssl_versions b/changes/readable_ssl_versions new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c8e06c --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/readable_ssl_versions @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Code simplification and refactoring: + - Use macros to indicate OpenSSL versions, so we don't need to worry + about accidental hexadecimal bit shifts. + diff --git a/src/common/aes.c b/src/common/aes.c index 9487cdd..5791e66 100644 --- a/src/common/aes.c +++ b/src/common/aes.c @@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ #include <openssl/aes.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/engine.h> -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000001fL +#include "crypto.h" +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'a') /* See comments about which counter mode implementation to use below. */ #include <openssl/modes.h> #define USE_OPENSSL_CTR diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index d1d823d..aa8ceed 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ #include "container.h" #include "compat.h" -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000l +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,7) #error "We require OpenSSL >= 0.9.7" #endif @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ /** Longest recognized */ #define MAX_DNS_LABEL_SIZE 63 -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00908000l +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8) /** @{ */ /** On OpenSSL versions before 0.9.8, there is no working SHA256 * implementation, so we use Tom St Denis's nice speedy one, slightly adapted @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(crypto_pk_env_t *env, int bits) if (env->key) RSA_free(env->key); -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00908000l +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8) /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7, RSA_generate_key is all we have. */ env->key = RSA_generate_key(bits, 65537, NULL, NULL); #else @@ -1723,7 +1723,7 @@ crypto_hmac_sha256(char *hmac_out, const char *key, size_t key_len, const char *msg, size_t msg_len) { -#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000l) +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8) /* If we've got OpenSSL >=0.9.8 we can use its hmac implementation. */ tor_assert(key_len < INT_MAX); tor_assert(msg_len < INT_MAX); @@ -2363,9 +2363,8 @@ crypto_dh_free(crypto_dh_env_t *dh) /** True iff we should use OpenSSL's RAND_poll function to add entropy to its * pool. * - * Use RAND_poll if OpenSSL is 0.9.6 release or later. (The "f" means - *"release".) */ -#define HAVE_RAND_POLL (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090600fl) + * Use RAND_poll if OpenSSL is 0.9.6 release or later. */ +#define HAVE_RAND_POLL (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_NOPATCH(0,9,6)) /** True iff it's safe to use RAND_poll after setup. * @@ -2374,9 +2373,9 @@ crypto_dh_free(crypto_dh_env_t *dh) * that fd without checking whether it fit in the fd_set. Thus, if the * system has not just been started up, it is unsafe to call */ #define RAND_POLL_IS_SAFE \ - ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x009070afl && \ - OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x00907fffl) || \ - (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090803fl)) + ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V(0,9,7,'j') && \ + OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8)) || \ + OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'c')) /** Set the seed of the weak RNG to a random value. */ static void diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index 771c49c..4783654 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -16,6 +16,38 @@ #include <stdio.h> #include "torint.h" +/* + Macro to create an arbitrary OpenSSL version number as used by + OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER or SSLeay(), since the actual numbers are a bit hard + to read. + + Don't use this directly, instead use one of the other OPENSSL_V macros + below. + + The format is: 4 bits major, 8 bits minor, 8 bits fix, 8 bits patch, 4 bit + status. + */ +#define OPENSSL_VER(a,b,c,d,e) \ + (((a)<<28) | \ + ((b)<<20) | \ + ((c)<<12) | \ + ((d)<< 4) | \ + (e)) +/** An openssl release number. For example, OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'j') is the + * version for the released version of 0.9.8j */ +#define OPENSSL_V(a,b,c,d) \ + OPENSSL_VER((a),(b),(c),(d)-'a'+1,0xf) +/** An openssl release number for the first release in the series. For + * example, OPENSSL_V_NOPATCH(1,0,0) is the first released version of OpenSSL + * 1.0.0. */ +#define OPENSSL_V_NOPATCH(a,b,c) \ + OPENSSL_VER((a),(b),(c),0,0xf) +/** The first version that would occur for any alpha or beta in an openssl + * series. For example, OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8) is greater than any released + * 0.9.7, and less than any released 0.9.8. */ +#define OPENSSL_V_SERIES(a,b,c) \ + OPENSSL_VER((a),(b),(c),0,0) + /** Length of the output of our message digest. */ #define DIGEST_LEN 20 /** Length of the output of our second (improved) message digests. (For now diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 832f744..834e5f1 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -44,10 +44,6 @@ #include <openssl/bio.h> #include <openssl/opensslv.h> -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000l -#error "We require OpenSSL >= 0.9.7" -#endif - #ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS #include <event2/bufferevent_ssl.h> #include <event2/buffer.h> @@ -65,6 +61,10 @@ #include "container.h" #include <string.h> +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,7) +#error "We require OpenSSL >= 0.9.7" +#endif + /* Enable the "v2" TLS handshake. */ #define V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER @@ -79,9 +79,9 @@ #define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer") -#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090813fL || \ - (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L && \ - OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000006fL)) +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'s') || \ + (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,9) && \ + OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f'))) /* This is a version of OpenSSL before 0.9.8s/1.0.0f. It does not have * the CVE-2011-4657 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and * SSL3 safely at the same time. @@ -474,18 +474,18 @@ tor_tls_init(void) * program should be allowed to use renegotiation unless it first passed * a test of intelligence and determination. */ - if (version >= 0x009080c0L && version < 0x009080d0L) { + if (version > OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'k') && version <= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'l')) { log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8l; " "I will try SSL3_FLAGS to enable renegotation.", SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 1; use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1; - } else if (version >= 0x009080d0L) { + } else if (version > OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'l')) { log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8m or later; " "I will try SSL_OP to enable renegotiation", SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1; - } else if (version < 0x009080c0L) { + } else if (version <= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'k')) { log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s [%lx] looks like it's older than " "0.9.8l, but some vendors have backported 0.9.8l's " "renegotiation code to earlier versions, and some have " @@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ tor_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len) if (certificate_len > INT_MAX) return NULL; -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00908000l +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8) /* This ifdef suppresses a type warning. Take out this case once everybody * is using OpenSSL 0.9.8 or later. */ x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, (unsigned char**)&cp, (int)certificate_len); @@ -1177,9 +1177,9 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, #ifdef DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE 1 || #endif - SSLeay() < 0x0090813fL || - (SSLeay() >= 0x00909000L && - SSLeay() < 0x1000006fL)) { + SSLeay() < OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'s') || + (SSLeay() >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,9) && + SSLeay() < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f'))) { /* And not SSL3 if it's subject to CVE-2011-4657. */ log_info(LD_NET, "Disabling SSLv3 because this OpenSSL version " "might otherwise be vulnerable to CVE-2011-4657 "

