September 2018 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] hs-v3: Re-enable the decoding in the encoding function
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 53dd1699baf5cb09086644eaca239596aedbde15 Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun Apr 22 20:51:21 2018 +0700 hs-v3: Re-enable the decoding in the encoding function Previously, the validation by decoding a created descriptor was disabled because the interface had to be entirely changed and not implemented at the time. This commit re-enabled it because it is now implemented. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c index 3f9b505cb..52b080271 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c @@ -2705,14 +2705,16 @@ hs_desc_encode_descriptor,(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, goto err; } - /* Try to decode what we just encoded. Symmetry is nice! */ - /* XXX: I need to disable this assertation for now to make the test pass. - * I will enable it again when I finish writing the decoding */ - /* ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(*encoded_out, */ - /* desc->subcredential, NULL); */ - /* if (BUG(ret < 0)) { */ - /* goto err; */ - /* } */ + /* Try to decode what we just encoded. Symmetry is nice!, but it is + * symmetric only if the client auth is disabled. That is, the descriptor + * cookie will be NULL. */ + if (!descriptor_cookie) { + ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(*encoded_out, desc->subcredential, + NULL, NULL); + if (BUG(ret < 0)) { + goto err; + } + } return 0;

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[tor/master] hs-v3: Refactor secret data building logic
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 462d4097ce8b0059591b366c0ddb21b5efe97c3c Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Apr 19 22:36:59 2018 +0700 hs-v3: Refactor secret data building logic Because this secret data building logic is not only used by the descriptor encoding process but also by the descriptor decoding, refactor the function to take both steps into account. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c index b99797497..4eb06c827 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c @@ -944,6 +944,53 @@ encrypt_desc_data_and_base64(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, return enc_b64; } +/* Generate the secret data which is used to encrypt/decrypt the descriptor. + * + * SECRET_DATA = blinded-public-key + * SECRET_DATA = blinded-public-key | descriptor_cookie + * + * The descriptor_cookie is optional but if it exists, it must be at least + * HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN bytes long. + * + * A newly allocated secret data is put in secret_data_out. Return the + * length of the secret data. This function cannot fail. */ +static size_t +build_secret_data(const ed25519_public_key_t *blinded_pubkey, + const uint8_t *descriptor_cookie, + uint8_t **secret_data_out) +{ + size_t secret_data_len; + uint8_t *secret_data; + + tor_assert(blinded_pubkey); + tor_assert(secret_data_out); + + if (descriptor_cookie) { + /* If the descriptor cookie is present, we need both the blinded + * pubkey and the descriptor cookie as a secret data. */ + secret_data_len = ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN + HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN; + secret_data = tor_malloc(secret_data_len); + + memcpy(secret_data, + blinded_pubkey->pubkey, + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + memcpy(secret_data + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN, + descriptor_cookie, + HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN); + } else { + /* If the descriptor cookie is not present, we need only the blinded + * pubkey as a secret data. */ + secret_data_len = ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN; + secret_data = tor_malloc(secret_data_len); + memcpy(secret_data, + blinded_pubkey->pubkey, + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + } + + *secret_data_out = secret_data; + return secret_data_len; +} + /* Generate and encode the superencrypted portion of <b>desc</b>. This also * involves generating the encrypted portion of the descriptor, and performing * the superencryption. A newly allocated NUL-terminated string pointer @@ -976,27 +1023,9 @@ encode_superencrypted_data(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, goto err; } - if (descriptor_cookie) { - /* If the descriptor cookie is present, we need both the blinded - * pubkey and the descriptor cookie as a secret data. */ - secret_data_len = ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN + HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN; - secret_data = tor_malloc(secret_data_len); - - memcpy(secret_data, - desc->plaintext_data.blinded_pubkey.pubkey, - ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); - memcpy(secret_data + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN, - descriptor_cookie, - HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN); - } else { - /* If the descriptor cookie is not present, we need only the blinded - * pubkey as a secret data. */ - secret_data_len = ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN; - secret_data = tor_malloc(secret_data_len); - memcpy(secret_data, - desc->plaintext_data.blinded_pubkey.pubkey, - ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); - } + secret_data_len = build_secret_data(&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_pubkey, + descriptor_cookie, + &secret_data); /* Encrypt and b64 the inner layer */ layer2_b64_ciphertext =

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[tor/master] hs-v3: Make all descriptor content free functions public
