December 2021 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[translation/tpo-web] new translations in tpo-web
by translation＠torproject.org 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

commit 0105461ad799ed130487e82041b30ce0877b73b1 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 15 14:47:38 2021 +0000 new translations in tpo-web --- contents+fr.po | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/contents+fr.po b/contents+fr.po index 3552dc4f7b..4c12a93796 100644 --- a/contents+fr.po +++ b/contents+fr.po @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ msgstr "La vie privée est un droit de la personne" #: (dynamic) msgid "Thank you for helping us reach our $150,000 Friends of Tor match!" msgstr "" +"Merci de nous avoir permis d'atteindre 150 000$ de donations pour Friends of" +" Tor !" #: (dynamic) msgid "Your donation will be matched by Friends of Tor, up to $100,000."

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[translation/tbmanual-contentspot] new translations in tbmanual-contentspot
by translation＠torproject.org 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

commit 5dae227ee02255cbc5ef599e49e63707e93bf055 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 15 14:46:48 2021 +0000 new translations in tbmanual-contentspot --- contents+fr.po | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/contents+fr.po b/contents+fr.po index 5b40cab18a..e08d83c62f 100644 --- a/contents+fr.po +++ b/contents+fr.po @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ # Emeric Vallespi <evallespi(a)protonmail.com>, 2021 # AO_LL <ao(a)localizationlab.org>, 2021 # PoorPockets McNewHold <poorpocketsmcnewhold(a)protonmail.ch>, 2021 -# Matburnx <matboury(a)gmail.com>, 2021 # conan future, 2021 # Emma Peel, 2021 +# Matburnx <matboury(a)gmail.com>, 2021 # msgid "" msgstr "" @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ msgstr "" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2021-12-08 15:23+UTC\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2018-11-14 12:31+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2021\n" +"Last-Translator: Matburnx <matboury(a)gmail.com>, 2021\n" "Language-Team: French (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/fr/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ msgstr "La vie privée est un droit de la personne" #: (dynamic) msgid "Thank you for helping us reach our $150,000 Friends of Tor match!" msgstr "" +"Merci de nous avoir permis d'atteindre 150 000$ de donations pour Friends of" +" Tor !" #: (dynamic) msgid "Your donation will be matched by Friends of Tor, up to $100,000." @@ -770,7 +772,7 @@ msgstr "" #: https//tb-manual.torproject.org/installation/ #: (content/installation/contents+en.lrtopic.body) msgid "‪`./start-tor-browser.desktop`" -msgstr "" +msgstr "‪`./start-tor-browser.desktop`" #: https//tb-manual.torproject.org/installation/ #: (content/installation/contents+en.lrtopic.body) @@ -807,11 +809,15 @@ msgstr "|----------|-----------------|" msgid "" "| ‪`--register-app` | To register Tor Browser as a desktop application. |" msgstr "" +"| ‪`--register-app` | Pour enregistrer le Navigateur Tor comme application " +"sur le bureau. |" #: https//tb-manual.torproject.org/installation/ #: (content/installation/contents+en.lrtopic.body) msgid "| ‪`--verbose` | To display Tor and Firefox output in the terminal. |" msgstr "" +"| ‪`--verbose` | Pour afficher les messages de Tor et de Firefox dans le " +"terminal. |" #: https//tb-manual.torproject.org/installation/ #: (content/installation/contents+en.lrtopic.body) @@ -819,6 +825,8 @@ msgid "" "| ‪`--log [file]` | To record Tor and Firefox output in file (default: tor-" "browser.log). |" msgstr "" +"| ‪`--log [file]` | Pour enregistrer les messages de Tor et de Firefox dans " +"un fichier (par défaut : tor-browser.log). |" #: https//tb-manual.torproject.org/installation/ #: (content/installation/contents+en.lrtopic.body) @@ -826,6 +834,8 @@ msgid "" "| ‪`--detach` | To detach from terminal and run Tor Browser in the " "background. |" msgstr "" +"| ‪`--detach` | Pour s'éloigner du terminal et lancer le Navigateur Tor en " +"arrière-plan. |" #: https//tb-manual.torproject.org/installation/ #: (content/installation/contents+en.lrtopic.body) @@ -833,6 +843,8 @@ msgid "" "| ‪`--unregister-app` | To unregister Tor Browser as a desktop application. " "|" msgstr "" +"| ‪`--unregister-app` | Pour retirer le Navigateur Tor des applications de " +"bureau. |" #: https//tb-manual.torproject.org/installation/ #: (content/installation/contents+en.lrtopic.body) @@ -3096,6 +3108,8 @@ msgstr "" msgid "" "* Then type `~/Library/Application Support/` in the window and click Go." msgstr "" +"* Tapez ensuite `~/Library/Application Support/` dans la fenêtre et cliquez " +"sur Aller." #: https//tb-manual.torproject.org/uninstalling/ #: (content/uninstalling/contents+en.lrtopic.body)

