tor-commits September 2018

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[translation/torbutton-browseronboardingproperties] Update translations for torbutton-browseronboardingproperties
by translation＠torproject.org 20 Sep '18

20 Sep '18

commit 9308b11f2f68c53a635afcc74743196ce1e06fad Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 20 21:18:06 2018 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-browseronboardingproperties --- fr/browserOnboarding.properties | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fr/browserOnboarding.properties b/fr/browserOnboarding.properties index 7b85a7266..dc852d46a 100644 --- a/fr/browserOnboarding.properties +++ b/fr/browserOnboarding.properties @@ -8,28 +8,28 @@ onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.description=Le Navigateur Tor offre le plus haut niv onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.button=Commencer maintenant onboarding.tour-tor-privacy=Confidentialité -onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.title=Repousser les traqueurs et les fouineurs. -onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.description=Tor Browser isolates cookies and deletes your browser history after your session. These modifications ensure your privacy and security are protected in the browser. Click ‘Tor Network’ to learn how we protect you on the network level. -onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.button=Go to Tor Network +onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.title=Repoussez les traqueurs et les fouineurs. +onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.description=Le Navigateur Tor isole les témoins et supprime l’historique de votre navigateur en fin de session. Ces modifications garantissent que confidentialité et sécurité sont protégées dans le navigateur. Cliquez sur « Réseau Tor » pour savoir comment nous vous protégeons au niveau du réseau. +onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.button=Se rendre sur le Réseau Tor -onboarding.tour-tor-network=Tor Network -onboarding.tour-tor-network.title=Travel a decentralized network. -onboarding.tour-tor-network.description=Tor Browser connects you to the Tor network run by thousands of volunteers around the world. Unlike a VPN, there’s no one point of failure or centralized entity you need to trust in order to enjoy the internet privately. -onboarding.tour-tor-network.button=Go to Circuit Display +onboarding.tour-tor-network=Réseau Tor +onboarding.tour-tor-network.title=Naviguez sur un réseau décentralisé. +onboarding.tour-tor-network.description=Le navigateur Tor vous connecte au réseau Tor exploité par des milliers de bénévoles dans le monde entier. Contrairement à un RPV, il n’y a pas de point de défaillance unique ou d’entité centralisée auxquels vous devez faire confiance pour profiter d’Internet en toute confidentialité. +onboarding.tour-tor-network.button=Se rendre sur l’Affichage des circuits -onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display=Circuit Display -onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.title=See your path. -onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.description=For each domain you visit, your traffic is relayed and encrypted in a circuit across three Tor relays around the world. No website knows where you are connecting from. You can request a new circuit by clicking ‘New Circuit for this Site’ on our Circuit Display. -onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.button=See My Path +onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display=Affichage des circuits +onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.title=Visualisez votre chemin. +onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.description=Pour chaque domaine que vous visitez, votre trafic est relayé et chiffré dans un circuit passant par 3 relais Tor disséminés dans le monde entier. Aucun site Web ne sait d’où vous vous connectez. Vous pouvez demander un nouveau circuit en cliquant sur « Nouveau circuit Tor pour ce site » dans votre Affichage des circuits. +onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.button=Visualiser mon chemin onboarding.tour-tor-security=Sécurité -onboarding.tour-tor-security.title=Choose your experience. -onboarding.tour-tor-security.description=We also provide you with additional settings for bumping up your browser security. Our Security Settings allow you to block elements that could be used to attack your computer. Click below to see what the different options do. -onboarding.tour-tor-security.button=Review Settings +onboarding.tour-tor-security.title=Choisissez votre expérience. +onboarding.tour-tor-security.description=Nous vous offrons aussi des paramètres supplémentaires pour augmenter la sécurité de votre navigateur. Nos Paramètres de sécurité vous permettent de bloquer des éléments qui pourraient être utilisés pour attaquer votre ordinateur. Cliquez ci-dessous pour voir ce que les différentes options vous proposent. +onboarding.tour-tor-security.button=Passer les Paramètres en revue -onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences=Experience Tips -onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.title=Expect some differences. -onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.description=With all the security and privacy features provided by Tor, your experience while browsing the internet may be a little different. Things may be a bit slower, and depending on your security level, some elements may not work or load. You may also be asked to prove you are a human and not a robot. +onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences=Astuces concernant l’expérience +onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.title=Attendez-vous à des différences. +onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.description=Avec toutes les fonctions de sécurité et de confidentialité offertes par Tor, votre expérience de navigation sur Internet pourrait être un peu différente. Les choses pourraient être un peu plus lentes et selon votre niveau de sécurité, certains éléments pourraient ne pas fonctionner ou ne pas se charger. On pourrait aussi vous demander de prouver que vous êtes un humain et pas un robot. onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.button=See FAQs onboarding.tour-tor-onion-services=Les services oignon @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ onboarding.tor-circuit-display.three-of-three=3 of 3 onboarding.tor-circuit-display.intro.title=How do circuits work? onboarding.tor-circuit-display.intro.msg=Circuits are made up of randomly assigned relays, which are computers around the world configured to forward Tor traffic. Circuits allow you to browse privately and to connect to onion services. -onboarding.tor-circuit-display.diagram.title=Circuit Display +onboarding.tor-circuit-display.diagram.title=Affichage des circuits onboarding.tor-circuit-display.diagram.msg=This diagram shows the relays that make up the circuit for this website. To prevent linking of activity across different sites, each website gets a different circuit. onboarding.tor-circuit-display.new-circuit.title=Do you need a new circuit?

