commit ed62f0fa151f7a21a9634fbec1e95832ddbede94
Merge: 98755cbdd 3e64553f7
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org>
Date: Thu Jan 3 09:02:39 2019 -0500
Merge branch 'maint-0.3.4' into maint-0.3.5
changes/ticket28973 | 6 ++++++
src/core/or/connection_or.c | 16 +++++++++------
src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --cc src/core/or/connection_or.c
index 65f4e28c9,000000000..e6f04259f
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/core/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/core/or/connection_or.c
@@@ -1,3022 -1,0 +1,3026 @@@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file connection_or.c
+ * \brief Functions to handle OR connections, TLS handshaking, and
+ * cells on the network.
+ *
+ * An or_connection_t is a subtype of connection_t (as implemented in
+ * connection.c) that uses a TLS connection to send and receive cells on the
+ * Tor network. (By sending and receiving cells connection_or.c, it cooperates
+ * with channeltls.c to implement a the channel interface of channel.c.)
+ *
+ * Every OR connection has an underlying tortls_t object (as implemented in
+ * tortls.c) which it uses as its TLS stream. It is responsible for
+ * sending and receiving cells over that TLS.
+ *
+ * This module also implements the client side of the v3 Tor link handshake,
+ **/
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "feature/client/bridges.h"
+#include "lib/container/buffers.h"
+/*
+ * Define this so we get channel internal functions, since we're implementing
+ * part of a subclass (channel_tls_t).
+ */
+#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_
+#define CONNECTION_OR_PRIVATE
+#include "core/or/channel.h"
+#include "core/or/channeltls.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitstats.h"
+#include "core/or/command.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
+#include "core/or/connection_or.h"
+#include "feature/control/control.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/reachability.h"
+#include "feature/client/entrynodes.h"
+#include "lib/geoip/geoip.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
+#include "trunnel/link_handshake.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/microdesc.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+#include "core/proto/proto_cell.h"
+#include "core/or/reasons.h"
+#include "core/or/relay.h"
+#include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h"
+#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
+#include "feature/relay/ext_orport.h"
+#include "core/or/scheduler.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+#include "core/or/channelpadding.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h"
+
+#include "core/or/cell_st.h"
+#include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h"
+#include "core/or/or_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h"
+#include "core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h"
+#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
+#include "core/or/var_cell_st.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
+
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+
+static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn);
+static int connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn);
+static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn);
+static int connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
+ int started_here,
+ char *digest_rcvd_out);
+
+static void connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn);
+
+static unsigned int
+connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn);
+static void connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn);
+
+/*
+ * Call this when changing connection state, so notifications to the owning
+ * channel can be handled.
+ */
+
+static void connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state);
+
+static void connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn,
+ int started_here);
+
+/**************************************************************/
+
+/** Convert a connection_t* to an or_connection_t*; assert if the cast is
+ * invalid. */
+or_connection_t *
+TO_OR_CONN(connection_t *c)
+{
+ tor_assert(c->magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
+ return DOWNCAST(or_connection_t, c);
+}
+
+/** Global map between Extended ORPort identifiers and OR
+ * connections. */
+static digestmap_t *orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL;
+
+/** Clear clear conn->identity_digest and update other data
+ * structures as appropriate.*/
+void
+connection_or_clear_identity(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ memset(conn->identity_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
+}
+
+/** Clear all identities in OR conns.*/
+void
+connection_or_clear_identity_map(void)
+{
+ smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn,
+ {
+ if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
+ connection_or_clear_identity(TO_OR_CONN(conn));
+ }
+ });
+}
+
+/** Change conn->identity_digest to digest, and add conn into
+ * the appropriate digest maps.
+ *
+ * NOTE that this function only allows two kinds of transitions: from
+ * unset identity to set identity, and from idempotent re-settings
+ * of the same identity. It's not allowed to clear an identity or to
+ * change an identity. Return 0 on success, and -1 if the transition
+ * is not allowed.
+ **/
+static void
+connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn,
+ const char *rsa_digest,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
+{
+ channel_t *chan = NULL;
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ tor_assert(rsa_digest);
+
+ if (conn->chan)
+ chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
+
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Set identity digest for %p (%s): %s %s.",
+ conn,
+ escaped_safe_str(conn->base_.address),
+ hex_str(rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
+ ed25519_fmt(ed_id));
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, " (Previously: %s %s)",
+ hex_str(conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
+ chan ? ed25519_fmt(&chan->ed25519_identity) : "<null>");
+
+ const int rsa_id_was_set = ! tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest);
+ const int ed_id_was_set =
+ chan && !ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&chan->ed25519_identity);
+ const int rsa_changed =
+ tor_memneq(conn->identity_digest, rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ const int ed_changed = ed_id_was_set &&
+ (!ed_id || !ed25519_pubkey_eq(ed_id, &chan->ed25519_identity));
+
+ tor_assert(!rsa_changed || !rsa_id_was_set);
+ tor_assert(!ed_changed || !ed_id_was_set);
+
+ if (!rsa_changed && !ed_changed)
+ return;
+
+ /* If the identity was set previously, remove the old mapping. */
+ if (rsa_id_was_set) {
+ connection_or_clear_identity(conn);
+ if (chan)
+ channel_clear_identity_digest(chan);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(conn->identity_digest, rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ /* If we're initializing the IDs to zero, don't add a mapping yet. */
+ if (tor_digest_is_zero(rsa_digest) &&
+ (!ed_id || ed25519_public_key_is_zero(ed_id)))
+ return;
+
+ /* Deal with channels */
+ if (chan)
+ channel_set_identity_digest(chan, rsa_digest, ed_id);
+}
+
+/** Remove the Extended ORPort identifier of <b>conn</b> from the
+ * global identifier list. Also, clear the identifier from the
+ * connection itself. */
+void
+connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ or_connection_t *tmp;
+ if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
+ return;
+ if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id)
+ return;
+
+ tmp = digestmap_remove(orconn_ext_or_id_map, conn->ext_or_conn_id);
+ if (!tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id))
+ tor_assert(tmp == conn);
+
+ memset(conn->ext_or_conn_id, 0, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
+}
+
+/** Return the connection whose ext_or_id is <b>id</b>. Return NULL if no such
+ * connection is found. */
+or_connection_t *
+connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(const char *id)
+{
+ if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
+ return NULL;
+ return digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, id);
+}
+
+/** Deallocate the global Extended ORPort identifier list */
+void
+connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map(void)
+{
+ digestmap_free(orconn_ext_or_id_map, NULL);
+ orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL;
+}
+
+/** Creates an Extended ORPort identifier for <b>conn</b> and deposits
+ * it into the global list of identifiers. */
+void
+connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ char random_id[EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN];
+ or_connection_t *tmp;
+
+ if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
+ orconn_ext_or_id_map = digestmap_new();
+
+ /* Remove any previous identifiers: */
+ if (conn->ext_or_conn_id && !tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id))
+ connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(conn);
+
+ do {
+ crypto_rand(random_id, sizeof(random_id));
+ } while (digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id));
+
+ if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id)
+ conn->ext_or_conn_id = tor_malloc_zero(EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
+
+ memcpy(conn->ext_or_conn_id, random_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
+
+ tmp = digestmap_set(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id, conn);
+ tor_assert(!tmp);
+}
+
+/**************************************************************/
+
+/** Map from a string describing what a non-open OR connection was doing when
+ * failed, to an intptr_t describing the count of connections that failed that
+ * way. Note that the count is stored _as_ the pointer.
+ */
+static strmap_t *broken_connection_counts;
+
+/** If true, do not record information in <b>broken_connection_counts</b>. */
+static int disable_broken_connection_counts = 0;
+
+/** Record that an OR connection failed in <b>state</b>. */
+static void
+note_broken_connection(const char *state)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ intptr_t val;
+ if (disable_broken_connection_counts)
+ return;
+
+ if (!broken_connection_counts)
+ broken_connection_counts = strmap_new();
+
+ ptr = strmap_get(broken_connection_counts, state);
+ val = (intptr_t)ptr;
+ val++;
+ ptr = (void*)val;
+ strmap_set(broken_connection_counts, state, ptr);
+}
+
+/** Forget all recorded states for failed connections. If
+ * <b>stop_recording</b> is true, don't record any more. */
+void
+clear_broken_connection_map(int stop_recording)
+{
+ if (broken_connection_counts)
+ strmap_free(broken_connection_counts, NULL);
+ broken_connection_counts = NULL;
+ if (stop_recording)
+ disable_broken_connection_counts = 1;
+}
+
+/** Write a detailed description the state of <b>orconn</b> into the
+ * <b>buflen</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>. This description includes not
+ * only the OR-conn level state but also the TLS state. It's useful for
+ * diagnosing broken handshakes. */
+static void
+connection_or_get_state_description(or_connection_t *orconn,
+ char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(orconn);
+ const char *conn_state;
+ char tls_state[256];
+
+ tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR);
+
+ conn_state = conn_state_to_string(conn->type, conn->state);
+ tor_tls_get_state_description(orconn->tls, tls_state, sizeof(tls_state));
+
+ tor_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s with SSL state %s", conn_state, tls_state);
+}
+
+/** Record the current state of <b>orconn</b> as the state of a broken
+ * connection. */
+static void
+connection_or_note_state_when_broken(or_connection_t *orconn)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ if (disable_broken_connection_counts)
+ return;
+ connection_or_get_state_description(orconn, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Connection died in state '%s'", buf);
+ note_broken_connection(buf);
+}
+
+/** Helper type used to sort connection states and find the most frequent. */
+typedef struct broken_state_count_t {
+ intptr_t count;
+ const char *state;
+} broken_state_count_t;
+
+/** Helper function used to sort broken_state_count_t by frequency. */
+static int
+broken_state_count_compare(const void **a_ptr, const void **b_ptr)
+{
+ const broken_state_count_t *a = *a_ptr, *b = *b_ptr;
+ if (b->count < a->count)
+ return -1;
+ else if (b->count == a->count)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Upper limit on the number of different states to report for connection
+ * failure. */
+#define MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT 10
+
+/** Report a list of the top states for failed OR connections at log level
+ * <b>severity</b>, in log domain <b>domain</b>. */
+void
+connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain)
+{
+ int total = 0;
+ smartlist_t *items;
+
+ if (!broken_connection_counts || disable_broken_connection_counts)
+ return;
+
+ items = smartlist_new();
+ STRMAP_FOREACH(broken_connection_counts, state, void *, countptr) {
+ broken_state_count_t *c = tor_malloc(sizeof(broken_state_count_t));
+ c->count = (intptr_t)countptr;
+ total += (int)c->count;
+ c->state = state;
+ smartlist_add(items, c);
+ } STRMAP_FOREACH_END;
+
+ smartlist_sort(items, broken_state_count_compare);
+
+ tor_log(severity, domain, "%d connections have failed%s", total,
+ smartlist_len(items) > MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT ? ". Top reasons:" : ":");
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(items, const broken_state_count_t *, c) {
+ if (c_sl_idx > MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT)
+ break;
+ tor_log(severity, domain,
+ " %d connections died in state %s", (int)c->count, c->state);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(c);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(items, broken_state_count_t *, c, tor_free(c));
+ smartlist_free(items);
+}
+
+/** Call this to change or_connection_t states, so the owning channel_tls_t can
+ * be notified.
+ */
+
+static void
+connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
+{
+ uint8_t old_state;
+
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ old_state = conn->base_.state;
+ conn->base_.state = state;
+
+ if (conn->chan)
+ channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(conn->chan, conn,
+ old_state, state);
+}
+
+/** Return the number of circuits using an or_connection_t; this used to
+ * be an or_connection_t field, but it got moved to channel_t and we
+ * shouldn't maintain two copies. */
+
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+connection_or_get_num_circuits, (or_connection_t *conn))
+{
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ if (conn->chan) {
+ return channel_num_circuits(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+ } else return 0;
+}
+
+/**************************************************************/
+
+/** Pack the cell_t host-order structure <b>src</b> into network-order
+ * in the buffer <b>dest</b>. See tor-spec.txt for details about the
+ * wire format.
+ *
+ * Note that this function doesn't touch <b>dst</b>-\>next: the caller
+ * should set it or clear it as appropriate.
+ */
+void
+cell_pack(packed_cell_t *dst, const cell_t *src, int wide_circ_ids)
+{
+ char *dest = dst->body;
+ if (wide_circ_ids) {
+ set_uint32(dest, htonl(src->circ_id));
+ dest += 4;
+ } else {
+ /* Clear the last two bytes of dest, in case we can accidentally
+ * send them to the network somehow. */
+ memset(dest+CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE-2, 0, 2);
+ set_uint16(dest, htons(src->circ_id));
+ dest += 2;
+ }
+ set_uint8(dest, src->command);
+ memcpy(dest+1, src->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
+}
+
+/** Unpack the network-order buffer <b>src</b> into a host-order
+ * cell_t structure <b>dest</b>.
+ */
+static void
+cell_unpack(cell_t *dest, const char *src, int wide_circ_ids)
+{
+ if (wide_circ_ids) {
+ dest->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(src));
+ src += 4;
+ } else {
+ dest->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(src));
+ src += 2;
+ }
+ dest->command = get_uint8(src);
+ memcpy(dest->payload, src+1, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
+}
+
+/** Write the header of <b>cell</b> into the first VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE
+ * bytes of <b>hdr_out</b>. Returns number of bytes used. */
+int
+var_cell_pack_header(const var_cell_t *cell, char *hdr_out, int wide_circ_ids)
+{
+ int r;
+ if (wide_circ_ids) {
+ set_uint32(hdr_out, htonl(cell->circ_id));
+ hdr_out += 4;
+ r = VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE;
+ } else {
+ set_uint16(hdr_out, htons(cell->circ_id));
+ hdr_out += 2;
+ r = VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE - 2;
+ }
+ set_uint8(hdr_out, cell->command);
+ set_uint16(hdr_out+1, htons(cell->payload_len));
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Allocate and return a new var_cell_t with <b>payload_len</b> bytes of
+ * payload space. */
+var_cell_t *
+var_cell_new(uint16_t payload_len)
+{
+ size_t size = offsetof(var_cell_t, payload) + payload_len;
+ var_cell_t *cell = tor_malloc_zero(size);
+ cell->payload_len = payload_len;
+ cell->command = 0;
+ cell->circ_id = 0;
+ return cell;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Copy a var_cell_t
+ */
+
+var_cell_t *
+var_cell_copy(const var_cell_t *src)
+{
+ var_cell_t *copy = NULL;
+ size_t size = 0;
+
+ if (src != NULL) {
+ size = offsetof(var_cell_t, payload) + src->payload_len;
+ copy = tor_malloc_zero(size);
+ copy->payload_len = src->payload_len;
+ copy->command = src->command;
+ copy->circ_id = src->circ_id;
+ memcpy(copy->payload, src->payload, copy->payload_len);
+ }
+
+ return copy;
+}
+
+/** Release all space held by <b>cell</b>. */
+void
+var_cell_free_(var_cell_t *cell)
+{
+ tor_free(cell);
+}
+
+/** We've received an EOF from <b>conn</b>. Mark it for close and return. */
+int
+connection_or_reached_eof(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ log_info(LD_OR,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
+ connection_or_close_normally(conn, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Handle any new bytes that have come in on connection <b>conn</b>.