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 3b08b239972df982f6130900295bcde76db8b0ed Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu May 10 03:14:01 2018 +0700 hs-v3: Make all descriptor content free functions public Series of functions that we now need in hs_service.c. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h | 5 +- src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c index 52b080271..dc7012ec4 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c @@ -152,62 +152,6 @@ static token_rule_t hs_desc_intro_point_v3_token_table[] = { END_OF_TABLE }; -/* Free the content of the plaintext section of a descriptor. */ -STATIC void -desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *desc) -{ - if (!desc) { - return; - } - - if (desc->superencrypted_blob) { - tor_free(desc->superencrypted_blob); - } - tor_cert_free(desc->signing_key_cert); - - memwipe(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc)); -} - -/* Free the content of the superencrypted section of a descriptor. */ -static void -desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(hs_desc_superencrypted_data_t *desc) -{ - if (!desc) { - return; - } - - if (desc->encrypted_blob) { - tor_free(desc->encrypted_blob); - } - if (desc->clients) { - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->clients, hs_desc_authorized_client_t *, client, - hs_desc_authorized_client_free(client)); - smartlist_free(desc->clients); - } - - memwipe(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc)); -} - -/* Free the content of the encrypted section of a descriptor. */ -static void -desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc) -{ - if (!desc) { - return; - } - - if (desc->intro_auth_types) { - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->intro_auth_types, char *, a, tor_free(a)); - smartlist_free(desc->intro_auth_types); - } - if (desc->intro_points) { - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->intro_points, hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip, - hs_desc_intro_point_free(ip)); - smartlist_free(desc->intro_points); - } - memwipe(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc)); -} - /* Using a key, salt and encrypted payload, build a MAC and put it in mac_out. * We use SHA3-256 for the MAC computation. * This function can't fail. */ @@ -2288,7 +2232,7 @@ desc_decode_superencrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, err: tor_assert(ret < 0); - desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(desc_superencrypted_out); + hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(desc_superencrypted_out); done: if (tokens) { @@ -2388,7 +2332,7 @@ desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, err: tor_assert(ret < 0); - desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(desc_encrypted_out); + hs_desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(desc_encrypted_out); done: if (tokens) { @@ -2723,11 +2667,67 @@ hs_desc_encode_descriptor,(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, return ret; } +/* Free the content of the plaintext section of a descriptor. */ +void +hs_desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *desc) +{ + if (!desc) { + return; + } + + if (desc->superencrypted_blob) { + tor_free(desc->superencrypted_blob); + } + tor_cert_free(desc->signing_key_cert); + + memwipe(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc)); +} + +/* Free the content of the superencrypted section of a descriptor. */ +void +hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(hs_desc_superencrypted_data_t *desc) +{ + if (!desc) { + return; + } + + if (desc->encrypted_blob) { + tor_free(desc->encrypted_blob); + } + if (desc->clients) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->clients, hs_desc_authorized_client_t *, client, + hs_desc_authorized_client_free(client)); + smartlist_free(desc->clients); + } + + memwipe(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc)); +} + +/* Free the content of the encrypted section of a descriptor. */ +void +hs_desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc) +{ + if (!desc) { + return; + } + + if (desc->intro_auth_types) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->intro_auth_types, char *, a, tor_free(a)); + smartlist_free(desc->intro_auth_types); + } + if (desc->intro_points) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->intro_points, hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip, + hs_desc_intro_point_free(ip)); + smartlist_free(desc->intro_points); + } + memwipe(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc)); +} + /* Free the descriptor plaintext data object. */ void hs_desc_plaintext_data_free_(hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *desc) { - desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(desc); + hs_desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(desc); tor_free(desc); } @@ -2735,7 +2735,7 @@ hs_desc_plaintext_data_free_(hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *desc) void hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_(hs_desc_superencrypted_data_t *desc) { - desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(desc); + hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(desc); tor_free(desc); } @@ -2743,7 +2743,7 @@ hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_(hs_desc_superencrypted_data_t *desc) void hs_desc_encrypted_data_free_(hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc) { - desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(desc); + hs_desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(desc); tor_free(desc); } @@ -2755,9 +2755,9 @@ hs_descriptor_free_(hs_descriptor_t *desc) return; } - desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(&desc->plaintext_data); - desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(&desc->superencrypted_data); - desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(&desc->encrypted_data); + hs_desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(&desc->plaintext_data); + hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(&desc->superencrypted_data); + hs_desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(&desc->encrypted_data); tor_free(desc); } diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h index 64a5a8f7f..5f589f927 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h @@ -309,6 +309,10 @@ void hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t *client_pk, auth_ephemeral_sk, const uint8_t *descriptor_cookie, hs_desc_authorized_client_t *client_out); +void hs_desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *desc); +void hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents( + hs_desc_superencrypted_data_t *desc); +void hs_desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc); #ifdef HS_DESCRIPTOR_PRIVATE @@ -328,7 +332,6 @@ STATIC int cert_is_valid(tor_cert_t *cert, uint8_t type, STATIC int desc_sig_is_valid(const char *b64_sig, const ed25519_public_key_t *signing_pubkey, const char *encoded_desc, size_t encoded_len); -STATIC void desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *desc); MOCK_DECL(STATIC size_t, decrypt_desc_layer,(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, const uint8_t *encrypted_blob, diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c index 952499a2c..2a2e3a527 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c @@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ test_decode_bad_signature(void *arg) teardown_capture_of_logs(); done: - desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(&desc_plaintext); + hs_desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(&desc_plaintext); } static void

