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September 2018

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[tor/master] Remove a redundant function.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '18

05 Sep '18

commit 38212d2e40a1eae9f65c1a695e478854177c0783 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 19 09:00:12 2018 -0400 Remove a redundant function. --- src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c | 22 ++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c index a342c1e7d..cd9fb5266 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c +++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c @@ -41,11 +41,10 @@ struct crypto_pk_t RSA *key; /**< The key itself */ }; -/** used internally: quicly validate a crypto_pk_t object as a private key. - * Return 1 iff the public key is valid, 0 if obviously invalid. - */ -static int -crypto_pk_private_ok(const crypto_pk_t *k) +/** Return true iff key contains the private-key portion of the RSA + * key. */ +int +crypto_pk_key_is_private(const crypto_pk_t *k) { #ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API if (!k || !k->key) @@ -371,7 +370,7 @@ crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(crypto_pk_t *env, char *s; int r; - tor_assert(crypto_pk_private_ok(env)); + tor_assert(crypto_pk_key_is_private(env)); if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) return -1; @@ -407,15 +406,6 @@ crypto_pk_check_key(crypto_pk_t *env) return r; } -/** Return true iff key contains the private-key portion of the RSA - * key. */ -int -crypto_pk_key_is_private(const crypto_pk_t *key) -{ - tor_assert(key); - return crypto_pk_private_ok(key); -} - /** Return true iff env contains a public key whose public exponent * equals 65537. */ @@ -545,7 +535,7 @@ crypto_pk_copy_full(crypto_pk_t *env) tor_assert(env); tor_assert(env->key); - if (crypto_pk_private_ok(env)) { + if (crypto_pk_key_is_private(env)) { new_key = RSAPrivateKey_dup(env->key); privatekey = 1; } else {

1 0

[tor/master] Use a constant for "65537"
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '18

05 Sep '18

commit 0812f1cbc2f528f0acb785e2fea416b9f2113c7c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 19 09:23:30 2018 -0400 Use a constant for "65537" --- src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h | 3 +++ src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h index 88978bf37..4a5d92c6b 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h +++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ * including terminating NUL. */ #define FINGERPRINT_LEN 49 +/** Value of 'e' to use in our public keys */ +#define TOR_RSA_EXPONENT 65537 + /** A public key, or a public/private key-pair. */ typedef struct crypto_pk_t crypto_pk_t; diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c index 20be34cbd..d1b56c3b6 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c +++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits,(crypto_pk_t *env, int bits)) RSA *r = NULL; if (!e) goto done; - if (! BN_set_word(e, 65537)) + if (! BN_set_word(e, TOR_RSA_EXPONENT)) goto done; r = RSA_new(); if (!r) @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ crypto_pk_check_key(crypto_pk_t *env) } /** Return true iff env contains a public key whose public exponent - * equals 65537. + * equals TOR_RSA_EXPONENT. */ int crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(crypto_pk_t *env) @@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(crypto_pk_t *env) #else e = env->key->e; #endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ - return BN_is_word(e, 65537); + return BN_is_word(e, TOR_RSA_EXPONENT); } /** Compare the public-key components of a and b. Return less than 0

1 0

[tor/master] Rename openssl-bridging functions in crypto_rsa
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '18

05 Sep '18

commit 824009cde52d40c937c23670b71e9c5b28d2e1f3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 19 09:07:08 2018 -0400 Rename openssl-bridging functions in crypto_rsa These functions exist only to expose RSA keys to other places in Tor that use OpenSSL; let's be specific about their purpose. --- src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h | 10 ++++++---- src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- src/lib/tls/tortls.c | 14 +++++++------- src/test/test_tortls.c | 6 +++--- src/tools/tor-gencert.c | 7 +++---- 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h index d1f9d57aa..88978bf37 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h +++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h @@ -104,14 +104,16 @@ int crypto_pk_get_common_digests(crypto_pk_t *pk, int crypto_pk_base64_encode_private(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char **priv_out); crypto_pk_t *crypto_pk_base64_decode_private(const char *str, size_t len); +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL /* Prototypes for private functions only used by tortls.c, crypto.c, and the * unit tests. */ struct rsa_st; -struct rsa_st *crypto_pk_get_rsa_(crypto_pk_t *env); -crypto_pk_t *crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(struct rsa_st *rsa); -MOCK_DECL(struct evp_pkey_st *, crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_,(crypto_pk_t *env, - int private)); struct evp_pkey_st; +struct rsa_st *crypto_pk_get_openssl_rsa_(crypto_pk_t *env); +crypto_pk_t *crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(struct rsa_st *rsa); +MOCK_DECL(struct evp_pkey_st *, crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_,( + crypto_pk_t *env,int private)); +#endif #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS void crypto_pk_assign_(crypto_pk_t *dest, const crypto_pk_t *src); diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c index cd9fb5266..20be34cbd 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c +++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c @@ -58,9 +58,10 @@ crypto_pk_key_is_private(const crypto_pk_t *k) #endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ } -/** used by tortls.c: wrap an RSA* in a crypto_pk_t. */ +/** used by tortls.c: wrap an RSA* in a crypto_pk_t. Takes ownership of + * its argument. */ crypto_pk_t * -crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(RSA *rsa) +crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(RSA *rsa) { crypto_pk_t *env; tor_assert(rsa); @@ -70,19 +71,19 @@ crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(RSA *rsa) return env; } -/** Helper, used by tor-gencert.c. Return the RSA from a +/** Helper, used by tor-gencert.c. Return a copy of the private RSA from a * crypto_pk_t. */ RSA * -crypto_pk_get_rsa_(crypto_pk_t *env) +crypto_pk_get_openssl_rsa_(crypto_pk_t *env) { - return env->key; + return RSA_PrivateKeyDup(env->key); } /** used by tortls.c: get an equivalent EVP_PKEY* for a crypto_pk_t. Iff * private is set, include the private-key portion of the key. Return a valid * pointer on success, and NULL on failure. */ MOCK_IMPL(EVP_PKEY *, -crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_,(crypto_pk_t *env, int private)) +crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_,(crypto_pk_t *env, int private)) { RSA *key = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; @@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ crypto_pk_new,(void)) rsa = RSA_new(); tor_assert(rsa); - return crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(rsa); + return crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); } /** Release a reference to an asymmetric key; when all the references @@ -556,7 +557,7 @@ crypto_pk_copy_full(crypto_pk_t *env) /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } - return crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(new_key); + return crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(new_key); } /** Encrypt fromlen bytes from from with the public key @@ -729,7 +730,7 @@ crypto_pk_asn1_decode(const char *str, size_t len) crypto_openssl_log_errors(LOG_WARN,"decoding public key"); return NULL; } - return crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(rsa); + return crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); } /** Given a crypto_pk_t pk, allocate a new buffer containing the @@ -789,7 +790,7 @@ crypto_pk_base64_decode_private(const char *str, size_t len) goto out; } - pk = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(rsa); + pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); /* Make sure it's valid. */ if (crypto_pk_check_key(pk) <= 0) { diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c index 875ed95f8..466df8966 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c @@ -539,9 +539,9 @@ tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa, tor_assert(cname); tor_assert(rsa_sign); tor_assert(cname_sign); - if (!(sign_pkey = crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(rsa_sign,1))) + if (!(sign_pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa_sign,1))) goto error; - if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(rsa,0))) + if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,0))) goto error; if (!(x509 = X509_new())) goto error; @@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert)) if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) && (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) { - crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(rsa); + crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); if (crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests) < 0) { crypto_pk_free(pk); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); @@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return NULL; } - result = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(rsa); + result = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return result; } @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); if (!is_client) { tor_assert(rsa); - if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(rsa,1))) + if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,1))) goto error; if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey)) goto error; @@ -2277,7 +2277,7 @@ tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity_key) rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(id_pkey); if (!rsa) goto done; - *identity_key = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(rsa); + *identity_key = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); r = 0; @@ -2362,7 +2362,7 @@ tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp, { X509 *newc = X509_dup(inp->cert); X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newc), 0, &new_expiration_time); - EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1); + EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1); tor_assert(X509_sign(newc, pk, EVP_sha256())); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); return tor_x509_cert_new(newc); diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.c b/src/test/test_tortls.c index 54e5eca4f..49a39e264 100644 --- a/src/test/test_tortls.c +++ b/src/test/test_tortls.c @@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ test_tortls_get_my_client_auth_key(void *ignored) RSA *k = RSA_new(); ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t)); - expected = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(k); + expected = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(k); ctx->auth_key = expected; client_tls_context = NULL; @@ -2609,7 +2609,7 @@ test_tortls_create_certificate(void *ignored) pk1 = crypto_pk_new(); pk2 = crypto_pk_new(); - MOCK(crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_, fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_); + MOCK(crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_, fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_); fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0; fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = NULL; ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1); @@ -2628,7 +2628,7 @@ test_tortls_create_certificate(void *ignored) tt_assert(!ret); done: - UNMOCK(crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_); + UNMOCK(crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_); crypto_pk_free(pk1); crypto_pk_free(pk2); } diff --git a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c index 63e24d922..e0ac3dec8 100644 --- a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c +++ b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c @@ -239,8 +239,7 @@ generate_key(int bits) crypto_pk_t *env = crypto_pk_new(); if (crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(env,bits)<0) goto done; - rsa = crypto_pk_get_rsa_(env); - rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa); + rsa = crypto_pk_get_openssl_rsa_(env); done: crypto_pk_free(env); return rsa; @@ -416,7 +415,7 @@ static int get_fingerprint(EVP_PKEY *pkey, char *out) { int r = -1; - crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey)); + crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey)); if (pk) { r = crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(pk, out, 0); crypto_pk_free(pk); @@ -429,7 +428,7 @@ static int get_digest(EVP_PKEY *pkey, char *out) { int r = -1; - crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey)); + crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey)); if (pk) { r = crypto_pk_get_digest(pk, out); crypto_pk_free(pk);

1 0

[tor/master] Add rudimentary support for PEM-encoding, since NSS doesn't do that.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '18

05 Sep '18

commit 9566ed6fd9e4aab2ce6b84afc2f7112550cf0483 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 19 15:47:48 2018 -0400 Add rudimentary support for PEM-encoding, since NSS doesn't do that. --- src/lib/encoding/.may_include | 1 + src/lib/encoding/include.am | 2 + src/lib/encoding/pem.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/lib/encoding/pem.h | 26 +++++++++ src/test/include.am | 1 + src/test/test.c | 1 + src/test/test.h | 1 + src/test/test_pem.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 260 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/lib/encoding/.may_include b/src/lib/encoding/.may_include index 92231b513..7c2ef3692 100644 --- a/src/lib/encoding/.may_include +++ b/src/lib/encoding/.may_include @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ orconfig.h lib/cc/*.h +lib/ctime/*.h lib/encoding/*.h lib/intmath/*.h lib/log/*.h diff --git a/src/lib/encoding/include.am b/src/lib/encoding/include.am index 868e531b6..2d2aa3988 100644 --- a/src/lib/encoding/include.am +++ b/src/lib/encoding/include.am @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ src_lib_libtor_encoding_a_SOURCES = \ src/lib/encoding/confline.c \ src/lib/encoding/cstring.c \ src/lib/encoding/keyval.c \ + src/lib/encoding/pem.c \ src/lib/encoding/time_fmt.c src_lib_libtor_encoding_testing_a_SOURCES = \ @@ -21,4 +22,5 @@ noinst_HEADERS += \ src/lib/encoding/confline.h \ src/lib/encoding/cstring.h \ src/lib/encoding/keyval.h \ + src/lib/encoding/pem.h \ src/lib/encoding/time_fmt.h diff --git a/src/lib/encoding/pem.c b/src/lib/encoding/pem.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0d4a814f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/encoding/pem.c @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001, Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file pem.c + * + * \brief Implement a trivial version of PEM encoding, for use with NSS. + * + * We deliberately do not support any encryption here. + **/ + +#include "orconfig.h" + +#include "lib/encoding/pem.h" + +#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h" +#include "lib/encoding/binascii.h" +#include "lib/log/util_bug.h" +#include "lib/malloc/malloc.h" +#include "lib/string/printf.h" +#include "lib/string/util_string.h" + +#include <string.h> + +/** + * Return the length of a src_len-byte object when tagged with + * objtype and PEM-encoded. Includes terminating NUL. + */ +size_t +pem_encoded_size(size_t src_len, const char *objtype) +{ + return + strlen("-----BEGIN -----\n") + + strlen("-----END -----\n") + + strlen(objtype) * 2 + + base64_encode_size(src_len, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) + + 1; +} + +/** + * PEM-encode the srclen-byte object at src into the + * destlen<\b>-byte buffer at dest, tagging it with objtype. + * Return 0 on success and -1 on failure. + */ +int +pem_encode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const uint8_t *src, size_t srclen, + const char *objtype) +{ + if (tor_snprintf(dest, destlen, "-----BEGIN %s-----\n", objtype) < 0) + return -1; + + size_t offset = strlen(dest); + + int n = base64_encode(dest + offset, destlen - offset, + (const char *)src, srclen, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE); + if (n < 0) + return -1; + offset += n; + if (BUG(offset > destlen)) + return -1; + + if (tor_snprintf(dest + offset, destlen - offset, + "-----END %s-----\n", objtype) < 0) + return -1; + + tor_assert(strlen(dest) + 1 <= pem_encoded_size(srclen, objtype)); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Given a PEM-encoded block of size srclen in src, if it has + * object type objtype, decode it into the destlen-byte buffer + * at dest. Return the number of characters decoded on success, or -1 + * on failure. + */ +int +pem_decode(uint8_t *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen, + const char *objtype) +{ + const char *eos = src + srclen; + + src = eat_whitespace_eos(src, eos); + + char *tag = NULL; + tor_asprintf(&tag, "-----BEGIN %s-----\n", objtype); + if ((size_t)(eos-src) < strlen(tag) || fast_memneq(src, tag, strlen(tag))) { + tor_free(tag); + return -1; + } + src += strlen(tag); + tor_free(tag); + + // NOTE lack of trailing \n. We do not enforce its presence. + tor_asprintf(&tag, "\n-----END %s-----", objtype); + const char *end_of_base64 = tor_memstr(src, eos-src, tag); + tor_free(tag); + if (end_of_base64 == NULL) + return -1; + + /* Should we actually allow extra stuff at the end? */ + + return base64_decode((char*)dest, destlen, src, end_of_base64-src); +} diff --git a/src/lib/encoding/pem.h b/src/lib/encoding/pem.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ba2122884 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/encoding/pem.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001, Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file pem.h + * + * \brief Header for pem.c + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_PEM_H +#define TOR_PEM_H + +#include "orconfig.h" +#include <stddef.h> +#include "lib/cc/torint.h" + +size_t pem_encoded_size(size_t src_len, const char *objtype); +int pem_encode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const uint8_t *src, size_t srclen, + const char *objtype); +int pem_decode(uint8_t *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen, + const char *objtype); + +#endif diff --git a/src/test/include.am b/src/test/include.am index 46990597f..68372adc7 100644 --- a/src/test/include.am +++ b/src/test/include.am @@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ src_test_test_SOURCES += \ src/test/test_oom.c \ src/test/test_oos.c \ src/test/test_options.c \ + src/test/test_pem.c \ src/test/test_periodic_event.c \ src/test/test_policy.c \ src/test/test_procmon.c \ diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c index 745aa987a..94eae5a4f 100644 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@ -867,6 +867,7 @@ struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { { "crypto/", crypto_tests }, { "crypto/ope/", crypto_ope_tests }, { "crypto/openssl/", crypto_openssl_tests }, + { "crypto/pem/", pem_tests }, { "dir/", dir_tests }, { "dir_handle_get/", dir_handle_get_tests }, { "dir/md/", microdesc_tests }, diff --git a/src/test/test.h b/src/test/test.h index bfe50cbb8..b3a73271e 100644 --- a/src/test/test.h +++ b/src/test/test.h @@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ extern struct testcase_t nodelist_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t oom_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t oos_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t options_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t pem_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t periodic_event_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t policy_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t procmon_tests[]; diff --git a/src/test/test_pem.c b/src/test/test_pem.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2bae286e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_pem.c @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#include "orconfig.h" + +#include "lib/encoding/pem.h" +#include "lib/cc/compat_compiler.h" +#include "lib/malloc/malloc.h" + +#include "test/test.h" + +#include <string.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> + +static const char example_pre[] = + "Lest you get the wrong impression, we wombats " + "are not in the habit of tunneling madly about, without any supplies " + "or even a map."; /* -- Ursula Vernon, _Digger_ */ +static const char expected[] = + "-----BEGIN WOMBAT QUOTE-----\n" + "TGVzdCB5b3UgZ2V0IHRoZSB3cm9uZyBpbXByZXNzaW9uLCB3ZSB3b21iYXRzIGFy\n" + "ZSBub3QgaW4gdGhlIGhhYml0IG9mIHR1bm5lbGluZyBtYWRseSBhYm91dCwgd2l0\n" + "aG91dCBhbnkgc3VwcGxpZXMgb3IgZXZlbiBhIG1hcC4=\n" + "-----END WOMBAT QUOTE-----\n"; + +static void +test_crypto_pem_encode(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + + char buf[4096]; + + int n = (int) pem_encoded_size(strlen(example_pre), "WOMBAT QUOTE"); + + int n2 = pem_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), + (const unsigned char *)example_pre, strlen(example_pre), + "WOMBAT QUOTE"); + tt_int_op(strlen(buf)+1, OP_EQ, n); + tt_int_op(n2, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, expected); + + /* Now make sure it succeeds if the buffer is exactly the length we want. */ + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + n2 = pem_encode(buf, n, (const unsigned char *)example_pre, + strlen(example_pre), "WOMBAT QUOTE"); + tt_int_op(n2, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, expected); + + /* Make sure it fails if the buffer is too short. */ + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + n2 = pem_encode(buf, n - 1, (const unsigned char *)example_pre, + strlen(example_pre), "WOMBAT QUOTE"); + tt_int_op(n2, OP_EQ, -1); + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_crypto_pem_decode(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + + unsigned char buf[4096]; + + /* Try a straightforward decoding. */ + int n = pem_decode(buf, sizeof(buf), + expected, strlen(expected), + "WOMBAT QUOTE"); + tt_int_op(n, OP_EQ, strlen(example_pre)); + tt_mem_op(buf, OP_EQ, example_pre, n); + + /* Succeed if the buffer is exactly the right size. */ + memset(buf, 0xff, sizeof(buf)); + n = pem_decode(buf, strlen(example_pre), + expected, strlen(expected), + "WOMBAT QUOTE"); + tt_int_op(n, OP_EQ, strlen(example_pre)); + tt_mem_op(buf, OP_EQ, example_pre, n); + tt_int_op(buf[n], OP_EQ, 0xff); + + /* Verify that it fails if the buffer is too small. */ + memset(buf, 0xff, sizeof(buf)); + n = pem_decode(buf, strlen(example_pre) - 1, + expected, strlen(expected), + "WOMBAT QUOTE"); + tt_int_op(n, OP_EQ, -1); + + /* Verify that it fails with an incorrect tag. */ + memset(buf, 0xff, sizeof(buf)); + n = pem_decode(buf, sizeof(buf), + expected, strlen(expected), + "QUOKKA VOTE"); + tt_int_op(n, OP_EQ, -1); + + /* Try truncated buffers of different sizes. */ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i <= strlen(expected); ++i) { + char *truncated = tor_memdup(expected, i); + n = pem_decode(buf, sizeof(buf), + truncated, i, + "WOMBAT QUOTE"); + tor_free(truncated); + if (i < strlen(expected) - 1) { + tt_int_op(n, OP_EQ, -1); + } else { + tt_int_op(n, OP_EQ, strlen(example_pre)); + } + } + + done: + ; +} + +struct testcase_t pem_tests[] = { + { "encode", test_crypto_pem_encode, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "decode", test_crypto_pem_decode, 0, NULL, NULL }, + END_OF_TESTCASES +};

1 0

[tor/master] Refactor crypto_rsa to use pem module.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '18

05 Sep '18

commit b94e7de7dbf31a9b9bfe2d376013e279f15500f8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 19 17:09:23 2018 -0400 Refactor crypto_rsa to use pem module. This cleans up a lot of junk from crypto_rsa_openssl, and will save us duplicated code in crypto_rsa_nss (when it exists). (Actually, it already exists, but I am going to use git rebase so that this commit precedes the creation of crypto_rsa_nss.) --- src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.c | 253 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h | 16 +- src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c | 320 +++++---------------------------- src/test/test_crypto.c | 3 +- src/test/testing_rsakeys.c | 3 +- 5 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 278 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.c b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.c index 328fd732d..0f80bc967 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.c +++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.c @@ -23,8 +23,12 @@ #include "lib/log/log.h" #include "lib/encoding/binascii.h" +#include "lib/encoding/pem.h" #include <string.h> +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include <sys/stat.h> +#endif /** Return the number of bytes added by padding method padding. */ @@ -388,3 +392,252 @@ crypto_pk_get_common_digests(crypto_pk_t *pk, common_digests_t *digests_out) tor_free(buf); return rv; } + +static const char RSA_PUBLIC_TAG[] = "RSA PUBLIC KEY"; +static const char RSA_PRIVATE_TAG[] = "RSA PRIVATE KEY"; + +/** PEM-encode the public key portion of env and write it to a + * newly allocated string. On success, set *dest to the new + * string, *len to the string's length, and return 0. On + * failure, return -1. + */ +int +crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(crypto_pk_t *env, + char **dest, size_t *len) +{ + size_t buflen = crypto_pk_keysize(env) * 3; + char *buf = tor_malloc(buflen); + char *result = NULL; + size_t resultlen = 0; + int rv = -1; + + int n = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(env, buf, buflen); + if (n < 0) + goto done; + + resultlen = pem_encoded_size(n, RSA_PUBLIC_TAG); + result = tor_malloc(resultlen); + if (pem_encode(result, resultlen, + (const unsigned char *)buf, n, RSA_PUBLIC_TAG) < 0) { + goto done; + } + + *dest = result; + *len = resultlen; + rv = 0; + + done: + if (rv < 0 && result) { + memwipe(result, 0, resultlen); + tor_free(result); + } + memwipe(buf, 0, buflen); + tor_free(buf); + return rv; +} + +/** PEM-encode the private key portion of env and write it to a + * newly allocated string. On success, set *dest to the new + * string, *len to the string's length, and return 0. On + * failure, return -1. + */ +int +crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string(crypto_pk_t *env, + char **dest, size_t *len) +{ + size_t buflen = crypto_pk_keysize(env) * 16; + char *buf = tor_malloc(buflen); + char *result = NULL; + size_t resultlen = 0; + int rv = -1; + + int n = crypto_pk_asn1_encode_private(env, buf, buflen); + if (n < 0) + goto done; + + resultlen = pem_encoded_size(n, RSA_PRIVATE_TAG); + result = tor_malloc(resultlen); + if (pem_encode(result, resultlen, + (const unsigned char *)buf, n, RSA_PRIVATE_TAG) < 0) + goto done; + + *dest = result; + *len = resultlen; + rv = 0; + done: + if (rv < 0 && result) { + memwipe(result, 0, resultlen); + tor_free(result); + } + memwipe(buf, 0, buflen); + tor_free(buf); + return rv; +} + +/** Read a PEM-encoded public key from the first len characters of + * src, and store the result in env. Return 0 on success, -1 on + * failure. + */ +int +crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env, + const char *src, size_t len) +{ + if (len == (size_t)-1) + len = strlen(src); + + size_t buflen = len; + uint8_t *buf = tor_malloc(buflen); + int rv = -1; + + int n = pem_decode(buf, buflen, src, len, RSA_PUBLIC_TAG); + if (n < 0) + goto done; + + crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_pk_asn1_decode((const char*)buf, n); + if (! pk) + goto done; + + crypto_pk_assign_public(env, pk); + crypto_pk_free(pk); + rv = 0; + + done: + memwipe(buf, 0, buflen); + tor_free(buf); + return rv; +} + +/** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the len-byte string s + * into env. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. If len is -1, + * the string is nul-terminated. + */ +int +crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env, + const char *s, ssize_t len) +{ + if (len == -1) + len = strlen(s); + + size_t buflen = len; + uint8_t *buf = tor_malloc(buflen); + int rv = -1; + + int n = pem_decode(buf, buflen, s, len, RSA_PRIVATE_TAG); + if (n < 0) { + goto done; + } + + crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_pk_asn1_decode_private((const char *)buf, n); + if (! pk) + goto done; + + crypto_pk_assign_private(env, pk); + crypto_pk_free(pk); + rv = 0; + + done: + memwipe(buf, 0, buflen); + tor_free(buf); + return rv; +} + +/** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the file named by + * keyfile into env. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(crypto_pk_t *env, + const char *keyfile) +{ + struct stat st; + char *buf = read_file_to_str(keyfile, 0, &st); + if (!buf) + return -1; + + int rv = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(env, buf, st.st_size); + memwipe(buf, 0, st.st_size); + tor_free(buf); + return rv; +} + +/** Write the private key from env into the file named by fname, + * PEM-encoded. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(crypto_pk_t *env, + const char *fname) +{ + char *s = NULL; + size_t n = 0; + + if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string(env, &s, &n) < 0) + return -1; + + int rv = write_bytes_to_file(fname, s, n, 0); + memwipe(s, 0, n); + tor_free(s); + return rv; +} + +/** Given a crypto_pk_t pk, allocate a new buffer containing the + * Base64 encoding of the DER representation of the private key as a NUL + * terminated string, and return it via priv_out. Return 0 on + * success, -1 on failure. + * + * It is the caller's responsibility to sanitize and free the resulting buffer. + */ +int +crypto_pk_base64_encode_private(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char **priv_out) +{ + size_t buflen = crypto_pk_keysize(pk)*16; + char *buf = tor_malloc(buflen); + char *result = NULL; + size_t reslen = 0; + bool ok = false; + + int n = crypto_pk_asn1_encode_private(pk, buf, buflen); + + if (n < 0) + goto done; + + reslen = base64_encode_size(n, 0)+1; + result = tor_malloc(reslen); + if (base64_encode(result, reslen, buf, n, 0) < 0) + goto done; + + ok = true; + + done: + memwipe(buf, 0, buflen); + tor_free(buf); + if (result && ! ok) { + memwipe(result, 0, reslen); + tor_free(result); + } + *priv_out = result; + return ok ? 0 : -1; +} + +/** Given a string containing the Base64 encoded DER representation of the + * private key str, decode and return the result on success, or NULL + * on failure. + */ +crypto_pk_t * +crypto_pk_base64_decode_private(const char *str, size_t len) +{ + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; + + char *der = tor_malloc_zero(len + 1); + int der_len = base64_decode(der, len, str, len); + if (der_len <= 0) { + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Stored RSA private key seems corrupted (base64)."); + goto out; + } + + pk = crypto_pk_asn1_decode_private(der, der_len); + + out: + memwipe(der, 0, len+1); + tor_free(der); + + return pk; +} diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h index 4a5d92c6b..bcb2b51dd 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h +++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h @@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ int crypto_pk_private_sign(const crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen, const char *from, size_t fromlen); int crypto_pk_asn1_encode(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char *dest, size_t dest_len); crypto_pk_t *crypto_pk_asn1_decode(const char *str, size_t len); +int crypto_pk_asn1_encode_private(const crypto_pk_t *pk, + char *dest, size_t dest_len); +crypto_pk_t *crypto_pk_asn1_decode_private(const char *str, size_t len); int crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out,int add_space); int crypto_pk_get_hashed_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out); void crypto_add_spaces_to_fp(char *out, size_t outlen, const char *in); @@ -107,6 +110,14 @@ int crypto_pk_get_common_digests(crypto_pk_t *pk, int crypto_pk_base64_encode_private(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char **priv_out); crypto_pk_t *crypto_pk_base64_decode_private(const char *str, size_t len); +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +#ifdef ENABLE_NSS +struct SECItemStr; +STATIC int secitem_uint_cmp(const struct SECItemStr *a, + const struct SECItemStr *b); +#endif +#endif + #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL /* Prototypes for private functions only used by tortls.c, crypto.c, and the * unit tests. */ @@ -118,8 +129,7 @@ MOCK_DECL(struct evp_pkey_st *, crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_,( crypto_pk_t *env,int private)); #endif -#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS -void crypto_pk_assign_(crypto_pk_t *dest, const crypto_pk_t *src); -#endif +void crypto_pk_assign_public(crypto_pk_t *dest, const crypto_pk_t *src); +void crypto_pk_assign_private(crypto_pk_t *dest, const crypto_pk_t *src); #endif diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c index d1b56c3b6..9a3729a87 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c +++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa_openssl.c @@ -183,216 +183,6 @@ crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits,(crypto_pk_t *env, int bits)) return 0; } -/** A PEM callback that always reports a failure to get a password */ -static int -pem_no_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u) -{ - (void)buf; - (void)size; - (void)rwflag; - (void)u; - return -1; -} - -/** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the len-byte string s - * into env. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. If len is -1, - * the string is nul-terminated. - */ -int -crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env, - const char *s, ssize_t len) -{ - BIO *b; - - tor_assert(env); - tor_assert(s); - tor_assert(len < INT_MAX && len < SSIZE_T_CEILING); - - /* Create a read-only memory BIO, backed by the string 's' */ - b = BIO_new_mem_buf((char*)s, (int)len); - if (!b) - return -1; - - if (env->key) - RSA_free(env->key); - - env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(b,NULL,pem_no_password_cb,NULL); - - BIO_free(b); - - if (!env->key) { - crypto_openssl_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "Error parsing private key"); - return -1; - } - return 0; -} - -/** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the file named by - * keyfile into env. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. - */ -int -crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(crypto_pk_t *env, - const char *keyfile) -{ - char *contents; - int r; - - /* Read the file into a string. */ - contents = read_file_to_str(keyfile, 0, NULL); - if (!contents) { - log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Error reading private key from \"%s\"", keyfile); - return -1; - } - - /* Try to parse it. */ - r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(env, contents, -1); - memwipe(contents, 0, strlen(contents)); - tor_free(contents); - if (r) - return -1; /* read_private_key_from_string already warned, so we don't.*/ - - /* Make sure it's valid. */ - if (crypto_pk_check_key(env) <= 0) - return -1; - - return 0; -} - -/** Helper function to implement crypto_pk_write_*_key_to_string. Return 0 on - * success, -1 on failure. */ -static int -crypto_pk_write_key_to_string_impl(crypto_pk_t *env, char **dest, - size_t *len, int is_public) -{ - BUF_MEM *buf; - BIO *b; - int r; - - tor_assert(env); - tor_assert(env->key); - tor_assert(dest); - - b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* Create a memory BIO */ - if (!b) - return -1; - - /* Now you can treat b as if it were a file. Just use the - * PEM_*_bio_* functions instead of the non-bio variants. - */ - if (is_public) - r = PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(b, env->key); - else - r = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(b, env->key, NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); - - if (!r) { - crypto_openssl_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "writing RSA key to string"); - BIO_free(b); - return -1; - } - - BIO_get_mem_ptr(b, &buf); - - *dest = tor_malloc(buf->length+1); - memcpy(*dest, buf->data, buf->length); - (*dest)[buf->length] = 0; /* nul terminate it */ - *len = buf->length; - - BIO_free(b); - - return 0; -} - -/** PEM-encode the public key portion of env and write it to a - * newly allocated string. On success, set *dest to the new - * string, *len to the string's length, and return 0. On - * failure, return -1. - */ -int -crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(crypto_pk_t *env, char **dest, - size_t *len) -{ - return crypto_pk_write_key_to_string_impl(env, dest, len, 1); -} - -/** PEM-encode the private key portion of env and write it to a - * newly allocated string. On success, set *dest to the new - * string, *len to the string's length, and return 0. On - * failure, return -1. - */ -int -crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string(crypto_pk_t *env, char **dest, - size_t *len) -{ - return crypto_pk_write_key_to_string_impl(env, dest, len, 0); -} - -/** Read a PEM-encoded public key from the first len characters of - * src, and store the result in env. Return 0 on success, -1 on - * failure. - */ -int -crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env, const char *src, - size_t len) -{ - BIO *b; - - tor_assert(env); - tor_assert(src); - tor_assert(len<INT_MAX); - - b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* Create a memory BIO */ - if (!b) - return -1; - - BIO_write(b, src, (int)len); - - if (env->key) - RSA_free(env->key); - env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(b, NULL, pem_no_password_cb, NULL); - BIO_free(b); - if (!env->key) { - crypto_openssl_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "reading public key from string"); - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -/** Write the private key from env into the file named by fname, - * PEM-encoded. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. - */ -int -crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(crypto_pk_t *env, - const char *fname) -{ - BIO *bio; - char *cp; - long len; - char *s; - int r; - - tor_assert(crypto_pk_key_is_private(env)); - - if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) - return -1; - if (PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, env->key, NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL) - == 0) { - crypto_openssl_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "writing private key"); - BIO_free(bio); - return -1; - } - len = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &cp); - tor_assert(len >= 0); - s = tor_malloc(len+1); - memcpy(s, cp, len); - s[len]='\0'; - r = write_str_to_file(fname, s, 0); - BIO_free(bio); - memwipe(s, 0, strlen(s)); - tor_free(s); - return r; -} - /** Return true iff env has a valid key. */ int @@ -512,11 +302,11 @@ crypto_pk_dup_key(crypto_pk_t *env) return env; } -#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS -/** For testing: replace dest with src. (Dest must have a refcount - * of 1) */ +/** Replace dest with src (private key only). (Dest must have a refcount + * of 1) + */ void -crypto_pk_assign_(crypto_pk_t *dest, const crypto_pk_t *src) +crypto_pk_assign_private(crypto_pk_t *dest, const crypto_pk_t *src) { tor_assert(dest); tor_assert(dest->refs == 1); @@ -524,7 +314,19 @@ crypto_pk_assign_(crypto_pk_t *dest, const crypto_pk_t *src) RSA_free(dest->key); dest->key = RSAPrivateKey_dup(src->key); } -#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ + +/** Replace dest with src (public key only). (Dest must have a refcount + * of 1) + */ +void +crypto_pk_assign_public(crypto_pk_t *dest, const crypto_pk_t *src) +{ + tor_assert(dest); + tor_assert(dest->refs == 1); + tor_assert(src); + RSA_free(dest->key); + dest->key = RSAPublicKey_dup(src->key); +} /** Make a real honest-to-goodness copy of env, and return it. * Returns NULL on failure. */ @@ -733,74 +535,48 @@ crypto_pk_asn1_decode(const char *str, size_t len) return crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); } -/** Given a crypto_pk_t pk, allocate a new buffer containing the - * Base64 encoding of the DER representation of the private key as a NUL - * terminated string, and return it via priv_out. Return 0 on - * success, -1 on failure. - * - * It is the caller's responsibility to sanitize and free the resulting buffer. +/** ASN.1-encode the private portion of pk into dest. + * Return -1 on error, or the number of characters used on success. */ int -crypto_pk_base64_encode_private(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char **priv_out) +crypto_pk_asn1_encode_private(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char *dest, + size_t dest_len) { - unsigned char *der = NULL; - int der_len; - int ret = -1; - - *priv_out = NULL; + int len; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; - der_len = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pk->key, &der); - if (der_len < 0 || der == NULL) - return ret; + len = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pk->key, &buf); + if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) + return -1; - size_t priv_len = base64_encode_size(der_len, 0) + 1; - char *priv = tor_malloc_zero(priv_len); - if (base64_encode(priv, priv_len, (char *)der, der_len, 0) >= 0) { - *priv_out = priv; - ret = 0; - } else { - tor_free(priv); + if ((size_t)len > dest_len || dest_len > SIZE_T_CEILING) { + OPENSSL_free(buf); + return -1; } - - memwipe(der, 0, der_len); - OPENSSL_free(der); - return ret; + /* We don't encode directly into 'dest', because that would be illegal + * type-punning. (C99 is smarter than me, C99 is smarter than me...) + */ + memcpy(dest,buf,len); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + return len; } -/** Given a string containing the Base64 encoded DER representation of the - * private key str, decode and return the result on success, or NULL - * on failure. +/** Decode an ASN.1-encoded private key from str; return the result on + * success and NULL on failure. */ crypto_pk_t * -crypto_pk_base64_decode_private(const char *str, size_t len) +crypto_pk_asn1_decode_private(const char *str, size_t len) { - crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; - - char *der = tor_malloc_zero(len + 1); - int der_len = base64_decode(der, len, str, len); - if (der_len <= 0) { - log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Stored RSA private key seems corrupted (base64)."); - goto out; - } - - const unsigned char *dp = (unsigned char*)der; /* Shut the compiler up. */ - RSA *rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &dp, der_len); + RSA *rsa; + unsigned char *buf; + const unsigned char *cp; + cp = buf = tor_malloc(len); + memcpy(buf,str,len); + rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &cp, len); + tor_free(buf); if (!rsa) { - crypto_openssl_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "decoding private key"); - goto out; - } - - pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); - - /* Make sure it's valid. */ - if (crypto_pk_check_key(pk) <= 0) { - crypto_pk_free(pk); - pk = NULL; - goto out; + crypto_openssl_log_errors(LOG_WARN,"decoding public key"); + return NULL; } - - out: - memwipe(der, 0, len + 1); - tor_free(der); - return pk; + return crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); } diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 81d43ff13..90fb8d468 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -1519,7 +1519,8 @@ test_crypto_digests(void *arg) (void)arg; k = crypto_pk_new(); tt_assert(k); - r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(k, AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_3, -1); + r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(k, AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_3, + strlen(AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_3)); tt_assert(!r); r = crypto_pk_get_digest(k, digest); diff --git a/src/test/testing_rsakeys.c b/src/test/testing_rsakeys.c index a8c9ce4ce..c8062b82d 100644 --- a/src/test/testing_rsakeys.c +++ b/src/test/testing_rsakeys.c @@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits__get_cached(crypto_pk_t *env, int bits) { if (bits == 1024 || bits == 2048) { crypto_pk_t *newkey = pk_generate_internal(bits); - crypto_pk_assign_(env, newkey); + crypto_pk_assign_private(env, newkey); crypto_pk_free(newkey); } else { return crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits__real(env, bits); @@ -544,4 +544,3 @@ init_pregenerated_keys(void) crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits__get_cached); #endif /* defined(USE_PREGENERATED_RSA_KEYS) */ } -

