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[vidalia/alpha] Use consensus bandwidth when microdescriptors is enabled
by chiiph＠torproject.org 09 Mar '12

09 Mar '12

commit 31a82341b0c8d5288962aacb6dc401f85bc4b5a9 Author: Tomás Touceda <chiiph(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 9 14:53:57 2012 -0300 Use consensus bandwidth when microdescriptors is enabled --- src/torcontrol/RouterDescriptor.cpp | 3 +++ src/torcontrol/RouterStatus.cpp | 13 +++++++++++++ src/torcontrol/RouterStatus.h | 3 +++ src/vidalia/network/NetViewer.cpp | 3 --- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/torcontrol/RouterDescriptor.cpp b/src/torcontrol/RouterDescriptor.cpp index 3634f3e..21643f2 100644 --- a/src/torcontrol/RouterDescriptor.cpp +++ b/src/torcontrol/RouterDescriptor.cpp @@ -106,4 +106,7 @@ RouterDescriptor::appendRouterStatusInfo(const RouterStatus &rs) _ip = rs.ipAddress(); _orPort = rs.orPort(); _dirPort = rs.dirPort(); + _avgBandwidth = rs.bandwidth(); + _burstBandwidth = rs.bandwidth(); + _observedBandwidth = rs.bandwidth(); } diff --git a/src/torcontrol/RouterStatus.cpp b/src/torcontrol/RouterStatus.cpp index 9ee795b..02f13b5 100644 --- a/src/torcontrol/RouterStatus.cpp +++ b/src/torcontrol/RouterStatus.cpp @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ RouterStatus::RouterStatus(const QStringList &status) _valid = false; _flags = 0; + _bandwidth = 0; + foreach (QString line, status) { if (line.startsWith("r ")) { QStringList parts = line.split(" ", QString::SkipEmptyParts); @@ -83,6 +85,17 @@ RouterStatus::RouterStatus(const QStringList &status) foreach (QString flag, flags) { _flags |= flagValue(flag); } + } else if (line.startsWith("w ")) { + /* Status flags */ + QStringList parts = line.split(" ", QString::SkipEmptyParts); + parts.removeFirst(); /* Remove the "w" */ + + if(parts.size() > 0) { + QStringList bw = parts.at(0).split("=", QString::SkipEmptyParts); + if(bw.size() == 2) { + _bandwidth = (quint64)bw.at(1).toULongLong(); + } + } } } } diff --git a/src/torcontrol/RouterStatus.h b/src/torcontrol/RouterStatus.h index c71e548..cff3b8a 100644 --- a/src/torcontrol/RouterStatus.h +++ b/src/torcontrol/RouterStatus.h @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ public: Flags flags() const { return _flags; } /** Returns true if this router is currently listed as Running. */ bool isRunning() const { return (flags() & Running); } + /** Returns the consensus bandwidth */ + quint64 bandwidth() const { return _bandwidth; } /** Returns true if this router status object is valid. This method should * be called to verify that the QStringList given in this object's @@ -89,6 +91,7 @@ private: quint16 _orPort; /**< Current OR port. */ quint16 _dirPort; /**< Current directory port. */ Flags _flags; /**< OR-ed field of the router's current status flags. */ + quint64 _bandwidth; /**< Consensus bandwidth */ }; Q_DECLARE_OPERATORS_FOR_FLAGS(RouterStatus::Flags) diff --git a/src/vidalia/network/NetViewer.cpp b/src/vidalia/network/NetViewer.cpp index 0a88ec5..8ff6b32 100644 --- a/src/vidalia/network/NetViewer.cpp +++ b/src/vidalia/network/NetViewer.cpp @@ -333,9 +333,6 @@ NetViewer::preLoadNetworkStatus() { NetworkStatus networkStatus = _torControl->getNetworkStatus(); - if(_torControl->useMicrodescriptors()) - ui.treeRouterList->hideColumn(RouterListWidget::StatusColumn); - foreach(RouterStatus rs, networkStatus) { if (!rs.isRunning()) continue;

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[torspec/master] Draft-status proposal 195: normalize TLS in 0.2.4
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Mar '12