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[tor/master] hs-v3: Republish descriptors if client auth changes
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 8f64931d67df2f4b6811b0244bef8d1ea04d8330 Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu May 10 03:35:29 2018 +0700 hs-v3: Republish descriptors if client auth changes When reloading tor, check if our the configured client authorization have changed from what we previously had. If so, republish the updated descriptor. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 142 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 140 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c index c1dc12dde..042880992 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ static int consider_republishing_hs_descriptors = 0; static int load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service); static void set_descriptor_revision_counter(hs_service_descriptor_t *hs_desc, time_t now, bool is_current); +static int build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service, + hs_service_descriptor_t *desc); static void move_descriptors(hs_service_t *src, hs_service_t *dst); static int service_encode_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service, const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, @@ -1321,8 +1323,113 @@ service_descriptor_new(void) return sdesc; } -/* Move descriptor(s) from the src service to the dst service. We do this - * during SIGHUP when we re-create our hidden services. */ +/* Allocate and return a deep copy of client. */ +static hs_service_authorized_client_t * +service_authorized_client_dup(const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client) +{ + hs_service_authorized_client_t *client_dup = NULL; + + tor_assert(client); + + client_dup = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_authorized_client_t)); + /* Currently, the public key is the only component of + * hs_service_authorized_client_t. */ + memcpy(client_dup->client_pk.public_key, + client->client_pk.public_key, + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + + return client_dup; +} + +/* If two authorized clients are equal, return 0. If the first one should come + * before the second, return less than zero. If the first should come after + * the second, return greater than zero. */ +static int +service_authorized_client_cmp(const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client1, + const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client2) +{ + tor_assert(client1); + tor_assert(client2); + + /* Currently, the public key is the only component of + * hs_service_authorized_client_t. */ + return tor_memcmp(client1->client_pk.public_key, + client2->client_pk.public_key, + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); +} + +/* Helper for sorting authorized clients. */ +static int +compare_service_authorzized_client_(const void **_a, const void **_b) +{ + const hs_service_authorized_client_t *a = *_a, *b = *_b; + return service_authorized_client_cmp(a, b); +} + +/* If the list of hs_service_authorized_client_t's is different between + * src and dst, return 1. Otherwise, return 0. */ +static int +service_authorized_client_config_equal(const hs_service_config_t *config1, + const hs_service_config_t *config2) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i; + smartlist_t *sl1 = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_t *sl2 = smartlist_new(); + + tor_assert(config1); + tor_assert(config2); + tor_assert(config1->clients); + tor_assert(config2->clients); + + /* If the number of clients is different, it is obvious that the list + * changes. */ + if (smartlist_len(config1->clients) != smartlist_len(config2->clients)) { + goto done; + } + + /* We do not want to mutate config1 and config2, so we will duplicate both + * entire client lists here. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config1->clients, + hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client, + smartlist_add(sl1, service_authorized_client_dup(client))); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config2->clients, + hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client, + smartlist_add(sl2, service_authorized_client_dup(client))); + + smartlist_sort(sl1, compare_service_authorzized_client_); + smartlist_sort(sl2, compare_service_authorzized_client_); + + for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(sl1); i++) { + /* If the clients at index i in both lists differ, the whole configs + * differ. */ + if (service_authorized_client_cmp(smartlist_get(sl1, i), + smartlist_get(sl2, i))) { + goto done; + } + } + + /* Success. */ + ret = 1; + + done: + if (sl1) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl1, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p, + service_authorized_client_free(p)); + smartlist_free(sl1); + } + if (sl2) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl2, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p, + service_authorized_client_free(p)); + smartlist_free(sl2); + } + return ret; +} + +/* Move descriptor(s) from the src service to the dst service and modify their + * content if necessary. We do this during SIGHUP when we re-create our + * hidden services. */ static void move_descriptors(hs_service_t *src, hs_service_t *dst) { @@ -1346,6 +1453,37 @@ move_descriptors(hs_service_t *src, hs_service_t *dst) dst->desc_next = src->desc_next; src->desc_next = NULL; } + + /* If the client authorization changes, we must rebuild the superencrypted + * section and republish the descriptors. */ + int client_auth_changed = + !service_authorized_client_config_equal(&src->config, &dst->config); + if (client_auth_changed && dst->desc_current) { + /* We have to clear the superencrypted content first. */ + hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents( + &dst->desc_current->desc->superencrypted_data); + if (build_service_desc_superencrypted(dst, dst->desc_current) < 0) { + goto err; + } + service_desc_schedule_upload(dst->desc_current, time(NULL), 1); + } + if (client_auth_changed && dst->desc_next) { + /* We have to clear the superencrypted content first. */ + hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents( + &dst->desc_next->desc->superencrypted_data); + if (build_service_desc_superencrypted(dst, dst->desc_next) < 0) { + goto err; + } + service_desc_schedule_upload(dst->desc_next, time(NULL), 1); + } + + return; + + err: + /* If there is an error, free all descriptors to make it clean and generate + * them later. */ + service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_current); + service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_next); } /* From the given service, remove all expired failing intro points for each