+ * If conn is in 'open' state, hand it to
+ * connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf()
+ * (else do nothing).
+ */
+int
+connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ /** Don't let the inbuf of a nonopen OR connection grow beyond this many
+ * bytes: it's either a broken client, a non-Tor client, or a DOS
+ * attempt. */
+#define MAX_OR_INBUF_WHEN_NONOPEN 0
+
+ int ret = 0;
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ switch (conn->base_.state) {
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING:
+ ret = connection_read_proxy_handshake(TO_CONN(conn));
+
+ /* start TLS after handshake completion, or deal with error */
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ tor_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state == PROXY_CONNECTED);
+ if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0)
+ ret = -1;
+ /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
+ if (conn->chan)
+ channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING:
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
+ return connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(conn);
+ default:
+ break; /* don't do anything */
+ }
+
+ /* This check was necessary with 0.2.2, when the TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING
+ * check would otherwise just let data accumulate. It serves no purpose
+ * in 0.2.3.
+ *
+ * XXXX Remove this check once we verify that the above paragraph is
+ * 100% true. */
+ if (buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf) > MAX_OR_INBUF_WHEN_NONOPEN) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Accumulated too much data (%d bytes) "
+ "on nonopen OR connection %s %s:%u in state %s; closing.",
+ (int)buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf),
+ connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn) ? "to" : "from",
+ conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port,
+ conn_state_to_string(conn->base_.type, conn->base_.state));
+ connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/** Called whenever we have flushed some data on an or_conn: add more data
+ * from active circuits. */
+int
+connection_or_flushed_some(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ size_t datalen;
+
+ /* Update the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
+ if (conn->chan)
+ channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+
+ /* If we're under the low water mark, add cells until we're just over the
+ * high water mark. */
+ datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
+ if (datalen < OR_CONN_LOWWATER) {
+ /* Let the scheduler know */
+ scheduler_channel_wants_writes(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** This is for channeltls.c to ask how many cells we could accept if
+ * they were available. */
+ssize_t
+connection_or_num_cells_writeable(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ size_t datalen, cell_network_size;
+ ssize_t n = 0;
+
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If we're under the high water mark, we're potentially
+ * writeable; note this is different from the calculation above
+ * used to trigger when to start writing after we've stopped.
+ */
+ datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
+ if (datalen < OR_CONN_HIGHWATER) {
+ cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
+ n = CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - datalen, cell_network_size);
+ }
+
+ return n;
+}
+
+/** Connection <b>conn</b> has finished writing and has no bytes left on
+ * its outbuf.
+ *
+ * Otherwise it's in state "open": stop writing and return.
+ *
+ * If <b>conn</b> is broken, mark it for close and return -1, else
+ * return 0.
+ */
+int
+connection_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn),0);
+
+ switch (conn->base_.state) {
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING:
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_err(LD_BUG,"Called in unexpected state %d.", conn->base_.state);
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Update the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
+ if (conn->chan)
+ channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Connected handler for OR connections: begin the TLS handshake.
+ */
+int
+connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn)
+{
+ const int proxy_type = or_conn->proxy_type;
+ connection_t *conn;
+
+ tor_assert(or_conn);
+ conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
+ tor_assert(conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
+
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"OR connect() to router at %s:%u finished.",
+ conn->address,conn->port);
+ control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE, 0);
+ control_event_boot_first_orconn();
+
+ if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
+ /* start proxy handshake */
+ if (connection_proxy_connect(conn, proxy_type) < 0) {
+ connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ connection_start_reading(conn);
+ connection_or_change_state(or_conn, OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (connection_tls_start_handshake(or_conn, 0) < 0) {
+ /* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
+ connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Called when we're about to finally unlink and free an OR connection:
+ * perform necessary accounting and cleanup */
+void
+connection_or_about_to_close(or_connection_t *or_conn)
+{
+ connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
+
+ /* Tell the controlling channel we're closed */
+ if (or_conn->chan) {
+ channel_closed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
+ /*
+ * NULL this out because the channel might hang around a little
+ * longer before channel_run_cleanup() gets it.
+ */
+ or_conn->chan->conn = NULL;
+ or_conn->chan = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Remember why we're closing this connection. */
+ if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
+ /* now mark things down as needed */
+ if (connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_conn)) {
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ connection_or_note_state_when_broken(or_conn);
+ /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */
+ entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
+ if (conn->state >= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
+ int reason = tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error);
+ control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
+ reason);
+ if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
+ control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(
+ orconn_end_reason_to_control_string(reason),
+ reason, or_conn);
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (conn->hold_open_until_flushed) {
+ /* We only set hold_open_until_flushed when we're intentionally
+ * closing a connection. */
+ control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED,
+ tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error));
+ } else if (!tor_digest_is_zero(or_conn->identity_digest)) {
+ control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED,
+ tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error));
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if identity digest <b>id_digest</b> is known to be a
+ * currently or recently running relay. Otherwise return 0. */
+int
+connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(const char *id_digest)
+{
+ if (router_get_consensus_status_by_id(id_digest))
+ return 1; /* It's in the consensus: "yes" */
+ if (router_get_by_id_digest(id_digest))
+ return 1; /* Not in the consensus, but we have a descriptor for
+ * it. Probably it was in a recent consensus. "Yes". */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Set the per-conn read and write limits for <b>conn</b>. If it's a known
+ * relay, we will rely on the global read and write buckets, so give it
+ * per-conn limits that are big enough they'll never matter. But if it's
+ * not a known relay, first check if we set PerConnBwRate/Burst, then
+ * check if the consensus sets them, else default to 'big enough'.
+ *
+ * If <b>reset</b> is true, set the bucket to be full. Otherwise, just
+ * clip the bucket if it happens to be <em>too</em> full.
+ */
+static void
+connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(or_connection_t *conn, int reset,
+ const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ int rate, burst; /* per-connection rate limiting params */
+ if (connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(conn->identity_digest)) {
+ /* It's in the consensus, or we have a descriptor for it meaning it
+ * was probably in a recent consensus. It's a recognized relay:
+ * give it full bandwidth. */
+ rate = (int)options->BandwidthRate;
+ burst = (int)options->BandwidthBurst;
+ } else {
+ /* Not a recognized relay. Squeeze it down based on the suggested
+ * bandwidth parameters in the consensus, but allow local config
+ * options to override. */
+ rate = options->PerConnBWRate ? (int)options->PerConnBWRate :
+ networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "perconnbwrate",
+ (int)options->BandwidthRate, 1, INT32_MAX);
+ burst = options->PerConnBWBurst ? (int)options->PerConnBWBurst :
+ networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "perconnbwburst",
+ (int)options->BandwidthBurst, 1, INT32_MAX);
+ }
+
+ token_bucket_rw_adjust(&conn->bucket, rate, burst);
+ if (reset) {
+ token_bucket_rw_reset(&conn->bucket, monotime_coarse_get_stamp());
+ }
+}
+
+/** Either our set of relays or our per-conn rate limits have changed.
+ * Go through all the OR connections and update their token buckets to make
+ * sure they don't exceed their maximum values. */
+void
+connection_or_update_token_buckets(smartlist_t *conns,
+ const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn,
+ {
+ if (connection_speaks_cells(conn))
+ connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 0, options);
+ });
+}
+
+/* Mark <b>or_conn</b> as canonical if <b>is_canonical</b> is set, and
+ * non-canonical otherwise. Adjust idle_timeout accordingly.
+ */
+void
+connection_or_set_canonical(or_connection_t *or_conn,
+ int is_canonical)
+{
+ if (bool_eq(is_canonical, or_conn->is_canonical) &&
+ or_conn->idle_timeout != 0) {
+ /* Don't recalculate an existing idle_timeout unless the canonical
+ * status changed. */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ or_conn->is_canonical = !! is_canonical; /* force to a 1-bit boolean */
+ or_conn->idle_timeout = channelpadding_get_channel_idle_timeout(
+ TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan), is_canonical);
+
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Channel %"PRIu64 " chose an idle timeout of %d.",
+ or_conn->chan ?
+ (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan)->global_identifier):0,
+ or_conn->idle_timeout);
+}
+
+/** If we don't necessarily know the router we're connecting to, but we
+ * have an addr/port/id_digest, then fill in as much as we can. Start
+ * by checking to see if this describes a router we know.
+ * <b>started_here</b> is 1 if we are the initiator of <b>conn</b> and
+ * 0 if it's an incoming connection. */
+void
+connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn,
+ const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
+ const char *id_digest,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id,
+ int started_here)
+{
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "init conn from address %s: %s, %s (%d)",
+ fmt_addr(addr),
+ hex_str((const char*)id_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
+ ed25519_fmt(ed_id),
+ started_here);
+
+ connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn, id_digest, ed_id);
+ connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(conn, 1, get_options());
+
+ conn->base_.port = port;
+ tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, addr);
+ tor_addr_copy(&conn->real_addr, addr);
+
+ connection_or_check_canonicity(conn, started_here);
+}
+
+/** Check whether the identity of <b>conn</b> matches a known node. If it
+ * does, check whether the address of conn matches the expected address, and
+ * update the connection's is_canonical flag, nickname, and address fields as
+ * appropriate. */
+static void
+connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
+{
+ const char *id_digest = conn->identity_digest;
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id = NULL;
+ const tor_addr_t *addr = &conn->real_addr;
+ if (conn->chan)
+ ed_id = & TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->ed25519_identity;
+
+ const node_t *r = node_get_by_id(id_digest);
+ if (r &&
+ node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(r, 1) &&
+ ! node_ed25519_id_matches(r, ed_id)) {
+ /* If this node is capable of proving an ed25519 ID,
+ * we can't call this a canonical connection unless both IDs match. */
+ r = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (r) {
+ tor_addr_port_t node_ap;
+ node_get_pref_orport(r, &node_ap);
+ /* XXXX proposal 186 is making this more complex. For now, a conn
+ is canonical when it uses the _preferred_ address. */
+ if (tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap.addr))
+ connection_or_set_canonical(conn, 1);
+ if (!started_here) {
+ /* Override the addr/port, so our log messages will make sense.
+ * This is dangerous, since if we ever try looking up a conn by
+ * its actual addr/port, we won't remember. Careful! */
+ /* XXXX arma: this is stupid, and it's the reason we need real_addr
+ * to track is_canonical properly. What requires it? */
+ /* XXXX <arma> i believe the reason we did this, originally, is because
+ * we wanted to log what OR a connection was to, and if we logged the
+ * right IP address and port 56244, that wouldn't be as helpful. now we
+ * log the "right" port too, so we know if it's moria1 or moria2.
+ */
+ tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap.addr);
+ conn->base_.port = node_ap.port;
+ }
+ tor_free(conn->nickname);
+ conn->nickname = tor_strdup(node_get_nickname(r));
+ tor_free(conn->base_.address);
+ conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&node_ap.addr);
+ } else {
+ tor_free(conn->nickname);
+ conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
+ conn->nickname[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
+ conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ tor_free(conn->base_.address);
+ conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(addr);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We have to tell channeltls.c to update the channel marks (local, in
+ * particular), since we may have changed the address.
+ */
+
+ if (conn->chan) {
+ channel_tls_update_marks(conn);
+ }
+}
+
+/** These just pass all the is_bad_for_new_circs manipulation on to
+ * channel_t */
+
+static unsigned int
+connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
+{
+ tor_assert(or_conn);
+
+ if (or_conn->chan)
+ return channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
+ else return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
+{
+ tor_assert(or_conn);
+
+ if (or_conn->chan)
+ channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
+}
+
+/** How old do we let a connection to an OR get before deciding it's
+ * too old for new circuits? */
+#define TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD (60*60*24*7)
+
+/** Expire an or_connection if it is too old. Helper for
+ * connection_or_group_set_badness_ and fast path for
+ * channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the connection was already expired, else 0.
+ */
+int
+connection_or_single_set_badness_(time_t now,
+ or_connection_t *or_conn,
+ int force)
+{
+ /* XXXX this function should also be about channels? */
+ if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
+ connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (force ||
+ or_conn->base_.timestamp_created + TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD
+ < now) {
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as too old for new circuits "
+ "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old).",
+ or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
+ (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
+ connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Given a list of all the or_connections with a given
+ * identity, set elements of that list as is_bad_for_new_circs as
+ * appropriate. Helper for connection_or_set_bad_connections().
+ *
+ * Specifically, we set the is_bad_for_new_circs flag on:
+ * - all connections if <b>force</b> is true.
+ * - all connections that are too old.
+ * - all open non-canonical connections for which a canonical connection
+ * exists to the same router.
+ * - all open canonical connections for which a 'better' canonical
+ * connection exists to the same router.
+ * - all open non-canonical connections for which a 'better' non-canonical
+ * connection exists to the same router at the same address.
+ *
+ * See channel_is_better() in channel.c for our idea of what makes one OR
+ * connection better than another.
+ */
+void
+connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force)
+{
+ /* XXXX this function should be entirely about channels, not OR
+ * XXXX connections. */
+
+ or_connection_t *best = NULL;
+ int n_old = 0, n_inprogress = 0, n_canonical = 0, n_other = 0;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+ /* Pass 1: expire everything that's old, and see what the status of
+ * everything else is. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
+ if (connection_or_single_set_badness_(now, or_conn, force))
+ continue;
+
+ if (connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn)) {
+ ++n_old;
+ } else if (or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
+ ++n_inprogress;
+ } else if (or_conn->is_canonical) {
+ ++n_canonical;
+ } else {
+ ++n_other;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
+
+ /* Pass 2: We know how about how good the best connection is.
+ * expire everything that's worse, and find the very best if we can. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
+ if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
+ connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn))
+ continue; /* This one doesn't need to be marked bad. */
+ if (or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
+ continue; /* Don't mark anything bad until we have seen what happens
+ * when the connection finishes. */
+ if (n_canonical && !or_conn->is_canonical) {
+ /* We have at least one open canonical connection to this router,
+ * and this one is open but not canonical. Mark it bad. */
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
+ "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). It is not "
+ "canonical, and we have another connection to that OR that is.",
+ or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
+ (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
+ connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!best ||
+ channel_is_better(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan),
+ TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan))) {
+ best = or_conn;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
+
+ if (!best)
+ return;
+
+ /* Pass 3: One connection to OR is best. If it's canonical, mark as bad
+ * every other open connection. If it's non-canonical, mark as bad
+ * every other open connection to the same address.
+ *
+ * XXXX This isn't optimal; if we have connections to an OR at multiple
+ * addresses, we'd like to pick the best _for each address_, and mark as
+ * bad every open connection that isn't best for its address. But this
+ * can only occur in cases where the other OR is old (so we have no
+ * canonical connection to it), or where all the connections to the OR are
+ * at noncanonical addresses and we have no good direct connection (which
+ * means we aren't at risk of attaching circuits to it anyway). As
+ * 0.1.2.x dies out, the first case will go away, and the second one is
+ * "mostly harmless", so a fix can wait until somebody is bored.