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[translation/torbutton-browseronboardingproperties] Update translations for torbutton-browseronboardingproperties
by translation＠torproject.org 20 Sep '18

20 Sep '18

commit eb87d835095d78337a4666e9e1ffde858b45469a Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 20 20:48:06 2018 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-browseronboardingproperties --- fr/browserOnboarding.properties | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fr/browserOnboarding.properties b/fr/browserOnboarding.properties index 4c9fff793..7b85a7266 100644 --- a/fr/browserOnboarding.properties +++ b/fr/browserOnboarding.properties @@ -3,12 +3,12 @@ # vim: set sw=2 sts=2 ts=8 et: onboarding.tour-tor-welcome=Bienvenue -onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.title=You’re ready. -onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.description=Tor Browser offers the highest standard of privacy and security while browsing the web. You’re now protected against tracking, surveillance, and censorship. This quick onboarding will show you how. -onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.button=Start Now +onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.title=Vous êtes prêts. +onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.description=Le Navigateur Tor offre le plus haut niveau de confidentialité et de sécurité quand vous parcourez le Web. Vous êtes maintenant protégé contre le suivi à la trace, la surveillance et la censure. Cette introduction rapide vous montrera comment faire. +onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.button=Commencer maintenant onboarding.tour-tor-privacy=Confidentialité -onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.title=Snub trackers and snoopers. +onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.title=Repousser les traqueurs et les fouineurs. onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.description=Tor Browser isolates cookies and deletes your browser history after your session. These modifications ensure your privacy and security are protected in the browser. Click ‘Tor Network’ to learn how we protect you on the network level. onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.button=Go to Tor Network

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[tor/master] Bump to 0.3.5.2-alpha
by nickm＠torproject.org 20 Sep '18

20 Sep '18

commit 1a85ac8c2de77f40212d46569632ec47bc309ba7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 20 16:36:07 2018 -0400 Bump to 0.3.5.2-alpha --- configure.ac | 2 +- contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +- src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index a77c6bb05..230004946 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information AC_PREREQ([2.63]) -AC_INIT([tor],[0.3.5.1-alpha-dev]) +AC_INIT([tor],[0.3.5.2-alpha]) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/app/main/tor_main.c]) AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4]) diff --git a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in index 9297d592a..04702c346 100644 --- a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ !include "LogicLib.nsh" !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.3.5.1-alpha-dev" +!define VERSION "0.3.5.2-alpha" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index 457cfa794..f20db1318 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.3.5.1-alpha-dev" +#define VERSION "0.3.5.2-alpha"