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[tor/master] hs-v3: Rename client_sk to client_auth_sk
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 9f975e99953fa57a7c1f43ebd22cc9e602037b6d Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue May 22 00:01:52 2018 +0700 hs-v3: Rename client_sk to client_auth_sk Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 7 ++++--- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++---------------- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h | 4 ++-- src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index 0038fdfa5..b178282c1 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -1233,7 +1233,7 @@ hs_client_decode_descriptor(const char *desc_str, uint8_t subcredential[DIGEST256_LEN]; ed25519_public_key_t blinded_pubkey; hs_client_service_authorization_t *client_auth = NULL; - curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk = NULL; + curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auht_sk = NULL; tor_assert(desc_str); tor_assert(service_identity_pk); @@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@ hs_client_decode_descriptor(const char *desc_str, /* Check if we have a client authorization for this service in the map. */ client_auth = find_client_auth(service_identity_pk); if (client_auth) { - client_sk = &client_auth->enc_seckey; + client_auht_sk = &client_auth->enc_seckey; } /* Create subcredential for this HS so that we can decrypt */ @@ -1254,7 +1254,8 @@ hs_client_decode_descriptor(const char *desc_str, } /* Parse descriptor */ - ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(desc_str, subcredential, client_sk, desc); + ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(desc_str, subcredential, + client_auht_sk, desc); memwipe(subcredential, 0, sizeof(subcredential)); if (ret < 0) { log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Could not parse received descriptor as client."); diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c index dc7012ec4..be8e206c7 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c @@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ encrypted_data_length_is_valid(size_t len) static int decrypt_descriptor_cookie(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, const hs_desc_authorized_client_t *client, - const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk, + const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk, uint8_t **descriptor_cookie_out) { int ret = -1; @@ -1421,15 +1421,15 @@ decrypt_descriptor_cookie(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, tor_assert(desc); tor_assert(client); - tor_assert(client_sk); + tor_assert(client_auth_sk); tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero( (char *) &desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey, sizeof(desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey))); - tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) client_sk, - sizeof(*client_sk))); + tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) client_auth_sk, + sizeof(*client_auth_sk))); /* Calculate x25519(client_x, hs_Y) */ - curve25519_handshake(secret_seed, client_sk, + curve25519_handshake(secret_seed, client_auth_sk, &desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey); /* Calculate KEYS = KDF(SECRET_SEED, 40) */ @@ -1440,7 +1440,7 @@ decrypt_descriptor_cookie(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, /* If the client id of auth client is not the same as the calculcated * client id, it means that this auth client is invaild according to the - * client secret key client_sk. */ + * client secret key client_auth_sk. */ if (tor_memneq(client->client_id, keystream, HS_DESC_CLIENT_ID_LEN)) { goto done; } @@ -1630,7 +1630,7 @@ desc_decrypt_superencrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, char **decrypted_out) * decrypted_out is set to NULL. */ static size_t desc_decrypt_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, - const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk, + const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk, char **decrypted_out) { size_t encrypted_len = 0; @@ -1643,12 +1643,12 @@ desc_decrypt_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, /* If the client secret key is provided, try to find a valid descriptor * cookie. Otherwise, leave it NULL. */ - if (client_sk) { + if (client_auth_sk) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->superencrypted_data.clients, hs_desc_authorized_client_t *, client) { /* If we can decrypt the descriptor cookie successfully, we will use that * descriptor cookie and break from the loop. */ - if (!decrypt_descriptor_cookie(desc, client, client_sk, + if (!decrypt_descriptor_cookie(desc, client, client_auth_sk, &descriptor_cookie)) { break; } @@ -2253,7 +2253,7 @@ desc_decode_superencrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, * success else -1. */ static int desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, - const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk, + const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk, hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_encrypted_out) { int ret = -1; @@ -2268,7 +2268,7 @@ desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, /* Decrypt the encrypted data that is located in the superencrypted section * in the descriptor as a blob of bytes. */ - message_len = desc_decrypt_encrypted(desc, client_sk, &message); + message_len = desc_decrypt_encrypted(desc, client_auth_sk, &message); if (!message_len) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor decryption failed."); goto err; @@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, static int (*decode_encrypted_handlers[])( const hs_descriptor_t *desc, - const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk, + const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk, hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_encrypted) = { /* v0 */ NULL, /* v1 */ NULL, /* v2 */ NULL, @@ -2365,7 +2365,7 @@ static int * negative value on