1 0

[tor/master] Also reinitialize the pregenerated keys postfork.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '18

05 Sep '18

commit cb5cfe3177bbf841e5ad18c0103b3d2ebe443e07 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 31 18:42:42 2018 -0400 Also reinitialize the pregenerated keys postfork. --- src/test/testing_common.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/testing_common.c b/src/test/testing_common.c index 6957342c6..17a075680 100644 --- a/src/test/testing_common.c +++ b/src/test/testing_common.c @@ -227,7 +227,9 @@ void tinytest_postfork(void); void tinytest_postfork(void) { + free_pregenerated_keys(); crypto_postfork(); + init_pregenerated_keys(); } /** Main entry point for unit test code: parse the command line, and run

1 0

[tor/master] Split X509 code out of tortls.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '18

05 Sep '18

commit 9a4f05b05c12687e640d2aed9bb21229138bd1a5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Aug 11 18:16:04 2018 -0400 Split X509 code out of tortls.c --- src/core/or/channeltls.c | 1 + src/core/or/connection_or.c | 1 + src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c | 1 + src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c | 1 + src/lib/tls/include.am | 6 +- src/lib/tls/tortls.c | 506 +------------------------------------- src/lib/tls/tortls.h | 76 ++---- src/lib/tls/x509.c | 539 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/lib/tls/x509.h | 78 ++++++ src/test/test_link_handshake.c | 1 + src/test/test_tortls.c | 1 + 11 files changed, 649 insertions(+), 562 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/or/channeltls.c b/src/core/or/channeltls.c index 87f5a02b7..153813c4d 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/core/or/channeltls.c @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ #include "core/or/var_cell_st.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" /** How many CELL_PADDING cells have we received, ever? */ uint64_t stats_n_padding_cells_processed = 0; diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_or.c b/src/core/or/connection_or.c index c5ff10f6a..08371d1ad 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/core/or/connection_or.c @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn); static int connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn); diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c b/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c index a27608202..fe67e5640 100644 --- a/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c +++ b/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include "lib/log/log.h" #include "trunnel/link_handshake.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" #include "core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h" diff --git a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c index f12eb3d33..d018f300f 100644 --- a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c +++ b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "lib/term/getpass.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h" #define ENC_KEY_HEADER "Boxed Ed25519 key" diff --git a/src/lib/tls/include.am b/src/lib/tls/include.am index 9cc57ca77..1fd25a0b3 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/include.am +++ b/src/lib/tls/include.am @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ endif src_lib_libtor_tls_a_SOURCES = \ src/lib/tls/buffers_tls.c \ - src/lib/tls/tortls.c + src/lib/tls/tortls.c \ + src/lib/tls/x509.c src_lib_libtor_tls_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TOR_CFLAGS_CRYPTLIB) @@ -20,4 +21,5 @@ src_lib_libtor_tls_testing_a_CFLAGS = \ noinst_HEADERS += \ src/lib/tls/ciphers.inc \ src/lib/tls/buffers_tls.h \ - src/lib/tls/tortls.h + src/lib/tls/tortls.h \ + src/lib/tls/x509.h diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c index 466df8966..20e432081 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" /* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */ @@ -67,26 +68,6 @@ ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) #include "lib/arch/bytes.h" -#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API -#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \ - X509_get0_notBefore(cert) -#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \ - X509_get0_notAfter(cert) -#ifndef X509_get_notBefore -#define X509_get_notBefore(cert) \ - X509_getm_notBefore(cert) -#endif -#ifndef X509_get_notAfter -#define X509_get_notAfter(cert) \ - X509_getm_notAfter(cert) -#endif -#else /* ! OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ -#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \ - ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notBefore((X509 *)cert)) -#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \ - ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notAfter((X509 *)cert)) -#endif - /* Copied from or.h */ #define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \ "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789" @@ -162,10 +143,6 @@ tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const SSL *ssl) static void tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx); static void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx); -static int check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert, - time_t now, - int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance); - /** Global TLS contexts. We keep them here because nobody else needs * to touch them. * @@ -267,7 +244,7 @@ tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err, /** Log all pending tls errors at level severity in log domain * domain. Use doing to describe our current activities. */ -STATIC void +void tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, const char *doing) { unsigned long err; @@ -375,7 +352,7 @@ tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra, /** Initialize OpenSSL, unless it has already been initialized. */ -static void +void tor_tls_init(void) { check_no_tls_errors(); @@ -459,145 +436,6 @@ always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, return 1; } -/** Return a newly allocated X509 name with commonName cname. */ -static X509_NAME * -tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname) -{ - int nid; - X509_NAME *name; - /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START : these branches will only fail on OOM errors */ - if (!(name = X509_NAME_new())) - return NULL; - if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error; - if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC, - (unsigned char*)cname, -1, -1, 0))) - goto error; - /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */ - return name; - - /* LCOV_EXCL_START : these lines will only execute on out of memory errors*/ - error: - X509_NAME_free(name); - return NULL; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ -} - -/** Generate and sign an X509 certificate with the public key rsa, - * signed by the private key rsa_sign. The commonName of the - * certificate will be cname; the commonName of the issuer will be - * cname_sign. The cert will be valid for cert_lifetime - * seconds, starting from some time in the past. - * - * Return a certificate on success, NULL on failure. - */ -MOCK_IMPL(STATIC X509 *, -tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa, - crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, - const char *cname, - const char *cname_sign, - unsigned int cert_lifetime)) -{ - /* OpenSSL generates self-signed certificates with random 64-bit serial - * numbers, so let's do that too. */ -#define SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE 8 - - time_t start_time, end_time; - BIGNUM *serial_number = NULL; - unsigned char serial_tmp[SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE]; - EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL; - X509 *x509 = NULL; - X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL; - - tor_tls_init(); - - /* Make sure we're part-way through the certificate lifetime, rather - * than having it start right now. Don't choose quite uniformly, since - * then we might pick a time where we're about to expire. Lastly, be - * sure to start on a day boundary. */ - time_t now = time(NULL); - /* Our certificate lifetime will be cert_lifetime no matter what, but if we - * start cert_lifetime in the past, we'll have 0 real lifetime. instead we - * start up to (cert_lifetime - min_real_lifetime - start_granularity) in - * the past. */ - const time_t min_real_lifetime = 24*3600; - const time_t start_granularity = 24*3600; - time_t earliest_start_time; - /* Don't actually start in the future! */ - if (cert_lifetime <= min_real_lifetime + start_granularity) { - earliest_start_time = now - 1; - } else { - earliest_start_time = now + min_real_lifetime + start_granularity - - cert_lifetime; - } - start_time = crypto_rand_time_range(earliest_start_time, now); - /* Round the start time back to the start of a day. */ - start_time -= start_time % start_granularity; - - end_time = start_time + cert_lifetime; - - tor_assert(rsa); - tor_assert(cname); - tor_assert(rsa_sign); - tor_assert(cname_sign); - if (!(sign_pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa_sign,1))) - goto error; - if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,0))) - goto error; - if (!(x509 = X509_new())) - goto error; - if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2))) - goto error; - - { /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */ - crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp)); - if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL))) - goto error; - if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509)))) - goto error; - } - - if (!(name = tor_x509_name_new(cname))) - goto error; - if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name))) - goto error; - if (!(name_issuer = tor_x509_name_new(cname_sign))) - goto error; - if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer))) - goto error; - - if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time)) - goto error; - if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time)) - goto error; - if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey)) - goto error; - - if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha256())) - goto error; - - goto done; - error: - if (x509) { - X509_free(x509); - x509 = NULL; - } - done: - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "generating certificate"); - if (sign_pkey) - EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey); - if (pkey) - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - if (serial_number) - BN_clear_free(serial_number); - if (name) - X509_NAME_free(name); - if (name_issuer) - X509_NAME_free(name_issuer); - return x509; - -#undef SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE -} - /** List of ciphers that servers should select from when the client might be * claiming extra unsupported ciphers in order to avoid fingerprinting. */ static const char SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] = @@ -697,156 +535,6 @@ static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] = #undef CIPHER #undef XCIPHER -/** Free all storage held in cert */ -void -tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) -{ - if (! cert) - return; - if (cert->cert) - X509_free(cert->cert); - tor_free(cert->encoded); - memwipe(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert)); - /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since cert will never be NULL here */ - tor_free(cert); - /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */ -} - -/** - * Allocate a new tor_x509_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert". - * - * Steals a reference to x509_cert. - */ -MOCK_IMPL(STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *, -tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert)) -{ - tor_x509_cert_t *cert; - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - RSA *rsa; - int length; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - - if (!x509_cert) - return NULL; - - length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf); - cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) { - goto err; - } - cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length; - cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length); - memcpy(cert->encoded, buf, length); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - - cert->cert = x509_cert; - - crypto_common_digests(&cert->cert_digests, - (char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len); - - if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) && - (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) { - crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); - if (crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests) < 0) { - crypto_pk_free(pk); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - goto err; - } - - cert->pkey_digests_set = 1; - crypto_pk_free(pk); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - } - - return cert; - err: - /* LCOV_EXCL_START for the same reason as the exclusion above */ - tor_free(cert); - log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't wrap encoded X509 certificate."); - X509_free(x509_cert); - return NULL; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ -} - -/** Return a new copy of cert. */ -tor_x509_cert_t * -tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) -{ - tor_assert(cert); - X509 *x509 = cert->cert; - return tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(x509)); -} - -/** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly certificate_len, - * from a certificate. Return a newly allocated tor_x509_cert_t on - * success and NULL on failure. */ -tor_x509_cert_t * -tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len) -{ - X509 *x509; - const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)certificate; - tor_x509_cert_t *newcert; - tor_assert(certificate); - check_no_tls_errors(); - - if (certificate_len > INT_MAX) - goto err; - - x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)certificate_len); - - if (!x509) - goto err; /* Couldn't decode */ - if (cp - certificate != (int)certificate_len) { - X509_free(x509); - goto err; /* Didn't use all the bytes */ - } - newcert = tor_x509_cert_new(x509); - if (!newcert) { - goto err; - } - if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len || - fast_memneq(newcert->encoded, certificate, certificate_len)) { - /* Cert wasn't in DER */ - tor_x509_cert_free(newcert); - goto err; - } - return newcert; - err: - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "decoding a certificate"); - return NULL; -} - -/** Set *encoded_out and *size_out to cert's encoded DER - * representation and length, respectively. */ -void -tor_x509_cert_get_der(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, - const uint8_t **encoded_out, size_t *size_out) -{ - tor_assert(cert); - tor_assert(encoded_out); - tor_assert(size_out); - *encoded_out = cert->encoded; - *size_out = cert->encoded_len; -} - -/** Return a set of digests for the public key in cert, or NULL if this - * cert's public key is not one we know how to take the digest of. */ -const common_digests_t * -tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) -{ - if (cert->pkey_digests_set) - return &cert->pkey_digests; - else - return NULL; -} - -/** Return a set of digests for the public key in cert. */ -const common_digests_t * -tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) -{ - return &cert->cert_digests; -} - /** Remove a reference to ctx, and free it if it has no more * references. */ static void @@ -898,28 +586,6 @@ tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void) return client_tls_context->auth_key; } -/** - * Return a newly allocated copy of the public key that a certificate - * certifies. Watch out! This returns NULL if the cert's key is not RSA. - */ -crypto_pk_t * -tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) -{ - crypto_pk_t *result = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert); - RSA *rsa; - if (!pkey) - return NULL; - rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); - if (!rsa) { - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return NULL; - } - result = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return result; -} - /** Return true iff the other side of tls has authenticated to us, and * the key certified in cert is the same as the key they used to do it. */ @@ -946,71 +612,6 @@ tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)) return result; } -/** Check whether cert is well-formed, currently live, and correctly - * signed by the public key in signing_cert. If check_rsa_1024, - * make sure that it has an RSA key with 1024 bits; otherwise, just check that - * the key is long enough. Return 1 if the cert is good, and 0 if it's bad or - * we couldn't check it. */ -int -tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, - const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, - const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert, - time_t now, - int check_rsa_1024) -{ - check_no_tls_errors(); - EVP_PKEY *cert_key; - int r, key_ok = 0; - - if (!signing_cert || !cert) - goto bad; - - EVP_PKEY *signing_key = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert->cert); - if (!signing_key) - goto bad; - r = X509_verify(cert->cert, signing_key); - EVP_PKEY_free(signing_key); - if (r <= 0) - goto bad; - - /* okay, the signature checked out right. Now let's check the check the - * lifetime. */ - if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert, now, - 48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0) - goto bad; - - cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert); - if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) { - RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key); -#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - if (rsa && RSA_bits(rsa) == 1024) -#else - if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024) -#endif - key_ok = 1; - if (rsa) - RSA_free(rsa); - } else if (cert_key) { - int min_bits = 1024; -#ifdef EVP_PKEY_EC - if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(cert_key) == EVP_PKEY_EC) - min_bits = 128; -#endif - if (EVP_PKEY_bits(cert_key) >= min_bits) - key_ok = 1; - } - EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key); - if (!key_ok) - goto bad; - - /* XXXX compare DNs or anything? */ - - return 1; - bad: - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "checking a certificate"); - return 0; -} - /** Increase the reference count of ctx. */ static void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx) @@ -2146,63 +1747,6 @@ tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)) return tor_x509_cert_new(duplicate); } -/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */ -static void -log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem, - time_t now) -{ - BIO *bio = NULL; - BUF_MEM *buf; - char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL; - char mytime[33]; - struct tm tm; - size_t n; - - if (problem) - tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, - "Certificate %s. Either their clock is set wrong, or your clock " - "is wrong.", - problem); - - if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) { - log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end; - } - if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore_const(cert)))) { - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime"); - goto end; - } - BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf); - s1 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length); - - (void)BIO_reset(bio); - if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter_const(cert)))) { - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime"); - goto end; - } - BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf); - s2 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length); - - n = strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y UTC", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm)); - if (n > 0) { - tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, - "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)", - s1,s2,mytime); - } else { - tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, - "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. " - "Couldn't get your time.)", - s1, s2); - } - - end: - /* Not expected to get invoked */ - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "getting certificate lifetime"); - if (bio) - BIO_free(bio); - tor_free(s1); - tor_free(s2); -} - /** Helper function: try to extract a link certificate and an identity * certificate from tls, and store them in *cert_out and * *id_cert_out respectively. Log all messages at level @@ -2325,50 +1869,6 @@ tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, return r; } -/** Helper: check whether cert is expired give or take - * past_tolerance seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take - * future_tolerance seconds. (Relative to the current time - * now.) If it is live, return 0. If it is not live, log a message - * and return -1. */ -static int -check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert, - time_t now, - int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance) -{ - time_t t; - - t = now + future_tolerance; - if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore_const(cert), &t) > 0) { - log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid", now); - return -1; - } - t = now - past_tolerance; - if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter_const(cert), &t) < 0) { - log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired", now); - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS -/* Testing only: return a new x509 cert with the same contents as inp, - but with the expiration time new_expiration_time, signed with - signing_key. */ -STATIC tor_x509_cert_t * -tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp, - time_t new_expiration_time, - crypto_pk_t *signing_key) -{ - X509 *newc = X509_dup(inp->cert); - X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newc), 0, &new_expiration_time); - EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1); - tor_assert(X509_sign(newc, pk, EVP_sha256())); - EVP_PKEY_free(pk); - return tor_x509_cert_new(newc); -} -#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ - /** Return the number of bytes available for reading from tls. */ int diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.h b/src/lib/tls/tortls.h index fe192b2ab..a1d90c16b 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.h +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.h @@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ /* Opaque structure to hold a TLS connection. */ typedef struct tor_tls_t tor_tls_t; -/* Opaque structure to hold an X509 certificate. */ -typedef struct tor_x509_cert_t tor_x509_cert_t; +struct tor_x509_cert_t; /* Possible return values for most tor_tls_* functions. */ #define MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ -9 @@ -62,10 +61,11 @@ typedef enum { } tor_tls_state_t; #define tor_tls_state_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(tor_tls_state_t) -struct x509_st; +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL struct ssl_st; struct ssl_ctx_st; struct ssl_session_st; +#endif /** Holds a SSL_CTX object and related state used to configure TLS * connections. @@ -73,23 +73,13 @@ struct ssl_session_st; typedef struct tor_tls_context_t { int refcnt; struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx; - tor_x509_cert_t *my_link_cert; - tor_x509_cert_t *my_id_cert; - tor_x509_cert_t *my_auth_cert; + struct tor_x509_cert_t *my_link_cert; + struct tor_x509_cert_t *my_id_cert; + struct tor_x509_cert_t *my_auth_cert; crypto_pk_t *link_key; crypto_pk_t *auth_key; } tor_tls_context_t; -/** Structure that we use for a single certificate. */ -struct tor_x509_cert_t { - struct x509_st *cert; - uint8_t *encoded; - size_t encoded_len; - unsigned pkey_digests_set : 1; - common_digests_t cert_digests; - common_digests_t pkey_digests; -}; - /** Holds a SSL object and its associated data. Members are only * accessed from within tortls.c. */ @@ -134,15 +124,15 @@ STATIC int tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra, const char *doing, int severity, int domain); STATIC tor_tls_t *tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const struct ssl_st *ssl); STATIC void tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void); +MOCK_DECL(STATIC void, try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, + (int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, struct x509_st **cert_out, + struct x509_st **id_cert_out)); #ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE STATIC int always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx); STATIC int tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers); #endif STATIC int tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl); -MOCK_DECL(STATIC void, try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, - (int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, struct x509_st **cert_out, - struct x509_st **id_cert_out)); #ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY STATIC size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(struct ssl_session_st *s, uint8_t *out, @@ -161,23 +151,13 @@ STATIC int tor_tls_session_secret_cb(struct ssl_st *ssl, void *secret, STATIC int find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher); #endif /* defined(TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE) */ -MOCK_DECL(STATIC struct x509_st *, tor_tls_create_certificate, - (crypto_pk_t *rsa, - crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, - const char *cname, - const char *cname_sign, - unsigned int cert_lifetime)); STATIC tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned flags, int is_client); -MOCK_DECL(STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *, tor_x509_cert_new, - (struct x509_st *x509_cert)); STATIC int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned int flags, int is_client); -STATIC void tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, - const char *doing); #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS extern int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index; @@ -187,15 +167,10 @@ extern uint16_t v2_cipher_list[]; extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls; extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls; -STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration( - const tor_x509_cert_t *inp, - time_t new_expiration_time, - crypto_pk_t *signing_key); #endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ #endif /* defined(TORTLS_PRIVATE) */ -tor_x509_cert_t *tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert); const char *tor_tls_err_to_string(int err); void tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz); @@ -205,6 +180,9 @@ void tor_tls_free_all(void); #define TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256 (1u<<1) #define TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224 (1u<<2) +void tor_tls_init(void); +void tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, + const char *doing); int tor_tls_context_init(unsigned flags, crypto_pk_t *client_identity, crypto_pk_t *server_identity, @@ -218,8 +196,8 @@ int tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls); void tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls); #define tor_tls_free(tls) FREE_AND_NULL(tor_tls_t, tor_tls_free_, (tls)) int tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls); -MOCK_DECL(tor_x509_cert_t *,tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)); -MOCK_DECL(tor_x509_cert_t *,tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)); +MOCK_DECL(struct tor_x509_cert_t *,tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)); +MOCK_DECL(struct tor_x509_cert_t *,tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)); int tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity); int tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, time_t now, @@ -248,6 +226,8 @@ MOCK_DECL(double, tls_get_write_overhead_ratio, (void)); int tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls); int tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls); int tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls); +MOCK_DECL(int,tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, + const struct tor_x509_cert_t *cert)); MOCK_DECL(int,tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out)); MOCK_DECL(int,tor_tls_export_key_material,( tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out, @@ -263,29 +243,11 @@ void check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line); void tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err, int severity, int domain, const char *doing); -void tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert); -#define tor_x509_cert_free(c) \ - FREE_AND_NULL(tor_x509_cert_t, tor_x509_cert_free_, (c)) -tor_x509_cert_t *tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, - size_t certificate_len); -void tor_x509_cert_get_der(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, - const uint8_t **encoded_out, size_t *size_out); -const common_digests_t *tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests( - const tor_x509_cert_t *cert); -const common_digests_t *tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests( - const tor_x509_cert_t *cert); int tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server, - const tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out, - const tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out); + const struct tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out, + const struct tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out); crypto_pk_t *tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void); -crypto_pk_t *tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert); -MOCK_DECL(int,tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, - const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)); -int tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, - const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, - const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert, - time_t now, - int check_rsa_1024); + const char *tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls); int evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup); diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509.c b/src/lib/tls/x509.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..feded3473 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/tls/x509.c @@ -0,0 +1,539 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file x509.c + * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to + * X.509 functions from OpenSSL. + **/ + +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +//#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" + +/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in + * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */ +DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) + +#include <openssl/opensslv.h> + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support" +#endif + +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/asn1.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> + +ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) + +#include "lib/log/log.h" +#include "lib/log/util_bug.h" +#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h" +#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h" + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API +#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \ + X509_get0_notBefore(cert) +#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \ + X509_get0_notAfter(cert) +#ifndef X509_get_notBefore +#define X509_get_notBefore(cert) \ + X509_getm_notBefore(cert) +#endif +#ifndef X509_get_notAfter +#define X509_get_notAfter(cert) \ + X509_getm_notAfter(cert) +#endif +#else /* ! OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ +#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \ + ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notBefore((X509 *)cert)) +#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \ + ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notAfter((X509 *)cert)) +#endif + +/** Return a newly allocated X509 name with commonName cname. */ +static X509_NAME * +tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname) +{ + int nid; + X509_NAME *name; + /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START : these branches will only fail on OOM errors */ + if (!(name = X509_NAME_new())) + return NULL; + if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error; + if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC, + (unsigned char*)cname, -1, -1, 0))) + goto error; + /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */ + return name; + + /* LCOV_EXCL_START : these lines will only execute on out of memory errors*/ + error: + X509_NAME_free(name); + return NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ +} + +/** Generate and sign an X509 certificate with the public key rsa, + * signed by the private key rsa_sign. The commonName of the + * certificate will be cname; the commonName of the issuer will be + * cname_sign. The cert will be valid for cert_lifetime + * seconds, starting from some time in the past. + * + * Return a certificate on success, NULL on failure. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(X509 *, +tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa, + crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, + const char *cname, + const char *cname_sign, + unsigned int cert_lifetime)) +{ + /* OpenSSL generates self-signed certificates with random 64-bit serial + * numbers, so let's do that too. */ +#define SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE 8 + + time_t start_time, end_time; + BIGNUM *serial_number = NULL; + unsigned char serial_tmp[SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE]; + EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL; + X509 *x509 = NULL; + X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL; + + tor_tls_init(); + + /* Make sure we're part-way through the certificate lifetime, rather + * than having it start right now. Don't choose quite uniformly, since + * then we might pick a time where we're about to expire. Lastly, be + * sure to start on a day boundary. */ + time_t now = time(NULL); + /* Our certificate lifetime will be cert_lifetime no matter what, but if we + * start cert_lifetime in the past, we'll have 0 real lifetime. instead we + * start up to (cert_lifetime - min_real_lifetime - start_granularity) in + * the past. */ + const time_t min_real_lifetime = 24*3600; + const time_t start_granularity = 24*3600; + time_t earliest_start_time; + /* Don't actually start in the future! */ + if (cert_lifetime <= min_real_lifetime + start_granularity) { + earliest_start_time = now - 1; + } else { + earliest_start_time = now + min_real_lifetime + start_granularity + - cert_lifetime; + } + start_time = crypto_rand_time_range(earliest_start_time, now); + /* Round the start time back to the start of a day. */ + start_time -= start_time % start_granularity; + + end_time = start_time + cert_lifetime; + + tor_assert(rsa); + tor_assert(cname); + tor_assert(rsa_sign); + tor_assert(cname_sign); + if (!(sign_pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa_sign,1))) + goto error; + if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,0))) + goto error; + if (!(x509 = X509_new())) + goto error; + if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2))) + goto error; + + { /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */ + crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp)); + if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL))) + goto error; + if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509)))) + goto error; + } + + if (!(name = tor_x509_name_new(cname))) + goto error; + if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name))) + goto error; + if (!(name_issuer = tor_x509_name_new(cname_sign))) + goto error; + if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer))) + goto error; + + if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time)) + goto error; + if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time)) + goto error; + if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey)) + goto error; + + if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha256())) + goto error; + + goto done; + error: + if (x509) { + X509_free(x509); + x509 = NULL; + } + done: + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "generating certificate"); + if (sign_pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey); + if (pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (serial_number) + BN_clear_free(serial_number); + if (name) + X509_NAME_free(name); + if (name_issuer) + X509_NAME_free(name_issuer); + return x509; + +#undef SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE +} + +/** Free all storage held in cert */ +void +tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + if (! cert) + return; + if (cert->cert) + X509_free(cert->cert); + tor_free(cert->encoded); + memwipe(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert)); + /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since cert will never be NULL here */ + tor_free(cert); + /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */ +} + +/** + * Allocate a new tor_x509_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert". + * + * Steals a reference to x509_cert. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *, +tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert)) +{ + tor_x509_cert_t *cert; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + RSA *rsa; + int length; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + if (!x509_cert) + return NULL; + + length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf); + cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) { + goto err; + } + cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length; + cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length); + memcpy(cert->encoded, buf, length); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + + cert->cert = x509_cert; + + crypto_common_digests(&cert->cert_digests, + (char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len); + + if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) && + (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) { + crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); + if (crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests) < 0) { + crypto_pk_free(pk); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + goto err; + } + + cert->pkey_digests_set = 1; + crypto_pk_free(pk); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + } + + return cert; + err: + /* LCOV_EXCL_START for the same reason as the exclusion above */ + tor_free(cert); + log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't wrap encoded X509 certificate."); + X509_free(x509_cert); + return NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ +} + +/** Return a new copy of cert. */ +tor_x509_cert_t * +tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + tor_assert(cert); + X509 *x509 = cert->cert; + return tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(x509)); +} + +/** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly certificate_len, + * from a certificate. Return a newly allocated tor_x509_cert_t on + * success and NULL on failure. */ +tor_x509_cert_t * +tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len) +{ + X509 *x509; + const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)certificate; + tor_x509_cert_t *newcert; + tor_assert(certificate); + check_no_tls_errors(); + + if (certificate_len > INT_MAX) + goto err; + + x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)certificate_len); + + if (!x509) + goto err; /* Couldn't decode */ + if (cp - certificate != (int)certificate_len) { + X509_free(x509); + goto err; /* Didn't use all the bytes */ + } + newcert = tor_x509_cert_new(x509); + if (!newcert) { + goto err; + } + if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len || + fast_memneq(newcert->encoded, certificate, certificate_len)) { + /* Cert wasn't in DER */ + tor_x509_cert_free(newcert); + goto err; + } + return newcert; + err: + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "decoding a certificate"); + return NULL; +} + +/** Set *encoded_out and *size_out to cert's encoded DER + * representation and length, respectively. */ +void +tor_x509_cert_get_der(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, + const uint8_t **encoded_out, size_t *size_out) +{ + tor_assert(cert); + tor_assert(encoded_out); + tor_assert(size_out); + *encoded_out = cert->encoded; + *size_out = cert->encoded_len; +} + +/** Return a set of digests for the public key in cert, or NULL if this + * cert's public key is not one we know how to take the digest of. */ +const common_digests_t * +tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + if (cert->pkey_digests_set) + return &cert->pkey_digests; + else + return NULL; +} + +/** Return a set of digests for the public key in cert. */ +const common_digests_t * +tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + return &cert->cert_digests; +} + +/** + * Return a newly allocated copy of the public key that a certificate + * certifies. Watch out! This returns NULL if the cert's key is not RSA. + */ +crypto_pk_t * +tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + crypto_pk_t *result = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert); + RSA *rsa; + if (!pkey) + return NULL; + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (!rsa) { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + return NULL; + } + result = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + return result; +} + +/** Check whether cert is well-formed, currently live, and correctly + * signed by the public key in signing_cert. If check_rsa_1024, + * make sure that it has an RSA key with 1024 bits; otherwise, just check that + * the key is long enough. Return 1 if the cert is good, and 0 if it's bad or + * we couldn't check it. */ +int +tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, + const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, + const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert, + time_t now, + int check_rsa_1024) +{ + check_no_tls_errors(); + EVP_PKEY *cert_key; + int r, key_ok = 0; + + if (!signing_cert || !cert) + goto bad; + + EVP_PKEY *signing_key = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert->cert); + if (!signing_key) + goto bad; + r = X509_verify(cert->cert, signing_key); + EVP_PKEY_free(signing_key); + if (r <= 0) + goto bad; + + /* okay, the signature checked out right. Now let's check the check the + * lifetime. */ + if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert, now, + 48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0) + goto bad; + + cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert); + if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) { + RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key); +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + if (rsa && RSA_bits(rsa) == 1024) +#else + if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024) +#endif + key_ok = 1; + if (rsa) + RSA_free(rsa); + } else if (cert_key) { + int min_bits = 1024; +#ifdef EVP_PKEY_EC + if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(cert_key) == EVP_PKEY_EC) + min_bits = 128; +#endif + if (EVP_PKEY_bits(cert_key) >= min_bits) + key_ok = 1; + } + EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key); + if (!key_ok) + goto bad; + + /* XXXX compare DNs or anything? */ + + return 1; + bad: + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "checking a certificate"); + return 0; +} + +/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */ +static void +log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem, + time_t now) +{ + BIO *bio = NULL; + BUF_MEM *buf; + char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL; + char mytime[33]; + struct tm tm; + size_t n; + + if (problem) + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, + "Certificate %s. Either their clock is set wrong, or your clock " + "is wrong.", + problem); + + if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end; + } + if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore_const(cert)))) { + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime"); + goto end; + } + BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf); + s1 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length); + + (void)BIO_reset(bio); + if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter_const(cert)))) { + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime"); + goto end; + } + BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf); + s2 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length); + + n = strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y UTC", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm)); + if (n > 0) { + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, + "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)", + s1,s2,mytime); + } else { + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, + "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. " + "Couldn't get your time.)", + s1, s2); + } + + end: + /* Not expected to get invoked */ + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "getting certificate lifetime"); + if (bio) + BIO_free(bio); + tor_free(s1); + tor_free(s2); +} + +/** Helper: check whether cert is expired give or take + * past_tolerance seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take + * future_tolerance seconds. (Relative to the current time + * now.) If it is live, return 0. If it is not live, log a message + * and return -1. */ +int +check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert, + time_t now, + int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance) +{ + time_t t; + + t = now + future_tolerance; + if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore_const(cert), &t) > 0) { + log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid", now); + return -1; + } + t = now - past_tolerance; + if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter_const(cert), &t) < 0) { + log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired", now); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +/* Testing only: return a new x509 cert with the same contents as inp, + but with the expiration time new_expiration_time, signed with + signing_key. */ +STATIC tor_x509_cert_t * +tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp, + time_t new_expiration_time, + crypto_pk_t *signing_key) +{ + X509 *newc = X509_dup(inp->cert); + X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newc), 0, &new_expiration_time); + EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1); + tor_assert(X509_sign(newc, pk, EVP_sha256())); + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + return tor_x509_cert_new(newc); +} +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509.h b/src/lib/tls/x509.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2f3f3a410 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/tls/x509.h @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_X509_H +#define TOR_X509_H + +/** + * \file x509.h + * \brief Headers for tortls.c + **/ + +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" +#include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h" + +/* Opaque structure to hold an X509 certificate. */ +typedef struct tor_x509_cert_t tor_x509_cert_t; + +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL +struct x509_st; +#endif + +/** Structure that we use for a single certificate. */ +struct tor_x509_cert_t { +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL + struct x509_st *cert; +#endif + uint8_t *encoded; + size_t encoded_len; + unsigned pkey_digests_set : 1; + common_digests_t cert_digests; + common_digests_t pkey_digests; +}; + +MOCK_DECL(struct x509_st *, tor_tls_create_certificate, + (crypto_pk_t *rsa, + crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, + const char *cname, + const char *cname_sign, + unsigned int cert_lifetime)); +MOCK_DECL(tor_x509_cert_t *, tor_x509_cert_new, + (struct x509_st *x509_cert)); + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +tor_x509_cert_t *tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration( + const tor_x509_cert_t *inp, + time_t new_expiration_time, + crypto_pk_t *signing_key); +#endif + +tor_x509_cert_t *tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert); + +void tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert); +#define tor_x509_cert_free(c) \ + FREE_AND_NULL(tor_x509_cert_t, tor_x509_cert_free_, (c)) +tor_x509_cert_t *tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, + size_t certificate_len); +void tor_x509_cert_get_der(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, + const uint8_t **encoded_out, size_t *size_out); +const common_digests_t *tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests( + const tor_x509_cert_t *cert); +const common_digests_t *tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests( + const tor_x509_cert_t *cert); + +crypto_pk_t *tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert); +int tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, + const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, + const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert, + time_t now, + int check_rsa_1024); + +int check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert, + time_t now, + int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance); + +#endif diff --git a/src/test/test_link_handshake.c b/src/test/test_link_handshake.c index e0d12fb47..c1ede5420 100644 --- a/src/test/test_link_handshake.c +++ b/src/test/test_link_handshake.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include "core/or/var_cell_st.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" #include "test/test.h" #include "test/log_test_helpers.h" diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.c b/src/test/test_tortls.c index cd3435556..f5b11d4f2 100644 --- a/src/test/test_tortls.c +++ b/src/test/test_tortls.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) #include "lib/log/log.h" #include "app/config/config.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" #include "app/config/or_state_st.h" #include "test/test.h"

1 0

[tor/master] Extract tortls structures into a new header; clean up a little
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '18