09 Mar '12

commit 28a78381e4cee7d9fe20415d5c2d1391510a87f8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 6 18:04:04 2012 -0500 Draft-status proposal 195: normalize TLS in 0.2.4 --- proposals/000-index.txt | 6 +- .../179-TLS-cert-and-parameter-normalization.txt | 27 +++- proposals/195-TLS-normalization-for-024.txt | 170 ++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt index 95dd4d4..fc5c508 100644 --- a/proposals/000-index.txt +++ b/proposals/000-index.txt @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Proposals by number: 176 Proposed version-3 link handshake for Tor [CLOSED] 177 Abstaining from votes on individual flags [OPEN] 178 Require majority of authorities to vote for consensus parameters [CLOSED] -179 TLS certificate and parameter normalization [DRAFT] +179 TLS certificate and parameter normalization [CLOSED] 180 Pluggable transports for circumvention [OPEN] 181 Optimistic Data for Tor: Client Side [CLOSED] 182 Credit Bucket [DRAFT] @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ Proposals by number: 192 Automatically retrieve and store information about bridges [OPEN] 193 Safe cookie authentication for Tor controllers [OPEN] 194 Mnemonic .onion URLs [OPEN] +195 TLS certificate normalization for Tor 0.2.4.x [DRAFT] Proposals by status: @@ -126,9 +127,9 @@ Proposals by status: 141 Download server descriptors on demand 144 Increase the diversity of circuits by detecting nodes belonging the same provider 175 Automatically promoting Tor clients to nodes - 179 TLS certificate and parameter normalization [for 0.2.3.x] 182 Credit Bucket 186 Multiple addresses for one OR or bridge + 195 TLS certificate normalization for Tor 0.2.4.x [for 0.2.4.x] NEEDS-REVISION: 131 Help users to verify they are using Tor 190 Bridge Client Authorization Based on a Shared Secret @@ -205,6 +206,7 @@ Proposals by status: 174 Optimistic Data for Tor: Server Side [in 0.2.3.1-alpha] 176 Proposed version-3 link handshake for Tor [for 0.2.3] 178 Require majority of authorities to vote for consensus parameters [in 0.2.3.9-alpha] + 179 TLS certificate and parameter normalization [for 0.2.3.x] 181 Optimistic Data for Tor: Client Side [in 0.2.3.3-alpha] 183 Refill Intervals [in 0.2.3.5-alpha] 184 Miscellaneous changes for a v3 Tor link protocol [for 0.2.3.x] diff --git a/proposals/179-TLS-cert-and-parameter-normalization.txt b/proposals/179-TLS-cert-and-parameter-normalization.txt index 7ad3ed8..4272d4f 100644 --- a/proposals/179-TLS-cert-and-parameter-normalization.txt +++ b/proposals/179-TLS-cert-and-parameter-normalization.txt @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Filename: 179-TLS-cert-and-parameter-normalization.txt Title: TLS certificate and parameter normalization Author: Jacob Appelbaum, Gladys Shufflebottom Created: 16-Feb-2011 -Status: Draft +Status: Closed Target: 0.2.3.x @@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ Target: 0.2.3.x Overview + STATUS NOTE: + + This document is implemented in part in 0.2.3.x, deferred in part, and + rejected in part. See indented bracketed comments in individual + sections below for more information. -NM + Scope This is a document that proposes improvements to problems with Tor's @@ -135,6 +141,11 @@ covert channel will not lead to an attacker having a method to downgrade client behavior. This shouldn't be a risk because the TLS Finished message hashes over all the bytes of the handshake, including the certificates. + [Randomized serial numbers are implemented in 0.2.3.9-alpha. We probably + shouldn't do certificate tagging by a covert channel in serial numbers, + since doing so would mean we could never have an externally signed + cert. -NM] + Certificate fingerprinting issues expressed as base64 encoding It appears that all deployed Tor certificates have the following strings in @@ -209,6 +220,8 @@ The expiration time should not be a fixed time that is simple to calculate by any Deep Packet Inspection device or it will become a new Tor TLS setup fingerprint. + [Deferred and needs revision; see proposal XXX. -NM] + Proposed certificate form The following output from openssl asn1parse results from the proposed @@ -260,6 +273,10 @@ default self-signed certificate: 383:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL 385:d=1 hl=3 l= 129 prim: BIT STRING + [Rejected pending more evidence; this pattern is trivially detectable, + and there is just not enough reason at the moment to think that