error. */ int hs_desc_decode_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, - const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk, + const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk, hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_encrypted) { int ret; @@ -2391,7 +2391,8 @@ hs_desc_decode_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, tor_assert(decode_encrypted_handlers[version]); /* Run the version specific plaintext decoder. */ - ret = decode_encrypted_handlers[version](desc, client_sk, desc_encrypted); + ret = decode_encrypted_handlers[version](desc, client_auth_sk, + desc_encrypted); if (ret < 0) { goto err; } @@ -2547,7 +2548,7 @@ hs_desc_decode_plaintext(const char *encoded, int hs_desc_decode_descriptor(const char *encoded, const uint8_t *subcredential, - const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk, + const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk, hs_descriptor_t **desc_out) { int ret = -1; @@ -2575,7 +2576,7 @@ hs_desc_decode_descriptor(const char *encoded, goto err; } - ret = hs_desc_decode_encrypted(desc, client_sk, &desc->encrypted_data); + ret = hs_desc_decode_encrypted(desc, client_auth_sk, &desc->encrypted_data); if (ret < 0) { goto err; } diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h index 5f589f927..06d3bfe75 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h @@ -277,14 +277,14 @@ MOCK_DECL(int, int hs_desc_decode_descriptor(const char *encoded, const uint8_t *subcredential, - const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk, + const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk, hs_descriptor_t **desc_out); int hs_desc_decode_plaintext(const char *encoded, hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *plaintext); int hs_desc_decode_superencrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, hs_desc_superencrypted_data_t *desc_out); int hs_desc_decode_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, - const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_sk, + const curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auth_sk, hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_out); size_t hs_desc_obj_size(const hs_descriptor_t *data); diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c index 2a2e3a527..50a073b41 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c @@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg) hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client = NULL; uint8_t descriptor_cookie[HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN]; curve25519_secret_key_t auth_ephemeral_sk; - curve25519_secret_key_t client_sk; + curve25519_secret_key_t client_auth_sk; curve25519_public_key_t client_pk; const char ephemeral_sk_b16[] = "d023b674d993a5c8446bd2ca97e9961149b3c0e88c7dc14e8777744dd3468d6a"; @@ -882,9 +882,9 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg) ret = curve25519_secret_key_generate(&auth_ephemeral_sk, 0); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - ret = curve25519_secret_key_generate(&client_sk, 0); + ret = curve25519_secret_key_generate(&client_auth_sk, 0); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - curve25519_public_key_generate(&client_pk, &client_sk); + curve25519_public_key_generate(&client_pk, &client_auth_sk); desc_client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_authorized_client_t));

1 0

[tor/master] test: HS v3 client auth is config equal function
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit b61403c7870b9ee289fe61e2f2349a8d49a8d37a Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed May 16 21:57:24 2018 +0700 test: HS v3 client auth is config equal function Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 4 +- src/feature/hs/hs_service.h | 6 ++ src/test/test_hs_service.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c index 042880992..87c28f620 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ set_service_default_config(hs_service_config_t *c, /* From a service configuration object config, clear everything from it * meaning free allocated pointers and reset the values. */ -static void +STATIC void service_clear_config(hs_service_config_t *config) { if (config == NULL) { @@ -1368,7 +1368,7 @@ compare_service_authorzized_client_(const void **_a, const void **_b) /* If the list of hs_service_authorized_client_t's is different between * src and dst, return 1. Otherwise, return 0. */ -static int +STATIC int service_authorized_client_config_equal(const hs_service_config_t *config1, const hs_service_config_t *config2) { diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h index f1b98b805..735266071 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h @@ -399,6 +399,12 @@ STATIC void service_desc_schedule_upload(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, STATIC int service_desc_hsdirs_changed(const hs_service_t *service, const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc); +STATIC int service_authorized_client_config_equal( + const hs_service_config_t *config1, + const hs_service_config_t *config2); + +STATIC void service_clear_config(hs_service_config_t *config); + #endif /* defined(HS_SERVICE_PRIVATE) */ #endif /* !defined(TOR_HS_SERVICE_H) */ diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_service.c b/src/test/test_hs_service.c index 11f542c44..6a061eaea 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_service.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_service.c @@ -246,6 +246,22 @@ helper_create_authorized_client(void) return client; } +/* Helper: Return a newly allocated authorized client object with the + * same client name and the same public key as the given client. */ +static hs_service_authorized_client_t * +helper_clone_authorized_client(const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client) +{ + hs_service_authorized_client_t *client_out; + + tor_assert(client); + + client_out = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_authorized_client_t)); + memcpy(client_out->client_pk.public_key, + client->client_pk.