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[tor/master] Start on an 0.3.5.2-alpha changelog
by nickm＠torproject.org 20 Sep '18

20 Sep '18

commit de066b76a536b7c8deacdc1beddadd2f2bd200dd Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 20 16:35:36 2018 -0400 Start on an 0.3.5.2-alpha changelog --- ChangeLog | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ changes/bug23512 | 6 ----- changes/bug27073 | 4 ---- changes/bug27139 | 14 ------------ changes/bug27206 | 4 ---- changes/bug27764 | 4 ---- changes/bug27782 | 4 ---- changes/bug27795 | 5 ----- changes/ticket27410 | 5 ----- changes/ticket27799 | 3 --- 10 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index bde75efa2..1a3428cf0 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,66 @@ +Changes in version 0.3.5.2-alpha - 2018-09-2? + Tor 0.3.5.2-alpha fixes several bugs in 0.3.5.1-alpha, including one + that made Tor think it had run out of sockets. Anybody running a relay + or an onion service on 0.3.5.1-alpha should upgrade. + + o Major bugfixes (relay bandwidth statistics): + - When we close relayed circuits, report the data in the circuit + queues as being written in our relay bandwidth stats. This + mitigates guard discovery and other attacks that close circuits + for the explicit purpose of noticing this discrepancy in + statistics. Fixes bug 23512; bugfix on 0.0.8pre3. + + o Major bugfixes (socket accounting): + - In our socket accounting code, count a socket as closed even when + it is closed indirectly by the TLS layer. Previously, we would + count these sockets as still in use, and incorrectly believe that + we had run out of sockets. Fixes bug 27795; bugfix + on 0.3.5.1-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (32-bit OSX and iOS, timing): + - Fix an integer overflow bug in our optimized 32-bit millisecond- + difference algorithm for 32-bit Apple platforms. Previously, it + would overflow when calculating the difference between two times + more than 47 days apart. Fixes part of bug 27139; bugfix + on 0.3.4.1-alpha. + - Improve the precision of our 32-bit millisecond difference + algorithm for 32-bit Apple platforms. Fixes part of bug 27139; + bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha. + - Relax the tolerance on the mainloop/update_time_jumps test when + running on 32-bit Apple platforms. Fixes part of bug 27139; bugfix + on 0.3.4.1-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (onion service v3): + - Close all SOCKS request (for the same .onion) if the newly fetched + descriptor is unusable. Before that, we would close only the first + one leaving the other hanging and let to time out by themselves. + Fixes bug 27410; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (memory leak): + - Fix an unlikely memory leak when trying to read a private key from + a ridiculously large file. Fixes bug 27764; bugfix on + 0.3.5.1-alpha. This is CID 1439488. + + o Minor bugfixes (NSS): + - Correctly detect failure to open a dummy TCP socket when stealing + ownership of an fd from the NSS layer. Fixes bug 27782; bugfix + on 0.3.5.1-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (rust): + - protover_all_supported() would attempt to allocate up to 16GB on + some inputs, leading to a potential memory DoS. Fixes bug 27206; + bugfix on 0.3.3.5-rc. + + o Minor bugfixes (testing): + - Revise the "conditionvar_timeout" test so that it succeeds even on + heavily loaded systems where the test threads are not scheduled + within 200 msec. Fixes bug 27073; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha. + + o Code simplification and refactoring: + - Divide the routerlist.c and dirserv.c modules into smaller parts. + Closes ticket 27799. + + Changes in version 0.3.5.1-alpha - 2018-09-18 Tor 0.3.5.1-alpha is the first release of the 0.3.5.x series. It adds client authorization for modern (v3) onion services, improves diff --git a/changes/bug23512 b/changes/bug23512 deleted file mode 100644 index 91b2786de..000000000 --- a/changes/bug23512 