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[tor/master] Don't close HS client circs which are 'almost connected' on timeout
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 4b13c33c0c18c66cc39caba9b70005bbe43c6613 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Dec 23 05:25:17 2011 -0800 Don't close HS client circs which are 'almost connected' on timeout --- changes/bug1297b | 12 +++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 7 ++++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 5 ++++ 4 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b2754a --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + + - Don't close hidden service client circuits which have almost + finished connecting to their destination when they reach the + normal circuit-build timeout. Previously, we would close + introduction circuits which are waiting for an acknowledgement + from the introduction-point relay and rendezvous circuits which + have been specified in an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden + service after the normal CBT; now, we mark them as 'timed out', + and launch another rendezvous attempt in parallel. Fixes part + of bug 1297. + diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index ef4ac6f..58d8aa6 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ, return 0; } + /* If this is a timed-out hidden service circuit, skip it. */ + if (origin_circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out) { + return 0; + } + if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) if (circ->timestamp_dirty && @@ -351,7 +356,9 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) * circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout() if we haven't computed * custom timeouts yet */ struct timeval general_cutoff, begindir_cutoff, fourhop_cutoff, - cannibalize_cutoff, close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff; + cannibalize_cutoff, close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff, + hs_extremely_old_cutoff; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); struct timeval now; cpath_build_state_t *build_state; @@ -371,6 +378,10 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms); SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000); + SET_CUTOFF(hs_extremely_old_cutoff, + MAX(circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000, + options->SocksTimeout * 1000)); + while (next_circ) { struct timeval cutoff; victim = next_circ; @@ -392,6 +403,9 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) else cutoff = general_cutoff; + if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) + cutoff = hs_extremely_old_cutoff; + if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_created, &cutoff, >)) continue; /* it's still young, leave it alone */ @@ -497,6 +511,43 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) } } + /* If this is a hidden-service circuit which is far enough along + * in connecting to its destination, and we haven't already + * flagged it as 'timed out', flag it as 'timed out' so we'll + * launch another intro or rend circ, but don't mark it for close + * yet. + * + * (Circs flagged as 'timed out' are given a much longer timeout + * period above, so we won't close them in the next call to + * circuit_expire_building.) */ + if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) { + switch (victim->purpose) { + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: + /* We only want to spare a rend circ if it has been specified in + * an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden service. A circ's + * pending_final_cpath field is non-NULL iff it is a rend circ + * and we have tried to send an INTRODUCE1 cell specifying it. + * Thus, if the pending_final_cpath field *is* NULL, then we + * want to not spare it. */ + if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->pending_final_cpath == + NULL) + break; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT: + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: + /* If we have reached this line, we want to spare the circ for now. */ + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d) " + "as timed-out HS circ", + victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, + victim->n_circ_id, + victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), + victim->purpose); + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1; + continue; + default: + break; + } + } + if (victim->n_conn) log_info(LD_CIRC,"Abandoning circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)", victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 63ff5c4..63eb64c 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2607,6 +2607,13 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * cannibalized circuits. */ unsigned int has_opened : 1; + /** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out + * according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has + * been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to + * its destination, and which is not a fully-connected rendezvous + * circuit. */ + unsigned int hs_circ_has_timed_out : 1; + /** What commands were sent over this circuit that decremented the * RELAY_EARLY counter? This is for debugging task 878. */ uint8_t relay_early_commands[MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT]; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 84a9d49..17c92ab 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -895,6 +895,11 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window(); hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START; + /* Now that this circuit has finished connecting to its destination, + * make sure circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch is willing to return it + * so we can actually use it. */ + circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 0; + onion_append_to_cpath(&circ->cpath, hop); circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath = NULL; /* prevent double-free */

