commit 7589995111b452cf7e92f5e9b5d94df244cbdbb9
Merge: 3c97ab3c2 046183714
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org>
Date: Tue Sep 17 09:16:52 2019 -0400
Merge branch 'maint-0.3.5' into bug31107_035
.appveyor.yml | 119 +
.gitignore | 139 +-
.gitlab-ci.yml | 45 +
.gitmodules | 3 +
.travis.yml | 78 +-
CODE_OF_CONDUCT | 7 +
CONTRIBUTING | 39 +
ChangeLog | 9099 +++++++++++++++++++-
Doxyfile.in | 1184 ++-
INSTALL | 34 -
LICENSE | 32 +-
Makefile.am | 276 +-
README | 3 +
ReleaseNotes | 7319 +++++++++++++++-
acinclude.m4 | 25 +-
autogen.sh | 4 +-
changes/29241_diagnostic | 4 +
changes/bug13221 | 5 +
changes/bug21394.2 | 7 -
changes/bug22619 | 3 +
changes/bug23512 | 6 -
changes/bug23681 | 5 -
changes/bug23790 | 6 -
changes/bug24104 | 4 -
changes/bug24661 | 3 +
changes/bug24903 | 5 -
changes/bug25113 | 5 -
changes/bug25116 | 4 -
changes/bug25733 | 4 -
changes/bug27073 | 4 -
changes/bug27197 | 3 +
changes/bug27199 | 3 +
changes/bug27316 | 3 -
changes/bug27658 | 6 -
changes/bug27709 | 4 -
changes/bug27740 | 4 +
changes/bug27741 | 5 +
changes/bug27750 | 6 +
changes/bug27800 | 4 +
changes/bug27804 | 3 +
changes/bug27841 | 7 +
changes/bug27963_timeradd | 4 +
changes/bug27968 | 3 +
changes/bug28115 | 3 +
changes/bug28127 | 7 +
changes/bug28183 | 4 +
changes/bug28298 | 4 +
changes/bug28303 | 3 +
changes/bug28348_034 | 5 +
changes/bug28399 | 4 +
changes/bug28419 | 3 +
changes/bug28435 | 3 +
changes/bug28441 | 4 +
changes/bug28454 | 4 +
changes/bug28485 | 3 +
changes/bug28524 | 4 +
changes/bug28554 | 3 +
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changes/bug29135 | 5 +
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changes/bug29161 | 3 +
changes/bug29175_035 | 4 +
changes/bug29241 | 6 +
changes/bug29244 | 4 +
changes/bug29530_035 | 5 +
changes/bug29601 | 6 +
changes/bug29670 | 4 +
changes/bug29875 | 11 +
changes/bug29922 | 4 +
changes/bug30011 | 4 +
changes/bug30040 | 9 +
changes/bug30148 | 4 +
changes/bug30189 | 4 +
changes/bug30190 | 3 +
changes/bug30316 | 4 +
changes/bug30452 | 3 +
changes/bug30475 | 4 +
changes/bug30713 | 5 +
changes/bug30744 | 3 +
changes/bug30894 | 4 +
changes/bug31003 | 4 +
changes/bug31463 | 3 +
changes/cid1444119 | 3 +
changes/geoip-2018-09-06 | 4 -
changes/geoip-2018-10-09 | 4 -
changes/rust_asan | 8 +
changes/ticket19566 | 6 +
changes/ticket27252 | 6 -
changes/ticket27471 | 5 +
changes/ticket27738 | 4 -
changes/ticket27751 | 2 +
changes/ticket27838 | 4 +
changes/ticket27913 | 3 +
changes/ticket27995 | 4 +
changes/ticket28026 | 3 +
changes/ticket28113 | 5 +
changes/ticket28128 | 4 +
changes/ticket28229_diag | 3 +
changes/ticket28275 | 4 +
changes/ticket28318 | 3 +
changes/ticket28459 | 4 +
changes/ticket28574 | 4 +
changes/ticket28668 | 3 +
changes/ticket28669 | 6 +
changes/ticket28838 | 8 +
changes/ticket28851 | 4 +
changes/ticket28879 | 5 +
changes/ticket28881 | 4 +
changes/ticket28883 | 4 +
changes/ticket28912 | 6 +
changes/ticket28924 | 4 +
changes/ticket28973 | 6 +
changes/ticket29026 | 4 +
changes/ticket29160 | 4 +
changes/ticket29168 | 5 +
changes/ticket29435 | 3 +
changes/ticket29617 | 4 +
changes/ticket29702 | 4 +
changes/ticket29806 | 7 +
changes/ticket29962 | 3 +
changes/ticket30117 | 4 +
changes/ticket30234 | 2 +
changes/ticket30454 | 10 +
changes/ticket30591 | 3 +
changes/ticket30694 | 3 +
changes/ticket30871 | 6 +
changes/ticket31554 | 4 +
config.rust.in | 24 +
configure.ac | 967 ++-
contrib/dist/tor.service.in | 2 +-
contrib/include.am | 1 -
contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh | 2 +-
contrib/win32build/package_nsis-mingw.sh | 95 -
contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +-
doc/HACKING/CodeStructure.md | 129 +
doc/HACKING/CodingStandards.md | 237 +-
doc/HACKING/CodingStandardsRust.md | 523 ++
doc/HACKING/Fuzzing.md | 123 +
doc/HACKING/GettingStarted.md | 5 +-
doc/HACKING/GettingStartedRust.md | 183 +
doc/HACKING/HelpfulTools.md | 132 +-
doc/HACKING/HowToReview.md | 3 +
doc/HACKING/Module.md | 111 +
doc/HACKING/ReleasingTor.md | 135 +-
doc/HACKING/Tracing.md | 91 +
doc/HACKING/WritingTests.md | 12 +-
doc/HACKING/android/Simpleperf.md | 98 +
doc/include.am | 28 +-
doc/tor-print-ed-signing-cert.1.txt | 32 +
doc/tor-resolve.1.txt | 2 +-
doc/tor.1.txt | 1706 ++--
doc/torify.1.txt | 20 +-
doc/torrc_format.txt | 15 +-
m4/ax_check_sign.m4 | 4 +-
m4/pc_from_ucontext.m4 | 20 +-
scripts/README | 6 +
scripts/coccinelle/ceil_div.cocci | 6 +
scripts/coccinelle/test-operator-cleanup | 11 +
scripts/coccinelle/test_assert_int.cocci | 49 +
scripts/coccinelle/test_assert_null.cocci | 11 +
scripts/coccinelle/test_assert_zero.cocci | 5 +
scripts/codegen/fuzzing_include_am.py | 154 +
scripts/codegen/gen_server_ciphers.py | 64 +-
scripts/codegen/get_mozilla_ciphers.py | 15 +-
scripts/codegen/makedesc.py | 2 +-
scripts/codegen/run_trunnel.sh | 10 +-
scripts/maint/analyze_callgraph.py | 259 -
scripts/maint/annotate_ifdef_directives | 74 +
scripts/maint/checkIncludes.py | 115 +
scripts/maint/checkOptionDocs.pl.in | 2 +-
scripts/maint/checkSpace.pl | 148 +-
scripts/maint/display_callgraph.py | 41 -
scripts/maint/fallback.blacklist | 229 -
scripts/maint/fallback.whitelist | 525 +-
scripts/maint/format_changelog.py | 4 +-
scripts/maint/generateFallbackDirLine.py | 38 +
scripts/maint/generate_callgraph.sh | 14 -
scripts/maint/lintChanges.py | 72 +-
scripts/maint/lookupFallbackDirContact.py | 28 +
scripts/maint/rectify_include_paths.py | 60 +
scripts/maint/redox.py | 4 +-
scripts/maint/run_calltool.sh | 29 +
scripts/maint/sortChanges.py | 2 +-
scripts/maint/updateCopyright.pl | 4 +-
scripts/maint/updateFallbackDirs.py | 815 +-
scripts/maint/updateRustDependencies.sh | 45 +
scripts/test/appveyor-irc-notify.py | 219 +
scripts/test/chutney-git-bisect.sh | 62 +
scripts/test/cov-diff | 14 +-
scripts/test/cov-exclude | 6 +
scripts/test/coverage | 8 +-
scripts/test/scan-build.sh | 61 +-
src/{or => app/config}/auth_dirs.inc | 0
src/app/config/config.c | 8521 ++++++++++++++++++
src/app/config/config.h | 300 +
src/app/config/confparse.c | 1207 +++
src/app/config/confparse.h | 233 +
src/{or => app/config}/fallback_dirs.inc | 0
src/app/config/or_options_st.h | 1077 +++
src/app/config/or_state_st.h | 92 +
src/app/config/statefile.c | 728 ++
src/app/config/statefile.h | 36 +
src/app/include.am | 35 +
src/app/main/main.c | 1519 ++++
src/app/main/main.h | 31 +
src/app/main/ntmain.c | 785 ++
src/app/main/ntmain.h | 28 +
src/app/main/tor_main.c | 42 +
src/common/Makefile.nmake | 28 -
src/common/address.c | 2162 -----
src/common/address.h | 379 -
src/common/address_set.c | 129 -
src/common/address_set.h | 35 -
src/common/aes.c | 404 -
src/common/aes.h | 27 -
src/common/backtrace.c | 248 -
src/common/backtrace.h | 21 -
src/common/ciphers.inc | 140 -
src/common/compat.c | 3555 --------
src/common/compat.h | 747 --
src/common/compat_libevent.c | 285 -
src/common/compat_libevent.h | 75 -
src/common/compat_openssl.h | 47 -
src/common/compat_pthreads.c | 349 -
src/common/compat_threads.c | 332 -
src/common/compat_threads.h | 151 -
src/common/compat_time.c | 656 --
src/common/compat_time.h | 162 -
src/common/compat_winthreads.c | 250 -
src/common/container.c | 1517 ----
src/common/container.h | 725 --
src/common/crypto.c | 3432 --------
src/common/crypto.h | 340 -
src/common/crypto_curve25519.c | 354 -
src/common/crypto_curve25519.h | 87 -
src/common/crypto_ed25519.c | 736 --
src/common/crypto_ed25519.h | 131 -
src/common/crypto_format.c | 277 -
src/common/crypto_format.h | 46 -
src/common/crypto_pwbox.c | 212 -
src/common/crypto_pwbox.h | 20 -
src/common/crypto_s2k.c | 468 -
src/common/crypto_s2k.h | 73 -
src/common/di_ops.c | 274 -
src/common/di_ops.h | 50 -
src/common/handles.h | 153 -
src/common/include.am | 175 -
src/common/log.c | 1395 ---
src/common/memarea.c | 306 -
src/common/memarea.h | 24 -
src/common/procmon.c | 343 -
src/common/procmon.h | 33 -
src/common/pubsub.c | 129 -
src/common/pubsub.h | 179 -
src/common/sandbox.c | 2016 -----
src/common/sandbox.h | 182 -
src/common/testsupport.h | 90 -
src/common/timers.c | 293 -
src/common/timers.h | 24 -
src/common/torgzip.c | 586 --
src/common/torgzip.h | 72 -
src/common/torint.h | 367 -
src/common/torlog.h | 251 -
src/common/tortls.c | 2579 ------
src/common/tortls.h | 265 -
src/common/util.c | 5774 -------------
src/common/util.h | 561 --
src/common/util_bug.c | 115 -
src/common/util_bug.h | 204 -
src/common/util_format.c | 562 --
src/common/util_format.h | 34 -
src/common/util_process.c | 158 -
src/common/util_process.h | 26 -
src/common/workqueue.c | 538 --
src/common/workqueue.h | 49 -
src/config/torrc.minimal.in-staging | 18 +-
src/config/torrc.sample.in | 49 +-
src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.c | 620 ++
src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.h | 69 +
src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c | 311 +
src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h | 47 +
src/core/crypto/onion_fast.c | 144 +
src/core/crypto/onion_fast.h | 41 +
src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.c | 341 +
src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.h | 65 +
src/core/crypto/onion_tap.c | 246 +
src/core/crypto/onion_tap.h | 40 +
src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.c | 332 +
src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.h | 31 +
src/core/include.am | 404 +
src/core/mainloop/connection.c | 5504 ++++++++++++
src/core/mainloop/connection.h | 353 +
src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c | 600 ++
src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.h | 37 +
src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c | 2942 +++++++
src/core/mainloop/mainloop.h | 114 +
src/core/mainloop/netstatus.c | 28 +
src/core/mainloop/netstatus.h | 13 +
src/core/mainloop/periodic.c | 174 +
src/core/mainloop/periodic.h | 88 +
src/core/or/addr_policy_st.h | 46 +
src/core/or/address_set.c | 71 +
src/core/or/address_set.h | 31 +
src/core/or/cell_queue_st.h | 29 +
src/core/or/cell_st.h | 20 +
src/core/or/channel.c | 3476 ++++++++
src/core/or/channel.h | 780 ++
src/core/or/channelpadding.c | 794 ++
src/core/or/channelpadding.h | 43 +
src/core/or/channeltls.c | 2485 ++++++
src/core/or/channeltls.h | 79 +
src/core/or/circuit_st.h | 182 +
src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 3012 +++++++
src/core/or/circuitbuild.h | 102 +
src/core/or/circuitlist.c | 2853 ++++++
src/core/or/circuitlist.h | 250 +
src/core/or/circuitmux.c | 1364 +++
src/core/or/circuitmux.h | 162 +
src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.c | 829 ++
src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h | 30 +
src/core/or/circuitstats.c | 1951 +++++
src/core/or/circuitstats.h | 213 +
src/core/or/circuituse.c | 3142 +++++++
src/core/or/circuituse.h | 93 +
src/core/or/command.c | 703 ++
src/core/or/command.h | 31 +
src/core/or/connection_edge.c | 4534 ++++++++++
src/core/or/connection_edge.h | 279 +
src/core/or/connection_or.c | 3026 +++++++
src/core/or/connection_or.h | 166 +
src/core/or/connection_st.h | 149 +
src/core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h | 38 +
src/core/or/crypt_path_reference_st.h | 23 +
src/core/or/crypt_path_st.h | 70 +
src/core/or/destroy_cell_queue_st.h | 27 +
src/core/or/dos.c | 801 ++
src/core/or/dos.h | 140 +
src/core/or/edge_connection_st.h | 77 +
src/core/or/entry_connection_st.h | 100 +
src/core/or/entry_port_cfg_st.h | 54 +
src/core/or/extend_info_st.h | 30 +
src/core/or/half_edge_st.h | 34 +
src/core/or/listener_connection_st.h | 25 +
src/core/or/onion.c | 720 ++
src/core/or/onion.h | 90 +
src/core/or/or.h | 1094 +++
src/core/or/or_circuit_st.h | 80 +
src/core/or/or_connection_st.h | 92 +
src/core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h | 40 +
src/core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h | 78 +
src/core/or/origin_circuit_st.h | 294 +
src/core/or/policies.c | 3145 +++++++
src/core/or/policies.h | 187 +
src/core/or/port_cfg_st.h | 35 +
src/core/or/protover.c | 942 ++
src/core/or/protover.h | 97 +
src/core/or/protover_rust.c | 34 +
src/core/or/reasons.c | 497 ++
src/core/or/reasons.h | 34 +
src/core/or/relay.c | 3169 +++++++
src/core/or/relay.h | 124 +
src/core/or/relay_crypto_st.h | 31 +
src/core/or/scheduler.c | 768 ++
src/core/or/scheduler.h | 218 +
src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c | 844 ++
src/core/or/scheduler_vanilla.c | 175 +
src/core/or/server_port_cfg_st.h | 20 +
src/core/or/socks_request_st.h | 77 +
src/core/or/status.c | 252 +
src/core/or/status.h | 18 +
src/core/or/tor_version_st.h | 32 +
src/core/or/var_cell_st.h | 23 +
src/core/or/versions.c | 422 +
src/core/or/versions.h | 44 +
src/core/proto/proto_cell.c | 86 +
src/core/proto/proto_cell.h | 17 +
src/core/proto/proto_control0.c | 26 +
src/core/proto/proto_control0.h | 14 +
src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.c | 40 +
src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.h | 22 +
src/core/proto/proto_http.c | 171 +
src/core/proto/proto_http.h | 24 +
src/core/proto/proto_socks.c | 1133 +++
src/core/proto/proto_socks.h | 21 +
src/ext/OpenBSD_malloc_Linux.c | 2 +-
src/ext/byteorder.h | 71 +
src/ext/csiphash.c | 50 +-