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'openssl_versions_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Jan '12

10 Jan '12

commit b443d6a4fbfaac8d4a944d8b2a763666d1683ada Merge: 6b9298e 5741aef Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 10 10:41:03 2012 -0500 Merge branch 'openssl_versions_squashed' changes/readable_ssl_versions | 6 ++++++ src/common/aes.c | 3 ++- src/common/crypto.c | 25 ++++++++----------------- src/common/crypto.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/tortls.c | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Log which votes we still need to fetch
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Jan '12

10 Jan '12

commit 6b9298ef72997c1cd0ed2e9c47abeb6c06f64f9f Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 10 16:12:22 2012 +0100 Log which votes we still need to fetch This might help us see which authorities are problematic in getting their vote published the first time. --- changes/dirauth_log | 3 +++ src/or/dirvote.c | 9 +++++++-- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/dirauth_log b/changes/dirauth_log new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df82314 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/dirauth_log @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor features: + - Log which authority we're missing votes from when we go to fetch them + from the other auths. diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c index 2843336..3bb165a 100644 --- a/src/or/dirvote.c +++ b/src/or/dirvote.c @@ -2801,8 +2801,13 @@ dirvote_fetch_missing_votes(void) smartlist_free(missing_fps); return; } - log_notice(LOG_NOTICE, "We're missing votes from %d authorities. Asking " - "every other authority for a copy.", smartlist_len(missing_fps)); + { + char *tmp = smartlist_join_strings(missing_fps, " ", 0, NULL); + log_notice(LOG_NOTICE, "We're missing votes from %d authorities (%s). " + "Asking every other authority for a copy.", + smartlist_len(missing_fps), tmp); + tor_free(tmp); + } resource = smartlist_join_strings(missing_fps, "+", 0, NULL); directory_get_from_all_authorities(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_STATUS_VOTE, 0, resource);

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[tor/master] Advertise dirport if accountingmax is large enough
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Jan '12