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[translation/gettor-website-contentspot] new translations in gettor-website-contentspot
by translation＠torproject.org 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

commit 85aaa515991f2fcc26b5105b2ca09405ffaa5978 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 15 14:45:22 2021 +0000 new translations in gettor-website-contentspot --- contents+fr.po | 27 +++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/contents+fr.po b/contents+fr.po index b80e7b9c15..5fcef1ce20 100644 --- a/contents+fr.po +++ b/contents+fr.po @@ -1,10 +1,11 @@ # # Translators: # Vincent Breitmoser <look(a)my.amazin.horse>, 2021 -# AO <ao(a)localizationlab.org>, 2021 +# AO_LL <ao(a)localizationlab.org>, 2021 # Emma Peel, 2021 # erinm, 2021 # Gus, 2021 +# Matburnx <matboury(a)gmail.com>, 2021 # msgid "" msgstr "" @@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ msgstr "" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2021-06-22 19:15+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2021-03-24 14:33+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Gus, 2021\n" +"Last-Translator: Matburnx <matboury(a)gmail.com>, 2021\n" "Language-Team: French (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/fr/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -32,8 +33,8 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "GetTor est un service qui offre d’autres méthodes pour télécharger le " "Navigateur Tor, particulièrement pour les personnes qui vivent en des lieux " -"où la censure est particulièrement forte, où l’accès au site Web du Projet " -"Tor est limité." +"où la censure est particulièrement forte, où l’accès au site Web du " +"Projet Tor est limité." #: https//gettor.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) msgid "# How does it work?" @@ -66,6 +67,9 @@ msgid "" "- Step 3: Download Tor Browser from one of the providers. When done, check " "the integrity of the downloaded file by verifying its signature." msgstr "" +"– Étape 3 : téléchargez le Navigateur Tor d’un des fournisseurs. Une fois " +"cela fait, vérifiez l’intégrité du fichier téléchargé en confirmant sa " +"signature." #: https//gettor.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) msgid "- Step 4: If required, get some bridges!" @@ -118,8 +122,8 @@ msgstr "" #: https//gettor.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) msgid "" -"Check [how to verify a digital signature](https://support.torproject.org/tbb" -"/how-to-verify-signature/)." +"Check [how to verify a digital " +"signature](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/)." msgstr "" "Apprenez [comment confirmer un signature " "numérique](https://support.torproject.org/fr/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/)." @@ -184,6 +188,9 @@ msgid "" "bridge.' Click on the drop-down menu and select the pluggable transport " "you'd like to use." msgstr "" +"Dans la section « Ponts », sélectionnez « Sélectionner un pont intégré ». " +"Cliquez sur le menu déroulant et choisissez le transport enfichable que vous" +" voulez utiliser." #: https//gettor.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) msgid "Click 'OK' to save your settings." @@ -195,8 +202,8 @@ msgid "" "torproject.org'. This will require you solve a CAPTCHA and will " "automatically populate your settings with one or more bridges." msgstr "" -"Si les ponts intégrés ne fonctionnent pas, vous pouvez aussi sélectionner « " -"Demander un pont à torproject.org ». Une fois que vous aurez résolu un " +"Si les ponts intégrés ne fonctionnent pas, vous pouvez aussi sélectionner " +"« Demander un pont à torproject.org ». Une fois que vous aurez résolu un " "captcha, un ou plusieurs ponts apparaîtront automatiquement dans vos " "paramètres." @@ -314,8 +321,8 @@ msgid "" "eavesdroppers with and without Tor Browser and HTTPS encryption:" msgstr "" "La visualisation suivante montre quels renseignements sont visibles aux " -"écoutes électroniques avec et sans le Navigateur Tor ni le chiffrement HTTPS" -" :" +"écoutes électroniques avec et sans le Navigateur Tor ni le chiffrement " +"HTTPS :" #: lego/templates/secure-connections.html:4 msgid ""

