September 2018 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.3.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 36885f34f6e8dc7f5791e4ba2c4eefff5f9de9e0 Merge: cdaf9aec8 da29074fc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Sep 7 15:11:49 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.2 "ours" to avoid bump

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[tor/maint-0.3.2] Bump to 0.3.2.12
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit cdaf9aec8e7d81fb583075c9486f4af4216ded94 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Sep 7 15:11:07 2018 -0400 Bump to 0.3.2.12 --- configure.ac | 2 +- contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +- src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 79d2f7e54..5b541d7c9 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information AC_PREREQ([2.63]) -AC_INIT([tor],[0.3.2.10-dev]) +AC_INIT([tor],[0.3.2.12]) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/or/main.c]) AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4]) diff --git a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in index 7f2220153..8c84e3659 100644 --- a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ !include "LogicLib.nsh" !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.3.2.10-dev" +!define VERSION "0.3.2.12" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index f5186fd24..fcdc090d4 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.3.2.10-dev" +#define VERSION "0.3.2.12"

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[tor/master] bug: Use PATH_SEPARATOR instead of slash
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 5e1d36c7db50d977c4a9a1ed9e80ac9800a6077e Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Sep 3 03:19:24 2018 +0700 bug: Use PATH_SEPARATOR instead of slash In function get_fname_suffix, previously it uses /, but in fact it should use PATH_SEPARATOR. --- src/test/testing_common.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/testing_common.c b/src/test/testing_common.c index 3880bca9c..56cac99eb 100644 --- a/src/test/testing_common.c +++ b/src/test/testing_common.c @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ get_fname_suffix(const char *name, const char *suffix) setup_directory(); if (!name) return temp_dir; - tor_snprintf(buf,sizeof(buf),"%s/%s%s%s",temp_dir,name,suffix ? "_" : "", - suffix ? suffix : ""); + tor_snprintf(buf,sizeof(buf),"%s%s%s%s%s", temp_dir, PATH_SEPARATOR, name, + suffix ? "_" : "", suffix ? suffix : ""); return buf; }

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[tor/master] HSv3: Add subcredential in client auth KDF on the client-side.
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 6583d1e7091ba368b66c6f3038df223d3b7652cb Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Thu Sep 6 16:25:31 2018 +0300 HSv3: Add subcredential in client auth KDF on the client-side. --- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c | 14 ++++++++------ src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c index f34685e23..d0cdffdf1 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c @@ -1427,13 +1427,15 @@ decrypt_descriptor_cookie(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, sizeof(desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey))); tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) client_auth_sk, sizeof(*client_auth_sk))); + tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) desc->subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN)); /* Calculate x25519(client_x, hs_Y) */ curve25519_handshake(secret_seed, client_auth_sk, &desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey); - /* Calculate KEYS = KDF(SECRET_SEED, 40) */ + /* Calculate KEYS = KDF(subcredential | SECRET_SEED, 40) */ xof = crypto_xof_new(); + crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, desc->subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN); crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, secret_seed, sizeof(secret_seed)); crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, keystream, sizeof(keystream)); crypto_xof_free(xof); @@ -2539,9 +2541,8 @@ hs_desc_decode_plaintext(const char *encoded, } /* Fully decode an encoded descriptor and set a newly allocated descriptor - * object in desc_out. Subcredentials are used if not NULL else it's ignored. - * Client secret key is used to decrypt the "encrypted" section if not NULL - * else it's ignored. + * object in desc_out. Client secret key is used to decrypt the "encrypted" + * section if not NULL else it's ignored. * * Return 0 on success. A negative value is returned on error and desc_out is * set to NULL. */ @@ -2558,8 +2559,9 @@ hs_desc_decode_descriptor(const char *encoded, desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_descriptor_t)); - /* Subcredentials are optional. */ - if (BUG(!subcredential)) { + /* Subcredentials are not