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfix (Relay bandwidth statistics): - - When we close relayed circuits, report the data in the circuit queues - as being written in our relay bandwidth stats. This mitigates guard - discovery and other attacks that close circuits for the explicit purpose - of noticing this discrepancy in statistics. Fixes bug 23512; bugfix - on 0.0.8pre3. diff --git a/changes/bug27073 b/changes/bug27073 deleted file mode 100644 index 851e7f0df..000000000 --- a/changes/bug27073 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (testing): - - Revise the "conditionvar_timeout" test so that it succeeds even - on heavily loaded systems where the test threads are not scheduled - within 200 msec. Fixes bug 27073; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug27139 b/changes/bug27139 deleted file mode 100644 index 0d1e3b432..000000000 --- a/changes/bug27139 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (32-bit OSX and iOS, timing): - - Fix an integer overflow bug in our optimized 32-bit millisecond- - difference algorithm for 32-bit Apple platforms. Previously, it - would overflow when calculating the difference between two times - more than 47 days apart. Fixes part of bug 27139; bugfix on - 0.3.4.1-alpha. - - Improve the precision of our 32-bit millisecond difference - algorithm for 32-bit Apple platforms. Fixes part of bug 27139; - bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha. - - Relax the tolerance on the mainloop/update_time_jumps test - when running on 32-bit Apple platforms. Fixes part of bug 27139; - bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha. - - diff --git a/changes/bug27206 b/changes/bug27206 deleted file mode 100644 index c0fbbed70..000000000 --- a/changes/bug27206 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (rust): - - protover_all_supported() would attempt to allocate up to 16GB on some - inputs, leading to a potential memory DoS. Fixes bug 27206; bugfix on - 0.3.3.5-rc. diff --git a/changes/bug27764 b/changes/bug27764 deleted file mode 100644 index f23fdf2e6..000000000 --- a/changes/bug27764 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (memory leak): - - Fix an unlikely memory leak when trying to read a private key - from a ridiculously large file. Fixes bug 27764; bugfix on - 0.3.5.1-alpha. This is CID 1439488. diff --git a/changes/bug27782 b/changes/bug27782 deleted file mode 100644 index 3564c34b6..000000000 --- a/changes/bug27782 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (NSS): - - Correctly detect failure to open a dummy TCP socket when - stealing ownership of an fd from the NSS layer. Fixes bug 27782; - bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug27795 b/changes/bug27795 deleted file mode 100644 index 43bb1ba16..000000000 --- a/changes/bug27795 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes (socket accounting): - - In our socket accounting code, count a socket as closed even - when it is closed indirectly by the TLS layer. Previously, we - would count these sockets as still in use, and incorrectly believe that - we had run out of sockets. Fixes bug 27795; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket27410 b/changes/ticket27410 deleted file mode 100644 index a21fdde58..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket27410 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (hidden service v3): - - Close all SOCKS request (for the same .onion) if the newly fetched - descriptor is unusable. Before that, we would close only the first one - leaving the other hanging and let to time out by themselves. Fixes bug - 27410; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket27799 b/changes/ticket27799 deleted file mode 100644 index 31b89d8c6..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket27799 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Code simplification and refactoring: - - Divide the routerlist.c and dirserv.c modules into smaller - parts. Closes ticket 27799.