10 Jan '12

commit 50a50392b7d65409de4416eb604bec6339670a2c Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 25 16:45:27 2011 +0100 Advertise dirport if accountingmax is large enough When we have an effective bandwidthrate configured so that we cannot exceed our bandwidth limit in one accounting interval, don't disable advertising the dirport. Implements ticket 2434. --- changes/bug2434 | 6 ++++++ src/or/hibernate.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ src/or/hibernate.h | 1 + src/or/router.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2434 b/changes/bug2434 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5fd3d11 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2434 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor features: + - Don't disable the DirPort when we cannot exceed our AccountingMax + limit during this interval because the effective bandwidthrate is + low enough. This is useful in a situation where AccountMax is only + used as an additional safeguard or to provide statistics. + diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.c b/src/or/hibernate.c index ce64581..803f7f5 100644 --- a/src/or/hibernate.c +++ b/src/or/hibernate.c @@ -242,6 +242,14 @@ accounting_is_enabled(const or_options_t *options) return 0; } +/** If accounting is enabled, return how long (in seconds) this + * interval lasts. */ +int +accounting_get_interval_length(void) +{ + return (int)(interval_end_time - interval_start_time); +} + /** Called from main.c to tell us that seconds seconds have * passed, n_read bytes have been read, and n_written * bytes have been written. */ @@ -504,7 +512,6 @@ accounting_set_wakeup_time(void) { char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; crypto_digest_env_t *d_env; - int time_in_interval; uint64_t time_to_exhaust_bw; int time_to_consider; @@ -538,22 +545,21 @@ accounting_set_wakeup_time(void) interval_wakeup_time = interval_start_time; log_notice(LD_ACCT, - "Configured hibernation. This interval begins at %s " - "and ends at %s. We have no prior estimate for bandwidth, so " + "Configured hibernation. This interval begins at %s " + "and ends at %s. We have no prior estimate for bandwidth, so " "we will start out awake and hibernate when we exhaust our quota.", buf1, buf2); return; } - time_in_interval = (int)(interval_end_time - interval_start_time); - time_to_exhaust_bw = (get_options()->AccountingMax/expected_bandwidth_usage)*60; if (time_to_exhaust_bw > INT_MAX) { time_to_exhaust_bw = INT_MAX; time_to_consider = 0; } else { - time_to_consider = time_in_interval - (int)time_to_exhaust_bw; + time_to_consider = accounting_get_interval_length() - + (int)time_to_exhaust_bw; } if (time_to_consider<=0) { diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.h b/src/or/hibernate.h index 78e7bb7..d77e946 100644 --- a/src/or/hibernate.h +++ b/src/or/hibernate.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ int accounting_parse_options(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only); int accounting_is_enabled(const or_options_t *options); +int accounting_get_interval_length(void); void configure_accounting(time_t now); void accounting_run_housekeeping(time_t now); void accounting_add_bytes(size_t n_read, size_t n_written, int seconds); diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index a08a200..b2df383 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -823,9 +823,26 @@ decide_to_advertise_dirport(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dir_port) * make us choose not to publish. */ if (accounting_is_enabled(options)) { - /* if we might potentially hibernate */ - new_choice = 0; - reason = "AccountingMax enabled"; + /* Don't spend bytes for directory traffic if we could end up hibernating, + * but allow DirPort otherwise. Some people set AccountingMax because + * they're confused or to get statistics. */ + int interval_length = accounting_get_interval_length(); + uint32_t effective_bw = get_effective_bwrate(options); + if (!interval_length) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "An accounting interval is not allowed to be zero " + "seconds long. Raising to 1."); + interval_length = 1; + } + log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Calculating whether to disable dirport: effective " + "bwrate: %u, AccountingMax: "U64_FORMAT", " + "accounting interval length %d", effective_bw, + U64_PRINTF_ARG(options->AccountingMax), + interval_length); + if (effective_bw >= + options->AccountingMax / interval_length) { + new_choice = 0; + reason = "AccountingMax enabled"; + } #define MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRPORT 51200 } else if (options->BandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRPORT || (options->RelayBandwidthRate > 0 &&

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug4883'
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Jan '12

10 Jan '12

commit 2a9b279163da4ba0d870dd5e9b7fc1ae9591127c Merge: 2367f7e 72ed4a4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 10 09:33:55 2012 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug4883' src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Fix brown-paper-bag bug in #4759 fix
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Jan '12

10 Jan '12

commit 72ed4a41f5716923ce16d168ad421cc26ab2fbea Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Jan 9 22:03:04 2012 -0800 Fix brown-paper-bag bug in #4759 fix Fixes #4883, not yet in any release. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 17c92ab..dff8bc3 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, /* Copy the rendezvous cookie from rendcirc to introcirc, so that * when introcirc gets an ack, we can change the state of the right * rendezvous circuit. */ - memcpy(rendcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie, introcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie, + memcpy(introcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie, rendcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN); log_info(LD_REND, "Sending an INTRODUCE1 cell");

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[tor/master] Make sure MAX_DNS_LABEL_SIZE is defined
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Jan '12