+ */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
+ if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
+ connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn) ||
+ or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
+ continue;
+ if (or_conn != best &&
+ channel_is_better(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan),
+ TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan))) {
+ /* This isn't the best conn, _and_ the best conn is better than it */
+ if (best->is_canonical) {
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
+ "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). "
+ "We have a better canonical one "
+ "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
+ or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
+ (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
+ best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
+ connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
+ } else if (!tor_addr_compare(&or_conn->real_addr,
+ &best->real_addr, CMP_EXACT)) {
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
+ "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). We have a better "
+ "one with the "
+ "same address (fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
+ or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
+ (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
+ best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
+ connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
+ }
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
+}
+
+/* Lifetime of a connection failure. After that, we'll retry. This is in
+ * seconds. */
+#define OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_LIFETIME 60
+/* The interval to use with when to clean up the failure cache. */
+#define OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL 60
+
+/* When is the next time we have to cleanup the failure map. We keep this
+ * because we clean it opportunistically. */
+static time_t or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts = 0;
+
+/* OR connection failure entry data structure. It is kept in the connection
+ * failure map defined below and indexed by OR identity digest, address and
+ * port.
+ *
+ * We need to identify a connection failure with these three values because we
+ * want to avoid to wrongfully blacklist a relay if someone is trying to
+ * extend to a known identity digest but with the wrong IP/port. For instance,
+ * it can happen if a relay changed its port but the client still has an old
+ * descriptor with the old port. We want to stop connecting to that
+ * IP/port/identity all together, not only the relay identity. */
+typedef struct or_connect_failure_entry_t {
+ HT_ENTRY(or_connect_failure_entry_t) node;
+ /* Identity digest of the connection where it is connecting to. */
+ uint8_t identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ /* This is the connection address from the base connection_t. After the
+ * connection is checked for canonicity, the base address should represent
+ * what we know instead of where we are connecting to. This is what we need
+ * so we can correlate known relays within the consensus. */
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ uint16_t port;
+ /* Last time we were unable to connect. */
+ time_t last_failed_connect_ts;
+} or_connect_failure_entry_t;
+
+/* Map where we keep connection failure entries. They are indexed by addr,
+ * port and identity digest. */
+static HT_HEAD(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t)
+ or_connect_failures_map = HT_INITIALIZER();
+
+/* Helper: Hashtable equal function. Return 1 if equal else 0. */
+static int
+or_connect_failure_ht_eq(const or_connect_failure_entry_t *a,
+ const or_connect_failure_entry_t *b)
+{
+ return fast_memeq(a->identity_digest, b->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) &&
+ tor_addr_eq(&a->addr, &b->addr) &&
+ a->port == b->port;
+}
+
+/* Helper: Return the hash for the hashtable of the given entry. For this
+ * table, it is a combination of address, port and identity digest. */
+static unsigned int
+or_connect_failure_ht_hash(const or_connect_failure_entry_t *entry)
+{
+ size_t offset = 0, addr_size;
+ const void *addr_ptr;
+ /* Largest size is IPv6 and IPv4 is smaller so it is fine. */
+ uint8_t data[16 + sizeof(uint16_t) + DIGEST_LEN];
+
+ /* Get the right address bytes depending on the family. */
+ switch (tor_addr_family(&entry->addr)) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ addr_size = 4;
+ addr_ptr = &entry->addr.addr.in_addr.s_addr;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ addr_size = 16;
+ addr_ptr = &entry->addr.addr.in6_addr.s6_addr;
+ break;
+ default:
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(data, addr_ptr, addr_size);
+ offset += addr_size;
+ memcpy(data + offset, entry->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ offset += DIGEST_LEN;
+ set_uint16(data + offset, entry->port);
+ offset += sizeof(uint16_t);
+
+ return (unsigned int) siphash24g(data, offset);
+}
+
+HT_PROTOTYPE(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node,
+ or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq)
+
+HT_GENERATE2(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node,
+ or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq,
+ 0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_)
+
+/* Initialize a given connect failure entry with the given identity_digest,
+ * addr and port. All field are optional except ocf. */
+static void
+or_connect_failure_init(const char *identity_digest, const tor_addr_t *addr,
+ uint16_t port, or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf)
+{
+ tor_assert(ocf);
+ if (identity_digest) {
+ memcpy(ocf->identity_digest, identity_digest,
+ sizeof(ocf->identity_digest));
+ }
+ if (addr) {
+ tor_addr_copy(&ocf->addr, addr);
+ }
+ ocf->port = port;
+}
+
+/* Return a newly allocated connection failure entry. It is initialized with
+ * the given or_conn data. This can't fail. */
+static or_connect_failure_entry_t *
+or_connect_failure_new(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
+{
+ or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ocf));
+ or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &or_conn->real_addr,
+ TO_CONN(or_conn)->port, ocf);
+ return ocf;
+}
+
+/* Return a connection failure entry matching the given or_conn. NULL is
+ * returned if not found. */
+static or_connect_failure_entry_t *
+or_connect_failure_find(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
+{
+ or_connect_failure_entry_t lookup;
+ tor_assert(or_conn);
+ or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
+ TO_CONN(or_conn)->port, &lookup);
+ return HT_FIND(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, &lookup);
+}
+
+/* Note down in the connection failure cache that a failure occurred on the
+ * given or_conn. */
+STATIC void
+note_or_connect_failed(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
+{
+ or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(or_conn);
+
+ ocf = or_connect_failure_find(or_conn);
+ if (ocf == NULL) {
+ ocf = or_connect_failure_new(or_conn);
+ HT_INSERT(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ocf);
+ }
+ ocf->last_failed_connect_ts = approx_time();
+}
+
+/* Cleanup the connection failure cache and remove all entries below the
+ * given cutoff. */
+static void
+or_connect_failure_map_cleanup(time_t cutoff)
+{
+ or_connect_failure_entry_t **ptr, **next, *entry;
+
+ for (ptr = HT_START(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map);
+ ptr != NULL; ptr = next) {
+ entry = *ptr;
+ if (entry->last_failed_connect_ts <= cutoff) {
+ next = HT_NEXT_RMV(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ptr);
+ tor_free(entry);
+ } else {
+ next = HT_NEXT(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ptr);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return true iff the given OR connection can connect to its destination that
+ * is the triplet identity_digest, address and port.
+ *
+ * The or_conn MUST have gone through connection_or_check_canonicity() so the
+ * base address is properly set to what we know or doesn't know. */
+STATIC int
+should_connect_to_relay(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
+{
+ time_t now, cutoff;
+ time_t connect_failed_since_ts = 0;
+ or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf;
+
+ tor_assert(or_conn);
+
+ now = approx_time();
+ cutoff = now - OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_LIFETIME;
+
+ /* Opportunistically try to cleanup the failure cache. We do that at regular
+ * interval so it doesn't grow too big. */
+ if (or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts <= now) {
+ or_connect_failure_map_cleanup(cutoff);
+ or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts =
+ now + OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Look if we have failed previously to the same destination as this
+ * OR connection. */
+ ocf = or_connect_failure_find(or_conn);
+ if (ocf) {
+ connect_failed_since_ts = ocf->last_failed_connect_ts;
+ }
+ /* If we do have an unable to connect timestamp and it is below cutoff, we
+ * can connect. Or we have never failed before so let it connect. */
+ if (connect_failed_since_ts > cutoff) {
+ goto no_connect;
+ }
+
+ /* Ok we can connect! */
+ return 1;
+ no_connect:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** <b>conn</b> is in the 'connecting' state, and it failed to complete
+ * a TCP connection. Send notifications appropriately.
+ *
+ * <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
+ * <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
+ */
+void
+connection_or_connect_failed(or_connection_t *conn,
+ int reason, const char *msg)
+{
+ control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, reason);
+ if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(get_options()))
+ control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(msg, reason, conn);
+ note_or_connect_failed(conn);
+}
+
+/** <b>conn</b> got an error in connection_handle_read_impl() or
+ * connection_handle_write_impl() and is going to die soon.
+ *
+ * <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
+ * <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
+ */
+void
+connection_or_notify_error(or_connection_t *conn,
+ int reason, const char *msg)
+{
+ channel_t *chan;
+
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ /* If we're connecting, call connect_failed() too */
+ if (TO_CONN(conn)->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING)
+ connection_or_connect_failed(conn, reason, msg);
+
+ /* Tell the controlling channel if we have one */
+ if (conn->chan) {
+ chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
+ /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
+ if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
+ channel_close_for_error(chan);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* No need to mark for error because connection.c is about to do that */
+}
+
+/** Launch a new OR connection to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> and expect to
+ * handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>. Optionally,
+ * pass in a pointer to a channel using this connection.
+ *
+ * If <b>id_digest</b> is me, do nothing. If we're already connected to it,
+ * return that connection. If the connect() is in progress, set the
+ * new conn's state to 'connecting' and return it. If connect() succeeds,
+ * call connection_tls_start_handshake() on it.
+ *
+ * This function is called from router_retry_connections(), for
+ * ORs connecting to ORs, and circuit_establish_circuit(), for
+ * OPs connecting to ORs.
+ *
+ * Return the launched conn, or NULL if it failed.
+ */
+
+MOCK_IMPL(or_connection_t *,
+connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
+ const char *id_digest,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id,
+ channel_tls_t *chan))
+{
+ or_connection_t *conn;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ int socket_error = 0;
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+
+ int r;
+ tor_addr_t proxy_addr;
+ uint16_t proxy_port;
+ int proxy_type;
+
+ tor_assert(_addr);
+ tor_assert(id_digest);
+ tor_addr_copy(&addr, _addr);
+
+ if (server_mode(options) && router_digest_is_me(id_digest)) {
+ log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself. Refusing.");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (server_mode(options) && router_ed25519_id_is_me(ed_id)) {
+ log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself by Ed25519 "
+ "identity. Refusing.");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ conn = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, tor_addr_family(&addr));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember for channels
+ *
+ * This stuff needs to happen before connection_or_init_conn_from_address()
+ * so connection_or_set_identity_digest() and such know where to look to
+ * keep the channel up to date.
+ */
+ conn->chan = chan;
+ chan->conn = conn;
+ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &addr, port, id_digest, ed_id, 1);
+
+ /* We have a proper OR connection setup, now check if we can connect to it
+ * that is we haven't had a failure earlier. This is to avoid to try to
+ * constantly connect to relays that we think are not reachable. */
+ if (!should_connect_to_relay(conn)) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Can't connect to identity %s at %s:%u because we "
+ "failed earlier. Refusing.",
+ hex_str(id_digest, DIGEST_LEN), fmt_addr(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr),
+ TO_CONN(conn)->port);
+ connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
+ control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
+
+ conn->is_outgoing = 1;
+
+ /* If we are using a proxy server, find it and use it. */
+ r = get_proxy_addrport(&proxy_addr, &proxy_port, &proxy_type, TO_CONN(conn));
+ if (r == 0) {
+ conn->proxy_type = proxy_type;
+ if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
+ tor_addr_copy(&addr, &proxy_addr);
+ port = proxy_port;
+ conn->base_.proxy_state = PROXY_INFANT;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* get_proxy_addrport() might fail if we have a Bridge line that
+ references a transport, but no ClientTransportPlugin lines
+ defining its transport proxy. If this is the case, let's try to
+ output a useful log message to the user. */
+ const char *transport_name =
+ find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr,
+ TO_CONN(conn)->port);
+
+ if (transport_name) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We were supposed to connect to bridge '%s' "
+ "using pluggable transport '%s', but we can't find a pluggable "
+ "transport proxy supporting '%s'. This can happen if you "
+ "haven't provided a ClientTransportPlugin line, or if "
+ "your pluggable transport proxy stopped running.",
+ fmt_addrport(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr, TO_CONN(conn)->port),
+ transport_name, transport_name);
+
+ control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(
+ "Can't connect to bridge",
+ END_OR_CONN_REASON_PT_MISSING,
+ conn);
+
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Tried to connect to '%s' through a proxy, but "
+ "the proxy address could not be found.",
+ fmt_addrport(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr, TO_CONN(conn)->port));
+ }
+
+ connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ switch (connection_connect(TO_CONN(conn), conn->base_.address,
+ &addr, port, &socket_error)) {
+ case -1:
+ /* We failed to establish a connection probably because of a local
+ * error. No need to blame the guard in this case. Notify the networking
+ * system of this failure. */
+ connection_or_connect_failed(conn,
+ errno_to_orconn_end_reason(socket_error),
+ tor_socket_strerror(socket_error));
+ connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return NULL;
+ case 0:
+ connection_watch_events(TO_CONN(conn), READ_EVENT | WRITE_EVENT);
+ /* writable indicates finish, readable indicates broken link,
+ error indicates broken link on windows */
+ return conn;
+ /* case 1: fall through */
+ }
+
+ if (connection_or_finished_connecting(conn) < 0) {
+ /* already marked for close */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return conn;
+}
+
+/** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
+ * the closing state.
+ *
+ * It's safe to call this and connection_or_close_for_error() any time, and
+ * channel layer will treat it as a connection closing for reasons outside
+ * its control, like the remote end closing it. It can also be a local
+ * reason that's specific to connection_t/or_connection_t rather than
+ * the channel mechanism, such as expiration of old connections in
+ * run_connection_housekeeping(). If you want to close a channel_t
+ * from somewhere that logically works in terms of generic channels
+ * rather than connections, use channel_mark_for_close(); see also
+ * the comment on that function in channel.c.
+ */
+
+void
+connection_or_close_normally(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
+{
+ channel_t *chan = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(orconn);
+ if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
+ else connection_mark_for_close_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
+ if (orconn->chan) {
+ chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
+ /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
+ if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
+ channel_close_from_lower_layer(chan);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
+ * the error state.
+ */
+
+MOCK_IMPL(void,
+connection_or_close_for_error,(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush))
+{
+ channel_t *chan = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(orconn);
+ if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
+ else connection_mark_for_close_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
+ if (orconn->chan) {
+ chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
+ /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
+ if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
+ channel_close_for_error(chan);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Begin the tls handshake with <b>conn</b>. <b>receiving</b> is 0 if
+ * we initiated the connection, else it's 1.
+ *
+ * Assign a new tls object to conn->tls, begin reading on <b>conn</b>, and
+ * pass <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_continue_handshake().
+ *
+ * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+connection_tls_start_handshake,(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving))
+{
+ channel_listener_t *chan_listener;
+ channel_t *chan;
+
+ /* Incoming connections will need a new channel passed to the
+ * channel_tls_listener */
+ if (receiving) {
+ /* It shouldn't already be set */
+ tor_assert(!(conn->chan));
+ chan_listener = channel_tls_get_listener();
+ if (!chan_listener) {
+ chan_listener = channel_tls_start_listener();
+ command_setup_listener(chan_listener);
+ }
+ chan = channel_tls_handle_incoming(conn);
+ channel_listener_queue_incoming(chan_listener, chan);
+ }
+
+ connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING);
+ tor_assert(!conn->tls);
+ conn->tls = tor_tls_new(conn->base_.s, receiving);
+ if (!conn->tls) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ tor_tls_set_logged_address(conn->tls, // XXX client and relay?