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[tor/main] relay: Don't make DNS timeout trigger an overload
by ahf＠torproject.org 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

commit cda7acb35d40c505dc4d2c3b55d611faab189477 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Dec 13 10:22:29 2021 -0500 relay: Don't make DNS timeout trigger an overload Tor has configure libevent to attempt up to 3 times a DNS query for a maximum of 5 seconds each. Once that 5 seconds has elapsed, it consider the query "Timed Out" but tor only gets a timeout if all 3 attempts have failed. For example, using Unbound, it has a much higher threshold of timeout. It is well defined in https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/documentation/unbound/info-timeout/ and has some complexity to it. But the gist is that if it times out, it will be much more than 5 seconds. And so the Tor DNS timeouts are more of a "UX issue" rather than a "network issue". For this reason, we are removing this metric from the overload general signal. See https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/issues/139 for more information. Fixes #40527 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket40527 | 5 +++ src/feature/stats/rephist.c | 12 ------- src/test/test_stats.c | 82 ++------------------------------------------- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket40527 b/changes/ticket40527 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..631b3d4bb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket40527 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major bugfixes (relay, overload): + - Don't make Tor DNS timeout trigger an overload general state. These + timeouts are different from DNS server timeout. They have to be seen as + timeout related to UX and not because of a network problem. Fixes bug + 40527; bugfix on 0.4.6.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/stats/rephist.c b/src/feature/stats/rephist.c index c3a281a8c2..2bfa14d326 100644 --- a/src/feature/stats/rephist.c +++ b/src/feature/stats/rephist.c @@ -283,18 +283,6 @@ overload_general_dns_assessment(void) return; } - /* Lets see if we can signal a general overload. */ - double fraction = (double) overload_dns_stats.stats_n_error_timeout / - (double) overload_dns_stats.stats_n_request; - if (fraction >= overload_dns_timeout_fraction) { - log_notice(LD_HIST, "General overload -> DNS timeouts (%" PRIu64 ") " - "fraction %.4f%% is above threshold of %.4f%%", - overload_dns_stats.stats_n_error_timeout, - fraction * 100.0, - overload_dns_timeout_fraction * 100.0); - rep_hist_note_overload(OVERLOAD_GENERAL); - } - reset: /* Reset counters for the next period. */ overload_dns_stats.stats_n_error_timeout = 0; diff --git a/src/test/test_stats.c b/src/test/test_stats.c index 3b9a192c75..af035ae54c 100644 --- a/src/test/test_stats.c +++ b/src/test/test_stats.c @@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ test_overload_stats(void *arg) stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_stats_lines(); tt_assert(!stats_str); - /* Note a DNS overload */ + /* Note a overload */ rep_hist_note_overload(OVERLOAD_GENERAL); /* Move the time forward one hour */ @@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ test_overload_stats(void *arg) /* Now the time should be 2002-01-07 00:00:00 */ - /* Note a DNS overload */ + /* Note a overload */ rep_hist_note_overload(OVERLOAD_GENERAL); stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); @@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ test_overload_stats(void *arg) tt_str_op("overload-fd-exhausted 1 2002-01-07 00:00:00\n", OP_EQ, stats_str); tor_free(stats_str); - /* Move the time forward. Register DNS overload. See that the time changed */ + /* Move the time forward. Register overload. See that the time changed */ current_time += 3600*2; update_approx_time(current_time); @@ -867,81 +867,6 @@ test_overload_stats(void *arg) tor_free(stats_str); } -/** Test the overload stats logic. */ -static void -test_overload_dns_timeout(void *arg) -{ - char *stats_str = NULL; - (void) arg; - - /* Lets simulate a series of timeouts but below our default 1% threshold. */ - - for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { - /* This should trigger 9 timeouts which is just below 1% (10) */ - if (i > 0 && !(i % 100)) { - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT); - } else { - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_NONE); - } - } - - /* No overload yet. */ - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(!stats_str); - - /* Move it 10 minutes in the future and see if we get a general overload. */ - update_approx_time(approx_time() + (10 * 60)); - - /* This query should NOT trigger the general overload because we are below - * our default of 1%. */ - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_NONE); - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(!stats_str); - - /* We'll now go above our 1% threshold. */ - for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { - /* This should trigger 10 timeouts which is our threshold of 1% (10) */ - if (!(i % 10)) { - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT); - } else { - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_NONE); - } - } - - /* Move it 10 minutes in the future and see if we get a general overload. */ - update_approx_time(approx_time() + (10 * 60)); - - /* This query should trigger the general overload because we are above 1%. */ - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_NONE); - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(stats_str); - tor_free(stats_str); - - /* Move 72h in the future, we should NOT get an overload anymore. */ - update_approx_time(approx_time() + (72 * 3600)); - - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(!stats_str); - - /* This query should NOT trigger the general overload. */ - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT); - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(!stats_str); - - /* Move it 10 minutes in the future and see if we get a general overload. We - * have now 100% of requests timing out. */ - update_approx_time(approx_time() + (10 * 60)); - - /* This query should trigger the general overload with 50% of timeouts. */ - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_NONE); - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(stats_str); - tor_free(stats_str); - - done: - tor_free(stats_str); -} - #define ENT(name) \ { #name, test_ ## name , 0, NULL, NULL } #define FORK(name) \ @@ -958,7 +883,6 @@ struct testcase_t stats_tests[] = { FORK(rephist_v3_onions), FORK(load_stats_file), FORK(overload_stats), - FORK(overload_dns_timeout), END_OF_TESTCASES };