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[tor/master] Add an option to close 'almost-connected' HS client circs on timeout
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 078e3e9dd59520b7f40a126a91e89eba91098c49 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Dec 24 00:46:37 2011 -0800 Add an option to close 'almost-connected' HS client circs on timeout --- changes/bug1297b | 6 ++++-- doc/tor.1.txt | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 14 ++++++++------ src/or/config.c | 1 + src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b index 2b2754a..28b7564 100644 --- a/changes/bug1297b +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ from the introduction-point relay and rendezvous circuits which have been specified in an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden service after the normal CBT; now, we mark them as 'timed out', - and launch another rendezvous attempt in parallel. Fixes part - of bug 1297. + and launch another rendezvous attempt in parallel. This + behaviour change can be disabled using the new + CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout option. Fixes part of + bug 1297. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index b373678..f942573 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -683,6 +683,16 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if services can be configured to require authorization using the **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option. +**CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout** **0**|**1**:: + If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden service client circuits + which have not moved closer to connecting to their destination + hidden service when their internal state has not changed for the + duration of the current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such + circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish + connecting to their destination hidden services. In either case, + another set of introduction and rendezvous circuits for the same + destination hidden service will be launched. (Default: 0) + **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__:: A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 58d8aa6..d9d95bc 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -511,16 +511,18 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) } } - /* If this is a hidden-service circuit which is far enough along - * in connecting to its destination, and we haven't already - * flagged it as 'timed out', flag it as 'timed out' so we'll - * launch another intro or rend circ, but don't mark it for close - * yet. + /* If this is a hidden service client circuit which is far enough + * along in connecting to its destination, and we haven't already + * flagged it as 'timed out', and the user has not told us to + * close such circs immediately on timeout, flag it as 'timed out' + * so we'll launch another intro or rend circ, but don't mark it + * for close yet. * * (Circs flagged as 'timed out' are given a much longer timeout * period above, so we won't close them in the next call to * circuit_expire_building.) */ - if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) { + if (!(options->CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout) && + !(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) { switch (victim->purpose) { case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: /* We only want to spare a rend circ if it has been specified in diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 521f760..3374459 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(HidServAuth, LINELIST, NULL), V(HSAuthoritativeDir, BOOL, "0"), OBSOLETE("HSAuthorityRecordStats"), + V(CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), V(HTTPProxy, STRING, NULL), V(HTTPProxyAuthenticator, STRING, NULL), V(HTTPSProxy, STRING, NULL), diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 63eb64c..d84f04b 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3057,6 +3057,11 @@ typedef struct { * circuits.) */ int Tor2webMode; + /** Close hidden service client circuits immediately when they reach + * the normal circuit-build timeout, even if they have already sent + * an INTRODUCE1 cell on its way to the service. */ + int CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout; + int ConnLimit; /**< Demanded minimum number of simultaneous connections. */ int _ConnLimit; /**< Maximum allowed number of simultaneous connections. */ int RunAsDaemon; /**< If true, run in the background. (Unix only) */

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug1297b-v2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 65420e4cb5edcd02b6f44462dcc5c3a7fa8bb2e9 Merge: 47b7a27 0bd53b8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 4 13:50:24 2012 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug1297b-v2' changes/bug1297b | 20 ++++++++++++++ changes/bug4759 | 14 +++++++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 38 +++++++++++++++++++------- src/or/circuitlist.c | 22 +++++++++------ src/or/circuitlist.h | 4 +- src/or/circuituse.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/config.c | 2 + src/or/or.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 14 ++++++++- src/or/rendservice.c | 16 +++++++++++ 10 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Don't close HS service-side rend circs on timeout