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[tor/master] changes for 27799
by nickm＠torproject.org 20 Sep '18

20 Sep '18

commit 313b67163a39a0cbf9d7ac720c26246d7c1cae69 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 20 16:30:33 2018 -0400 changes for 27799 --- changes/ticket27799 | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket27799 b/changes/ticket27799 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..31b89d8c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket27799 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Code simplification and refactoring: + - Divide the routerlist.c and dirserv.c modules into smaller + parts. Closes ticket 27799.

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.1' into maint-0.3.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 20 Sep '18

20 Sep '18

commit 6fed66d268fa84bff7c68eb549907546b66ca6f8 Merge: a4e8f9450 12258bbb9 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 3 13:31:08 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.1' into maint-0.3.2

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.2' of https://git.torproject.org/tor into maint-0.3.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 20 Sep '18

20 Sep '18

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.1
by nickm＠torproject.org 20 Sep '18

20 Sep '18

commit 12258bbb9056ae400a58de4eb57c3de079b21782 Merge: 2968c716d b205714ba Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 3 13:31:06 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.1 changes/bug26535.029 | 5 +++++ src/test/ntor_ref.py | 9 ++++++--- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] test: hs-v3 desc has arrived unit test
by nickm＠torproject.org 20 Sep '18

20 Sep '18

commit cb81a69f90c82c2c2a5b41b80eadf50be5e8193d Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 19 09:55:57 2018 -0400 test: hs-v3 desc has arrived unit test That unit test makes sure we don't have pending SOCK request if the descriptor turns out to be unusable. Part of #27410. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 2 +- src/feature/hs/hs_client.h | 2 + src/test/test_hs_client.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index fa7c78c8f..563f6c6b3 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ close_all_socks_conns_waiting_for_desc(const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk, /* Find all pending SOCKS connection waiting for a descriptor and retry them * all. This is called when the directory information changed. */ -static void +STATIC void retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(void) { smartlist_t *conns = diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h index 1ba0338dc..fb4f9e9e9 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.h @@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ STATIC int handle_rendezvous2(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload, MOCK_DECL(STATIC hs_client_fetch_status_t, fetch_v3_desc, (const ed25519_public_key_t *onion_identity_pk)); +STATIC void retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(void); + #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS STATIC digest256map_t *get_hs_client_auths_map(void); diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_client.c b/src/test/test_hs_client.c index c91e82ed4..a115997c7 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_client.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_client.c @@ -523,6 +523,9 @@ mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_(entry_connection_t *conn, int endreason, (void) line; (void) file; conn->edge_.end_reason = endreason; + /* This function ultimately will flag this so make sure we do also in the + * MOCK one so we can assess closed connections vs open ones. */ + conn->edge_.base_.marked_for_close = 1; } static void @@ -771,6 +774,117 @@ test_config_client_authorization(void *arg) UNMOCK(check_private_dir); } +static entry_connection_t * +helper_build_socks_connection(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk, + int conn_state) +{ + entry_connection_t *socks = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET); + ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(socks)->hs_ident = hs_ident_edge_conn_new(service_pk); + TO_CONN(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(socks))->state = conn_state; + smartlist_add(get_connection_array(), &socks->edge_.base_); + return socks; +} + +static void +test_desc_has_arrived_cleanup(void *arg) +{ + /* The goal of this test is to make sure we clean up everything in between + * two descriptors from the same .onion. Because intro points can change + * from one descriptor to another, once we received a new descriptor, we + * need to cleanup the remaining circuits so they aren't used or selected + * when establishing a connection with the newly stored descriptor. + * + * This test was created because of #27410. */ + + int ret; + char *desc_str = NULL; + hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL; + const hs_descriptor_t *cached_desc; + ed25519_keypair_t signing_kp; + entry_connection_t *socks1 = NULL, *socks2 = NULL; + hs_ident_dir_conn_t hs_dir_ident; + + (void) arg; + + hs_init(); + + MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus, + mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus); + MOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_, + mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_); + MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info, + mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true); + + /* Set consensus time before our time so the cache lookup can always + * validate that the entry is not expired. */ + parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.valid_after); + parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.fresh_until); + parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 16:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.valid_until); + + /* Build a descriptor for a specific .onion. */ + ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&signing_kp, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + desc = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_ip(&signing_kp); + tt_assert(desc); + ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &signing_kp, NULL, &desc_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* Store in the client cache. */ + ret = hs_cache_store_as_client(desc_str, &signing_kp.pubkey); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + cached_desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&signing_kp.pubkey); + tt_assert(cached_desc); + hs_helper_desc_equal(desc, cached_desc); + + /* Create two SOCKS connection for the same .onion both in the waiting for a + * descriptor state. */ + socks1 = helper_build_socks_connection(&signing_kp.pubkey, + AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT); + tt_assert(socks1); + socks2 = helper_build_socks_connection(&signing_kp.pubkey, + AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT); + tt_assert(socks2); + + /* Now, we'll make the intro points in the current descriptor unusable so + * the hs_client_desc_has_arrived() will take the right code path that we + * want to test that is the fetched descriptor has bad intro points. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, + hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) { + hs_cache_client_intro_state_note(&signing_kp.pubkey, + &ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key, + INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip); + + /* Simulate that a new descriptor just arrived. We should have both of our + * SOCKS connection to be ended with a resolved failed. */ + hs_ident_dir_conn_init(&signing_kp.pubkey, + &desc->plaintext_data.blinded_pubkey, &hs_dir_ident); + hs_client_desc_has_arrived(&hs_dir_ident); + tt_int_op(socks1->edge_.end_reason, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED); + /* XXX: MUST work with OP_EQ. */ + tt_int_op(socks2->edge_.end_reason, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED); + + /* Now let say tor cleans up the intro state cache which resets all intro + * point failure count. */ + hs_cache_client_intro_state_purge(); + + /* Retrying all SOCKS which should basically do nothing since we don't have + * any pending SOCKS connection in AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state. */ + /* XXX: BUG() is triggered here, shouldn't if socks2 wasn't alive. */ + retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); + + done: + connection_free_minimal(ENTRY_TO_CONN(socks1)); + connection_free_minimal(ENTRY_TO_CONN(socks2)); + hs_descriptor_free(desc); + tor_free(desc_str); + hs_free_all(); + + UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus); + UNMOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_); + UNMOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info); +} + struct testcase_t hs_client_tests[] = { { "e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy", test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, @@ -786,5 +900,8 @@ struct testcase_t hs_client_tests[] = { NULL, NULL }, { "config_client_authorization", test_config_client_authorization, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "desc_has_arrived_cleanup", test_desc_has_arrived_cleanup, + TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + END_OF_TESTCASES };