+ escaped_safe_str(conn->base_.address));
+
+ connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"starting TLS handshake on fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT,
+ conn->base_.s);
+
+ if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Block all future attempts to renegotiate on 'conn' */
+void
+connection_or_block_renegotiation(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ tor_tls_t *tls = conn->tls;
+ if (!tls)
+ return;
+ tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, NULL, NULL);
+ tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tls);
+}
+
+/** Invoked on the server side from inside tor_tls_read() when the server
+ * gets a successful TLS renegotiation from the client. */
+static void
+connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn)
+{
+ or_connection_t *conn = _conn;
+ (void)tls;
+
+ /* Don't invoke this again. */
+ connection_or_block_renegotiation(conn);
+
+ if (connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn) < 0) {
+ /* XXXX_TLS double-check that it's ok to do this from inside read. */
+ /* XXXX_TLS double-check that this verifies certificates. */
+ connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Move forward with the tls handshake. If it finishes, hand
+ * <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_finish_handshake().
+ *
+ * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
+ */
+int
+connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ int result;
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING);
+ // log_notice(LD_OR, "Continue handshake with %p", conn->tls);
+ result = tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls);
+ // log_notice(LD_OR, "Result: %d", result);
+
+ switch (result) {
+ CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY:
+ log_info(LD_OR,"tls error [%s]. breaking connection.",
+ tor_tls_err_to_string(result));
+ return -1;
+ case TOR_TLS_DONE:
+ if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
+ if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) {
+ tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING);
+ return connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(conn);
+ } else {
+ /* v2/v3 handshake, but we are not a client. */
+ log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (server-side). "
+ "Expecting renegotiation or VERSIONS cell");
+ tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls,
+ connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb,
+ conn);
+ connection_or_change_state(conn,
+ OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING);
+ connection_stop_writing(TO_CONN(conn));
+ connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ tor_assert(tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls));
+ return connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn);
+ case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE:
+ connection_start_writing(TO_CONN(conn));
+ log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted write");
+ return 0;
+ case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: /* handshaking conns are *always* reading */
+ log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted read");
+ return 0;
+ case TOR_TLS_CLOSE:
+ log_info(LD_OR,"tls closed. breaking connection.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if we initiated this connection, or 0 if it started
+ * out as an incoming connection.
+ */
+int
+connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ tor_assert(conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_OR ||
+ conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR);
+ if (!conn->tls)
+ return 1; /* it's still in proxy states or something */
+ if (conn->handshake_state)
+ return conn->handshake_state->started_here;
+ return !tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls);
+}
+
+/** <b>Conn</b> just completed its handshake. Return 0 if all is well, and
+ * return -1 if they are lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong.
+ *
+ * If we initiated this connection (<b>started_here</b> is true), make sure
+ * the other side sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the
+ * connection, make sure it's the right relay by checking the certificate.
+ *
+ * Otherwise (if we _didn't_ initiate this connection), it's okay for
+ * the certificate to be weird or absent.
+ *
+ * If we return 0, and the certificate is as expected, write a hash of the
+ * identity key into <b>digest_rcvd_out</b>, which must have DIGEST_LEN
+ * space in it.
+ * If the certificate is invalid or missing on an incoming connection,
+ * we return 0 and set <b>digest_rcvd_out</b> to DIGEST_LEN NUL bytes.
+ * (If we return -1, the contents of this buffer are undefined.)
+ *
+ * As side effects,
+ * 1) Set conn->circ_id_type according to tor-spec.txt.
+ * 2) If we're an authdirserver and we initiated the connection: drop all
+ * descriptors that claim to be on that IP/port but that aren't
+ * this relay; and note that this relay is reachable.
+ * 3) If this is a bridge and we didn't configure its identity
+ * fingerprint, remember the keyid we just learned.
+ */
+static int
+connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
+ int started_here,
+ char *digest_rcvd_out)
+{
+ crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ int severity = server_mode(options) ? LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN : LOG_WARN;
+ const char *safe_address =
+ started_here ? conn->base_.address :
+ safe_str_client(conn->base_.address);
+ const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming";
+ int has_cert = 0;
+
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ has_cert = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls);
+ if (started_here && !has_cert) {
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but it didn't "
+ "send a cert! Closing.",
+ safe_address, conn->base_.port);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (!has_cert) {
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Got incoming connection with no certificate. "
+ "That's ok.");
+ }
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ if (has_cert) {
+ int v = tor_tls_verify(started_here?severity:LOG_INFO,
+ conn->tls, &identity_rcvd);
+ if (started_here && v<0) {
+ log_fn(severity,LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d: It"
+ " has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
+ safe_address, conn->base_.port);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (v<0) {
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Incoming connection gave us an invalid cert "
+ "chain; ignoring.");
+ } else {
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "The certificate seems to be valid on %s connection "
+ "with %s:%d", conn_type, safe_address, conn->base_.port);
+ }
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ }
+
+ if (identity_rcvd) {
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd_out) < 0) {
+ crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ memset(digest_rcvd_out, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
+ }
+
+ tor_assert(conn->chan);
+ channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan), identity_rcvd, 1);
+
+ crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
+
+ if (started_here) {
+ /* A TLS handshake can't teach us an Ed25519 ID, so we set it to NULL
+ * here. */
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Calling client_learned_peer_id from "
+ "check_valid_tls_handshake");
+ return connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(conn,
+ (const uint8_t*)digest_rcvd_out,
+ NULL);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Called when we (as a connection initiator) have definitively,
+ * authenticatedly, learned that ID of the Tor instance on the other
+ * side of <b>conn</b> is <b>rsa_peer_id</b> and optionally <b>ed_peer_id</b>.
+ * For v1 and v2 handshakes,
+ * this is right after we get a certificate chain in a TLS handshake
+ * or renegotiation. For v3+ handshakes, this is right after we get a
+ * certificate chain in a CERTS cell.
+ *
+ * If we did not know the ID before, record the one we got.
+ *
+ * If we wanted an ID, but we didn't get the one we expected, log a message
+ * and return -1.
+ * On relays:
+ * - log a protocol warning whenever the fingerprints don't match;
+ * On clients:
+ * - if a relay's fingerprint doesn't match, log a warning;
+ * - if we don't have updated relay fingerprints from a recent consensus, and
+ * a fallback directory mirror's hard-coded fingerprint has changed, log an
+ * info explaining that we will try another fallback.
+ *
+ * If we're testing reachability, remember what we learned.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn,
+ const uint8_t *rsa_peer_id,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_peer_id)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ channel_tls_t *chan_tls = conn->chan;
+ channel_t *chan = channel_tls_to_base(chan_tls);
+ int changed_identity = 0;
+ tor_assert(chan);
+
+ const int expected_rsa_key =
+ ! tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest);
+ const int expected_ed_key =
+ ! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&chan->ed25519_identity);
+
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "learned peer id for %p (%s): %s, %s",
+ conn,
+ safe_str_client(conn->base_.address),
+ hex_str((const char*)rsa_peer_id, DIGEST_LEN),
+ ed25519_fmt(ed_peer_id));
+
+ if (! expected_rsa_key && ! expected_ed_key) {
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "(we had no ID in mind when we made this "
+ "connection.");
+ connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn,
+ (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
+ tor_free(conn->nickname);
+ conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
+ conn->nickname[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
+ conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Connected to router %s at %s:%d without knowing "
+ "its key. Hoping for the best.",
+ conn->nickname, conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port);
+ /* if it's a bridge and we didn't know its identity fingerprint, now
+ * we do -- remember it for future attempts. */
+ learned_router_identity(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
+ (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
+ changed_identity = 1;
+ }
+
+ const int rsa_mismatch = expected_rsa_key &&
+ tor_memneq(rsa_peer_id, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ /* It only counts as an ed25519 mismatch if we wanted an ed25519 identity
+ * and didn't get it. It's okay if we get one that we didn't ask for. */
+ const int ed25519_mismatch =
+ expected_ed_key &&
+ (ed_peer_id == NULL ||
+ ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&chan->ed25519_identity, ed_peer_id));
+
+ if (rsa_mismatch || ed25519_mismatch) {
+ /* I was aiming for a particular digest. I didn't get it! */
+ char seen_rsa[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ char expected_rsa[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ char seen_ed[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
+ char expected_ed[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
+ base16_encode(seen_rsa, sizeof(seen_rsa),
+ (const char*)rsa_peer_id, DIGEST_LEN);
+ base16_encode(expected_rsa, sizeof(expected_rsa), conn->identity_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+ if (ed_peer_id) {
+ ed25519_public_to_base64(seen_ed, ed_peer_id);
+ } else {
+ strlcpy(seen_ed, "no ed25519 key", sizeof(seen_ed));
+ }
+ if (! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&chan->ed25519_identity)) {
+ ed25519_public_to_base64(expected_ed, &chan->ed25519_identity);
+ } else {
+ strlcpy(expected_ed, "no ed25519 key", sizeof(expected_ed));
+ }
+ const int using_hardcoded_fingerprints =
+ !networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(time(NULL),
+ usable_consensus_flavor());
+ const int is_fallback_fingerprint = router_digest_is_fallback_dir(
+ conn->identity_digest);
+ const int is_authority_fingerprint = router_digest_is_trusted_dir(
+ conn->identity_digest);
+ const int non_anonymous_mode = rend_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options);
+ int severity;
+ const char *extra_log = "";
+
+ /* Relays and Single Onion Services make direct connections using
+ * untrusted authentication keys. */
+ if (server_mode(options) || non_anonymous_mode) {
+ severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN;
+ } else {
+ if (using_hardcoded_fingerprints) {
+ /* We need to do the checks in this order, because the list of
+ * fallbacks includes the list of authorities */
+ if (is_authority_fingerprint) {
+ severity = LOG_WARN;
+ } else if (is_fallback_fingerprint) {
+ /* we expect a small number of fallbacks to change from their
+ * hard-coded fingerprints over the life of a release */
+ severity = LOG_INFO;
+ extra_log = " Tor will try a different fallback.";
+ } else {
+ /* it's a bridge, it's either a misconfiguration, or unexpected */
+ severity = LOG_WARN;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* a relay has changed its fingerprint from the one in the consensus */
+ severity = LOG_WARN;
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_fn(severity, LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but RSA + ed25519 identity "
+ "keys were not as expected: wanted %s + %s but got %s + %s.%s",
+ conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port,
+ expected_rsa, expected_ed, seen_rsa, seen_ed, extra_log);
+
+ /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */
+ entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+ control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
+ END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY);
+ if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
+ control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(
+ "Unexpected identity in router certificate",
+ END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY,
+ conn);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!expected_ed_key && ed_peer_id) {
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "(We had no Ed25519 ID in mind when we made this "
+ "connection.)");
+ connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn,
+ (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
+ changed_identity = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (changed_identity) {
+ /* If we learned an identity for this connection, then we might have
+ * just discovered it to be canonical. */
+ connection_or_check_canonicity(conn, conn->handshake_state->started_here);
+ }
+
+ if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) {
+ dirserv_orconn_tls_done(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
+ (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return when we last used this channel for client activity (origin
+ * circuits). This is called from connection.c, since client_used is now one
+ * of the timestamps in channel_t */
+
+time_t
+connection_or_client_used(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ if (conn->chan) {
+ return channel_when_last_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+ } else return 0;
+}
+
+/** The v1/v2 TLS handshake is finished.
+ *
+ * Make sure we are happy with the peer we just handshaked with.
+ *
+ * If they initiated the connection, make sure they're not already connected,
+ * then initialize conn from the information in router.
+ *
+ * If all is successful, call circuit_n_conn_done() to handle events
+ * that have been pending on the <tls handshake completion. Also set the
+ * directory to be dirty (only matters if I'm an authdirserver).
+ *
+ * If this is a v2 TLS handshake, send a versions cell.
+ */
+static int
+connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN];
+ int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
+
+ tor_assert(!started_here);
+
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"%s tls handshake on %p with %s done, using "
+ "ciphersuite %s. verifying.",
+ started_here?"outgoing":"incoming",
+ conn,
+ safe_str_client(conn->base_.address),
+ tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(conn->tls));
+
+ if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn, started_here,
+ digest_rcvd) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
+
+ if (tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
+ conn->link_proto = 1;
+ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &conn->base_.addr,
+ conn->base_.port, digest_rcvd,
+ NULL, 0);
+ tor_tls_block_renegotiation(conn->tls);
+ rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto(1, started_here);
+ return connection_or_set_state_open(conn);
+ } else {
+ connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2);
+ if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, started_here) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &conn->base_.addr,
+ conn->base_.port, digest_rcvd,
+ NULL, 0);
+ return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Called as client when initial TLS handshake is done, and we notice
+ * that we got a v3-handshake signalling certificate from the server.
+ * Set up structures, do bookkeeping, and send the versions cell.
+ * Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ tor_assert(connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn));
+
+ circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
+
+ connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
+ if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 1);
+}
+
+/** Allocate a new connection handshake state for the connection
+ * <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
+int
+connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
+{
+ or_handshake_state_t *s;
+ if (conn->handshake_state) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Duplicate call to connection_init_or_handshake_state!");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s = conn->handshake_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
+ s->started_here = started_here ? 1 : 0;
+ s->digest_sent_data = 1;
+ s->digest_received_data = 1;
+ if (! started_here && get_current_link_cert_cert()) {
+ s->own_link_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_current_link_cert_cert());
+ }
+ s->certs = or_handshake_certs_new();
+ s->certs->started_here = s->started_here;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Free all storage held by <b>state</b>. */
+void
+or_handshake_state_free_(or_handshake_state_t *state)
+{
+ if (!state)
+ return;
+ crypto_digest_free(state->digest_sent);
+ crypto_digest_free(state->digest_received);
+ or_handshake_certs_free(state->certs);
+ tor_cert_free(state->own_link_cert);
+ memwipe(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
+ tor_free(state);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remember that <b>cell</b> has been transmitted (if <b>incoming</b> is
+ * false) or received (if <b>incoming</b> is true) during a V3 handshake using
+ * <b>state</b>.
+ *
+ * (We don't record the cell, but we keep a digest of everything sent or
+ * received during the v3 handshake, and the client signs it in an
+ * authenticate cell.)
+ */
+void
+or_handshake_state_record_cell(or_connection_t *conn,
+ or_handshake_state_t *state,
+ const cell_t *cell,
+ int incoming)
+{
+ size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
+ crypto_digest_t *d, **dptr;
+ packed_cell_t packed;
+ if (incoming) {
+ if (!state->digest_received_data)
+ return;
+ } else {
+ if (!state->digest_sent_data)
+ return;
+ }
+ if (!incoming) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "We shouldn't be sending any non-variable-length cells "
+ "while making a handshake digest. But we think we are sending "
+ "one with type %d.", (int)cell->command);
+ }
+ dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent;
+ if (! *dptr)
+ *dptr = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
+
+ d = *dptr;
+ /* Re-packing like this is a little inefficient, but we don't have to do
+ this very often at all. */
+ cell_pack(&packed, cell, conn->wide_circ_ids);
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, packed.body, cell_network_size);
+ memwipe(&packed, 0, sizeof(packed));
+}
+
+/** Remember that a variable-length <b>cell</b> has been transmitted (if
+ * <b>incoming</b> is false) or received (if <b>incoming</b> is true) during a
+ * V3 handshake using <b>state</b>.