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit f88c8ca8c98dc3a0c9e63012ce425d1287625444 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Dec 24 04:47:30 2011 -0800 Don't close HS service-side rend circs on timeout --- changes/bug1297b | 4 ++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/or/or.h | 4 ++++ src/or/rendservice.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b index 28b7564..9cf2597 100644 --- a/changes/bug1297b +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -12,3 +12,7 @@ CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout option. Fixes part of bug 1297. + - Don't close hidden-service-side rendezvous circuits when they + reach the normal circuit-build timeout. Previously, we would + close them. Fixes the remaining part of bug 1297. + diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index d9d95bc..9778ae7 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -550,6 +550,22 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) } } + /* If this is a service-side rendezvous circuit which is far + * enough along in connecting to its destination, consider sparing + * it. */ + if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) && + victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) { + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d) " + "as timed-out HS circ; relaunching rendezvous attempt.", + victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, + victim->n_circ_id, + victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), + victim->purpose); + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1; + rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)); + continue; + } + if (victim->n_conn) log_info(LD_CIRC,"Abandoning circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)", victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index d84f04b..3ac8b92 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2614,6 +2614,10 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * circuit. */ unsigned int hs_circ_has_timed_out : 1; + /** Set iff this is a service-side rendezvous circuit for which a + * new connection attempt has been launched. */ + unsigned int hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched : 1; + /** What commands were sent over this circuit that decremented the * RELAY_EARLY counter? This is for debugging task 878. */ uint8_t relay_early_commands[MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT]; diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 76caeff..bbc9c91 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1419,6 +1419,17 @@ rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *oldcirc) tor_assert(oldcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND); + /* Don't relaunch the same rend circ twice. */ + if (oldcirc->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit to %s has already been relaunched; " + "not relaunching it again.", + oldcirc->build_state ? + safe_str(extend_info_describe(oldcirc->build_state->chosen_exit)) + : "*unknown*"); + return; + } + oldcirc->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched = 1; + if (!oldcirc->build_state || oldcirc->build_state->failure_count > MAX_REND_FAILURES || oldcirc->build_state->expiry_time < time(NULL)) { @@ -1727,6 +1738,11 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) "cookie %s for service %s", circuit->_base.n_circ_id, hexcookie, serviceid); + /* Clear the 'in-progress HS circ has timed out' flag for + * consistency with what happens on the client side; this line has + * no effect on Tor's behaviour. */ + circuit->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 0; + service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest( circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest); if (!service) {

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[tor/master] Add an option to close HS service-side rend circs on timeout
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 836161c56062686d274abf4218779c4db5c8cf5c Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Dec 24 04:55:20 2011 -0800 Add an option to close HS service-side rend circs on timeout --- changes/bug1297b | 4 +++- doc/tor.1.txt | 8 ++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 3 ++- src/or/config.c | 1 + src/or/or.h | 4 ++++ 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b index 9cf2597..fb0d00c 100644 --- a/changes/bug1297b +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -14,5 +14,7 @@ - Don't close hidden-service-side rendezvous circuits when they reach the normal circuit-build timeout. Previously, we would - close them. Fixes the remaining part of bug 1297. + close them. This behaviour change can be disabled using the new + CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout option. Fixes + the remaining part of bug 1297. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index f942573..91a7c69 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -693,6 +693,14 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if another set of introduction and rendezvous circuits for the same destination hidden service will be launched. (Default: 0) +**CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout** **0**|**1**:: + If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden-service-side rendezvous + circuits after the current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such + circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish + connecting to their destinations. In either case, another + rendezvous circuit for the same destination client will be + launched. (Default: 0) + **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__:: A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 9778ae7..c07d434 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -553,7 +553,8 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) /* If this is a service-side rendezvous circuit which is far * enough along in connecting to its destination, consider sparing * it. */ - if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) && + if (!