src/ext/curve25519_donna/curve25519-donna-c64.c | 2 +-
src/ext/curve25519_donna/curve25519-donna.c | 2 +-
src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519-donna-impl-base.h | 12 +-
.../donna/ed25519-donna-portable-identify.h | 2 +-
src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519-hash-custom.h | 31 +
src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519-randombytes-custom.h | 2 +-
src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h | 7 +-
src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c | 43 +-
src/ext/ed25519/ref10/blinding.c | 51 +-
src/ext/ed25519/ref10/crypto_hash_sha512.h | 30 +-
src/ext/ed25519/ref10/crypto_int32.h | 2 +-
src/ext/ed25519/ref10/crypto_int64.h | 2 +-
src/ext/ed25519/ref10/crypto_uint32.h | 2 +-
src/ext/ed25519/ref10/crypto_uint64.h | 2 +-
src/ext/ed25519/ref10/crypto_verify_32.h | 3 +-
src/ext/ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h | 6 +-
src/ext/ed25519/ref10/keypair.c | 4 +-
src/ext/ed25519/ref10/randombytes.h | 2 +-
src/ext/getdelim.c | 79 +
src/ext/ht.h | 4 +-
src/ext/include.am | 4 +-
src/ext/keccak-tiny/keccak-tiny-unrolled.c | 21 +-
src/ext/keccak-tiny/keccak-tiny.h | 2 +-
src/ext/mulodi/mulodi4.c | 2 +-
src/ext/rust | 1 +
src/ext/siphash.h | 1 +
src/ext/timeouts/timeout-bitops.c | 3 +-
src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c | 4 +-
src/ext/tinytest.c | 13 +-
src/ext/trunnel/trunnel-impl.h | 5 +-
src/ext/trunnel/trunnel.c | 10 +-
src/ext/trunnel/trunnel.h | 4 +-
src/feature/api/tor_api.c | 167 +
src/feature/api/tor_api.h | 129 +
src/feature/api/tor_api_internal.h | 29 +
src/feature/client/addressmap.c | 1156 +++
src/feature/client/addressmap.h | 65 +
src/feature/client/bridges.c | 1029 +++
src/feature/client/bridges.h | 80 +
src/feature/client/circpathbias.c | 1641 ++++
src/feature/client/circpathbias.h | 29 +
src/feature/client/dnsserv.c | 415 +
src/feature/client/dnsserv.h | 27 +
src/feature/client/entrynodes.c | 3824 ++++++++
src/feature/client/entrynodes.h | 639 ++
src/feature/client/transports.c | 1738 ++++
src/feature/client/transports.h | 147 +
src/feature/control/control.c | 7902 +++++++++++++++++
src/feature/control/control.h | 417 +
src/feature/control/control_connection_st.h | 46 +
src/feature/control/fmt_serverstatus.c | 104 +
src/feature/control/fmt_serverstatus.h | 18 +
src/feature/control/getinfo_geoip.c | 45 +
src/feature/control/getinfo_geoip.h | 14 +
src/feature/dirauth/authmode.c | 70 +
src/feature/dirauth/authmode.h | 46 +
src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.c | 459 +
src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.h | 58 +
src/feature/dirauth/dircollate.c | 327 +
src/feature/dirauth/dircollate.h | 70 +
src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c | 4658 ++++++++++
src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h | 250 +
src/feature/dirauth/dsigs_parse.c | 282 +
src/feature/dirauth/dsigs_parse.h | 22 +
src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.c | 333 +
src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.h | 24 +
src/feature/dirauth/keypin.c | 515 ++
src/feature/dirauth/keypin.h | 47 +
src/feature/dirauth/ns_detached_signatures_st.h | 22 +
src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.c | 839 ++
src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.h | 38 +
src/feature/dirauth/reachability.c | 207 +
src/feature/dirauth/reachability.h | 36 +
src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.c | 90 +
src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.h | 17 +
src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c | 1291 +++
src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.h | 194 +
src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c | 1340 +++
src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.h | 148 +
src/feature/dirauth/vote_microdesc_hash_st.h | 22 +
src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.c | 644 ++
src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.h | 31 +
src/feature/dircache/cached_dir_st.h | 25 +
src/feature/dircache/conscache.c | 627 ++
src/feature/dircache/conscache.h | 66 +
src/feature/dircache/consdiffmgr.c | 1945 +++++
src/feature/dircache/consdiffmgr.h | 75 +
src/feature/dircache/dircache.c | 1740 ++++
src/feature/dircache/dircache.h | 43 +
src/feature/dircache/dirserv.c | 918 ++
src/feature/dircache/dirserv.h | 119 +
src/feature/dirclient/dir_server_st.h | 54 +
src/feature/dirclient/dirclient.c | 3206 +++++++
src/feature/dirclient/dirclient.h | 172 +
src/feature/dirclient/dlstatus.c | 422 +
src/feature/dirclient/dlstatus.h | 58 +
src/feature/dirclient/download_status_st.h | 65 +
src/feature/dircommon/consdiff.c | 1414 +++
src/feature/dircommon/consdiff.h | 99 +
src/feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h | 67 +
src/feature/dircommon/directory.c | 651 ++
src/feature/dircommon/directory.h | 129 +
src/feature/dircommon/fp_pair.c | 315 +
src/feature/dircommon/fp_pair.h | 56 +
src/feature/dircommon/vote_timing_st.h | 24 +
src/feature/dircommon/voting_schedule.c | 194 +
src/feature/dircommon/voting_schedule.h | 65 +
src/feature/dirparse/authcert_members.i | 13 +
src/feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.c | 207 +
src/feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.h | 18 +
src/feature/dirparse/microdesc_parse.c | 267 +
src/feature/dirparse/microdesc_parse.h | 20 +
src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.c | 1685 ++++
src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.h | 45 +
src/feature/dirparse/parsecommon.c | 458 +
src/feature/dirparse/parsecommon.h | 324 +
src/feature/dirparse/policy_parse.c | 224 +
src/feature/dirparse/policy_parse.h | 25 +
src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c | 1245 +++
src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.h | 49 +
src/feature/dirparse/sigcommon.c | 185 +
src/feature/dirparse/sigcommon.h | 48 +
src/feature/dirparse/signing.c | 98 +
src/feature/dirparse/signing.h | 23 +
src/feature/dirparse/unparseable.c | 591 ++
src/feature/dirparse/unparseable.h | 56 +
src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.c | 1267 +++
src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.h | 61 +
src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c | 986 +++
src/feature/hs/hs_cache.h | 130 +
src/feature/hs/hs_cell.c | 952 ++
src/feature/hs/hs_cell.h | 109 +
src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c | 1271 +++
src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.h | 75 +
src/feature/hs/hs_circuitmap.c | 585 ++
src/feature/hs/hs_circuitmap.h | 112 +
src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 1945 +++++
src/feature/hs/hs_client.h | 119 +
src/feature/hs/hs_common.c | 1829 ++++
src/feature/hs/hs_common.h | 288 +
src/feature/hs/hs_config.c | 696 ++
src/feature/hs/hs_config.h | 25 +
src/feature/hs/hs_control.c | 261 +
src/feature/hs/hs_control.h | 52 +
src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c | 3073 +++++++
src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h | 346 +
src/feature/hs/hs_ident.c | 127 +
src/feature/hs/hs_ident.h | 150 +
src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.c | 609 ++
src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h | 64 +
src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 4170 +++++++++
src/feature/hs/hs_service.h | 444 +
src/feature/hs/hs_stats.c | 58 +
src/feature/hs/hs_stats.h | 14 +
src/feature/hs/hsdir_index_st.h | 24 +
src/feature/hs_common/replaycache.c | 209 +
src/feature/hs_common/replaycache.h | 67 +
src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.c | 293 +
src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h | 48 +
src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.c | 755 ++
src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.h | 55 +
src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c | 1208 +++
src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h | 60 +
src/feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h | 32 +
src/feature/nodelist/desc_store_st.h | 39 +
src/feature/nodelist/describe.c | 183 +
src/feature/nodelist/describe.h | 25 +
src/feature/nodelist/dirlist.c | 422 +
src/feature/nodelist/dirlist.h | 47 +
src/feature/nodelist/document_signature_st.h | 29 +
src/feature/nodelist/extrainfo_st.h | 30 +
src/feature/nodelist/fmt_routerstatus.c | 253 +
src/feature/nodelist/fmt_routerstatus.h | 41 +
src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.c | 1063 +++
src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.h | 60 +
src/feature/nodelist/microdesc_st.h | 80 +
src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c | 2723 ++++++
src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h | 160 +
src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus_sr_info_st.h | 23 +
src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h | 104 +
src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus_voter_info_st.h | 30 +
src/feature/nodelist/nickname.c | 62 +
src/feature/nodelist/nickname.h | 19 +
src/feature/nodelist/node_select.c | 1111 +++
src/feature/nodelist/node_select.h | 102 +
src/feature/nodelist/node_st.h | 102 +
src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c | 2620 ++++++
src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.h | 169 +
src/feature/nodelist/routerinfo.c | 79 +
src/feature/nodelist/routerinfo.h | 27 +
src/feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h | 115 +
src/feature/nodelist/routerlist.c | 3234 +++++++
src/feature/nodelist/routerlist.h | 207 +
src/feature/nodelist/routerlist_st.h | 40 +
src/feature/nodelist/routerset.c | 463 +
src/feature/nodelist/routerset.h | 89 +
src/feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h | 80 +
src/feature/nodelist/signed_descriptor_st.h | 61 +
src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c | 764 ++
src/feature/nodelist/torcert.h | 116 +
src/feature/nodelist/vote_routerstatus_st.h | 41 +
src/feature/relay/dns.c | 2187 +++++
src/feature/relay/dns.h | 72 +
src/feature/relay/dns_structs.h | 102 +
src/feature/relay/ext_orport.c | 662 ++
src/feature/relay/ext_orport.h | 64 +
src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c | 361 +
src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h | 23 +
src/feature/relay/router.c | 3128 +++++++
src/feature/relay/router.h | 122 +
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c | 740 ++
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h | 45 +
src/feature/relay/routermode.c | 80 +
src/feature/relay/routermode.h | 24 +
src/feature/relay/selftest.c | 301 +
src/feature/relay/selftest.h | 24 +
src/feature/rend/rend_authorized_client_st.h | 18 +
.../rend/rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_st.h | 17 +
src/feature/rend/rend_intro_point_st.h | 76 +
src/feature/rend/rend_service_descriptor_st.h | 34 +
src/feature/rend/rendcache.c | 1008 +++
src/feature/rend/rendcache.h | 130 +
src/feature/rend/rendclient.c | 1228 +++
src/feature/rend/rendclient.h | 51 +
src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c | 1047 +++
src/feature/rend/rendcommon.h | 82 +
src/feature/rend/rendmid.c | 370 +
src/feature/rend/rendmid.h | 25 +
src/feature/rend/rendparse.c | 600 ++
src/feature/rend/rendparse.h | 32 +
src/feature/rend/rendservice.c | 4487 ++++++++++
src/feature/rend/rendservice.h | 222 +
src/feature/stats/geoip_stats.c | 1425 +++
src/feature/stats/geoip_stats.h | 139 +
src/feature/stats/predict_ports.c | 313 +
src/feature/stats/predict_ports.h | 30 +
src/feature/stats/rephist.c | 2933 +++++++
src/feature/stats/rephist.h | 133 +
src/include.am | 43 +-
src/lib/arch/.may_include | 2 +
src/lib/arch/bytes.h | 182 +
src/lib/arch/include.am | 3 +
src/lib/cc/.may_include | 1 +
src/lib/cc/compat_compiler.h | 220 +
src/lib/cc/include.am | 4 +
src/lib/cc/torint.h | 128 +
src/lib/compress/.may_include | 12 +
src/lib/compress/compress.c | 681 ++
src/lib/compress/compress.h | 99 +
src/lib/compress/compress_buf.c | 83 +
src/lib/compress/compress_lzma.c | 362 +
src/lib/compress/compress_lzma.h | 46 +
src/lib/compress/compress_none.c | 54 +
src/lib/compress/compress_none.h | 20 +
src/lib/compress/compress_zlib.c | 304 +
src/lib/compress/compress_zlib.h | 46 +
src/lib/compress/compress_zstd.c | 541 ++
src/lib/compress/compress_zstd.h | 53 +
src/lib/compress/include.am | 26 +
src/lib/container/.may_include | 18 +
src/lib/container/bitarray.h | 86 +
src/lib/container/bloomfilt.c | 113 +
src/lib/container/bloomfilt.h | 41 +
src/lib/container/buffers.c | 932 ++
src/lib/container/buffers.h | 122 +
src/lib/container/handles.h | 153 +
src/lib/container/include.am | 27 +
src/lib/container/map.c | 413 +
src/lib/container/map.h | 261 +
src/lib/container/order.c | 48 +
src/lib/container/order.h | 60 +
src/lib/container/smartlist.c | 866 ++