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[tor/master] hs-v3: Close all SOCKS request on descriptor failure
by nickm＠torproject.org 20 Sep '18

20 Sep '18

commit f4f809fe3dc45ce72b4ccfb891eb715a8b330675 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 19 10:56:15 2018 -0400 hs-v3: Close all SOCKS request on descriptor failure Client side, when a descriptor is finally fetched and stored in the cache, we then go over all pending SOCKS request for that descriptor. If it turns out that the intro points are unusable, we close the first SOCKS request but not the others for the same .onion. This commit makes it that we'll close all SOCKS requests so we don't let hanging the other ones. It also fixes another bug which is having a SOCKS connection in RENDDESC_WAIT state but with a descriptor in the cache. At some point, tor will expire the intro failure cache which will make that descriptor usable again. When retrying all SOCKS connection (retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc()), we won't end up in the code path where we have already the descriptor for a pending request causing a BUG(). Bottom line is that we should never have pending requests (waiting for a descriptor) with that descriptor in the cache (even if unusable). Fixees #27410. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket27410 | 5 +++++ src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket27410 b/changes/ticket27410 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a21fdde58 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket27410 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (hidden service v3): + - Close all SOCKS request (for the same .onion) if the newly fetched + descriptor is unusable. Before that, we would close only the first one + leaving the other hanging and let to time out by themselves. Fixes bug + 27410; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index a6384b87a..fa7c78c8f 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -1688,7 +1688,7 @@ hs_client_desc_has_arrived(const hs_ident_dir_conn_t *ident) /* We are unable to use the descriptor so remove the directory request * from the cache so the next connection can try again. */ note_connection_attempt_succeeded(edge_conn->hs_ident); - goto end; + continue; } log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor has arrived. Launching circuits.");

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