+ *
+ * (We don't record the cell, but we keep a digest of everything sent or
+ * received during the v3 handshake, and the client signs it in an
+ * authenticate cell.)
+ */
+void
+or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(or_connection_t *conn,
+ or_handshake_state_t *state,
+ const var_cell_t *cell,
+ int incoming)
+{
+ crypto_digest_t *d, **dptr;
+ int n;
+ char buf[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
+ if (incoming) {
+ if (!state->digest_received_data)
+ return;
+ } else {
+ if (!state->digest_sent_data)
+ return;
+ }
+ dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent;
+ if (! *dptr)
+ *dptr = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
+
+ d = *dptr;
+
+ n = var_cell_pack_header(cell, buf, conn->wide_circ_ids);
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, buf, n);
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, (const char *)cell->payload, cell->payload_len);
+
+ memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+/** Set <b>conn</b>'s state to OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN, and tell other subsystems
+ * as appropriate. Called when we are done with all TLS and OR handshaking.
+ */
+int
+connection_or_set_state_open(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN);
+ control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED, 0);
+
+ /* Link protocol 3 appeared in Tor 0.2.3.6-alpha, so any connection
+ * that uses an earlier link protocol should not be treated as a relay. */
+ if (conn->link_proto < 3) {
+ channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+ }
+
+ or_handshake_state_free(conn->handshake_state);
+ conn->handshake_state = NULL;
+ connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Pack <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto <b>conn</b>'s outbuf.
+ * For cells that use or affect a circuit, this should only be called by
+ * connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit().
+ */
+void
+connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ packed_cell_t networkcell;
+ size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
+
+ tor_assert(cell);
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ cell_pack(&networkcell, cell, conn->wide_circ_ids);
+
+ rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL);
+ if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING)
+ rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_CELL);
+
+ connection_buf_add(networkcell.body, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn));
+
+ /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
+ if (conn->chan) {
+ channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+
+ if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->currently_padding) {
+ rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL);
+ if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING)
+ rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
+ or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
+}
+
+/** Pack a variable-length <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto
+ * <b>conn</b>'s outbuf. Right now, this <em>DOES NOT</em> support cells that
+ * affect a circuit.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(void,
+connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf,(const var_cell_t *cell,
+ or_connection_t *conn))
+{
+ int n;
+ char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
+ tor_assert(cell);
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ n = var_cell_pack_header(cell, hdr, conn->wide_circ_ids);
+ connection_buf_add(hdr, n, TO_CONN(conn));
+ connection_buf_add((char*)cell->payload,
+ cell->payload_len, TO_CONN(conn));
+ if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
+ or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
+
+ /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
+ if (conn->chan)
+ channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+}
+
+/** See whether there's a variable-length cell waiting on <b>or_conn</b>'s
+ * inbuf. Return values as for fetch_var_cell_from_buf(). */
+static int
+connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(or_connection_t *or_conn, var_cell_t **out)
+{
+ connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
+ return fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn->inbuf, out, or_conn->link_proto);
+}
+
+/** Process cells from <b>conn</b>'s inbuf.
+ *
+ * Loop: while inbuf contains a cell, pull it off the inbuf, unpack it,
+ * and hand it to command_process_cell().
+ *
+ * Always return 0.
+ */
+static int
+connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ var_cell_t *var_cell;
+
+ /*
+ * Note on memory management for incoming cells: below the channel layer,
+ * we shouldn't need to consider its internal queueing/copying logic. It
+ * is safe to pass cells to it on the stack or on the heap, but in the
+ * latter case we must be sure we free them later.
+ *
+ * The incoming cell queue code in channel.c will (in the common case)
+ * decide it can pass them to the upper layer immediately, in which case
+ * those functions may run directly on the cell pointers we pass here, or
+ * it may decide to queue them, in which case it will allocate its own
+ * buffer and copy the cell.
+ */
+
+ while (1) {
+ log_debug(LD_OR,
+ TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT": starting, inbuf_datalen %d "
+ "(%d pending in tls object).",
+ conn->base_.s,(int)connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)),
+ tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(conn->tls));
+ if (connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn, &var_cell)) {
+ if (!var_cell)
+ return 0; /* not yet. */
+
+ /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
+ if (conn->chan)
+ channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+
+ circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
+ channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell, conn);
+ var_cell_free(var_cell);
+ } else {
+ const int wide_circ_ids = conn->wide_circ_ids;
+ size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
+ char buf[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE];
+ cell_t cell;
+ if (connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn))
+ < cell_network_size) /* whole response available? */
+ return 0; /* not yet */
+
+ /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
+ if (conn->chan)
+ channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
+
+ circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
+ connection_buf_get_bytes(buf, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn));
+
+ /* retrieve cell info from buf (create the host-order struct from the
+ * network-order string) */
+ cell_unpack(&cell, buf, wide_circ_ids);
+
+ channel_tls_handle_cell(&cell, conn);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Array of recognized link protocol versions. */
+static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 };
+/** Number of versions in <b>or_protocol_versions</b>. */
+static const int n_or_protocol_versions =
+ (int)( sizeof(or_protocol_versions)/sizeof(uint16_t) );
+
+/** Return true iff <b>v</b> is a link protocol version that this Tor
+ * implementation believes it can support. */
+int
+is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t v)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
+ if (or_protocol_versions[i] == v)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Send a VERSIONS cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other host about the
+ * link protocol versions that this Tor can support.
+ *
+ * If <b>v3_plus</b>, this is part of a V3 protocol handshake, so only
+ * allow protocol version v3 or later. If not <b>v3_plus</b>, this is
+ * not part of a v3 protocol handshake, so don't allow protocol v3 or
+ * later.
+ **/
+int
+connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus)
+{
+ var_cell_t *cell;
+ int i;
+ int n_versions = 0;
+ const int min_version = v3_plus ? 3 : 0;
+ const int max_version = v3_plus ? UINT16_MAX : 2;
+ tor_assert(conn->handshake_state &&
+ !conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at);
+ cell = var_cell_new(n_or_protocol_versions * 2);
+ cell->command = CELL_VERSIONS;
+ for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
+ uint16_t v = or_protocol_versions[i];
+ if (v < min_version || v > max_version)
+ continue;
+ set_uint16(cell->payload+(2*n_versions), htons(v));
+ ++n_versions;
+ }
+ cell->payload_len = n_versions * 2;
+
+ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
+ conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at = time(NULL);
+
+ var_cell_free(cell);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Send a NETINFO cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other server what we know
+ * about their address, our address, and the current time. */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn))
+{
+ cell_t cell;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ const routerinfo_t *me;
+ int len;
+ uint8_t *out;
+
+ tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
+
+ if (conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Attempted to send an extra netinfo cell on a connection "
+ "where we already sent one.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
+ cell.command = CELL_NETINFO;
+
+ /* Timestamp, if we're a relay. */
+ if (public_server_mode(get_options()) || ! conn->is_outgoing)
+ set_uint32(cell.payload, htonl((uint32_t)now));
+
+ /* Their address. */
+ out = cell.payload + 4;
+ /* We use &conn->real_addr below, unless it hasn't yet been set. If it
+ * hasn't yet been set, we know that base_.addr hasn't been tampered with
+ * yet either. */
+ len = append_address_to_payload(out, !tor_addr_is_null(&conn->real_addr)
+ ? &conn->real_addr : &conn->base_.addr);
+ if (len<0)
+ return -1;
+ out += len;
+
+ /* My address -- only include it if I'm a public relay, or if I'm a
+ * bridge and this is an incoming connection. If I'm a bridge and this
+ * is an outgoing connection, act like a normal client and omit it. */
+ if ((public_server_mode(get_options()) || !conn->is_outgoing) &&
+ (me = router_get_my_routerinfo())) {
+ tor_addr_t my_addr;
+ *out++ = 1 + !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr);
+
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&my_addr, me->addr);
+ len = append_address_to_payload(out, &my_addr);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return -1;
+ out += len;
+
+ if (!tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr)) {
+ len = append_address_to_payload(out, &me->ipv6_addr);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ *out = 0;
+ }
+
+ conn->handshake_state->digest_sent_data = 0;
+ conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo = 1;
+ connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Helper used to add an encoded certs to a cert cell */
+static void
+add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ const uint8_t *cert_encoded,
+ size_t cert_len)
+{
+ tor_assert(cert_len <= UINT16_MAX);
+ certs_cell_cert_t *ccc = certs_cell_cert_new();
+ ccc->cert_type = cert_type;
+ ccc->cert_len = cert_len;
+ certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(ccc, cert_len);
+ memcpy(certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(ccc), cert_encoded, cert_len);
+
+ certs_cell_add_certs(certs_cell, ccc);
+}
+
+/** Add an encoded X509 cert (stored as <b>cert_len</b> bytes at
+ * <b>cert_encoded</b>) to the trunnel certs_cell_t object that we are
+ * building in <b>certs_cell</b>. Set its type field to <b>cert_type</b>.
+ * (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */
+static void
+add_x509_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ if (NULL == cert)
+ return;
+
+ const uint8_t *cert_encoded = NULL;
+ size_t cert_len;
+ tor_x509_cert_get_der(cert, &cert_encoded, &cert_len);
+
+ add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell, cert_type, cert_encoded, cert_len);
+}
+
+/** Add an Ed25519 cert from <b>cert</b> to the trunnel certs_cell_t object
+ * that we are building in <b>certs_cell</b>. Set its type field to
+ * <b>cert_type</b>. (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */
+static void
+add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ const tor_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ if (NULL == cert)
+ return;
+
+ add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell, cert_type,
+ cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+int certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing = 0;
+#else
+#define certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing 0
+#endif
+
+/** Send a CERTS cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on success, -1
+ * on failure. */
+int
+connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *global_link_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+ tor_x509_cert_t *own_link_cert = NULL;
+ var_cell_t *cell;
+
+ certs_cell_t *certs_cell = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
+
+ if (! conn->handshake_state)
+ return -1;
+
+ const int conn_in_server_mode = ! conn->handshake_state->started_here;
+
+ /* Get the encoded values of the X509 certificates */
+ if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(conn_in_server_mode,
+ &global_link_cert, &id_cert) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (conn_in_server_mode) {
+ own_link_cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls);
+ }
+ tor_assert(id_cert);
+
+ certs_cell = certs_cell_new();
+
+ /* Start adding certs. First the link cert or auth1024 cert. */
+ if (conn_in_server_mode) {
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(own_link_cert);
+ add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
+ OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK, own_link_cert);
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(global_link_cert);
+ add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
+ OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024, global_link_cert);
+ }
+
+ /* Next the RSA->RSA ID cert */
+ add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
+ OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024, id_cert);
+
+ /* Next the Ed25519 certs */
+ add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
+ CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN,
+ get_master_signing_key_cert());
+ if (conn_in_server_mode) {
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert ||
+ certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing);
+ add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
+ CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK,
+ conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert);
+ } else {
+ add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
+ CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH,
+ get_current_auth_key_cert());
+ }
+
+ /* And finally the crosscert. */
+ {
+ const uint8_t *crosscert=NULL;
+ size_t crosscert_len;
+ get_master_rsa_crosscert(&crosscert, &crosscert_len);
+ if (crosscert) {
+ add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell,
+ CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID,
+ crosscert, crosscert_len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We've added all the certs; make the cell. */
+ certs_cell->n_certs = certs_cell_getlen_certs(certs_cell);
+
+ ssize_t alloc_len = certs_cell_encoded_len(certs_cell);
+ tor_assert(alloc_len >= 0 && alloc_len <= UINT16_MAX);
+ cell = var_cell_new(alloc_len);
+ cell->command = CELL_CERTS;
+ ssize_t enc_len = certs_cell_encode(cell->payload, alloc_len, certs_cell);
+ tor_assert(enc_len > 0 && enc_len <= alloc_len);
+ cell->payload_len = enc_len;
+
+ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
+ var_cell_free(cell);
+ certs_cell_free(certs_cell);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(own_link_cert);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+int testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported = 0;
+#else
+#define testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported 0
+#endif
+
+/** Return true iff <b>challenge_type</b> is an AUTHCHALLENGE type that
+ * we can send and receive. */
+int
+authchallenge_type_is_supported(uint16_t challenge_type)
+{
+ switch (challenge_type) {
+ case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET:
+#ifdef HAVE_WORKING_TOR_TLS_GET_TLSSECRETS
+ return 1;
+#else
+ return testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported;
+#endif
+ case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705:
+ return 1;
+ case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705:
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return true iff <b>challenge_type_a</b> is one that we would rather
+ * use than <b>challenge_type_b</b>. */
+int
+authchallenge_type_is_better(uint16_t challenge_type_a,
+ uint16_t challenge_type_b)
+{
+ /* Any supported type is better than an unsupported one;
+ * all unsupported types are equally bad. */
+ if (!authchallenge_type_is_supported(challenge_type_a))
+ return 0;
+ if (!authchallenge_type_is_supported(challenge_type_b))
+ return 1;
+ /* It happens that types are superior in numerically ascending order.
+ * If that ever changes, this must change too. */
+ return (challenge_type_a > challenge_type_b);
+}
+
+/** Send an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0
+ * on success, -1 on failure. */
+int
+connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ var_cell_t *cell = NULL;
+ int r = -1;
+ tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
+
+ if (! conn->handshake_state)
+ return -1;
+
+ auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = auth_challenge_cell_new();
+
+ tor_assert(sizeof(ac->challenge) == 32);
+ crypto_rand((char*)ac->challenge, sizeof(ac->challenge));
+
+ if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET))
+ auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET);
+ /* Disabled, because everything that supports this method also supports
+ * the much-superior ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705 */
+ /* auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705); */
+ if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705))
+ auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705);
+ auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(ac,
+ auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(ac));
+
+ cell = var_cell_new(auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(ac));
+ ssize_t len = auth_challenge_cell_encode(cell->payload, cell->payload_len,
+ ac);
+ if (len != cell->payload_len) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Encoded auth challenge cell length not as expected");
+ goto done;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ cell->command = CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE;
+
+ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
+ r = 0;
+
+ done:
+ var_cell_free(cell);
+ auth_challenge_cell_free(ac);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Compute the main body of an AUTHENTICATE cell that a client can use
+ * to authenticate itself on a v3 handshake for <b>conn</b>. Return it
+ * in a var_cell_t.
+ *
+ * If <b>server</b> is true, only calculate the first
+ * V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN bytes -- the part of the authenticator that's
+ * determined by the rest of the handshake, and which match the provided value
+ * exactly.
+ *
+ * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is NULL, calculate the
+ * first V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN bytes of the authenticator (that is, everything
+ * that should be signed), but don't actually sign it.
+ *
+ * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is provided, calculate the
+ * entire authenticator, signed with <b>signing_key</b>.
+ *
+ * Return the length of the cell body on success, and -1 on failure.