this + particular certificate pattern is common enough for sites that matter + that the censors wouldn't be willing to block it. -NM] Custom Certificates @@ -271,6 +288,8 @@ This may be desirable in some kinds of filtered networks or when attempting to avoid attracting suspicion by blending in with the TLS web server certificate crowd. + [Deferred; see proposal XXX] + Problematic Diffie–Hellman parameters We currently send a static Diffie–Hellman parameter, prime p (or “prime p @@ -317,6 +336,8 @@ well for Tor. More research in this area including the applicability of Miller-Rabin or AKS primality tests[6] will need to be analyzed and probably added to Tor. + [Randomized DH groups are implemented in 0.2.3.9-alpha. -NM] + Practical key size Currently we use a 1024 bit long RSA modulus. I propose that we increase the @@ -327,6 +348,10 @@ with regard to key security properties. The implementer should increase the 1024 bit RSA modulus to 2048 bits. + [Deferred and needs performance analysis. See proposal + XXX. Additionally, DH group strength seems far more crucial. Still, this + is out-of-scope for a "normalization" question. -NM] + Possible future filtering nightmares At some point it may cost effective or politically feasible for a network diff --git a/proposals/195-TLS-normalization-for-024.txt b/proposals/195-TLS-normalization-for-024.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..37ee546 --- /dev/null +++ b/proposals/195-TLS-normalization-for-024.txt @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +Filename: 195-TLS-normalization-for-024.txt +Title: TLS certificate normalization for Tor 0.2.4.x +Author: Jacob Appelbaum, Gladys Shufflebottom, Nick Mathewson, Tim Wilde +Created: 6-Mar-2012 +Status: Draft +Target: 0.2.4.x + + +0. Introduction + + The TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol was designed for security + and extensibility, not for uniformity. Because of this, it's not + hard for an attacker to tell one application's use of TLS from + another's. + + We proposes improvements to Tor's current TLS certificates to + reduce the distinguishability of Tor traffic. + +0.1. History + + This draft is based on parts of Proposal 179, by Jacob Appelbaum + and Gladys Shufflebottom, but removes some already implemented parts + and replaces others. + +0.2. Non-Goals + + We do not address making TLS harder to distinguish after the + handshake is done. We also do not discuss TLS improvements not + related to distinguishability (such as increased key size, algorithm + choice, and so on). + +1. Certificate Issues + + Currently, Tor generates certificates according to a fixed pattern, + where lifetime is fairly small, the certificate Subject DN is a + single randomly generated CN, and the certificate Issuer DN is a + different single randomly generated CN. + + We propose several ways to improve this below. + +1.1. Separate initial certificate from link certificate + + When Tor is using the v2 or v3 link handshake (see tor-spec.txt), it + currently presents an initial handshake authenticating the link key + with the identity key. + + We propose instead that Tor should be able to present an arbitrary + initial certificate (so long as its key matches the link key used in + the actual TLS handshake), and then present the real certificate + authenticating the link key during the Tor handshake. (That is, + during the v2 handshake's renegotiation step, or in the v3 + handshake's CERTS cell.) + + The TLS protocol and the Tor handshake protocol both allow this, and + doing so will give us more freedom for the alternative certificate + presentation ideas below. + +1.2. Allow externally generated certificates + + It should be possible for a Tor relay operator to generate and + provide their own certificate and secret key. This will allow a relay or + bridge operator to use a certificate signed by any member of the "SSL + mafia,"[*] to generate their own self-signed certificate, and so on. + + For compatibility, we need to require that the key be an RSA secret + key, of at least 1024 bits, generated with e=65537. + + As a proposed interface, let's require that the certificate be stored + in ${DataDir}/tls_cert/tls_certificate.crt , that the secret key be + stored in ${DataDir}/tls_cert/private_tls_key.key , and that they be + used instead of generating our own certificate whenever the new + boolean option "ProvidedTLSCert" is set to true. + + (Alternative