optional. */ + if (BUG(!subcredential || + tor_mem_is_zero((char*)subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN))) { log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Tried to decrypt without subcred. Impossible!"); goto err; } diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h index 9d447105f..adfb94dea 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h @@ -303,7 +303,8 @@ link_specifier_t *hs_desc_lspec_to_trunnel( const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *spec); hs_desc_authorized_client_t *hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(void); -void hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t * +void hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const uint8_t *subcredential, + const curve25519_public_key_t * client_auth_pk, const curve25519_secret_key_t * auth_ephemeral_sk,

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[tor/master] hs-v3: Make hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client() return an object
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit c76d00abfa779059b2936e5b84c032d0e36726d4 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 5 13:37:37 2018 -0400 hs-v3: Make hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client() return an object Return a newly allocated fake client authorization object instead of taking the object as a parameter. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------ src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h | 3 +-- src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 6 ++---- src/test/hs_test_helpers.c | 6 ++---- src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c | 3 +-- 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c index 0cabe5036..9c3d4fc96 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c @@ -2833,18 +2833,22 @@ hs_desc_intro_point_free_(hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip) tor_free(ip); } -/* Build a fake client info for the descriptor */ -void -hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(hs_desc_authorized_client_t *client_out) -{ - tor_assert(client_out); - - crypto_rand((char *) client_out->client_id, - sizeof(client_out->client_id)); - crypto_rand((char *) client_out->iv, - sizeof(client_out->iv)); - crypto_rand((char *) client_out->encrypted_cookie, - sizeof(client_out->encrypted_cookie)); +/* Allocate and build a new fake client info for the descriptor. Return a + * newly allocated object. This can't fail. */ +hs_desc_authorized_client_t * +hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(void) +{ + hs_desc_authorized_client_t *client_auth = + tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*client_auth)); + + crypto_rand((char *) client_auth->client_id, + sizeof(client_auth->client_id)); + crypto_rand((char *) client_auth->iv, + sizeof(client_auth->iv)); + crypto_rand((char *) client_auth->encrypted_cookie, + sizeof(client_auth->encrypted_cookie)); + + return client_auth; } /* Using the client public key, auth ephemeral secret key, and descriptor diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h index 8ce5fd6a1..9d447105f 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h @@ -302,8 +302,7 @@ void hs_desc_authorized_client_free_(hs_desc_authorized_client_t *client); link_specifier_t *hs_desc_lspec_to_trunnel( const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *spec); -void -hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(hs_desc_authorized_client_t *client_out); +hs_desc_authorized_client_t *hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(void); void hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t * client_auth_pk, const curve25519_secret_key_t * diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c index 09329340c..79ef0a35e 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -1786,10 +1786,8 @@ build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service, } for (i = 0; i < num_clients_to_add; i++) { - hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client; - desc_client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_authorized_client_t)); - - hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(desc_client); + hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client = + hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(); smartlist_add(superencrypted->clients, desc_client); } diff --git a/src/test/hs_test_helpers.c b/src/test/hs_test_helpers.c index f8c582afc..4e13ba43a 100644 --- a/src/test/hs_test_helpers.c +++ b/src/test/hs_test_helpers.c @@ -138,10 +138,8 @@ hs_helper_build_hs_desc_impl(unsigned int no_ip, desc->superencrypted_data.clients = smartlist_new(); for (i = 0; i < HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE; i++) { - hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client; - desc_client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_authorized_client_t)); - - hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(desc_client); + hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client = + hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(); smartlist_add(desc->superencrypted_data.clients, desc_client); } diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c index de977599a..be7932cd2 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c @@ -412,8 +412,7 @@ test_decode_descriptor(void *arg) /* We need to add fake auth clients here. */ for (i=0; i < 15; ++i) { - fake_client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_authorized_client_t)); - hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(fake_client); + fake_client = hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(); smartlist_add(clients, fake_client); } desc->superencrypted_data.clients = clients;

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/ticket20700_035_03'
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 9ca1af9a8757ee73cf4018263cb3ae2340ebaa9f Merge: 13d0855a8 3695ef634 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Sep 7 15:03:32 2018 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/ticket20700_035_03' src/app/config/config.c | 7 +- src/app/config/or_options_st.h | 2 + src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 266 +++++++++- src/feature/hs/hs_client.h | 24 + src/feature/hs/hs_config.c | 27 + src/feature/hs/hs_config.h | 1 + src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c | 1046 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h | 84 +++- src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 525 +++++++++++++++++++- src/feature/hs/hs_service.h | 36 ++ src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.c | 4 +- src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h | 2 +- src/test/fuzz/fuzz_hsdescv3.c | 4 +- src/test/hs_test_helpers.c | 43 ++ src/test/test_hs_cache.c | 20 +- src/test/test_hs_client.c | 178 ++++++- src/test/test_hs_common.c | 6 +- src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c | 262 ++++++---- src/test/test_hs_service.c | 459 +++++++++++++++++ src/test/testing_common.c | 4 +- 20 files changed, 2560 insertions(+), 440 deletions(-) diff --cc src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.c index 78471bf39,554777cf5..313d829a5 --- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.c +++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.c @@@ -335,16 -319,14 +335,16 @@@ crypto_strongest_rand_raw(uint8_t *out * Try to get <b>out_len</b> bytes of the strongest entropy we can generate, * storing it into <b>out</b>. **/ - void - crypto_strongest_rand(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) + MOCK_IMPL(void, + crypto_strongest_rand,(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len)) { -#define DLEN SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH +#define DLEN DIGEST512_LEN + /* We're going to hash DLEN bytes from the system RNG together with some - * bytes from the openssl PRNG, in order to yield DLEN bytes. + * bytes from the PRNGs from our crypto librar(y/ies), in order to yield + * DLEN bytes. */ - uint8_t inp[DLEN*2]; + uint8_t inp[DLEN*3]; uint8_t tmp[DLEN]; tor_assert(out); while (out_len) {

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[tor/master] HSv3: Add subcredential in client auth KDF on the service-side.
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 1e9428dc618250ba7a64f5e2e0451a9da9c75853 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Thu Sep 6 16:07:27 2018 +0300 HSv3: Add subcredential in client auth KDF on the service-side. Also update some client auth test vectors that broke... --- src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c | 15 ++++++++++----- src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 11 ++++++++++- src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c index 9c3d4fc96..f34685e23 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c @@ -2851,11 +2851,12 @@ hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(void) return client_auth; } -/* Using the client public key, auth ephemeral secret key, and descriptor - * cookie, build the auth client so we can then encode the descriptor for - * publication. client_out must be already allocated. */ +/* Using the service's subcredential, client public key, auth ephemeral secret + * key, and descriptor cookie, build the auth client so we can then encode the + * descriptor for publication. client_out must be already allocated. */ void -hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t *client_auth_pk, +hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const uint8_t *subcredential, + const curve25519_public_key_t *client_auth_pk, const curve25519_secret_key_t * auth_ephemeral_sk, const uint8_t *descriptor_cookie, @@ -2871,20 +2872,24 @@ hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t *client_auth_pk, tor_assert(auth_ephemeral_sk); tor_assert(descriptor_cookie); tor_assert(client_out); + tor_assert(subcredential); tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) auth_ephemeral_sk, sizeof(*auth_ephemeral_sk))); tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) client_auth_pk, sizeof(*client_auth_pk))); tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) descriptor_cookie, HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN)); + tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) subcredential, + DIGEST256_LEN)); /* Calculate x25519(hs_y, client_X) */ curve25519_handshake(secret_seed, auth_ephemeral_sk, client_auth_pk); - /* Calculate KEYS = KDF(SECRET_SEED, 40) */ + /* Calculate KEYS = KDF(subcredential | SECRET_SEED, 40) */ xof = crypto_xof_new(); + crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN); crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, secret_seed, sizeof(secret_seed)); crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, keystream, sizeof(keystream)); crypto_xof_free(xof); diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c index 79ef0a35e..43e5626a5 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -1744,10 +1744,18 @@ build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service, /* The ephemeral key pair is already generated, so this should not give * an error. */ + if (BUG(!curve25519_public_key_is_ok(&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey))) { + return -1; + } memcpy(&superencrypted->auth_ephemeral_pubkey, &desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t)); + /* Test that subcred is not zero because we might use it below */ + if (BUG(tor_mem_is_zero((char*)desc->desc->subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN))) { + return -1; + } + /* Create a smartlist to store clients */ superencrypted->clients = smartlist_new(); @@ -1761,7 +1769,8 @@ build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service, /* Prepare the client for descriptor and then add to the list in the * superencrypted part of the descriptor */ - hs_desc_build_authorized_client(&client->client_pk, + hs_desc_build_authorized_client(desc->desc->subcredential, + &client->client_pk, &desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.seckey, desc->descriptor_cookie, desc_client); smartlist_add(superencrypted->clients, desc_client); diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c index be7932cd2..4889281cb 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c @@ -400,12 +400,16 @@ test_decode_descriptor(void *arg) memcpy(&desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey, &auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + hs_helper_get_subcred_from_identity_keypair(&signing_kp, + subcredential); + /* Build and add the auth client to the descriptor. */ clients = desc->superencrypted_data.clients; if (!clients) { clients = smartlist_new(); } - hs_desc_build_authorized_client(&client_kp.pubkey, + hs_desc_build_authorized_client(subcredential, + &client_kp.pubkey, &auth_ephemeral_kp.seckey, descriptor_cookie, client); smartlist_add(clients, client); @@ -418,8 +422,6 @@ test_decode_descriptor(void *arg) desc->superencrypted_data.clients = clients; /* Test the encoding/decoding in the following lines. */ - hs_helper_get_subcred_from_identity_keypair(&signing_kp, - subcredential); tor_free(encoded); ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &signing_kp, descriptor_cookie, &encoded); @@ -874,6 +876,7 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg) "07d087f1d8c68393721f6e70316d3b29"; const char client_pubkey_b16[] = "8c1298fa6050e372f8598f6deca32e27b0ad457741422c2629ebb132cf7fae37"; + uint8_t subcredential[DIGEST256_LEN]; char *mem_op_hex_tmp=NULL; (void) arg; @@ -885,6 +888,8 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg) tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); curve25519_public_key_generate(&client_auth_pk, &client_auth_sk); + memset(subcredential, 42, sizeof(subcredential)); + desc_client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_authorized_client_t)); base16_decode((char *) &auth_ephemeral_sk, @@ -904,15 +909,16 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg) MOCK(crypto_strongest_rand, mock_crypto_strongest_rand); - hs_desc_build_authorized_client(&client_auth_pk, &auth_ephemeral_sk, + hs_desc_build_authorized_client(subcredential, + &client_auth_pk, &auth_ephemeral_sk, descriptor_cookie, desc_client); test_memeq_hex((char *) desc_client->client_id, - "b514ef67192cad5f"); + "EC19B7FF4D2DDA13"); test_memeq_hex((char *) desc_client->iv, "01010101010101010101010101010101"); test_memeq_hex((char *) desc_client->encrypted_cookie, - "46860a9df37b9f6d708E0D7E730C10C1"); + "B21222BE13F385F355BD07B2381F9F29"); done: tor_free(desc_client);

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[tor/master] HSv3: Don't assert when reading bad client-side privkeys.