(options->CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout) && + !(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) && victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) { log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d) " "as timed-out HS circ; relaunching rendezvous attempt.", diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 3374459..da4f3c1 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(HSAuthoritativeDir, BOOL, "0"), OBSOLETE("HSAuthorityRecordStats"), V(CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), + V(CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), V(HTTPProxy, STRING, NULL), V(HTTPProxyAuthenticator, STRING, NULL), V(HTTPSProxy, STRING, NULL), diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 3ac8b92..e246ac4 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3066,6 +3066,10 @@ typedef struct { * an INTRODUCE1 cell on its way to the service. */ int CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout; + /** Close hidden-service-side rendezvous circuits immediately when + * they reach the normal circuit-build timeout. */ + int CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout; + int ConnLimit; /**< Demanded minimum number of simultaneous connections. */ int _ConnLimit; /**< Maximum allowed number of simultaneous connections. */ int RunAsDaemon; /**< If true, run in the background. (Unix only) */

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[tor/master] Verbotify documentation comments for the #1297-fix flags
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 0bd53b8d87a5fd4691530b8cb54181037062b949 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Jan 4 09:37:49 2012 -0800 Verbotify documentation comments for the #1297-fix flags --- src/or/or.h | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index e246ac4..2acb621 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2611,11 +2611,24 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has * been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to * its destination, and which is not a fully-connected rendezvous - * circuit. */ + * circuit. + * + * (We clear this flag for client-side rendezvous circuits when they + * are 'joined' to the other side's rendezvous circuit, so that + * connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit can put client streams on + * the circuit. We also clear this flag for service-side rendezvous + * circuits when they are 'joined' to a client's rend circ, but only + * for symmetry with the client case. Client-side introduction + * circuits are closed when we get a joined rend circ, and + * service-side introduction circuits never have this flag set.) */ unsigned int hs_circ_has_timed_out : 1; /** Set iff this is a service-side rendezvous circuit for which a - * new connection attempt has been launched. */ + * new connection attempt has been launched. We consider launching + * a new service-side rend circ to a client when the previous one + * fails; now that we don't necessarily close a service-side rend + * circ when we launch a new one to the same client, this flag keeps + * us from launching two retries for the same failed rend circ. */ unsigned int hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched : 1; /** What commands were sent over this circuit that decremented the

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[tor/master] Mark each intro circ with the rend cookie sent in its INTRODUCE1 cell
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 66f77561c0bb93bf768b2764137ab1b5e4fc04a4 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Dec 22 06:45:45 2011 -0800 Mark each intro circ with the rend cookie sent in its INTRODUCE1 cell Needed by fix for #4759. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 8aae8c5..d9b210a 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -275,6 +275,12 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, payload_len = DIGEST_LEN + r; tor_assert(payload_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE); /* we overran something */ + /* Copy the rendezvous cookie from rendcirc to introcirc, so that + * when introcirc gets an ack, we can change the state of the right + * rendezvous circuit. */ + memcpy(rendcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie, introcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie, + REND_COOKIE_LEN); + log_info(LD_REND, "Sending an INTRODUCE1 cell"); if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1,

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[tor/master] Look up the rend circ whose INTRODUCE1 is being ACKed correctly