05 Sep '18

commit 598bc78bfa62e0879497c0ef03999d3700a5cd16 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Aug 11 19:38:07 2018 -0400 Extract tortls structures into a new header; clean up a little --- src/lib/tls/tortls.c | 5 ++-- src/lib/tls/tortls.h | 58 +----------------------------------- src/lib/tls/tortls_st.h | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/lib/tls/x509.c | 11 ++++++- src/lib/tls/x509.h | 24 ++++++++------- src/test/test_link_handshake.c | 1 + src/test/test_tortls.c | 3 ++ 7 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c index 20e432081..cb507057e 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" #include "lib/tls/x509.h" /* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in @@ -51,8 +52,8 @@ DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) -#define TORTLS_PRIVATE #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h" #include "lib/log/log.h" #include "lib/log/util_bug.h" #include "lib/container/smartlist.h" @@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)) if (!peercert) return 0; link_key = X509_get_pubkey(peercert); - cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert); + cert_key = X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)tor_x509_cert_get_impl(cert)); result = link_key && cert_key && EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_key, link_key) == 1; diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.h b/src/lib/tls/tortls.h index a1d90c16b..f46e73267 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.h +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.h @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ **/ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h" -#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" #include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h" /* Opaque structure to hold a TLS connection. */ @@ -52,14 +51,6 @@ struct tor_x509_cert_t; #define TOR_TLS_IS_ERROR(rv) ((rv) < TOR_TLS_CLOSE) #ifdef TORTLS_PRIVATE -#define TOR_TLS_MAGIC 0x71571571 - -typedef enum { - TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE, TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN, TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE, - TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED, TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE, - TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT -} tor_tls_state_t; -#define tor_tls_state_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(tor_tls_state_t) #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL struct ssl_st; @@ -70,54 +61,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st; /** Holds a SSL_CTX object and related state used to configure TLS * connections. */ -typedef struct tor_tls_context_t { - int refcnt; - struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx; - struct tor_x509_cert_t *my_link_cert; - struct tor_x509_cert_t *my_id_cert; - struct tor_x509_cert_t *my_auth_cert; - crypto_pk_t *link_key; - crypto_pk_t *auth_key; -} tor_tls_context_t; - -/** Holds a SSL object and its associated data. Members are only - * accessed from within tortls.c. - */ -struct tor_tls_t { - uint32_t magic; - tor_tls_context_t *context; /** A link to the context object for this tls. */ - struct ssl_st *ssl; /**< An OpenSSL SSL object. */ - int socket; /**< The underlying file descriptor for this TLS connection. */ - char *address; /**< An address to log when describing this connection. */ - tor_tls_state_bitfield_t state : 3; /**< The current SSL state, - * depending on which operations - * have completed successfully. */ - unsigned int isServer:1; /**< True iff this is a server-side connection */ - unsigned int wasV2Handshake:1; /**< True iff the original handshake for - * this connection used the updated version - * of the connection protocol (client sends - * different cipher list, server sends only - * one certificate). */ - /** True iff we should call negotiated_callback when we're done reading. */ - unsigned int got_renegotiate:1; - /** Return value from tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers, or 0 if we haven't - * called that function yet. */ - int8_t client_cipher_list_type; - /** Incremented every time we start the server side of a handshake. */ - uint8_t server_handshake_count; - size_t wantwrite_n; /**< 0 normally, >0 if we returned wantwrite last - * time. */ - /** Last values retrieved from BIO_number_read()/write(); see - * tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes() for usage. - */ - unsigned long last_write_count; - unsigned long last_read_count; - /** If set, a callback to invoke whenever the client tries to renegotiate - * the handshake. */ - void (*negotiated_callback)(tor_tls_t *tls, void *arg); - /** Argument to pass to negotiated_callback. */ - void *callback_arg; -}; +typedef struct tor_tls_context_t tor_tls_context_t; STATIC int tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e); STATIC int tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra, diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_st.h b/src/lib/tls/tortls_st.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..897be497e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_st.h @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_TORTLS_ST_H +#define TOR_TORTLS_ST_H + +#define TOR_TLS_MAGIC 0x71571571 + +typedef enum { + TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE, TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN, TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE, + TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED, TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE, + TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT +} tor_tls_state_t; +#define tor_tls_state_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(tor_tls_state_t) + +struct tor_tls_context_t { + int refcnt; + struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx; + struct tor_x509_cert_t *my_link_cert; + struct tor_x509_cert_t *my_id_cert; + struct tor_x509_cert_t *my_auth_cert; + crypto_pk_t *link_key; + crypto_pk_t *auth_key; +}; + +/** Holds a SSL object and its associated data. Members are only + * accessed from within tortls.c. + */ +struct tor_tls_t { + uint32_t magic; + tor_tls_context_t *context; /** A link to the context object for this tls. */ + struct ssl_st *ssl; /**< An OpenSSL SSL object. */ + int socket; /**< The underlying file descriptor for this TLS connection. */ + char *address; /**< An address to log when describing this connection. */ + tor_tls_state_bitfield_t state : 3; /**< The current SSL state, + * depending on which operations + * have completed successfully. */ + unsigned int isServer:1; /**< True iff this is a server-side connection */ + unsigned int wasV2Handshake:1; /**< True iff the original handshake for + * this connection used the updated version + * of the connection protocol (client sends + * different cipher list, server sends only + * one certificate). */ + /** True iff we should call negotiated_callback when we're done reading. */ + unsigned int got_renegotiate:1; + /** Return value from tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers, or 0 if we haven't + * called that function yet. */ + int8_t client_cipher_list_type; + /** Incremented every time we start the server side of a handshake. */ + uint8_t server_handshake_count; + size_t wantwrite_n; /**< 0 normally, >0 if we returned wantwrite last + * time. */ + /** Last values retrieved from BIO_number_read()/write(); see + * tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes() for usage. + */ + unsigned long last_write_count; + unsigned long last_read_count; + /** If set, a callback to invoke whenever the client tries to renegotiate + * the handshake. */ + void (*negotiated_callback)(tor_tls_t *tls, void *arg); + /** Argument to pass to negotiated_callback. */ + void *callback_arg; +}; + +#endif diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509.c b/src/lib/tls/x509.c index feded3473..27cba1be6 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/x509.c +++ b/src/lib/tls/x509.c @@ -9,11 +9,12 @@ * X.509 functions from OpenSSL. **/ +#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE #include "lib/tls/x509.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" -//#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" /* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */ @@ -332,6 +333,14 @@ tor_x509_cert_get_der(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, *size_out = cert->encoded_len; } +/** Return the underlying implementation for cert */ +const tor_x509_cert_impl_t * +tor_x509_cert_get_impl(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + tor_assert(cert); + return cert->cert; +} + /** Return a set of digests for the public key in cert, or NULL if this * cert's public key is not one we know how to take the digest of. */ const common_digests_t * diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509.h b/src/lib/tls/x509.h index 2f3f3a410..4dadba06d 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/x509.h +++ b/src/lib/tls/x509.h @@ -12,36 +12,35 @@ **/ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h" -#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" #include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h" /* Opaque structure to hold an X509 certificate. */ typedef struct tor_x509_cert_t tor_x509_cert_t; #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL -struct x509_st; +typedef struct x509_st tor_x509_cert_impl_t; #endif +#ifdef TOR_X509_PRIVATE /** Structure that we use for a single certificate. */ struct tor_x509_cert_t { -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL - struct x509_st *cert; -#endif + tor_x509_cert_impl_t *cert; uint8_t *encoded; size_t encoded_len; unsigned pkey_digests_set : 1; common_digests_t cert_digests; common_digests_t pkey_digests; }; +#endif -MOCK_DECL(struct x509_st *, tor_tls_create_certificate, +MOCK_DECL(tor_x509_cert_impl_t *, tor_tls_create_certificate, (crypto_pk_t *rsa, crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, const char *cname, const char *cname_sign, unsigned int cert_lifetime)); MOCK_DECL(tor_x509_cert_t *, tor_x509_cert_new, - (struct x509_st *x509_cert)); + (tor_x509_cert_impl_t *x509_cert)); #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS tor_x509_cert_t *tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration( @@ -57,22 +56,27 @@ void tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert); FREE_AND_NULL(tor_x509_cert_t, tor_x509_cert_free_, (c)) tor_x509_cert_t *tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len); +const tor_x509_cert_impl_t *tor_x509_cert_get_impl( + const tor_x509_cert_t *cert); void tor_x509_cert_get_der(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, const uint8_t **encoded_out, size_t *size_out); + const common_digests_t *tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests( const tor_x509_cert_t *cert); const common_digests_t *tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests( const tor_x509_cert_t *cert); crypto_pk_t *tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert); + int tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert, time_t now, int check_rsa_1024); -int check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert, - time_t now, - int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance); +int check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, + const tor_x509_cert_impl_t *cert, + time_t now, + int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance); #endif diff --git a/src/test/test_link_handshake.c b/src/test/test_link_handshake.c index c1ede5420..e4722b4df 100644 --- a/src/test/test_link_handshake.c +++ b/src/test/test_link_handshake.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h" #include "core/or/var_cell_st.h" +#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" #include "lib/tls/x509.h" diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.c b/src/test/test_tortls.c index f5b11d4f2..ec197ba99 100644 --- a/src/test/test_tortls.c +++ b/src/test/test_tortls.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #define TORTLS_PRIVATE #define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE +#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE #define LOG_PRIVATE #include "orconfig.h" @@ -33,7 +34,9 @@ ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) #include "core/or/or.h" #include "lib/log/log.h" #include "app/config/config.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h" #include "lib/tls/x509.h" #include "app/config/or_state_st.h"

1 0

[tor/master] The RSA_free in this test is no longer needed or wanted
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '18

05 Sep '18

commit 3ccb94d7b6ff6806bc17d71ef461f4211a014879 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Aug 11 16:36:05 2018 -0400 The RSA_free in this test is no longer needed or wanted --- src/test/test_tortls.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.c b/src/test/test_tortls.c index 49a39e264..cd3435556 100644 --- a/src/test/test_tortls.c +++ b/src/test/test_tortls.c @@ -702,7 +702,6 @@ test_tortls_get_my_client_auth_key(void *ignored) tt_assert(ret == expected); done: - RSA_free(k); tor_free(expected); tor_free(ctx); }

1 0

[tor/master] Split tls modules and their tests into openssl and generic.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '18