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 3695ef6343fa1c05cd15a3ddf35c3fe6991ff2ad Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Fri Sep 7 18:06:44 2018 +0300 HSv3: Don't assert when reading bad client-side privkeys. --- src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 6 ++++++ src/test/test_hs_client.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index af657c7c9..6f031eb3b 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -1500,6 +1500,12 @@ parse_auth_file_content(const char *client_key_str) goto err; } + if (strlen(seckey_b32) != BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization encoded base32 private key " + "length is invalid: %s", seckey_b32); + goto err; + } + auth = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_client_service_authorization_t)); if (base32_decode((char *) auth->enc_seckey.secret_key, sizeof(auth->enc_seckey.secret_key), diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_client.c b/src/test/test_hs_client.c index eacbd328e..03d14924b 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_client.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_client.c @@ -660,7 +660,9 @@ test_parse_auth_file_content(void *arg) "x:zdsyvn2jq534ugyiuzgjy4267jbtzcjbsgedhshzx5mforyxtryq")); /* Some malformed string. */ tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("xx:descriptor:x25519:aa==")); - + /* Bigger key than it should be */ + tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("xx:descriptor:x25519:" + "vjqea4jbhwwc4hto7ekyvqfbeodghbaq6nxi45hz4wr3qvhqv3yqa")); done: tor_free(auth); }

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[tor/master] test: HS v3 loading client auth keys service side
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit 15af47ede07a858bfa0871befa6e1fe76cdd372d Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Aug 18 21:24:26 2018 +0700 test: HS v3 loading client auth keys service side Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 4 +- src/feature/hs/hs_service.h | 3 + src/test/test_hs_service.c | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c index d61b2809b..8d1ee82ab 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ load_service_keys(hs_service_t *service) /* Check if the client file name is valid or not. Return 1 if valid, * otherwise return 0. */ -static int +STATIC int client_filename_is_valid(const char *filename) { int ret = 1; @@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ client_filename_is_valid(const char *filename) * The <key-type> can only be "x25519". * * Return the key on success, return NULL, otherwise. */ -static hs_service_authorized_client_t * +STATIC hs_service_authorized_client_t * parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str) { char *auth_type = NULL; diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h index c64eb7763..cab9b41bc 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h @@ -349,6 +349,9 @@ STATIC hs_service_descriptor_t *service_desc_find_by_intro( const hs_service_t *service, const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip); /* Helper functions. */ +STATIC int client_filename_is_valid(const char *filename); +STATIC hs_service_authorized_client_t * +parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str); STATIC void get_objects_from_ident(const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident, hs_service_t **service, hs_service_intro_point_t **ip, diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_service.c b/src/test/test_hs_service.c index f8a465629..573c8bc56 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_service.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_service.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" #include "core/or/circuituse.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" +#include "lib/fs/dir.h" #include "feature/dirauth/dirvote.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" #include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" @@ -65,6 +66,13 @@ /* Trunnel */ #include "trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.h" +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include <sys/stat.h> +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include <unistd.h> +#endif + static networkstatus_t mock_ns; static networkstatus_t * @@ -303,6 +311,8 @@ test_load_keys(void *arg) /* It's in staging? */ tt_int_op(get_hs_service_staging_list_size(), OP_EQ, 1); +#undef conf_fmt + /* Load the keys for these. After that, the v3 service should be registered * in the global map. */ hs_service_load_all_keys(); @@ -322,6 +332,9 @@ test_load_keys(void *arg) tt_int_op(hs_address_is_valid(addr), OP_EQ, 