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 4c3a23b283774f02fbc35f70c72256c6469071d3 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Dec 22 07:15:24 2011 -0800 Look up the rend circ whose INTRODUCE1 is being ACKed correctly This change cannibalizes circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose because it had exactly one caller. --- changes/bug4759 | 14 ++++++++++++++ src/or/circuitlist.c | 22 +++++++++++++--------- src/or/circuitlist.h | 4 ++-- src/or/rendclient.c | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug4759 b/changes/bug4759 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..19138ab --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug4759 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + + - Make sure we never mark the wrong rendezvous circuit as having + had its introduction cell acknowleged by the introduction-point + relay. Previously, when we received an INTRODUCE_ACK cell on a + client-side hidden-service introduction circuit, we might have + marked a rendezvous circuit other than the one we specified in + the INTRODUCE1 cell as INTRO_ACKED, which would have produced a + warning message and interfered with the hidden service + connection-establishment process. Bugfix on 0.2.3.3-alpha, when + the stream-isolation feature which might cause Tor to open + multiple rendezvous circuits for the same hidden service was + added. Fixes bug 4759. + diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 25b80f1..350d8ed 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -873,26 +873,30 @@ circuit_unlink_all_from_or_conn(or_connection_t *conn, int reason) } } -/** Return a circ such that: - * - circ-\>rend_data-\>onion_address is equal to rend_query, and - * - circ-\>purpose is equal to purpose. +/** Return a circ such that + * - circ-\>rend_data-\>onion_address is equal to + * rend_data-\>onion_address, + * - circ-\>rend_data-\>rend_cookie is equal to + * rend_data-\>rend_cookie, and + * - circ-\>purpose is equal to CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY. * * Return NULL if no such circuit exists. */ origin_circuit_t * -circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(const char *rend_query, uint8_t purpose) +circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(const rend_data_t *rend_data) { circuit_t *circ; - tor_assert(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(purpose)); - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { if (!circ->marked_for_close && - circ->purpose == purpose) { + circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); if (ocirc->rend_data && - !rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_query, - ocirc->rend_data->onion_address)) + !rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_data->onion_address, + ocirc->rend_data->onion_address) && + tor_memeq(ocirc->rend_data->rend_cookie, + rend_data->rend_cookie, + REND_COOKIE_LEN)) return ocirc; } } diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.h b/src/or/circuitlist.h index 7b01ca3..dea2813 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.h +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.h @@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ int circuit_id_in_use_on_orconn(circid_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn); circuit_t *circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_connection_t *conn); void circuit_unlink_all_from_or_conn(or_connection_t *conn, int reason); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id); -origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(const char *rend_query, - uint8_t purpose); +origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data( + const rend_data_t *rend_data); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start, const char *digest, uint8_t purpose); or_circuit_t *circuit_get_rendezvous(const char *cookie); diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index d9b210a..84a9d49 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -350,8 +350,7 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, * and tell it. */ log_info(LD_REND,"Received ack. Telling rend circ..."); - rendcirc = circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose( - circ->rend_data->onion_address, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY); + rendcirc = circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(circ->rend_data); if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */ #ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED tor_assert(!(rendcirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel));

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[translation/tsum] Update translations for tsum
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 7d7ef13d9f104c82b258a857992d0275f70d9568 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 4 14:45:03 2012 +0000 Update translations for tsum --- hr_HR/tsum.po | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/hr_HR/tsum.po b/hr_HR/tsum.po index 62c289b..ec05261 100644 --- a/hr_HR/tsum.po +++ b/hr_HR/tsum.po @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2011-11-05 17:16+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-01-04 14:12+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-01-04 14:42+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Armando Vega <synaan(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ msgid "" "The green monitors represent relays in the Tor network, while the three keys" " represent the layers of encryption between the user and each relay." msgstr "" +"Slika niže ilustrira korisnika koji pretražuje različite web stranice preko " +"Tora. Zeleni monitori predstavljaju releje u Tor mreži, dok tri ključa " +"predstavljaju slojeve šifriranja između korisnika i svakog releja." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:31 @@ -222,6 +225,9 @@ msgid "" "*What to do with split packages* for information on how to unpack and re-" "assemble the small sized packages." msgstr "" +"Važno je da uključite ključnu riječ *split* u svom vlastitom redu. " +"Pogledajte *Što učiniti sa podijeljenim paketima* za više informacija o tome" +" kako otpakirati i ponovno sastaviti manje pakete." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:89 @@ -229,6 +235,8 @@ msgid "" "### Tor for smartphones\n" "You can get Tor on your Android device by installing the package named *Orbot*. For information about how to download and install Orbot, please see the [Tor Project website](https://www.torproject.org/docs/android.html.en)." msgstr "" +"### Tor za smartphone uređaje\n" +"Možete preuzeti Tor na svom Android uređaju instaliranjem paketa nazvanog *Orbot*. Za više informacija o tome kako preuzeti i instalirati Orbot, molimo pogledajte [web stranicu Tor Projekta](https://www.torproject.org/docs/android.html.en)." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:93 @@ -237,6 +245,9 @@ msgid "" "Maemo/N900](https://www.torproject.org/docs/N900.html.en) and [Apple " "iOS](http://sid77.slackware.it/iphone/)." msgstr "" +"Ujedno imamo i eksperimentalne pakete za [Nokia " +"Maemo/N900](https://www.torproject.org/docs/N900.html.en) i [Apple " +"iOS](http://sid77.slackware.it/iphone/)." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:97 @@ -244,6 +255,8 @@ msgid "" "### How to verify that you have the right version\n" "Before running the Tor Browser Bundle, you should make sure that you have the right version." msgstr "" +"### Kako verificirati da imate pravu verziju\n" +"Prije pokretanja Tor Browser Bundle, trebali biste provjeriti da imate pravu verziju." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:102 @@ -365,6 +378,10 @@ msgid "" "about where you downloaded the package from, how you verified the signature," " and the output from GnuPG in an email to help(a)rt.torproject.org." msgstr "" +"Izlaz bi trebao glasiti *\"Good signature\"*. Loš potpis znači da je " +"datoteka možda neovlašteno izmjenjena. Ako vidite neispravan potpis, " +"pošaljite nam detalje o mjestu preuzimanja paketa, kako ste verificirali " +"potpis, te izlaz GnuPG-a u emailu na help(a)rt.torproject.org." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:147 @@ -389,6 +406,8 @@ msgid "" "### How to use the Tor Browser Bundle\n" "After downloading the Tor Browser Bundle and extracting the package, you should have a directory with a few files in it. One of the files is an executable called \"Start Tor Browser\" (or \"start-tor-browser\", depending on your operating system)." msgstr "" +"### Kako koristiti Tor Browser Bundle\n" +"Nakon preuzimanja Tor Browser Bundle i otpakiravanja paketa, trebali biste imati mapu koja sadrži nekoliko datoteka. Jedna od datoteka je izvršna, imena \"Start Tor Browser\" (ili \"start-tor-browser\", ovisno o vašem operacijskom sustavu)." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:160 @@ -421,6 +440,8 @@ msgid "" "### What to do when Tor does not connect\n" "Some users will notice that Vidalia gets stuck when trying to connect to the Tor network. If this happens, make sure that you are connected to the Internet. If you need to connect to a proxy server, see *How to use an open proxy* below." msgstr "" +"### Što učiniti kada se Tor ne spaja\n" +"Neki korisnici će primjetiti da se Vidalia zaglavi pri pokušaju spajanja na Tor mrežu. Ako se to dogodi, uvjerite se da ste spojeni na Internet. Ako se morate spojiti na proxy poslužitelj, pogledajte *Kako koristiti otvoreni proxy* niže." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:174 @@ -490,6 +511,9 @@ msgid "" "If you need help with figuring out why Tor can't connect, send an email to " "help(a)rt.torproject.org and include the relevant parts from the log file." msgstr "" +"Ako trebate pomoć pri razlučivanju zašto se Tor ne može spojiti, pošaljite " +"email na help(a)rt.torproject.org i uključite relevantne dijelove log " +"datoteke." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:203 @@ -497,6 +521,8 @@ msgid "" "### How to find a bridge\n" "To use a bridge, you will first have to locate one; you can either browse to [bridges.torproject.org](https://bridges.torproject.org/), or you can send an email to bridges(a)torproject.org. If you do send an email, please make sure that you write **get bridges** in the body of the email. Without this, you will not get a reply. Note that you need to send this email from either a gmail.com or a yahoo.com address." msgstr "" +"### Kako pronaći most\n" +"Za korištenje mosta, prvo će te morati locirati neki most; možete pretraživačem doći na [bridges.torproject.org](https://bridges.torproject.org/), ili možete poslati email na bridges(a)torproject.org. Ako pak pošaljete email, molimo vas da obavezno napišete **get bridges** u tijelu emaila. Bez toga nećete dobiti odgovor. Napominjemo da morate poslati ovaj email sa gmail.com ili yahoo.com adrese." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:208 @@ -517,6 +543,8 @@ msgid "" "### How to use a bridge\n" "Once you have a set of bridges to use, open the Vidalia control panel, click on *Settings*, *Network* and tick the box that says *My ISP blocks connections to the Tor network*. Enter the bridges in the box below, hit *OK* and start Tor again." msgstr "" +"### Kako koristiti most\n" +"Jednom kada imate zbirku mostova za korištenje, otvorite Vidalia kontrolnu ploču, kliknite na *Settings*, *Network* i stavite kvačicu gdje piše \"My ISP blocks connections to the Tor network*. Unesite mostove u kućicu niže, pritisnite *OK* i ponovno pokrenite Tor." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:220 @@ -524,6 +552,8 @@ msgid "" "### How to use an open proxy\n" "If using a bridge does not work, try configuring Tor to use any HTTPS or SOCKS proxy to get access to the Tor network. This means even if Tor is blocked by your local network, open proxies can be safely used to connect to the Tor Network and on to the uncensored Internet." msgstr "" +"## Kako koristiti otvoreni proxy\n" +"Ako korištenje mosta ne radi, probajte podesiti Tor da koristi bilo koji HTTPS ili SOCKS proxy kako biste dobili pristup Tor mreži. To znači čak i kad je Tor blokiran na vašoj lokalnoj mreži, otvoreni proxy sustavi mogu se sigurno koristiti za spajanje na Tor mrežu i na necenzurirani Internet." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:223 @@ -574,6 +604,8 @@ msgid "" "## Frequently Asked Questions\n" "This section will answer some of the most common questions. If your question is not mentioned here, please send an email to help(a)rt.torproject.org." msgstr "" +"## Često Postavljana Pitanja\n" +"Ovaj odjeljak će odgovoriti na neka od najčešćih pitanja. Ako vaše pitanje ovdje nije spomenuto, molimo pošaljite email na help(a)rt.torproject.org." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:244 @@ -581,6 +613,8 @@ msgid "" "### Unable to extract the archive\n" "If you are using Windows and find that you cannot extract the archive, download and install [7-Zip](http://www.7-zip.org/)." msgstr "" +"## Nije moguće otpakirati arhivu\n" +"Ako koristite Windowse i otkrijete da ne možete otpakirati arhivu, preuzmite i instalirajte [7-Zip](http://www.7-zip.org/)." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:248 @@ -589,6 +623,9 @@ msgid "" "and use winzip to extract the archive. Before renaming the file, tell " "Windows to show file extensions:" msgstr "" +"Ako niste u mogućnosti preuzeti 7-Zip, pokušajte preimenovati datoteku iz .z" +" u .zip i upotrijebite winzip za otpakiravanje arhive. Prije preimenovanja " +"datoteke, podesite Windowse kako bi vam prikazivali nastavke datoteka:" #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:254 @@ -599,6 +636,11 @@ msgid "" "3. Click on the *View* tab\n" "4. Uncheck *Hide extensions for known file types* and click *OK*" msgstr "" +"#### Windows XP\n" +"1. Otvorite *My Computer*\n" +"2. Kliknite na *Tools* i odaberite *Folder Options...* u izborniku\n" +"3. Kliknite na *View* tab\n" +"4. Uklonite kvačicu gdje piše *Hide extensions for known file types* i kliknite *OK*" #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:260 @@ -609,6 +651,11 @@ msgid "" "3. Click on the *View* tab\n" "4. Uncheck *Hide extensions for known file types* and click *OK*" msgstr "" +"#### Windows Vista\n" +"1. Otvorite *Computer*\n" +"2. Kliknite na *Organize* i odaberite *Folder and search options* u izborniku\n" +"3. Kliknite na *View* tab\n" +"4. Uklonite kvačicu gdje piše *Hide extensions for known file types* i kliknite *OK*" #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:266 @@ -619,6 +666,11 @@ msgid "" "3. Click on the *View* tab\n" " 4. Uncheck *Hide extensions for known file types* and click *OK*" msgstr "" +"#### Windows 7\n" +"1. Otvorite *Computer*\n" +"2. Kliknite na *Organize* i odaberite *Folder and search options* u izborniku\n" +"3. Kliknite na *View* tab\n" +"4. Uklonite kvačicu gdje piše *Hide extensions for known file types* i kliknite *OK*" #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:273 @@ -626,6 +678,8 @@ msgid "" "### What to do with split packages\n" "When you request a split package, the parts may arrive out of order. You need to make sure you have received all the parts before you attempt to unpack them. Save all the parts into one directory on your computer, unzip them, and double-click the file that ends in \"..split.part01.exe\" to start the unpacking process." msgstr "" +"### Što učiniti sa podijeljenim paketima\n" +"Kada zatražite podijeljeni paket, paketi mogu pristići u krivom redosljedu. Morate se uvjeriti da ste primili sve dijelove prije no što ih pokušate otpakirati. Snimite sve dijelove u jednu mapu na vašem računalu, odzipajte ih, te dvoklikom na datoteku koja završava na \"..split.part01.exe\" pokrenite proces otpakiravanja." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:277 @@ -644,6 +698,8 @@ msgid "" "### Vidalia asks for a password\n" "You should not have to enter a password when starting Vidalia. If you are prompted for one, you are likely affected by one of these problems:" msgstr "" +"### Vidalia pita za lozinku\n" +"Nebiste trebali unositi lozinku pri pokretanju Vidalie. Ako vas svejedno pita za lozinku, vjerojatno imate jedan od sljedećih problema:" #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:287 @@ -696,6 +752,8 @@ msgid "" "### Flash does not work\n" "For security reasons, Flash, Java, and other plugins are currently disabled for Tor. Plugins operate independently from Firefox and can perform activity on your computer that ruins your anonymity." msgstr "" +"### Flash ne radi\n" +"Zbog sigurnosnih razloga, Flash, Java i drugi plugini su trenutno onemogućeni za Tor. Pluginovi djeluju odvojeno od Firefoxa i mogu izvršavati aktivnosti na vašem računalu koje uništavaju anonimnost." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:308 @@ -734,6 +792,8 @@ msgid "" "### I want to use another browser\n" "For security reasons, we recommend that you only browse the web through Tor using the Tor Browser Bundle. It is technically possible to use Tor with other browsers, but by doing so you open yourself up to potential attacks." msgstr "" +"### Želim koristiti neki drugi pretražnik\n" +"Zbog sigurnosnih razloga, preporučujemo da pretražujete web kroz Tor koristeći Tor Brower Bundle. Tehnički je moguće koristiti Tor sa drugim pretražnicima, ali time se ostavljate otvorenim za potencijalne napade." #. type: Plain text #: en/tsum.text:325 @@ -741,5 +801,7 @@ msgid "" "### Why Tor is slow\n" "Tor can sometimes be a bit slower than your normal Internet connection. After all, your traffic is sent through many different countries, sometimes across oceans around the world!" msgstr "" +"### Zašto je Tor spor\n" +"Tor može ponekada biti nešto sporiji od vaše uobičajene Internet veze. Na posljetku, vaš promet šalje se kroz mnogo različitih država, neki puta i preko oceana diljem svijeta!"