src/lib/container/smartlist.h | 168 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/.may_include | 24 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/aes.h | 31 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/aes_nss.c | 106 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/aes_openssl.c | 410 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h | 57 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.c | 190 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h | 57 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.c | 366 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.h | 85 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.c | 113 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h | 64 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh_nss.c | 209 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh_openssl.c | 477 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_digest.c | 828 ++
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_digest.h | 132 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.c | 821 ++
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h | 144 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.c | 305 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h | 50 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_hkdf.c | 201 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_hkdf.h | 27 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_init.c | 204 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_init.h | 36 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_nss_mgt.c | 132 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_nss_mgt.h | 34 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ope.c | 185 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ope.h | 46 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_openssl_mgt.c | 398 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_openssl_mgt.h | 89 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_pwbox.c | 219 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_pwbox.h | 28 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.c | 731 ++
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h | 53 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.c | 672 ++
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h | 145 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_nss.c | 738 ++
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c | 590 ++
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_s2k.c | 525 ++
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_s2k.h | 78 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.c | 111 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h | 21 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/digestset.c | 58 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/digestset.h | 29 +
src/lib/crypt_ops/include.am | 70 +
src/lib/ctime/.may_include | 5 +
src/lib/ctime/di_ops.c | 278 +
src/lib/ctime/di_ops.h | 55 +
src/lib/ctime/include.am | 25 +
src/lib/defs/.may_include | 1 +
src/lib/defs/dh_sizes.h | 22 +
src/lib/defs/digest_sizes.h | 27 +
src/lib/defs/include.am | 5 +
src/lib/defs/x25519_sizes.h | 36 +
src/lib/encoding/.may_include | 10 +
src/lib/encoding/binascii.c | 520 ++
src/lib/encoding/binascii.h | 60 +
src/lib/encoding/confline.c | 402 +
src/lib/encoding/confline.h | 78 +
src/lib/encoding/cstring.c | 138 +
src/lib/encoding/cstring.h | 19 +
src/lib/encoding/include.am | 26 +
src/lib/encoding/keyval.c | 52 +
src/lib/encoding/keyval.h | 17 +
src/lib/encoding/pem.c | 106 +
src/lib/encoding/pem.h | 26 +
src/lib/encoding/time_fmt.c | 516 ++
src/lib/encoding/time_fmt.h | 44 +
src/lib/err/.may_include | 3 +
src/lib/err/backtrace.c | 286 +
src/lib/err/backtrace.h | 35 +
src/lib/err/include.am | 19 +
src/lib/err/torerr.c | 238 +
src/lib/err/torerr.h | 47 +
src/lib/evloop/.may_include | 16 +
src/lib/evloop/compat_libevent.c | 535 ++
src/lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h | 104 +
src/lib/evloop/include.am | 26 +
src/lib/evloop/procmon.c | 339 +
src/lib/evloop/procmon.h | 34 +
src/lib/evloop/timers.c | 328 +
src/lib/evloop/timers.h | 35 +
src/lib/evloop/token_bucket.c | 258 +
src/lib/evloop/token_bucket.h | 117 +
src/lib/evloop/workqueue.c | 682 ++
src/lib/evloop/workqueue.h | 70 +
src/lib/fdio/.may_include | 4 +
src/lib/fdio/fdio.c | 115 +
src/lib/fdio/fdio.h | 23 +
src/lib/fdio/include.am | 17 +
src/lib/fs/.may_include | 16 +
src/lib/fs/conffile.c | 174 +
src/lib/fs/conffile.h | 23 +
src/lib/fs/dir.c | 367 +
src/lib/fs/dir.h | 33 +
src/lib/fs/files.c | 721 ++
src/lib/fs/files.h | 145 +
src/lib/fs/freespace.c | 63 +
src/lib/fs/include.am | 37 +
src/lib/fs/lockfile.c | 145 +
src/lib/fs/lockfile.h | 20 +
src/lib/fs/mmap.c | 240 +
src/lib/fs/mmap.h | 41 +
src/lib/fs/path.c | 295 +
src/lib/fs/path.h | 30 +
src/lib/fs/storagedir.c | 606 ++
src/lib/fs/storagedir.h | 64 +
src/lib/fs/userdb.c | 138 +
src/lib/fs/userdb.h | 26 +
src/lib/fs/winlib.c | 30 +
src/lib/fs/winlib.h | 22 +
src/lib/geoip/.may_include | 13 +
src/lib/geoip/country.h | 16 +
src/lib/geoip/geoip.c | 510 ++
src/lib/geoip/geoip.h | 50 +
src/lib/geoip/include.am | 17 +
src/lib/include.libdonna.am | 24 +
src/lib/intmath/.may_include | 4 +
src/lib/intmath/addsub.c | 28 +
src/lib/intmath/addsub.h | 19 +
src/lib/intmath/bits.c | 94 +
src/lib/intmath/bits.h | 22 +
src/lib/intmath/cmp.h | 39 +
src/lib/intmath/include.am | 25 +
src/lib/intmath/logic.h | 20 +
src/lib/intmath/muldiv.c | 81 +
src/lib/intmath/muldiv.h | 28 +
src/lib/intmath/weakrng.c | 60 +
src/lib/intmath/weakrng.h | 31 +
src/lib/lock/.may_include | 5 +
src/lib/lock/compat_mutex.c | 40 +
src/lib/lock/compat_mutex.h | 66 +
src/lib/lock/compat_mutex_pthreads.c | 103 +
src/lib/lock/compat_mutex_winthreads.c | 46 +
src/lib/lock/include.am | 24 +
src/lib/log/.may_include | 15 +
src/lib/log/escape.c | 137 +
src/lib/log/escape.h | 23 +
src/lib/log/git_revision.c | 24 +
src/lib/log/git_revision.h | 12 +
src/lib/log/include.am | 36 +
src/lib/log/log.c | 1483 ++++
src/lib/log/log.h | 276 +
src/lib/log/ratelim.c | 60 +
src/lib/log/ratelim.h | 53 +
src/lib/log/util_bug.c | 161 +
src/lib/log/util_bug.h | 246 +
src/lib/log/win32err.c | 61 +
src/lib/log/win32err.h | 22 +
src/lib/malloc/.may_include | 6 +
src/lib/malloc/include.am | 21 +
src/lib/malloc/malloc.c | 230 +
src/lib/malloc/malloc.h | 92 +
src/lib/math/.may_include | 5 +
src/lib/math/fp.c | 119 +
src/lib/math/fp.h | 23 +
src/lib/math/include.am | 20 +
src/lib/math/laplace.c | 73 +
src/lib/math/laplace.h | 22 +
src/lib/memarea/.may_include | 7 +
src/lib/memarea/include.am | 17 +
src/lib/memarea/memarea.c | 403 +
src/lib/memarea/memarea.h | 35 +
src/lib/meminfo/.may_include | 8 +
src/lib/meminfo/include.am | 17 +
src/lib/meminfo/meminfo.c | 180 +
src/lib/meminfo/meminfo.h | 21 +
src/lib/net/.may_include | 15 +
src/lib/net/address.c | 2057 +++++
src/lib/net/address.h | 388 +
src/lib/net/alertsock.c | 295 +
src/lib/net/alertsock.h | 45 +
src/lib/net/buffers_net.c | 202 +
src/lib/net/buffers_net.h | 27 +
src/lib/net/gethostname.c | 30 +
src/lib/net/gethostname.h | 19 +
src/lib/net/inaddr.c | 267 +
src/lib/net/inaddr.h | 27 +
src/lib/net/inaddr_st.h | 107 +
src/lib/net/include.am | 34 +
src/lib/net/nettypes.h | 44 +
src/lib/net/resolve.c | 424 +
src/lib/net/resolve.h | 58 +
src/lib/net/socket.c | 697 ++
src/lib/net/socket.h | 118 +
src/lib/net/socketpair.c | 214 +
src/lib/net/socketpair.h | 19 +
src/lib/net/socks5_status.h | 32 +
src/lib/osinfo/.may_include | 5 +
src/lib/osinfo/include.am | 17 +
src/lib/osinfo/uname.c | 149 +
src/lib/osinfo/uname.h | 18 +
src/lib/process/.may_include | 17 +
src/lib/process/daemon.c | 187 +
src/lib/process/daemon.h | 21 +
src/lib/process/env.c | 224 +
src/lib/process/env.h | 41 +
src/lib/process/include.am | 29 +
src/lib/process/pidfile.c | 52 +
src/lib/process/pidfile.h | 16 +
src/lib/process/restrict.c | 285 +
src/lib/process/restrict.h | 27 +
src/lib/process/setuid.c | 386 +
src/lib/process/setuid.h | 22 +
src/lib/process/subprocess.c | 1236 +++
src/lib/process/subprocess.h | 134 +
src/lib/process/waitpid.c | 154 +
src/lib/process/waitpid.h | 29 +
src/lib/sandbox/.may_include | 15 +
src/lib/sandbox/include.am | 18 +
src/{common => lib/sandbox}/linux_syscalls.inc | 0
src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c | 1808 ++++
src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.h | 150 +
src/lib/smartlist_core/.may_include | 7 +
src/lib/smartlist_core/include.am | 21 +
src/lib/smartlist_core/smartlist_core.c | 234 +
src/lib/smartlist_core/smartlist_core.h | 100 +
src/lib/smartlist_core/smartlist_foreach.h | 133 +
src/lib/smartlist_core/smartlist_split.c | 92 +
src/lib/smartlist_core/smartlist_split.h | 20 +
src/lib/string/.may_include | 10 +
src/lib/string/compat_ctype.c | 72 +
src/lib/string/compat_ctype.h | 67 +
src/lib/string/compat_string.c | 74 +
src/lib/string/compat_string.h | 62 +
src/lib/string/include.am | 27 +
src/lib/string/parse_int.c | 131 +
src/lib/string/parse_int.h | 25 +
src/lib/string/printf.c | 167 +
src/lib/string/printf.h | 30 +
src/lib/string/scanf.c | 317 +
src/lib/string/scanf.h | 24 +
src/lib/string/util_string.c | 543 ++
src/lib/string/util_string.h | 57 +
src/lib/term/.may_include | 9 +
src/lib/term/getpass.c | 120 +
src/lib/term/getpass.h | 18 +
src/lib/term/include.am | 24 +
src/lib/testsupport/.may_include | 0
src/lib/testsupport/include.am | 3 +
src/lib/testsupport/testsupport.h | 103 +
src/lib/thread/.may_include | 7 +
src/lib/thread/compat_pthreads.c | 270 +
src/lib/thread/compat_threads.c | 111 +
src/lib/thread/compat_winthreads.c | 223 +
src/lib/thread/include.am | 27 +
src/lib/thread/numcpus.c | 98 +
src/lib/thread/numcpus.h | 16 +
src/lib/thread/threads.h | 168 +
src/lib/time/.may_include | 11 +
src/lib/time/compat_time.c | 869 ++
src/lib/time/compat_time.h | 235 +
src/lib/time/include.am | 19 +
src/lib/time/tvdiff.c | 189 +
src/lib/time/tvdiff.h | 23 +
src/lib/tls/.may_include | 17 +
src/lib/tls/buffers_tls.c | 182 +
src/lib/tls/buffers_tls.h | 23 +
src/lib/tls/ciphers.inc | 100 +
src/lib/tls/include.am | 40 +
src/lib/tls/nss_countbytes.c | 244 +
src/lib/tls/nss_countbytes.h | 25 +
src/lib/tls/tortls.c | 442 +
src/lib/tls/tortls.h | 160 +
src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h | 76 +
src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 833 ++
src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c | 1795 ++++
src/lib/tls/tortls_st.h | 75 +
src/lib/tls/x509.c | 143 +
src/lib/tls/x509.h | 75 +
src/lib/tls/x509_internal.h | 53 +
src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c | 458 +
src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c | 464 +
src/lib/trace/.may_include | 3 +
src/lib/trace/debug.h | 30 +
src/lib/trace/events.h | 45 +
src/lib/trace/include.am | 18 +
src/lib/trace/trace.c | 17 +
src/lib/trace/trace.h | 14 +
src/lib/wallclock/.may_include | 6 +
src/lib/wallclock/approx_time.c | 43 +
src/lib/wallclock/approx_time.h | 25 +
src/lib/wallclock/include.am | 22 +
src/lib/wallclock/time_to_tm.c | 200 +
src/lib/wallclock/time_to_tm.h | 22 +
src/lib/wallclock/timeval.h | 65 +
src/lib/wallclock/tor_gettimeofday.c | 82 +
src/lib/wallclock/tor_gettimeofday.h | 20 +
src/or/Makefile.nmake | 78 -
src/or/addressmap.c | 1125 ---
src/or/addressmap.h | 65 -
src/or/buffers.c | 2065 -----
src/or/buffers.h | 101 -
src/or/channel.c | 4617 ----------
src/or/channel.h | 609 --
src/or/channeltls.c | 2208 -----
src/or/channeltls.h | 76 -
src/or/circpathbias.c | 1546 ----
src/or/circpathbias.h | 29 -
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2553 ------
src/or/circuitbuild.h | 78 -
src/or/circuitlist.c | 2435 ------
src/or/circuitlist.h | 91 -
src/or/circuitmux.c | 1990 -----
src/or/circuitmux.h | 160 -
src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c | 765 --
src/or/circuitmux_ewma.h | 24 -
src/or/circuitstats.c | 1734 ----
src/or/circuitstats.h | 98 -
src/or/circuituse.c | 2624 ------
src/or/circuituse.h | 63 -
src/or/command.c | 642 --
src/or/command.h | 31 -
src/or/config.c | 8013 -----------------
src/or/config.h | 205 -
src/or/confparse.c | 1364 ---
src/or/confparse.h | 143 -
src/or/connection.c | 5177 -----------
src/or/connection.h | 290 -
src/or/connection_edge.c | 3825 --------
src/or/connection_edge.h | 192 -
src/or/connection_or.c | 2454 ------
src/or/connection_or.h | 107 -
src/or/control.c | 7190 ----------------
src/or/control.h | 292 -
src/or/cpuworker.c | 572 --
src/or/cpuworker.h | 29 -
src/or/dircollate.c | 353 -
src/or/dircollate.h | 68 -
src/or/directory.c | 4316 ----------
src/or/directory.h | 175 -
src/or/dirserv.c | 3913 ---------
src/or/dirserv.h | 143 -
src/or/dirvote.c | 4012 ---------
src/or/dirvote.h | 240 -
src/or/dns.c | 2120 -----
src/or/dns.h | 70 -
src/or/dns_structs.h | 102 -
src/or/dnsserv.c | 396 -
src/or/dnsserv.h | 27 -
src/or/dos.c | 794 --
src/or/dos.h | 140 -
src/or/entrynodes.c | 2561 ------
src/or/entrynodes.h | 187 -
src/or/ext_orport.c | 653 --
src/or/ext_orport.h | 42 -
src/or/fp_pair.c | 315 -
src/or/fp_pair.h | 45 -
src/or/geoip.c | 1875 ----
src/or/geoip.h | 100 -
src/or/hibernate.c | 1125 ---
src/or/hibernate.h | 59 -
src/or/include.am | 222 -
src/or/keypin.c | 498 --
src/or/keypin.h | 47 -
src/or/main.c | 3533 --------
src/or/main.h | 98 -
src/or/microdesc.c | 968 ---
src/or/microdesc.h | 56 -
src/or/networkstatus.c | 2535 ------
src/or/networkstatus.h | 135 -
src/or/nodelist.c | 2026 -----
src/or/nodelist.h | 131 -
src/or/ntmain.c | 781 --
src/or/ntmain.h | 28 -
src/or/onion.c | 1247 ---
src/or/onion.h | 121 -