interface: Allow the cert and key cert to be stored + wherever, and have the user provide their respective locations with + TLSCertificateFile and TLSCertificateKeyFile options.) + +1.3. Longer certificate lifetimes + + Tor's current certificates aren't long-lived, which makes them + different from most other certificates in the wild. + + Typically, certificates are valid for a year, so let's use that as + our default lifetime. [TODO: investigate whether "a year" for most + CAs and self-signed certs have their validity dates running for a + calendar year ending at the second of issue, one calendar year + ending at midnight, or 86400*(365.5 +/- .5) seconds, or what.] + + There are two ways to approach this. We could continue our current + certificate management approach where we frequently generate new + certificates (albeit with longer lifetimes), or we could make a cert, + store it to disk, and use it for all or most of its declared + lifetime. + + If we continue to use fairly short lifetimes for the _true_ link + certificates (the ones presented during the Tor handshake), then + presenting long-lived certificates doesn't hurt us much: in the event + of a link-key-only compromise, the adversary still couldn't actually + impersonate a server for long.[**] + + Using shorter-lived certificates with long nominal lifetimes doesn't + seem to buy us much. It would let us rotate link keys more + frequently, but we're already getting forward secrecy from our use of + diffie-hellman key agreement. Further, it would make our behavior + look less like regular TLS behavior, where certificates are typically + used for most of their nominal lifetime. Therefore, let's store and + use certs and link keys for the full year. + +1.4. Self-signed certificates with better DNs + + When we generate our own certificates, we currently set no DN fields + other than the commonName. This behavior isn't terribly common: + users of self-signed certs usually/often set other fields too. + [TODO: find out frequency.] + + Unfortunately, it appears that no particular other set of fields or + way of filling them out _is_ universal for self-signed certificates, + or even particularly common. The most common schema seem to be for + things most censors wouldn't mind blocking, like embedded devices. + Even the default openssl schema, though common, doesn't appear to + represent a terribly large fraction of self-signed websites. [TODO: + get numbers here.] + + So the best we can do here is probably to reproduce the process that + results in self-signed certificates originally: let the bridge and relay + operators to pick the DN fields themselves. This is an annoying + interface issue, and wants a better solution. + +1.5. Better commonName values + + Our current certificates set the commonName to a randomly generated + field like www.rmf4h4h.net. This is also a weird behavior: nearly + all TLS certs used for web purposes will have a hostname that + resolves to their IP. + + The simplest way to get a plausible commonName here would be to do a + reverse lookup on our IP and try to find a good hostname. It's not + clear whether this would actually work out in practice, or whether + we'd just get dynamic-IP-pool hostnames everywhere blocked when they + appear in certificates. + + Alternatively, if we are told a hostname in our Torrc (possibly in + the Address field), we could try to use that. + +2. TLS handshake issues + +2.1. Session ID. + + Currently we do not send an SSL session ID, as we do not support session + resumption. However, Apache (and likely other major SSL servers) do have + this support, and do send a 32 byte SSLv3/TLSv1 session ID in their Server + Hello cleartext. We should do the same to avoid an easy fingerprinting + opportunity. It may be necessary to lie to OpenSSL to claim that we are + tracking session IDs to cause it to generate them for us. + + (We should not actually support session resumption.) + + + + +[*] "Hey buddy, it's a nice website you've got there. Sure would be a + shame if somebody started poppin' up warnings on all your user's + browsers, tellin' everbody that you're _insecure_..." + +[**] Furthermore, a link-key-only compromise isn't very realistic atm; + nearly any attack that would let an adversary learn a link key would + probably let the adversary learn the identity key too. The most + plausible way would probably be an implementation bug in OpenSSL or + something. +