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[translation/vidalia] Update translations for vidalia
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 3a9477506ab547419774ca1287501f4eb1ce4c37 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 4 14:15:13 2012 +0000 Update translations for vidalia --- el/vidalia_el.po | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/el/vidalia_el.po b/el/vidalia_el.po index 8433714..fd82a80 100755 --- a/el/vidalia_el.po +++ b/el/vidalia_el.po @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2011-09-07 14:40+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-01-04 11:16+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-01-04 13:59+0000\n" "Last-Translator: anvo <fragos.george(a)hotmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: translations(a)vidalia-project.net\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "AdvancedPage" msgid "Configure ControlPort automatically" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Αυτόματη ρύθμιση του ControlPort" msgctxt "AdvancedPage" msgid "" @@ -1308,13 +1308,15 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "CrashReportDialog" msgid "Please fill a ticket in:" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Συμπληρώστε το εισητήριο:" msgctxt "CrashReportDialog" msgid "" "<a " "href=\"https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket\">https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket</a>" msgstr "" +"<a " +"href=\"https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket\">https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket</a>" msgctxt "CrashReportDialog" msgid "" @@ -3622,17 +3624,20 @@ msgstr "" msgctxt "StatusEventWidget" msgid "Relay Descriptor Rejected" -msgstr "" +msgstr "O Περιγραφέας του Αναμεταδότη Απορρίφθηκε" msgctxt "StatusEventWidget" msgid "" "Your relay's descriptor, which enables clients to connect to your relay, was" " rejected by the directory server at %1:%2. The reason given was: %3" msgstr "" +"Ο περιγραφέας του αναμεταδότη σας ο οποίος συνδέει προγράμματα-πελάτες στον " +"αναμεταδότη σας, απορρίφθηκε από τον διακομηστή καταλόγου %1:%2. Η αιτία που" +" δίδεται είναι: %3" msgctxt "StatusEventWidget" msgid "Your Relay is Online" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Ο Αναμεταδότης σας είναι Συνδεδεμένος" msgctxt "StatusEventWidget" msgid "" @@ -3641,6 +3646,11 @@ msgid "" " hours as more clients learn about your relay. Thank you for contributing to" " the Tor network!" msgstr "" +"Ο αναμεταδότης σας είναι συνδεδεμένος και διαθέσιμος προς χρήση από " +"προγράμματα Tor. Θα δείτε μια αύξηση στην κίνηση του δικτύου, μέσω του " +"Γραφήματος Εύρους Ζώνης, μέσα στις επόμενες λίγες ώρες, όσο περισσότερα " +"προγράμματα-πελάτες μαθαίνουν για τον αναμεταδότη σας. Ευχαριστούμε για την " +"συνεισφορά σας στο δίκτο Tor!" msgctxt "Stream" msgid "New" @@ -3696,13 +3706,15 @@ msgstr "Αποτυχία ''ανακατώματος'' του κωδικού ελ msgctxt "TorrcDialog" msgid "Editing torrc" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Επεξεργασία του torrc" msgctxt "TorrcDialog" msgid "" "Save settings. If unchecked it will only apply settings to the current Tor " "instance." msgstr "" +"Αποθήκευση ρυθμίσεων. Αν δεν επιλεχθεί, οι ρυθμίσεις θα εφαρμοσθούν μόνον " +"για την τρέχουσα συνεδρία του Tor." msgctxt "TorrcDialog" msgid "Cut" @@ -3718,11 +3730,11 @@ msgstr "Επικόλληση" msgctxt "TorrcDialog" msgid "Undo" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Ακύρωση" msgctxt "TorrcDialog" msgid "Redo" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Επανάληψη" msgctxt "TorrcDialog" msgid "Select All" @@ -3730,15 +3742,15 @@ msgstr "Επιλογή όλων" msgctxt "TorrcDialog" msgid "Apply all" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Εφαρμογή όλων" msgctxt "TorrcDialog" msgid "Apply selection only" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Εφαρμογή μόνο της επιλογής" msgctxt "TorrcDialog" msgid "Error connecting to Tor" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Σφάλμα κατά την σύνδεση στο Tor" msgctxt "TorrcDialog" msgid "Selection is empty. Please select some text, or check \"Apply all\""

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