src/or/onion_fast.c | 142 -
src/or/onion_fast.h | 39 -
src/or/onion_ntor.c | 335 -
src/or/onion_ntor.h | 61 -
src/or/onion_tap.c | 247 -
src/or/onion_tap.h | 38 -
src/or/or.h | 5392 ------------
src/or/periodic.c | 126 -
src/or/periodic.h | 37 -
src/or/policies.c | 3040 -------
src/or/policies.h | 147 -
src/or/protover.c | 793 --
src/or/protover.h | 74 -
src/or/reasons.c | 444 -
src/or/reasons.h | 31 -
src/or/relay.c | 3068 -------
src/or/relay.h | 115 -
src/or/rendcache.c | 1013 ---
src/or/rendcache.h | 115 -
src/or/rendclient.c | 1567 ----
src/or/rendclient.h | 58 -
src/or/rendcommon.c | 1118 ---
src/or/rendcommon.h | 87 -
src/or/rendmid.c | 382 -
src/or/rendmid.h | 25 -
src/or/rendservice.c | 4438 ----------
src/or/rendservice.h | 205 -
src/or/rephist.c | 3299 -------
src/or/rephist.h | 123 -
src/or/replaycache.c | 216 -
src/or/replaycache.h | 66 -
src/or/router.c | 3658 --------
src/or/router.h | 163 -
src/or/routerkeys.c | 1147 ---
src/or/routerkeys.h | 77 -
src/or/routerlist.c | 5820 -------------
src/or/routerlist.h | 258 -
src/or/routerparse.c | 6364 --------------
src/or/routerparse.h | 131 -
src/or/routerset.c | 445 -
src/or/routerset.h | 84 -
src/or/scheduler.c | 707 --
src/or/scheduler.h | 57 -
src/or/shared_random.c | 1363 ---
src/or/shared_random.h | 168 -
src/or/shared_random_state.c | 1360 ---
src/or/shared_random_state.h | 149 -
src/or/statefile.c | 684 --
src/or/statefile.h | 28 -
src/or/status.c | 210 -
src/or/status.h | 18 -
src/or/tor_main.c | 40 -
src/or/torcert.c | 297 -
src/or/torcert.h | 76 -
src/or/transports.c | 1744 ----
src/or/transports.h | 139 -
src/rust/.cargo/config.in | 12 +
src/rust/.rustfmt.toml | 12 +
src/rust/Cargo.lock | 122 +
src/rust/Cargo.toml | 26 +
src/rust/build.rs | 190 +
src/rust/crypto/Cargo.toml | 37 +
src/rust/crypto/digests/mod.rs | 7 +
src/rust/crypto/digests/sha2.rs | 234 +
src/rust/crypto/lib.rs | 46 +
src/rust/crypto/rand/mod.rs | 6 +
src/rust/crypto/rand/rng.rs | 145 +
src/rust/external/Cargo.toml | 20 +
src/rust/external/crypto_digest.rs | 454 +
src/rust/external/crypto_rand.rs | 84 +
src/rust/external/external.rs | 37 +
src/rust/external/lib.rs | 19 +
src/rust/include.am | 41 +
src/rust/protover/Cargo.toml | 33 +
src/rust/protover/errors.rs | 57 +
src/rust/protover/ffi.rs | 245 +
src/rust/protover/lib.rs | 40 +
src/rust/protover/protoset.rs | 689 ++
src/rust/protover/protover.rs | 971 +++
src/rust/protover/tests/protover.rs | 404 +
src/rust/smartlist/Cargo.toml | 18 +
src/rust/smartlist/lib.rs | 17 +
src/rust/smartlist/smartlist.rs | 115 +
src/rust/tor_allocate/Cargo.toml | 18 +
src/rust/tor_allocate/lib.rs | 20 +
src/rust/tor_allocate/tor_allocate.rs | 104 +
src/rust/tor_log/Cargo.toml | 21 +
src/rust/tor_log/lib.rs | 16 +
src/rust/tor_log/tor_log.rs | 265 +
src/rust/tor_rust/Cargo.toml | 22 +
src/rust/tor_rust/include.am | 28 +
src/rust/tor_rust/lib.rs | 5 +
src/rust/tor_util/Cargo.toml | 24 +
src/rust/tor_util/ffi.rs | 27 +
src/rust/tor_util/lib.rs | 14 +
src/rust/tor_util/strings.rs | 140 +
src/test/Makefile.nmake | 4 +-
src/test/bench.c | 125 +-
src/test/bt_test.py | 2 +-
src/test/ed25519_exts_ref.py | 38 +-
src/test/ed25519_vectors.inc | 32 +-
src/test/fakechans.h | 3 +-
src/test/fuzz/dict/consensus | 52 +
src/test/fuzz/dict/descriptor | 41 +
src/test/fuzz/dict/extrainfo | 32 +
src/test/fuzz/dict/hsdescv2 | 8 +
src/test/fuzz/dict/hsdescv3 | 6 +
src/test/fuzz/dict/http | 24 +
src/test/fuzz/dict/iptsv2 | 6 +
src/test/fuzz/dict/microdesc | 7 +
src/test/fuzz/fixup_filenames.sh | 19 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_consensus.c | 81 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_descriptor.c | 81 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_diff.c | 69 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_diff_apply.c | 65 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_extrainfo.c | 67 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_hsdescv2.c | 52 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_hsdescv3.c | 99 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_http.c | 134 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_http_connect.c | 109 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_iptsv2.c | 50 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_microdesc.c | 49 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_multi.sh | 34 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_socks.c | 50 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_vrs.c | 87 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzzing.h | 13 +
src/test/fuzz/fuzzing_common.c | 197 +
src/test/fuzz/include.am | 440 +
src/test/fuzz/minimize.sh | 14 +
src/test/fuzz_static_testcases.sh | 27 +
src/test/hs_build_address.py | 38 +
src/test/hs_indexes.py | 70 +
src/test/hs_ntor_ref.py | 428 +
src/test/hs_test_helpers.c | 325 +
src/test/hs_test_helpers.h | 25 +
src/test/include.am | 224 +-
src/test/log_test_helpers.c | 6 +-
src/test/log_test_helpers.h | 45 +-
src/test/ntor_ref.py | 2 +-
src/test/ope_ref.py | 40 +
src/test/rend_test_helpers.c | 31 +-
src/test/rend_test_helpers.h | 7 +-
src/test/rust_supp.txt | 1 +
src/test/test-child.c | 4 +-
src/test/test-memwipe.c | 17 +-
src/test/test-network.sh | 4 +-
src/test/test-timers.c | 31 +-
src/test/test.c | 568 +-
src/test/test.h | 79 +-
src/test/test_accounting.c | 16 +-
src/test/test_addr.c | 248 +-
src/test/test_address.c | 147 +-
src/test/test_address_set.c | 26 +-
src/test/test_bridges.c | 704 ++
src/test/test_bt_cl.c | 27 +-
src/test/test_buffers.c | 548 +-
src/test/test_bwmgt.c | 233 +
src/test/test_cell_formats.c | 66 +-
src/test/test_cell_queue.c | 19 +-
src/test/test_channel.c | 1931 ++---
src/test/test_channelpadding.c | 1104 +++
src/test/test_channeltls.c | 67 +-
src/test/test_checkdir.c | 16 +-
src/test/test_circuitbuild.c | 182 +
src/test/test_circuitlist.c | 192 +-
src/test/test_circuitmux.c | 69 +-
src/test/test_circuitstats.c | 206 +
src/test/test_circuituse.c | 310 +
src/test/test_compat_libevent.c | 71 +-
src/test/test_config.c | 1983 +++--
src/test/test_connection.c | 558 +-
src/test/test_connection.h | 13 +
src/test/test_conscache.c | 340 +
src/test/test_consdiff.c | 1185 +++
src/test/test_consdiffmgr.c | 900 ++
src/test/test_containers.c | 150 +-
src/test/test_controller.c | 667 +-
src/test/test_controller_events.c | 160 +-
src/test/test_crypto.c | 538 +-
src/test/test_crypto_ope.c | 154 +
src/test/test_crypto_openssl.c | 106 +
src/test/test_crypto_slow.c | 50 +-
src/test/test_data.c | 4 +-
src/test/test_dir.c | 2531 ++++--
src/test/test_dir_common.c | 28 +-
src/test/test_dir_common.h | 7 +-
src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c | 376 +-
src/test/test_dns.c | 88 +-
src/test/test_dos.c | 31 +-
src/test/test_entryconn.c | 202 +-
src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 3519 ++++++--
src/test/test_extorport.c | 86 +-
src/test/test_geoip.c | 580 ++
src/test/test_guardfraction.c | 81 +-
src/test/test_handles.c | 13 +-
src/test/test_helpers.c | 229 +-
src/test/test_helpers.h | 22 +-
src/test/test_hs.c | 613 +-
src/test/test_hs_cache.c | 566 ++
src/test/test_hs_cell.c | 131 +
src/test/test_hs_client.c | 1010 +++
src/test/test_hs_common.c | 1839 ++++
src/test/test_hs_config.c | 517 ++
src/test/test_hs_control.c | 194 +
src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c | 965 +++
src/test/test_hs_descriptor.inc | 224 +
src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c | 930 ++
src/test/test_hs_ntor.c | 115 +
src/test/test_hs_ntor.sh | 11 +
src/test/test_hs_ntor_cl.c | 259 +
src/test/test_hs_service.c | 2145 +++++
src/test/test_introduce.c | 20 +-
src/test/test_key_expiration.sh | 138 +
src/test/test_keygen.sh | 112 +-
src/test/test_keypin.c | 112 +-
src/test/test_link_handshake.c | 941 +-
src/test/test_logging.c | 28 +-
src/test/test_mainloop.c | 142 +
src/test/test_microdesc.c | 135 +-
src/test/test_nodelist.c | 140 +-
src/test/test_ntor_cl.c | 18 +-
src/test/test_oom.c | 83 +-
src/test/test_oos.c | 37 +-
src/test/test_options.c | 981 +--
src/test/test_pem.c | 122 +
src/test/test_periodic_event.c | 333 +
src/test/test_policy.c | 492 +-
src/test/test_procmon.c | 10 +-
src/test/test_proto_http.c | 213 +
src/test/test_proto_misc.c | 265 +
src/test/test_protover.c | 363 +-
src/test/test_pt.c | 74 +-
src/test/test_pubsub.c | 85 -
src/test/test_rebind.py | 145 +
src/test/test_rebind.sh | 32 +
src/test/test_relay.c | 59 +-
src/test/test_relaycell.c | 837 +-
src/test/test_relaycrypt.c | 190 +
src/test/test_rendcache.c | 114 +-
src/test/test_replay.c | 34 +-
src/test/test_router.c | 119 +-
src/test/test_routerkeys.c | 334 +-
src/test/test_routerlist.c | 432 +-
src/test/test_routerset.c | 130 +-
src/test/test_rust.sh | 27 +
src/test/test_scheduler.c | 1115 ++-
src/test/test_shared_random.c | 508 +-
src/test/test_slow.c | 6 +-
src/test/test_socks.c | 671 +-
src/test/test_status.c | 57 +-
src/test/test_storagedir.c | 376 +
src/test/test_switch_id.c | 17 +-
src/test/test_threads.c | 20 +-
src/test/test_tortls.c | 2860 +-----
src/test/test_tortls.h | 13 +
src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c | 2316 +++++
src/test/test_util.c | 1553 +++-
src/test/test_util_format.c | 99 +-
src/test/test_util_process.c | 12 +-
src/test/test_util_slow.c | 45 +-
src/test/test_voting_schedule.c | 64 +
src/test/test_workqueue.c | 79 +-
src/test/test_x509.c | 205 +
src/test/test_zero_length_keys.sh | 6 +-
src/test/testing_common.c | 181 +-
src/test/testing_rsakeys.c | 546 ++
src/test/zero_length_keys.sh | 3 +-
src/tools/Makefile.nmake | 5 +-
src/tools/include.am | 80 +-
src/tools/tor-checkkey.c | 89 -
src/tools/tor-fw-helper/README | 10 -
src/tools/tor-gencert.c | 110 +-
src/tools/tor-print-ed-signing-cert.c | 65 +
src/tools/tor-resolve.c | 72 +-
src/tools/tor_runner.c | 112 +
src/trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.c | 281 +
src/trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h | 98 +
src/trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.trunnel | 17 +
src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.c | 2312 ++++-
src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h | 678 +-
src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.trunnel | 64 +-
src/trunnel/hs/cell_common.c | 595 ++
src/trunnel/hs/cell_common.h | 203 +
src/trunnel/hs/cell_common.trunnel | 12 +
src/trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.c | 735 ++
src/trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.h | 276 +
src/trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.trunnel | 41 +
src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.c | 1347 +++
src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h | 500 ++
src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel | 75 +
src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.c | 470 +
src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h | 187 +
src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.trunnel | 29 +
src/trunnel/include.am | 36 +-
src/trunnel/link_handshake.c | 212 +-
src/trunnel/link_handshake.h | 148 +-
src/trunnel/pwbox.c | 54 +-
src/trunnel/pwbox.h | 38 +-
src/trunnel/socks5.c | 3978 +++++++++
src/trunnel/socks5.h | 995 +++
src/trunnel/socks5.trunnel | 94 +
src/trunnel/trunnel-local.h | 6 +-
src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +-
warning_flags.in | 1 +
1347 files changed, 319206 insertions(+), 195287 deletions(-)
diff --cc src/core/or/channeltls.c
index 000000000,91a424728..4db283d20
mode 000000,100644..100644
--- a/src/core/or/channeltls.c
+++ b/src/core/or/channeltls.c
@@@ -1,0 -1,2477 +1,2485 @@@
+ /* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+ /**
+ * \file channeltls.c
+ *
+ * \brief A concrete subclass of channel_t using or_connection_t to transfer
+ * cells between Tor instances.
+ *
+ * This module fills in the various function pointers in channel_t, to
+ * implement the channel_tls_t channels as used in Tor today. These channels
+ * are created from channel_tls_connect() and
+ * channel_tls_handle_incoming(). Each corresponds 1:1 to or_connection_t
+ * object, as implemented in connection_or.c. These channels transmit cells
+ * to the underlying or_connection_t by calling
+ * connection_or_write_*_cell_to_buf(), and receive cells from the underlying
+ * or_connection_t when connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf() calls
+ * channel_tls_handle_*_cell().
+ *
+ * Here we also implement the server (responder) side of the v3+ Tor link
+ * handshake, which uses CERTS and AUTHENTICATE cell to negotiate versions,
+ * exchange expected and observed IP and time information, and bootstrap a
+ * level of authentication higher than we have gotten on the raw TLS
+ * handshake.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Since there is currently only one type of channel, there are probably
+ * more than a few cases where functionality that is currently in
+ * channeltls.c, connection_or.c, and channel.c ought to be divided up
+ * differently. The right time to do this is probably whenever we introduce
+ * our next channel type.
+ **/
+
+ /*
+ * Define this so channel.h gives us things only channel_t subclasses
+ * should touch.