+ */
+var_cell_t *
+connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
+ const int authtype,
+ crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
+ int server)
+{
+ auth1_t *auth = NULL;
+ auth_ctx_t *ctx = auth_ctx_new();
+ var_cell_t *result = NULL;
+ int old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 0;
+ const char *authtype_str = NULL;
+
+ int is_ed = 0;
+
+ /* assert state is reasonable XXXX */
+ switch (authtype) {
+ case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET:
+ authtype_str = "AUTH0001";
+ old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 1;
+ break;
+ case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705:
+ authtype_str = "AUTH0002";
+ break;
+ case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705:
+ authtype_str = "AUTH0003";
+ is_ed = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ tor_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ auth = auth1_new();
+ ctx->is_ed = is_ed;
+
+ /* Type: 8 bytes. */
+ memcpy(auth1_getarray_type(auth), authtype_str, 8);
+
+ {
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL;
+ const common_digests_t *my_digests, *their_digests;
+ const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id;
+ if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(server, NULL, &id_cert))
+ goto err;
+ my_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
+ their_digests =
+ tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert);
+ tor_assert(my_digests);
+ tor_assert(their_digests);
+ my_id = (uint8_t*)my_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
+ their_id = (uint8_t*)their_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
+
+ client_id = server ? their_id : my_id;
+ server_id = server ? my_id : their_id;
+
+ /* Client ID digest: 32 octets. */
+ memcpy(auth->cid, client_id, 32);
+
+ /* Server ID digest: 32 octets. */
+ memcpy(auth->sid, server_id, 32);
+ }
+
+ if (is_ed) {
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *my_ed_id, *their_ed_id;
+ if (!conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Ed authenticate without Ed ID cert from peer.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ my_ed_id = get_master_identity_key();
+ their_ed_id = &conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign->signing_key;
+
+ const uint8_t *cid_ed = (server ? their_ed_id : my_ed_id)->pubkey;
+ const uint8_t *sid_ed = (server ? my_ed_id : their_ed_id)->pubkey;
+
+ memcpy(auth->u1_cid_ed, cid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ memcpy(auth->u1_sid_ed, sid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ }
+
+ {
+ crypto_digest_t *server_d, *client_d;
+ if (server) {
+ server_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_sent;
+ client_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_received;
+ } else {
+ client_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_sent;
+ server_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_received;
+ }
+
+ /* Server log digest : 32 octets */
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(server_d, (char*)auth->slog, 32);
+
+ /* Client log digest : 32 octets */
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(client_d, (char*)auth->clog, 32);
+ }
+
+ {
+ /* Digest of cert used on TLS link : 32 octets. */
+ tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+ if (server) {
+ cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls);
+ } else {
+ cert = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(conn->tls);
+ }
+ if (!cert) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to find cert when making %s data.",
+ authtype_str);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(auth->scert,
+ tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256], 32);
+
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+ }
+
+ /* HMAC of clientrandom and serverrandom using master key : 32 octets */
+ if (old_tlssecrets_algorithm) {
+ if (tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets) < 0) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Somebody asked us for an older TLS "
+ "authentication method (AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET) "
+ "which we don't support.");
+ }
+ } else {
+ char label[128];
+ tor_snprintf(label, sizeof(label),
+ "EXPORTER FOR TOR TLS CLIENT BINDING %s", authtype_str);
- tor_tls_export_key_material(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets,
- auth->cid, sizeof(auth->cid),
- label);
++ int r = tor_tls_export_key_material(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets,
++ auth->cid, sizeof(auth->cid),
++ label);
++ if (r < 0) {
++ if (r != -2)
++ log_warn(LD_BUG, "TLS key export failed for unknown reason.");
++ // If r == -2, this was openssl bug 7712.
++ goto err;
++ }
+ }
+
+ /* 8 octets were reserved for the current time, but we're trying to get out
+ * of the habit of sending time around willynilly. Fortunately, nothing
+ * checks it. That's followed by 16 bytes of nonce. */
+ crypto_rand((char*)auth->rand, 24);
+
+ ssize_t maxlen = auth1_encoded_len(auth, ctx);
+ if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
+ maxlen += ED25519_SIG_LEN;
+ } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
+ maxlen += crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key);
+ }
+
+ const int AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN = 4; /* 2 bytes of type, 2 bytes of length */
+ result = var_cell_new(AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN + maxlen);
+ uint8_t *const out = result->payload + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
+ const size_t outlen = maxlen;
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ result->command = CELL_AUTHENTICATE;
+ set_uint16(result->payload, htons(authtype));
+
+ if ((len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx)) < 0) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed part of AUTH1 data.");
+ goto err;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+
+ if (server) {
+ auth1_t *tmp = NULL;
+ ssize_t len2 = auth1_parse(&tmp, out, len, ctx);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to parse signed part of AUTH1 data that "
+ "we just encoded");
+ goto err;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ result->payload_len = (tmp->end_of_signed - result->payload);
+
+ auth1_free(tmp);
+ if (len2 != len) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Mismatched length when re-parsing AUTH1 data.");
+ goto err;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
+ ed25519_signature_t sig;
+ if (ed25519_sign(&sig, out, len, ed_signing_key) < 0) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to sign ed25519 authentication data");
+ goto err;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ auth1_setlen_sig(auth, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+ memcpy(auth1_getarray_sig(auth), sig.sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+
+ } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
+ auth1_setlen_sig(auth, crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key));
+
+ char d[32];
+ crypto_digest256(d, (char*)out, len, DIGEST_SHA256);
+ int siglen = crypto_pk_private_sign(signing_key,
+ (char*)auth1_getarray_sig(auth),
+ auth1_getlen_sig(auth),
+ d, 32);
+ if (siglen < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to sign AUTH1 data.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ auth1_setlen_sig(auth, siglen);
+ }
+
+ len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed AUTH1 data.");
+ goto err;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ tor_assert(len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN <= result->payload_len);
+ result->payload_len = len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
+ set_uint16(result->payload+2, htons(len));
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ var_cell_free(result);
+ result = NULL;
+ done:
+ auth1_free(auth);
+ auth_ctx_free(ctx);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Send an AUTHENTICATE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on
+ * success, -1 on failure */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype))
+{
+ var_cell_t *cell;
+ crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
+ /* XXXX make sure we're actually supposed to send this! */
+
+ if (!pk) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't compute authenticate cell: no client auth key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (! authchallenge_type_is_supported(authtype)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to send authenticate cell with unknown "
+ "authentication type %d", authtype);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(conn,
+ authtype,
+ pk,
+ get_current_auth_keypair(),
+ 0 /* not server */);
+ if (! cell) {
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to compute authenticate cell!");
++ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Unable to compute authenticate cell!");
+ return -1;
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
+ var_cell_free(cell);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --cc src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c
index 63f6259a6,000000000..99371cfc4
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c
@@@ -1,1751 -1,0 +1,1795 @@@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file tortls.c
+ * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
+ * TLS, SSL, and X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
+ **/
+
+/* (Unlike other tor functions, these
+ * are prefixed with tor_ in order to avoid conflicting with OpenSSL
+ * functions and variables.)
+ */
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+
+#define TORTLS_PRIVATE
+#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
+#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+ /* We need to include these here, or else the dtls1.h header will include
+ * <winsock.h> and mess things up, in at least some openssl versions. */
+ #include <winsock2.h>
+ #include <ws2tcpip.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h"
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+#include "lib/tls/x509_internal.h"
+
+/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
+ * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
+DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support"
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/tls1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h"
+#include "lib/log/log.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+#include "lib/container/smartlist.h"
+#include "lib/string/compat_string.h"
+#include "lib/string/printf.h"
+#include "lib/net/socket.h"
+#include "lib/intmath/cmp.h"
+#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "lib/arch/bytes.h"
+
+/* Copied from or.h */
+#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
+ "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
+
+#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer")
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f')
+/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 1.0.0f. It does not have
+ * the CVE-2011-4576 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and
+ * SSL3 safely at the same time.
+ */
+#define DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') */
+
+/* We redefine these so that we can run correctly even if the vendor gives us
+ * a version of OpenSSL that does not match its header files. (Apple: I am
+ * looking at you.)
+ */
+#ifndef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
+#endif
+#ifndef SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010
+#endif
+
++/** Set to true iff openssl bug 7712 has been detected. */
++static int openssl_bug_7712_is_present = 0;
++
+/** Return values for tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers.
+ *
+ * @{
+ */
+/** An error occurred when examining the client ciphers */
+#define CIPHERS_ERR -1
+/** The client cipher list indicates that a v1 handshake was in use. */
+#define CIPHERS_V1 1
+/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
+ * v3 handshake, but that it is (probably!) lying about what ciphers it
+ * supports */
+#define CIPHERS_V2 2
+/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
+ * v3 handshake, and that it is telling the truth about what ciphers it
+ * supports */
+#define CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED 3
+/** @} */
+
+/** The ex_data index in which we store a pointer to an SSL object's
+ * corresponding tor_tls_t object. */
+STATIC int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index = -1;
+
+/** Helper: Allocate tor_tls_object_ex_data_index. */
+void
+tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void)
+{
+ if (tor_tls_object_ex_data_index == -1) {
+ tor_tls_object_ex_data_index =
+ SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ tor_assert(tor_tls_object_ex_data_index != -1);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Helper: given a SSL* pointer, return the tor_tls_t object using that
+ * pointer. */
+tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ tor_tls_t *result = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index);
+ if (result)
+ tor_assert(result->magic == TOR_TLS_MAGIC);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** True iff tor_tls_init() has been called. */
+static int tls_library_is_initialized = 0;
+
+/* Module-internal error codes. */
+#define TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 2)
+#define TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 1)
+
+/** Write a description of the current state of <b>tls</b> into the
+ * <b>sz</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz)
+{
+ const char *ssl_state;
+ const char *tortls_state;
+
+ if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!tls || !tls->ssl)) {
+ strlcpy(buf, "(No SSL object)", sz);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ssl_state = SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl);
+ switch (tls->state) {
+#define CASE(st) case TOR_TLS_ST_##st: tortls_state = " in "#st ; break
+ CASE(HANDSHAKE);
+ CASE(OPEN);
+ CASE(GOTCLOSE);
+ CASE(SENTCLOSE);
+ CASE(CLOSED);
+ CASE(RENEGOTIATE);
+#undef CASE
+ case TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT:
+ tortls_state = "";
+ break;
+ default:
+ tortls_state = " in unknown TLS state";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tor_snprintf(buf, sz, "%s%s", ssl_state, tortls_state);
+}
+
+/** Log a single error <b>err</b> as returned by ERR_get_error(), which was
+ * received while performing an operation <b>doing</b> on <b>tls</b>. Log
+ * the message at <b>severity</b>, in log domain <b>domain</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err,
+ int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+{
+ const char *state = NULL, *addr;
+ const char *msg, *lib, *func;
+
+ state = (tls && tls->ssl)?SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl):"---";
+
+ addr = tls ? tls->address : NULL;
+
+ /* Some errors are known-benign, meaning they are the fault of the other
+ * side of the connection. The caller doesn't know this, so override the
+ * priority for those cases. */
+ switch (ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
+ case SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ case SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE:
+#endif
+ case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL:
+ case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL:
+ severity = LOG_INFO;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err);
+ lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err);
+ func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err);
+ if (!msg) msg = "(null)";
+ if (!lib) lib = "(null)";
+ if (!func) func = "(null)";
+ if (doing) {
+ tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error while %s%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
+ doing, addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
+ msg, lib, func, state);
+ } else {
+ tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
+ addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
+ msg, lib, func, state);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Log all pending tls errors at level <b>severity</b> in log domain
+ * <b>domain</b>. Use <b>doing</b> to describe our current activities.
+ */
+void
+tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+{
+ unsigned long err;
+
+ while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, err, severity, domain, doing);
+ }
+}
+
+#define CATCH_SYSCALL 1
+#define CATCH_ZERO 2
+
+/** Given a TLS object and the result of an SSL_* call, use
+ * SSL_get_error to determine whether an error has occurred, and if so
+ * which one. Return one of TOR_TLS_{DONE|WANTREAD|WANTWRITE|ERROR}.
+ * If extra&CATCH_SYSCALL is true, return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ instead of
+ * reporting syscall errors. If extra&CATCH_ZERO is true, return
+ * TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ instead of reporting zero-return errors.
+ *
+ * If an error has occurred, log it at level <b>severity</b> and describe the
+ * current action as <b>doing</b>.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
+ const char *doing, int severity, int domain)
+{
+ int err = SSL_get_error(tls->ssl, r);
+ int tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ switch (err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ return TOR_TLS_WANTREAD;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ return TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ if (extra&CATCH_SYSCALL)
+ return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_;
+ if (r == 0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error: unexpected close while %s (%s)",
+ doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO;
+ } else {
+ int e = tor_socket_errno(tls->socket);
+ tor_log(severity, LD_NET,
+ "TLS error: <syscall error while %s> (errno=%d: %s; state=%s)",
+ doing, e, tor_socket_strerror(e),
+ SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ tor_error = tor_errno_to_tls_error(e);
+ }
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+ return tor_error;
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ if (extra&CATCH_ZERO)
+ return TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_;
+ tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS connection closed while %s in state %s",
+ doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+ return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
+ default:
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Initialize OpenSSL, unless it has already been initialized.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_init(void)
+{
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ if (!tls_library_is_initialized) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL);
+#else
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+#endif
+
+#if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && \
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1))
+ long version = OpenSSL_version_num();
+
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START : we can't test these lines on the same machine */
+ if (version >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) {
+ /* Warn if we could *almost* be running with much faster ECDH.
+ If we're built for a 64-bit target, using OpenSSL 1.0.1, but we
+ don't have one of the built-in __uint128-based speedups, we are
+ just one build operation away from an accelerated handshake.
+
+ (We could be looking at OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 instead of
+ doing this test, but that gives compile-time options, not runtime
+ behavior.)
+ */
+ EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+ const EC_GROUP *g = key ? EC_KEY_get0_group(key) : NULL;
+ const EC_METHOD *m = g ? EC_GROUP_method_of(g) : NULL;
+ const int warn = (m == EC_GFp_simple_method() ||
+ m == EC_GFp_mont_method() ||
+ m == EC_GFp_nist_method());
+ EC_KEY_free(key);
+
+ if (warn)
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with "
+ "OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, but with a version of OpenSSL "
+ "that apparently lacks accelerated support for the NIST "
+ "P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with such "
+ "support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option "
+ "when configuring it) would make ECDH much faster.");
+ }
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+#endif /* (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && ... */
+
+ tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
+
+ tls_library_is_initialized = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/** We need to give OpenSSL a callback to verify certificates. This is
+ * it: We always accept peer certs and complete the handshake. We
+ * don't validate them until later.
+ */
+int
+always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok,
+ X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+ (void) preverify_ok;
+ (void) x509_ctx;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when the client might be
+ * claiming extra unsupported ciphers in order to avoid fingerprinting. */
+static const char SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ /* This one can never actually get selected, since if the client lists it,
+ * we will assume that the client is honest, and not use this list.
+ * Nonetheless we list it if it's available, so that the server doesn't
+ * conclude that it has no valid ciphers if it's running with TLS1.3.