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[tor/master] Correctly handle broken escape sequences in torrc values
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Mar '12

09 Mar '12

commit be0535f00ba40f777a9f47aa41a98aa48254d37c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 9 11:50:22 2012 -0500 Correctly handle broken escape sequences in torrc values Previously, malformatted torrc values could crash us. Patch by Esteban Manchado. Fixes bug 5090; fix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. --- changes/bug5090 | 6 ++++++ src/common/util.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug5090 b/changes/bug5090 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..240d470 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug5090 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Detect and reject certain misformed escape sequences in configuration + values. Previously, these values would cause us to crash if received + in a torrc file or over an (authenticated) control port. Patch by + Esteban Manchado Velázquez. Fix for bug 5090; bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. + diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 7675ede..e3cd154 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -2212,14 +2212,16 @@ unescape_string(const char *s, char **result, size_t *size_out) case '\"': goto end_of_loop; case '\\': - if ((cp[1] == 'x' || cp[1] == 'X') - && TOR_ISXDIGIT(cp[2]) && TOR_ISXDIGIT(cp[3])) { + if (cp[1] == 'x' || cp[1] == 'X') { + if (!(TOR_ISXDIGIT(cp[2]) && TOR_ISXDIGIT(cp[3]))) + return NULL; cp += 4; } else if (TOR_ISODIGIT(cp[1])) { cp += 2; if (TOR_ISODIGIT(*cp)) ++cp; if (TOR_ISODIGIT(*cp)) ++cp; - } else if (cp[1]) { + } else if (cp[1] == 'n' || cp[1] == 'r' || cp[1] == 't' || cp[1] == '"' + || cp[1] == '\\' || cp[1] == '\'') { cp += 2; } else { return NULL; @@ -2251,9 +2253,19 @@ unescape_string(const char *s, char **result, size_t *size_out) case 'r': *out++ = '\r'; cp += 2; break; case 't': *out++ = '\t'; cp += 2; break; case 'x': case 'X': - *out++ = ((hex_decode_digit(cp[2])<<4) + - hex_decode_digit(cp[3])); - cp += 4; + { + int x1, x2; + + x1 = hex_decode_digit(cp[2]); + x2 = hex_decode_digit(cp[3]); + if (x1 == -1 || x2 == -1) { + tor_free(*result); + return NULL; + } + + *out++ = ((x1<<4) + x2); + cp += 4; + } break; case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4': case '5': case '6': case '7':

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[tor/master] Oops; credit bug5090 patch to flupzor. estebanm only found the bug.
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Mar '12

09 Mar '12

commit 31f253ae6a96ea88425f8ea5c287f5eda599c9e9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 9 11:54:27 2012 -0500 Oops; credit bug5090 patch to flupzor. estebanm only found the bug. --- changes/bug5090 | 5 +++-- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug5090 b/changes/bug5090 index 240d470..5e323de 100644 --- a/changes/bug5090 +++ b/changes/bug5090 @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ o Minor bugfixes: - Detect and reject certain misformed escape sequences in configuration values. Previously, these values would cause us to crash if received - in a torrc file or over an (authenticated) control port. Patch by - Esteban Manchado Velázquez. Fix for bug 5090; bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. + in a torrc file or over an (authenticated) control port. Bug found by + Esteban Manchado Velázquez. Patch by "flupzor." Fix for bug 5090; + bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha.

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Mar '12

09 Mar '12

commit c13dc5170f09473ec2255501cbb1c0433bd959e5 Merge: 0f7e960 31f253a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 9 11:54:45 2012 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' changes/bug5090 | 7 +++++++ src/common/util.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Oops; credit bug5090 patch to flupzor. estebanm only found the bug.
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Mar '12

09 Mar '12

commit 31f253ae6a96ea88425f8ea5c287f5eda599c9e9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 9 11:54:27 2012 -0500 Oops; credit bug5090 patch to flupzor. estebanm only found the bug. --- changes/bug5090 | 5 +++-- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug5090 b/changes/bug5090 index 240d470..5e323de 100644 --- a/changes/bug5090 +++ b/changes/bug5090 @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ o Minor bugfixes: - Detect and reject certain misformed escape sequences in configuration values. Previously, these values would cause us to crash if received - in a torrc file or over an (authenticated) control port. Patch by - Esteban Manchado Velázquez. Fix for bug 5090; bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. + in a torrc file or over an (authenticated) control port. Bug found by + Esteban Manchado Velázquez. Patch by "flupzor." Fix for bug 5090; + bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha.