+ */
+ #define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_
+
+ #define CHANNELTLS_PRIVATE
+
+ #include "core/or/or.h"
+ #include "core/or/channel.h"
+ #include "core/or/channeltls.h"
+ #include "core/or/circuitmux.h"
+ #include "core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h"
+ #include "core/or/command.h"
+ #include "app/config/config.h"
+ #include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
+ #include "core/or/connection_or.h"
+ #include "feature/control/control.h"
+ #include "feature/client/entrynodes.h"
+ #include "trunnel/link_handshake.h"
+ #include "core/or/relay.h"
+ #include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
+ #include "feature/relay/router.h"
+ #include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
+ #include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
+ #include "core/or/scheduler.h"
+ #include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+ #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+ #include "trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h"
+ #include "core/or/channelpadding.h"
+
+ #include "core/or/cell_st.h"
+ #include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h"
+ #include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
+ #include "core/or/or_connection_st.h"
+ #include "core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h"
+ #include "core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h"
+ #include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
+ #include "core/or/var_cell_st.h"
+
+ #include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+ #include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+
+ /** How many CELL_PADDING cells have we received, ever? */
+ uint64_t stats_n_padding_cells_processed = 0;
+ /** How many CELL_VERSIONS cells have we received, ever? */
+ uint64_t stats_n_versions_cells_processed = 0;
+ /** How many CELL_NETINFO cells have we received, ever? */
+ uint64_t stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed = 0;
+ /** How many CELL_VPADDING cells have we received, ever? */
+ uint64_t stats_n_vpadding_cells_processed = 0;
+ /** How many CELL_CERTS cells have we received, ever? */
+ uint64_t stats_n_certs_cells_processed = 0;
+ /** How many CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE cells have we received, ever? */
+ uint64_t stats_n_auth_challenge_cells_processed = 0;
+ /** How many CELL_AUTHENTICATE cells have we received, ever? */
+ uint64_t stats_n_authenticate_cells_processed = 0;
+ /** How many CELL_AUTHORIZE cells have we received, ever? */
+ uint64_t stats_n_authorize_cells_processed = 0;
+
+ /** Active listener, if any */
+ static channel_listener_t *channel_tls_listener = NULL;
+
+ /* channel_tls_t method declarations */
+
+ static void channel_tls_close_method(channel_t *chan);
+ static const char * channel_tls_describe_transport_method(channel_t *chan);
+ static void channel_tls_free_method(channel_t *chan);
+ static double channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method(channel_t *chan);
+ static int
+ channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method(channel_t *chan, tor_addr_t *addr_out);
+ static int
+ channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out);
+ static const char *
+ channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags);
+ static int channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan);
+ static int channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req);
+ static int
+ channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method(channel_t *chan,
+ extend_info_t *extend_info);
+ static int channel_tls_matches_target_method(channel_t *chan,
+ const tor_addr_t *target);
+ static int channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method(channel_t *chan);
+ static size_t channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method(channel_t *chan);
+ static int channel_tls_write_cell_method(channel_t *chan,
+ cell_t *cell);
+ static int channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method(channel_t *chan,
+ packed_cell_t *packed_cell);
+ static int channel_tls_write_var_cell_method(channel_t *chan,
+ var_cell_t *var_cell);
+
+ /* channel_listener_tls_t method declarations */
+
+ static void channel_tls_listener_close_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l);
+ static const char *
+ channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l);
+
+ /** Handle incoming cells for the handshake stuff here rather than
+ * passing them on up. */
+
+ static void channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan);
+ static void channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell,
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan);
+ static int command_allowed_before_handshake(uint8_t command);
+ static int enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan);
+ static void channel_tls_process_padding_negotiate_cell(cell_t *cell,
+ channel_tls_t *chan);
+
+ /**
+ * Do parts of channel_tls_t initialization common to channel_tls_connect()
+ * and channel_tls_handle_incoming().
+ */
+ STATIC void
+ channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan)
+ {
+ channel_t *chan;
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+
+ chan = &(tlschan->base_);
+ channel_init(chan);
+ chan->magic = TLS_CHAN_MAGIC;
+ chan->state = CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING;
+ chan->close = channel_tls_close_method;
+ chan->describe_transport = channel_tls_describe_transport_method;
+ chan->free_fn = channel_tls_free_method;
+ chan->get_overhead_estimate = channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method;
+ chan->get_remote_addr = channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method;
+ chan->get_remote_descr = channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method;
+ chan->get_transport_name = channel_tls_get_transport_name_method;
+ chan->has_queued_writes = channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method;
+ chan->is_canonical = channel_tls_is_canonical_method;
+ chan->matches_extend_info = channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method;
+ chan->matches_target = channel_tls_matches_target_method;
+ chan->num_bytes_queued = channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method;
+ chan->num_cells_writeable = channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method;
+ chan->write_cell = channel_tls_write_cell_method;
+ chan->write_packed_cell = channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method;
+ chan->write_var_cell = channel_tls_write_var_cell_method;
+
+ chan->cmux = circuitmux_alloc();
+ /* We only have one policy for now so always set it to EWMA. */
+ circuitmux_set_policy(chan->cmux, &ewma_policy);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Start a new TLS channel.
+ *
+ * Launch a new OR connection to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> and expect to
+ * handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>, and wrap
+ * it in a channel_tls_t.
+ */
+ channel_t *
+ channel_tls_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
+ const char *id_digest,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*tlschan));
+ channel_t *chan = &(tlschan->base_);
+
+ channel_tls_common_init(tlschan);
+
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "In channel_tls_connect() for channel %p "
+ "(global id %"PRIu64 ")",
+ tlschan,
+ (chan->global_identifier));
+
+ if (is_local_addr(addr)) {
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Marking new outgoing channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local",
+ (chan->global_identifier), chan);
+ channel_mark_local(chan);
+ } else {
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Marking new outgoing channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote",
+ (chan->global_identifier), chan);
+ channel_mark_remote(chan);
+ }
+
+ channel_mark_outgoing(chan);
+
+ /* Set up or_connection stuff */
+ tlschan->conn = connection_or_connect(addr, port, id_digest, ed_id, tlschan);
+ /* connection_or_connect() will fill in tlschan->conn */
+ if (!(tlschan->conn)) {
+ chan->reason_for_closing = CHANNEL_CLOSE_FOR_ERROR;
+ channel_change_state(chan, CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Got orconn %p for channel with global id %"PRIu64,
+ tlschan->conn, (chan->global_identifier));
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ circuitmux_free(chan->cmux);
+ tor_free(tlschan);
+ chan = NULL;
+
+ done:
+ /* If we got one, we should register it */
+ if (chan) channel_register(chan);
+
+ return chan;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Return the current channel_tls_t listener.
+ *
+ * Returns the current channel listener for incoming TLS connections, or
+ * NULL if none has been established
+ */
+ channel_listener_t *
+ channel_tls_get_listener(void)
+ {
+ return channel_tls_listener;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Start a channel_tls_t listener if necessary.
+ *
+ * Return the current channel_tls_t listener, or start one if we haven't yet,
+ * and return that.
+ */
+ channel_listener_t *
+ channel_tls_start_listener(void)
+ {
+ channel_listener_t *listener;
+
+ if (!channel_tls_listener) {
+ listener = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*listener));
+ channel_init_listener(listener);
+ listener->state = CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING;
+ listener->close = channel_tls_listener_close_method;
+ listener->describe_transport =
+ channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method;
+
+ channel_tls_listener = listener;
+
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Starting TLS channel listener %p with global id %"PRIu64,
+ listener, (listener->global_identifier));
+
+ channel_listener_register(listener);
+ } else listener = channel_tls_listener;
+
+ return listener;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Free everything on shutdown.
+ *
+ * Not much to do here, since channel_free_all() takes care of a lot, but let's
+ * get rid of the listener.
+ */
+ void
+ channel_tls_free_all(void)
+ {
+ channel_listener_t *old_listener = NULL;
+
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Shutting down TLS channels...");
+
+ if (channel_tls_listener) {
+ /*
+ * When we close it, channel_tls_listener will get nulled out, so save
+ * a pointer so we can free it.
+ */
+ old_listener = channel_tls_listener;
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Closing channel_tls_listener with ID %"PRIu64
+ " at %p.",
+ (old_listener->global_identifier),
+ old_listener);
+ channel_listener_unregister(old_listener);
+ channel_listener_mark_for_close(old_listener);
+ channel_listener_free(old_listener);
+ tor_assert(channel_tls_listener == NULL);
+ }
+
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Done shutting down TLS channels");
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Create a new channel around an incoming or_connection_t.
+ */
+ channel_t *
+ channel_tls_handle_incoming(or_connection_t *orconn)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*tlschan));
+ channel_t *chan = &(tlschan->base_);
+
+ tor_assert(orconn);
+ tor_assert(!(orconn->chan));
+
+ channel_tls_common_init(tlschan);
+
+ /* Link the channel and orconn to each other */
+ tlschan->conn = orconn;
+ orconn->chan = tlschan;
+
+ if (is_local_addr(&(TO_CONN(orconn)->addr))) {
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Marking new incoming channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local",
+ (chan->global_identifier), chan);
+ channel_mark_local(chan);
+ } else {
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Marking new incoming channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote",
+ (chan->global_identifier), chan);
+ channel_mark_remote(chan);
+ }
+
+ channel_mark_incoming(chan);
+
+ /* Register it */
+ channel_register(chan);
+
+ return chan;
+ }
+
+ /*********
+ * Casts *
+ ********/
+
+ /**
+ * Cast a channel_tls_t to a channel_t.
+ */
+ channel_t *
+ channel_tls_to_base(channel_tls_t *tlschan)
+ {
+ if (!tlschan) return NULL;
+
+ return &(tlschan->base_);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Cast a channel_t to a channel_tls_t, with appropriate type-checking
+ * asserts.
+ */
+ channel_tls_t *
+ channel_tls_from_base(channel_t *chan)
+ {
+ if (!chan) return NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(chan->magic == TLS_CHAN_MAGIC);
+
+ return (channel_tls_t *)(chan);
+ }
+
+ /********************************************
+ * Method implementations for channel_tls_t *
+ *******************************************/
+
+ /**
+ * Close a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * This implements the close method for channel_tls_t.
+ */
+ static void
+ channel_tls_close_method(channel_t *chan)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+
+ if (tlschan->conn) connection_or_close_normally(tlschan->conn, 1);
+ else {
+ /* Weird - we'll have to change the state ourselves, I guess */
+ log_info(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Tried to close channel_tls_t %p with NULL conn",
+ tlschan);
+ channel_change_state(chan, CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Describe the transport for a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * This returns the string "TLS channel on connection <id>" to the upper
+ * layer.
+ */
+ static const char *
+ channel_tls_describe_transport_method(channel_t *chan)
+ {
+ static char *buf = NULL;
+ uint64_t id;
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan;
+ const char *rv = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(chan);
+
+ tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+
+ if (tlschan->conn) {
+ id = TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->global_identifier;
+
+ if (buf) tor_free(buf);
+ tor_asprintf(&buf,
+ "TLS channel (connection %"PRIu64 ")",
+ (id));
+
+ rv = buf;
+ } else {
+ rv = "TLS channel (no connection)";
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Free a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * This is called by the generic channel layer when freeing a channel_tls_t;
+ * this happens either on a channel which has already reached
+ * CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED or CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR from channel_run_cleanup() or
+ * on shutdown from channel_free_all(). In the latter case we might still
+ * have an orconn active (which connection_free_all() will get to later),
+ * so we should null out its channel pointer now.
+ */
+ static void
+ channel_tls_free_method(channel_t *chan)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+
+ if (tlschan->conn) {
+ tlschan->conn->chan = NULL;
+ tlschan->conn = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Get an estimate of the average TLS overhead for the upper layer.
+ */
+ static double
+ channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method(channel_t *chan)
+ {
+ double overhead = 1.0;
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+ tor_assert(tlschan->conn);
+
+ /* Just return 1.0f if we don't have sensible data */
+ if (tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted > 0 &&
+ tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted_by_tls >=
+ tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted) {
+ overhead = ((double)(tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted_by_tls)) /
+ ((double)(tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted));
+
+ /*
+ * Never estimate more than 2.0; otherwise we get silly large estimates
+ * at the very start of a new TLS connection.
+ */
+ if (overhead > 2.0)
+ overhead = 2.0;
+ }
+
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Estimated overhead ratio for TLS chan %"PRIu64 " is %f",
+ (chan->global_identifier), overhead);
+
+ return overhead;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the remote address of a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * This implements the get_remote_addr method for channel_tls_t; copy the
+ * remote endpoint of the channel to addr_out and return 1 (always
+ * succeeds for this transport).
+ */
+ static int
+ channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method(channel_t *chan, tor_addr_t *addr_out)
+ {
+ int rv = 0;
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+ tor_assert(addr_out);
+
+ if (tlschan->conn) {
+ tor_addr_copy(addr_out, &(tlschan->conn->real_addr));
+ rv = 1;
+ } else tor_addr_make_unspec(addr_out);
+
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the name of the pluggable transport used by a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * This implements the get_transport_name for channel_tls_t. If the
+ * channel uses a pluggable transport, copy its name to
+ * <b>transport_out</b> and return 0. If the channel did not use a
+ * pluggable transport, return -1.
+ */
+ static int
+ channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+ tor_assert(transport_out);
+ tor_assert(tlschan->conn);
+
+ if (!tlschan->conn->ext_or_transport)
+ return -1;
+
+ *transport_out = tor_strdup(tlschan->conn->ext_or_transport);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Get endpoint description of a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * This implements the get_remote_descr method for channel_tls_t; it returns
+ * a text description of the remote endpoint of the channel suitable for use
+ * in log messages. The req parameter is 0 for the canonical address or 1 for
+ * the actual address seen.
+ */
+ static const char *
+ channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags)
+ {
+ #define MAX_DESCR_LEN 32
+
+ static char buf[MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1];
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+ connection_t *conn;
+ const char *answer = NULL;
+ char *addr_str;
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+
+ if (tlschan->conn) {
+ conn = TO_CONN(tlschan->conn);
+ switch (flags) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Canonical address with port*/
+ tor_snprintf(buf, MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1,
+ "%s:%u", conn->address, conn->port);
+ answer = buf;
+ break;
+ case GRD_FLAG_ORIGINAL:
+ /* Actual address with port */
+ addr_str = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr));
+ tor_snprintf(buf, MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1,
+ "%s:%u", addr_str, conn->port);
+ tor_free(addr_str);
+ answer = buf;
+ break;
+ case GRD_FLAG_ADDR_ONLY:
+ /* Canonical address, no port */
+ strlcpy(buf, conn->address, sizeof(buf));
+ answer = buf;
+ break;
+ case GRD_FLAG_ORIGINAL|GRD_FLAG_ADDR_ONLY:
+ /* Actual address, no port */
+ addr_str = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr));
+ strlcpy(buf, addr_str, sizeof(buf));
+ tor_free(addr_str);
+ answer = buf;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Something's broken in channel.c */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
+ }
+ } else {
+ strlcpy(buf, "(No connection)", sizeof(buf));
+ answer = buf;
+ }
+
+ return answer;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Tell the upper layer if we have queued writes.
+ *
+ * This implements the has_queued_writes method for channel_tls t_; it returns
+ * 1 iff we have queued writes on the outbuf of the underlying or_connection_t.
+ */
+ static int
+ channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan)
+ {
+ size_t outbuf_len;
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+ if (!(tlschan->conn)) {
+ log_info(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "something called has_queued_writes on a tlschan "
+ "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn",
+ chan, (chan->global_identifier));
+ }
+
+ outbuf_len = (tlschan->conn != NULL) ?
+ connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)) :
+ 0;
+
+ return (outbuf_len > 0);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Tell the upper layer if we're canonical.
+ *
+ * This implements the is_canonical method for channel_tls_t; if req is zero,
+ * it returns whether this is a canonical channel, and if it is one it returns
+ * whether that can be relied upon.
+ */
+ static int
+ channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req)
+ {
+ int answer = 0;
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+
+ if (tlschan->conn) {
+ switch (req) {
+ case 0:
+ answer = tlschan->conn->is_canonical;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ /*
+ * Is the is_canonical bit reliable? In protocols version 2 and up
+ * we get the canonical address from a NETINFO cell, but in older
+ * versions it might be based on an obsolete descriptor.
+ */
+ answer = (tlschan->conn->link_proto >= 2);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* This shouldn't happen; channel.c is broken if it does */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
+ }
+ }
+ /* else return 0 for tlschan->conn == NULL */
+
+ return answer;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Check if we match an extend_info_t.
+ *
+ * This implements the matches_extend_info method for channel_tls_t; the upper
+ * layer wants to know if this channel matches an extend_info_t.
+ */
+ static int
+ channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method(channel_t *chan,
+ extend_info_t *extend_info)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+ tor_assert(extend_info);
+
+ /* Never match if we have no conn */
+ if (!(tlschan->conn)) {
+ log_info(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "something called matches_extend_info on a tlschan "
+ "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn",
+ chan, (chan->global_identifier));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return (tor_addr_eq(&(extend_info->addr),
+ &(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->addr)) &&
+ (extend_info->port == TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->port));
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Check if we match a target address; return true iff we do.