05 Sep '18

commit 1992c761308538cffea64abecc9e45cbd47b1bda Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Aug 12 16:04:12 2018 -0400 Split tls modules and their tests into openssl and generic. Also, add a stubbed-out nss version of the modules. The tests won't pass with NSS yet since the NSS modules don't do anything. This is a good patch to read with --color-moved. --- src/lib/tls/include.am | 12 + src/lib/tls/tortls.c | 2055 +----------------------------- src/lib/tls/tortls.h | 64 +- src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h | 65 + src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 432 +++++++ src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c | 2032 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/lib/tls/x509.c | 479 +------ src/lib/tls/x509.h | 4 +- src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c | 122 ++ src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c | 489 +++++++ src/test/include.am | 8 + src/test/test.c | 3 + src/test/test.h | 1 + src/test/test_tortls.c | 2732 ++-------------------------------------- src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c | 2597 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 15 files changed, 5873 insertions(+), 5222 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/tls/include.am b/src/lib/tls/include.am index 1fd25a0b3..173104903 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/include.am +++ b/src/lib/tls/include.am @@ -10,6 +10,16 @@ src_lib_libtor_tls_a_SOURCES = \ src/lib/tls/tortls.c \ src/lib/tls/x509.c +if USE_NSS +src_lib_libtor_tls_a_SOURCES += \ + src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c \ + src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c +else +src_lib_libtor_tls_a_SOURCES += \ + src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c \ + src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c +endif + src_lib_libtor_tls_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TOR_CFLAGS_CRYPTLIB) src_lib_libtor_tls_testing_a_SOURCES = \ @@ -22,4 +32,6 @@ noinst_HEADERS += \ src/lib/tls/ciphers.inc \ src/lib/tls/buffers_tls.h \ src/lib/tls/tortls.h \ + src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h \ + src/lib/tls/tortls_st.h \ src/lib/tls/x509.h diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c index 4c5dedb57..4b35177df 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c @@ -3,146 +3,13 @@ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ -/** - * \file tortls.c - * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to - * TLS, SSL, and X.509 functions from OpenSSL. - **/ - -/* (Unlike other tor functions, these - * are prefixed with tor_ in order to avoid conflicting with OpenSSL - * functions and variables.) - */ - -#include "orconfig.h" - #define TORTLS_PRIVATE -#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE - -#ifdef _WIN32 /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/ - #include <winsock2.h> - #include <ws2tcpip.h> -#endif - -#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h" -#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" -#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h" -#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" -#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" #include "lib/tls/x509.h" - -/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in - * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */ -DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) - -#include <openssl/opensslv.h> - -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC -#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support" -#endif - -#include <openssl/ssl.h> -#include <openssl/ssl3.h> -#include <openssl/err.h> -#include <openssl/tls1.h> -#include <openssl/asn1.h> -#include <openssl/bio.h> -#include <openssl/bn.h> -#include <openssl/rsa.h> - -ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) - #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h" -#include "lib/log/log.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h" #include "lib/log/util_bug.h" -#include "lib/container/smartlist.h" -#include "lib/string/compat_string.h" -#include "lib/string/printf.h" -#include "lib/net/socket.h" #include "lib/intmath/cmp.h" -#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h" -#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h" - -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <string.h> - -#include "lib/arch/bytes.h" - -/* Copied from or.h */ -#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \ - "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789" - -/** How long do identity certificates live? (sec) */ -#define IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME (365*24*60*60) - -#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer") - -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') -/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 1.0.0f. It does not have - * the CVE-2011-4576 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and - * SSL3 safely at the same time. - */ -#define DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE -#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') */ - -/* We redefine these so that we can run correctly even if the vendor gives us - * a version of OpenSSL that does not match its header files. (Apple: I am - * looking at you.) - */ -#ifndef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L -#endif -#ifndef SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010 -#endif - -/** Return values for tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers. - * - * @{ - */ -/** An error occurred when examining the client ciphers */ -#define CIPHERS_ERR -1 -/** The client cipher list indicates that a v1 handshake was in use. */ -#define CIPHERS_V1 1 -/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the - * v3 handshake, but that it is (probably!) lying about what ciphers it - * supports */ -#define CIPHERS_V2 2 -/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the - * v3 handshake, and that it is telling the truth about what ciphers it - * supports */ -#define CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED 3 -/** @} */ - -/** The ex_data index in which we store a pointer to an SSL object's - * corresponding tor_tls_t object. */ -STATIC int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index = -1; - -/** Helper: Allocate tor_tls_object_ex_data_index. */ -STATIC void -tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void) -{ - if (tor_tls_object_ex_data_index == -1) { - tor_tls_object_ex_data_index = - SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); - tor_assert(tor_tls_object_ex_data_index != -1); - } -} - -/** Helper: given a SSL* pointer, return the tor_tls_t object using that - * pointer. */ -STATIC tor_tls_t * -tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const SSL *ssl) -{ - tor_tls_t *result = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index); - if (result) - tor_assert(result->magic == TOR_TLS_MAGIC); - return result; -} - -static void tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx); -static void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx); /** Global TLS contexts. We keep them here because nobody else needs * to touch them. @@ -152,126 +19,37 @@ STATIC tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context = NULL; STATIC tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context = NULL; /**@}*/ -/** True iff tor_tls_init() has been called. */ -static int tls_library_is_initialized = 0; - -/* Module-internal error codes. */ -#define TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 2) -#define TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 1) - -/** Write a description of the current state of tls into the - * sz-byte buffer at buf. */ -void -tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz) +/** + * Return the appropriate TLS context. + */ +tor_tls_context_t * +tor_tls_context_get(int is_server) { - const char *ssl_state; - const char *tortls_state; - - if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!tls || !tls->ssl)) { - strlcpy(buf, "(No SSL object)", sz); - return; - } - - ssl_state = SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl); - switch (tls->state) { -#define CASE(st) case TOR_TLS_ST_##st: tortls_state = " in "#st ; break - CASE(HANDSHAKE); - CASE(OPEN); - CASE(GOTCLOSE); - CASE(SENTCLOSE); - CASE(CLOSED); - CASE(RENEGOTIATE); -#undef CASE - case TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT: - tortls_state = ""; - break; - default: - tortls_state = " in unknown TLS state"; - break; - } - - tor_snprintf(buf, sz, "%s%s", ssl_state, tortls_state); + return is_server ? server_tls_context : client_tls_context; } -/** Log a single error err as returned by ERR_get_error(), which was - * received while performing an operation doing on tls. Log - * the message at severity, in log domain domain. */ +/** Increase the reference count of ctx. */ void -tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err, - int severity, int domain, const char *doing) +tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx) { - const char *state = NULL, *addr; - const char *msg, *lib, *func; - - state = (tls && tls->ssl)?SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl):"---"; - - addr = tls ? tls->address : NULL; - - /* Some errors are known-benign, meaning they are the fault of the other - * side of the connection. The caller doesn't know this, so override the - * priority for those cases. */ - switch (ERR_GET_REASON(err)) { - case SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST: - case SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST: - case SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH: -#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API - case SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE: -#endif - case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL: - case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL: - severity = LOG_INFO; - break; - default: - break; - } - - msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err); - lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err); - func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err); - if (!msg) msg = "(null)"; - if (!lib) lib = "(null)"; - if (!func) func = "(null)"; - if (doing) { - tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error while %s%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)", - doing, addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"", - msg, lib, func, state); - } else { - tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)", - addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"", - msg, lib, func, state); - } + ++ctx->refcnt; } -/** Log all pending tls errors at level severity in log domain - * domain. Use doing to describe our current activities. - */ +/** Free all global TLS structures. */ void -tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, const char *doing) +tor_tls_free_all(void) { - unsigned long err; + check_no_tls_errors(); - while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) { - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, err, severity, domain, doing); + if (server_tls_context) { + tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server_tls_context; + server_tls_context = NULL; + tor_tls_context_decref(ctx); } -} - -/** Convert an errno (or a WSAerrno on windows) into a TOR_TLS_* error - * code. */ -STATIC int -tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e) -{ - switch (e) { - case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNRESET): // most common - return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET; - case SOCK_ERRNO(ETIMEDOUT): - return TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT; - case SOCK_ERRNO(EHOSTUNREACH): - case SOCK_ERRNO(ENETUNREACH): - return TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE; - case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNREFUSED): - return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED; // least common - default: - return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; + if (client_tls_context) { + tor_tls_context_t *ctx = client_tls_context; + client_tls_context = NULL; + tor_tls_context_decref(ctx); } } @@ -295,331 +73,6 @@ tor_tls_err_to_string(int err) } } -#define CATCH_SYSCALL 1 -#define CATCH_ZERO 2 - -/** Given a TLS object and the result of an SSL_* call, use - * SSL_get_error to determine whether an error has occurred, and if so - * which one. Return one of TOR_TLS_{DONE|WANTREAD|WANTWRITE|ERROR}. - * If extra&CATCH_SYSCALL is true, return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ instead of - * reporting syscall errors. If extra&CATCH_ZERO is true, return - * TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ instead of reporting zero-return errors. - * - * If an error has occurred, log it at level severity and describe the - * current action as doing. - */ -STATIC int -tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra, - const char *doing, int severity, int domain) -{ - int err = SSL_get_error(tls->ssl, r); - int tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; - switch (err) { - case SSL_ERROR_NONE: - return TOR_TLS_DONE; - case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: - return TOR_TLS_WANTREAD; - case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: - return TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE; - case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: - if (extra&CATCH_SYSCALL) - return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_; - if (r == 0) { - tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error: unexpected close while %s (%s)", - doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); - tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO; - } else { - int e = tor_socket_errno(tls->socket); - tor_log(severity, LD_NET, - "TLS error: <syscall error while %s> (errno=%d: %s; state=%s)", - doing, e, tor_socket_strerror(e), - SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); - tor_error = tor_errno_to_tls_error(e); - } - tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing); - return tor_error; - case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: - if (extra&CATCH_ZERO) - return TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_; - tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS connection closed while %s in state %s", - doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); - tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing); - return TOR_TLS_CLOSE; - default: - tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing); - return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; - } -} - -/** Initialize OpenSSL, unless it has already been initialized. - */ -void -tor_tls_init(void) -{ - check_no_tls_errors(); - - if (!tls_library_is_initialized) { -#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL); -#else - SSL_library_init(); - SSL_load_error_strings(); -#endif - -#if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && \ - OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) - long version = OpenSSL_version_num(); - - /* LCOV_EXCL_START : we can't test these lines on the same machine */ - if (version >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) { - /* Warn if we could *almost* be running with much faster ECDH. - If we're built for a 64-bit target, using OpenSSL 1.0.1, but we - don't have one of the built-in __uint128-based speedups, we are - just one build operation away from an accelerated handshake. - - (We could be looking at OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 instead of - doing this test, but that gives compile-time options, not runtime - behavior.) - */ - EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); - const EC_GROUP *g = key ? EC_KEY_get0_group(key) : NULL; - const EC_METHOD *m = g ? EC_GROUP_method_of(g) : NULL; - const int warn = (m == EC_GFp_simple_method() || - m == EC_GFp_mont_method() || - m == EC_GFp_nist_method()); - EC_KEY_free(key); - - if (warn) - log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with " - "OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, but with a version of OpenSSL " - "that apparently lacks accelerated support for the NIST " - "P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with such " - "support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option " - "when configuring it) would make ECDH much faster."); - } - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ -#endif /* (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && ... */ - - tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); - - tls_library_is_initialized = 1; - } -} - -/** Free all global TLS structures. */ -void -tor_tls_free_all(void) -{ - check_no_tls_errors(); - - if (server_tls_context) { - tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server_tls_context; - server_tls_context = NULL; - tor_tls_context_decref(ctx); - } - if (client_tls_context) { - tor_tls_context_t *ctx = client_tls_context; - client_tls_context = NULL; - tor_tls_context_decref(ctx); - } -} - -/** We need to give OpenSSL a callback to verify certificates. This is - * it: We always accept peer certs and complete the handshake. We - * don't validate them until later. - */ -STATIC int -always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, - X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx) -{ - (void) preverify_ok; - (void) x509_ctx; - return 1; -} - -/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when the client might be - * claiming extra unsupported ciphers in order to avoid fingerprinting. */ -static const char SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] = -#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - /* This one can never actually get selected, since if the client lists it, - * we will assume that the client is honest, and not use this list. - * Nonetheless we list it if it's available, so that the server doesn't - * conclude that it has no valid ciphers if it's running with TLS1.3. - */ - TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":" -#endif - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":" - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA; - -/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when we actually have - * our choice of what cipher to use. */ -static const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] = - /* Here are the TLS 1.3 ciphers we like, in the order we prefer. */ -#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 - TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 - TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 ":" -#endif - - /* This list is autogenerated with the gen_server_ciphers.py script; - * don't hand-edit it. */ -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 - TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 - TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":" -#endif - /* Required */ - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":" - /* Required */ - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 - TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ":" -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 -#endif - ; - -/* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto - * disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to - * (SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA). If you do this, you won't be able to communicate - * with any of the "real" Tors, though. */ - -#define CIPHER(id, name) name ":" -#define XCIPHER(id, name) -/** List of ciphers that clients should advertise, omitting items that - * our OpenSSL doesn't know about. */ -static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] = -#include "ciphers.inc" - /* Tell it not to use SSLv2 ciphers, so that it can select an SSLv3 version - * of any cipher we say. */ - "!SSLv2" - ; -#undef CIPHER -#undef XCIPHER - -/** Remove a reference to ctx, and free it if it has no more - * references. */ -static void -tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx) -{ - tor_assert(ctx); - if (--ctx->refcnt == 0) { - SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx); - tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_link_cert); - tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_id_cert); - tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_auth_cert); - crypto_pk_free(ctx->link_key); - crypto_pk_free(ctx->auth_key); - /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since ctx will never be NULL here */ - tor_free(ctx); - /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */ - } -} - -/** Set *link_cert_out and *id_cert_out to the link certificate - * and ID certificate that we're currently using for our V3 in-protocol - * handshake's certificate chain. If server is true, provide the certs - * that we use in server mode (auth, ID); otherwise, provide the certs that we - * use in client mode. (link, ID) */ -int -tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server, - const tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out, - const tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out) -{ - tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server ? server_tls_context : client_tls_context; - if (! ctx) - return -1; - if (link_cert_out) - *link_cert_out = server ? ctx->my_link_cert : ctx->my_auth_cert; - if (id_cert_out) - *id_cert_out = ctx->my_id_cert; - return 0; -} - -/** - * Return the authentication key that we use to authenticate ourselves as a - * client in the V3 in-protocol handshake. - */ -crypto_pk_t * -tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void) -{ - if (! client_tls_context) - return NULL; - return client_tls_context->auth_key; -} - -/** Return true iff the other side of tls has authenticated to us, and - * the key certified in cert is the same as the key they used to do it. - */ -MOCK_IMPL(int, -tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)) -{ - X509 *peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl); - EVP_PKEY *link_key = NULL, *cert_key = NULL; - int result; - - if (!peercert) - return 0; - link_key = X509_get_pubkey(peercert); - cert_key = X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)tor_x509_cert_get_impl(cert)); - - result = link_key && cert_key && EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_key, link_key) == 1; - - X509_free(peercert); - if (link_key) - EVP_PKEY_free(link_key); - if (cert_key) - EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key); - - return result; -} - -/** Increase the reference count of ctx. */ -static void -tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx) -{ - ++ctx->refcnt; -} - /** Create new global client and server TLS contexts. * * If server_identity is NULL, this will not generate a server @@ -686,687 +139,6 @@ tor_tls_context_init(unsigned flags, return MIN(rv1, rv2); } -/** Create a new global TLS context. - * - * You can call this function multiple times. Each time you call it, - * it generates new certificates; all new connections will use - * the new SSL context. - */ -STATIC int -tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, - crypto_pk_t *identity, - unsigned int key_lifetime, - unsigned int flags, - int is_client) -{ - tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity, - key_lifetime, - flags, - is_client); - tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = *ppcontext; - - if (new_ctx != NULL) { - *ppcontext = new_ctx; - - /* Free the old context if one existed. */ - if (old_ctx != NULL) { - /* This is safe even if there are open connections: we reference- - * count tor_tls_context_t objects. */ - tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx); - } - } - - return ((new_ctx != NULL) ? 0 : -1); -} - -/** The group we should use for ecdhe when none was selected. */ -#define NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group NID_X9_62_prime256v1 - -#define RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS 2048 - -/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes. - * identity should be set to the identity key used to sign the - * certificate. - */ -STATIC tor_tls_context_t * -tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, - unsigned flags, int is_client) -{ - crypto_pk_t *rsa = NULL, *rsa_auth = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL; - X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL, *authcert = NULL; - char *nickname = NULL, *nn2 = NULL; - - tor_tls_init(); - nickname = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net"); -#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE - nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net"); -#else - nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".com"); -#endif - - /* Generate short-term RSA key for use with TLS. */ - if (!(rsa = crypto_pk_new())) - goto error; - if (crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(rsa, RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS)<0) - goto error; - if (!is_client) { - /* Generate short-term RSA key for use in the in-protocol ("v3") - * authentication handshake. */ - if (!(rsa_auth = crypto_pk_new())) - goto error; - if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa_auth)<0) - goto error; - /* Create a link certificate signed by identity key. */ - cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2, - key_lifetime); - /* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */ - idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2, - IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME); - /* Create an authentication certificate signed by identity key. */ - authcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa_auth, identity, nickname, nn2, - key_lifetime); - if (!cert || !idcert || !authcert) { - log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate"); - goto error; - } - } - - result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t)); - result->refcnt = 1; - if (!is_client) { - result->my_link_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(cert)); - result->my_id_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(idcert)); - result->my_auth_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(authcert)); - if (!result->my_link_cert || !result->my_id_cert || !result->my_auth_cert) - goto error; - result->link_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa); - result->auth_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa_auth); - } - -#if 0 - /* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1. This may have subtly different results - * from SSLv23_method() with SSLv2 and SSLv3 disabled, so we need to do some - * investigation before we consider adjusting it. It should be compatible - * with existing Tors. */ - if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()))) - goto error; -#endif /* 0 */ - - /* Tell OpenSSL to use TLS 1.0 or later but not SSL2 or SSL3. */ -#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD - if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()))) - goto error; -#else - if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()))) - goto error; -#endif /* defined(HAVE_TLS_METHOD) */ - SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); - SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3); - - /* Prefer the server's ordering of ciphers: the client's ordering has - * historically been chosen for fingerprinting resistance. */ - SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE); - - /* Disable TLS tickets if they're supported. We never want to use them; - * using them can make our perfect forward secrecy a little worse, *and* - * create an opportunity to fingerprint us (since it's unusual to use them - * with TLS sessions turned off). - * - * In 0.2.4, clients advertise support for them though, to avoid a TLS - * distinguishability vector. This can give us worse PFS, though, if we - * get a server that doesn't set SSL_OP_NO_TICKET. With luck, there will - * be few such servers by the time 0.2.4 is more stable. - */ -#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET - if (! is_client) { - SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET); - } -#endif - - SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); - SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE); - -#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION - SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, - SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION); -#endif - /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation - * as authenticating any earlier-received data. - */ - { - SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION); - } - - /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses RAM and time, it makes TLS - * vulnerable to CRIME-style attacks, and most of the data we transmit over - * TLS is encrypted (and therefore uncompressible) anyway. */ -#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION - SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); -#endif -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (result->ctx->comp_methods) - result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL; -#endif -#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ - -#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS - SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); -#endif - if (! is_client) { - if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert)) - goto error; - X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */ - cert=NULL; - if (idcert) { - X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx); - tor_assert(s); - X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert); - X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */ - idcert = NULL; - } - } - SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); - if (!is_client) { - tor_assert(rsa); - if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,1))) - goto error; - if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey)) - goto error; - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - pkey = NULL; - if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx)) - goto error; - } - { - DH *dh = crypto_dh_new_openssl_tls(); - tor_assert(dh); - SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, dh); - DH_free(dh); - } - if (! is_client) { - int nid; - EC_KEY *ec_key; - if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224) - nid = NID_secp224r1; - else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256) - nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; - else - nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group; - /* Use P-256 for ECDHE. */ - ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); - if (ec_key != NULL) /*XXXX Handle errors? */ - SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(result->ctx, ec_key); - EC_KEY_free(ec_key); - } - SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, - always_accept_verify_cb); - /* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */ - SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER); - - if (rsa) - crypto_pk_free(rsa); - if (rsa_auth) - crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth); - X509_free(authcert); - tor_free(nickname); - tor_free(nn2); - return result; - - error: - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating TLS context"); - tor_free(nickname); - tor_free(nn2); - if (pkey) - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - if (rsa) - crypto_pk_free(rsa); - if (rsa_auth) - crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth); - if (result) - tor_tls_context_decref(result); - if (cert) - X509_free(cert); - if (idcert) - X509_free(idcert); - if (authcert) - X509_free(authcert); - return NULL; -} - -/** Invoked when a TLS state changes: log the change at severity 'debug' */ -STATIC void -tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) -{ - /* LCOV_EXCL_START since this depends on whether debug is captured or not */ - log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "SSL %p is now in state %s [type=%d,val=%d].", - ssl, SSL_state_string_long(ssl), type, val); - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ -} - -/* Return the name of the negotiated ciphersuite in use on tls */ -const char * -tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - return SSL_get_cipher(tls->ssl); -} - -/* Here's the old V2 cipher list we sent from 0.2.1.1-alpha up to - * 0.2.3.17-beta. If a client is using this list, we can't believe the ciphers - * that it claims to support. We'll prune this list to remove the ciphers - * *we* don't recognize. */ -STATIC uint16_t v2_cipher_list[] = { - 0xc00a, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ - 0xc014, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ - 0x0039, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */ - 0x0038, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA */ - 0xc00f, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ - 0xc005, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ - 0x0035, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */ - 0xc007, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ - 0xc009, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ - 0xc011, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ - 0xc013, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ - 0x0033, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */ - 0x0032, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA */ - 0xc00c, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ - 0xc00e, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ - 0xc002, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ - 0xc004, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ - 0x0004, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 */ - 0x0005, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA */ - 0x002f, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */ - 0xc008, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ - 0xc012, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ - 0x0016, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ - 0x0013, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ - 0xc00d, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ - 0xc003, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ - 0xfeff, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ - 0x000a, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ - 0 -}; -/** Have we removed the unrecognized ciphers from v2_cipher_list yet? */ -static int v2_cipher_list_pruned = 0; - -/** Return 0 if m does not support the cipher with ID cipher; - * return 1 if it does support it, or if we have no way to tell. */ -STATIC int -find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher) -{ - const SSL_CIPHER *c; -#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND - (void) m; - { - unsigned char cipherid[3]; - tor_assert(ssl); - set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher)); - cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting - * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2 - * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */ - c = SSL_CIPHER_find((SSL*)ssl, cipherid); - if (c) - tor_assert((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) & 0xffff) == cipher); - return c != NULL; - } -#else /* !(defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND)) */ - -# if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) - if (m && m->get_cipher_by_char) { - unsigned char cipherid[3]; - set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher)); - cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting - * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2 - * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */ - c = m->get_cipher_by_char(cipherid); - if (c) - tor_assert((c->id & 0xffff) == cipher); - return c != NULL; - } -#endif /* defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API - if (m && m->get_cipher && m->num_ciphers) { - /* It would seem that some of the "let's-clean-up-openssl" forks have - * removed the get_cipher_by_char function. Okay, so now you get a - * quadratic search. - */ - int i; - for (i = 0; i < m->num_ciphers(); ++i) { - c = m->get_cipher(i); - if (c && (c->id & 0xffff) == cipher) { - return 1; - } - } - return 0; - } -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ - (void) ssl; - (void) m; - (void) cipher; - return 1; /* No way to search */ -#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND) */ -} - -/** Remove from v2_cipher_list every cipher that we don't support, so that - * comparing v2_cipher_list to a client's cipher list will give a sensible - * result. */ -static void -prune_v2_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl) -{ - uint16_t *inp, *outp; -#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD - const SSL_METHOD *m = TLS_method(); -#else - const SSL_METHOD *m = SSLv23_method(); -#endif - - inp = outp = v2_cipher_list; - while (*inp) { - if (find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, *inp)) { - *outp++ = *inp++; - } else { - inp++; - } - } - *outp = 0; - - v2_cipher_list_pruned = 1; -} - -/** Examine the client cipher list in ssl, and determine what kind of - * client it is. Return one of CIPHERS_ERR, CIPHERS_V1, CIPHERS_V2, - * CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED. - **/ -STATIC int -tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers) -{ - int i, res; - tor_tls_t *tor_tls; - if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!v2_cipher_list_pruned)) - prune_v2_cipher_list(ssl); - - tor_tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl); - if (tor_tls && tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type) - return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type; - - /* If we reached this point, we just got a client hello. See if there is - * a cipher list. */ - if (!peer_ciphers) { - log_info(LD_NET, "No ciphers on session"); - res = CIPHERS_ERR; - goto done; - } - /* Now we need to see if there are any ciphers whose presence means we're - * dealing with an updated Tor. */ - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) { - const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i); - const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); - if (strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) && - strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) && - strcmp(ciphername, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) && - strcmp(ciphername, "(NONE)")) { - log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher called '%s'", ciphername); - // return 1; - goto v2_or_higher; - } - } - res = CIPHERS_V1; - goto done; - v2_or_higher: - { - const uint16_t *v2_cipher = v2_cipher_list; - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) { - const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i); - uint16_t id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff; - if (id == 0x00ff) /* extended renegotiation indicator. */ - continue; - if (!id || id != *v2_cipher) { - res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED; - goto dump_ciphers; - } - ++v2_cipher; - } - if (*v2_cipher != 0) { - res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED; - goto dump_ciphers; - } - res = CIPHERS_V2; - } - - dump_ciphers: - { - smartlist_t *elts = smartlist_new(); - char *s; - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) { - const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i); - const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); - smartlist_add(elts, (char*)ciphername); - } - s = smartlist_join_strings(elts, ":", 0, NULL); - log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a %s V2/V3 cipher list from %s. It is: '%s'", - (res == CIPHERS_V2) ? "fictitious" : "real", ADDR(tor_tls), s); - tor_free(s); - smartlist_free(elts); - } - done: - if (tor_tls) - return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type = res; - - return res; -} - -/** Return true iff the cipher list suggested by the client for ssl is - * a list that indicates that the client knows how to do the v2 TLS connection - * handshake. */ -STATIC int -tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) -{ - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; -#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS - ciphers = SSL_get_client_ciphers(ssl); -#else - SSL_SESSION *session; - if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) { - log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?"); - return CIPHERS_ERR; - } - ciphers = session->ciphers; -#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */ - - return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2; -} - -/** Invoked when we're accepting a connection on ssl, and the connection - * changes state. We use this: - * <ul><li>To alter the state of the handshake partway through, so we - * do not send or request extra certificates in v2 handshakes.</li> - * <li>To detect renegotiation</li></ul> - */ -STATIC void -tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) -{ - tor_tls_t *tls; - (void) val; - - IF_BUG_ONCE(ssl == NULL) { - return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE - } - - tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, type, val); - - if (type != SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) - return; - - OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE ssl_state = SSL_get_state(ssl); - if (! STATE_IS_SW_SERVER_HELLO(ssl_state)) - return; - tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl); - if (tls) { - /* Check whether we're watching for renegotiates. If so, this is one! */ - if (tls->negotiated_callback) - tls->got_renegotiate = 1; - if (tls->server_handshake_count < 127) /*avoid any overflow possibility*/ - ++tls->server_handshake_count; - } else { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!"); - return; - } - - /* Now check the cipher list. */ - if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl)) { - if (tls->wasV2Handshake) - return; /* We already turned this stuff off for the first handshake; - * This is a renegotiation. */ - - /* Yes, we're casting away the const from ssl. This is very naughty of us. - * Let's hope openssl doesn't notice! */ - - /* Set SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN to keep from sending back any extra certs. */ - SSL_set_mode((SSL*) ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN); - /* Don't send a hello request. */ - SSL_set_verify((SSL*) ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); - - if (tls) { - tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; - } else { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START this line is not reachable */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!"); - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ - } - } -} - -/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers - * the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite. - * - * We can't abuse an info_cb for this, since by the time one of the - * client_hello info_cbs is called, we've already picked which ciphersuite to - * use. - * - * Technically, this function is an abuse of this callback, since the point of - * a session_secret_cb is to try to set up and/or verify a shared-secret for - * authentication on the fly. But as long as we return 0, we won't actually be - * setting up a shared secret, and all will be fine. - */ -STATIC int -tor_tls_session_secret_cb(SSL *ssl, void *secret, int *secret_len, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, - CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher, - void *arg) -{ - (void) secret; - (void) secret_len; - (void) peer_ciphers; - (void) cipher; - (void) arg; - - if (tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, peer_ciphers) == - CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED) { - SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST); - } - - SSL_set_session_secret_cb(ssl, NULL, NULL); - - return 0; -} -static void -tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL); -} - -/** Create a new TLS object from a file descriptor, and a flag to - * determine whether it is functioning as a server. - */ -tor_tls_t * -tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer) -{ - BIO *bio = NULL; - tor_tls_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tor_tls_context_t *context = isServer ? server_tls_context : - client_tls_context; - result->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC; - - check_no_tls_errors(); - tor_assert(context); /* make sure somebody made it first */ - if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(context->ctx))) { - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating SSL object"); - tor_free(result); - goto err; - } - -#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name - /* Browsers use the TLS hostname extension, so we should too. */ - if (!isServer) { - char *fake_hostname = crypto_random_hostname(4,25, "www.",".com"); - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, fake_hostname); - tor_free(fake_hostname); - } -#endif /* defined(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name) */ - - if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(result->ssl, - isServer ? SERVER_CIPHER_LIST : CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST)) { - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "setting ciphers"); -#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL); -#endif - SSL_free(result->ssl); - tor_free(result); - goto err; - } - result->socket = sock; - bio = BIO_new_socket(sock, BIO_NOCLOSE); - if (! bio) { - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "opening BIO"); -#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL); -#endif - SSL_free(result->ssl); - tor_free(result); - goto err; - } - { - int set_worked = - SSL_set_ex_data(result->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, result); - if (!set_worked) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, - "Couldn't set the tls for an SSL*; connection will fail"); - } - } - SSL_set_bio(result->ssl, bio, bio); - tor_tls_context_incref(context); - result->context = context; - result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; - result->isServer = isServer; - result->wantwrite_n = 0; - result->last_write_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(bio); - result->last_read_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(bio); - if (result->last_write_count || result->last_read_count) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "Newly created BIO has read count %lu, write count %lu", - result->last_read_count, result->last_write_count); - } - if (isServer) { - SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback); - } else { - SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback); - } - - if (isServer) - tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(result); - - goto done; - err: - result = NULL; - done: - /* Not expected to get called. */ - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating tor_tls_t object"); - return result; -} - /** Make future log messages about tls display the address * address. */ @@ -1378,64 +150,6 @@ tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address) tls->address = tor_strdup(address); } -/** Set cb to be called with argument arg whenever tls - * next gets a client-side renegotiate in the middle of a read. Do not - * invoke this function until after initial handshaking is done! - */ -void -tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls, - void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg), - void *arg) -{ - tls->negotiated_callback = cb; - tls->callback_arg = arg; - tls->got_renegotiate = 0; - if (cb) { - SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback); - } else { - SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback); - } -} - -/** If this version of openssl requires it, turn on renegotiation on - * tls. - */ -void -tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation - * as authenticating any earlier-received data. */ - SSL_set_options(tls->ssl, - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION); -} - -/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on - * tls. (Our protocol never requires this for security, but it's nice - * to use belt-and-suspenders here.) - */ -void -tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ -#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG - tls->ssl->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; -#else - (void) tls; -#endif -} - -/** Assert that the flags that allow legacy renegotiation are still set */ -void -tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ -#if defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && \ - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION != 0 - long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl); - tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)); -#else - (void) tls; -#endif /* defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && ... */ -} - /** Return whether this tls initiated the connect (client) or * received it (server). */ int @@ -1444,730 +158,3 @@ tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls) tor_assert(tls); return tls->isServer; } - -/** Release resources associated with a TLS object. Does not close the - * underlying file descriptor. - */ -void -tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - if (!tls) - return; - tor_assert(tls->ssl); - { - size_t r,w; - tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tls,&r,&w); /* ensure written_by_tls is updated */ - } -#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(tls->ssl, NULL); -#endif - SSL_free(tls->ssl); - tls->ssl = NULL; - tls->negotiated_callback = NULL; - if (tls->context) - tor_tls_context_decref(tls->context); - tor_free(tls->address); - tls->magic = 0x99999999; - tor_free(tls); -} - -/** Underlying function for TLS reading. Reads up to len - * characters from tls into cp. On success, returns the - * number of characters read. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, - * TOR_TLS_CLOSE, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE. - */ -MOCK_IMPL(int, -tor_tls_read,(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len)) -{ - int r, err; - tor_assert(tls); - tor_assert(tls->ssl); - tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN); - tor_assert(len<INT_MAX); - r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, (int)len); - if (r > 0) { - if (tls->got_renegotiate) { - /* Renegotiation happened! */ - log_info(LD_NET, "Got a TLS renegotiation from %s", ADDR(tls)); - if (tls->negotiated_callback) - tls->negotiated_callback(tls, tls->callback_arg); - tls->got_renegotiate = 0; - } - return r; - } - err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading", LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET); - if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ || err == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) { - log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d; TLS is closed",r); - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED; - return TOR_TLS_CLOSE; - } else { - tor_assert(err != TOR_TLS_DONE); - log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d, err=%d",r,err); - return err; - } -} - -/** Total number of bytes that we've used TLS to send. Used to track TLS - * overhead. */ -STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0; -/** Total number of bytes that TLS has put on the network for us. Used to - * track TLS overhead. */ -STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls = 0; - -/** Underlying function for TLS writing. Write up to n - * characters from cp onto tls. On success, returns the - * number of characters written. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, - * TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE. - */ -int -tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n) -{ - int r, err; - tor_assert(tls); - tor_assert(tls->ssl); - tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN); - tor_assert(n < INT_MAX); - if (n == 0) - return 0; - if (tls->wantwrite_n) { - /* if WANTWRITE last time, we must use the _same_ n as before */ - tor_assert(n >= tls->wantwrite_n); - log_debug(LD_NET,"resuming pending-write, (%d to flush, reusing %d)", - (int)n, (int)tls->wantwrite_n); - n = tls->wantwrite_n; - tls->wantwrite_n = 0; - } - r = SSL_write(tls->ssl, cp, (int)n); - err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "writing", LOG_INFO, LD_NET); - if (err == TOR_TLS_DONE) { - total_bytes_written_over_tls += r; - return r; - } - if (err == TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE || err == TOR_TLS_WANTREAD) { - tls->wantwrite_n = n; - } - return err; -} - -/** Perform initial handshake on tls. When finished, returns - * TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, - * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE. - */ -int -tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - int r; - tor_assert(tls); - tor_assert(tls->ssl); - tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE); - - check_no_tls_errors(); - - OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE oldstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl); - - if (tls->isServer) { - log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_accept on %p (%s)", tls, - SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); - r = SSL_accept(tls->ssl); - } else { - log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_connect on %p (%s)", tls, - SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); - r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl); - } - - OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE newstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl); - - if (oldstate != newstate) - log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "After call, %p was in state %s", - tls, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); - /* We need to call this here and not earlier, since OpenSSL has a penchant - * for clearing its flags when you say accept or connect. */ - tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls); - r = tor_tls_get_error(tls,r,0, "handshaking", LOG_INFO, LD_HANDSHAKE); - if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) { - tls_log_errors(tls, tls->isServer ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, - "handshaking"); - return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; - } - if (r == TOR_TLS_DONE) { - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; - return tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); - } - return r; -} - -/** Perform the final part of the initial TLS handshake on tls. This - * should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1 - * or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation - * handshake as appropriate. - * - * tor_tls_handshake() calls this on its own; you only need to call this if - * bufferevent is doing the handshake for you. - */ -int -tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - int r = TOR_TLS_DONE; - check_no_tls_errors(); - if (tls->isServer) { - SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL); - SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb); - SSL_clear_mode(tls->ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN); - if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl)) { - /* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback, - * we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code - * was buggy. Fixing that. */ - if (!tls->wasV2Handshake) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't" - " get set. Fixing that."); - } - tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; - log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Completed V2 TLS handshake with client; waiting" - " for renegotiation."); - } else { - tls->wasV2Handshake = 0; - } - } else { - /* Client-side */ - tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; - /* XXXX this can move, probably? -NM */ - if (SSL_set_cipher_list(tls->ssl, SERVER_CIPHER_LIST) == 0) { - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "re-setting ciphers"); - r = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; - } - } - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "finishing the handshake"); - return r; -} - -/** Shut down an open tls connection tls. When finished, returns - * TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, - * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE. - */ -int -tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - int r, err; - char buf[128]; - tor_assert(tls); - tor_assert(tls->ssl); - check_no_tls_errors(); - - while (1) { - if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) { - /* If we've already called shutdown once to send a close message, - * we read until the other side has closed too. - */ - do { - r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, buf, 128); - } while (r>0); - err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading to shut down", - LOG_INFO, LD_NET); - if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) { - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE; - /* fall through... */ - } else { - return err; - } - } - - r = SSL_shutdown(tls->ssl); - if (r == 1) { - /* If shutdown returns 1, the connection is entirely closed. */ - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED; - return TOR_TLS_DONE; - } - err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_SYSCALL|CATCH_ZERO, "shutting down", - LOG_INFO, LD_NET); - if (err == TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_) { - /* The underlying TCP connection closed while we were shutting down. */ - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED; - return TOR_TLS_DONE; - } else if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) { - /* The TLS connection says that it sent a shutdown record, but - * isn't done shutting down yet. Make sure that this hasn't - * happened before, then go back to the start of the function - * and try to read. - */ - if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE || - tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) { - log_warn(LD_NET, - "TLS returned \"half-closed\" value while already half-closed"); - return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; - } - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE; - /* fall through ... */ - } else { - return err; - } - } /* end loop */ -} - -/** Return true iff this TLS connection is authenticated. - */ -int -tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - X509 *cert; - cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl); - tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate"); - if (!cert) - return 0; - X509_free(cert); - return 1; -} - -/** Return a newly allocated copy of the peer certificate, or NULL if there - * isn't one. */ -MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *, -tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)) -{ - X509 *cert; - cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl); - tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate"); - if (!cert) - return NULL; - return tor_x509_cert_new(cert); -} - -/** Return a newly allocated copy of the cerficate we used on the connection, - * or NULL if somehow we didn't use one. */ -MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *, -tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)) -{ - X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(tls->ssl); - tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, - "getting own-connection certificate"); - if (!cert) - return NULL; - /* Fun inconsistency: SSL_get_peer_certificate increments the reference - * count, but SSL_get_certificate does not. */ - X509 *duplicate = X509_dup(cert); - if (BUG(duplicate == NULL)) - return NULL; - return tor_x509_cert_new(duplicate); -} - -/** Helper function: try to extract a link certificate and an identity - * certificate from tls, and store them in *cert_out and - * *id_cert_out respectively. Log all messages at level - * severity. - * - * Note that a reference is added to cert_out, so it needs to be - * freed. id_cert_out doesn't. */ -MOCK_IMPL(STATIC void, -try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, - X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out)) -{ - X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL; - STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; - int num_in_chain, i; - *cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL; - if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl))) - return; - *cert_out = cert; - if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl))) - return; - num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain); - /* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert. - * 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link - * cert and the id_cert. - */ - if (num_in_chain < 1) { - log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL, - "Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)", - num_in_chain); - return; - } - for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) { - id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i); - if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0) - break; - } - *id_cert_out = id_cert; -} - -/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a - * certificate chain that is currently valid and signed, then set - * *identity_key to the identity certificate's key and return - * 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level severity. - */ -int -tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity_key) -{ - X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL; - RSA *rsa; - int r = -1; - - check_no_tls_errors(); - *identity_key = NULL; - - try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &cert, &id_cert); - if (!cert) - goto done; - if (!id_cert) { - log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"No distinct identity certificate found"); - goto done; - } - tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "before verifying certificate"); - - if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) || - X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) { - log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0"); - tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "verifying certificate"); - goto done; - } - - rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(id_pkey); - if (!rsa) - goto done; - *identity_key = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); - - r = 0; - - done: - if (cert) - X509_free(cert); - if (id_pkey) - EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey); - - /* This should never get invoked, but let's make sure in case OpenSSL - * acts unexpectedly. */ - tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "finishing tor_tls_verify"); - - return r; -} - -/** Check whether the certificate set on the connection tls is expired - * give or take past_tolerance seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take - * future_tolerance seconds. Return 0 for valid, -1 for failure. - * - * NOTE: you should call tor_tls_verify before tor_tls_check_lifetime. - */ -int -tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, - time_t now, - int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance) -{ - X509 *cert; - int r = -1; - - if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl))) - goto done; - - if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert, now, - past_tolerance, - future_tolerance) < 0) - goto done; - - r = 0; - done: - if (cert) - X509_free(cert); - /* Not expected to get invoked */ - tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "checking certificate lifetime"); - - return r; -} - -/** Return the number of bytes available for reading from tls. - */ -int -tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - tor_assert(tls); - return SSL_pending(tls->ssl); -} - -/** If tls requires that the next write be of a particular size, - * return that size. Otherwise, return 0. */ -size_t -tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - return tls->wantwrite_n; -} - -/** Sets n_read and n_written to the number of bytes read and written, - * respectively, on the raw socket used by tls since the last time this - * function was called on tls. */ -void -tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written) -{ - BIO *wbio, *tmpbio; - unsigned long r, w; - r = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)); - /* We want the number of bytes actually for real written. Unfortunately, - * sometimes OpenSSL replaces the wbio on tls->ssl with a buffering bio, - * which makes the answer turn out wrong. Let's cope with that. Note - * that this approach will fail if we ever replace tls->ssl's BIOs with - * buffering bios for reasons of our own. As an alternative, we could - * save the original BIO for tls->ssl in the tor_tls_t structure, but - * that would be tempting fate. */ - wbio = SSL_get_wbio(tls->ssl); -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) - /* BIO structure is opaque as of OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre5-dev. Again, not - * supposed to use this form of the version macro, but the OpenSSL developers - * introduced major API changes in the pre-release stage. - */ - if (BIO_method_type(wbio) == BIO_TYPE_BUFFER && - (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL) - wbio = tmpbio; -#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)) */ - if (wbio->method == BIO_f_buffer() && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL) - wbio = tmpbio; -#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) */ - w = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(wbio); - - /* We are ok with letting these unsigned ints go "negative" here: - * If we wrapped around, this should still give us the right answer, unless - * we wrapped around by more than ULONG_MAX since the last time we called - * this function. - */ - *n_read = (size_t)(r - tls->last_read_count); - *n_written = (size_t)(w - tls->last_write_count); - if (*n_read > INT_MAX || *n_written > INT_MAX) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Preposterously large value in tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes. " - "r=%lu, last_read=%lu, w=%lu, last_written=%lu", - r, tls->last_read_count, w, tls->last_write_count); - } - total_bytes_written_by_tls += *n_written; - tls->last_read_count = r; - tls->last_write_count = w; -} - -/** Return a ratio of the bytes that TLS has sent to the bytes that we've told - * it to send. Used to track whether our TLS records are getting too tiny. */ -MOCK_IMPL(double, -tls_get_write_overhead_ratio,(void)) -{ - if (total_bytes_written_over_tls == 0) - return 1.0; - - return ((double)total_bytes_written_by_tls) / - ((double)total_bytes_written_over_tls); -} - -/** Implement check_no_tls_errors: If there are any pending OpenSSL - * errors, log an error message. */ -void -check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line) -{ - if (ERR_peek_error() == 0) - return; - log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Unhandled OpenSSL errors found at %s:%d: ", - tor_fix_source_file(fname), line); - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, NULL); -} - -/** Return true iff the initial TLS connection at tls did not use a v2 - * TLS handshake. Output is undefined if the handshake isn't finished. */ -int -tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - return ! tls->wasV2Handshake; -} - -/** Return the number of server handshakes that we've noticed doing on - * tls. */ -int -tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - return tls->server_handshake_count; -} - -/** Return true iff the server TLS connection tls got the renegotiation - * request it was waiting for. */ -int -tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - return tls->got_renegotiate; -} - -#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM -static size_t -SSL_get_client_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len) -{ - if (len == 0) - return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - tor_assert(s->s3); - memcpy(out, s->s3->client_random, len); - return len; -} -#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM) */ - -#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM -static size_t -SSL_get_server_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len) -{ - if (len == 0) - return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - tor_assert(s->s3); - memcpy(out, s->s3->server_random, len); - return len; -} -#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM) */ - -#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY -STATIC size_t -SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len) -{ - tor_assert(s); - if (len == 0) - return s->master_key_length; - tor_assert(len == (size_t)s->master_key_length); - tor_assert(out); - memcpy(out, s->master_key, len); - return len; -} -#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */ - -/** Set the DIGEST256_LEN buffer at secrets_out to the value used in - * the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the - * connection tls. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. - */ -MOCK_IMPL(int, -tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out)) -{ -#define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification" - uint8_t buf[128]; - size_t len; - tor_assert(tls); - - SSL *const ssl = tls->ssl; - SSL_SESSION *const session = SSL_get_session(ssl); - - tor_assert(ssl); - tor_assert(session); - - const size_t server_random_len = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, NULL, 0); - const size_t client_random_len = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, NULL, 0); - const size_t master_key_len = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, NULL, 0); - - tor_assert(server_random_len); - tor_assert(client_random_len); - tor_assert(master_key_len); - - len = client_random_len + server_random_len + strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1; - tor_assert(len <= sizeof(buf)); - - { - size_t r = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, buf, client_random_len); - tor_assert(r == client_random_len); - } - - { - size_t r = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, - buf+client_random_len, - server_random_len); - tor_assert(r == server_random_len); - } - - uint8_t *master_key = tor_malloc_zero(master_key_len); - { - size_t r = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, master_key_len); - tor_assert(r == master_key_len); - } - - uint8_t *nextbuf = buf + client_random_len + server_random_len; - memcpy(nextbuf, TLSSECRET_MAGIC, strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1); - - /* - The value is an HMAC, using the TLS master key as the HMAC key, of - client_random | server_random | TLSSECRET_MAGIC - */ - crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)secrets_out, - (char*)master_key, - master_key_len, - (char*)buf, len); - memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - memwipe(master_key, 0, master_key_len); - tor_free(master_key); - - return 0; -} - -/** Using the RFC5705 key material exporting construction, and the - * provided context (context_len bytes long) and - * label (a NUL-terminated string), compute a 32-byte secret in - * secrets_out that only the parties to this TLS session can - * compute. Return 0 on success and -1 on failure. - */ -MOCK_IMPL(int, -tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out, - const uint8_t *context, - size_t context_len, - const char *label)) -{ - tor_assert(tls); - tor_assert(tls->ssl); - - int r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl, - secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN, - label, strlen(label), - context, context_len, 1); - return (r == 1) ? 0 : -1; -} - -/** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in tls. - * Set *rbuf_capacity to the amount of storage allocated for the read - * buffer and *rbuf_bytes to the amount actually used. - * Set *wbuf_capacity to the amount of storage allocated for the write - * buffer and *wbuf_bytes to the amount actually used. - * - * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.*/ -int -tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls, - size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes, - size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes) -{ -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) - (void)tls; - (void)rbuf_capacity; - (void)rbuf_bytes; - (void)wbuf_capacity; - (void)wbuf_bytes; - - return -1; -#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)) */ - if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf) - *rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len; - else - *rbuf_capacity = 0; - if (tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf) - *wbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len; - else - *wbuf_capacity = 0; - *rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left; - *wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left; - return 0; -#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ -} - -/** Check whether the ECC group requested is supported by the current OpenSSL - * library instance. Return 1 if the group is supported, and 0 if not. - */ -int -evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup) -{ - EC_KEY *ec_key; - int nid; - int ret; - - if (!ecgroup) - nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group; - else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P256")) - nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; - else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P224")) - nid = NID_secp224r1; - else - return 0; - - ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); - ret = (ec_key != NULL); - EC_KEY_free(ec_key); - - return ret; -} diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.h b/src/lib/tls/tortls.h index f46e73267..306d321cd 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.h +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.h @@ -50,74 +50,13 @@ struct tor_x509_cert_t; #define TOR_TLS_IS_ERROR(rv) ((rv) < TOR_TLS_CLOSE) -#ifdef TORTLS_PRIVATE - -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL -struct ssl_st; -struct ssl_ctx_st; -struct ssl_session_st; -#endif - /** Holds a SSL_CTX object and related state used to configure TLS * connections. */ typedef struct tor_tls_context_t tor_tls_context_t; -STATIC int tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e); -STATIC int tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra, - const char *doing, int severity, int domain); -STATIC tor_tls_t *tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const struct ssl_st *ssl); -STATIC void tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void); -MOCK_DECL(STATIC void, try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, - (int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, struct x509_st **cert_out, - struct x509_st **id_cert_out)); -#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE -STATIC int always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx); -STATIC int tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers); -#endif -STATIC int tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl); -#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY -STATIC size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(struct ssl_session_st *s, - uint8_t *out, - size_t len); -#endif -STATIC void tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl, - int type, int val); -STATIC void tor_tls_server_info_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl, - int type, int val); -#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE -STATIC int tor_tls_session_secret_cb(struct ssl_st *ssl, void *secret, - int *secret_len, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, - CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher, - void *arg); -STATIC int find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, - uint16_t cipher); -#endif /* defined(TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE) */ -STATIC tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, - unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned flags, int is_client); -STATIC int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, - crypto_pk_t *identity, - unsigned int key_lifetime, - unsigned int flags, - int is_client); - -#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS -extern int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index; -extern tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context; -extern tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context; -extern uint16_t v2_cipher_list[]; -extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls; -extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls; - -#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ - -#endif /* defined(TORTLS_PRIVATE) */ - const char *tor_tls_err_to_string(int err); void tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz); - void tor_tls_free_all(void); #define TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER (1u<<0) @@ -131,6 +70,9 @@ int tor_tls_context_init(unsigned flags, crypto_pk_t *client_identity, crypto_pk_t *server_identity, unsigned int key_lifetime); +void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx); +void tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx); +tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_get(int is_server); tor_tls_t *tor_tls_new(int sock, int is_server); void tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address); void tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls, diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h b/src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f6afb348c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TORTLS_INTERNAL_H +#define TORTLS_INTERNAL_H + +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL +struct ssl_st; +struct ssl_ctx_st; +struct ssl_session_st; +#endif + +int tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e); +int tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra, + const char *doing, int severity, int domain); +tor_tls_t *tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const struct ssl_st *ssl); +void tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void); +MOCK_DECL(void, try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, + (int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, + tor_x509_cert_impl_t **cert_out, + tor_x509_cert_impl_t **id_cert_out)); +#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE +int always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx); +int tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers); +#endif +int tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl); +#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY +size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(struct ssl_session_st *s, + uint8_t *out, + size_t len); +#endif +void tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl, + int type, int val); +void tor_tls_server_info_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl, + int type, int val); +#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE +STATIC int tor_tls_session_secret_cb(struct ssl_st *ssl, void *secret, + int *secret_len, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, + CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher, + void *arg); +STATIC int find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, + uint16_t cipher); +#endif /* defined(TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE) */ +tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, + unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned flags, int is_client); +int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, + crypto_pk_t *identity, + unsigned int key_lifetime, + unsigned int flags, + int is_client); + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +extern int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index; +extern tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context; +extern tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context; +extern uint16_t v2_cipher_list[]; +extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls; +extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls; +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ + +#endif /* defined(TORTLS_INTERNAL_H) */ diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..078196ac5 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c @@ -0,0 +1,432 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file tortls_nss.c + * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to + * TLS and SSL X.509 functions from NSS. + **/ + +#include "orconfig.h" + +#define TORTLS_PRIVATE + +#ifdef _WIN32 /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/ + #include <winsock2.h> + #include <ws2tcpip.h> +#endif + +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h" +#include "lib/log/util_bug.h" + +int +tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e) +{ + (void)e; + // XXXX + return -1; +} +int +tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra, + const char *doing, int severity, int domain) +{ + (void)tls; + (void)r; + (void)extra; + (void)doing; + (void)severity; + (void)domain; + // XXXX + return -1; +} +tor_tls_t * +tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const struct ssl_st *ssl) +{ + (void) ssl; + // XXXX + // XXXX refers to ssl_st. + return NULL; +} +void +tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void) +{ + // XXXX openssl only. +} +MOCK_IMPL(void, +try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, + tor_x509_cert_impl_t **cert_out, + tor_x509_cert_impl_t **id_cert_out)) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(cert_out); + tor_assert(id_cert_out); + (void)severity; + // XXXX +} +int +tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl) +{ + (void) ssl; + // XXXX + // XXXX refers to ssl_st. + return 0; +} + +void +tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl, + int type, int val) +{ + (void) ssl; + (void)type; + (void)val; + // XXXX + // XXXX refers to ssl_st. +} + +void +tor_tls_server_info_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl, + int type, int val) +{ + (void)ssl; + (void)type; + (void)val; + // XXXX + // XXXX refers to ssl_st. +} +tor_tls_context_t * +tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, + unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned flags, int is_client) +{ + tor_assert(identity); + tor_assert(key_lifetime); + (void)flags; + (void)is_client; + // XXXX + return NULL; +} +int +tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, + crypto_pk_t *identity, + unsigned int key_lifetime, + unsigned int flags, + int is_client) +{ + tor_assert(ppcontext); + tor_assert(identity); + tor_assert(key_lifetime); + (void)flags; + (void)is_client; + // XXXX + return -1; +} + +void +tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz) +{ + (void)tls; + (void)buf; + (void)sz; + // XXXX +} + +void +tor_tls_init(void) +{ + // XXXX +} +void +tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, + const char *doing) +{ + (void)tls; + (void)severity; + (void)domain; + (void)doing; + // XXXX +} + +tor_tls_t * +tor_tls_new(int sock, int is_server) +{ + (void)sock; + (void)is_server; + // XXXX + return NULL; +} +void +tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls, + void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg), + void *arg) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + (void)cb; + (void)arg; + // XXXX; +} + +void +tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + (void)tls; + // XXXX +} + +int +tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + (void)tls; + // XXXX + return -1; +} +MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *, +tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX + return NULL; +} +MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *, +tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX + return NULL; +} +int +tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(identity); + (void)severity; + // XXXX + return -1; +} +int +tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, + tor_tls_t *tls, time_t now, + int past_tolerance, + int future_tolerance) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + (void)severity; + (void)now; + (void)past_tolerance; + (void)future_tolerance; + // XXXX + return -1; +} +MOCK_IMPL(int, +tor_tls_read, (tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len)) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(cp); + (void)len; + // XXXX + return -1; +} +int +tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(cp); + (void)n; + // XXXX + return -1; +} +int +tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX + return -1; +} +int +tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX + return -1; +} +void +tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX +} +void +tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX +} +void +tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX +} +int +tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX + return -1; +} +int +tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX + return -1; +} +size_t +tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX + return 0; +} +void +tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, + size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(n_read); + tor_assert(n_written); + // XXXX +} + +int +tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls, + size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes, + size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(rbuf_capacity); + tor_assert(rbuf_bytes); + tor_assert(wbuf_capacity); + tor_assert(wbuf_bytes); + // XXXX + return -1; +} +MOCK_IMPL(double, +tls_get_write_overhead_ratio, (void)) +{ + // XXXX + return 0.0; +} + +int +tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX + return -1; +} +int +tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX + return -1; +} +int +tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX + return -1; +} +MOCK_IMPL(int, +tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, + const struct tor_x509_cert_t *cert)) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(cert); + // XXXX + return 0; +} +MOCK_IMPL(int, +tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out)) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(secrets_out); + // XXXX + return -1; +} +MOCK_IMPL(int, +tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out, + const uint8_t *context, + size_t context_len, + const char *label)) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(secrets_out); + tor_assert(context); + tor_assert(label); + (void)context_len; + // XXXX + return -1; +} + +void +check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line) +{ + (void)fname; + (void)line; + // XXXX +} +void +tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err, + int severity, int domain, const char *doing) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + (void)err; + (void)severity; + (void)domain; + (void)doing; + // XXXX +} + +int +tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server, + const struct tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out, + const struct tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out) +{ + tor_assert(link_cert_out); + tor_assert(id_cert_out); + (void)server; + // XXXX + return -1; +} + +crypto_pk_t * +tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void) +{ + // XXXX + return NULL; +} + +const char * +tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + // XXXX + return NULL; +} + +int +evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup) +{ + (void)ecgroup; + // XXXX + return -1; +} diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..333b86481 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,2032 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file tortls.c + * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to + * TLS, SSL, and X.509 functions from OpenSSL. + **/ + +/* (Unlike other tor functions, these + * are prefixed with tor_ in order to avoid conflicting with OpenSSL + * functions and variables.) + */ + +#include "orconfig.h" + +#define TORTLS_PRIVATE +#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE + +#ifdef _WIN32 /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/ + #include <winsock2.h> + #include <ws2tcpip.h> +#endif + +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" + +/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in + * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */ +DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) + +#include <openssl/opensslv.h> + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support" +#endif + +#include <openssl/ssl.h> +#include <openssl/ssl3.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/tls1.h> +#include <openssl/asn1.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> + +ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) + +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h" +#include "lib/log/log.h" +#include "lib/log/util_bug.h" +#include "lib/container/smartlist.h" +#include "lib/string/compat_string.h" +#include "lib/string/printf.h" +#include "lib/net/socket.h" +#include "lib/intmath/cmp.h" +#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h" +#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h" + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include "lib/arch/bytes.h" + +/* Copied from or.h */ +#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \ + "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789" + +/** How long do identity certificates live? (sec) */ +#define IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME (365*24*60*60) + +#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer") + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') +/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 1.0.0f. It does not have + * the CVE-2011-4576 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and + * SSL3 safely at the same time. + */ +#define DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') */ + +/* We redefine these so that we can run correctly even if the vendor gives us + * a version of OpenSSL that does not match its header files. (Apple: I am + * looking at you.) + */ +#ifndef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L +#endif +#ifndef SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010 +#endif + +/** Return values for tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers. + * + * @{ + */ +/** An error occurred when examining the client ciphers */ +#define CIPHERS_ERR -1 +/** The client cipher list indicates that a v1 handshake was in use. */ +#define CIPHERS_V1 1 +/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the + * v3 handshake, but that it is (probably!) lying about what ciphers it + * supports */ +#define CIPHERS_V2 2 +/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the + * v3 handshake, and that it is telling the truth about what ciphers it + * supports */ +#define CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED 3 +/** @} */ + +/** The ex_data index in which we store a pointer to an SSL object's + * corresponding tor_tls_t object. */ +STATIC int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index = -1; + +/** Helper: Allocate tor_tls_object_ex_data_index. */ +void +tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void) +{ + if (tor_tls_object_ex_data_index == -1) { + tor_tls_object_ex_data_index = + SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + tor_assert(tor_tls_object_ex_data_index != -1); + } +} + +/** Helper: given a SSL* pointer, return the tor_tls_t object using that + * pointer. */ +tor_tls_t * +tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const SSL *ssl) +{ + tor_tls_t *result = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index); + if (result) + tor_assert(result->magic == TOR_TLS_MAGIC); + return result; +} + +/** True iff tor_tls_init() has been called. */ +static int tls_library_is_initialized = 0; + +/* Module-internal error codes. */ +#define TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 2) +#define TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 1) + +/** Write a description of the current state of tls into the + * sz-byte buffer at buf. */ +void +tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz) +{ + const char *ssl_state; + const char *tortls_state; + + if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!tls || !tls->ssl)) { + strlcpy(buf, "(No SSL object)", sz); + return; + } + + ssl_state = SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl); + switch (tls->state) { +#define CASE(st) case TOR_TLS_ST_##st: tortls_state = " in "#st ; break + CASE(HANDSHAKE); + CASE(OPEN); + CASE(GOTCLOSE); + CASE(SENTCLOSE); + CASE(CLOSED); + CASE(RENEGOTIATE); +#undef CASE + case TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT: + tortls_state = ""; + break; + default: + tortls_state = " in unknown TLS state"; + break; + } + + tor_snprintf(buf, sz, "%s%s", ssl_state, tortls_state); +} + +/** Log a single error err as returned by ERR_get_error(), which was + * received while performing an operation doing on tls. Log + * the message at severity, in log domain domain. */ +void +tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err, + int severity, int domain, const char *doing) +{ + const char *state = NULL, *addr; + const char *msg, *lib, *func; + + state = (tls && tls->ssl)?SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl):"---"; + + addr = tls ? tls->address : NULL; + + /* Some errors are known-benign, meaning they are the fault of the other + * side of the connection. The caller doesn't know this, so override the + * priority for those cases. */ + switch (ERR_GET_REASON(err)) { + case SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST: + case SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST: + case SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH: +#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API + case SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE: +#endif + case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL: + case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL: + severity = LOG_INFO; + break; + default: + break; + } + + msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err); + lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err); + func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err); + if (!msg) msg = "(null)"; + if (!lib) lib = "(null)"; + if (!func) func = "(null)"; + if (doing) { + tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error while %s%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)", + doing, addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"", + msg, lib, func, state); + } else { + tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)", + addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"", + msg, lib, func, state); + } +} + +/** Log all pending tls errors at level severity in log domain + * domain. Use doing to describe our current activities. + */ +void +tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, const char *doing) +{ + unsigned long err; + + while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) { + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, err, severity, domain, doing); + } +} + +/** Convert an errno (or a WSAerrno on windows) into a TOR_TLS_* error + * code. */ +int +tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e) +{ + switch (e) { + case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNRESET): // most common + return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET; + case SOCK_ERRNO(ETIMEDOUT): + return TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT; + case SOCK_ERRNO(EHOSTUNREACH): + case SOCK_ERRNO(ENETUNREACH): + return TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE; + case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNREFUSED): + return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED; // least common + default: + return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; + } +} + +#define CATCH_SYSCALL 1 +#define CATCH_ZERO 2 + +/** Given a TLS object and the result of an SSL_* call, use + * SSL_get_error to determine whether an error has occurred, and if so + * which one. Return one of TOR_TLS_{DONE|WANTREAD|WANTWRITE|ERROR}. + * If extra&CATCH_SYSCALL is true, return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ instead of + * reporting syscall errors. If extra&CATCH_ZERO is true, return + * TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ instead of reporting zero-return errors. + * + * If an error has occurred, log it at level severity and describe the + * current action as doing. + */ +int +tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra, + const char *doing, int severity, int domain) +{ + int err = SSL_get_error(tls->ssl, r); + int tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; + switch (err) { + case SSL_ERROR_NONE: + return TOR_TLS_DONE; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + return TOR_TLS_WANTREAD; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + return TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE; + case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: + if (extra&CATCH_SYSCALL) + return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_; + if (r == 0) { + tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error: unexpected close while %s (%s)", + doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); + tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO; + } else { + int e = tor_socket_errno(tls->socket); + tor_log(severity, LD_NET, + "TLS error: <syscall error while %s> (errno=%d: %s; state=%s)", + doing, e, tor_socket_strerror(e), + SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); + tor_error = tor_errno_to_tls_error(e); + } + tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing); + return tor_error; + case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: + if (extra&CATCH_ZERO) + return TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_; + tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS connection closed while %s in state %s", + doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); + tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing); + return TOR_TLS_CLOSE; + default: + tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing); + return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; + } +} + +/** Initialize OpenSSL, unless it has already been initialized. + */ +void +tor_tls_init(void) +{ + check_no_tls_errors(); + + if (!tls_library_is_initialized) { +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL); +#else + SSL_library_init(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); +#endif + +#if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && \ + OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) + long version = OpenSSL_version_num(); + + /* LCOV_EXCL_START : we can't test these lines on the same machine */ + if (version >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) { + /* Warn if we could *almost* be running with much faster ECDH. + If we're built for a 64-bit target, using OpenSSL 1.0.1, but we + don't have one of the built-in __uint128-based speedups, we are + just one build operation away from an accelerated handshake. + + (We could be looking at OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 instead of + doing this test, but that gives compile-time options, not runtime + behavior.) + */ + EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + const EC_GROUP *g = key ? EC_KEY_get0_group(key) : NULL; + const EC_METHOD *m = g ? EC_GROUP_method_of(g) : NULL; + const int warn = (m == EC_GFp_simple_method() || + m == EC_GFp_mont_method() || + m == EC_GFp_nist_method()); + EC_KEY_free(key); + + if (warn) + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with " + "OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, but with a version of OpenSSL " + "that apparently lacks accelerated support for the NIST " + "P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with such " + "support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option " + "when configuring it) would make ECDH much faster."); + } + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ +#endif /* (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && ... */ + + tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); + + tls_library_is_initialized = 1; + } +} + +/** We need to give OpenSSL a callback to verify certificates. This is + * it: We always accept peer certs and complete the handshake. We + * don't validate them until later. + */ +int +always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, + X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx) +{ + (void) preverify_ok; + (void) x509_ctx; + return 1; +} + +/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when the client might be + * claiming extra unsupported ciphers in order to avoid fingerprinting. */ +static const char SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] = +#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + /* This one can never actually get selected, since if the client lists it, + * we will assume that the client is honest, and not use this list. + * Nonetheless we list it if it's available, so that the server doesn't + * conclude that it has no valid ciphers if it's running with TLS1.3. + */ + TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":" +#endif + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":" + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA; + +/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when we actually have + * our choice of what cipher to use. */ +static const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] = + /* Here are the TLS 1.3 ciphers we like, in the order we prefer. */ +#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 + TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 + TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 ":" +#endif + + /* This list is autogenerated with the gen_server_ciphers.py script; + * don't hand-edit it. */ +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":" +#endif + /* Required */ + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":" + /* Required */ + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 +#endif + ; + +/* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto + * disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to + * (SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA). If you do this, you won't be able to communicate + * with any of the "real" Tors, though. */ + +#define CIPHER(id, name) name ":" +#define XCIPHER(id, name) +/** List of ciphers that clients should advertise, omitting items that + * our OpenSSL doesn't know about. */ +static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] = +#include "ciphers.inc" + /* Tell it not to use SSLv2 ciphers, so that it can select an SSLv3 version + * of any cipher we say. */ + "!SSLv2" + ; +#undef CIPHER +#undef XCIPHER + +/** Remove a reference to ctx, and free it if it has no more + * references. */ +void +tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx) +{ + tor_assert(ctx); + if (--ctx->refcnt == 0) { + SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx); + tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_link_cert); + tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_id_cert); + tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_auth_cert); + crypto_pk_free(ctx->link_key); + crypto_pk_free(ctx->auth_key); + /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since ctx will never be NULL here */ + tor_free(ctx); + /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */ + } +} + +/** Set *link_cert_out and *id_cert_out to the link certificate + * and ID certificate that we're currently using for our V3 in-protocol + * handshake's certificate chain. If server is true, provide the certs + * that we use in server mode (auth, ID); otherwise, provide the certs that we + * use in client mode. (link, ID) */ +int +tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server, + const tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out, + const tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out) +{ + tor_tls_context_t *ctx = tor_tls_context_get(server); + if (! ctx) + return -1; + if (link_cert_out) + *link_cert_out = server ? ctx->my_link_cert : ctx->my_auth_cert; + if (id_cert_out) + *id_cert_out = ctx->my_id_cert; + return 0; +} + +/** + * Return the authentication key that we use to authenticate ourselves as a + * client in the V3 in-protocol handshake. + */ +crypto_pk_t * +tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void) +{ + tor_tls_context_t *context = tor_tls_context_get(0); + if (! context) + return NULL; + return context->auth_key; +} + +/** Return true iff the other side of tls has authenticated to us, and + * the key certified in cert is the same as the key they used to do it. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(int, +tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)) +{ + X509 *peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl); + EVP_PKEY *link_key = NULL, *cert_key = NULL; + int result; + + if (!peercert) + return 0; + link_key = X509_get_pubkey(peercert); + cert_key = X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)tor_x509_cert_get_impl(cert)); + + result = link_key && cert_key && EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_key, link_key) == 1; + + X509_free(peercert); + if (link_key) + EVP_PKEY_free(link_key); + if (cert_key) + EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key); + + return result; +} + +/** Create a new global TLS context. + * + * You can call this function multiple times. Each time you call it, + * it generates new certificates; all new connections will use + * the new SSL context. + */ +int +tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, + crypto_pk_t *identity, + unsigned int key_lifetime, + unsigned int flags, + int is_client) +{ + tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity, + key_lifetime, + flags, + is_client); + tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = *ppcontext; + + if (new_ctx != NULL) { + *ppcontext = new_ctx; + + /* Free the old context if one existed. */ + if (old_ctx != NULL) { + /* This is safe even if there are open connections: we reference- + * count tor_tls_context_t objects. */ + tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx); + } + } + + return ((new_ctx != NULL) ? 0 : -1); +} + +/** The group we should use for ecdhe when none was selected. */ +#define NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group NID_X9_62_prime256v1 + +#define RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS 2048 + +/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes. + * identity should be set to the identity key used to sign the + * certificate. + */ +tor_tls_context_t * +tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, + unsigned flags, int is_client) +{ + crypto_pk_t *rsa = NULL, *rsa_auth = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL; + X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL, *authcert = NULL; + char *nickname = NULL, *nn2 = NULL; + + tor_tls_init(); + nickname = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net"); +#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE + nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net"); +#else + nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".com"); +#endif + + /* Generate short-term RSA key for use with TLS. */ + if (!(rsa = crypto_pk_new())) + goto error; + if (crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(rsa, RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS)<0) + goto error; + if (!is_client) { + /* Generate short-term RSA key for use in the in-protocol ("v3") + * authentication handshake. */ + if (!(rsa_auth = crypto_pk_new())) + goto error; + if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa_auth)<0) + goto error; + /* Create a link certificate signed by identity key. */ + cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2, + key_lifetime); + /* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */ + idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2, + IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME); + /* Create an authentication certificate signed by identity key. */ + authcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa_auth, identity, nickname, nn2, + key_lifetime); + if (!cert || !idcert || !authcert) { + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate"); + goto error; + } + } + + result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t)); + result->refcnt = 1; + if (!is_client) { + result->my_link_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(cert)); + result->my_id_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(idcert)); + result->my_auth_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(authcert)); + if (!result->my_link_cert || !result->my_id_cert || !result->my_auth_cert) + goto error; + result->link_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa); + result->auth_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa_auth); + } + +#if 0 + /* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1. This may have subtly different results + * from SSLv23_method() with SSLv2 and SSLv3 disabled, so we need to do some + * investigation before we consider adjusting it. It should be compatible + * with existing Tors. */ + if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()))) + goto error; +#endif /* 0 */ + + /* Tell OpenSSL to use TLS 1.0 or later but not SSL2 or SSL3. */ +#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD + if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()))) + goto error; +#else + if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()))) + goto error; +#endif /* defined(HAVE_TLS_METHOD) */ + SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); + SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3); + + /* Prefer the server's ordering of ciphers: the client's ordering has + * historically been chosen for fingerprinting resistance. */ + SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE); + + /* Disable TLS tickets if they're supported. We never want to use them; + * using them can make our perfect forward secrecy a little worse, *and* + * create an opportunity to fingerprint us (since it's unusual to use them + * with TLS sessions turned off). + * + * In 0.2.4, clients advertise support for them though, to avoid a TLS + * distinguishability vector. This can give us worse PFS, though, if we + * get a server that doesn't set SSL_OP_NO_TICKET. With luck, there will + * be few such servers by the time 0.2.4 is more stable. + */ +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET + if (! is_client) { + SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET); + } +#endif + + SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); + SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE); + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION + SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, + SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION); +#endif + /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation + * as authenticating any earlier-received data. + */ + { + SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, + SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION); + } + + /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses RAM and time, it makes TLS + * vulnerable to CRIME-style attacks, and most of the data we transmit over + * TLS is encrypted (and therefore uncompressible) anyway. */ +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION + SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); +#endif +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (result->ctx->comp_methods) + result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL; +#endif +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ + +#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS + SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); +#endif + if (! is_client) { + if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert)) + goto error; + X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */ + cert=NULL; + if (idcert) { + X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx); + tor_assert(s); + X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert); + X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */ + idcert = NULL; + } + } + SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); + if (!is_client) { + tor_assert(rsa); + if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,1))) + goto error; + if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey)) + goto error; + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx)) + goto error; + } + { + DH *dh = crypto_dh_new_openssl_tls(); + tor_assert(dh); + SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, dh); + DH_free(dh); + } + if (! is_client) { + int nid; + EC_KEY *ec_key; + if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224) + nid = NID_secp224r1; + else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256) + nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; + else + nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group; + /* Use P-256 for ECDHE. */ + ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); + if (ec_key != NULL) /*XXXX Handle errors? */ + SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(result->ctx, ec_key); + EC_KEY_free(ec_key); + } + SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, + always_accept_verify_cb); + /* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */ + SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER); + + if (rsa) + crypto_pk_free(rsa); + if (rsa_auth) + crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth); + X509_free(authcert); + tor_free(nickname); + tor_free(nn2); + return result; + + error: + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating TLS context"); + tor_free(nickname); + tor_free(nn2); + if (pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (rsa) + crypto_pk_free(rsa); + if (rsa_auth) + crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth); + if (result) + tor_tls_context_decref(result); + if (cert) + X509_free(cert); + if (idcert) + X509_free(idcert); + if (authcert) + X509_free(authcert); + return NULL; +} + +/** Invoked when a TLS state changes: log the change at severity 'debug' */ +void +tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) +{ + /* LCOV_EXCL_START since this depends on whether debug is captured or not */ + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "SSL %p is now in state %s [type=%d,val=%d].", + ssl, SSL_state_string_long(ssl), type, val); + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ +} + +/* Return the name of the negotiated ciphersuite in use on tls */ +const char * +tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + return SSL_get_cipher(tls->ssl); +} + +/* Here's the old V2 cipher list we sent from 0.2.1.1-alpha up to + * 0.2.3.17-beta. If a client is using this list, we can't believe the ciphers + * that it claims to support. We'll prune this list to remove the ciphers + * *we* don't recognize. */ +STATIC uint16_t v2_cipher_list[] = { + 0xc00a, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ + 0xc014, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ + 0x0039, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */ + 0x0038, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA */ + 0xc00f, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ + 0xc005, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ + 0x0035, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */ + 0xc007, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ + 0xc009, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ + 0xc011, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ + 0xc013, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ + 0x0033, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */ + 0x0032, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA */ + 0xc00c, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ + 0xc00e, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ + 0xc002, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ + 0xc004, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ + 0x0004, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 */ + 0x0005, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA */ + 0x002f, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */ + 0xc008, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ + 0xc012, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ + 0x0016, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ + 0x0013, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ + 0xc00d, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ + 0xc003, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ + 0xfeff, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ + 0x000a, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */ + 0 +}; +/** Have we removed the unrecognized ciphers from v2_cipher_list yet? */ +static int v2_cipher_list_pruned = 0; + +/** Return 0 if m does not support the cipher with ID cipher; + * return 1 if it does support it, or if we have no way to tell. */ +int +find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher) +{ + const SSL_CIPHER *c; +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND + (void) m; + { + unsigned char cipherid[3]; + tor_assert(ssl); + set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher)); + cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting + * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2 + * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */ + c = SSL_CIPHER_find((SSL*)ssl, cipherid); + if (c) + tor_assert((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) & 0xffff) == cipher); + return c != NULL; + } +#else /* !(defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND)) */ + +# if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) + if (m && m->get_cipher_by_char) { + unsigned char cipherid[3]; + set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher)); + cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting + * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2 + * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */ + c = m->get_cipher_by_char(cipherid); + if (c) + tor_assert((c->id & 0xffff) == cipher); + return c != NULL; + } +#endif /* defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) */ +# ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API + if (m && m->get_cipher && m->num_ciphers) { + /* It would seem that some of the "let's-clean-up-openssl" forks have + * removed the get_cipher_by_char function. Okay, so now you get a + * quadratic search. + */ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < m->num_ciphers(); ++i) { + c = m->get_cipher(i); + if (c && (c->id & 0xffff) == cipher) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; + } +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ + (void) ssl; + (void) m; + (void) cipher; + return 1; /* No way to search */ +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND) */ +} + +/** Remove from v2_cipher_list every cipher that we don't support, so that + * comparing v2_cipher_list to a client's cipher list will give a sensible + * result. */ +static void +prune_v2_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl) +{ + uint16_t *inp, *outp; +#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD + const SSL_METHOD *m = TLS_method(); +#else + const SSL_METHOD *m = SSLv23_method(); +#endif + + inp = outp = v2_cipher_list; + while (*inp) { + if (find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, *inp)) { + *outp++ = *inp++; + } else { + inp++; + } + } + *outp = 0; + + v2_cipher_list_pruned = 1; +} + +/** Examine the client cipher list in ssl, and determine what kind of + * client it is. Return one of CIPHERS_ERR, CIPHERS_V1, CIPHERS_V2, + * CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED. + **/ +int +tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers) +{ + int i, res; + tor_tls_t *tor_tls; + if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!v2_cipher_list_pruned)) + prune_v2_cipher_list(ssl); + + tor_tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl); + if (tor_tls && tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type) + return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type; + + /* If we reached this point, we just got a client hello. See if there is + * a cipher list. */ + if (!peer_ciphers) { + log_info(LD_NET, "No ciphers on session"); + res = CIPHERS_ERR; + goto done; + } + /* Now we need to see if there are any ciphers whose presence means we're + * dealing with an updated Tor. */ + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i); + const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); + if (strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) && + strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) && + strcmp(ciphername, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) && + strcmp(ciphername, "(NONE)")) { + log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher called '%s'", ciphername); + // return 1; + goto v2_or_higher; + } + } + res = CIPHERS_V1; + goto done; + v2_or_higher: + { + const uint16_t *v2_cipher = v2_cipher_list; + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i); + uint16_t id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff; + if (id == 0x00ff) /* extended renegotiation indicator. */ + continue; + if (!id || id != *v2_cipher) { + res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED; + goto dump_ciphers; + } + ++v2_cipher; + } + if (*v2_cipher != 0) { + res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED; + goto dump_ciphers; + } + res = CIPHERS_V2; + } + + dump_ciphers: + { + smartlist_t *elts = smartlist_new(); + char *s; + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i); + const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); + smartlist_add(elts, (char*)ciphername); + } + s = smartlist_join_strings(elts, ":", 0, NULL); + log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a %s V2/V3 cipher list from %s. It is: '%s'", + (res == CIPHERS_V2) ? "fictitious" : "real", ADDR(tor_tls), s); + tor_free(s); + smartlist_free(elts); + } + done: + if (tor_tls) + return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type = res; + + return res; +} + +/** Return true iff the cipher list suggested by the client for ssl is + * a list that indicates that the client knows how to do the v2 TLS connection + * handshake. */ +int +tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS + ciphers = SSL_get_client_ciphers(ssl); +#else + SSL_SESSION *session; + if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) { + log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?"); + return CIPHERS_ERR; + } + ciphers = session->ciphers; +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */ + + return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2; +} + +/** Invoked when we're accepting a connection on ssl, and the connection + * changes state. We use this: + * <ul><li>To alter the state of the handshake partway through, so we + * do not send or request extra certificates in v2 handshakes.</li> + * <li>To detect renegotiation</li></ul> + */ +void +tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) +{ + tor_tls_t *tls; + (void) val; + + IF_BUG_ONCE(ssl == NULL) { + return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE + } + + tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, type, val); + + if (type != SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) + return; + + OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE ssl_state = SSL_get_state(ssl); + if (! STATE_IS_SW_SERVER_HELLO(ssl_state)) + return; + tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl); + if (tls) { + /* Check whether we're watching for renegotiates. If so, this is one! */ + if (tls->negotiated_callback) + tls->got_renegotiate = 1; + if (tls->server_handshake_count < 127) /*avoid any overflow possibility*/ + ++tls->server_handshake_count; + } else { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!"); + return; + } + + /* Now check the cipher list. */ + if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl)) { + if (tls->wasV2Handshake) + return; /* We already turned this stuff off for the first handshake; + * This is a renegotiation. */ + + /* Yes, we're casting away the const from ssl. This is very naughty of us. + * Let's hope openssl doesn't notice! */ + + /* Set SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN to keep from sending back any extra certs. */ + SSL_set_mode((SSL*) ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN); + /* Don't send a hello request. */ + SSL_set_verify((SSL*) ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); + + if (tls) { + tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; + } else { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START this line is not reachable */ + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!"); + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ + } + } +} + +/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers + * the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite. + * + * We can't abuse an info_cb for this, since by the time one of the + * client_hello info_cbs is called, we've already picked which ciphersuite to + * use. + * + * Technically, this function is an abuse of this callback, since the point of + * a session_secret_cb is to try to set up and/or verify a shared-secret for + * authentication on the fly. But as long as we return 0, we won't actually be + * setting up a shared secret, and all will be fine. + */ +int +tor_tls_session_secret_cb(SSL *ssl, void *secret, int *secret_len, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, + CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher, + void *arg) +{ + (void) secret; + (void) secret_len; + (void) peer_ciphers; + (void) cipher; + (void) arg; + + if (tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, peer_ciphers) == + CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED) { + SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST); + } + + SSL_set_session_secret_cb(ssl, NULL, NULL); + + return 0; +} +static void +tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL); +} + +/** Create a new TLS object from a file descriptor, and a flag to + * determine whether it is functioning as a server. + */ +tor_tls_t * +tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer) +{ + BIO *bio = NULL; + tor_tls_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tor_tls_context_t *context = tor_tls_context_get(isServer); + result->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC; + + check_no_tls_errors(); + tor_assert(context); /* make sure somebody made it first */ + if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(context->ctx))) { + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating SSL object"); + tor_free(result); + goto err; + } + +#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name + /* Browsers use the TLS hostname extension, so we should too. */ + if (!isServer) { + char *fake_hostname = crypto_random_hostname(4,25, "www.",".com"); + SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, fake_hostname); + tor_free(fake_hostname); + } +#endif /* defined(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name) */ + + if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(result->ssl, + isServer ? SERVER_CIPHER_LIST : CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST)) { + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "setting ciphers"); +#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name + SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL); +#endif + SSL_free(result->ssl); + tor_free(result); + goto err; + } + result->socket = sock; + bio = BIO_new_socket(sock, BIO_NOCLOSE); + if (! bio) { + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "opening BIO"); +#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name + SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL); +#endif + SSL_free(result->ssl); + tor_free(result); + goto err; + } + { + int set_worked = + SSL_set_ex_data(result->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, result); + if (!set_worked) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, + "Couldn't set the tls for an SSL*; connection will fail"); + } + } + SSL_set_bio(result->ssl, bio, bio); + tor_tls_context_incref(context); + result->context = context; + result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; + result->isServer = isServer; + result->wantwrite_n = 0; + result->last_write_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(bio); + result->last_read_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(bio); + if (result->last_write_count || result->last_read_count) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Newly created BIO has read count %lu, write count %lu", + result->last_read_count, result->last_write_count); + } + if (isServer) { + SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback); + } else { + SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback); + } + + if (isServer) + tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(result); + + goto done; + err: + result = NULL; + done: + /* Not expected to get called. */ + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating tor_tls_t object"); + return result; +} + +/** Set cb to be called with argument arg whenever tls + * next gets a client-side renegotiate in the middle of a read. Do not + * invoke this function until after initial handshaking is done! + */ +void +tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls, + void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg), + void *arg) +{ + tls->negotiated_callback = cb; + tls->callback_arg = arg; + tls->got_renegotiate = 0; + if (cb) { + SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback); + } else { + SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback); + } +} + +/** If this version of openssl requires it, turn on renegotiation on + * tls. + */ +void +tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation + * as authenticating any earlier-received data. */ + SSL_set_options(tls->ssl, + SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION); +} + +/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on + * tls. (Our protocol never requires this for security, but it's nice + * to use belt-and-suspenders here.) + */ +void +tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ +#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG + tls->ssl->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; +#else + (void) tls; +#endif +} + +/** Assert that the flags that allow legacy renegotiation are still set */ +void +tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ +#if defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && \ + SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION != 0 + long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl); + tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)); +#else + (void) tls; +#endif /* defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && ... */ +} + +/** Release resources associated with a TLS object. Does not close the + * underlying file descriptor. + */ +void +tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + if (!tls) + return; + tor_assert(tls->ssl); + { + size_t r,w; + tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tls,&r,&w); /* ensure written_by_tls is updated */ + } +#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name + SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(tls->ssl, NULL); +#endif + SSL_free(tls->ssl); + tls->ssl = NULL; + tls->negotiated_callback = NULL; + if (tls->context) + tor_tls_context_decref(tls->context); + tor_free(tls->address); + tls->magic = 0x99999999; + tor_free(tls); +} + +/** Underlying function for TLS reading. Reads up to len + * characters from tls into cp. On success, returns the + * number of characters read. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, + * TOR_TLS_CLOSE, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(int, +tor_tls_read,(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len)) +{ + int r, err; + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(tls->ssl); + tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN); + tor_assert(len<INT_MAX); + r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, (int)len); + if (r > 0) { + if (tls->got_renegotiate) { + /* Renegotiation happened! */ + log_info(LD_NET, "Got a TLS renegotiation from %s", ADDR(tls)); + if (tls->negotiated_callback) + tls->negotiated_callback(tls, tls->callback_arg); + tls->got_renegotiate = 0; + } + return r; + } + err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading", LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET); + if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ || err == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) { + log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d; TLS is closed",r); + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED; + return TOR_TLS_CLOSE; + } else { + tor_assert(err != TOR_TLS_DONE); + log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d, err=%d",r,err); + return err; + } +} + +/** Total number of bytes that we've used TLS to send. Used to track TLS + * overhead. */ +STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0; +/** Total number of bytes that TLS has put on the network for us. Used to + * track TLS overhead. */ +STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls = 0; + +/** Underlying function for TLS writing. Write up to n + * characters from cp onto tls. On success, returns the + * number of characters written. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, + * TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE. + */ +int +tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n) +{ + int r, err; + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(tls->ssl); + tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN); + tor_assert(n < INT_MAX); + if (n == 0) + return 0; + if (tls->wantwrite_n) { + /* if WANTWRITE last time, we must use the _same_ n as before */ + tor_assert(n >= tls->wantwrite_n); + log_debug(LD_NET,"resuming pending-write, (%d to flush, reusing %d)", + (int)n, (int)tls->wantwrite_n); + n = tls->wantwrite_n; + tls->wantwrite_n = 0; + } + r = SSL_write(tls->ssl, cp, (int)n); + err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "writing", LOG_INFO, LD_NET); + if (err == TOR_TLS_DONE) { + total_bytes_written_over_tls += r; + return r; + } + if (err == TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE || err == TOR_TLS_WANTREAD) { + tls->wantwrite_n = n; + } + return err; +} + +/** Perform initial handshake on tls. When finished, returns + * TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, + * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE. + */ +int +tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + int r; + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(tls->ssl); + tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE); + + check_no_tls_errors(); + + OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE oldstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl); + + if (tls->isServer) { + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_accept on %p (%s)", tls, + SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); + r = SSL_accept(tls->ssl); + } else { + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_connect on %p (%s)", tls, + SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); + r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl); + } + + OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE newstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl); + + if (oldstate != newstate) + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "After call, %p was in state %s", + tls, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl)); + /* We need to call this here and not earlier, since OpenSSL has a penchant + * for clearing its flags when you say accept or connect. */ + tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls); + r = tor_tls_get_error(tls,r,0, "handshaking", LOG_INFO, LD_HANDSHAKE); + if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) { + tls_log_errors(tls, tls->isServer ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, + "handshaking"); + return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; + } + if (r == TOR_TLS_DONE) { + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; + return tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); + } + return r; +} + +/** Perform the final part of the initial TLS handshake on tls. This + * should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1 + * or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation + * handshake as appropriate. + * + * tor_tls_handshake() calls this on its own; you only need to call this if + * bufferevent is doing the handshake for you. + */ +int +tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + int r = TOR_TLS_DONE; + check_no_tls_errors(); + if (tls->isServer) { + SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL); + SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb); + SSL_clear_mode(tls->ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN); + if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl)) { + /* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback, + * we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code + * was buggy. Fixing that. */ + if (!tls->wasV2Handshake) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't" + " get set. Fixing that."); + } + tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Completed V2 TLS handshake with client; waiting" + " for renegotiation."); + } else { + tls->wasV2Handshake = 0; + } + } else { + /* Client-side */ + tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; + /* XXXX this can move, probably? -NM */ + if (SSL_set_cipher_list(tls->ssl, SERVER_CIPHER_LIST) == 0) { + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "re-setting ciphers"); + r = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; + } + } + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "finishing the handshake"); + return r; +} + +/** Shut down an open tls connection tls. When finished, returns + * TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, + * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE. + */ +int +tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + int r, err; + char buf[128]; + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(tls->ssl); + check_no_tls_errors(); + + while (1) { + if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) { + /* If we've already called shutdown once to send a close message, + * we read until the other side has closed too. + */ + do { + r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, buf, 128); + } while (r>0); + err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading to shut down", + LOG_INFO, LD_NET); + if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) { + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE; + /* fall through... */ + } else { + return err; + } + } + + r = SSL_shutdown(tls->ssl); + if (r == 1) { + /* If shutdown returns 1, the connection is entirely closed. */ + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED; + return TOR_TLS_DONE; + } + err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_SYSCALL|CATCH_ZERO, "shutting down", + LOG_INFO, LD_NET); + if (err == TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_) { + /* The underlying TCP connection closed while we were shutting down. */ + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED; + return TOR_TLS_DONE; + } else if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) { + /* The TLS connection says that it sent a shutdown record, but + * isn't done shutting down yet. Make sure that this hasn't + * happened before, then go back to the start of the function + * and try to read. + */ + if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE || + tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) { + log_warn(LD_NET, + "TLS returned \"half-closed\" value while already half-closed"); + return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC; + } + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE; + /* fall through ... */ + } else { + return err; + } + } /* end loop */ +} + +/** Return true iff this TLS connection is authenticated. + */ +int +tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + X509 *cert; + cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl); + tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate"); + if (!cert) + return 0; + X509_free(cert); + return 1; +} + +/** Return a newly allocated copy of the peer certificate, or NULL if there + * isn't one. */ +MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *, +tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)) +{ + X509 *cert; + cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl); + tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate"); + if (!cert) + return NULL; + return tor_x509_cert_new(cert); +} + +/** Return a newly allocated copy of the cerficate we used on the connection, + * or NULL if somehow we didn't use one. */ +MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *, +tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)) +{ + X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(tls->ssl); + tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, + "getting own-connection certificate"); + if (!cert) + return NULL; + /* Fun inconsistency: SSL_get_peer_certificate increments the reference + * count, but SSL_get_certificate does not. */ + X509 *duplicate = X509_dup(cert); + if (BUG(duplicate == NULL)) + return NULL; + return tor_x509_cert_new(duplicate); +} + +/** Helper function: try to extract a link certificate and an identity + * certificate from tls, and store them in *cert_out and + * *id_cert_out respectively. Log all messages at level + * severity. + * + * Note that a reference is added to cert_out, so it needs to be + * freed. id_cert_out doesn't. */ +MOCK_IMPL(void, +try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, + X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out)) +{ + X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + int num_in_chain, i; + *cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL; + if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl))) + return; + *cert_out = cert; + if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl))) + return; + num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain); + /* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert. + * 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link + * cert and the id_cert. + */ + if (num_in_chain < 1) { + log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL, + "Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)", + num_in_chain); + return; + } + for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) { + id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0) + break; + } + *id_cert_out = id_cert; +} + +/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a + * certificate chain that is currently valid and signed, then set + * *identity_key to the identity certificate's key and return + * 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level severity. + */ +int +tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity_key) +{ + X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL; + RSA *rsa; + int r = -1; + + check_no_tls_errors(); + *identity_key = NULL; + + try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &cert, &id_cert); + if (!cert) + goto done; + if (!id_cert) { + log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"No distinct identity certificate found"); + goto done; + } + tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "before verifying certificate"); + + if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) || + X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) { + log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0"); + tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "verifying certificate"); + goto done; + } + + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(id_pkey); + if (!rsa) + goto done; + *identity_key = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); + + r = 0; + + done: + if (cert) + X509_free(cert); + if (id_pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey); + + /* This should never get invoked, but let's make sure in case OpenSSL + * acts unexpectedly. */ + tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "finishing tor_tls_verify"); + + return r; +} + +/** Check whether the certificate set on the connection tls is expired + * give or take past_tolerance seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take + * future_tolerance seconds. Return 0 for valid, -1 for failure. + * + * NOTE: you should call tor_tls_verify before tor_tls_check_lifetime. + */ +int +tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, + time_t now, + int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance) +{ + X509 *cert; + int r = -1; + + if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl))) + goto done; + + if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert, now, + past_tolerance, + future_tolerance) < 0) + goto done; + + r = 0; + done: + if (cert) + X509_free(cert); + /* Not expected to get invoked */ + tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "checking certificate lifetime"); + + return r; +} + +/** Return the number of bytes available for reading from tls. + */ +int +tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + return SSL_pending(tls->ssl); +} + +/** If tls requires that the next write be of a particular size, + * return that size. Otherwise, return 0. */ +size_t +tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + return tls->wantwrite_n; +} + +/** Sets n_read and n_written to the number of bytes read and written, + * respectively, on the raw socket used by tls since the last time this + * function was called on tls. */ +void +tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written) +{ + BIO *wbio, *tmpbio; + unsigned long r, w; + r = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)); + /* We want the number of bytes actually for real written. Unfortunately, + * sometimes OpenSSL replaces the wbio on tls->ssl with a buffering bio, + * which makes the answer turn out wrong. Let's cope with that. Note + * that this approach will fail if we ever replace tls->ssl's BIOs with + * buffering bios for reasons of our own. As an alternative, we could + * save the original BIO for tls->ssl in the tor_tls_t structure, but + * that would be tempting fate. */ + wbio = SSL_get_wbio(tls->ssl); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) + /* BIO structure is opaque as of OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre5-dev. Again, not + * supposed to use this form of the version macro, but the OpenSSL developers + * introduced major API changes in the pre-release stage. + */ + if (BIO_method_type(wbio) == BIO_TYPE_BUFFER && + (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL) + wbio = tmpbio; +#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)) */ + if (wbio->method == BIO_f_buffer() && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL) + wbio = tmpbio; +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) */ + w = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(wbio); + + /* We are ok with letting these unsigned ints go "negative" here: + * If we wrapped around, this should still give us the right answer, unless + * we wrapped around by more than ULONG_MAX since the last time we called + * this function. + */ + *n_read = (size_t)(r - tls->last_read_count); + *n_written = (size_t)(w - tls->last_write_count); + if (*n_read > INT_MAX || *n_written > INT_MAX) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Preposterously large value in tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes. " + "r=%lu, last_read=%lu, w=%lu, last_written=%lu", + r, tls->last_read_count, w, tls->last_write_count); + } + total_bytes_written_by_tls += *n_written; + tls->last_read_count = r; + tls->last_write_count = w; +} + +/** Return a ratio of the bytes that TLS has sent to the bytes that we've told + * it to send. Used to track whether our TLS records are getting too tiny. */ +MOCK_IMPL(double, +tls_get_write_overhead_ratio,(void)) +{ + if (total_bytes_written_over_tls == 0) + return 1.0; + + return ((double)total_bytes_written_by_tls) / + ((double)total_bytes_written_over_tls); +} + +/** Implement check_no_tls_errors: If there are any pending OpenSSL + * errors, log an error message. */ +void +check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line) +{ + if (ERR_peek_error() == 0) + return; + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Unhandled OpenSSL errors found at %s:%d: ", + tor_fix_source_file(fname), line); + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, NULL); +} + +/** Return true iff the initial TLS connection at tls did not use a v2 + * TLS handshake. Output is undefined if the handshake isn't finished. */ +int +tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + return ! tls->wasV2Handshake; +} + +/** Return the number of server handshakes that we've noticed doing on + * tls. */ +int +tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + return tls->server_handshake_count; +} + +/** Return true iff the server TLS connection tls got the renegotiation + * request it was waiting for. */ +int +tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + return tls->got_renegotiate; +} + +#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM +static size_t +SSL_get_client_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len) +{ + if (len == 0) + return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + tor_assert(s->s3); + memcpy(out, s->s3->client_random, len); + return len; +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM) */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM +static size_t +SSL_get_server_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len) +{ + if (len == 0) + return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + tor_assert(s->s3); + memcpy(out, s->s3->server_random, len); + return len; +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM) */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY +size_t +SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len) +{ + tor_assert(s); + if (len == 0) + return s->master_key_length; + tor_assert(len == (size_t)s->master_key_length); + tor_assert(out); + memcpy(out, s->master_key, len); + return len; +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */ + +/** Set the DIGEST256_LEN buffer at secrets_out to the value used in + * the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the + * connection tls. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(int, +tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out)) +{ +#define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification" + uint8_t buf[128]; + size_t len; + tor_assert(tls); + + SSL *const ssl = tls->ssl; + SSL_SESSION *const session = SSL_get_session(ssl); + + tor_assert(ssl); + tor_assert(session); + + const size_t server_random_len = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, NULL, 0); + const size_t client_random_len = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, NULL, 0); + const size_t master_key_len = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, NULL, 0); + + tor_assert(server_random_len); + tor_assert(client_random_len); + tor_assert(master_key_len); + + len = client_random_len + server_random_len + strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1; + tor_assert(len <= sizeof(buf)); + + { + size_t r = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, buf, client_random_len); + tor_assert(r == client_random_len); + } + + { + size_t r = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, + buf+client_random_len, + server_random_len); + tor_assert(r == server_random_len); + } + + uint8_t *master_key = tor_malloc_zero(master_key_len); + { + size_t r = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, master_key_len); + tor_assert(r == master_key_len); + } + + uint8_t *nextbuf = buf + client_random_len + server_random_len; + memcpy(nextbuf, TLSSECRET_MAGIC, strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1); + + /* + The value is an HMAC, using the TLS master key as the HMAC key, of + client_random | server_random | TLSSECRET_MAGIC + */ + crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)secrets_out, + (char*)master_key, + master_key_len, + (char*)buf, len); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(master_key, 0, master_key_len); + tor_free(master_key); + + return 0; +} + +/** Using the RFC5705 key material exporting construction, and the + * provided context (context_len bytes long) and + * label (a NUL-terminated string), compute a 32-byte secret in + * secrets_out that only the parties to this TLS session can + * compute. Return 0 on success and -1 on failure. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(int, +tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out, + const uint8_t *context, + size_t context_len, + const char *label)) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(tls->ssl); + + int r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl, + secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN, + label, strlen(label), + context, context_len, 1); + return (r == 1) ? 0 : -1; +} + +/** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in tls. + * Set *rbuf_capacity to the amount of storage allocated for the read + * buffer and *rbuf_bytes to the amount actually used. + * Set *wbuf_capacity to the amount of storage allocated for the write + * buffer and *wbuf_bytes to the amount actually used. + * + * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.*/ +int +tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls, + size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes, + size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes) +{ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) + (void)tls; + (void)rbuf_capacity; + (void)rbuf_bytes; + (void)wbuf_capacity; + (void)wbuf_bytes; + + return -1; +#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)) */ + if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf) + *rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len; + else + *rbuf_capacity = 0; + if (tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf) + *wbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len; + else + *wbuf_capacity = 0; + *rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left; + *wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left; + return 0; +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ +} + +/** Check whether the ECC group requested is supported by the current OpenSSL + * library instance. Return 1 if the group is supported, and 0 if not. + */ +int +evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup) +{ + EC_KEY *ec_key; + int nid; + int ret; + + if (!ecgroup) + nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group; + else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P256")) + nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; + else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P224")) + nid = NID_secp224r1; + else + return 0; + + ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); + ret = (ec_key != NULL); + EC_KEY_free(ec_key); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509.c b/src/lib/tls/x509.c index 8bed6f5a1..dbf1dd927 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/x509.c +++ b/src/lib/tls/x509.c @@ -4,86 +4,15 @@ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** - * \file x509.c + * \file x509_openssl.c * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to - * X.509 functions from OpenSSL. + * X.509 functions. **/ #define TOR_X509_PRIVATE #include "lib/tls/x509.h" -#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" -#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" -#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" -#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" - -/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in - * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */ -DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) - -#include <openssl/opensslv.h> - -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC -#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support" -#endif - -#include <openssl/err.h> -#include <openssl/asn1.h> -#include <openssl/bio.h> -#include <openssl/bn.h> -#include <openssl/rsa.h> - -ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) - -#include "lib/log/log.h" #include "lib/log/util_bug.h" -#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h" -#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h" - -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <string.h> - -#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API -#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \ - X509_get0_notBefore(cert) -#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \ - X509_get0_notAfter(cert) -#ifndef X509_get_notBefore -#define X509_get_notBefore(cert) \ - X509_getm_notBefore(cert) -#endif -#ifndef X509_get_notAfter -#define X509_get_notAfter(cert) \ - X509_getm_notAfter(cert) -#endif -#else /* ! OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ -#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \ - ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notBefore((X509 *)cert)) -#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \ - ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notAfter((X509 *)cert)) -#endif - -/** Return a newly allocated X509 name with commonName cname. */ -static X509_NAME * -tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname) -{ - int nid; - X509_NAME *name; - /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START : these branches will only fail on OOM errors */ - if (!(name = X509_NAME_new())) - return NULL; - if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error; - if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC, - (unsigned char*)cname, -1, -1, 0))) - goto error; - /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */ - return name; - - /* LCOV_EXCL_START : these lines will only execute on out of memory errors*/ - error: - X509_NAME_free(name); - return NULL; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ -} +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" /** Choose the start and end times for a certificate */ void @@ -121,221 +50,6 @@ tor_tls_pick_certificate_lifetime(time_t now, *end_time_out = end_time; } -/** Generate and sign an X509 certificate with the public key rsa, - * signed by the private key rsa_sign. The commonName of the - * certificate will be cname; the commonName of the issuer will be - * cname_sign. The cert will be valid for cert_lifetime - * seconds, starting from some time in the past. - * - * Return a certificate on success, NULL on failure. - */ -MOCK_IMPL(X509 *, -tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa, - crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, - const char *cname, - const char *cname_sign, - unsigned int cert_lifetime)) -{ - /* OpenSSL generates self-signed certificates with random 64-bit serial - * numbers, so let's do that too. */ -#define SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE 8 - - time_t start_time, end_time; - BIGNUM *serial_number = NULL; - unsigned char serial_tmp[SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE]; - EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL; - X509 *x509 = NULL; - X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL; - - tor_tls_init(); - - time_t now = time(NULL); - - tor_tls_pick_certificate_lifetime(now, cert_lifetime, - &start_time, &end_time); - - tor_assert(rsa); - tor_assert(cname); - tor_assert(rsa_sign); - tor_assert(cname_sign); - if (!(sign_pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa_sign,1))) - goto error; - if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,0))) - goto error; - if (!(x509 = X509_new())) - goto error; - if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2))) - goto error; - - { /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */ - crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp)); - if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL))) - goto error; - if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509)))) - goto error; - } - - if (!(name = tor_x509_name_new(cname))) - goto error; - if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name))) - goto error; - if (!(name_issuer = tor_x509_name_new(cname_sign))) - goto error; - if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer))) - goto error; - - if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time)) - goto error; - if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time)) - goto error; - if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey)) - goto error; - - if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha256())) - goto error; - - goto done; - error: - if (x509) { - X509_free(x509); - x509 = NULL; - } - done: - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "generating certificate"); - if (sign_pkey) - EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey); - if (pkey) - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - if (serial_number) - BN_clear_free(serial_number); - if (name) - X509_NAME_free(name); - if (name_issuer) - X509_NAME_free(name_issuer); - return x509; - -#undef SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE -} - -/** Free all storage held in cert */ -void -tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) -{ - if (! cert) - return; - if (cert->cert) - X509_free(cert->cert); - tor_free(cert->encoded); - memwipe(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert)); - /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since cert will never be NULL here */ - tor_free(cert); - /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */ -} - -/** - * Allocate a new tor_x509_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert". - * - * Steals a reference to x509_cert. - */ -MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *, -tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert)) -{ - tor_x509_cert_t *cert; - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - RSA *rsa; - int length; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - - if (!x509_cert) - return NULL; - - length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf); - cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) { - goto err; - } - cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length; - cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length); - memcpy(cert->encoded, buf, length); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - - cert->cert = x509_cert; - - crypto_common_digests(&cert->cert_digests, - (char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len); - - if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) && - (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) { - crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); - if (crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests) < 0) { - crypto_pk_free(pk); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - goto err; - } - - cert->pkey_digests_set = 1; - crypto_pk_free(pk); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - } - - return cert; - err: - /* LCOV_EXCL_START for the same reason as the exclusion above */ - tor_free(cert); - log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't wrap encoded X509 certificate."); - X509_free(x509_cert); - return NULL; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ -} - -/** Return a new copy of cert. */ -tor_x509_cert_t * -tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) -{ - tor_assert(cert); - X509 *x509 = cert->cert; - return tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(x509)); -} - -/** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly certificate_len, - * from a certificate. Return a newly allocated tor_x509_cert_t on - * success and NULL on failure. */ -tor_x509_cert_t * -tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len) -{ - X509 *x509; - const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)certificate; - tor_x509_cert_t *newcert; - tor_assert(certificate); - check_no_tls_errors(); - - if (certificate_len > INT_MAX) - goto err; - - x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)certificate_len); - - if (!x509) - goto err; /* Couldn't decode */ - if (cp - certificate != (int)certificate_len) { - X509_free(x509); - goto err; /* Didn't use all the bytes */ - } - newcert = tor_x509_cert_new(x509); - if (!newcert) { - goto err; - } - if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len || - fast_memneq(newcert->encoded, certificate, certificate_len)) { - /* Cert wasn't in DER */ - tor_x509_cert_free(newcert); - goto err; - } - return newcert; - err: - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "decoding a certificate"); - return NULL; -} - /** Set *encoded_out and *size_out to cert's encoded DER * representation and length, respectively. */ void @@ -375,190 +89,3 @@ tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) return &cert->cert_digests; } -/** - * Return a newly allocated copy of the public key that a certificate - * certifies. Watch out! This returns NULL if the cert's key is not RSA. - */ -crypto_pk_t * -tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) -{ - crypto_pk_t *result = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert); - RSA *rsa; - if (!pkey) - return NULL; - rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); - if (!rsa) { - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return NULL; - } - result = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return result; -} - -/** Check whether cert is well-formed, currently live, and correctly - * signed by the public key in signing_cert. If check_rsa_1024, - * make sure that it has an RSA key with 1024 bits; otherwise, just check that - * the key is long enough. Return 1 if the cert is good, and 0 if it's bad or - * we couldn't check it. */ -int -tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, - const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, - const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert, - time_t now, - int check_rsa_1024) -{ - check_no_tls_errors(); - EVP_PKEY *cert_key; - int r, key_ok = 0; - - if (!signing_cert || !cert) - goto bad; - - EVP_PKEY *signing_key = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert->cert); - if (!signing_key) - goto bad; - r = X509_verify(cert->cert, signing_key); - EVP_PKEY_free(signing_key); - if (r <= 0) - goto bad; - - /* okay, the signature checked out right. Now let's check the check the - * lifetime. */ - if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert, now, - 48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0) - goto bad; - - cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert); - if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) { - RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key); -#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - if (rsa && RSA_bits(rsa) == 1024) -#else - if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024) -#endif - key_ok = 1; - if (rsa) - RSA_free(rsa); - } else if (cert_key) { - int min_bits = 1024; -#ifdef EVP_PKEY_EC - if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(cert_key) == EVP_PKEY_EC) - min_bits = 128; -#endif - if (EVP_PKEY_bits(cert_key) >= min_bits) - key_ok = 1; - } - EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key); - if (!key_ok) - goto bad; - - /* XXXX compare DNs or anything? */ - - return 1; - bad: - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "checking a certificate"); - return 0; -} - -/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */ -static void -log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem, - time_t now) -{ - BIO *bio = NULL; - BUF_MEM *buf; - char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL; - char mytime[33]; - struct tm tm; - size_t n; - - if (problem) - tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, - "Certificate %s. Either their clock is set wrong, or your clock " - "is wrong.", - problem); - - if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) { - log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end; - } - if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore_const(cert)))) { - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime"); - goto end; - } - BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf); - s1 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length); - - (void)BIO_reset(bio); - if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter_const(cert)))) { - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime"); - goto end; - } - BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf); - s2 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length); - - n = strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y UTC", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm)); - if (n > 0) { - tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, - "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)", - s1,s2,mytime); - } else { - tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, - "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. " - "Couldn't get your time.)", - s1, s2); - } - - end: - /* Not expected to get invoked */ - tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "getting certificate lifetime"); - if (bio) - BIO_free(bio); - tor_free(s1); - tor_free(s2); -} - -/** Helper: check whether cert is expired give or take - * past_tolerance seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take - * future_tolerance seconds. (Relative to the current time - * now.) If it is live, return 0. If it is not live, log a message - * and return -1. */ -int -tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert, - time_t now, - int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance) -{ - time_t t; - - t = now + future_tolerance; - if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore_const(cert), &t) > 0) { - log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid", now); - return -1; - } - t = now - past_tolerance; - if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter_const(cert), &t) < 0) { - log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired", now); - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS -/* Testing only: return a new x509 cert with the same contents as inp, - but with the expiration time new_expiration_time, signed with - signing_key. */ -STATIC tor_x509_cert_t * -tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp, - time_t new_expiration_time, - crypto_pk_t *signing_key) -{ - X509 *newc = X509_dup(inp->cert); - X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newc), 0, &new_expiration_time); - EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1); - tor_assert(X509_sign(newc, pk, EVP_sha256())); - EVP_PKEY_free(pk); - return tor_x509_cert_new(newc); -} -#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509.h b/src/lib/tls/x509.h index e3dfcf393..f75d15d7e 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/x509.h +++ b/src/lib/tls/x509.h @@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ /* Opaque structure to hold an X509 certificate. */ typedef struct tor_x509_cert_t tor_x509_cert_t; -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL +#ifdef ENABLE_NSS +typedef struct CERTCertificateStr tor_x509_cert_impl_t; +#elif defined(ENABLE_OPENSSL) typedef struct x509_st tor_x509_cert_impl_t; #endif diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e856c9518 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file x509_nss.c + * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to + * X.509 functions from NSS. + **/ + +#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/log/util_bug.h" + +MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_impl_t *, +tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa, + crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, + const char *cname, + const char *cname_sign, + unsigned int cert_lifetime)) +{ + tor_assert(rsa); + tor_assert(rsa_sign); + tor_assert(cname); + tor_assert(cname_sign); + (void) cert_lifetime; + // XXXX + return NULL; +} + +MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *, +tor_x509_cert_new,(tor_x509_cert_impl_t *x509_cert)) +{ + tor_assert(x509_cert); + // XXXX + return NULL; +} + +tor_x509_cert_t * +tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + tor_assert(cert); + // XXXX + return NULL; +} + +void +tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + (void)cert; + // XXXX +} + +tor_x509_cert_t * +tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, + size_t certificate_len) +{ + tor_assert(certificate); + (void) certificate_len; + // XXXX + return NULL; +} + +crypto_pk_t * +tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + tor_assert(cert); + // XXXXX + return NULL; +} + +int +tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, + const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, + const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert, + time_t now, + int check_rsa_1024) +{ + tor_assert(cert); + tor_assert(signing_cert); + (void)severity; + (void)now; + (void)check_rsa_1024; + // XXXXX + + return 0; +} + +int +tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, + const tor_x509_cert_impl_t *cert, + time_t now, + int past_tolerance, + int future_tolerance) +{ + tor_assert(cert); + (void)severity; + (void)now; + (void)past_tolerance; + (void)future_tolerance; + // XXXX + return -1; +} + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +tor_x509_cert_t * +tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp, + time_t new_expiration_time, + crypto_pk_t *signing_key) +{ + tor_assert(inp); + tor_assert(signing_key); + (void)new_expiration_time; + + // XXXX + return NULL; +} +#endif diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c b/src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c003d4704 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,489 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file x509_openssl.c + * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to + * X.509 functions from OpenSSL. + **/ + +#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" + +/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in + * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */ +DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) + +#include <openssl/opensslv.h> + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support" +#endif + +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/asn1.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> + +ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) + +#include "lib/log/log.h" +#include "lib/log/util_bug.h" +#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h" +#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h" + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API +#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \ + X509_get0_notBefore(cert) +#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \ + X509_get0_notAfter(cert) +#ifndef X509_get_notBefore +#define X509_get_notBefore(cert) \ + X509_getm_notBefore(cert) +#endif +#ifndef X509_get_notAfter +#define X509_get_notAfter(cert) \ + X509_getm_notAfter(cert) +#endif +#else /* ! OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ +#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \ + ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notBefore((X509 *)cert)) +#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \ + ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notAfter((X509 *)cert)) +#endif + +/** Return a newly allocated X509 name with commonName cname. */ +static X509_NAME * +tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname) +{ + int nid; + X509_NAME *name; + /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START : these branches will only fail on OOM errors */ + if (!(name = X509_NAME_new())) + return NULL; + if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error; + if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC, + (unsigned char*)cname, -1, -1, 0))) + goto error; + /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */ + return name; + + /* LCOV_EXCL_START : these lines will only execute on out of memory errors*/ + error: + X509_NAME_free(name); + return NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ +} + +/** Generate and sign an X509 certificate with the public key rsa, + * signed by the private key rsa_sign. The commonName of the + * certificate will be cname; the commonName of the issuer will be + * cname_sign. The cert will be valid for cert_lifetime + * seconds, starting from some time in the past. + * + * Return a certificate on success, NULL on failure. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(X509 *, +tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa, + crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, + const char *cname, + const char *cname_sign, + unsigned int cert_lifetime)) +{ + /* OpenSSL generates self-signed certificates with random 64-bit serial + * numbers, so let's do that too. */ +#define SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE 8 + + time_t start_time, end_time; + BIGNUM *serial_number = NULL; + unsigned char serial_tmp[SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE]; + EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL; + X509 *x509 = NULL; + X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL; + + tor_tls_init(); + + time_t now = time(NULL); + + tor_tls_pick_certificate_lifetime(now, cert_lifetime, + &start_time, &end_time); + + tor_assert(rsa); + tor_assert(cname); + tor_assert(rsa_sign); + tor_assert(cname_sign); + if (!(sign_pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa_sign,1))) + goto error; + if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,0))) + goto error; + if (!(x509 = X509_new())) + goto error; + if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2))) + goto error; + + { /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */ + crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp)); + if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL))) + goto error; + if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509)))) + goto error; + } + + if (!(name = tor_x509_name_new(cname))) + goto error; + if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name))) + goto error; + if (!(name_issuer = tor_x509_name_new(cname_sign))) + goto error; + if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer))) + goto error; + + if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time)) + goto error; + if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time)) + goto error; + if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey)) + goto error; + + if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha256())) + goto error; + + goto done; + error: + if (x509) { + X509_free(x509); + x509 = NULL; + } + done: + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "generating certificate"); + if (sign_pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey); + if (pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (serial_number) + BN_clear_free(serial_number); + if (name) + X509_NAME_free(name); + if (name_issuer) + X509_NAME_free(name_issuer); + return x509; + +#undef SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE +} + +/** Free all storage held in cert */ +void +tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + if (! cert) + return; + if (cert->cert) + X509_free(cert->cert); + tor_free(cert->encoded); + memwipe(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert)); + /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since cert will never be NULL here */ + tor_free(cert); + /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */ +} + +/** + * Allocate a new tor_x509_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert". + * + * Steals a reference to x509_cert. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *, +tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert)) +{ + tor_x509_cert_t *cert; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + RSA *rsa; + int length; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + if (!x509_cert) + return NULL; + + length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf); + cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) { + goto err; + } + cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length; + cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length); + memcpy(cert->encoded, buf, length); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + + cert->cert = x509_cert; + + crypto_common_digests(&cert->cert_digests, + (char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len); + + if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) && + (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) { + crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); + if (crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests) < 0) { + crypto_pk_free(pk); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + goto err; + } + + cert->pkey_digests_set = 1; + crypto_pk_free(pk); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + } + + return cert; + err: + /* LCOV_EXCL_START for the same reason as the exclusion above */ + tor_free(cert); + log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't wrap encoded X509 certificate."); + X509_free(x509_cert); + return NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ +} + +/** Return a new copy of cert. */ +tor_x509_cert_t * +tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + tor_assert(cert); + X509 *x509 = cert->cert; + return tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(x509)); +} + +/** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly certificate_len, + * from a certificate. Return a newly allocated tor_x509_cert_t on + * success and NULL on failure. */ +tor_x509_cert_t * +tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len) +{ + X509 *x509; + const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)certificate; + tor_x509_cert_t *newcert; + tor_assert(certificate); + check_no_tls_errors(); + + if (certificate_len > INT_MAX) + goto err; + + x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)certificate_len); + + if (!x509) + goto err; /* Couldn't decode */ + if (cp - certificate != (int)certificate_len) { + X509_free(x509); + goto err; /* Didn't use all the bytes */ + } + newcert = tor_x509_cert_new(x509); + if (!newcert) { + goto err; + } + if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len || + fast_memneq(newcert->encoded, certificate, certificate_len)) { + /* Cert wasn't in DER */ + tor_x509_cert_free(newcert); + goto err; + } + return newcert; + err: + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "decoding a certificate"); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * Return a newly allocated copy of the public key that a certificate + * certifies. Watch out! This returns NULL if the cert's key is not RSA. + */ +crypto_pk_t * +tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + crypto_pk_t *result = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert); + RSA *rsa; + if (!pkey) + return NULL; + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (!rsa) { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + return NULL; + } + result = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + return result; +} + +/** Check whether cert is well-formed, currently live, and correctly + * signed by the public key in signing_cert. If check_rsa_1024, + * make sure that it has an RSA key with 1024 bits; otherwise, just check that + * the key is long enough. Return 1 if the cert is good, and 0 if it's bad or + * we couldn't check it. */ +int +tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, + const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, + const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert, + time_t now, + int check_rsa_1024) +{ + check_no_tls_errors(); + EVP_PKEY *cert_key; + int r, key_ok = 0; + + if (!signing_cert || !cert) + goto bad; + + EVP_PKEY *signing_key = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert->cert); + if (!signing_key) + goto bad; + r = X509_verify(cert->cert, signing_key); + EVP_PKEY_free(signing_key); + if (r <= 0) + goto bad; + + /* okay, the signature checked out right. Now let's check the check the + * lifetime. */ + if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert, now, + 48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0) + goto bad; + + cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert); + if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) { + RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key); +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + if (rsa && RSA_bits(rsa) == 1024) +#else + if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024) +#endif + key_ok = 1; + if (rsa) + RSA_free(rsa); + } else if (cert_key) { + int min_bits = 1024; +#ifdef EVP_PKEY_EC + if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(cert_key) == EVP_PKEY_EC) + min_bits = 128; +#endif + if (EVP_PKEY_bits(cert_key) >= min_bits) + key_ok = 1; + } + EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key); + if (!key_ok) + goto bad; + + /* XXXX compare DNs or anything? */ + + return 1; + bad: + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "checking a certificate"); + return 0; +} + +/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */ +static void +log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem, + time_t now) +{ + BIO *bio = NULL; + BUF_MEM *buf; + char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL; + char mytime[33]; + struct tm tm; + size_t n; + + if (problem) + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, + "Certificate %s. Either their clock is set wrong, or your clock " + "is wrong.", + problem); + + if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end; + } + if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore_const(cert)))) { + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime"); + goto end; + } + BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf); + s1 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length); + + (void)BIO_reset(bio); + if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter_const(cert)))) { + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime"); + goto end; + } + BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf); + s2 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length); + + n = strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y UTC", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm)); + if (n > 0) { + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, + "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)", + s1,s2,mytime); + } else { + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, + "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. " + "Couldn't get your time.)", + s1, s2); + } + + end: + /* Not expected to get invoked */ + tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "getting certificate lifetime"); + if (bio) + BIO_free(bio); + tor_free(s1); + tor_free(s2); +} + +/** Helper: check whether cert is expired give or take + * past_tolerance seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take + * future_tolerance seconds. (Relative to the current time + * now.) If it is live, return 0. If it is not live, log a message + * and return -1. */ +int +tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert, + time_t now, + int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance) +{ + time_t t; + + t = now + future_tolerance; + if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore_const(cert), &t) > 0) { + log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid", now); + return -1; + } + t = now - past_tolerance; + if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter_const(cert), &t) < 0) { + log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired", now); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +/* Testing only: return a new x509 cert with the same contents as inp, + but with the expiration time new_expiration_time, signed with + signing_key. */ +STATIC tor_x509_cert_t * +tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp, + time_t new_expiration_time, + crypto_pk_t *signing_key) +{ + X509 *newc = X509_dup(inp->cert); + X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newc), 0, &new_expiration_time); + EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1); + tor_assert(X509_sign(newc, pk, EVP_sha256())); + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + return tor_x509_cert_new(newc); +} +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ diff --git a/src/test/include.am b/src/test/include.am index 68372adc7..c2e08aa3d 100644 --- a/src/test/include.am +++ b/src/test/include.am @@ -184,6 +184,14 @@ src_test_test_SOURCES += \ src/test/testing_common.c \ src/test/testing_rsakeys.c \ src/ext/tinytest.c + +if USE_NSS +# ... +else +src_test_test_SOURCES += \ + src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c +endif + endif src_test_test_slow_SOURCES = diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c index 94eae5a4f..3b63f1c07 100644 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@ -919,6 +919,9 @@ struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { { "status/" , status_tests }, { "storagedir/", storagedir_tests }, { "tortls/", tortls_tests }, +#ifndef ENABLE_NSS + { "tortls/openssl/", tortls_openssl_tests }, +#endif { "util/", util_tests }, { "util/format/", util_format_tests }, { "util/logging/", logging_tests }, diff --git a/src/test/test.h b/src/test/test.h index b3a73271e..94aa9443d 100644 --- a/src/test/test.h +++ b/src/test/test.h @@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ extern struct testcase_t socks_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t status_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t thread_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t tortls_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t tortls_openssl_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t util_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t util_format_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t util_process_tests[]; diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.c b/src/test/test_tortls.c index ec197ba99..d20bc5fa6 100644 --- a/src/test/test_tortls.c +++ b/src/test/test_tortls.c @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #define TORTLS_PRIVATE -#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE #define TOR_X509_PRIVATE #define LOG_PRIVATE #include "orconfig.h" @@ -11,64 +10,24 @@ #include <winsock2.h> #endif #include <math.h> +#include <stddef.h> #include "lib/cc/compat_compiler.h" -/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in - * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */ -DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) - -#include <openssl/opensslv.h> - -#include <openssl/ssl.h> -#include <openssl/ssl3.h> -#include <openssl/err.h> -#include <openssl/asn1t.h> -#include <openssl/x509.h> -#include <openssl/rsa.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/bn.h> - -ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) - #include "core/or/or.h" #include "lib/log/log.h" #include "app/config/config.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h" -#include "lib/tls/x509.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h" #include "app/config/or_state_st.h" #include "test/test.h" #include "test/log_test_helpers.h" -#define NS_MODULE tortls - -#ifndef HAVE_SSL_STATE -#define OPENSSL_OPAQUE -#endif -#if defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) -#define SSL_STATE_STR "before SSL initialization" -#else -#define SSL_STATE_STR "before/accept initialization" -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static SSL_METHOD * -give_me_a_test_method(void) -{ - SSL_METHOD *method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD)); - memcpy(method, TLSv1_method(), sizeof(SSL_METHOD)); - return method; -} - -static int -fake_num_ciphers(void) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ +#include "tinytest.h" static void test_tortls_errno_to_tls_error(void *data) @@ -121,66 +80,6 @@ mock_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) } static void -test_tortls_tor_tls_new(void *data) -{ - (void) data; - MOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key, mock_tls_cert_matches_key); - crypto_pk_t *key1 = NULL, *key2 = NULL; - SSL_METHOD *method = NULL; - - key1 = pk_generate(2); - key2 = pk_generate(3); - - tor_tls_t *tls = NULL; - tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER, - key1, key2, 86400), OP_EQ, 0); - tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0); - tt_want(tls); - tor_tls_free(tls); tls = NULL; - - SSL_CTX_free(client_tls_context->ctx); - client_tls_context->ctx = NULL; - tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0); - tt_ptr_op(tls, OP_EQ, NULL); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE - method = give_me_a_test_method(); - SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method); - method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers; - client_tls_context->ctx = ctx; - tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0); - tt_ptr_op(tls, OP_EQ, NULL); -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - - done: - UNMOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key); - crypto_pk_free(key1); - crypto_pk_free(key2); - tor_tls_free(tls); - tor_free(method); - tor_tls_free_all(); -} - -#define NS_MODULE tortls -NS_DECL(void, logv, (int severity, log_domain_mask_t domain, - const char *funcname, const char *suffix, - const char *format, va_list ap)); - -static void -NS(logv)(int severity, log_domain_mask_t domain, - const char *funcname, const char *suffix, const char *format, - va_list ap) -{ - (void) severity; - (void) domain; - (void) funcname; - (void) suffix; - (void) format; - (void) ap; // XXXX look at this. - CALLED(logv)++; -} - -static void test_tortls_tor_tls_get_error(void *data) { (void) data; @@ -193,11 +92,10 @@ test_tortls_tor_tls_get_error(void *data) tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER, key1, key2, 86400), OP_EQ, 0); tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0); - NS_MOCK(logv); - tt_int_op(CALLED(logv), OP_EQ, 0); + setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, - (const char *)"test", 0, 0); - tt_int_op(CALLED(logv), OP_EQ, 1); + (const char *)"in unit test", LOG_WARN, LD_GENERAL); + expect_single_log_msg_containing("unexpected close while in unit test"); done: UNMOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key); @@ -208,2638 +106,172 @@ test_tortls_tor_tls_get_error(void *data) } static void -library_init(void) -{ -#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL); -#else - SSL_library_init(); - SSL_load_error_strings(); -#endif -} - -static void -test_tortls_get_state_description(void *ignored) +test_tortls_x509_cert_get_id_digests(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; - char *buf; - SSL_CTX *ctx; - - library_init(); - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); - - buf = tor_malloc_zero(1000); - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - - tor_tls_get_state_description(NULL, buf, 20); - tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, "(No SSL object)"); - - SSL_free(tls->ssl); - tls->ssl = NULL; - tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 20); - tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, "(No SSL object)"); - - tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); - tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); - tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in HANDSHAKE"); - - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; - tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); - tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in OPEN"); - - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE; - tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); - tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in GOTCLOSE"); - - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE; - tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); - tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in SENTCLOSE"); - - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED; - tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); - tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in CLOSED"); - - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE; - tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); - tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in RENEGOTIATE"); + tor_x509_cert_t *cert; + common_digests_t *d; + const common_digests_t *res; + cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(common_digests_t)); + d->d[0][0] = 42; - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT; - tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); - tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR); + res = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(cert); + tt_assert(!res); - tls->state = 7; - tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); - tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in unknown TLS state"); + cert->pkey_digests_set = 1; + cert->pkey_digests = *d; + res = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(cert); + tt_int_op(res->d[0][0], OP_EQ, 42); done: - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); - SSL_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(buf); - tor_free(tls); + tor_free(cert); + tor_free(d); } static void -test_tortls_get_by_ssl(void *ignored) +test_tortls_get_my_certs(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; - tor_tls_t *res; - SSL_CTX *ctx; - SSL *ssl; - - library_init(); - tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); - - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC; - - ssl = SSL_new(ctx); - - res = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl); - tt_assert(!res); + int ret; + tor_tls_context_t *ctx; + const tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert_out = NULL; + const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert_out = NULL; - SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls); + ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t)); - res = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl); - tt_assert(res == tls); + client_tls_context = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, NULL, NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - done: - SSL_free(ssl); - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); - tor_free(tls); -} + server_tls_context = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, NULL, NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); -static void -test_tortls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int first; + client_tls_context = ctx; + ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, NULL, NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); + client_tls_context = ctx; + ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, &link_cert_out, &id_cert_out); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - first = tor_tls_object_ex_data_index; - tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); - tt_int_op(first, OP_EQ, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index); + server_tls_context = ctx; + ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_cert_out, &id_cert_out); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); done: - (void)0; + (void)1; } static void -test_tortls_log_one_error(void *ignored) +test_tortls_get_forced_write_size(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; + long ret; tor_tls_t *tls; - SSL_CTX *ctx; - SSL *ssl = NULL; - library_init(); - - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); - - tor_tls_log_one_error(NULL, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, "something"); - expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: " - "(null) (in (null):(null):---)\n"); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); - expect_log_msg("TLS error: (null) " - "(in (null):(null):---)\n"); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tls->address = tor_strdup("127.hello"); - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); - expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: " - "(null) (in (null):(null):---)\n"); - tor_free(tls->address); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tls->address = tor_strdup("127.hello"); - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, "blarg"); - expect_log_msg("TLS error while blarg with " - "127.hello: (null) (in (null):(null):---)\n"); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, 3), LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); - expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: " - "BN lib (in unknown library:(null):---)\n"); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST), - LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); - expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST), - LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); - expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH), - LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); - expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE), - LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); - expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL), - LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); - expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL), - LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); - expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); - - tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); - expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: (null)" - " (in (null):(null):" SSL_STATE_STR ")\n"); + tls->wantwrite_n = 43; + ret = tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 43); done: - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - SSL_free(ssl); - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); - if (tls && tls->ssl) - SSL_free(tls->ssl); - if (tls) - tor_free(tls->address); tor_free(tls); } -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE static void -test_tortls_get_error(void *ignored) +test_tortls_used_v1_handshake(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; int ret; - SSL_CTX *ctx; - - library_init(); - - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); - setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); + tor_tls_t *tls; tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); - SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL); - ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO); - expect_log_msg("TLS error: unexpected close while" - " something (before/accept initialization)\n"); + // These tests assume both V2 handshake server and client are enabled + tls->wasV2Handshake = 0; + ret = tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 2, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); + tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; + ret = tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tls); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - expect_no_log_entry(); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 1, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -11); - expect_no_log_entry(); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - ERR_clear_error(); - ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); - ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); - expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: (null)" - " (in bignum routines:(null):before/accept initialization)\n"); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - ERR_clear_error(); - tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING; - SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_READ; - ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD); - expect_no_log_entry(); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - ERR_clear_error(); - tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING; - SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_WRITE; - ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE); - expect_no_log_entry(); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - ERR_clear_error(); - tls->ssl->rwstate = 0; - tls->ssl->shutdown = SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - tls->ssl->s3->warn_alert =SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY; - ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_CLOSE); - expect_log_entry(); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 2, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -10); - expect_no_log_entry(); - - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); - ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); - expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: (null) (in system library:" - "connect:before/accept initialization)\n"); done: - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - SSL_free(tls->ssl); tor_free(tls); - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); } -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ static void -test_tortls_always_accept_verify_cb(void *ignored) +test_tortls_get_num_server_handshakes(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; int ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; - ret = always_accept_verify_cb(0, NULL); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - done: - (void)0; -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_x509_cert_free(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_x509_cert_t *cert; - - cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - tor_x509_cert_free(cert); - - cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - cert->cert = X509_new(); - cert->encoded = tor_malloc_zero(1); - tor_x509_cert_free(cert); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -static void -test_tortls_x509_cert_get_id_digests(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_x509_cert_t *cert; - common_digests_t *d; - const common_digests_t *res; - cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(common_digests_t)); - d->d[0][0] = 42; - - res = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(cert); - tt_assert(!res); + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - cert->pkey_digests_set = 1; - cert->pkey_digests = *d; - res = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(cert); - tt_int_op(res->d[0][0], OP_EQ, 42); + tls->server_handshake_count = 3; + ret = tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3); done: - tor_free(cert); - tor_free(d); -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static int -fixed_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) -{ - (void) a; (void) b; - return 1; -} - -/* - * Use only for the matching fake_x509_free() call - */ -static X509 * -fake_x509_malloc(void) -{ - return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509)); -} - -static void -fake_x509_free(X509 *cert) -{ - if (cert) { - if (cert->cert_info) { - if (cert->cert_info->key) { - if (cert->cert_info->key->pkey) { - tor_free(cert->cert_info->key->pkey); - } - tor_free(cert->cert_info->key); - } - tor_free(cert->cert_info); - } - tor_free(cert); - } + tor_free(tls); } static void -test_tortls_cert_matches_key(void *ignored) +test_tortls_server_got_renegotiate(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; - int res; + int ret; tor_tls_t *tls; - tor_x509_cert_t *cert; - X509 *one = NULL, *two = NULL; - EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *meth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(999, 0, NULL, NULL); - EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(meth, NULL, NULL, fixed_pub_cmp, NULL, NULL, NULL); tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - one = fake_x509_malloc(); - one->references = 1; - two = fake_x509_malloc(); - two->references = 1; - - res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert); - tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0); - - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); - tls->ssl->session->peer = one; - res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert); - tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0); - - cert->cert = two; - res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert); - tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0); - - one->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF)); - one->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY)); - one->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY)); - one->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1; - one->cert_info->key->pkey->ameth = meth; - one->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1; - - two->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF)); - two->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY)); - two->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY)); - two->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1; - two->cert_info->key->pkey->ameth = meth; - two->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 2; - - res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert); - tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0); - one->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1; - two->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1; - res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert); - tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 