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[tor/main] relay: Change DNS timeout label on MetricsPort
by ahf＠torproject.org 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

commit bf1ed5c8534c515bf1ee39bfbf8c340d704b4490 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Dec 13 10:44:24 2021 -0500 relay: Change DNS timeout label on MetricsPort Change it from "timeout" to "tor_timeout" in order to indicate that the DNS timeout is one from tor's DNS threshold and not the DNS server itself. Fixes #40527 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket40527 | 6 +++ src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c | 1 - src/feature/relay/relay_metrics.c | 2 +- src/feature/stats/rephist.c | 88 ++---------------------------------- src/feature/stats/rephist.h | 2 - 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket40527 b/changes/ticket40527 index 631b3d4bb9..25bf6c57e3 100644 --- a/changes/ticket40527 +++ b/changes/ticket40527 @@ -3,3 +3,9 @@ timeouts are different from DNS server timeout. They have to be seen as timeout related to UX and not because of a network problem. Fixes bug 40527; bugfix on 0.4.6.1-alpha. + - Change the MetricsPort DNS "timeout" label to be "tor_timeout" in order + to indicate that this was a DNS timeout from tor perspective and not the + DNS server itself. + - Deprecate overload_dns_timeout_period_secs and + overload_dns_timeout_scale_percent consensus parameters as well. They + were used to assess the overload state which is no more now. diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c b/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c index d57db4c415..77e2b547f5 100644 --- a/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c @@ -1666,7 +1666,6 @@ notify_before_networkstatus_changes(const networkstatus_t *old_c, dos_consensus_has_changed(new_c); relay_consensus_has_changed(new_c); hs_dos_consensus_has_changed(new_c); - rep_hist_consensus_has_changed(new_c); } /* Called after a new consensus has been put in the global state. It is safe diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_metrics.c b/src/feature/relay/relay_metrics.c index 0886b6ae87..fc8eb10d1b 100644 --- a/src/feature/relay/relay_metrics.c +++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_metrics.c @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ fill_dns_error_values(void) { .name = "refused", .key = DNS_ERR_REFUSED }, { .name = "truncated", .key = DNS_ERR_TRUNCATED }, { .name = "unknown", .key = DNS_ERR_UNKNOWN }, - { .name = "timeout", .key = DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT }, + { .name = "tor_timeout", .key = DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT }, { .name = "shutdown", .key = DNS_ERR_SHUTDOWN }, { .name = "cancel", .key = DNS_ERR_CANCEL }, { .name = "nodata", .key = DNS_ERR_NODATA }, diff --git a/src/feature/stats/rephist.c b/src/feature/stats/rephist.c index 68c9349bc3..5ff4ef1d2e 100644 --- a/src/feature/stats/rephist.c +++ b/src/feature/stats/rephist.c @@ -219,33 +219,6 @@ static uint64_t stats_n_tcp_exhaustion = 0; /***** DNS statistics *****/ -/* We use a scale here so we can represent percentages with decimal points by - * scaling the value by this factor and so 0.5% becomes a value of 500. - * Default is 1% and thus min and max range is 0 to 100%. */ -#define OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERCENT_SCALE 1000.0 -#define OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERCENT_DEFAULT 1000 -#define OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERCENT_MIN 0 -#define OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERCENT_MAX 100000 - -/** Consensus parameter: indicate what fraction of DNS timeout errors over the - * total number of DNS requests must be reached before we trigger a general - * overload signal .*/ -static double overload_dns_timeout_fraction = - OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERCENT_DEFAULT / - OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERCENT_SCALE / 100.0; - -/* Number of seconds for the assessment period. Default is 10 minutes (600) and - * the min max range is within a 32bit value. */ -#define OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERIOD_SECS_DEFAULT (10 * 60) -#define OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERIOD_SECS_MIN 0 -#define OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERIOD_SECS_MAX INT32_MAX - -/** Consensus parameter: Period, in seconds, over which we count the number of - * DNS requests and timeout errors. After that period, we assess if we trigger - * an overload or not. */ -static int32_t