+ *
+ * This implements the matches_target method for channel_tls t_; the upper
+ * layer wants to know if this channel matches a target address when extending
+ * a circuit.
+ */
+ static int
+ channel_tls_matches_target_method(channel_t *chan,
+ const tor_addr_t *target)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+ tor_assert(target);
+
+ /* Never match if we have no conn */
+ if (!(tlschan->conn)) {
+ log_info(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "something called matches_target on a tlschan "
+ "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn",
+ chan, (chan->global_identifier));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* real_addr is the address this connection came from.
+ * base_.addr is updated by connection_or_init_conn_from_address()
+ * to be the address in the descriptor. It may be tempting to
+ * allow either address to be allowed, but if we did so, it would
+ * enable someone who steals a relay's keys to impersonate/MITM it
+ * from anywhere on the Internet! (Because they could make long-lived
+ * TLS connections from anywhere to all relays, and wait for them to
+ * be used for extends).
+ */
+ return tor_addr_eq(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr), target);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Tell the upper layer how many bytes we have queued and not yet
+ * sent.
+ */
+ static size_t
+ channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method(channel_t *chan)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+ tor_assert(tlschan->conn);
+
+ return connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn));
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Tell the upper layer how many cells we can accept to write.
+ *
+ * This implements the num_cells_writeable method for channel_tls_t; it
+ * returns an estimate of the number of cells we can accept with
+ * channel_tls_write_*_cell().
+ */
+ static int
+ channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method(channel_t *chan)
+ {
+ size_t outbuf_len;
+ ssize_t n;
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+ size_t cell_network_size;
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+ tor_assert(tlschan->conn);
+
+ cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(tlschan->conn->wide_circ_ids);
+ outbuf_len = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn));
+ /* Get the number of cells */
+ n = CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - outbuf_len, cell_network_size);
+ if (n < 0) n = 0;
+ #if SIZEOF_SIZE_T > SIZEOF_INT
+ if (n > INT_MAX) n = INT_MAX;
+ #endif
+
+ return (int)n;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Write a cell to a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * This implements the write_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a
+ * channel_tls_t and a cell_t, transmit the cell_t.
+ */
+ static int
+ channel_tls_write_cell_method(channel_t *chan, cell_t *cell)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+ int written = 0;
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+ tor_assert(cell);
+
+ if (tlschan->conn) {
+ connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(cell, tlschan->conn);
+ ++written;
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "something called write_cell on a tlschan "
+ "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn",
+ chan, (chan->global_identifier));
+ }
+
+ return written;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Write a packed cell to a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * This implements the write_packed_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a
+ * channel_tls_t and a packed_cell_t, transmit the packed_cell_t.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success or negative value on error. The caller must free the
+ * packed cell.
+ */
+ static int
+ channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method(channel_t *chan,
+ packed_cell_t *packed_cell)
+ {
+ tor_assert(chan);
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+ size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(chan->wide_circ_ids);
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+ tor_assert(packed_cell);
+
+ if (tlschan->conn) {
+ connection_buf_add(packed_cell->body, cell_network_size,
+ TO_CONN(tlschan->conn));
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "something called write_packed_cell on a tlschan "
+ "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn",
+ chan, (chan->global_identifier));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Write a variable-length cell to a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * This implements the write_var_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a
+ * channel_tls_t and a var_cell_t, transmit the var_cell_t.
+ */
+ static int
+ channel_tls_write_var_cell_method(channel_t *chan, var_cell_t *var_cell)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
+ int written = 0;
+
+ tor_assert(tlschan);
+ tor_assert(var_cell);
+
+ if (tlschan->conn) {
+ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(var_cell, tlschan->conn);
+ ++written;
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "something called write_var_cell on a tlschan "
+ "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn",
+ chan, (chan->global_identifier));
+ }
+
+ return written;
+ }
+
+ /*************************************************
+ * Method implementations for channel_listener_t *
+ ************************************************/
+
+ /**
+ * Close a channel_listener_t.
+ *
+ * This implements the close method for channel_listener_t.
+ */
+ static void
+ channel_tls_listener_close_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l)
+ {
+ tor_assert(chan_l);
+
+ /*
+ * Listeners we just go ahead and change state through to CLOSED, but
+ * make sure to check if they're channel_tls_listener to NULL it out.
+ */
+ if (chan_l == channel_tls_listener)
+ channel_tls_listener = NULL;
+
+ if (!(chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING ||
+ chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED ||
+ chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR)) {
+ channel_listener_change_state(chan_l, CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING);
+ }
+
+ if (chan_l->incoming_list) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(chan_l->incoming_list,
+ channel_t *, ichan) {
+ channel_mark_for_close(ichan);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ichan);
+
+ smartlist_free(chan_l->incoming_list);
+ chan_l->incoming_list = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!(chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED ||
+ chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR)) {
+ channel_listener_change_state(chan_l, CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Describe the transport for a channel_listener_t.
+ *
+ * This returns the string "TLS channel (listening)" to the upper
+ * layer.
+ */
+ static const char *
+ channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l)
+ {
+ tor_assert(chan_l);
+
+ return "TLS channel (listening)";
+ }
+
+ /*******************************************************
+ * Functions for handling events on an or_connection_t *
+ ******************************************************/
+
+ /**
+ * Handle an orconn state change.
+ *
+ * This function will be called by connection_or.c when the or_connection_t
+ * associated with this channel_tls_t changes state.
+ */
+ void
+ channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan,
+ or_connection_t *conn,
+ uint8_t old_state,
+ uint8_t state)
+ {
+ channel_t *base_chan;
+
+ tor_assert(chan);
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ tor_assert(conn->chan == chan);
+ tor_assert(chan->conn == conn);
+ /* Shut the compiler up without triggering -Wtautological-compare */
+ (void)old_state;
+
+ base_chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan);
+
+ /* Make sure the base connection state makes sense - shouldn't be error
+ * or closed. */
+
+ tor_assert(CHANNEL_IS_OPENING(base_chan) ||
+ CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(base_chan) ||
+ CHANNEL_IS_MAINT(base_chan) ||
+ CHANNEL_IS_CLOSING(base_chan));
+
+ /* Did we just go to state open? */
+ if (state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
+ /*
+ * We can go to CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN from CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING or
+ * CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT on this.
+ */
+ channel_change_state_open(base_chan);
+ /* We might have just become writeable; check and tell the scheduler */
+ if (connection_or_num_cells_writeable(conn) > 0) {
+ scheduler_channel_wants_writes(base_chan);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Not open, so from CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN we go to CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT,
+ * otherwise no change.
+ */
+ if (CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(base_chan)) {
+ channel_change_state(base_chan, CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ #ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS
+
+ /**
+ * Timing states wrapper.
+ *
+ * This is a wrapper function around the actual function that processes the
+ * <b>cell</b> that just arrived on <b>chan</b>. Increment <b>*time</b>
+ * by the number of microseconds used by the call to <b>*func(cell, chan)</b>.
+ */
+ static void
+ channel_tls_time_process_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan, int *time,
+ void (*func)(cell_t *, channel_tls_t *))
+ {
+ struct timeval start, end;
+ long time_passed;
+
+ tor_gettimeofday(&start);
+
+ (*func)(cell, chan);
+
+ tor_gettimeofday(&end);
+ time_passed = tv_udiff(&start, &end) ;
+
+ if (time_passed > 10000) { /* more than 10ms */
+ log_debug(LD_OR,"That call just took %ld ms.",time_passed/1000);
+ }
+
+ if (time_passed < 0) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,"That call took us back in time!");
+ time_passed = 0;
+ }
+
+ *time += time_passed;
+ }
+ #endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */
+
+ /**
+ * Handle an incoming cell on a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * This is called from connection_or.c to handle an arriving cell; it checks
+ * for cell types specific to the handshake for this transport protocol and
+ * handles them, and queues all other cells to the channel_t layer, which
+ * eventually will hand them off to command.c.
+ *
+ * The channel layer itself decides whether the cell should be queued or
+ * can be handed off immediately to the upper-layer code. It is responsible
+ * for copying in the case that it queues; we merely pass pointers through
+ * which we get from connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf().
+ */
+ void
+ channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *chan;
+ int handshaking;
+
+ #ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS
+ #define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) STMT_BEGIN { \
+ ++num ## tp; \
+ channel_tls_time_process_cell(cl, cn, & tp ## time , \
+ channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell); \
+ } STMT_END
+ #else /* !(defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS)) */
+ #define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell(cl, cn)
+ #endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */
+
+ tor_assert(cell);
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ chan = conn->chan;
+
+ if (!chan) {
+ log_warn(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Got a cell_t on an OR connection with no channel");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ handshaking = (TO_CONN(conn)->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN);
+
+ if (conn->base_.marked_for_close)
+ return;
+
+ /* Reject all but VERSIONS and NETINFO when handshaking. */
+ /* (VERSIONS should actually be impossible; it's variable-length.) */
+ if (handshaking && cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS &&
+ cell->command != CELL_NETINFO) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Received unexpected cell command %d in chan state %s / "
+ "conn state %s; closing the connection.",
+ (int)cell->command,
+ channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state),
+ conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state));
+ connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
+ or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 1);
+
+ /* We note that we're on the internet whenever we read a cell. This is
+ * a fast operation. */
+ entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(get_guard_selection_info());
+ rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL);
+
+ if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->currently_padding)
+ rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL);
+
+ switch (cell->command) {
+ case CELL_PADDING:
+ rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_CELL);
+ if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->currently_padding)
+ rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL);
+ ++stats_n_padding_cells_processed;
+ /* do nothing */
+ break;
+ case CELL_VERSIONS:
- tor_fragile_assert();
++ /* A VERSIONS cell should always be a variable-length cell, and
++ * so should never reach this function (which handles constant-sized
++ * cells). But if the connection is using the (obsolete) v1 link
++ * protocol, all cells will be treated as constant-sized, and so
++ * it's possible we'll reach this code.
++ */
++ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CHANNEL,
++ "Received unexpected VERSIONS cell on a channel using link "
++ "protocol %d; ignoring.", conn->link_proto);
+ break;
+ case CELL_NETINFO:
+ ++stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed;
+ PROCESS_CELL(netinfo, cell, chan);
+ break;
+ case CELL_PADDING_NEGOTIATE:
+ ++stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed;
+ PROCESS_CELL(padding_negotiate, cell, chan);
+ break;
+ case CELL_CREATE:
+ case CELL_CREATE_FAST:
+ case CELL_CREATED:
+ case CELL_CREATED_FAST:
+ case CELL_RELAY:
+ case CELL_RELAY_EARLY:
+ case CELL_DESTROY:
+ case CELL_CREATE2:
+ case CELL_CREATED2:
+ /*
+ * These are all transport independent and we pass them up through the
+ * channel_t mechanism. They are ultimately handled in command.c.
+ */
+ channel_process_cell(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), cell);
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Cell of unknown type (%d) received in channeltls.c. "
+ "Dropping.",
+ cell->command);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Handle an incoming variable-length cell on a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * Process a <b>var_cell</b> that was just received on <b>conn</b>. Keep
+ * internal statistics about how many of each cell we've processed so far
+ * this second, and the total number of microseconds it took to
+ * process each type of cell. All the var_cell commands are handshake-
+ * related and live below the channel_t layer, so no variable-length
+ * cells ever get delivered in the current implementation, but I've left
+ * the mechanism in place for future use.
+ *
+ * If we were handing them off to the upper layer, the channel_t queueing
+ * code would be responsible for memory management, and we'd just be passing
+ * pointers through from connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(). That
+ * caller always frees them after this function returns, so this function
+ * should never free var_cell.
+ */
+ void
+ channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell_t *var_cell, or_connection_t *conn)
+ {
+ channel_tls_t *chan;
+
+ #ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS
+ /* how many of each cell have we seen so far this second? needs better
+ * name. */
+ static int num_versions = 0, num_certs = 0;
+ static time_t current_second = 0; /* from previous calls to time */
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+ if (current_second == 0) current_second = now;
+ if (now > current_second) { /* the second has rolled over */
+ /* print stats */
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "At end of second: %d versions (%d ms), %d certs (%d ms)",
+ num_versions, versions_time / ((now - current_second) * 1000),
+ num_certs, certs_time / ((now - current_second) * 1000));
+
+ num_versions = num_certs = 0;
+ versions_time = certs_time = 0;
+
+ /* remember which second it is, for next time */
+ current_second = now;
+ }
+ #endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */
+
+ tor_assert(var_cell);
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ chan = conn->chan;
+
+ if (!chan) {
+ log_warn(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Got a var_cell_t on an OR connection with no channel");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close)
+ return;
+
+ switch (TO_CONN(conn)->state) {
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
+ if (var_cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Received a cell with command %d in unexpected "
+ "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; "
+ "closing the connection.",
+ (int)(var_cell->command),
+ conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state),
+ TO_CONN(conn)->state,
+ channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state),
+ (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state));
+ /*
+ * The code in connection_or.c will tell channel_t to close for
+ * error; it will go to CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING, and then to
+ * CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR when conn is closed.
+ */
+ connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ break;
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING:
+ /* If we're using bufferevents, it's entirely possible for us to
+ * notice "hey, data arrived!" before we notice "hey, the handshake
+ * finished!" And we need to be accepting both at once to handle both
+ * the v2 and v3 handshakes. */
+ /* But that should be happening any longer've disabled bufferevents. */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
+
+ /* fall through */
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING:
+ if (!(command_allowed_before_handshake(var_cell->command))) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Received a cell with command %d in unexpected "
+ "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; "
+ "closing the connection.",
+ (int)(var_cell->command),
+ conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state),
+ (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state),
+ channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state),
+ (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state));
+ /* see above comment about CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR */
+ connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
+ return;
+ } else {
+ if (enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell, chan) < 0)
+ return;
+ }
+ break;
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
+ if (var_cell->command != CELL_AUTHENTICATE)
+ or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state,
+ var_cell, 1);
+ break; /* Everything is allowed */
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
+ if (conn->link_proto < 3) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Received a variable-length cell with command %d in orconn "
+ "state %s [%d], channel state %s [%d] with link protocol %d; "
+ "ignoring it.",
+ (int)(var_cell->command),
+ conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state),
+ (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state),
+ channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state),
+ (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state),
+ (int)(conn->link_proto));
+ return;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Received var-length cell with command %d in unexpected "
+ "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; "
+ "ignoring it.",
+ (int)(var_cell->command),
+ conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state),
+ (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state),
+ channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state),
+ (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* We note that we're on the internet whenever we read a cell. This is
+ * a fast operation. */
+ entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(get_guard_selection_info());
+
+ /* Now handle the cell */
+
+ switch (var_cell->command) {
+ case CELL_VERSIONS:
+ ++stats_n_versions_cells_processed;
+ PROCESS_CELL(versions, var_cell, chan);
+ break;
+ case CELL_VPADDING:
+ ++stats_n_vpadding_cells_processed;
+ /* Do nothing */
+ break;
+ case CELL_CERTS:
+ ++stats_n_certs_cells_processed;
+ PROCESS_CELL(certs, var_cell, chan);
+ break;
+ case CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE:
+ ++stats_n_auth_challenge_cells_processed;
+ PROCESS_CELL(auth_challenge, var_cell, chan);
+ break;
+ case CELL_AUTHENTICATE:
+ ++stats_n_authenticate_cells_processed;
+ PROCESS_CELL(authenticate, var_cell, chan);
+ break;
+ case CELL_AUTHORIZE:
+ ++stats_n_authorize_cells_processed;
+ /* Ignored so far. */
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Variable-length cell of unknown type (%d) received.",
+ (int)(var_cell->command));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Update channel marks after connection_or.c has changed an address.