1); + tls->got_renegotiate = 1; + ret = tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); done: - EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(meth); - tor_free(tls->ssl->session); - tor_free(tls->ssl); tor_free(tls); - tor_free(cert); - fake_x509_free(one); - fake_x509_free(two); } static void -test_tortls_cert_get_key(void *ignored) +test_tortls_evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; - tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL; - crypto_pk_t *res = NULL; - cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - X509 *key = NULL; - key = fake_x509_malloc(); - key->references = 1; - - res = tor_tls_cert_get_key(cert); - tt_assert(!res); - - cert->cert = key; - key->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF)); - key->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY)); - key->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY)); - key->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1; - key->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 2; - res = tor_tls_cert_get_key(cert); - tt_assert(!res); - - done: - fake_x509_free(key); - tor_free(cert); - crypto_pk_free(res); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + int ret; -static void -test_tortls_get_my_client_auth_key(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - crypto_pk_t *ret; - crypto_pk_t *expected; - tor_tls_context_t *ctx; - RSA *k = RSA_new(); + ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t)); - expected = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(k); - ctx->auth_key = expected; + ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("foobar"); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - client_tls_context = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(); - tt_assert(!ret); + ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("P256"); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - client_tls_context = ctx; - ret = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(); - tt_assert(ret == expected); + ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("P224"); + // tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); This varies between machines + tt_assert(ret == 0 || ret == 1); done: - tor_free(expected); - tor_free(ctx); + (void)0; } -static void -test_tortls_get_my_certs(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_context_t *ctx; - const tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert_out = NULL; - const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert_out = NULL; - - ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t)); - - client_tls_context = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, NULL, NULL); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - server_tls_context = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, NULL, NULL); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - client_tls_context = ctx; - ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, NULL, NULL); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - client_tls_context = ctx; - ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, &link_cert_out, &id_cert_out); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - server_tls_context = ctx; - ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_cert_out, &id_cert_out); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - done: - (void)1; -} - -#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS -static SSL_CIPHER * -get_cipher_by_name(const char *name) -{ - int i; - const SSL_METHOD *method = SSLv23_method(); - int num = method->num_ciphers(); - - for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { - const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = method->get_cipher(i); - const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); - if (!strcmp(ciphername, name)) { - return (SSL_CIPHER *)cipher; - } - } - - return NULL; -} -#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_get_ciphersuite_name(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - const char *ret; - tor_tls_t *ctx; - ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - ctx->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - - ret = tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(ctx); - tt_str_op(ret, OP_EQ, "(NONE)"); - - done: - tor_free(ctx->ssl); - tor_free(ctx); -} - -static SSL_CIPHER * -get_cipher_by_id(uint16_t id) -{ - int i; - const SSL_METHOD *method = SSLv23_method(); - int num = method->num_ciphers(); - for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { - const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = method->get_cipher(i); - if (id == (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff)) { - return (SSL_CIPHER *)cipher; - } - } - - return NULL; -} - -static void -test_tortls_classify_client_ciphers(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int i; - int ret; - SSL_CTX *ctx; - SSL *ssl; - tor_tls_t *tls; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; - SSL_CIPHER *tmp_cipher; - - library_init(); - - tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC; - - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()); - ssl = SSL_new(ctx); - tls->ssl = ssl; - - ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); - - ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, NULL); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls); - tls->client_cipher_list_type = 42; - - ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, NULL); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42); - - tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; - ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 1); - - tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; - ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl)); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3); - tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3); - - SSL_CIPHER *one = get_cipher_by_name(TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA), - *two = get_cipher_by_name(TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA), - *three = get_cipher_by_name(SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA), - *four = NULL; - sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, two); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, three); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, four); - - tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; - ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 1); - - sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(ciphers); - - one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"); - tt_assert(one); - one->id = 0x00ff; - two = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"); - tt_assert(two); - two->id = 0x0000; - sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one); - tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; - ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3); - tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3); - - sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, two); - tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; - ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3); - tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3); - - one->id = 0xC00A; - tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; - ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3); - tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3); - - sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(ciphers); - for (i=0; v2_cipher_list[i]; i++) { - tmp_cipher = get_cipher_by_id(v2_cipher_list[i]); - tt_assert(tmp_cipher); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, tmp_cipher); - } - tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; - ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 2); - tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 2); - - done: - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - SSL_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -static void -test_tortls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - -#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS - tt_skip(); - done: - (void)1; -#else - int ret; - SSL_CTX *ctx; - SSL *ssl; - SSL_SESSION *sess; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; - - library_init(); - - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()); - ssl = SSL_new(ctx); - sess = SSL_SESSION_new(); - - ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - ssl->session = sess; - ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); - SSL_CIPHER *one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"); - tt_assert(one); - one->id = 0x00ff; - sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one); - sess->ciphers = ciphers; - ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - done: - SSL_free(ssl); - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); -#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */ -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static X509 *fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = NULL; -static X509 *fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = NULL; - -static void -fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, - X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out) -{ - (void) severity; - (void) tls; - *cert_out = fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result; - *id_cert_out = fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result; -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static const char* notCompletelyValidCertString = - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" - "MIICVjCCAb8CAg37MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMIGbMQswCQYDVQQGEwJKUDEOMAwG\n" - "A1UECBMFVG9reW8xEDAOBgNVBAcTB0NodW8ta3UxETAPBgNVBAoTCEZyYW5rNERE\n" - "MRgwFgYDVQQLEw9XZWJDZXJ0IFN1cHBvcnQxGDAWBgNVBAMTD0ZyYW5rNEREIFdl\n" - "YiBDQTEjMCEGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYUc3VwcG9ydEBmcmFuazRkZC5jb20wHhcNMTIw\n" - "ODIyMDUyNzIzWhcNMTcwODIxMDUyNzIzWjBKMQswCQYDVQQGEwJKUDEOMAwGA1UE\n" - "CAwFVG9reW8xETAPBgNVBAoMCEZyYW5rNEREMRgwFgYDVQQDDA93d3cuZXhhbXBs\n" - "ZS5jb20wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAMYBBrx5PlP0WNI/ZdzD\n" - "+6Pktmurn+F2kQYbtc7XQh8/LTBvCo+P6iZoLEmUA9e7EXLRxgU1CVqeAi7QcAn9\n" - "MwBlc8ksFJHB0rtf9pmf8Oza9E0Bynlq/4/Kb1x+d+AyhL7oK9tQwB24uHOueHi1\n" - "C/iVv8CSWKiYe6hzN1txYe8rAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAASPdjigJ\n" - "kXCqKWpnZ/Oc75EUcMi6HztaW8abUMlYXPIgkV2F7YanHOB7K4f7OOLjiz8DTPFf\n" - "jC9UeuErhaA/zzWi8ewMTFZW/WshOrm3fNvcMrMLKtH534JKvcdMg6qIdjTFINIr\n" - "evnAhf0cwULaebn+lMs8Pdl7y37+sfluVok=\n" - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -static const char* validCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" - "MIIDpTCCAY0CAg3+MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMF4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMREwDwYD\n" - "VQQIDAhJbGxpbm9pczEQMA4GA1UEBwwHQ2hpY2FnbzEUMBIGA1UECgwLVG9yIFRl\n" - "c3RpbmcxFDASBgNVBAMMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMB4XDTE1MDkwNjEzMzk1OVoXDTQz\n" - "MDEyMjEzMzk1OVowVjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEDAOBgNVBAcMB0NoaWNhZ28xFDAS\n" - "BgNVBAoMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMR8wHQYDVQQDDBZ0ZXN0aW5nLnRvcnByb2plY3Qu\n" - "b3JnMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDoT6uyVVhWyOF3wkHjjYbd\n" - "nKaykyRv4JVtKQdZ4OpEErmX1zw4MmyzpQNV6iR4bQnWiyLfzyVJMZDIC/WILBfX\n" - "w2Pza/yuLgUvDc3twMuhOACzOQVO8PrEF/aVv2+hbCCy2udXvKhnYn+CCXl3ozc8\n" - "XcKYvujTXDyvGWY3xwAjlQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4ICAQCUvnhzQWuQ\n" - "MrN+pERkE+zcTI/9dGS90rUMMLgu8VDNqTa0TUQh8uO0EQ6uDvI8Js6e8tgwS0BR\n" - "UBahqb7ZHv+rejGCBr5OudqD+x4STiiuPNJVs86JTLN8SpM9CHjIBH5WCCN2KOy3\n" - "mevNoRcRRyYJzSFULCunIK6FGulszigMYGscrO4oiTkZiHPh9KvWT40IMiHfL+Lw\n" - "EtEWiLex6064LcA2YQ1AMuSZyCexks63lcfaFmQbkYOKqXa1oLkIRuDsOaSVjTfe\n" - "vec+X6jvf12cFTKS5WIeqkKF2Irt+dJoiHEGTe5RscUMN/f+gqHPzfFz5dR23sxo\n" - "g+HC6MZHlFkLAOx3wW6epPS8A/m1mw3zMPoTnb2U2YYt8T0dJMMlUn/7Y1sEAa+a\n" - "dSTMaeUf6VnJ//11m454EZl1to9Z7oJOgqmFffSrdD4BGIWe8f7hhW6L1Enmqe/J\n" - "BKL3wbzZh80O1W0bndAwhnEEhlzneFY84cbBo9pmVxpODHkUcStpr5Z7pBDrcL21\n" - "Ss/aB/1YrsVXhdvJdOGxl3Mnl9dUY57CympLGlT8f0pPS6GAKOelECOhFMHmJd8L\n" - "dj3XQSmKtYHevZ6IvuMXSlB/fJvSjSlkCuLo5+kJoaqPuRu+i/S1qxeRy3CBwmnE\n" - "LdSNdcX4N79GQJ996PA8+mUCQG7YRtK+WA==\n" - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; - -static const char* caCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" - "MIIFjzCCA3egAwIBAgIJAKd5WgyfPMYRMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMF4xCzAJBgNV\n" - "BAYTAlVTMREwDwYDVQQIDAhJbGxpbm9pczEQMA4GA1UEBwwHQ2hpY2FnbzEUMBIG\n" - "A1UECgwLVG9yIFRlc3RpbmcxFDASBgNVBAMMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMB4XDTE1MDkw\n" - "NjEzMzc0MVoXDTQzMDEyMjEzMzc0MVowXjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxETAPBgNVBAgM\n" - "CElsbGlub2lzMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdDaGljYWdvMRQwEgYDVQQKDAtUb3IgVGVzdGlu\n" - "ZzEUMBIGA1UEAwwLVG9yIFRlc3RpbmcwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAw\n" - "ggIKAoICAQCpLMUEiLW5leUgBZoEJms2V7lZRhIAjnJBhVMHD0e3UubNknmaQoxf\n" - "ARz3rvqOaRd0JlV+qM9qE0DjiYcCVP1cAfqAo9d83uS1vwY3YMVJzADlaIiHfyVW\n" - "uEgBy0vvkeUBqaua24dYlcwsemOiXYLu41yM1wkcGHW1AhBNHppY6cznb8TyLgNM\n" - "2x3SGUdzc5XMyAFx51faKGBA3wjs+Hg1PLY7d30nmCgEOBavpm5I1disM/0k+Mcy\n" - "YmAKEo/iHJX/rQzO4b9znP69juLlR8PDBUJEVIG/CYb6+uw8MjjUyiWXYoqfVmN2\n" - "hm/lH8b6rXw1a2Aa3VTeD0DxaWeacMYHY/i01fd5n7hCoDTRNdSw5KJ0L3Z0SKTu\n" - "0lzffKzDaIfyZGlpW5qdouACkWYzsaitQOePVE01PIdO30vUfzNTFDfy42ccx3Di\n" - "59UCu+IXB+eMtrBfsok0Qc63vtF1linJgjHW1z/8ujk8F7/qkOfODhk4l7wngc2A\n" - "EmwWFIFoGaiTEZHB9qteXr4unbXZ0AHpM02uGGwZEGohjFyebEb73M+J57WKKAFb\n" - "PqbLcGUksL1SHNBNAJcVLttX55sO4nbidOS/kA3m+F1R04MBTyQF9qA6YDDHqdI3\n" - "h/3pw0Z4fxVouTYT4/NfRnX4JTP4u+7Mpcoof28VME0qWqD1LnRhFQIDAQABo1Aw\n" - "TjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUMoAgIXH7pZ3QMRwTjT+DM9Yo/v0wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUMoAg\n" - "IXH7pZ3QMRwTjT+DM9Yo/v0wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\n" - "AgEAUJxacjXR9sT+Xs6ISFiUsyd0T6WVKMnV46xrYJHirGfx+krWHrjxMY+ZtxYD\n" - "DBDGlo11Qc4v6QrclNf5QUBfIiGQsP9Cm6hHcQ+Tpg9HHCgSqG1YNPwCPReCR4br\n" - "BLvLfrfkcBL2IWM0PdQdCze+59DBfipsULD2mEn9fjYRXQEwb2QWtQ9qRc20Yb/x\n" - "Q4b/+CvUodLkaq7B8MHz0BV8HHcBoph6DYaRmO/N+hPauIuSp6XyaGYcEefGKVKj\n" - "G2+fcsdyXsoijNdL8vNKwm4j2gVwCBnw16J00yfFoV46YcbfqEdJB2je0XSvwXqt\n" - "14AOTngxso2h9k9HLtrfpO1ZG/B5AcCMs1lzbZ2fp5DPHtjvvmvA2RJqgo3yjw4W\n" - "4DHAuTglYFlC3mDHNfNtcGP20JvepcQNzNP2UzwcpOc94hfKikOFw+gf9Vf1qd0y\n" - "h/Sk6OZHn2+JVUPiWHIQV98Vtoh4RmUZDJD+b55ia3fQGTGzt4z1XFzQYSva5sfs\n" - "wocS/papthqWldQU7x+3wofNd5CNU1x6WKXG/yw30IT/4F8ADJD6GeygNT8QJYvt\n" - "u/8lAkbOy6B9xGmSvr0Kk1oq9P2NshA6kalxp1Oz/DTNDdL4AeBXV3JmM6WWCjGn\n" - "Yy1RT69d0rwYc5u/vnqODz1IjvT90smsrkBumGt791FAFeg=\n" - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; - -static X509 * -read_cert_from(const char *str) -{ - BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); - BIO_write(bio, str, (int) strlen(str)); - X509 *res = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); - BIO_free(bio); - return res; -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_verify(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - crypto_pk_t *k = NULL; - X509 *cert1 = NULL, *cert2 = NULL, *invalidCert = NULL, - *validCert = NULL, *caCert = NULL; - - cert1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509)); - cert1->references = 10; - - cert2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509)); - cert2->references = 10; - - validCert = read_cert_from(validCertString); - caCert = read_cert_from(caCertString); - invalidCert = read_cert_from(notCompletelyValidCertString); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - MOCK(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls); - - fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = cert1; - ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = cert2; - ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = invalidCert; - fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = invalidCert; - - ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = validCert; - fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = caCert; - - ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_assert(k); - - done: - UNMOCK(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls); - tor_free(cert1); - tor_free(cert2); - tor_free(tls); - tor_free(k); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_check_lifetime(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - X509 *validCert = read_cert_from(validCertString); - time_t now = time(NULL); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); - tls->ssl->session->peer = validCert; - ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - ASN1_STRING_free(validCert->cert_info->validity->notBefore); - validCert->cert_info->validity->notBefore = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, now-10); - ASN1_STRING_free(validCert->cert_info->validity->notAfter); - validCert->cert_info->validity->notAfter = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, now+60); - - ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, -1000); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), -1000, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - done: - tor_free(tls->ssl->session); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); - X509_free(validCert); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static int fixed_ssl_pending_result = 0; - -static int -fixed_ssl_pending(const SSL *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - return fixed_ssl_pending_result; -} - -static void -test_tortls_get_pending_bytes(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - SSL_METHOD *method; - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD)); - method->ssl_pending = fixed_ssl_pending; - tls->ssl->method = method; - - fixed_ssl_pending_result = 42; - ret = tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42); - - done: - tor_free(method); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -static void -test_tortls_get_forced_write_size(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - long ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - - tls->wantwrite_n = 43; - ret = tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 43); - - done: - tor_free(tls); -} - -static void -test_tortls_get_write_overhead_ratio(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - double ret; - - total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0; - ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio(); - tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 1.0), OP_LT, 1E-12); - - total_bytes_written_by_tls = 10; - total_bytes_written_over_tls = 1; - ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio(); - tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 10.0), OP_LT, 1E-12); - - total_bytes_written_by_tls = 10; - total_bytes_written_over_tls = 2; - ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio(); - tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 5.0), OP_LT, 1E-12); - - done: - (void)0; -} - -static void -test_tortls_used_v1_handshake(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - - // These tests assume both V2 handshake server and client are enabled - tls->wasV2Handshake = 0; - ret = tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; - ret = tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - done: - tor_free(tls); -} - -static void -test_tortls_get_num_server_handshakes(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - - tls->server_handshake_count = 3; - ret = tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3); - - done: - tor_free(tls); -} - -static void -test_tortls_server_got_renegotiate(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - - tls->got_renegotiate = 1; - ret = tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - done: - tor_free(tls); -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - size_t ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - uint8_t *out; - out = tor_malloc_zero(1); - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); - tls->ssl->session->master_key_length = 1; - -#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY - tls->ssl->session->master_key[0] = 43; - ret = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(tls->ssl->session, out, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - tt_int_op(out[0], OP_EQ, 0); - - ret = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(tls->ssl->session, out, 1); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - tt_int_op(out[0], OP_EQ, 43); - - done: -#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */ - tor_free(tls->ssl->session); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); - tor_free(out); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_get_tlssecrets(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - uint8_t *secret_out = tor_malloc_zero(DIGEST256_LEN); - tor_tls_t *tls; - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); - tls->ssl->session->master_key_length = 1; - tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE)); - - ret = tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(tls, secret_out); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - done: - tor_free(secret_out); - tor_free(tls->ssl->s3); - tor_free(tls->ssl->session); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_get_buffer_sizes(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - size_t rbuf_c=-1, rbuf_b=-1, wbuf_c=-1, wbuf_b=-1; - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE)); - - tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL; - tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len = 1; - tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.offset = 0; - tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left = 42; - - tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL; - tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len = 2; - tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.offset = 0; - tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left = 43; - - ret = tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tls, &rbuf_c, &rbuf_b, &wbuf_c, &wbuf_b); -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); -#else - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(rbuf_c, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(wbuf_c, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(rbuf_b, OP_EQ, 42); - tt_int_op(wbuf_b, OP_EQ, 43); - - tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf = tor_malloc_zero(1); - tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf = tor_malloc_zero(1); - ret = tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tls, &rbuf_c, &rbuf_b, &wbuf_c, &wbuf_b); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(rbuf_c, OP_EQ, 1); - tt_int_op(wbuf_c, OP_EQ, 2); - -#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ - - done: - tor_free(tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf); - tor_free(tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf); - tor_free(tls->ssl->s3); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -static void -test_tortls_evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - - ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(NULL); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("foobar"); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("P256"); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("P224"); - // tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); This varies between machines - tt_assert(ret == 0 || ret == 1); - - done: - (void)0; -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -typedef struct cert_pkey_st_local -{ - X509 *x509; - EVP_PKEY *privatekey; - const EVP_MD *digest; -} CERT_PKEY_local; - -typedef struct sess_cert_st_local -{ - STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; - int peer_cert_type; - CERT_PKEY_local *peer_key; - CERT_PKEY_local peer_pkeys[8]; - int references; -} SESS_CERT_local; - -static void -test_tortls_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; - X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL, *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL; - SESS_CERT_local *sess = NULL; - - c1 = read_cert_from(validCertString); - c2 = read_cert_from(caCertString); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); - sess = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SESS_CERT_local)); - tls->ssl->session->sess_cert = (void *)sess; - - try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert); - tt_assert(!cert); - tt_assert(!id_cert); - - tls->ssl->session->peer = c1; - try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert); - tt_assert(cert == c1); - tt_assert(!id_cert); - X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */ - - sess->cert_chain = sk_X509_new_null(); - try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert); - tt_assert(cert == c1); - tt_assert(!id_cert); - X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */ - - sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c1); - sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c2); - - try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert); - tt_assert(cert == c1); - tt_assert(id_cert); - X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */ - - done: - sk_X509_free(sess->cert_chain); - tor_free(sess); - tor_free(tls->ssl->session); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); - X509_free(c1); - X509_free(c2); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_get_peer_cert(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_x509_cert_t *ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - X509 *cert = NULL; - - cert = read_cert_from(validCertString); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); - - ret = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tls); - tt_assert(!ret); - - tls->ssl->session->peer = cert; - ret = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tls); - tt_assert(ret); - tt_assert(ret->cert == cert); - - done: - tor_x509_cert_free(ret); - tor_free(tls->ssl->session); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); - X509_free(cert); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_peer_has_cert(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - X509 *cert = NULL; - - cert = read_cert_from(validCertString); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); - - ret = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tls); - tt_assert(!ret); - - tls->ssl->session->peer = cert; - ret = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tls); - tt_assert(ret); - - done: - tor_free(tls->ssl->session); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); - X509_free(cert); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -static void -test_tortls_is_server(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; - int ret; - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->isServer = 1; - ret = tor_tls_is_server(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - done: - tor_free(tls); -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_session_secret_cb(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; - SSL_CTX *ctx; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; - SSL_CIPHER *one; - - library_init(); - - tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - - tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC; - - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()); - tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); - SSL_set_ex_data(tls->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls); - - SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL); - - tor_tls_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); - tt_assert(!tls->ssl->tls_session_secret_cb); - - one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"); - one->id = 0x00ff; - ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one); - - tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; - tor_tls_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, NULL, NULL, ciphers, NULL, NULL); - tt_assert(!tls->ssl->tls_session_secret_cb); - - done: - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - SSL_free(tls->ssl); - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); - tor_free(tls); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -/* TODO: It seems block_renegotiation and unblock_renegotiation and - * using different blags. This might not be correct */ -static void -test_tortls_block_renegotiation(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE)); -#ifndef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG -#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0 -#endif - - tls->ssl->s3->flags = SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; - - tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tls); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API - tt_assert(!(tls->ssl->s3->flags & - SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)); -#endif - - done: - tor_free(tls->ssl->s3); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); -} - -static void -test_tortls_unblock_renegotiation(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls); - - tt_uint_op(SSL_get_options(tls->ssl) & - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION, OP_EQ, - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION); - - done: - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls); - tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tls); - /* No assertion here - this test will fail if tor_assert is turned on - * and things are bad. */ - - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -static void -test_tortls_set_logged_address(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - - tor_tls_set_logged_address(tls, "foo bar"); - - tt_str_op(tls->address, OP_EQ, "foo bar"); - - tor_tls_set_logged_address(tls, "foo bar 2"); - tt_str_op(tls->address, OP_EQ, "foo bar 2"); - - done: - tor_free(tls->address); - tor_free(tls); -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -example_cb(tor_tls_t *t, void *arg) -{ - (void)t; - (void)arg; -} - -static void -test_tortls_set_renegotiate_callback(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; - const char *arg = "hello"; - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - - tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, example_cb, (void*)arg); - tt_assert(tls->negotiated_callback == example_cb); - tt_assert(tls->callback_arg == arg); - tt_assert(!tls->got_renegotiate); - - /* Assumes V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER */ - tt_assert(tls->ssl->info_callback == tor_tls_server_info_callback); - - tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, NULL, (void*)arg); - tt_assert(tls->ssl->info_callback == tor_tls_debug_state_callback); - - done: - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static SSL_CIPHER *fixed_cipher1 = NULL; -static SSL_CIPHER *fixed_cipher2 = NULL; -static const SSL_CIPHER * -fake_get_cipher(unsigned ncipher) -{ - - switch (ncipher) { - case 1: - return fixed_cipher1; - case 2: - return fixed_cipher2; - default: - return NULL; - } -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_find_cipher_by_id(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - SSL *ssl; - SSL_CTX *ctx; - const SSL_METHOD *m = TLSv1_method(); - SSL_METHOD *empty_method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD)); - - fixed_cipher1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER)); - fixed_cipher2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER)); - fixed_cipher2->id = 0xC00A; - - library_init(); - - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(m); - ssl = SSL_new(ctx); - - ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, NULL, 0xC00A); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, 0xC00A); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, 0xFFFF); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xFFFF); -#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); -#else - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); -#endif - - empty_method->get_cipher = fake_get_cipher; - ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - empty_method->get_cipher = m->get_cipher; - empty_method->num_ciphers = m->num_ciphers; - ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - empty_method->get_cipher = fake_get_cipher; - empty_method->num_ciphers = m->num_ciphers; - ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - empty_method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers; - ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A); -#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); -#else - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); -#endif - - done: - tor_free(empty_method); - SSL_free(ssl); - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); - tor_free(fixed_cipher1); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_debug_state_callback(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - SSL *ssl; - char *buf = tor_malloc_zero(1000); - int n; - - setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_DEBUG); - - ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - - tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, 32, 45); - - n = tor_snprintf(buf, 1000, "SSL %p is now in state unknown" - " state [type=32,val=45].\n", ssl); - /* tor's snprintf returns -1 on error */ - tt_int_op(n, OP_NE, -1); - expect_log_msg(buf); - - done: - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - tor_free(buf); - tor_free(ssl); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_server_info_callback(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_tls_t *tls; - SSL_CTX *ctx; - SSL *ssl; - - library_init(); - - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()); - ssl = SSL_new(ctx); - - tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC; - tls->ssl = ssl; - - setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); - SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A); - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); - expect_single_log_msg("Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!\n"); - - SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B); - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); - expect_single_log_msg("Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!\n"); - - SSL_set_state(ssl, 99); - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); - expect_no_log_entry(); - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - - SSL_set_ex_data(tls->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls); - SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B); - tls->negotiated_callback = 0; - tls->server_handshake_count = 120; - tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); - tt_int_op(tls->server_handshake_count, OP_EQ, 121); - - tls->server_handshake_count = 127; - tls->negotiated_callback = (void *)1; - tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); - tt_int_op(tls->server_handshake_count, OP_EQ, 127); - tt_int_op(tls->got_renegotiate, OP_EQ, 1); - - tls->ssl->session = SSL_SESSION_new(); - tls->wasV2Handshake = 0; - tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); - tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 0); - - done: - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - SSL_free(ssl); - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); - tor_free(tls); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static int fixed_ssl_read_result_index; -static int fixed_ssl_read_result[5]; -static int fixed_ssl_shutdown_result; - -static int -fixed_ssl_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len) -{ - (void)s; - (void)buf; - (void)len; - return fixed_ssl_read_result[fixed_ssl_read_result_index++]; -} - -static int -fixed_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s) -{ - (void)s; - return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result; -} - -#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER -static int fixed_ssl_state_to_set; -static tor_tls_t *fixed_tls; - -static int -setting_version_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s) -{ - s->version = SSL2_VERSION; - return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result; -} - -static int -setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s) -{ - fixed_tls->state = fixed_ssl_state_to_set; - s->version = SSL2_VERSION; - return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result; -} -#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */ - -static int -dummy_handshake_func(SSL *s) -{ - (void)s; - return 1; -} - -static void -test_tortls_shutdown(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method(); - setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->ssl->method = method; - method->ssl_read = fixed_ssl_read; - method->ssl_shutdown = fixed_ssl_shutdown; - - ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); - - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE; - fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; - fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; - fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = -1; - ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); - -#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER - tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func; - - fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; - fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; - fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42; - fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0; - fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 1; - ERR_clear_error(); - tls->ssl->version = SSL2_VERSION; - ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_DONE); - tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED); - - fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; - fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; - fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42; - fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0; - fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0; - ERR_clear_error(); - tls->ssl->version = 0; - ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_DONE); - tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED); - - fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; - fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; - fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42; - fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0; - fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0; - ERR_clear_error(); - tls->ssl->version = 0; - method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_ssl_shutdown; - ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); - - fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; - fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; - fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42; - fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0; - fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0; - fixed_tls = tls; - fixed_ssl_state_to_set = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE; - ERR_clear_error(); - tls->ssl->version = 0; - method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown; - ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); - - fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; - fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; - fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42; - fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0; - fixed_ssl_read_result[3] = -1; - fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0; - fixed_tls = tls; - fixed_ssl_state_to_set = 0; - ERR_clear_error(); - tls->ssl->version = 0; - method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown; - ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); -#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */ - - done: - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - tor_free(method); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); -} - -static int negotiated_callback_called; - -static void -negotiated_callback_setter(tor_tls_t *t, void *arg) -{ - (void)t; - (void)arg; - negotiated_callback_called++; -} - -static void -test_tortls_read(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - char buf[100]; - SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method(); - setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; - - ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); - - /* These tests assume that V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER is set */ - tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func; - tls->ssl->method = method; - method->ssl_read = fixed_ssl_read; - fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; - fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 42; - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; - ERR_clear_error(); - ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42); - - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; - tls->got_renegotiate = 1; - fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; - ERR_clear_error(); - ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10); - tt_int_op(tls->got_renegotiate, OP_EQ, 0); - - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; - tls->got_renegotiate = 1; - negotiated_callback_called = 0; - tls->negotiated_callback = negotiated_callback_setter; - fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; - ERR_clear_error(); - ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10); - tt_int_op(negotiated_callback_called, OP_EQ, 1); - -#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER - fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; - fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 0; - tls->ssl->version = SSL2_VERSION; - ERR_clear_error(); - ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_CLOSE); - tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED); -#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */ - // TODO: fill up - - done: - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); - tor_free(method); -} - -static int fixed_ssl_write_result; - -static int -fixed_ssl_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len) -{ - (void)s; - (void)buf; - (void)len; - return fixed_ssl_write_result; -} - -static void -test_tortls_write(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method(); - char buf[100]; - setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; - - ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); - - tls->ssl->method = method; - tls->wantwrite_n = 1; - ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10); - tt_int_op(tls->wantwrite_n, OP_EQ, 0); - - method->ssl_write = fixed_ssl_write; - tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func; - fixed_ssl_write_result = 1; - ERR_clear_error(); - ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - fixed_ssl_write_result = -1; - ERR_clear_error(); - tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING; - SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL); - SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_READ; - ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD); - - ERR_clear_error(); - tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING; - SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL); - SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_WRITE; - ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE); - - done: - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - BIO_free(tls->ssl->rbio); - tor_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); - tor_free(method); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static int fixed_ssl_accept_result; -static int fixed_ssl_connect_result; - -static int -setting_error_ssl_accept(SSL *ssl) -{ - (void)ssl; - ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); - ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); - return fixed_ssl_accept_result; -} - -static int -setting_error_ssl_connect(SSL *ssl) -{ - (void)ssl; - ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); - ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); - return fixed_ssl_connect_result; -} - -static int -fixed_ssl_accept(SSL *ssl) -{ - (void) ssl; - return fixed_ssl_accept_result; -} - -static void -test_tortls_handshake(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - SSL_CTX *ctx; - SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method(); - setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); - - SSL_library_init(); - SSL_load_error_strings(); - - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; - - ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); - - tls->isServer = 1; - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; - ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); - - tls->ssl->method = method; - method->ssl_accept = fixed_ssl_accept; - fixed_ssl_accept_result = 2; - ERR_clear_error(); - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; - ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN); - - method->ssl_accept = setting_error_ssl_accept; - fixed_ssl_accept_result = 1; - ERR_clear_error(); - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; - ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); - expect_log_entry(); - /* This fails on jessie. Investigate why! */ -#if 0 - expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: (null) (in bignum routines:" - "(null):SSLv3 write client hello B)\n"); - expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: (null) (in system library:" - "connect:SSLv3 write client hello B)\n"); -#endif /* 0 */ - expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); - - tls->isServer = 0; - method->ssl_connect = setting_error_ssl_connect; - fixed_ssl_connect_result = 1; - ERR_clear_error(); - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; - ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); - expect_log_entry(); -#if 0 - /* See above */ - expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: " - "(null) (in bignum routines:(null):SSLv3 write client hello B)\n"); - expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: " - "(null) (in system library:connect:SSLv3 write client hello B)\n"); -#endif /* 0 */ - expect_log_severity(LOG_WARN); - - done: - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - SSL_free(tls->ssl); - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); - tor_free(tls); - tor_free(method); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static void -test_tortls_finish_handshake(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_t *tls; - SSL_CTX *ctx; - SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method(); - SSL_library_init(); - SSL_load_error_strings(); - - X509 *c1 = read_cert_from(validCertString); - SESS_CERT_local *sess = NULL; - - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method); - - tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); - tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); - tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; - - ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - tls->isServer = 1; - tls->wasV2Handshake = 0; - setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); - ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1); - expect_single_log_msg_containing("For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't " - "get set."); - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - - tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; - ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1); - - tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; - tls->ssl->session = SSL_SESSION_new(); - ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 0); - - tls->isServer = 0; - - sess = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SESS_CERT_local)); - tls->ssl->session->sess_cert = (void *)sess; - sess->cert_chain = sk_X509_new_null(); - sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c1); - tls->ssl->session->peer = c1; - tls->wasV2Handshake = 0; - ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1); - - method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers; - ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); - - done: - if (sess) - sk_X509_free(sess->cert_chain); - if (tls->ssl && tls->ssl->session) { - tor_free(tls->ssl->session->sess_cert); - } - SSL_free(tls->ssl); - tor_free(tls); - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); - tor_free(method); - teardown_capture_of_logs(); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -static int fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index; -static crypto_pk_t *fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[5]; - -static crypto_pk_t * -fixed_crypto_pk_new(void) -{ - return fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index++]; -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -static int fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index; -static int fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[5]; -static int fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index; -static X509 *fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[5]; -static int fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index; -static tor_x509_cert_t *fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[5]; - -static int -fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(crypto_pk_t *env, int bits) -{ - (void)env; - (void)bits; - return fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[ - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index++]; -} - -static X509 * -fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa, - crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, - const char *cname, - const char *cname_sign, - unsigned int cert_lifetime) -{ - (void)rsa; - (void)rsa_sign; - (void)cname; - (void)cname_sign; - (void)cert_lifetime; - return fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[ - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index++]; -} - -static tor_x509_cert_t * -fixed_tor_x509_cert_new(X509 *x509_cert) -{ - (void) x509_cert; - return fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[ - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index++]; -} - -static void -test_tortls_context_new(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_tls_context_t *ret; - crypto_pk_t *pk1, *pk2, *pk3, *pk4, *pk5, *pk6, *pk7, *pk8, *pk9, *pk10, - *pk11, *pk12, *pk13, *pk14, *pk15, *pk16, *pk17, *pk18; - - pk1 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk2 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk3 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk4 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk5 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk6 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk7 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk8 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk9 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk10 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk11 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk12 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk13 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk14 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk15 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk16 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk17 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk18 = crypto_pk_new(); - - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = NULL; - MOCK(crypto_pk_new, fixed_crypto_pk_new); - ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_assert(!ret); - - /* note: we already override this in testing_common.c, so we - * run this unit test in a subprocess. */ - MOCK(crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits, - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits); - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk1; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = NULL; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = -1; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; - ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_assert(!ret); - - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk2; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = NULL; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; - ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_assert(!ret); - - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk3; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk4; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[1] = -1; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; - ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_assert(!ret); - - MOCK(tor_tls_create_certificate, fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate); - - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk5; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk6; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[1] = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = NULL; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); - ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_assert(!ret); - - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk7; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk8; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = NULL; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); - ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_assert(!ret); - - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk9; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk10; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_assert(!ret); - - MOCK(tor_x509_cert_new, fixed_tor_x509_cert_new); - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk11; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk12; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = NULL; - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = NULL; - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_assert(!ret); - - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk13; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk14; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = NULL; - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_assert(!ret); - - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk15; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk16; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_assert(!ret); - - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk17; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk18; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; - fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_assert(!ret); - - done: - UNMOCK(tor_x509_cert_new); - UNMOCK(tor_tls_create_certificate); - UNMOCK(crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits); - UNMOCK(crypto_pk_new); -} -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -static int fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0; -static EVP_PKEY *fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[5]; - -static EVP_PKEY * -fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(crypto_pk_t *env, int private) -{ - (void) env; - (void) private; - return fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[ - fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index++]; -} - -static void -test_tortls_create_certificate(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - X509 *ret; - crypto_pk_t *pk1, *pk2; - - pk1 = crypto_pk_new(); - pk2 = crypto_pk_new(); - - MOCK(crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_, fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_); - fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1); - tt_assert(!ret); - - fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = EVP_PKEY_new(); - fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[1] = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1); - tt_assert(!ret); - - fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = EVP_PKEY_new(); - fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[1] = EVP_PKEY_new(); - ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1); - tt_assert(!ret); - - done: - UNMOCK(crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_); - crypto_pk_free(pk1); - crypto_pk_free(pk2); -} - -static void -test_tortls_cert_new(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - tor_x509_cert_t *ret; - X509 *cert = read_cert_from(validCertString); - - ret = tor_x509_cert_new(NULL); - tt_assert(!ret); - - ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert); - tt_assert(ret); - tor_x509_cert_free(ret); - ret = NULL; - -#if 0 - cert = read_cert_from(validCertString); - /* XXX this doesn't do what you think: it alters a copy of the pubkey. */ - X509_get_pubkey(cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_DSA; - ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert); - tt_assert(ret); -#endif /* 0 */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE - cert = read_cert_from(validCertString); - X509_CINF_free(cert->cert_info); - cert->cert_info = NULL; - ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert); - tt_assert(ret); -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - - done: - tor_x509_cert_free(ret); -} - -static void -test_tortls_cert_is_valid(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL, *scert = NULL; - - scert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); - ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tor_free(scert); - tor_free(cert); - - cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); - scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); - ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE - tor_x509_cert_free(cert); - tor_x509_cert_free(scert); - cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); - scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); - ASN1_TIME_free(cert->cert->cert_info->validity->notAfter); - cert->cert->cert_info->validity->notAfter = - ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, time(NULL)-1000000); - ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - tor_x509_cert_free(cert); - tor_x509_cert_free(scert); - cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); - scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); - X509_PUBKEY_free(cert->cert->cert_info->key); - cert->cert->cert_info->key = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - -#if 0 - tor_x509_cert_free(cert); - tor_x509_cert_free(scert); - cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); - scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); - /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */ - BN_one(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert))->n); - ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - tor_x509_cert_free(cert); - tor_x509_cert_free(scert); - cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); - scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); - /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */ - X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC; - ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - - tor_x509_cert_free(cert); - tor_x509_cert_free(scert); - cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); - scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); - /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */ - X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC; - ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); - - tor_x509_cert_free(cert); - tor_x509_cert_free(scert); - cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); - scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); - /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */ - X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC; - X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->ameth = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); -#endif /* 0 */ - - done: - tor_x509_cert_free(cert); - tor_x509_cert_free(scert); -} - -static void -test_tortls_context_init_one(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - tor_tls_context_t *old = NULL; - - MOCK(crypto_pk_new, fixed_crypto_pk_new); - - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; - fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = NULL; - ret = tor_tls_context_init_one(&old, NULL, 0, 0, 0); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - - done: - UNMOCK(crypto_pk_new); -} - -#define LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \ +#define LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \ { #name, test_tortls_##name, (flags|TT_FORK), NULL, NULL } -#ifdef OPENSSL_OPAQUE -#define INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \ - { #name, NULL, TT_SKIP, NULL, NULL } -#else -#define INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(name, flags) LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags) -#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ - struct testcase_t tortls_tests[] = { LOCAL_TEST_CASE(errno_to_tls_error, 0), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(err_to_string, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(tor_tls_new, TT_FORK), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(tor_tls_get_error, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_state_description, TT_FORK), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_by_ssl, TT_FORK), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, TT_FORK), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(log_one_error, TT_FORK), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_error, TT_FORK), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(always_accept_verify_cb, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(x509_cert_free, 0), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(x509_cert_get_id_digests, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_matches_key, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_get_key, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_my_client_auth_key, TT_FORK), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_my_certs, TT_FORK), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_ciphersuite_name, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(classify_client_ciphers, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(client_is_using_v2_ciphers, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(verify, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(check_lifetime, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_pending_bytes, 0), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_forced_write_size, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_write_overhead_ratio, TT_FORK), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(used_v1_handshake, TT_FORK), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_num_server_handshakes, 0), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(server_got_renegotiate, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(SSL_SESSION_get_master_key, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_tlssecrets, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_buffer_sizes, 0), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_peer_cert, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(peer_has_cert, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(shutdown, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(finish_handshake, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(handshake, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(write, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(read, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(server_info_callback, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(is_server, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(assert_renegotiation_unblocked, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(block_renegotiation, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(unblock_renegotiation, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(set_renegotiate_callback, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(set_logged_address, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(find_cipher_by_id, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(session_secret_cb, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(debug_state_callback, 0), - INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(context_new, TT_FORK /* redundant */), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(create_certificate, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_new, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_is_valid, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(context_init_one, 0), END_OF_TESTCASES }; diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c b/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a9336a6f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,2597 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2010-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define TORTLS_PRIVATE +#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE +#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE +#define LOG_PRIVATE +#include "orconfig.h" + +#ifdef _WIN32 +#include <winsock2.h> +#endif +#include <math.h> + +#include "lib/cc/compat_compiler.h" + +/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in + * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */ +DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) + +#include <openssl/opensslv.h> + +#include <openssl/ssl.h> +#include <openssl/ssl3.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/asn1t.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> + +ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "lib/log/log.h" +#include "app/config/config.