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + + return client_out; +} + /* Helper: Return a newly allocated service object with the identity keypair * sets and the current descriptor. Then register it to the global map. * Caller should us hs_free_all() to free this service or remove it from the @@ -1869,6 +1885,126 @@ test_rendezvous1_parsing(void *arg) UNMOCK(relay_send_command_from_edge_); } +static void +test_authorized_client_config_equal(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + hs_service_config_t *config1, *config2; + + (void) arg; + + config1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*config1)); + config2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*config2)); + + /* Both configs are empty. */ + { + config1->clients = smartlist_new(); + config2->clients = smartlist_new(); + + ret = service_authorized_client_config_equal(config1, config2); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + service_clear_config(config1); + service_clear_config(config2); + } + + /* Both configs have exactly the same client config. */ + { + config1->clients = smartlist_new(); + config2->clients = smartlist_new(); + + hs_service_authorized_client_t *client1, *client2; + client1 = helper_create_authorized_client(); + client2 = helper_create_authorized_client(); + + smartlist_add(config1->clients, client1); + smartlist_add(config1->clients, client2); + + /* We should swap the order of clients here to test that the order + * does not matter. */ + smartlist_add(config2->clients, helper_clone_authorized_client(client2)); + smartlist_add(config2->clients, helper_clone_authorized_client(client1)); + + ret = service_authorized_client_config_equal(config1, config2); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + service_clear_config(config1); + service_clear_config(config2); + } + + /* The numbers of clients in both configs are not equal. */ + { + config1->clients = smartlist_new(); + config2->clients = smartlist_new(); + + hs_service_authorized_client_t *client1, *client2; + client1 = helper_create_authorized_client(); + client2 = helper_create_authorized_client(); + + smartlist_add(config1->clients, client1); + smartlist_add(config1->clients, client2); + + smartlist_add(config2->clients, helper_clone_authorized_client(client1)); + + ret = service_authorized_client_config_equal(config1, config2); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + service_clear_config(config1); + service_clear_config(config2); + } + + /* The first config has two distinct clients while the second config + * has two clients but they are duplicate. */ + { + config1->clients = smartlist_new(); + config2->clients = smartlist_new(); + + hs_service_authorized_client_t *client1, *client2; + client1 = helper_create_authorized_client(); + client2 = helper_create_authorized_client(); + + smartlist_add(config1->clients, client1); + smartlist_add(config1->clients, client2); + + smartlist_add(config2->clients, helper_clone_authorized_client(client1)); + smartlist_add(config2->clients, helper_clone_authorized_client(client1)); + + ret = service_authorized_client_config_equal(config1, config2); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + service_clear_config(config1); + service_clear_config(config2); + } + + /* Both configs have totally distinct clients. */ + { + config1->clients = smartlist_new(); + config2->clients = smartlist_new(); + + hs_service_authorized_client_t *client1, *client2, *client3, *client4; + client1 = helper_create_authorized_client(); + client2 = helper_create_authorized_client(); + client3 = helper_create_authorized_client(); + client4 = helper_create_authorized_client(); + + smartlist_add(config1->clients, client1); + smartlist_add(config1->clients, client2); + + smartlist_add(config2->clients, client3); + smartlist_add(config2->clients, client4); + + ret = service_authorized_client_config_equal(config1, config2); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + service_clear_config(config1); + service_clear_config(config2); + } + + done: + tor_free(config1); + tor_free(config2); +} + struct testcase_t hs_service_tests[] = { { "e2e_rend_circuit_setup", test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, @@ -1908,6 +2044,8 @@ struct testcase_t hs_service_tests[] = { NULL, NULL }, { "rendezvous1_parsing", test_rendezvous1_parsing, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "authorized_client_config_equal", test_authorized_client_config_equal, + TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES };

1 0

[tor/master] hs-v3: Rename client_pk to client_auth_pk
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 83c8419e73a82deeecf25e4f5c24a390c80cac33 Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue May 22 00:09:40 2018 +0700 hs-v3: Rename client_pk to client_auth_pk Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c | 9 +++++---- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h | 3 ++- src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c | 12 ++++++------ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c index be8e206c7..0cabe5036 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c @@ -2851,7 +2851,7 @@ hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(hs_desc_authorized_client_t *client_out) * cookie, build the auth client so we can then encode the descriptor for * publication. client_out must be already allocated. */ void -hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t *client_pk, +hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t *client_auth_pk, const curve25519_secret_key_t * auth_ephemeral_sk, const uint8_t *descriptor_cookie, @@ -2863,20 +2863,21 @@ hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t *client_pk, crypto_cipher_t *cipher; crypto_xof_t *xof; - tor_assert(client_pk); + tor_assert(client_auth_pk); tor_assert(auth_ephemeral_sk); tor_assert(descriptor_cookie); tor_assert(client_out); tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) auth_ephemeral_sk, sizeof(*auth_ephemeral_sk))); - tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) client_pk, sizeof(*client_pk))); + tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) client_auth_pk, + sizeof(*client_auth_pk))); tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) descriptor_cookie, HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN)); /* Calculate x25519(hs_y, client_X) */ curve25519_handshake(secret_seed, auth_ephemeral_sk, - client_pk); + client_auth_pk); /* Calculate KEYS = KDF(SECRET_SEED, 40) */ xof = crypto_xof_new(); diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h index 06d3bfe75..8ce5fd6a1 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h @@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ link_specifier_t *hs_desc_lspec_to_trunnel( void hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(hs_desc_authorized_client_t *client_out); -void hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t *client_pk, +void hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t * + client_auth_pk, const