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Correctly handle broken escape sequences in torrc values
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Mar '12

09 Mar '12

commit be0535f00ba40f777a9f47aa41a98aa48254d37c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 9 11:50:22 2012 -0500 Correctly handle broken escape sequences in torrc values Previously, malformatted torrc values could crash us. Patch by Esteban Manchado. Fixes bug 5090; fix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. --- changes/bug5090 | 6 ++++++ src/common/util.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug5090 b/changes/bug5090 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..240d470 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug5090 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Detect and reject certain misformed escape sequences in configuration + values. Previously, these values would cause us to crash if received + in a torrc file or over an (authenticated) control port. Patch by + Esteban Manchado Velázquez. Fix for bug 5090; bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. + diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 7675ede..e3cd154 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -2212,14 +2212,16 @@ unescape_string(const char *s, char **result, size_t *size_out) case '\"': goto end_of_loop; case '\\': - if ((cp[1] == 'x' || cp[1] == 'X') - && TOR_ISXDIGIT(cp[2]) && TOR_ISXDIGIT(cp[3])) { + if (cp[1] == 'x' || cp[1] == 'X') { + if (!(TOR_ISXDIGIT(cp[2]) && TOR_ISXDIGIT(cp[3]))) + return NULL; cp += 4; } else if (TOR_ISODIGIT(cp[1])) { cp += 2; if (TOR_ISODIGIT(*cp)) ++cp; if (TOR_ISODIGIT(*cp)) ++cp; - } else if (cp[1]) { + } else if (cp[1] == 'n' || cp[1] == 'r' || cp[1] == 't' || cp[1] == '"' + || cp[1] == '\\' || cp[1] == '\'') { cp += 2; } else { return NULL; @@ -2251,9 +2253,19 @@ unescape_string(const char *s, char **result, size_t *size_out) case 'r': *out++ = '\r'; cp += 2; break; case 't': *out++ = '\t'; cp += 2; break; case 'x': case 'X': - *out++ = ((hex_decode_digit(cp[2])<<4) + - hex_decode_digit(cp[3])); - cp += 4; + { + int x1, x2; + + x1 = hex_decode_digit(cp[2]); + x2 = hex_decode_digit(cp[3]); + if (x1 == -1 || x2 == -1) { + tor_free(*result); + return NULL; + } + + *out++ = ((x1<<4) + x2); + cp += 4; + } break; case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4': case '5': case '6': case '7':

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[tor/master] Fix documentation URLs in config file comments
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Mar '12

09 Mar '12

commit 2a720847ad691c3cbfd92eedef1b4fd90e6d214c Author: Esteban Manchado Velázquez <emanchado(a)demiurgo.org> Date: Thu Feb 2 00:09:38 2012 +0100 Fix documentation URLs in config file comments --- src/config/torrc.bridge.in | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/config/torrc.bridge.in b/src/config/torrc.bridge.in index 557b7ad..6e77ecc 100644 --- a/src/config/torrc.bridge.in +++ b/src/config/torrc.bridge.in @@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ ## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them ## by removing the "#" symbol. ## -## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/tor-manual.html, +## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html, ## for more options you can use in this file. ## ## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform: -## https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#torrc +## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc ## Replace this with "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only as a

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[tor/master] Add quoted content tests for the config parser
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Mar '12