+ */
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA;
+
+/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when we actually have
+ * our choice of what cipher to use. */
+static const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+ /* Here are the TLS 1.3 ciphers we like, in the order we prefer. */
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+ TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+
+ /* This list is autogenerated with the gen_server_ciphers.py script;
+ * don't hand-edit it. */
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+ /* Required */
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
+ /* Required */
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":"
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+#endif
+ ;
+
+/* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto
+ * disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to
+ * (SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA). If you do this, you won't be able to communicate
+ * with any of the "real" Tors, though. */
+
+#define CIPHER(id, name) name ":"
+#define XCIPHER(id, name)
+/** List of ciphers that clients should advertise, omitting items that
+ * our OpenSSL doesn't know about. */
+static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+#include "ciphers.inc"
+ /* Tell it not to use SSLv2 ciphers, so that it can select an SSLv3 version
+ * of any cipher we say. */
+ "!SSLv2"
+ ;
+#undef CIPHER
+#undef XCIPHER
+
+/** Return true iff the other side of <b>tls</b> has authenticated to us, and
+ * the key certified in <b>cert</b> is the same as the key they used to do it.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert))
+{
+ tor_x509_cert_t *peer = tor_tls_get_peer_cert((tor_tls_t *)tls);
+ if (!peer)
+ return 0;
+
+ X509 *peercert = peer->cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *link_key = NULL, *cert_key = NULL;
+ int result;
+
+ link_key = X509_get_pubkey(peercert);
+ cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
+
+ result = link_key && cert_key && EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_key, link_key) == 1;
+
+ tor_x509_cert_free(peer);
+ if (link_key)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(link_key);
+ if (cert_key)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_context_impl_free_(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx)
+{
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
+/** The group we should use for ecdhe when none was selected. */
+#define NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group NID_X9_62_prime256v1
+
+/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes.
+ * <b>identity</b> should be set to the identity key used to sign the
+ * certificate.
+ */
+tor_tls_context_t *
+tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
+ unsigned flags, int is_client)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL;
+
+ tor_tls_init();
+
+ result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
+ result->refcnt = 1;
+
+ if (! is_client) {
+ if (tor_tls_context_init_certificates(result, identity, key_lifetime,
+ flags) < 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ /* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1. This may have subtly different results
+ * from SSLv23_method() with SSLv2 and SSLv3 disabled, so we need to do some
+ * investigation before we consider adjusting it. It should be compatible
+ * with existing Tors. */
+ if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method())))
+ goto error;
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+ /* Tell OpenSSL to use TLS 1.0 or later but not SSL2 or SSL3. */
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
+ if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method())))
+ goto error;
+#else
+ if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method())))
+ goto error;
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_TLS_METHOD) */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_SECURITY_LEVEL
+ /* Level 1 re-enables RSA1024 and DH1024 for compatibility with old tors */
+ SSL_CTX_set_security_level(result->ctx, 1);
+#endif
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
+
+ /* Prefer the server's ordering of ciphers: the client's ordering has
+ * historically been chosen for fingerprinting resistance. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
+
+ /* Disable TLS tickets if they're supported. We never want to use them;
+ * using them can make our perfect forward secrecy a little worse, *and*
+ * create an opportunity to fingerprint us (since it's unusual to use them
+ * with TLS sessions turned off).
+ *
+ * In 0.2.4, clients advertise support for them though, to avoid a TLS
+ * distinguishability vector. This can give us worse PFS, though, if we
+ * get a server that doesn't set SSL_OP_NO_TICKET. With luck, there will
+ * be few such servers by the time 0.2.4 is more stable.
+ */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+ if (! is_client) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
+ SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION);
+#endif
+ /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
+ * as authenticating any earlier-received data.
+ */
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
+ }
+
+ /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses RAM and time, it makes TLS
+ * vulnerable to CRIME-style attacks, and most of the data we transmit over
+ * TLS is encrypted (and therefore uncompressible) anyway. */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
+#endif
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (result->ctx->comp_methods)
+ result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+
+#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
+#endif
+ if (! is_client) {
+ if (result->my_link_cert &&
+ !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,
+ result->my_link_cert->cert)) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (result->my_id_cert) {
+ X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx);
+ tor_assert(s);
+ X509_STORE_add_cert(s, result->my_id_cert->cert);
+ }
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+ if (!is_client) {
+ tor_assert(result->link_key);
+ if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(result->link_key,1)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey))
+ goto error;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = NULL;
+ if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx))
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ {
+ DH *dh = crypto_dh_new_openssl_tls();
+ tor_assert(dh);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, dh);
+ DH_free(dh);
+ }
+/* We check for this function in two ways, since it might be either a symbol
+ * or a macro. */
+#if defined(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list) || defined(HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET1_GROUPS_LIST)
+ {
+ const char *list;
+ if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224)
+ list = "P-224:P-256";
+ else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256)
+ list = "P-256:P-224";
+ else
+ list = "P-256:P-224";
+ int r = (int) SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(result->ctx, list);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+#else
+ if (! is_client) {
+ int nid;
+ EC_KEY *ec_key;
+ if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224)
+ nid = NID_secp224r1;
+ else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256)
+ nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ else
+ nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
+ /* Use P-256 for ECDHE. */
+ ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ if (ec_key != NULL) /*XXXX Handle errors? */
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(result->ctx, ec_key);
+ EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
+ }
+#endif
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
+ always_accept_verify_cb);
+ /* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
+
+ return result;
+
+ error:
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating TLS context");
+ if (pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ tor_tls_context_decref(result);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Invoked when a TLS state changes: log the change at severity 'debug' */
+void
+tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
+{
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START since this depends on whether debug is captured or not */
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "SSL %p is now in state %s [type=%d,val=%d].",
+ ssl, SSL_state_string_long(ssl), type, val);
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+}
+
+/* Return the name of the negotiated ciphersuite in use on <b>tls</b> */
+const char *
+tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return SSL_get_cipher(tls->ssl);
+}
+
+/* Here's the old V2 cipher list we sent from 0.2.1.1-alpha up to
+ * 0.2.3.17-beta. If a client is using this list, we can't believe the ciphers
+ * that it claims to support. We'll prune this list to remove the ciphers
+ * *we* don't recognize. */
+STATIC uint16_t v2_cipher_list[] = {
+ 0xc00a, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc014, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0039, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+ 0x0038, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+ 0xc00f, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc005, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0035, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+ 0xc007, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc009, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc011, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc013, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0033, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+ 0x0032, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+ 0xc00c, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc00e, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc002, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc004, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0004, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 */
+ 0x0005, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0x002f, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+ 0xc008, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xc012, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0x0016, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0x0013, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xc00d, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xc003, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xfeff, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x000a, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0
+};
+/** Have we removed the unrecognized ciphers from v2_cipher_list yet? */
+static int v2_cipher_list_pruned = 0;
+
+/** Return 0 if <b>m</b> does not support the cipher with ID <b>cipher</b>;
+ * return 1 if it does support it, or if we have no way to tell. */
+int
+find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher)
+{
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND
+ (void) m;
+ {
+ unsigned char cipherid[3];
+ tor_assert(ssl);
+ set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
+ cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
+ * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
+ * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
+ c = SSL_CIPHER_find((SSL*)ssl, cipherid);
+ if (c)
+ tor_assert((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) & 0xffff) == cipher);
+ return c != NULL;
+ }
+#else /* !(defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND)) */
+
+# if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR)
+ if (m && m->get_cipher_by_char) {
+ unsigned char cipherid[3];
+ set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
+ cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
+ * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
+ * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
+ c = m->get_cipher_by_char(cipherid);
+ if (c)
+ tor_assert((c->id & 0xffff) == cipher);
+ return c != NULL;
+ }
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ if (m && m->get_cipher && m->num_ciphers) {
+ /* It would seem that some of the "let's-clean-up-openssl" forks have
+ * removed the get_cipher_by_char function. Okay, so now you get a
+ * quadratic search.
+ */
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < m->num_ciphers(); ++i) {
+ c = m->get_cipher(i);
+ if (c && (c->id & 0xffff) == cipher) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
+ (void) ssl;
+ (void) m;
+ (void) cipher;
+ return 1; /* No way to search */
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND) */
+}
+
+/** Remove from v2_cipher_list every cipher that we don't support, so that
+ * comparing v2_cipher_list to a client's cipher list will give a sensible
+ * result. */
+static void
+prune_v2_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ uint16_t *inp, *outp;
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
+ const SSL_METHOD *m = TLS_method();
+#else
+ const SSL_METHOD *m = SSLv23_method();
+#endif
+
+ inp = outp = v2_cipher_list;
+ while (*inp) {
+ if (find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, *inp)) {
+ *outp++ = *inp++;
+ } else {
+ inp++;
+ }
+ }
+ *outp = 0;
+
+ v2_cipher_list_pruned = 1;
+}
+
+/** Examine the client cipher list in <b>ssl</b>, and determine what kind of
+ * client it is. Return one of CIPHERS_ERR, CIPHERS_V1, CIPHERS_V2,
+ * CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED.
+ **/
+int
+tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers)
+{
+ int i, res;
+ tor_tls_t *tor_tls;
+ if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!v2_cipher_list_pruned))
+ prune_v2_cipher_list(ssl);
+
+ tor_tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
+ if (tor_tls && tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type)
+ return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type;
+
+ /* If we reached this point, we just got a client hello. See if there is
+ * a cipher list. */
+ if (!peer_ciphers) {
+ log_info(LD_NET, "No ciphers on session");
+ res = CIPHERS_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* Now we need to see if there are any ciphers whose presence means we're
+ * dealing with an updated Tor. */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+ const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+ if (strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) &&
+ strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) &&
+ strcmp(ciphername, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) &&
+ strcmp(ciphername, "(NONE)")) {
+ log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher called '%s'", ciphername);
+ // return 1;
+ goto v2_or_higher;
+ }
+ }
+ res = CIPHERS_V1;
+ goto done;
+ v2_or_higher:
+ {
+ const uint16_t *v2_cipher = v2_cipher_list;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+ uint16_t id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff;
+ if (id == 0x00ff) /* extended renegotiation indicator. */
+ continue;
+ if (!id || id != *v2_cipher) {
+ res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
+ goto dump_ciphers;
+ }
+ ++v2_cipher;
+ }
+ if (*v2_cipher != 0) {
+ res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
+ goto dump_ciphers;
+ }
+ res = CIPHERS_V2;
+ }
+
+ dump_ciphers:
+ {
+ smartlist_t *elts = smartlist_new();
+ char *s;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+ const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+ smartlist_add(elts, (char*)ciphername);
+ }
+ s = smartlist_join_strings(elts, ":", 0, NULL);
+ log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a %s V2/V3 cipher list from %s. It is: '%s'",
+ (res == CIPHERS_V2) ? "fictitious" : "real", ADDR(tor_tls), s);
+ tor_free(s);
+ smartlist_free(elts);
+ }
+ done:
+ if (tor_tls)
+ return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type = res;
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the cipher list suggested by the client for <b>ssl</b> is
+ * a list that indicates that the client knows how to do the v2 TLS connection
+ * handshake. */
+int
+tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
+ ciphers = SSL_get_client_ciphers(ssl);
+#else
+ SSL_SESSION *session;
+ if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) {
+ log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?");
+ return CIPHERS_ERR;
+ }
+ ciphers = session->ciphers;
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */
+
+ return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2;
+}
+
+/** Invoked when we're accepting a connection on <b>ssl</b>, and the connection
+ * changes state. We use this:
+ * <ul><li>To alter the state of the handshake partway through, so we
+ * do not send or request extra certificates in v2 handshakes.</li>
+ * <li>To detect renegotiation</li></ul>
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
+{
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ (void) val;
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(ssl == NULL) {
+ return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
+ }
+
+ tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, type, val);
+
+ if (type != SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP)
+ return;
+
+ OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE ssl_state = SSL_get_state(ssl);
+ if (! STATE_IS_SW_SERVER_HELLO(ssl_state))
+ return;
+ tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
+ if (tls) {
+ /* Check whether we're watching for renegotiates. If so, this is one! */
+ if (tls->negotiated_callback)
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Now check the cipher list. */
+ if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl)) {
+ if (tls->wasV2Handshake)
+ return; /* We already turned this stuff off for the first handshake;
+ * This is a renegotiation. */
+
+ /* Yes, we're casting away the const from ssl. This is very naughty of us.
+ * Let's hope openssl doesn't notice! */
+
+ /* Set SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN to keep from sending back any extra certs. */
+ SSL_set_mode((SSL*) ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
+ /* Don't send a hello request. */
+ SSL_set_verify((SSL*) ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
+
+ if (tls) {
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START this line is not reachable */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers
+ * the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite.
+ *
+ * We can't abuse an info_cb for this, since by the time one of the
+ * client_hello info_cbs is called, we've already picked which ciphersuite to
+ * use.
+ *
+ * Technically, this function is an abuse of this callback, since the point of
+ * a session_secret_cb is to try to set up and/or verify a shared-secret for
+ * authentication on the fly. But as long as we return 0, we won't actually be
+ * setting up a shared secret, and all will be fine.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_session_secret_cb(SSL *ssl, void *secret, int *secret_len,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
+ CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ (void) secret;
+ (void) secret_len;
+ (void) peer_ciphers;
+ (void) cipher;
+ (void) arg;
+
+ if (tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, peer_ciphers) ==
+ CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED) {
+ SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST);
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_session_secret_cb(ssl, NULL, NULL);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+static void
+tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Create a new TLS object from a file descriptor, and a flag to
+ * determine whether it is functioning as a server.
+ */
+tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_new(tor_socket_t sock, int isServer)
+{
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ tor_tls_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tor_tls_context_t *context = tor_tls_context_get(isServer);
+ result->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
+
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ tor_assert(context); /* make sure somebody made it first */
+ if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(context->ctx))) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating SSL object");
+ tor_free(result);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ /* Browsers use the TLS hostname extension, so we should too. */
+ if (!isServer) {
+ char *fake_hostname = crypto_random_hostname(4,25, "www.",".com");
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, fake_hostname);
+ tor_free(fake_hostname);
+ }
+#endif /* defined(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name) */
+
++#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION
++ if (openssl_bug_7712_is_present) {
++ /* We can't actually use TLS 1.3 until this bug is fixed. */
++ SSL_set_max_proto_version(result->ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(result->ssl,
+ isServer ? SERVER_CIPHER_LIST : CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST)) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "setting ciphers");
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+ SSL_free(result->ssl);
+ tor_free(result);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ result->socket = sock;
+ bio = BIO_new_socket(sock, BIO_CLOSE);
+ if (! bio) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "opening BIO");
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+ SSL_free(result->ssl);
+ tor_free(result);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ {
+ int set_worked =
+ SSL_set_ex_data(result->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, result);
+ if (!set_worked) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
+ "Couldn't set the tls for an SSL*; connection will fail");
+ }
+ }
+ SSL_set_bio(result->ssl, bio, bio);
+ tor_tls_context_incref(context);
+ result->context = context;
+ result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
+ result->isServer = isServer;
+ result->wantwrite_n = 0;
+ result->last_write_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(bio);
+ result->last_read_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(bio);
+ if (result->last_write_count || result->last_read_count) {
+ log_warn(LD_NET, "Newly created BIO has read count %lu, write count %lu",
+ result->last_read_count, result->last_write_count);
+ }
+ if (isServer) {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
+ } else {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
+ }
+
+ if (isServer)
+ tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(result);
+
+ goto done;
+ err:
+ result = NULL;
+ done:
+ /* Not expected to get called. */
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating tor_tls_t object");
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Set <b>cb</b> to be called with argument <b>arg</b> whenever <b>tls</b>
+ * next gets a client-side renegotiate in the middle of a read. Do not
+ * invoke this function until <em>after</em> initial handshaking is done!