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h" +#include "app/config/or_state_st.h" + +#include "test/test.h" +#include "test/log_test_helpers.h" +#define NS_MODULE tortls + +#ifndef HAVE_SSL_STATE +#define OPENSSL_OPAQUE +#endif + +#if defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) +#define SSL_STATE_STR "before SSL initialization" +#else +#define SSL_STATE_STR "before/accept initialization" +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static SSL_METHOD * +give_me_a_test_method(void) +{ + SSL_METHOD *method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD)); + memcpy(method, TLSv1_method(), sizeof(SSL_METHOD)); + return method; +} + +static int +fake_num_ciphers(void) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +static int +mock_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + (void) tls; + (void) cert; // XXXX look at this. + return 1; +} + +static void +test_tortls_tor_tls_new(void *data) +{ + (void) data; + MOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key, mock_tls_cert_matches_key); + crypto_pk_t *key1 = NULL, *key2 = NULL; + SSL_METHOD *method = NULL; + + key1 = pk_generate(2); + key2 = pk_generate(3); + + tor_tls_t *tls = NULL; + tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER, + key1, key2, 86400), OP_EQ, 0); + tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0); + tt_want(tls); + tor_tls_free(tls); tls = NULL; + + SSL_CTX_free(client_tls_context->ctx); + client_tls_context->ctx = NULL; + tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0); + tt_ptr_op(tls, OP_EQ, NULL); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE + method = give_me_a_test_method(); + SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method); + method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers; + client_tls_context->ctx = ctx; + tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0); + tt_ptr_op(tls, OP_EQ, NULL); +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + + done: + UNMOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key); + crypto_pk_free(key1); + crypto_pk_free(key2); + tor_tls_free(tls); + tor_free(method); + tor_tls_free_all(); +} + +#define NS_MODULE tortls + +static void +library_init(void) +{ +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL); +#else + SSL_library_init(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); +#endif +} + +static void +test_tortls_get_state_description(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + char *buf; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + + library_init(); + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); + + buf = tor_malloc_zero(1000); + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + + tor_tls_get_state_description(NULL, buf, 20); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, "(No SSL object)"); + + SSL_free(tls->ssl); + tls->ssl = NULL; + tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 20); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, "(No SSL object)"); + + tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in HANDSHAKE"); + + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; + tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in OPEN"); + + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE; + tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in GOTCLOSE"); + + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE; + tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in SENTCLOSE"); + + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED; + tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in CLOSED"); + + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE; + tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in RENEGOTIATE"); + + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT; + tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR); + + tls->state = 7; + tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200); + tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in unknown TLS state"); + + done: + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + SSL_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(buf); + tor_free(tls); +} + +static void +test_tortls_get_by_ssl(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + tor_tls_t *res; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *ssl; + + library_init(); + tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC; + + ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + + res = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl); + tt_assert(!res); + + SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls); + + res = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl); + tt_assert(res == tls); + + done: + SSL_free(ssl); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + tor_free(tls); +} + +static void +test_tortls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int first; + + tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); + + first = tor_tls_object_ex_data_index; + tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); + tt_int_op(first, OP_EQ, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index); + + done: + (void)0; +} + +static void +test_tortls_log_one_error(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *ssl = NULL; + + library_init(); + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); + + tor_tls_log_one_error(NULL, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, "something"); + expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: " + "(null) (in (null):(null):---)\n"); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); + expect_log_msg("TLS error: (null) " + "(in (null):(null):---)\n"); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tls->address = tor_strdup("127.hello"); + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); + expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: " + "(null) (in (null):(null):---)\n"); + tor_free(tls->address); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tls->address = tor_strdup("127.hello"); + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, "blarg"); + expect_log_msg("TLS error while blarg with " + "127.hello: (null) (in (null):(null):---)\n"); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, 3), LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); + expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: " + "BN lib (in unknown library:(null):---)\n"); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST), + LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); + expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST), + LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); + expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH), + LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); + expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE), + LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); + expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL), + LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); + expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL), + LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); + expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); + + tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); + expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: (null)" + " (in (null):(null):" SSL_STATE_STR ")\n"); + + done: + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + SSL_free(ssl); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + if (tls && tls->ssl) + SSL_free(tls->ssl); + if (tls) + tor_free(tls->address); + tor_free(tls); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_get_error(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + int ret; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + + library_init(); + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); + setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL); + + ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO); + expect_log_msg("TLS error: unexpected close while" + " something (before/accept initialization)\n"); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 2, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + expect_no_log_entry(); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 1, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -11); + expect_no_log_entry(); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + ERR_clear_error(); + ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); + ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); + expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: (null)" + " (in bignum routines:(null):before/accept initialization)\n"); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + ERR_clear_error(); + tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING; + SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_READ; + ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD); + expect_no_log_entry(); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + ERR_clear_error(); + tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING; + SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_WRITE; + ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE); + expect_no_log_entry(); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + ERR_clear_error(); + tls->ssl->rwstate = 0; + tls->ssl->shutdown = SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + tls->ssl->s3->warn_alert =SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY; + ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_CLOSE); + expect_log_entry(); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 2, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -10); + expect_no_log_entry(); + + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); + ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); + expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: (null) (in system library:" + "connect:before/accept initialization)\n"); + + done: + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + SSL_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +static void +test_tortls_always_accept_verify_cb(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + + ret = always_accept_verify_cb(0, NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + done: + (void)0; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_x509_cert_free(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_x509_cert_t *cert; + + cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + tor_x509_cert_free(cert); + + cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + cert->cert = X509_new(); + cert->encoded = tor_malloc_zero(1); + tor_x509_cert_free(cert); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static int +fixed_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) +{ + (void) a; (void) b; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Use only for the matching fake_x509_free() call + */ +static X509 * +fake_x509_malloc(void) +{ + return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509)); +} + +static void +fake_x509_free(X509 *cert) +{ + if (cert) { + if (cert->cert_info) { + if (cert->cert_info->key) { + if (cert->cert_info->key->pkey) { + tor_free(cert->cert_info->key->pkey); + } + tor_free(cert->cert_info->key); + } + tor_free(cert->cert_info); + } + tor_free(cert); + } +} + +static void +test_tortls_cert_matches_key(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int res; + tor_tls_t *tls; + tor_x509_cert_t *cert; + X509 *one = NULL, *two = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *meth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(999, 0, NULL, NULL); + EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(meth, NULL, NULL, fixed_pub_cmp, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + one = fake_x509_malloc(); + one->references = 1; + two = fake_x509_malloc(); + two->references = 1; + + res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert); + tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0); + + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + tls->ssl->session->peer = one; + res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert); + tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0); + + cert->cert = two; + res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert); + tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0); + + one->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF)); + one->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY)); + one->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY)); + one->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1; + one->cert_info->key->pkey->ameth = meth; + one->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1; + + two->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF)); + two->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY)); + two->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY)); + two->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1; + two->cert_info->key->pkey->ameth = meth; + two->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 2; + + res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert); + tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0); + + one->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1; + two->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1; + res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert); + tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 1); + + done: + EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(meth); + tor_free(tls->ssl->session); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); + tor_free(cert); + fake_x509_free(one); + fake_x509_free(two); +} + +static void +test_tortls_cert_get_key(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL; + crypto_pk_t *res = NULL; + cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + X509 *key = NULL; + key = fake_x509_malloc(); + key->references = 1; + + res = tor_tls_cert_get_key(cert); + tt_assert(!res); + + cert->cert = key; + key->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF)); + key->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY)); + key->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY)); + key->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1; + key->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 2; + res = tor_tls_cert_get_key(cert); + tt_assert(!res); + + done: + fake_x509_free(key); + tor_free(cert); + crypto_pk_free(res); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +static void +test_tortls_get_my_client_auth_key(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + crypto_pk_t *ret; + crypto_pk_t *expected; + tor_tls_context_t *ctx; + RSA *k = RSA_new(); + + ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t)); + expected = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(k); + ctx->auth_key = expected; + + client_tls_context = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(); + tt_assert(!ret); + + client_tls_context = ctx; + ret = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(); + tt_assert(ret == expected); + + done: + tor_free(expected); + tor_free(ctx); +} + +#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS +static SSL_CIPHER * +get_cipher_by_name(const char *name) +{ + int i; + const SSL_METHOD *method = SSLv23_method(); + int num = method->num_ciphers(); + + for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = method->get_cipher(i); + const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); + if (!strcmp(ciphername, name)) { + return (SSL_CIPHER *)cipher; + } + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_get_ciphersuite_name(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + const char *ret; + tor_tls_t *ctx; + ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + ctx->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + + ret = tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(ctx); + tt_str_op(ret, OP_EQ, "(NONE)"); + + done: + tor_free(ctx->ssl); + tor_free(ctx); +} + +static SSL_CIPHER * +get_cipher_by_id(uint16_t id) +{ + int i; + const SSL_METHOD *method = SSLv23_method(); + int num = method->num_ciphers(); + for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = method->get_cipher(i); + if (id == (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff)) { + return (SSL_CIPHER *)cipher; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +static void +test_tortls_classify_client_ciphers(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int i; + int ret; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *ssl; + tor_tls_t *tls; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; + SSL_CIPHER *tmp_cipher; + + library_init(); + + tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC; + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()); + ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + tls->ssl = ssl; + + ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); + + ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + + SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls); + tls->client_cipher_list_type = 42; + + ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42); + + tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; + ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 1); + + tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; + ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl)); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3); + tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3); + + SSL_CIPHER *one = get_cipher_by_name(TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA), + *two = get_cipher_by_name(TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA), + *three = get_cipher_by_name(SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA), + *four = NULL; + sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, two); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, three); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, four); + + tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; + ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 1); + + sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(ciphers); + + one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"); + tt_assert(one); + one->id = 0x00ff; + two = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"); + tt_assert(two); + two->id = 0x0000; + sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one); + tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; + ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3); + tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3); + + sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, two); + tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; + ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3); + tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3); + + one->id = 0xC00A; + tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; + ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3); + tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3); + + sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(ciphers); + for (i=0; v2_cipher_list[i]; i++) { + tmp_cipher = get_cipher_by_id(v2_cipher_list[i]); + tt_assert(tmp_cipher); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, tmp_cipher); + } + tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; + ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 2); + tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 2); + + done: + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); + SSL_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +static void +test_tortls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS + tt_skip(); + done: + (void)1; +#else + int ret; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *ssl; + SSL_SESSION *sess; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; + + library_init(); + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()); + ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + sess = SSL_SESSION_new(); + + ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + + ssl->session = sess; + ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); + SSL_CIPHER *one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"); + tt_assert(one); + one->id = 0x00ff; + sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one); + sess->ciphers = ciphers; + ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + done: + SSL_free(ssl); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */ +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static X509 *fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = NULL; +static X509 *fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = NULL; + +static void +fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, + tor_x509_cert_impl_t **cert_out, + tor_x509_cert_impl_t **id_cert_out) +{ + (void) severity; + (void) tls; + *cert_out = fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result; + *id_cert_out = fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result; +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static const char* notCompletelyValidCertString = + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" + "MIICVjCCAb8CAg37MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMIGbMQswCQYDVQQGEwJKUDEOMAwG\n" + "A1UECBMFVG9reW8xEDAOBgNVBAcTB0NodW8ta3UxETAPBgNVBAoTCEZyYW5rNERE\n" + "MRgwFgYDVQQLEw9XZWJDZXJ0IFN1cHBvcnQxGDAWBgNVBAMTD0ZyYW5rNEREIFdl\n" + "YiBDQTEjMCEGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYUc3VwcG9ydEBmcmFuazRkZC5jb20wHhcNMTIw\n" + "ODIyMDUyNzIzWhcNMTcwODIxMDUyNzIzWjBKMQswCQYDVQQGEwJKUDEOMAwGA1UE\n" + "CAwFVG9reW8xETAPBgNVBAoMCEZyYW5rNEREMRgwFgYDVQQDDA93d3cuZXhhbXBs\n" + "ZS5jb20wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAMYBBrx5PlP0WNI/ZdzD\n" + "+6Pktmurn+F2kQYbtc7XQh8/LTBvCo+P6iZoLEmUA9e7EXLRxgU1CVqeAi7QcAn9\n" + "MwBlc8ksFJHB0rtf9pmf8Oza9E0Bynlq/4/Kb1x+d+AyhL7oK9tQwB24uHOueHi1\n" + "C/iVv8CSWKiYe6hzN1txYe8rAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAASPdjigJ\n" + "kXCqKWpnZ/Oc75EUcMi6HztaW8abUMlYXPIgkV2F7YanHOB7K4f7OOLjiz8DTPFf\n" + "jC9UeuErhaA/zzWi8ewMTFZW/WshOrm3fNvcMrMLKtH534JKvcdMg6qIdjTFINIr\n" + "evnAhf0cwULaebn+lMs8Pdl7y37+sfluVok=\n" + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +static const char* validCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" + "MIIDpTCCAY0CAg3+MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMF4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMREwDwYD\n" + "VQQIDAhJbGxpbm9pczEQMA4GA1UEBwwHQ2hpY2FnbzEUMBIGA1UECgwLVG9yIFRl\n" + "c3RpbmcxFDASBgNVBAMMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMB4XDTE1MDkwNjEzMzk1OVoXDTQz\n" + "MDEyMjEzMzk1OVowVjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEDAOBgNVBAcMB0NoaWNhZ28xFDAS\n" + "BgNVBAoMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMR8wHQYDVQQDDBZ0ZXN0aW5nLnRvcnByb2plY3Qu\n" + "b3JnMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDoT6uyVVhWyOF3wkHjjYbd\n" + "nKaykyRv4JVtKQdZ4OpEErmX1zw4MmyzpQNV6iR4bQnWiyLfzyVJMZDIC/WILBfX\n" + "w2Pza/yuLgUvDc3twMuhOACzOQVO8PrEF/aVv2+hbCCy2udXvKhnYn+CCXl3ozc8\n" + "XcKYvujTXDyvGWY3xwAjlQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4ICAQCUvnhzQWuQ\n" + "MrN+pERkE+zcTI/9dGS90rUMMLgu8VDNqTa0TUQh8uO0EQ6uDvI8Js6e8tgwS0BR\n" + "UBahqb7ZHv+rejGCBr5OudqD+x4STiiuPNJVs86JTLN8SpM9CHjIBH5WCCN2KOy3\n" + "mevNoRcRRyYJzSFULCunIK6FGulszigMYGscrO4oiTkZiHPh9KvWT40IMiHfL+Lw\n" + "EtEWiLex6064LcA2YQ1AMuSZyCexks63lcfaFmQbkYOKqXa1oLkIRuDsOaSVjTfe\n" + "vec+X6jvf12cFTKS5WIeqkKF2Irt+dJoiHEGTe5RscUMN/f+gqHPzfFz5dR23sxo\n" + "g+HC6MZHlFkLAOx3wW6epPS8A/m1mw3zMPoTnb2U2YYt8T0dJMMlUn/7Y1sEAa+a\n" + "dSTMaeUf6VnJ//11m454EZl1to9Z7oJOgqmFffSrdD4BGIWe8f7hhW6L1Enmqe/J\n" + "BKL3wbzZh80O1W0bndAwhnEEhlzneFY84cbBo9pmVxpODHkUcStpr5Z7pBDrcL21\n" + "Ss/aB/1YrsVXhdvJdOGxl3Mnl9dUY57CympLGlT8f0pPS6GAKOelECOhFMHmJd8L\n" + "dj3XQSmKtYHevZ6IvuMXSlB/fJvSjSlkCuLo5+kJoaqPuRu+i/S1qxeRy3CBwmnE\n" + "LdSNdcX4N79GQJ996PA8+mUCQG7YRtK+WA==\n" + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; + +static const char* caCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" + "MIIFjzCCA3egAwIBAgIJAKd5WgyfPMYRMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMF4xCzAJBgNV\n" + "BAYTAlVTMREwDwYDVQQIDAhJbGxpbm9pczEQMA4GA1UEBwwHQ2hpY2FnbzEUMBIG\n" + "A1UECgwLVG9yIFRlc3RpbmcxFDASBgNVBAMMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMB4XDTE1MDkw\n" + "NjEzMzc0MVoXDTQzMDEyMjEzMzc0MVowXjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxETAPBgNVBAgM\n" + "CElsbGlub2lzMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdDaGljYWdvMRQwEgYDVQQKDAtUb3IgVGVzdGlu\n" + "ZzEUMBIGA1UEAwwLVG9yIFRlc3RpbmcwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAw\n" + "ggIKAoICAQCpLMUEiLW5leUgBZoEJms2V7lZRhIAjnJBhVMHD0e3UubNknmaQoxf\n" + "ARz3rvqOaRd0JlV+qM9qE0DjiYcCVP1cAfqAo9d83uS1vwY3YMVJzADlaIiHfyVW\n" + "uEgBy0vvkeUBqaua24dYlcwsemOiXYLu41yM1wkcGHW1AhBNHppY6cznb8TyLgNM\n" + "2x3SGUdzc5XMyAFx51faKGBA3wjs+Hg1PLY7d30nmCgEOBavpm5I1disM/0k+Mcy\n" + "YmAKEo/iHJX/rQzO4b9znP69juLlR8PDBUJEVIG/CYb6+uw8MjjUyiWXYoqfVmN2\n" + "hm/lH8b6rXw1a2Aa3VTeD0DxaWeacMYHY/i01fd5n7hCoDTRNdSw5KJ0L3Z0SKTu\n" + "0lzffKzDaIfyZGlpW5qdouACkWYzsaitQOePVE01PIdO30vUfzNTFDfy42ccx3Di\n" + "59UCu+IXB+eMtrBfsok0Qc63vtF1linJgjHW1z/8ujk8F7/qkOfODhk4l7wngc2A\n" + "EmwWFIFoGaiTEZHB9qteXr4unbXZ0AHpM02uGGwZEGohjFyebEb73M+J57WKKAFb\n" + "PqbLcGUksL1SHNBNAJcVLttX55sO4nbidOS/kA3m+F1R04MBTyQF9qA6YDDHqdI3\n" + "h/3pw0Z4fxVouTYT4/NfRnX4JTP4u+7Mpcoof28VME0qWqD1LnRhFQIDAQABo1Aw\n" + "TjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUMoAgIXH7pZ3QMRwTjT+DM9Yo/v0wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUMoAg\n" + "IXH7pZ3QMRwTjT+DM9Yo/v0wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\n" + "AgEAUJxacjXR9sT+Xs6ISFiUsyd0T6WVKMnV46xrYJHirGfx+krWHrjxMY+ZtxYD\n" + "DBDGlo11Qc4v6QrclNf5QUBfIiGQsP9Cm6hHcQ+Tpg9HHCgSqG1YNPwCPReCR4br\n" + "BLvLfrfkcBL2IWM0PdQdCze+59DBfipsULD2mEn9fjYRXQEwb2QWtQ9qRc20Yb/x\n" + "Q4b/+CvUodLkaq7B8MHz0BV8HHcBoph6DYaRmO/N+hPauIuSp6XyaGYcEefGKVKj\n" + "G2+fcsdyXsoijNdL8vNKwm4j2gVwCBnw16J00yfFoV46YcbfqEdJB2je0XSvwXqt\n" + "14AOTngxso2h9k9HLtrfpO1ZG/B5AcCMs1lzbZ2fp5DPHtjvvmvA2RJqgo3yjw4W\n" + "4DHAuTglYFlC3mDHNfNtcGP20JvepcQNzNP2UzwcpOc94hfKikOFw+gf9Vf1qd0y\n" + "h/Sk6OZHn2+JVUPiWHIQV98Vtoh4RmUZDJD+b55ia3fQGTGzt4z1XFzQYSva5sfs\n" + "wocS/papthqWldQU7x+3wofNd5CNU1x6WKXG/yw30IT/4F8ADJD6GeygNT8QJYvt\n" + "u/8lAkbOy6B9xGmSvr0Kk1oq9P2NshA6kalxp1Oz/DTNDdL4AeBXV3JmM6WWCjGn\n" + "Yy1RT69d0rwYc5u/vnqODz1IjvT90smsrkBumGt791FAFeg=\n" + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; + +static X509 * +read_cert_from(const char *str) +{ + BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + BIO_write(bio, str, (int) strlen(str)); + X509 *res = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); + BIO_free(bio); + return res; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_verify(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + crypto_pk_t *k = NULL; + X509 *cert1 = NULL, *cert2 = NULL, *invalidCert = NULL, + *validCert = NULL, *caCert = NULL; + + cert1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509)); + cert1->references = 10; + + cert2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509)); + cert2->references = 10; + + validCert = read_cert_from(validCertString); + caCert = read_cert_from(caCertString); + invalidCert = read_cert_from(notCompletelyValidCertString); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + + MOCK(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls); + + fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = cert1; + ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + + fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = cert2; + ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + + fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = invalidCert; + fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = invalidCert; + + ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + + fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = validCert; + fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = caCert; + + ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_assert(k); + + done: + UNMOCK(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls); + tor_free(cert1); + tor_free(cert2); + tor_free(tls); + tor_free(k); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_check_lifetime(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + X509 *validCert = read_cert_from(validCertString); + time_t now = time(NULL); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + tls->ssl->session->peer = validCert; + ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + ASN1_STRING_free(validCert->cert_info->validity->notBefore); + validCert->cert_info->validity->notBefore = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, now-10); + ASN1_STRING_free(validCert->cert_info->validity->notAfter); + validCert->cert_info->validity->notAfter = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, now+60); + + ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, -1000); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + + ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), -1000, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + + done: + tor_free(tls->ssl->session); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); + X509_free(validCert); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static int fixed_ssl_pending_result = 0; + +static int +fixed_ssl_pending(const SSL *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + return fixed_ssl_pending_result; +} + +static void +test_tortls_get_pending_bytes(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + SSL_METHOD *method; + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD)); + method->ssl_pending = fixed_ssl_pending; + tls->ssl->method = method; + + fixed_ssl_pending_result = 42; + ret = tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42); + + done: + tor_free(method); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + size_t ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + uint8_t *out; + out = tor_malloc_zero(1); + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + tls->ssl->session->master_key_length = 1; + +#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY + tls->ssl->session->master_key[0] = 43; + ret = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(tls->ssl->session, out, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(out[0], OP_EQ, 0); + + ret = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(tls->ssl->session, out, 1); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(out[0], OP_EQ, 43); + + done: +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */ + tor_free(tls->ssl->session); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); + tor_free(out); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_get_tlssecrets(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + uint8_t *secret_out = tor_malloc_zero(DIGEST256_LEN); + tor_tls_t *tls; + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + tls->ssl->session->master_key_length = 1; + tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE)); + + ret = tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(tls, secret_out); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + done: + tor_free(secret_out); + tor_free(tls->ssl->s3); + tor_free(tls->ssl->session); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_get_buffer_sizes(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + size_t rbuf_c=-1, rbuf_b=-1, wbuf_c=-1, wbuf_b=-1; + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE)); + + tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL; + tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len = 1; + tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.offset = 0; + tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left = 42; + + tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL; + tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len = 2; + tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.offset = 0; + tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left = 43; + + ret = tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tls, &rbuf_c, &rbuf_b, &wbuf_c, &wbuf_b); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); +#else + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(rbuf_c, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(wbuf_c, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(rbuf_b, OP_EQ, 42); + tt_int_op(wbuf_b, OP_EQ, 43); + + tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf = tor_malloc_zero(1); + tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf = tor_malloc_zero(1); + ret = tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tls, &rbuf_c, &rbuf_b, &wbuf_c, &wbuf_b); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(rbuf_c, OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(wbuf_c, OP_EQ, 2); + +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ + + done: + tor_free(tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf); + tor_free(tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf); + tor_free(tls->ssl->s3); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +typedef struct cert_pkey_st_local +{ + X509 *x509; + EVP_PKEY *privatekey; + const EVP_MD *digest; +} CERT_PKEY_local; + +typedef struct sess_cert_st_local +{ + STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; + int peer_cert_type; + CERT_PKEY_local *peer_key; + CERT_PKEY_local peer_pkeys[8]; + int references; +} SESS_CERT_local; + +static void +test_tortls_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL, *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL; + SESS_CERT_local *sess = NULL; + + c1 = read_cert_from(validCertString); + c2 = read_cert_from(caCertString); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + sess = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SESS_CERT_local)); + tls->ssl->session->sess_cert = (void *)sess; + + try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert); + tt_assert(!cert); + tt_assert(!id_cert); + + tls->ssl->session->peer = c1; + try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert); + tt_assert(cert == c1); + tt_assert(!id_cert); + X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */ + + sess->cert_chain = sk_X509_new_null(); + try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert); + tt_assert(cert == c1); + tt_assert(!id_cert); + X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */ + + sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c1); + sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c2); + + try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert); + tt_assert(cert == c1); + tt_assert(id_cert); + X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */ + + done: + sk_X509_free(sess->cert_chain); + tor_free(sess); + tor_free(tls->ssl->session); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); + X509_free(c1); + X509_free(c2); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_get_peer_cert(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_x509_cert_t *ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + X509 *cert = NULL; + + cert = read_cert_from(validCertString); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + + ret = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tls); + tt_assert(!ret); + + tls->ssl->session->peer = cert; + ret = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tls); + tt_assert(ret); + tt_assert(ret->cert == cert); + + done: + tor_x509_cert_free(ret); + tor_free(tls->ssl->session); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); + X509_free(cert); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_peer_has_cert(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + X509 *cert = NULL; + + cert = read_cert_from(validCertString); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + + ret = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tls); + tt_assert(!ret); + + tls->ssl->session->peer = cert; + ret = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tls); + tt_assert(ret); + + done: + tor_free(tls->ssl->session); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); + X509_free(cert); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +static void +test_tortls_get_write_overhead_ratio(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + double ret; + + total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0; + ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio(); + tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 1.0), OP_LT, 1E-12); + + total_bytes_written_by_tls = 10; + total_bytes_written_over_tls = 1; + ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio(); + tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 10.0), OP_LT, 1E-12); + + total_bytes_written_by_tls = 10; + total_bytes_written_over_tls = 2; + ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio(); + tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 5.0), OP_LT, 1E-12); + + done: + (void)0; +} + +static void +test_tortls_is_server(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + int ret; + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->isServer = 1; + ret = tor_tls_is_server(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + done: + tor_free(tls); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_session_secret_cb(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; + SSL_CIPHER *one; + + library_init(); + + tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + + tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC; + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()); + tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + SSL_set_ex_data(tls->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls); + + SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL); + + tor_tls_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + tt_assert(!tls->ssl->tls_session_secret_cb); + + one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"); + one->id = 0x00ff; + ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one); + + tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0; + tor_tls_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, NULL, NULL, ciphers, NULL, NULL); + tt_assert(!tls->ssl->tls_session_secret_cb); + + done: + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); + SSL_free(tls->ssl); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + tor_free(tls); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +/* TODO: It seems block_renegotiation and unblock_renegotiation and + * using different blags. This might not be correct */ +static void +test_tortls_block_renegotiation(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE)); +#ifndef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG +#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0 +#endif + + tls->ssl->s3->flags = SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; + + tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tls); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API + tt_assert(!(tls->ssl->s3->flags & + SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)); +#endif + + done: + tor_free(tls->ssl->s3); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); +} + +static void +test_tortls_unblock_renegotiation(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls); + + tt_uint_op(SSL_get_options(tls->ssl) & + SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION, OP_EQ, + SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION); + + done: + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls); + tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tls); + /* No assertion here - this test will fail if tor_assert is turned on + * and things are bad. */ + + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +static void +test_tortls_set_logged_address(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + + tor_tls_set_logged_address(tls, "foo bar"); + + tt_str_op(tls->address, OP_EQ, "foo bar"); + + tor_tls_set_logged_address(tls, "foo bar 2"); + tt_str_op(tls->address, OP_EQ, "foo bar 2"); + + done: + tor_free(tls->address); + tor_free(tls); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +example_cb(tor_tls_t *t, void *arg) +{ + (void)t; + (void)arg; +} + +static void +test_tortls_set_renegotiate_callback(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + const char *arg = "hello"; + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + + tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, example_cb, (void*)arg); + tt_assert(tls->negotiated_callback == example_cb); + tt_assert(tls->callback_arg == arg); + tt_assert(!tls->got_renegotiate); + + /* Assumes V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER */ + tt_assert(tls->ssl->info_callback == tor_tls_server_info_callback); + + tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, NULL, (void*)arg); + tt_assert(tls->ssl->info_callback == tor_tls_debug_state_callback); + + done: + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static SSL_CIPHER *fixed_cipher1 = NULL; +static SSL_CIPHER *fixed_cipher2 = NULL; +static const SSL_CIPHER * +fake_get_cipher(unsigned ncipher) +{ + + switch (ncipher) { + case 1: + return fixed_cipher1; + case 2: + return fixed_cipher2; + default: + return NULL; + } +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_find_cipher_by_id(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + SSL *ssl; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + const SSL_METHOD *m = TLSv1_method(); + SSL_METHOD *empty_method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD)); + + fixed_cipher1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER)); + fixed_cipher2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER)); + fixed_cipher2->id = 0xC00A; + + library_init(); + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(m); + ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + + ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, NULL, 0xC00A); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, 0xC00A); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, 0xFFFF); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xFFFF); +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); +#else + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); +#endif + + empty_method->get_cipher = fake_get_cipher; + ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + empty_method->get_cipher = m->get_cipher; + empty_method->num_ciphers = m->num_ciphers; + ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + empty_method->get_cipher = fake_get_cipher; + empty_method->num_ciphers = m->num_ciphers; + ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + empty_method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers; + ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A); +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); +#else + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); +#endif + + done: + tor_free(empty_method); + SSL_free(ssl); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + tor_free(fixed_cipher1); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_debug_state_callback(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + SSL *ssl; + char *buf = tor_malloc_zero(1000); + int n; + + setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_DEBUG); + + ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + + tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, 32, 45); + + n = tor_snprintf(buf, 1000, "SSL %p is now in state unknown" + " state [type=32,val=45].\n", ssl); + /* tor's snprintf returns -1 on error */ + tt_int_op(n, OP_NE, -1); + expect_log_msg(buf); + + done: + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + tor_free(buf); + tor_free(ssl); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_server_info_callback(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_t *tls; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *ssl; + + library_init(); + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()); + ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + + tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC; + tls->ssl = ssl; + + setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); + SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A); + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); + expect_single_log_msg("Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!\n"); + + SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B); + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); + expect_single_log_msg("Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!\n"); + + SSL_set_state(ssl, 99); + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); + expect_no_log_entry(); + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + + SSL_set_ex_data(tls->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls); + SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B); + tls->negotiated_callback = 0; + tls->server_handshake_count = 120; + tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); + tt_int_op(tls->server_handshake_count, OP_EQ, 121); + + tls->server_handshake_count = 127; + tls->negotiated_callback = (void *)1; + tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); + tt_int_op(tls->server_handshake_count, OP_EQ, 127); + tt_int_op(tls->got_renegotiate, OP_EQ, 1); + + tls->ssl->session = SSL_SESSION_new(); + tls->wasV2Handshake = 0; + tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0); + tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 0); + + done: + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + SSL_free(ssl); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + tor_free(tls); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static int fixed_ssl_read_result_index; +static int fixed_ssl_read_result[5]; +static int fixed_ssl_shutdown_result; + +static int +fixed_ssl_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len) +{ + (void)s; + (void)buf; + (void)len; + return fixed_ssl_read_result[fixed_ssl_read_result_index++]; +} + +static int +fixed_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s) +{ + (void)s; + return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result; +} + +#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER +static int fixed_ssl_state_to_set; +static tor_tls_t *fixed_tls; + +static int +setting_version_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s) +{ + s->version = SSL2_VERSION; + return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result; +} + +static int +setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s) +{ + fixed_tls->state = fixed_ssl_state_to_set; + s->version = SSL2_VERSION; + return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result; +} +#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */ + +static int +dummy_handshake_func(SSL *s) +{ + (void)s; + return 1; +} + +static void +test_tortls_shutdown(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method(); + setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->ssl->method = method; + method->ssl_read = fixed_ssl_read; + method->ssl_shutdown = fixed_ssl_shutdown; + + ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); + + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE; + fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; + fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; + fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = -1; + ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); + +#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER + tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func; + + fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; + fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; + fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42; + fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0; + fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 1; + ERR_clear_error(); + tls->ssl->version = SSL2_VERSION; + ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_DONE); + tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED); + + fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; + fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; + fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42; + fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0; + fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0; + ERR_clear_error(); + tls->ssl->version = 0; + ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_DONE); + tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED); + + fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; + fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; + fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42; + fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0; + fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0; + ERR_clear_error(); + tls->ssl->version = 0; + method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_ssl_shutdown; + ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); + + fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; + fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; + fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42; + fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0; + fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0; + fixed_tls = tls; + fixed_ssl_state_to_set = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE; + ERR_clear_error(); + tls->ssl->version = 0; + method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown; + ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); + + fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; + fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10; + fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42; + fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0; + fixed_ssl_read_result[3] = -1; + fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0; + fixed_tls = tls; + fixed_ssl_state_to_set = 0; + ERR_clear_error(); + tls->ssl->version = 0; + method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown; + ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); +#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */ + + done: + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + tor_free(method); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); +} + +static int negotiated_callback_called; + +static void +negotiated_callback_setter(tor_tls_t *t, void *arg) +{ + (void)t; + (void)arg; + negotiated_callback_called++; +} + +static void +test_tortls_read(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + char buf[100]; + SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method(); + setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; + + ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); + + /* These tests assume that V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER is set */ + tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func; + tls->ssl->method = method; + method->ssl_read = fixed_ssl_read; + fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; + fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 42; + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; + ERR_clear_error(); + ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42); + + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; + tls->got_renegotiate = 1; + fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; + ERR_clear_error(); + ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10); + tt_int_op(tls->got_renegotiate, OP_EQ, 0); + + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; + tls->got_renegotiate = 1; + negotiated_callback_called = 0; + tls->negotiated_callback = negotiated_callback_setter; + fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; + ERR_clear_error(); + ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10); + tt_int_op(negotiated_callback_called, OP_EQ, 1); + +#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER + fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0; + fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 0; + tls->ssl->version = SSL2_VERSION; + ERR_clear_error(); + ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_CLOSE); + tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED); +#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */ + // TODO: fill up + + done: + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); + tor_free(method); +} + +static int fixed_ssl_write_result; + +static int +fixed_ssl_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len) +{ + (void)s; + (void)buf; + (void)len; + return fixed_ssl_write_result; +} + +static void +test_tortls_write(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method(); + char buf[100]; + setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL)); + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; + + ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); + + tls->ssl->method = method; + tls->wantwrite_n = 1; + ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10); + tt_int_op(tls->wantwrite_n, OP_EQ, 0); + + method->ssl_write = fixed_ssl_write; + tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func; + fixed_ssl_write_result = 1; + ERR_clear_error(); + ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + fixed_ssl_write_result = -1; + ERR_clear_error(); + tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING; + SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL); + SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_READ; + ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD); + + ERR_clear_error(); + tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING; + SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL); + SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_WRITE; + ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE); + + done: + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + BIO_free(tls->ssl->rbio); + tor_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); + tor_free(method); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static int fixed_ssl_accept_result; +static int fixed_ssl_connect_result; + +static int +setting_error_ssl_accept(SSL *ssl) +{ + (void)ssl; + ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); + ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); + return fixed_ssl_accept_result; +} + +static int +setting_error_ssl_connect(SSL *ssl) +{ + (void)ssl; + ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); + ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99); + return fixed_ssl_connect_result; +} + +static int +fixed_ssl_accept(SSL *ssl) +{ + (void) ssl; + return fixed_ssl_accept_result; +} + +static void +test_tortls_handshake(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method(); + setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); + + SSL_library_init(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; + + ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); + + tls->isServer = 1; + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; + ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); + + tls->ssl->method = method; + method->ssl_accept = fixed_ssl_accept; + fixed_ssl_accept_result = 2; + ERR_clear_error(); + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; + ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN); + + method->ssl_accept = setting_error_ssl_accept; + fixed_ssl_accept_result = 1; + ERR_clear_error(); + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; + ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); + expect_log_entry(); + /* This fails on jessie. Investigate why! */ +#if 0 + expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: (null) (in bignum routines:" + "(null):SSLv3 write client hello B)\n"); + expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: (null) (in system library:" + "connect:SSLv3 write client hello B)\n"); +#endif /* 0 */ + expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); + + tls->isServer = 0; + method->ssl_connect = setting_error_ssl_connect; + fixed_ssl_connect_result = 1; + ERR_clear_error(); + mock_clean_saved_logs(); + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE; + ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC); + expect_log_entry(); +#if 0 + /* See above */ + expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: " + "(null) (in bignum routines:(null):SSLv3 write client hello B)\n"); + expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: " + "(null) (in system library:connect:SSLv3 write client hello B)\n"); +#endif /* 0 */ + expect_log_severity(LOG_WARN); + + done: + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + SSL_free(tls->ssl); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + tor_free(tls); + tor_free(method); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static void +test_tortls_finish_handshake(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_tls_t *tls; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method(); + SSL_library_init(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + + X509 *c1 = read_cert_from(validCertString); + SESS_CERT_local *sess = NULL; + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method); + + tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t)); + tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; + + ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + tls->isServer = 1; + tls->wasV2Handshake = 0; + setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); + ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1); + expect_single_log_msg_containing("For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't " + "get set."); + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + + tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; + ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1); + + tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; + tls->ssl->session = SSL_SESSION_new(); + ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 0); + + tls->isServer = 0; + + sess = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SESS_CERT_local)); + tls->ssl->session->sess_cert = (void *)sess; + sess->cert_chain = sk_X509_new_null(); + sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c1); + tls->ssl->session->peer = c1; + tls->wasV2Handshake = 0; + ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1); + + method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers; + ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9); + + done: + if (sess) + sk_X509_free(sess->cert_chain); + if (tls->ssl && tls->ssl->session) { + tor_free(tls->ssl->session->sess_cert); + } + SSL_free(tls->ssl); + tor_free(tls); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + tor_free(method); + teardown_capture_of_logs(); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +static int fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index; +static crypto_pk_t *fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[5]; + +static crypto_pk_t * +fixed_crypto_pk_new(void) +{ + return fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index++]; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +static int fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index; +static int fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[5]; +static int fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index; +static X509 *fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[5]; +static int fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index; +static tor_x509_cert_t *fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[5]; + +static int +fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(crypto_pk_t *env, int bits) +{ + (void)env; + (void)bits; + return fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[ + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index++]; +} + +static X509 * +fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa, + crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, + const char *cname, + const char *cname_sign, + unsigned int cert_lifetime) +{ + (void)rsa; + (void)rsa_sign; + (void)cname; + (void)cname_sign; + (void)cert_lifetime; + return fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[ + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index++]; +} + +static tor_x509_cert_t * +fixed_tor_x509_cert_new(tor_x509_cert_impl_t *x509_cert) +{ + (void) x509_cert; + return fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[ + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index++]; +} + +static void +test_tortls_context_new(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_tls_context_t *ret; + crypto_pk_t *pk1, *pk2, *pk3, *pk4, *pk5, *pk6, *pk7, *pk8, *pk9, *pk10, + *pk11, *pk12, *pk13, *pk14, *pk15, *pk16, *pk17, *pk18; + + pk1 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk2 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk3 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk4 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk5 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk6 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk7 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk8 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk9 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk10 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk11 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk12 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk13 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk14 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk15 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk16 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk17 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk18 = crypto_pk_new(); + + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = NULL; + MOCK(crypto_pk_new, fixed_crypto_pk_new); + ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_assert(!ret); + + /* note: we already override this in testing_common.c, so we + * run this unit test in a subprocess. */ + MOCK(crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits, + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits); + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk1; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = NULL; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = -1; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; + ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_assert(!ret); + + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk2; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = NULL; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; + ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_assert(!ret); + + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk3; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk4; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[1] = -1; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; + ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_assert(!ret); + + MOCK(tor_tls_create_certificate, fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate); + + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk5; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk6; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[1] = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = NULL; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); + ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_assert(!ret); + + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk7; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk8; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = NULL; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); + ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_assert(!ret); + + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk9; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk10; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_assert(!ret); + + MOCK(tor_x509_cert_new, fixed_tor_x509_cert_new); + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk11; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk12; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = NULL; + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = NULL; + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_assert(!ret); + + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk13; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk14; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = NULL; + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_assert(!ret); + + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk15; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk16; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_assert(!ret); + + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk17; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk18; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL; + fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new(); + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_assert(!ret); + + done: + UNMOCK(tor_x509_cert_new); + UNMOCK(tor_tls_create_certificate); + UNMOCK(crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits); + UNMOCK(crypto_pk_new); +} +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +static int fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0; +static EVP_PKEY *fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[5]; + +static EVP_PKEY * +fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(crypto_pk_t *env, int private) +{ + (void) env; + (void) private; + return fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[ + fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index++]; +} + +static void +test_tortls_create_certificate(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + X509 *ret; + crypto_pk_t *pk1, *pk2; + + pk1 = crypto_pk_new(); + pk2 = crypto_pk_new(); + + MOCK(crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_, fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_); + fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1); + tt_assert(!ret); + + fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = EVP_PKEY_new(); + fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[1] = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1); + tt_assert(!ret); + + fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = EVP_PKEY_new(); + fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[1] = EVP_PKEY_new(); + ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1); + tt_assert(!ret); + + done: + UNMOCK(crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_); + crypto_pk_free(pk1); + crypto_pk_free(pk2); +} + +static void +test_tortls_cert_new(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + tor_x509_cert_t *ret; + X509 *cert = read_cert_from(validCertString); + + ret = tor_x509_cert_new(NULL); + tt_assert(!ret); + + ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert); + tt_assert(ret); + tor_x509_cert_free(ret); + ret = NULL; + +#if 0 + cert = read_cert_from(validCertString); + /* XXX this doesn't do what you think: it alters a copy of the pubkey. */ + X509_get_pubkey(cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_DSA; + ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert); + tt_assert(ret); +#endif /* 0 */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE + cert = read_cert_from(validCertString); + X509_CINF_free(cert->cert_info); + cert->cert_info = NULL; + ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert); + tt_assert(ret); +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + + done: + tor_x509_cert_free(ret); +} + +static void +test_tortls_cert_is_valid(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL, *scert = NULL; + + scert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); + ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + tor_free(scert); + tor_free(cert); + + cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); + scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); + ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE + tor_x509_cert_free(cert); + tor_x509_cert_free(scert); + cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); + scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); + ASN1_TIME_free(cert->cert->cert_info->validity->notAfter); + cert->cert->cert_info->validity->notAfter = + ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, time(NULL)-1000000); + ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + tor_x509_cert_free(cert); + tor_x509_cert_free(scert); + cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); + scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); + X509_PUBKEY_free(cert->cert->cert_info->key); + cert->cert->cert_info->key = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +#if 0 + tor_x509_cert_free(cert); + tor_x509_cert_free(scert); + cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); + scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); + /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */ + BN_one(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert))->n); + ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + tor_x509_cert_free(cert); + tor_x509_cert_free(scert); + cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); + scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); + /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */ + X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC; + ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + tor_x509_cert_free(cert); + tor_x509_cert_free(scert); + cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); + scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); + /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */ + X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC; + ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + tor_x509_cert_free(cert); + tor_x509_cert_free(scert); + cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString)); + scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString)); + /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */ + X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC; + X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->ameth = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); +#endif /* 0 */ + + done: + tor_x509_cert_free(cert); + tor_x509_cert_free(scert); +} + +static void +test_tortls_context_init_one(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + int ret; + tor_tls_context_t *old = NULL; + + MOCK(crypto_pk_new, fixed_crypto_pk_new); + + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0; + fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = NULL; + ret = tor_tls_context_init_one(&old, NULL, 0, 0, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + + done: + UNMOCK(crypto_pk_new); +} + +#define LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \ + { #name, test_tortls_##name, (flags|TT_FORK), NULL, NULL } + +#ifdef OPENSSL_OPAQUE +#define INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \ + { #name, NULL, TT_SKIP, NULL, NULL } +#else +#define INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(name, flags) LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags) +#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */ + +struct testcase_t tortls_openssl_tests[] = { + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(tor_tls_new, TT_FORK), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_state_description, TT_FORK), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_by_ssl, TT_FORK), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, TT_FORK), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(log_one_error, TT_FORK), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_error, TT_FORK), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(always_accept_verify_cb, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(x509_cert_free, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_matches_key, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_get_key, 0), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_my_client_auth_key, TT_FORK), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_ciphersuite_name, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(classify_client_ciphers, 0), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(client_is_using_v2_ciphers, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(verify, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(check_lifetime, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_pending_bytes, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(SSL_SESSION_get_master_key, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_tlssecrets, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_buffer_sizes, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_peer_cert, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(peer_has_cert, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(shutdown, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(finish_handshake, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(handshake, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(write, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(read, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(server_info_callback, 0), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_write_overhead_ratio, TT_FORK), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(is_server, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(assert_renegotiation_unblocked, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(block_renegotiation, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(unblock_renegotiation, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(set_renegotiate_callback, 0), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(set_logged_address, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(find_cipher_by_id, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(session_secret_cb, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(debug_state_callback, 0), + INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(context_new, TT_FORK /* redundant */), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(create_certificate, 0), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_new, 0), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_is_valid, 0), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(context_init_one, 0), + END_OF_TESTCASES +};

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