09 Mar '12

commit 57a4e0766557e62d90d1e3ed44643a4890b96902 Author: Esteban Manchado Velázquez <emanchado(a)demiurgo.org> Date: Fri Feb 3 00:12:23 2012 +0100 Add quoted content tests for the config parser --- src/test/test_util.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c index c7540e8..9866ab3 100644 --- a/src/test/test_util.c +++ b/src/test/test_util.c @@ -243,6 +243,60 @@ test_util_config_line(void) tor_free(v); } +static void +test_util_config_line_quotes(void) +{ + char buf1[1024]; + char buf2[128]; + char buf3[128]; + char buf4[128]; + char *k=NULL, *v=NULL; + const char *str; + + /* Test parse_config_line_from_str */ + strlcpy(buf1, "kTrailingSpace \"quoted value\" \n" + "kTrailingGarbage \"quoted value\"trailing garbage\n" + , sizeof(buf1)); + strlcpy(buf2, "kTrailingSpaceAndGarbage \"quoted value\" trailing space+g\n" + , sizeof(buf2)); + strlcpy(buf3, "kMultilineTrailingSpace \"mline\\ \nvalue w/ trailing sp\"\n" + , sizeof(buf3)); + strlcpy(buf4, "kMultilineNoTrailingBackslash \"naked multiline\nvalue\"\n" + , sizeof(buf4)); + str = buf1; + + str = parse_config_line_from_str(str, &k, &v); + test_streq(k, "kTrailingSpace"); + test_streq(v, "quoted value"); + tor_free(k); tor_free(v); + + str = parse_config_line_from_str(str, &k, &v); + test_eq_ptr(str, NULL); + tor_free(k); tor_free(v); + + str = buf2; + + str = parse_config_line_from_str(str, &k, &v); + test_eq_ptr(str, NULL); + tor_free(k); tor_free(v); + + str = buf3; + + str = parse_config_line_from_str(str, &k, &v); + test_eq_ptr(str, NULL); + tor_free(k); tor_free(v); + + str = buf4; + + str = parse_config_line_from_str(str, &k, &v); + test_eq_ptr(str, NULL); + tor_free(k); tor_free(v); + + done: + tor_free(k); + tor_free(v); +} + /** Test basic string functionality. */ static void test_util_strmisc(void) @@ -2105,6 +2159,7 @@ test_util_set_env_var_in_sl(void *ptr) struct testcase_t util_tests[] = { UTIL_LEGACY(time), UTIL_LEGACY(config_line), + UTIL_LEGACY(config_line_quotes), UTIL_LEGACY(strmisc), UTIL_LEGACY(pow2), UTIL_LEGACY(gzip),

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[tor/master] Improve config parser escaped content tests
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Mar '12

09 Mar '12

commit 72d455b5eb00b2d87228c05ae6e818415f125cf6 Author: Esteban Manchado Velázquez <emanchado(a)demiurgo.org> Date: Fri Feb 3 21:05:17 2012 +0100 Improve config parser escaped content tests --- src/test/test_util.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c index 86c650e..b8c0544 100644 --- a/src/test/test_util.c +++ b/src/test/test_util.c @@ -315,8 +315,10 @@ test_util_config_line_escaped_content(void) "Newline \"\\n\"\n" "Tab \"\\t\"\n" "CarriageReturn \"\\r\"\n" - "Quote \"\\\"\"\n" + "DoubleQuote \"\\\"\"\n" + "SimpleQuote \"\\'\"\n" "Backslash \"\\\\\"\n" + "Mix \"This is a \\\"star\\\":\\t\\'\\x2a\\'\\nAnd second line\"\n" , sizeof(buf1)); strlcpy(buf2, "BrokenEscapedContent \"\\a\"\n" @@ -366,15 +368,25 @@ test_util_config_line_escaped_content(void) tor_free(k); tor_free(v); str = parse_config_line_from_str(str, &k, &v); - test_streq(k, "Quote"); + test_streq(k, "DoubleQuote"); test_streq(v, "\""); tor_free(k); tor_free(v); str = parse_config_line_from_str(str, &k, &v); + test_streq(k, "SimpleQuote"); + test_streq(v, "'"); + tor_free(k); tor_free(v); + + str = parse_config_line_from_str(str, &k, &v); test_streq(k, "Backslash"); test_streq(v, "\\"); tor_free(k); tor_free(v); + str = parse_config_line_from_str(str, &k, &v); + test_streq(k, "Mix"); + test_streq(v, "This is a \"star\":\t'*'\nAnd second line"); + tor_free(k); tor_free(v); + str = buf2; str = parse_config_line_from_str(str, &k, &v);

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