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
+ void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg),
+ void *arg)
+{
+ tls->negotiated_callback = cb;
+ tls->callback_arg = arg;
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
+ if (cb) {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
+ } else {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
+ }
+}
+
+/** If this version of openssl requires it, turn on renegotiation on
+ * <b>tls</b>.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
+ * as authenticating any earlier-received data. */
+ SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
+}
+
+/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on
+ * <b>tls</b>. (Our protocol never requires this for security, but it's nice
+ * to use belt-and-suspenders here.)
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
+ tls->ssl->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
+#else
+ (void) tls;
+#endif
+}
+
+/** Assert that the flags that allow legacy renegotiation are still set */
+void
+tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+#if defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && \
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION != 0
+ long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
+#else
+ (void) tls;
+#endif /* defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && ... */
+}
+
+/**
+ * Tell the TLS library that the underlying socket for <b>tls</b> has been
+ * closed, and the library should not attempt to free that socket itself.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_release_socket(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ if (! tls)
+ return;
+
+ BIO *rbio, *wbio;
+ rbio = SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl);
+ wbio = SSL_get_wbio(tls->ssl);
+
+ if (rbio) {
+ (void) BIO_set_close(rbio, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ }
+ if (wbio && wbio != rbio) {
+ (void) BIO_set_close(wbio, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_impl_free_(tor_tls_impl_t *ssl)
+{
+ if (!ssl)
+ return;
+
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+}
+
+/** Underlying function for TLS reading. Reads up to <b>len</b>
+ * characters from <b>tls</b> into <b>cp</b>. On success, returns the
+ * number of characters read. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
+ * TOR_TLS_CLOSE, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_read,(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len))
+{
+ int r, err;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
+ tor_assert(len<INT_MAX);
+ r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, (int)len);
+ if (r > 0) {
+ if (tls->got_renegotiate) {
+ /* Renegotiation happened! */
+ log_info(LD_NET, "Got a TLS renegotiation from %s", ADDR(tls));
+ if (tls->negotiated_callback)
+ tls->negotiated_callback(tls, tls->callback_arg);
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
+ }
+ return r;
+ }
+ err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading", LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET);
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ || err == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) {
+ log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d; TLS is closed",r);
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+ return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(err != TOR_TLS_DONE);
+ log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d, err=%d",r,err);
+ return err;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Total number of bytes that we've used TLS to send. Used to track TLS
+ * overhead. */
+STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0;
+/** Total number of bytes that TLS has put on the network for us. Used to
+ * track TLS overhead. */
+STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls = 0;
+
+/** Underlying function for TLS writing. Write up to <b>n</b>
+ * characters from <b>cp</b> onto <b>tls</b>. On success, returns the
+ * number of characters written. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
+ * TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n)
+{
+ int r, err;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
+ tor_assert(n < INT_MAX);
+ if (n == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (tls->wantwrite_n) {
+ /* if WANTWRITE last time, we must use the _same_ n as before */
+ tor_assert(n >= tls->wantwrite_n);
+ log_debug(LD_NET,"resuming pending-write, (%d to flush, reusing %d)",
+ (int)n, (int)tls->wantwrite_n);
+ n = tls->wantwrite_n;
+ tls->wantwrite_n = 0;
+ }
+ r = SSL_write(tls->ssl, cp, (int)n);
+ err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "writing", LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
+ total_bytes_written_over_tls += r;
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE || err == TOR_TLS_WANTREAD) {
+ tls->wantwrite_n = n;
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+/** Perform initial handshake on <b>tls</b>. When finished, returns
+ * TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
+ * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ int r;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE);
+
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE oldstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
+
+ if (tls->isServer) {
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_accept on %p (%s)", tls,
+ SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ r = SSL_accept(tls->ssl);
+ } else {
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_connect on %p (%s)", tls,
+ SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl);
+ }
+
+ OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE newstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
+
+ if (oldstate != newstate)
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "After call, %p was in state %s",
+ tls, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ /* We need to call this here and not earlier, since OpenSSL has a penchant
+ * for clearing its flags when you say accept or connect. */
+ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
+ r = tor_tls_get_error(tls,r,0, "handshaking", LOG_INFO, LD_HANDSHAKE);
+ if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) {
+ tls_log_errors(tls, tls->isServer ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "handshaking");
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+ if (r == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
+ return tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Perform the final part of the initial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>. This
+ * should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1
+ * or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation
+ * handshake as appropriate.
+ *
+ * tor_tls_handshake() calls this on its own; you only need to call this if
+ * bufferevent is doing the handshake for you.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ int r = TOR_TLS_DONE;
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ if (tls->isServer) {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
+ SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb);
+ SSL_clear_mode(tls->ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
+ if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl)) {
+ /* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback,
+ * we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code
+ * was buggy. Fixing that. */
+ if (!tls->wasV2Handshake) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't"
+ " get set. Fixing that.");
+ }
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Completed V2 TLS handshake with client; waiting"
+ " for renegotiation.");
+ } else {
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Client-side */
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ /* XXXX this can move, probably? -NM */
+ if (SSL_set_cipher_list(tls->ssl, SERVER_CIPHER_LIST) == 0) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "re-setting ciphers");
+ r = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+ }
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "finishing the handshake");
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff this TLS connection is authenticated.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ X509 *cert;
+ cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
+ if (!cert)
+ return 0;
+ X509_free(cert);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Return a newly allocated copy of the peer certificate, or NULL if there
+ * isn't one. */
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+ X509 *cert;
+ cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
+ if (!cert)
+ return NULL;
+ return tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
+}
+
+/** Return a newly allocated copy of the cerficate we used on the connection,
+ * or NULL if somehow we didn't use one. */
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+ X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(tls->ssl);
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "getting own-connection certificate");
+ if (!cert)
+ return NULL;
+ /* Fun inconsistency: SSL_get_peer_certificate increments the reference
+ * count, but SSL_get_certificate does not. */
+ X509 *duplicate = X509_dup(cert);
+ if (BUG(duplicate == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ return tor_x509_cert_new(duplicate);
+}
+
+/** Helper function: try to extract a link certificate and an identity
+ * certificate from <b>tls</b>, and store them in *<b>cert_out</b> and
+ * *<b>id_cert_out</b> respectively. Log all messages at level
+ * <b>severity</b>.
+ *
+ * Note that a reference is added both of the returned certificates. */
+MOCK_IMPL(void,
+try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+ X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out))
+{
+ X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+ int num_in_chain, i;
+ *cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL;
+ if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
+ return;
+ *cert_out = cert;
+ if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl)))
+ return;
+ num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain);
+ /* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert.
+ * 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link
+ * cert and the id_cert.
+ */
+ if (num_in_chain < 1) {
+ log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)",
+ num_in_chain);
+ return;
+ }
+ for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) {
+ id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ *id_cert_out = id_cert ? X509_dup(id_cert) : NULL;
+}
+
+/** Return the number of bytes available for reading from <b>tls</b>.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ return SSL_pending(tls->ssl);
+}
+
+/** If <b>tls</b> requires that the next write be of a particular size,
+ * return that size. Otherwise, return 0. */
+size_t
+tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return tls->wantwrite_n;
+}
+
+/** Sets n_read and n_written to the number of bytes read and written,
+ * respectively, on the raw socket used by <b>tls</b> since the last time this
+ * function was called on <b>tls</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written)
+{
+ BIO *wbio, *tmpbio;
+ unsigned long r, w;
+ r = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl));
+ /* We want the number of bytes actually for real written. Unfortunately,
+ * sometimes OpenSSL replaces the wbio on tls->ssl with a buffering bio,
+ * which makes the answer turn out wrong. Let's cope with that. Note
+ * that this approach will fail if we ever replace tls->ssl's BIOs with
+ * buffering bios for reasons of our own. As an alternative, we could
+ * save the original BIO for tls->ssl in the tor_tls_t structure, but
+ * that would be tempting fate. */
+ wbio = SSL_get_wbio(tls->ssl);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)
+ /* BIO structure is opaque as of OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre5-dev. Again, not
+ * supposed to use this form of the version macro, but the OpenSSL developers
+ * introduced major API changes in the pre-release stage.
+ */
+ if (BIO_method_type(wbio) == BIO_TYPE_BUFFER &&
+ (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
+ wbio = tmpbio;
+#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)) */
+ if (wbio->method == BIO_f_buffer() && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
+ wbio = tmpbio;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) */
+ w = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(wbio);
+
+ /* We are ok with letting these unsigned ints go "negative" here:
+ * If we wrapped around, this should still give us the right answer, unless
+ * we wrapped around by more than ULONG_MAX since the last time we called
+ * this function.
+ */
+ *n_read = (size_t)(r - tls->last_read_count);
+ *n_written = (size_t)(w - tls->last_write_count);
+ if (*n_read > INT_MAX || *n_written > INT_MAX) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Preposterously large value in tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes. "
+ "r=%lu, last_read=%lu, w=%lu, last_written=%lu",
+ r, tls->last_read_count, w, tls->last_write_count);
+ }
+ total_bytes_written_by_tls += *n_written;
+ tls->last_read_count = r;
+ tls->last_write_count = w;
+}
+
+/** Return a ratio of the bytes that TLS has sent to the bytes that we've told
+ * it to send. Used to track whether our TLS records are getting too tiny. */
+MOCK_IMPL(double,
+tls_get_write_overhead_ratio,(void))
+{
+ if (total_bytes_written_over_tls == 0)
+ return 1.0;
+
+ return ((double)total_bytes_written_by_tls) /
+ ((double)total_bytes_written_over_tls);
+}
+
+/** Implement check_no_tls_errors: If there are any pending OpenSSL
+ * errors, log an error message. */
+void
+check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line)
+{
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Unhandled OpenSSL errors found at %s:%d: ",
+ tor_fix_source_file(fname), line);
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the initial TLS connection at <b>tls</b> did not use a v2
+ * TLS handshake. Output is undefined if the handshake isn't finished. */
+int
+tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the server TLS connection <b>tls</b> got the renegotiation
+ * request it was waiting for. */
+int
+tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return tls->got_renegotiate;
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM
+static size_t
+SSL_get_client_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len == 0)
+ return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ tor_assert(s->s3);
+ memcpy(out, s->s3->client_random, len);
+ return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM
+static size_t
+SSL_get_server_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len == 0)
+ return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ tor_assert(s->s3);
+ memcpy(out, s->s3->server_random, len);
+ return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
+size_t
+SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+ tor_assert(s);
+ if (len == 0)
+ return s->master_key_length;
+ tor_assert(len == (size_t)s->master_key_length);
+ tor_assert(out);
+ memcpy(out, s->master_key, len);
+ return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */
+
+/** Set the DIGEST256_LEN buffer at <b>secrets_out</b> to the value used in
+ * the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the
+ * connection <b>tls</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
+{
+#define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification"
+ uint8_t buf[128];
+ size_t len;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+
+ SSL *const ssl = tls->ssl;
+ SSL_SESSION *const session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+
+ tor_assert(ssl);
+ tor_assert(session);
+
+ const size_t server_random_len = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
+ const size_t client_random_len = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
+ const size_t master_key_len = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, NULL, 0);
+
+ tor_assert(server_random_len);
+ tor_assert(client_random_len);
+ tor_assert(master_key_len);
+
+ len = client_random_len + server_random_len + strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1;
+ tor_assert(len <= sizeof(buf));
+
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, buf, client_random_len);
+ tor_assert(r == client_random_len);
+ }
+
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_get_server_random(ssl,
+ buf+client_random_len,
+ server_random_len);
+ tor_assert(r == server_random_len);
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *master_key = tor_malloc_zero(master_key_len);
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, master_key_len);
+ tor_assert(r == master_key_len);
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *nextbuf = buf + client_random_len + server_random_len;
+ memcpy(nextbuf, TLSSECRET_MAGIC, strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1);
+
+ /*
+ The value is an HMAC, using the TLS master key as the HMAC key, of
+ client_random | server_random | TLSSECRET_MAGIC
+ */
+ crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)secrets_out,
+ (char*)master_key,
+ master_key_len,
+ (char*)buf, len);
+ memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memwipe(master_key, 0, master_key_len);
+ tor_free(master_key);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Using the RFC5705 key material exporting construction, and the
+ * provided <b>context</b> (<b>context_len</b> bytes long) and
+ * <b>label</b> (a NUL-terminated string), compute a 32-byte secret in
+ * <b>secrets_out</b> that only the parties to this TLS session can
- * compute. Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
++ * compute. Return 0 on success; -1 on failure; and -2 on failure
++ * caused by OpenSSL bug 7712.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
+ const uint8_t *context,
+ size_t context_len,
+ const char *label))
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+
+ int r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl,
+ secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ label, strlen(label),
+ context, context_len, 1);
++
++ if (r != 1) {
++ int severity = openssl_bug_7712_is_present ? LOG_WARN : LOG_DEBUG;
++ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_NET, "exporting keying material");
++ }
++
++#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
++ if (r != 1 &&
++ strlen(label) > 12 &&
++ SSL_version(tls->ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
++
++ if (! openssl_bug_7712_is_present) {
++ /* We might have run into OpenSSL issue 7712, which caused OpenSSL
++ * 1.1.1a to not handle long labels. Let's test to see if we have.
++ */
++ r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl, secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN,
++ "short", 5, context, context_len, 1);
++ if (r == 1) {
++ /* A short label succeeds, but a long label fails. This was openssl
++ * issue 7712. */
++ openssl_bug_7712_is_present = 1;
++ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Detected OpenSSL bug 7712: disabling TLS 1.3 on "
++ "future connections. A fix is expected to appear in OpenSSL "
++ "1.1.1b.");
++ }
++ }
++ if (openssl_bug_7712_is_present)
++ return -2;
++ else
++ return -1;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ return (r == 1) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+/** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in <b>tls</b>.
+ * Set *<b>rbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the read
+ * buffer and *<b>rbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
+ * Set *<b>wbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the write
+ * buffer and *<b>wbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.*/
+int
+tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
+ size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes,
+ size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
+ (void)tls;
+ (void)rbuf_capacity;
+ (void)rbuf_bytes;
+ (void)wbuf_capacity;
+ (void)wbuf_bytes;
+
+ return -1;
+#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)) */
+ if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf)
+ *rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len;
+ else
+ *rbuf_capacity = 0;
+ if (tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf)
+ *wbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len;
+ else
+ *wbuf_capacity = 0;
+ *rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left;
+ *wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left;
+ return 0;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+}
+
+/** Check whether the ECC group requested is supported by the current OpenSSL
+ * library instance. Return 1 if the group is supported, and 0 if not.
+ */
+int
+evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ec_key;
+ int nid;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!ecgroup)
+ nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P256"))
+ nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P224"))
+ nid = NID_secp224r1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+
+ ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ ret = (ec_key != NULL);
+ EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