10 Jan '12

commit 2367f7e5594c5b0aab51f87b8221e2b0235ed0ed Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 10 06:14:35 2012 +0100 Make sure MAX_DNS_LABEL_SIZE is defined MAX_DNS_LABEL_SIZE was only defined for old versions of openssl, which broke the build. Spotted by xiando. Fixes bug 4413; not in any released version. --- src/common/crypto.c | 6 +++--- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 7edc7f2..d1d823d 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ #define DISABLE_ENGINES #endif +/** Longest recognized */ +#define MAX_DNS_LABEL_SIZE 63 + #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00908000l /** @{ */ /** On OpenSSL versions before 0.9.8, there is no working SHA256 @@ -82,9 +85,6 @@ #include "sha256.c" #define SHA256_Final(a,b) sha256_done(b,a) -/** Longest recognized */ -#define MAX_DNS_LABEL_SIZE 63 - static unsigned char * SHA256(const unsigned char *m, size_t len, unsigned char *d) {

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[doctor/master] Check that no Authority relays are missing from the consensus.
by karsten＠torproject.org 10 Jan '12

10 Jan '12

commit 237bb7f4f20fe4cc200e9b192b620a286c05ce30 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Tue Jan 10 11:25:37 2012 +0100 Check that no Authority relays are missing from the consensus. --- src/org/torproject/doctor/Checker.java | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ src/org/torproject/doctor/StatusFileReport.java | 4 ++++ src/org/torproject/doctor/Warning.java | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/org/torproject/doctor/Checker.java b/src/org/torproject/doctor/Checker.java index 2df8f54..ff2a04c 100644 --- a/src/org/torproject/doctor/Checker.java +++ b/src/org/torproject/doctor/Checker.java @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ public class Checker { this.checkAuthorityKeys(); this.checkMissingVotes(); this.checkBandwidthScanners(); + this.checkMissingAuthorities(); } } else { this.warnings.put(Warning.NoConsensusKnown, new TreeSet<String>()); @@ -347,5 +348,22 @@ public class Checker { missingBandwidthScanners); } } + + /* Check if any relays with the Authority flag are missing from the + * consensus. */ + private void checkMissingAuthorities() { + SortedSet<String> missingAuthorities = new TreeSet<String>( + Arrays.asList(("gabelmoo,tor26,ides,maatuska,dannenberg,urras," + + "moria1,dizum,Tonga").split(","))); + for (NetworkStatusEntry entry : + this.downloadedConsensus.getStatusEntries().values()) { + if (entry.getFlags().contains("Authority")) { + missingAuthorities.remove(entry.getNickname()); + } + } + if (!missingAuthorities.isEmpty()) { + this.warnings.put(Warning.MissingAuthorities, missingAuthorities); + } + } } diff --git a/src/org/torproject/doctor/StatusFileReport.java b/src/org/torproject/doctor/StatusFileReport.java index 8e78571..18def6f 100644 --- a/src/org/torproject/doctor/StatusFileReport.java +++ b/src/org/torproject/doctor/StatusFileReport.java @@ -161,6 +161,10 @@ public class StatusFileReport { + "previously voting authorities: " + detailsString, 150L * 60L * 1000L); break; + case MissingAuthorities: + warningStrings.put("WARNING: The following authorities are " + + "missing from the consensus: " + detailsString, + 150L * 60L * 1000L); } } long now = System.currentTimeMillis(); diff --git a/src/org/torproject/doctor/Warning.java b/src/org/torproject/doctor/Warning.java index eee4342..a49c3ba 100644 --- a/src/org/torproject/doctor/Warning.java +++ b/src/org/torproject/doctor/Warning.java @@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ public enum Warning { /* The consensuses downloaded from one or more authorities are missing * signatures from previously voting authorities. */ - ConsensusMissingSignatures + ConsensusMissingSignatures, + + /* One or more authorities are missing in the consensus. */ + MissingAuthorities }

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[metrics-web/master] Try harder only to run a second relay-search query when necessary.
by karsten＠torproject.org 10 Jan '12

10 Jan '12

commit 075fd8e0df632d6afa88cacccc47f845e07031a4 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Tue Jan 10 11:07:06 2012 +0100 Try harder only to run a second relay-search query when necessary. 444f874c missed the fact that the first query may return more than 31 results, in which case we don't have to run the second query anymore. Include this case. --- .../torproject/ernie/web/RelaySearchServlet.java | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/org/torproject/ernie/web/RelaySearchServlet.java b/src/org/torproject/ernie/web/RelaySearchServlet.java index 82d223b..8d47667 100644 --- a/src/org/torproject/ernie/web/RelaySearchServlet.java +++ b/src/org/torproject/ernie/web/RelaySearchServlet.java @@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ public class RelaySearchServlet extends HttpServlet { } rs.close(); statement.close(); - if (matches == 31) { + if (matches >= 31) { queries.clear(); } }

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