curve25519_secret_key_t * auth_ephemeral_sk, const uint8_t *descriptor_cookie, diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c index 50a073b41..de977599a 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c @@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg) uint8_t descriptor_cookie[HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN]; curve25519_secret_key_t auth_ephemeral_sk; curve25519_secret_key_t client_auth_sk; - curve25519_public_key_t client_pk; + curve25519_public_key_t client_auth_pk; const char ephemeral_sk_b16[] = "d023b674d993a5c8446bd2ca97e9961149b3c0e88c7dc14e8777744dd3468d6a"; const char descriptor_cookie_b16[] = @@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg) ret = curve25519_secret_key_generate(&client_auth_sk, 0); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - curve25519_public_key_generate(&client_pk, &client_auth_sk); + curve25519_public_key_generate(&client_auth_pk, &client_auth_sk); desc_client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_authorized_client_t)); @@ -898,15 +898,15 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg) descriptor_cookie_b16, strlen(descriptor_cookie_b16)); - base16_decode((char *) &client_pk, - sizeof(client_pk), + base16_decode((char *) &client_auth_pk, + sizeof(client_auth_pk), client_pubkey_b16, strlen(client_pubkey_b16)); MOCK(crypto_strongest_rand, mock_crypto_strongest_rand); - hs_desc_build_authorized_client(&client_pk, &auth_ephemeral_sk, - descriptor_cookie, desc_client); + hs_desc_build_authorized_client(&client_auth_pk, &auth_ephemeral_sk, + descriptor_cookie, desc_client); test_memeq_hex((char *) desc_client->client_id, "b514ef67192cad5f");

1 0

[tor/master] hs-v3: Log client auth load activities service side
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 7ace28c952562386ebe795394a038cdcf8c1dd57 Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun Aug 19 19:37:38 2018 +0700 hs-v3: Log client auth load activities service side Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c index 87c28f620..8d5d69302 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -1141,6 +1141,7 @@ parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str) SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE, 0); /* Wrong number of fields. */ if (smartlist_len(fields) != 3) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "The file is in a wrong format."); goto err; } @@ -1148,9 +1149,15 @@ parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str) key_type = smartlist_get(fields, 1); pubkey_b32 = smartlist_get(fields, 2); - /* Currently, the only supported auth type is "descriptor" and the only - * supported key type is "x25519". */ - if (strcmp(auth_type, "descriptor") || strcmp(key_type, "x25519")) { + /* Currently, the only supported auth type is "descriptor". */ + if (strcmp(auth_type, "descriptor")) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "The auth type '%s' is not supported.", auth_type); + goto err; + } + + /* Currently, the only supported key type is "x25519". */ + if (strcmp(key_type, "x25519")) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "The key type '%s' is not supported.", key_type); goto err; } @@ -1168,6 +1175,7 @@ parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str) if (base32_decode((char *) client->client_pk.public_key, sizeof(client->client_pk.public_key), pubkey_b32, strlen(pubkey_b32)) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "The public key cannot be decoded."); goto err; } @@ -1233,27 +1241,36 @@ load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service) SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(file_list, const char *, filename) { hs_service_authorized_client_t *client = NULL; + log_info(LD_REND, "Loading a client authorization key file %s...", + filename); - if (client_filename_is_valid(filename)) { - /* Create a full path for a file. */ - client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(client_keys_dir_path, - filename); - client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL); - /* Free immediately after using it. */ - tor_free(client_key_file_path); + if (!client_filename_is_valid(filename)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "The filename is invalid."); + continue; + } - /* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */ - if (!client_key_str) { - continue; - } + /* Create a full path for a file. */ + client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(client_keys_dir_path, + filename); + client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL); + /* Free immediately after using it. */ + tor_free(client_key_file_path); + + /* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */ + if (!client_key_str) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "The file cannot be read."); + continue; + } - client = parse_authorized_client(client_key_str); - /* Free immediately after using it. */ - tor_free(client_key_str); + client = parse_authorized_client(client_key_str); + /* Wipe and free immediately after using it. */ + memwipe(client_key_str, 0, strlen(client_key_str)); + tor_free(client_key_str); - if (client) { - smartlist_add(config->clients, client); - } + if (client) { + smartlist_add(config->clients, client); + log_info(LD_REND, "Loaded a client authorization key file %s.", + filename); } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(filename);

1 0

[tor/master] hs-v3: Log client auth load activities client side
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 5b2871d2f2a541ad15541eebf9830b1e448dbfc2 Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun Aug 19 19:47:46 2018 +0700 hs-v3: Log client auth load activities client side Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index b178282c1..23ab10e21 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -1567,42 +1567,51 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, hs_client_service_authorization_t *auth = NULL; ed25519_public_key_t identity_pk; + log_info(LD_REND, "Loading a client authorization key file %s...", + filename); - if (auth_key_filename_is_valid(filename)) { - /* Create a full path for a file. */ - client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(key_dir, filename); - client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL); - /* Free the file path immediately after using it. */ - tor_free(client_key_file_path); - - /* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */ - if (!client_key_str) { - continue; - } + if (!auth_key_filename_is_valid(filename)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "The filename is invalid."); + continue; + } - auth = parse_auth_file_content(client_key_str); - /* Free immediately after using it. */ - tor_free(client_key_str); + /* Create a full path for a file. */ + client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(key_dir, filename); + client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL); + /* Free the file path immediately after using it. */ + tor_free(client_key_file_path); - if (auth) { - /* Parse the onion address to get an identity public key and use it - * as a key of global map in the future. */ - if (hs_parse_address(auth->onion_address, &identity_pk, - NULL, NULL) < 0) { - client_service_authorization_free(auth); - continue; - } + /* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */ + if (!client_key_str) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "The file cannot be read."); + continue; + } - if (digest256map_get(auths, identity_pk.pubkey)) { - client_service_authorization_free(auth); + auth = parse_auth_file_content(client_key_str); + /* Free immediately after using it. */ + tor_free(client_key_str); + + if (auth) { + /* Parse the onion address to get an identity public key and use it + * as a key of global map in the future. */ + if (hs_parse_address(auth->onion_address, &identity_pk, + NULL, NULL) < 0) { + client_service_authorization_free(auth); + log_warn(LD_REND, "The onion address is invalid."); + continue; + } - log_warn(LD_REND, "Duplicate authorization for the same hidden " - "service."); - goto end; - } + if (digest256map_get(auths, identity_pk.pubkey)) { + client_service_authorization_free(auth); - digest256map_set(auths, identity_pk.pubkey, auth); + log_warn(LD_REND, "Duplicate authorization for the same hidden " + "service."); + goto end; } + + digest256map_set(auths, identity_pk.pubkey, auth); + log_info(LD_REND, "Loaded a client authorization key file %s.", + filename); } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(filename);

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[tor/master] hs-v3: Improve v3 client authorization logging
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 8e57986e7d826141727fc3d538b33882dc4aca91 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Aug 30 09:16:48 2018 -0400 hs-v3: Improve v3 client authorization logging Part of #20700. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 14 ++++++++------ src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index 23ab10e21..af657c7c9 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -1571,7 +1571,9 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, filename); if (!auth_key_filename_is_valid(filename)) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "The filename is invalid."); + log_notice(LD_REND, "Client authorization unrecognized filename %s. " + "File must end in .auth_private. Ignoring.", + filename); continue; } @@ -1583,7 +1585,7 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, /* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */ if (!client_key_str) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "The file cannot be read."); + log_warn(LD_REND, "The file %s cannot be read.", filename); continue; } @@ -1597,15 +1599,16 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, if (hs_parse_address(auth->onion_address, &identity_pk, NULL, NULL) < 0) { client_service_authorization_free(auth); - log_warn(LD_REND, "The onion address is invalid."); + log_warn(LD_REND, "The onion address \"%s\" is invalid in " + "file %s", filename, auth->onion_address); continue; } if (digest256map_get(auths, identity_pk.pubkey)) { client_service_authorization_free(auth); - log_warn(LD_REND, "Duplicate authorization for the same hidden " - "service."); + "service address %s.", + safe_str_client(auth->onion_address)); goto end; } @@ -1613,7 +1616,6 @@ hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options, log_info(LD_REND, "Loaded a client authorization key file %s.", filename); } - } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(filename); /* Success. */ diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c index 8d5d69302..09329340c 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str) SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE, 0); /* Wrong number of fields. */ if (smartlist_len(fields) != 3) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "The file is in a wrong format."); + log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown format of client authorization file."); goto err; } @@ -1151,13 +1151,15 @@ parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str) /* Currently, the only supported auth type is "descriptor". */ if (strcmp(auth_type, "descriptor")) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "The auth type '%s' is not supported.", auth_type); + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization auth type '%s' not supported.", + auth_type); goto err; } /* Currently, the only supported key type is "x25519". */ if (strcmp(key_type, "x25519")) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "The key type '%s' is not supported.", key_type); + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization key type '%s' not supported.", + key_type); goto err; } @@ -1175,7 +1177,8 @@ parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str) if (base32_decode((char *) client->client_pk.public_key, sizeof(client->client_pk.public_key), pubkey_b32, strlen(pubkey_b32)) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "The public key cannot be decoded."); + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization public key cannot be decoded: %s", + pubkey_b32); goto err; } @@ -1245,7 +1248,8 @@ load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service) filename); if (!client_filename_is_valid(filename)) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "The filename is invalid."); + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization unrecognized filename %s. " + "File must end in .auth. Ignoring.", filename); continue; } @@ -1258,7 +1262,9 @@ load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service) /* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */ if (!client_key_str) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "The file cannot be read."); + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization file %s can't be read. " + "Corrupted or verify permission? Ignoring.", + client_key_file_path); continue; }

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