overload_dns_timeout_period_secs = - OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERIOD_SECS_DEFAULT; - /** Overload DNS statistics. The information in this object is used to assess * if, due to DNS errors, we should emit a general overload signal or not. * @@ -260,9 +233,6 @@ typedef struct { * right before the DNS request is initiated. */ uint64_t stats_n_request; - /** Total number of DNS timeout errors. */ - uint64_t stats_n_error_timeout; - /** When is the next assessment time of the general overload for DNS errors. * Once this time is reached, all stats are reset and this time is set to the * next assessment time. */ @@ -285,7 +255,7 @@ typedef struct { /* Total number of DNS errors specific to libevent. */ uint64_t stats_n_error_truncated; /* 65 */ uint64_t stats_n_error_unknown; /* 66 */ - uint64_t stats_n_error_timeout; /* 67 */ + uint64_t stats_n_error_tor_timeout; /* 67 */ uint64_t stats_n_error_shutdown; /* 68 */ uint64_t stats_n_error_cancel; /* 69 */ uint64_t stats_n_error_nodata; /* 70 */ @@ -337,48 +307,6 @@ get_dns_stats_by_type(const int type) } #endif -/** Assess the DNS timeout errors and if we have enough to trigger a general - * overload. */ -static void -overload_general_dns_assessment(void) -{ - /* Initialize the time. Should be done once. */ - if (overload_dns_stats.next_assessment_time == 0) { - goto reset; - } - - /* Not the time yet. */ - if (overload_dns_stats.next_assessment_time > approx_time()) { - return; - } - - reset: - /* Reset counters for the next period. */ - overload_dns_stats.stats_n_error_timeout = 0; - overload_dns_stats.stats_n_request = 0; - overload_dns_stats.next_assessment_time = - approx_time() + overload_dns_timeout_period_secs; -} - -/** Called just before the consensus will be replaced. Update the consensus - * parameters in case they changed. */ -void -rep_hist_consensus_has_changed(const networkstatus_t *ns) -{ - overload_dns_timeout_fraction = - networkstatus_get_param(ns, "overload_dns_timeout_scale_percent", - OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERCENT_DEFAULT, - OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERCENT_MIN, - OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERCENT_MAX) / - OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERCENT_SCALE / 100.0; - - overload_dns_timeout_period_secs = - networkstatus_get_param(ns, "overload_dns_timeout_period_secs", - OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERIOD_SECS_DEFAULT, - OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERIOD_SECS_MIN, - OVERLOAD_DNS_TIMEOUT_PERIOD_SECS_MAX); -} - /** Return the DNS error count for the given libevent DNS type and error code. * The possible types are: DNS_IPv4_A, DNS_PTR, DNS_IPv6_AAAA. */ uint64_t @@ -407,7 +335,7 @@ rep_hist_get_n_dns_error(int type, uint8_t error) case DNS_ERR_UNKNOWN: return dns_stats->stats_n_error_unknown; case DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT: - return dns_stats->stats_n_error_timeout; + return dns_stats->stats_n_error_tor_timeout; case DNS_ERR_SHUTDOWN: return dns_stats->stats_n_error_shutdown; case DNS_ERR_CANCEL: @@ -442,16 +370,6 @@ rep_hist_get_n_dns_request(int type) void rep_hist_note_dns_error(int type, uint8_t error) { - /* Assess if we need to trigger a general overload with regards to the DNS - * errors or not. */ - overload_general_dns_assessment(); - - /* Because of the libevent problem (see note in the function comment), we - * disregard the DNS query type and keep track of DNS timeout for the - * overload state. */ - if (error == DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT) { - overload_dns_stats.stats_n_error_timeout++; - } overload_dns_stats.stats_n_request++; /* Again, the libevent bug (see function comment), for an error that is @@ -490,7 +408,7 @@ rep_hist_note_dns_error(int type, uint8_t error) dns_stats->stats_n_error_unknown++; break; case DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT: - dns_stats->stats_n_error_timeout++; + dns_stats->stats_n_error_tor_timeout++; break; case DNS_ERR_SHUTDOWN: dns_stats->stats_n_error_shutdown++; diff --git a/src/feature/stats/rephist.h b/src/feature/stats/rephist.h index 6918ed18c2..7f414de4c8 100644 --- a/src/feature/stats/rephist.h +++ b/src/feature/stats/rephist.h @@ -89,8 +89,6 @@ uint64_t rep_hist_get_n_dns_request(int type); void rep_hist_note_dns_request(int type); void rep_hist_note_dns_error(int type, uint8_t error); -void rep_hist_consensus_has_changed(const networkstatus_t *ns); - extern uint64_t rephist_total_alloc; extern uint32_t rephist_total_num; #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS

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[tor/main] fixup! relay: Change DNS timeout label on MetricsPort
by ahf＠torproject.org 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

commit 122c60c323bf6467c4cd998bf19ce44426861cd8 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 14 12:14:39 2021 -0500 fixup! relay: Change DNS timeout label on MetricsPort --- config.rust | 24 ------------------------ 1 file changed, 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/config.rust b/config.rust deleted file mode 100644 index 878a231cda..0000000000 --- a/config.rust +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -# Used by our cargo build.rs script to get variables from autoconf. -# -# The "configure" script will generate "config.rust" from "config.rust.in", -# and then build.rs will read "config.rust". - -BUILDDIR=/home/dgoulet/Documents/git/tor -TOR_LDFLAGS_zlib= -TOR_LDFLAGS_nss=@TOR_LDFLAGS_nss@ -TOR_LDFLAGS_openssl= -TOR_LDFLAGS_libevent= -TOR_ZLIB_LIBS=-lz -TOR_LIB_MATH=-lm -TOR_LIBEVENT_LIBS=-levent -TOR_OPENSSL_LIBS=-lssl -lcrypto -TOR_LIB_WS32= -TOR_LIB_GDI= -TOR_LIB_USERENV= -CURVE25519_LIBS= -TOR_SYSTEMD_LIBS=-lsystemd -TOR_LZMA_LIBS=-llzma -TOR_ZSTD_LIBS=-lzstd -LIBS=-lseccomp -lcap -LDFLAGS= -pie -z relro -z now -rdynamic -NSS_LIBS=

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[tor/main] fixup! relay: Change DNS timeout label on MetricsPort
by ahf＠torproject.org 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

commit b37674fec75f14a0be9dbeff458355d91897cbe5 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 14 16:12:17 2021 -0500 fixup! relay: Change DNS timeout label on MetricsPort Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/rust/.cargo/config | 12 ------------ 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/rust/.cargo/config b/src/rust/.cargo/config deleted file mode 100644 index d91e26719d..0000000000 --- a/src/rust/.cargo/config +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -[source] - - [source.crates-io] - registry = 'https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index' - replace-with = 'vendored-sources' - - [source.vendored-sources] - directory = '' - -[build] - rustflags = [ "-D", "warnings" ] -