+ *
+ * This is called from connection_or_init_conn_from_address() after the
+ * connection's _base.addr or real_addr fields have potentially been changed
+ * so we can recalculate the local mark. Notably, this happens when incoming
+ * connections are reverse-proxied and we only learn the real address of the
+ * remote router by looking it up in the consensus after we finish the
+ * handshake and know an authenticated identity digest.
+ */
+ void
+ channel_tls_update_marks(or_connection_t *conn)
+ {
+ channel_t *chan = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ tor_assert(conn->chan);
+
+ chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
+
+ if (is_local_addr(&(TO_CONN(conn)->addr))) {
+ if (!channel_is_local(chan)) {
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Marking channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local",
+ (chan->global_identifier), chan);
+ channel_mark_local(chan);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (channel_is_local(chan)) {
+ log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
+ "Marking channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote",
+ (chan->global_identifier), chan);
+ channel_mark_remote(chan);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Check if this cell type is allowed before the handshake is finished.
+ *
+ * Return true if <b>command</b> is a cell command that's allowed to start a
+ * V3 handshake.
+ */
+ static int
+ command_allowed_before_handshake(uint8_t command)
+ {
+ switch (command) {
+ case CELL_VERSIONS:
+ case CELL_VPADDING:
+ case CELL_AUTHORIZE:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Start a V3 handshake on an incoming connection.
+ *
+ * Called when we as a server receive an appropriate cell while waiting
+ * either for a cell or a TLS handshake. Set the connection's state to
+ * "handshaking_v3', initializes the or_handshake_state field as needed,
+ * and add the cell to the hash of incoming cells.)
+ */
+ static int
+ enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
+ {
+ int started_here = 0;
+
+ tor_assert(cell);
+ tor_assert(chan);
+ tor_assert(chan->conn);
+
+ started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn);
+
+ tor_assert(TO_CONN(chan->conn)->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING ||
+ TO_CONN(chan->conn)->state ==
+ OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING);
+
+ if (started_here) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Received a cell while TLS-handshaking, not in "
+ "OR_HANDSHAKING_V3, on a connection we originated.");
+ }
+ connection_or_block_renegotiation(chan->conn);
+ chan->conn->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
+ if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(chan->conn, started_here) < 0) {
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(chan->conn,
+ chan->conn->handshake_state, cell, 1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Process a 'versions' cell.
+ *
+ * This function is called to handle an incoming VERSIONS cell; the current
+ * link protocol version must be 0 to indicate that no version has yet been
+ * negotiated. We compare the versions in the cell to the list of versions
+ * we support, pick the highest version we have in common, and continue the
+ * negotiation from there.
+ */
+ static void
+ channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
+ {
+ int highest_supported_version = 0;
+ int started_here = 0;
+
+ tor_assert(cell);
+ tor_assert(chan);
+ tor_assert(chan->conn);
+
+ if ((cell->payload_len % 2) == 1) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Received a VERSION cell with odd payload length %d; "
+ "closing connection.",cell->payload_len);
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn);
+
+ if (chan->conn->link_proto != 0 ||
+ (chan->conn->handshake_state &&
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions)) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Received a VERSIONS cell on a connection with its version "
+ "already set to %d; dropping",
+ (int)(chan->conn->link_proto));
+ return;
+ }
+ switch (chan->conn->base_.state)
+ {
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
+ break;
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING:
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING:
+ default:
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "VERSIONS cell while in unexpected state");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ tor_assert(chan->conn->handshake_state);
+
+ {
+ int i;
+ const uint8_t *cp = cell->payload;
+ for (i = 0; i < cell->payload_len / 2; ++i, cp += 2) {
+ uint16_t v = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
+ if (is_or_protocol_version_known(v) && v > highest_supported_version)
+ highest_supported_version = v;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!highest_supported_version) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Couldn't find a version in common between my version list and the "
+ "list in the VERSIONS cell; closing connection.");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ } else if (highest_supported_version == 1) {
+ /* Negotiating version 1 makes no sense, since version 1 has no VERSIONS
+ * cells. */
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Used version negotiation protocol to negotiate a v1 connection. "
+ "That's crazily non-compliant. Closing connection.");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ } else if (highest_supported_version < 3 &&
+ chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Negotiated link protocol 2 or lower after doing a v3 TLS "
+ "handshake. Closing connection.");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ } else if (highest_supported_version != 2 &&
+ chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2) {
+ /* XXXX This should eventually be a log_protocol_warn */
+ log_fn(LOG_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Negotiated link with non-2 protocol after doing a v2 TLS "
+ "handshake with %s. Closing connection.",
+ fmt_addr(&chan->conn->base_.addr));
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto(highest_supported_version, started_here);
+
+ chan->conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1;
+
+ if (chan->conn->link_proto == 2) {
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; sending NETINFO.",
+ highest_supported_version,
+ safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port);
+
+ if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) {
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ } else {
+ const int send_versions = !started_here;
+ /* If we want to authenticate, send a CERTS cell */
+ const int send_certs = !started_here || public_server_mode(get_options());
+ /* If we're a host that got a connection, ask for authentication. */
+ const int send_chall = !started_here;
+ /* If our certs cell will authenticate us, we can send a netinfo cell
+ * right now. */
+ const int send_netinfo = !started_here;
+ const int send_any =
+ send_versions || send_certs || send_chall || send_netinfo;
+ tor_assert(chan->conn->link_proto >= 3);
+
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; %s%s%s%s%s",
+ highest_supported_version,
+ safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port,
+ send_any ? "Sending cells:" : "Waiting for CERTS cell",
+ send_versions ? " VERSIONS" : "",
+ send_certs ? " CERTS" : "",
+ send_chall ? " AUTH_CHALLENGE" : "",
+ send_netinfo ? " NETINFO" : "");
+
+ #ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE
+ if (1) {
+ connection_or_close_normally(chan->conn, 1);
+ return;
+ }
+ #endif /* defined(DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE) */
+
+ if (send_versions) {
+ if (connection_or_send_versions(chan->conn, 1) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send versions cell");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We set this after sending the versions cell. */
+ /*XXXXX symbolic const.*/
+ TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->wide_circ_ids =
+ chan->conn->link_proto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS;
+ chan->conn->wide_circ_ids = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->wide_circ_ids;
+
+ TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled =
+ chan->conn->link_proto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_CHANNEL_PADDING;
+
+ if (send_certs) {
+ if (connection_or_send_certs_cell(chan->conn) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send certs cell");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ if (send_chall) {
+ if (connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(chan->conn) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send auth_challenge cell");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ if (send_netinfo) {
+ if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Process a 'padding_negotiate' cell.
+ *
+ * This function is called to handle an incoming PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell;
+ * enable or disable padding accordingly, and read and act on its timeout
+ * value contents.
+ */
+ static void
+ channel_tls_process_padding_negotiate_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
+ {
+ channelpadding_negotiate_t *negotiation;
+ tor_assert(cell);
+ tor_assert(chan);
+ tor_assert(chan->conn);
+
+ if (chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_CHANNEL_PADDING) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Received a PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell on v%d connection; dropping.",
+ chan->conn->link_proto);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (channelpadding_negotiate_parse(&negotiation, cell->payload,
+ CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE) < 0) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Received malformed PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell on v%d connection; "
+ "dropping.", chan->conn->link_proto);
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ channelpadding_update_padding_for_channel(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan),
+ negotiation);
+
+ channelpadding_negotiate_free(negotiation);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Helper: compute the absolute value of a time_t.
+ *
+ * (we need this because labs() doesn't always work for time_t, since
+ * long can be shorter than time_t.)
+ */
+ static inline time_t
+ time_abs(time_t val)
+ {
+ return (val < 0) ? -val : val;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Process a 'netinfo' cell
+ *
+ * This function is called to handle an incoming NETINFO cell; read and act
+ * on its contents, and set the connection state to "open".
+ */
+ static void
+ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
+ {
+ time_t timestamp;
+ uint8_t my_addr_type;
+ uint8_t my_addr_len;
+ const uint8_t *my_addr_ptr;
+ const uint8_t *cp, *end;
+ uint8_t n_other_addrs;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+
+ time_t apparent_skew = 0;
+ tor_addr_t my_apparent_addr = TOR_ADDR_NULL;
+ int started_here = 0;
+ const char *identity_digest = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(cell);
+ tor_assert(chan);
+ tor_assert(chan->conn);
+
+ if (chan->conn->link_proto < 2) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Received a NETINFO cell on %s connection; dropping.",
+ chan->conn->link_proto == 0 ? "non-versioned" : "a v1");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 &&
+ chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Received a NETINFO cell on non-handshaking connection; dropping.");
+ return;
+ }
+ tor_assert(chan->conn->handshake_state &&
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions);
+ started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn);
+ identity_digest = chan->conn->identity_digest;
+
+ if (chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) {
+ tor_assert(chan->conn->link_proto >= 3);
+ if (started_here) {
+ if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Got a NETINFO cell from server, "
+ "but no authentication. Closing the connection.");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* we're the server. If the client never authenticated, we have
+ some housekeeping to do.*/
+ if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) {
+ tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero(
+ (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
+ authenticated_rsa_peer_id)));
+ tor_assert(tor_mem_is_zero(
+ (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
+ authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32));
+ /* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge
+ * relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (nor could we, as
+ * there are no authenticated peer IDs) */
+ channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan));
+ channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL,
+ chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS);
+
+ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn,
+ &(chan->conn->base_.addr),
+ chan->conn->base_.port,
+ /* zero, checked above */
+ (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
+ authenticated_rsa_peer_id),
+ NULL, /* Ed25519 ID: Also checked as zero */
+ 0);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Decode the cell. */
+ timestamp = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload));
+ const time_t sent_versions_at =
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at;
+ if (now > sent_versions_at && (now - sent_versions_at) < 180) {
+ /* If we have gotten the NETINFO cell reasonably soon after having
+ * sent our VERSIONS cell, maybe we can learn skew information from it. */
+ apparent_skew = now - timestamp;
+ }
+
+ my_addr_type = (uint8_t) cell->payload[4];
+ my_addr_len = (uint8_t) cell->payload[5];
+ my_addr_ptr = (uint8_t*) cell->payload + 6;
+ end = cell->payload + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE;
+ cp = cell->payload + 6 + my_addr_len;
+
+ /* We used to check:
+ * if (my_addr_len >= CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 6) {
+ *
+ * This is actually never going to happen, since my_addr_len is at most 255,
+ * and CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN - 6 is 503. So we know that cp is < end. */
+
+ if (my_addr_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && my_addr_len == 4) {
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&my_apparent_addr, get_uint32(my_addr_ptr));
+
+ if (!get_options()->BridgeRelay && me &&
+ get_uint32(my_addr_ptr) == htonl(me->addr)) {
+ TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer = 1;
+ }
+
+ } else if (my_addr_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 && my_addr_len == 16) {
+ tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&my_apparent_addr, (const char *) my_addr_ptr);
+
+ if (!get_options()->BridgeRelay && me &&
+ !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr) &&
+ tor_addr_eq(&my_apparent_addr, &me->ipv6_addr)) {
+ TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ n_other_addrs = (uint8_t) *cp++;
+ while (n_other_addrs && cp < end-2) {
+ /* Consider all the other addresses; if any matches, this connection is
+ * "canonical." */
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ const uint8_t *next =
+ decode_address_from_payload(&addr, cp, (int)(end-cp));
+ if (next == NULL) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Bad address in netinfo cell; closing connection.");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* A relay can connect from anywhere and be canonical, so
+ * long as it tells you from where it came. This may sound a bit
+ * concerning... but that's what "canonical" means: that the
+ * address is one that the relay itself has claimed. The relay
+ * might be doing something funny, but nobody else is doing a MITM
+ * on the relay's TCP.
+ */
+ if (tor_addr_eq(&addr, &(chan->conn->real_addr))) {
+ connection_or_set_canonical(chan->conn, 1);
+ break;
+ }
+ cp = next;
+ --n_other_addrs;
+ }
+
+ if (me && !TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer &&
+ channel_is_canonical(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan))) {
+ const char *descr =
+ TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->get_remote_descr(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), 0);
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "We made a connection to a relay at %s (fp=%s) but we think "
+ "they will not consider this connection canonical. They "
+ "think we are at %s, but we think its %s.",
+ safe_str(descr),
+ safe_str(hex_str(identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)),
+ safe_str(tor_addr_is_null(&my_apparent_addr) ?
+ "<none>" : fmt_and_decorate_addr(&my_apparent_addr)),
+ safe_str(fmt_addr32(me->addr)));
+ }
+
+ /* Act on apparent skew. */
+ /** Warn when we get a netinfo skew with at least this value. */
+ #define NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW 3600
+ if (time_abs(apparent_skew) > NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW &&
+ (started_here ||
+ connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(chan->conn->identity_digest))) {
+ int trusted = router_digest_is_trusted_dir(chan->conn->identity_digest);
+ clock_skew_warning(TO_CONN(chan->conn), apparent_skew, trusted, LD_GENERAL,
+ "NETINFO cell", "OR");
+ }
+
+ /* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently
+ * trustworthy. */
+
+ if (! chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) {
+ /* If we were prepared to authenticate, but we never got an AUTH_CHALLENGE
+ * cell, then we would not previously have sent a NETINFO cell. Do so
+ * now. */
+ if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) {
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (connection_or_set_state_open(chan->conn) < 0) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; but "
+ "was unable to make the OR connection become open.",
+ safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port);
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; OR connection is now "
+ "open, using protocol version %d. Its ID digest is %s. "
+ "Our address is apparently %s.",
+ safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port,
+ (int)(chan->conn->link_proto),
+ hex_str(identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
+ tor_addr_is_null(&my_apparent_addr) ?
+ "<none>" :
+ safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&my_apparent_addr)));
+ }
+ assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(chan->conn),time(NULL));
+ }
+
+ /** Types of certificates that we know how to parse from CERTS cells. Each
+ * type corresponds to a different encoding format. */
+ typedef enum cert_encoding_t {
+ CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN, /**< We don't recognize this. */
+ CERT_ENCODING_X509, /**< It's an RSA key, signed with RSA, encoded in x509.
+ * (Actually, it might not be RSA. We test that later.) */
+ CERT_ENCODING_ED25519, /**< It's something signed with an Ed25519 key,
+ * encoded asa a tor_cert_t.*/
+ CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT, /**< It's an Ed key signed with an RSA key. */
+ } cert_encoding_t;
+
+ /**
+ * Given one of the certificate type codes used in a CERTS cell,
+ * return the corresponding cert_encoding_t that we should use to parse
+ * the certificate.
+ */
+ static cert_encoding_t
+ certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(int typenum)
+ {
+ switch (typenum) {
+ case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK:
+ case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID:
+ case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH:
+ return CERT_ENCODING_X509;
+ case CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN:
+ case CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK:
+ case CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH:
+ return CERT_ENCODING_ED25519;
+ case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID:
+ return CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT;
+ default:
+ return CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Process a CERTS cell from a channel.
+ *
+ * This function is called to process an incoming CERTS cell on a
+ * channel_tls_t:
+ *
+ * If the other side should not have sent us a CERTS cell, or the cell is
+ * malformed, or it is supposed to authenticate the TLS key but it doesn't,
+ * then mark the connection.
+ *
+ * If the cell has a good cert chain and we're doing a v3 handshake, then
+ * store the certificates in or_handshake_state. If this is the client side
+ * of the connection, we then authenticate the server or mark the connection.
+ * If it's the server side, wait for an AUTHENTICATE cell.
+ */
+ STATIC void
+ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
+ {
+ #define MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID
+ /* These arrays will be sparse, since a cert type can be at most one
+ * of ed/x509 */
+ tor_x509_cert_t *x509_certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1];
+ tor_cert_t *ed_certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1];
+ uint8_t *rsa_ed_cc_cert = NULL;
+ size_t rsa_ed_cc_cert_len = 0;
+
+ int n_certs, i;
+ certs_cell_t *cc = NULL;
+
+ int send_netinfo = 0, started_here = 0;
+
+ memset(x509_certs, 0, sizeof(x509_certs));
+ memset(ed_certs, 0, sizeof(ed_certs));
+ tor_assert(cell);
+ tor_assert(chan);
+ tor_assert(chan->conn);
+
+ #define ERR(s) \
+ do { \
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \
+ "Received a bad CERTS cell from %s:%d: %s", \
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \
+ chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \
+ goto err; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ /* Can't use connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(); its conn->tls
+ * check looks like it breaks
+ * test_link_handshake_recv_certs_ok_server(). */
+ started_here = chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here;
+
+ if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
+ ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake!");
+ if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3)
+ ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3");
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell)
+ ERR("We already got one");
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated) {
+ /* Should be unreachable, but let's make sure. */
+ ERR("We're already authenticated!");
+ }
+ if (cell->payload_len < 1)
+ ERR("It had no body");
+ if (cell->circ_id)
+ ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID");
+
+ if (certs_cell_parse(&cc, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0)
+ ERR("It couldn't be parsed.");
+
+ n_certs = cc->n_certs;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n_certs; ++i) {
+ certs_cell_cert_t *c = certs_cell_get_certs(cc, i);
+
+ uint16_t cert_type = c->cert_type;
+ uint16_t cert_len = c->cert_len;
+ uint8_t *cert_body = certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(c);
+
+ if (cert_type > MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED)
+ continue;
+ const cert_encoding_t ct = certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(cert_type);
+ switch (ct) {
+ default:
+ case CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN:
+ break;
+ case CERT_ENCODING_X509: {
+ tor_x509_cert_t *x509_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(cert_body, cert_len);
+ if (!x509_cert) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Received undecodable certificate in CERTS cell from %s:%d",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port);
+ } else {
+ if (x509_certs[cert_type]) {
+ tor_x509_cert_free(x509_cert);
+ ERR("Duplicate x509 certificate");
+ } else {
+ x509_certs[cert_type] = x509_cert;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case CERT_ENCODING_ED25519: {
+ tor_cert_t *ed_cert = tor_cert_parse(cert_body, cert_len);
+ if (!ed_cert) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Received undecodable Ed certificate "
+ "in CERTS cell from %s:%d",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port);
+ } else {
+ if (ed_certs[cert_type]) {
+ tor_cert_free(ed_cert);
+ ERR("Duplicate Ed25519 certificate");
+ } else {
+ ed_certs[cert_type] = ed_cert;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT: {
+ if (rsa_ed_cc_cert) {
+ ERR("Duplicate RSA->Ed25519 crosscert");
+ } else {
+ rsa_ed_cc_cert = tor_memdup(cert_body, cert_len);
+ rsa_ed_cc_cert_len = cert_len;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Move the certificates we (might) want into the handshake_state->certs
+ * structure. */
+ tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID];
+ tor_x509_cert_t *auth_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH];
+ tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK];
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert = auth_cert;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->link_cert = link_cert;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert = id_cert;
+ x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID] =
+ x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH] =
+ x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK] = NULL;
+
+ tor_cert_t *ed_id_sign = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN];
+ tor_cert_t *ed_sign_link = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK];
+ tor_cert_t *ed_sign_auth = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH];
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign = ed_id_sign;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_link = ed_sign_link;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth = ed_sign_auth;
+ ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN] =
+ ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK] =
+ ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH] = NULL;
+
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_rsa_crosscert = rsa_ed_cc_cert;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_rsa_crosscert_len =
+ rsa_ed_cc_cert_len;
+ rsa_ed_cc_cert = NULL;
+
+ int severity;
+ /* Note that this warns more loudly about time and validity if we were
+ * _trying_ to connect to an authority, not necessarily if we _did_ connect
+ * to one. */
+ if (started_here &&
+ router_digest_is_trusted_dir(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->identity_digest))
+ severity = LOG_WARN;
+ else
+ severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN;
+
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *checked_ed_id = NULL;
+ const common_digests_t *checked_rsa_id = NULL;
+ or_handshake_certs_check_both(severity,
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs,
+ chan->conn->tls,
+ time(NULL),
+ &checked_ed_id,
+ &checked_rsa_id);
+
+ if (!checked_rsa_id)
+ ERR("Invalid certificate chain!");
+
+ if (started_here) {
+ /* No more information is needed. */
+
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa = 1;
+ {
+ const common_digests_t *id_digests = checked_rsa_id;
+ crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd;
+ if (!id_digests)
+ ERR("Couldn't compute digests for key in ID cert");
+
+ identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert);
+ if (!identity_rcvd) {
+ ERR("Couldn't get RSA key from ID cert.");
+ }
+ memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id,
+ id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN);
+ channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), identity_rcvd,
+ chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS);
+ crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
+ }
+
+ if (checked_ed_id) {
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519 = 1;
+ memcpy(&chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519_peer_id,
+ checked_ed_id, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t));
+ }
+
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "calling client_learned_peer_id from "
+ "process_certs_cell");
+
+ if (connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(chan->conn,
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id,
+ checked_ed_id) < 0)
+ ERR("Problem setting or checking peer id");
+
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "Got some good certificates from %s:%d: Authenticated it with "
+ "RSA%s",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), chan->conn->base_.port,
+ checked_ed_id ? " and Ed25519" : "");
+
+ if (!public_server_mode(get_options())) {
+ /* If we initiated the connection and we are not a public server, we
+ * aren't planning to authenticate at all. At this point we know who we
+ * are talking to, so we can just send a netinfo now. */
+ send_netinfo = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* We can't call it authenticated till we see an AUTHENTICATE cell. */
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Got some good RSA%s certificates from %s:%d. "
+ "Waiting for AUTHENTICATE.",
+ checked_ed_id ? " and Ed25519" : "",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port);
+ /* XXXX check more stuff? */
+ }
+
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 1;
+
+ if (send_netinfo) {
+ if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ err:
+ for (unsigned u = 0; u < ARRAY_LENGTH(x509_certs); ++u) {
+ tor_x509_cert_free(x509_certs[u]);
+ }
+ for (unsigned u = 0; u < ARRAY_LENGTH(ed_certs); ++u) {
+ tor_cert_free(ed_certs[u]);
+ }
+ tor_free(rsa_ed_cc_cert);
+ certs_cell_free(cc);
+ #undef ERR
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Process an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * This function is called to handle an incoming AUTH_CHALLENGE cell on a
+ * channel_tls_t; if we weren't supposed to get one (for example, because we're
+ * not the originator of the channel), or it's ill-formed, or we aren't doing
+ * a v3 handshake, mark the channel. If the cell is well-formed but we don't
+ * want to authenticate, just drop it. If the cell is well-formed *and* we
+ * want to authenticate, send an AUTHENTICATE cell and then a NETINFO cell.
+ */
+ STATIC void
+ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
+ {
+ int n_types, i, use_type = -1;
+ auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(cell);
+ tor_assert(chan);
+ tor_assert(chan->conn);
+
+ #define ERR(s) \
+ do { \
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \
+ "Received a bad AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: %s", \
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \
+ chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \
+ goto done; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
+ ERR("We're not currently doing a v3 handshake");
+ if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3)
+ ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3");
+ if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here))
+ ERR("We didn't originate this connection");
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge)
+ ERR("We already received one");
+ if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell))
+ ERR("We haven't gotten a CERTS cell yet");
+ if (cell->circ_id)
+ ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID");
+
+ if (auth_challenge_cell_parse(&ac, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0)
+ ERR("It was not well-formed.");
+
+ n_types = ac->n_methods;
+
+ /* Now see if there is an authentication type we can use */
+ for (i = 0; i < n_types; ++i) {
+ uint16_t authtype = auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(ac, i);
+ if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(authtype)) {
+ if (use_type == -1 ||
+ authchallenge_type_is_better(authtype, use_type)) {
+ use_type = authtype;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge = 1;
+
+ if (! public_server_mode(get_options())) {
+ /* If we're not a public server then we don't want to authenticate on a
+ connection we originated, and we already sent a NETINFO cell when we
+ got the CERTS cell. We have nothing more to do. */
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (use_type >= 0) {
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: Sending "
+ "authentication type %d",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port,
+ use_type);
+
+ if (connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(chan->conn, use_type) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR,
+ "Couldn't send authenticate cell");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d, but we don't "
+ "know any of its authentication types. Not authenticating.",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port);
+ }
+
+ if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell");
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ done:
+ auth_challenge_cell_free(ac);
+
+ #undef ERR
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Process an AUTHENTICATE cell from a channel_tls_t.
+ *
+ * If it's ill-formed or we weren't supposed to get one or we're not doing a
+ * v3 handshake, then mark the connection. If it does not authenticate the
+ * other side of the connection successfully (because it isn't signed right,
+ * we didn't get a CERTS cell, etc) mark the connection. Otherwise, accept
+ * the identity of the router on the other side of the connection.
+ */
+ STATIC void
+ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
+ {
+ var_cell_t *expected_cell = NULL;
+ const uint8_t *auth;
+ int authlen;
+ int authtype;
+ int bodylen;
+
+ tor_assert(cell);
+ tor_assert(chan);
+ tor_assert(chan->conn);
+
+ #define ERR(s) \
+ do { \
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \
+ "Received a bad AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d: %s", \
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \
+ chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \
+ connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \
+ var_cell_free(expected_cell); \
+ return; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
+ ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake");
+ if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3)
+ ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3");
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here)
+ ERR("We originated this connection");
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate)
+ ERR("We already got one!");
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated) {
+ /* Should be impossible given other checks */
+ ERR("The peer is already authenticated");
+ }
+ if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell))
+ ERR("We never got a certs cell");
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert == NULL)
+ ERR("We never got an identity certificate");
+ if (cell->payload_len < 4)
+ ERR("Cell was way too short");
+
+ auth = cell->payload;
+ {
+ uint16_t type = ntohs(get_uint16(auth));
+ uint16_t len = ntohs(get_uint16(auth+2));
+ if (4 + len > cell->payload_len)
+ ERR("Authenticator was truncated");
+
+ if (! authchallenge_type_is_supported(type))
+ ERR("Authenticator type was not recognized");
+ authtype = type;
+
+ auth += 4;
+ authlen = len;
+ }
+
+ if (authlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + 1)
+ ERR("Authenticator was too short");
+
+ expected_cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
+ chan->conn, authtype, NULL, NULL, 1);
+ if (! expected_cell)
+ ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body");
+
+ int sig_is_rsa;
+ if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET ||
+ authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705) {
+ bodylen = V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN;
+ sig_is_rsa = 1;
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(authtype == AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705);
+ /* Our earlier check had better have made sure we had room
+ * for an ed25519 sig (inadvertently) */
+ tor_assert(V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN > ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+ bodylen = authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN;
+ sig_is_rsa = 0;
+ }
+ if (expected_cell->payload_len != bodylen+4) {
+ ERR("Expected AUTHENTICATE cell body len not as expected.");
+ }
+
+ /* Length of random part. */
+ if (BUG(bodylen < 24)) {
+ // LCOV_EXCL_START
+ ERR("Bodylen is somehow less than 24, which should really be impossible");
+ // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
+ }
+
+ if (tor_memneq(expected_cell->payload+4, auth, bodylen-24))
+ ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected");
+
+ if (sig_is_rsa) {
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign != NULL)
+ ERR("RSA-signed AUTHENTICATE response provided with an ED25519 cert");
+
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert == NULL)
+ ERR("We never got an RSA authentication certificate");
+
+ crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_cert_get_key(
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert);
+ char d[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ char *signed_data;
+ size_t keysize;
+ int signed_len;
+
+ if (! pk) {
+ ERR("Couldn't get RSA key from AUTH cert.");
+ }
+ crypto_digest256(d, (char*)auth, V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN, DIGEST_SHA256);
+
+ keysize = crypto_pk_keysize(pk);
+ signed_data = tor_malloc(keysize);
+ signed_len = crypto_pk_public_checksig(pk, signed_data, keysize,
+ (char*)auth + V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN,
+ authlen - V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN);
+ crypto_pk_free(pk);
+ if (signed_len < 0) {
+ tor_free(signed_data);
+ ERR("RSA signature wasn't valid");
+ }
+ if (signed_len < DIGEST256_LEN) {
+ tor_free(signed_data);
+ ERR("Not enough data was signed");
+ }
+ /* Note that we deliberately allow *more* than DIGEST256_LEN bytes here,
+ * in case they're later used to hold a SHA3 digest or something. */
+ if (tor_memneq(signed_data, d, DIGEST256_LEN)) {
+ tor_free(signed_data);
+ ERR("Signature did not match data to be signed.");
+ }
+ tor_free(signed_data);
+ } else {
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign == NULL)
+ ERR("We never got an Ed25519 identity certificate.");
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth == NULL)
+ ERR("We never got an Ed25519 authentication certificate.");
+
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *authkey =
+ &chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth->signed_key;
+ ed25519_signature_t sig;
+ tor_assert(authlen > ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+ memcpy(&sig.sig, auth + authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+ if (ed25519_checksig(&sig, auth, authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN, authkey)<0) {
+ ERR("Ed25519 signature wasn't valid.");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Okay, we are authenticated. */
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate = 1;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa = 1;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->digest_received_data = 0;
+ {
+ tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert;
+ crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert);
+ const common_digests_t *id_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_identity_received = NULL;
+
+ if (! sig_is_rsa) {
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519 = 1;
+ ed_identity_received =
+ &chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign->signing_key;
+ memcpy(&chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519_peer_id,
+ ed_identity_received, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t));
+ }
+
+ /* This must exist; we checked key type when reading the cert. */
+ tor_assert(id_digests);
+
+ memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id,
+ id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), identity_rcvd,
+ chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS);
+ crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
+
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "Calling connection_or_init_conn_from_address for %s "
+ " from %s, with%s ed25519 id.",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ __func__,
+ ed_identity_received ? "" : "out");
+
+ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn,
+ &(chan->conn->base_.addr),
+ chan->conn->base_.port,
+ (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
+ authenticated_rsa_peer_id),
+ ed_identity_received,
+ 0);
+
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "Got an AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d, type %d: Looks good.",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port,
+ authtype);
+ }
+
+ var_cell_free(expected_cell);
+
+ #undef ERR
+ }