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[tor/main] Merge branch 'ticket40527_046_01' into ticket40527_047_01
by ahf＠torproject.org 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

commit ad6a0ebb119dba09fd1a0d1d6eb2a1362803bce3 Merge: b4c55f3a70 cda7acb35d Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Dec 13 10:48:54 2021 -0500 Merge branch 'ticket40527_046_01' into ticket40527_047_01 changes/ticket40527 | 5 +++ config.rust | 24 +++++++++++++ src/feature/stats/rephist.c | 12 ------- src/rust/.cargo/config | 12 +++++++ src/test/test_stats.c | 82 ++------------------------------------------- 5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) diff --cc config.rust index 0000000000,0000000000..878a231cda new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/config.rust @@@ -1,0 -1,0 +1,24 @@@ ++# Used by our cargo build.rs script to get variables from autoconf. ++# ++# The "configure" script will generate "config.rust" from "config.rust.in", ++# and then build.rs will read "config.rust". ++ ++BUILDDIR=/home/dgoulet/Documents/git/tor ++TOR_LDFLAGS_zlib= ++TOR_LDFLAGS_nss=@TOR_LDFLAGS_nss@ ++TOR_LDFLAGS_openssl= ++TOR_LDFLAGS_libevent= ++TOR_ZLIB_LIBS=-lz ++TOR_LIB_MATH=-lm ++TOR_LIBEVENT_LIBS=-levent ++TOR_OPENSSL_LIBS=-lssl -lcrypto ++TOR_LIB_WS32= ++TOR_LIB_GDI= ++TOR_LIB_USERENV= ++CURVE25519_LIBS= ++TOR_SYSTEMD_LIBS=-lsystemd ++TOR_LZMA_LIBS=-llzma ++TOR_ZSTD_LIBS=-lzstd ++LIBS=-lseccomp -lcap ++LDFLAGS= -pie -z relro -z now -rdynamic ++NSS_LIBS= diff --cc src/rust/.cargo/config index 0000000000,0000000000..d91e26719d new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/rust/.cargo/config @@@ -1,0 -1,0 +1,12 @@@ ++[source] ++ ++ [source.crates-io] ++ registry = 'https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index' ++ replace-with = 'vendored-sources' ++ ++ [source.vendored-sources] ++ directory = '' ++ ++[build] ++ rustflags = [ "-D", "warnings" ] ++

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[tor/main] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-gitlab/mr/500' into main
by ahf＠torproject.org 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

commit 193781e6ef8b1236bfd51eab344abcb0e914e168 Merge: 48d778bc32 eb06d52dae Author: Alexander Færøy <ahf(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 15 12:46:18 2021 +0000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-gitlab/mr/500' into main changes/ticket40527 | 11 ++++ src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c | 1 - src/feature/relay/relay_metrics.c | 2 +- src/feature/stats/rephist.c | 100 ++--------------------------------- src/feature/stats/rephist.h | 2 - src/test/test_stats.c | 82 ++-------------------------- 6 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 180 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.4.6] relay: Don't make DNS timeout trigger an overload
by ahf＠torproject.org 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

commit cda7acb35d40c505dc4d2c3b55d611faab189477 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Dec 13 10:22:29 2021 -0500 relay: Don't make DNS timeout trigger an overload Tor has configure libevent to attempt up to 3 times a DNS query for a maximum of 5 seconds each. Once that 5 seconds has elapsed, it consider the query "Timed Out" but tor only gets a timeout if all 3 attempts have failed. For example, using Unbound, it has a much higher threshold of timeout. It is well defined in https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/documentation/unbound/info-timeout/ and has some complexity to it. But the gist is that if it times out, it will be much more than 5 seconds. And so the Tor DNS timeouts are more of a "UX issue" rather than a "network issue". For this reason, we are removing this metric from the overload general signal. See https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/issues/139 for more information. Fixes #40527 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket40527 | 5 +++ src/feature/stats/rephist.c | 12 ------- src/test/test_stats.c | 82 ++------------------------------------------- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket40527 b/changes/ticket40527 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..631b3d4bb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket40527 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major bugfixes (relay, overload): + - Don't make Tor DNS timeout trigger an overload general state. These + timeouts are different from DNS server timeout. They have to be seen as + timeout related to UX and not because of a network problem. Fixes bug + 40527; bugfix on 0.4.6.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/stats/rephist.c b/src/feature/stats/rephist.c index c3a281a8c2..2bfa14d326 100644 --- a/src/feature/stats/rephist.c +++ b/src/feature/stats/rephist.c @@ -283,18 +283,6 @@ overload_general_dns_assessment(void) return; } - /* Lets see if we can signal a general overload. */ - double fraction = (double) overload_dns_stats.stats_n_error_timeout / - (double) overload_dns_stats.stats_n_request; - if (fraction >= overload_dns_timeout_fraction) { - log_notice(LD_HIST, "General overload -> DNS timeouts (%" PRIu64 ") " - "fraction %.4f%% is above threshold of %.4f%%", - overload_dns_stats.stats_n_error_timeout, - fraction * 100.0, - overload_dns_timeout_fraction * 100.0); - rep_hist_note_overload(OVERLOAD_GENERAL); - } - reset: /* Reset counters for the next period. */ overload_dns_stats.stats_n_error_timeout = 0; diff --git a/src/test/test_stats.c b/src/test/test_stats.c index 3b9a192c75..af035ae54c 100644 --- a/src/test/test_stats.c +++ b/src/test/test_stats.c @@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ test_overload_stats(void *arg) stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_stats_lines(); tt_assert(!stats_str); - /* Note a DNS overload */ + /* Note a overload */ rep_hist_note_overload(OVERLOAD_GENERAL); /* Move the time forward one hour */ @@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ test_overload_stats(void *arg) /* Now the time should be 2002-01-07 00:00:00 */ - /* Note a DNS overload */ + /* Note a overload */ rep_hist_note_overload(OVERLOAD_GENERAL); stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); @@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ test_overload_stats(void *arg) tt_str_op("overload-fd-exhausted 1 2002-01-07 00:00:00\n", OP_EQ, stats_str); tor_free(stats_str); - /* Move the time forward. Register DNS overload. See that the time changed */ + /* Move the time forward. Register overload. See that the time changed */ current_time += 3600*2; update_approx_time(current_time); @@ -867,81 +867,6 @@ test_overload_stats(void *arg) tor_free(stats_str); } -/** Test the overload stats logic. */ -static void -test_overload_dns_timeout(void *arg) -{ - char *stats_str = NULL; - (void) arg; - - /* Lets simulate a series of timeouts but below our default 1% threshold. */ - - for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { - /* This should trigger 9 timeouts which is just below 1% (10) */ - if (i > 0 && !(i % 100)) { - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT); - } else { - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_NONE); - } - } - - /* No overload yet. */ - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(!stats_str); - - /* Move it 10 minutes in the future and see if we get a general overload. */ - update_approx_time(approx_time() + (10 * 60)); - - /* This query should NOT trigger the general overload because we are below - * our default of 1%. */ - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_NONE); - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(!stats_str); - - /* We'll now go above our 1% threshold. */ - for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { - /* This should trigger 10 timeouts which is our threshold of 1% (10) */ - if (!(i % 10)) { - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT); - } else { - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_NONE); - } - } - - /* Move it 10 minutes in the future and see if we get a general overload. */ - update_approx_time(approx_time() + (10 * 60)); - - /* This query should trigger the general overload because we are above 1%. */ - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_NONE); - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(stats_str); - tor_free(stats_str); - - /* Move 72h in the future, we should NOT get an overload anymore. */ - update_approx_time(approx_time() + (72 * 3600)); - - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(!stats_str); - - /* This query should NOT trigger the general overload. */ - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT); - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(!stats_str); - - /* Move it 10 minutes in the future and see if we get a general overload. We - * have now 100% of requests timing out. */ - update_approx_time(approx_time() + (10 * 60)); - - /* This query should trigger the general overload with 50% of timeouts. */ - rep_hist_note_dns_query(0, DNS_ERR_NONE); - stats_str = rep_hist_get_overload_general_line(); - tt_assert(stats_str); - tor_free(stats_str); - - done: - tor_free(stats_str); -} - #define ENT(name) \ { #name, test_ ## name , 0, NULL, NULL } #define FORK(name) \ @@ -958,7 +883,6 @@ struct testcase_t stats_tests[] = { FORK(rephist_v3_onions), FORK(load_stats_file), FORK(overload_stats), - FORK(overload_dns_timeout), END_OF_TESTCASES };

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