1); tt_str_op(addr, OP_EQ, s->onion_address); + /* Check that the is_client_auth_enabled is not set. */ + tt_assert(!s->config.is_client_auth_enabled); + done: tor_free(hsdir_v2); tor_free(hsdir_v3); @@ -329,6 +342,184 @@ test_load_keys(void *arg) } static void +test_client_filename_is_valid(void *arg) +{ + (void) arg; + + /* Valid file name. */ + tt_assert(client_filename_is_valid("a.auth")); + /* Valid file name with special character. */ + tt_assert(client_filename_is_valid("a-.auth")); + /* Invalid extension. */ + tt_assert(!client_filename_is_valid("a.ath")); + /* Nothing before the extension. */ + tt_assert(!client_filename_is_valid(".auth")); + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_parse_authorized_client(void *arg) +{ + hs_service_authorized_client_t *client = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + /* Valid authorized client. */ + client = parse_authorized_client( + "descriptor:x25519:dz4q5xqlb4ldnbs72iarrml4ephk3du4i7o2cgiva5lwr6wkquja"); + tt_assert(client); + + /* Wrong number of fields. */ + tt_assert(!parse_authorized_client("a:b:c:d:e")); + /* Wrong auth type. */ + tt_assert(!parse_authorized_client( + "x:x25519:dz4q5xqlb4ldnbs72iarrml4ephk3du4i7o2cgiva5lwr6wkquja")); + /* Wrong key type. */ + tt_assert(!parse_authorized_client( + "descriptor:x:dz4q5xqlb4ldnbs72iarrml4ephk3du4i7o2cgiva5lwr6wkquja")); + /* Some malformed string. */ + tt_assert(!parse_authorized_client("descriptor:x25519:aa==")); + tt_assert(!parse_authorized_client("descriptor:")); + tt_assert(!parse_authorized_client("descriptor:x25519")); + tt_assert(!parse_authorized_client("descriptor:x25519:")); + tt_assert(!parse_authorized_client("")); + + done: + service_authorized_client_free(client); +} + +static char * +mock_read_file_to_str(const char *filename, int flags, struct stat *stat_out) +{ + char *ret = NULL; + + (void) flags; + (void) stat_out; + + if (!strcmp(filename, get_fname("hs3" PATH_SEPARATOR + "authorized_clients" PATH_SEPARATOR + "client1.auth"))) { + ret = tor_strdup("descriptor:x25519:" + "dz4q5xqlb4ldnbs72iarrml4ephk3du4i7o2cgiva5lwr6wkquja"); + goto done; + } + + if (!strcmp(filename, get_fname("hs3" PATH_SEPARATOR + "authorized_clients" PATH_SEPARATOR + "dummy.xxx"))) { + ret = tor_strdup("descriptor:x25519:" + "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"); + goto done; + } + + if (!strcmp(filename, get_fname("hs3" PATH_SEPARATOR + "authorized_clients" PATH_SEPARATOR + "client2.auth"))) { + ret = tor_strdup("descriptor:x25519:" + "okoi2gml3wd6x7jganlk5d66xxyjgg24sxw4y7javx4giqr66zta"); + goto done; + } + + done: + return ret; +} + +static smartlist_t * +mock_tor_listdir(const char *dirname) +{ + smartlist_t *file_list = smartlist_new(); + + (void) dirname; + + smartlist_add(file_list, tor_strdup("client1.auth")); + smartlist_add(file_list, tor_strdup("dummy.xxx")); + smartlist_add(file_list, tor_strdup("client2.auth")); + + return file_list; +} + +static void +test_load_keys_with_client_auth(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + char *conf = NULL; + smartlist_t *pubkey_b32_list = smartlist_new(); + char *hsdir_v3 = tor_strdup(get_fname("hs3")); + hs_service_t *service; + + (void) arg; + + hs_init(); + smartlist_add(pubkey_b32_list, tor_strdup( + "dz4q5xqlb4ldnbs72iarrml4ephk3du4i7o2cgiva5lwr6wkquja")); + smartlist_add(pubkey_b32_list, tor_strdup( + "okoi2gml3wd6x7jganlk5d66xxyjgg24sxw4y7javx4giqr66zta")); + +#define conf_fmt \ + "HiddenServiceDir %s\n" \ + "HiddenServiceVersion %d\n" \ + "HiddenServicePort 65534\n" + + tor_asprintf(&conf, conf_fmt, hsdir_v3, HS_VERSION_THREE); + ret = helper_config_service(conf); + tor_free(conf); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* It's in staging? */ + tt_int_op(get_hs_service_staging_list_size(), OP_EQ, 1); + +#undef conf_fmt + + MOCK(read_file_to_str, mock_read_file_to_str); + MOCK(tor_listdir, mock_tor_listdir); + + /* Load the keys for these. After that, the v3 service should be registered + * in the global map. */ + hs_service_load_all_keys(); + tt_int_op(get_hs_service_map_size(), OP_EQ, 1); + + service = get_first_service(); + tt_assert(service->config.clients); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(service->config.clients), OP_EQ, + smartlist_len(pubkey_b32_list)); + + /* Test that the is_client_auth_enabled flag is set. */ + tt_assert(service->config.is_client_auth_enabled); + + /* Test that the keys in clients are correct. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(pubkey_b32_list, char *, pubkey_b32) { + + curve25519_public_key_t pubkey; + /* This flag will be set if the key is found in clients. */ + int is_found = 0; + base32_decode((char *) pubkey.public_key, sizeof(pubkey.public_key), + pubkey_b32, strlen(pubkey_b32)); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(service->config.clients, + hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client) { + if (tor_memeq(&pubkey, &client->client_pk, sizeof(pubkey))) { + is_found = 1; + break; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(client); + + tt_assert(is_found); + + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(pubkey_b32); + + done: + if (pubkey_b32_list) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(pubkey_b32_list, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + } + smartlist_free(pubkey_b32_list); + tor_free(hsdir_v3); + hs_free_all(); + UNMOCK(read_file_to_str); + UNMOCK(tor_listdir); +} + +static void test_access_service(void *arg) { int ret; @@ -1561,6 +1752,12 @@ struct testcase_t hs_service_tests[] = { NULL, NULL }, { "load_keys", test_load_keys, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "client_filename_is_valid", test_client_filename_is_valid, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "parse_authorized_client", test_parse_authorized_client, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "load_keys_with_client_auth", test_load_keys_with_client_auth, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, { "access_service", test_access_service, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "service_intro_point", test_service_intro_point, TT_FORK,

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[tor/master] hs-v3: Load all client auth keys to the service
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '18

07 Sep '18

commit b894b40e647b4839f33f3a57704cafe9e644230c Author: Suphanat Chunhapanya <haxx.pop(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Aug 18 12:28:12 2018 +0700 hs-v3: Load all client auth keys to the service This commit loads all client public keys from every file in `authorized_clients/` directory. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 208 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/feature/hs/hs_service.h | 20 +++++ 2 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c index 30d01540f..d61b2809b 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ /* Onion service directory file names. */ static const char fname_keyfile_prefix[] = "hs_ed25519"; +static const char dname_client_pubkeys[] = "authorized_clients"; static const char fname_hostname[] = "hostname"; static const char address_tld[] = "onion"; @@ -103,6 +104,7 @@ static smartlist_t *hs_service_staging_list; static int consider_republishing_hs_descriptors = 0; /* Static declaration. */ +static int load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service); static void set_descriptor_revision_counter(hs_service_descriptor_t *hs_desc, time_t now, bool is_current); static void move_descriptors(hs_service_t *src, hs_service_t *dst); @@ -247,6 +249,11 @@ service_clear_config(hs_service_config_t *config) rend_service_port_config_free(p);); smartlist_free(config->ports); } + if (config->clients) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config->clients, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p, + service_authorized_client_free(p)); + smartlist_free(config->clients); + } memset(config, 0, sizeof(*config)); } @@ -1070,6 +1077,11 @@ load_service_keys(hs_service_t *service) goto end; } + /* Load all client authorization keys in the service. */ + if (load_client_keys(service) < 0) { + goto end; + } + /* Succes. */ ret = 0; end: @@ -1077,6 +1089,200 @@ load_service_keys(hs_service_t *service) return ret; } +/* Check if the client file name is valid or not. Return 1 if valid, + * otherwise return 0. */ +static int +client_filename_is_valid(const char *filename) +{ + int ret = 1; + const char *valid_extension = ".auth"; + + tor_assert(filename); + + /* The file extension must match and the total filename length can't be the + * length of the extension else we do not have a filename. */ + if (!strcmpend(filename, valid_extension) && + strlen(filename) != strlen(valid_extension)) { + ret = 1; + } else { + ret = 0; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* Parse an authorized client from a string. The format of a client string + * looks like (see rend-spec-v3.txt): + * + * <auth-type>:<key-type>:<base32-encoded-public-key> + * + * The <auth-type> can only be "descriptor". + * The <key-type> can only be "x25519". + * + * Return the key on success, return NULL, otherwise. */ +static hs_service_authorized_client_t * +parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str) +{ + char *auth_type = NULL; + char *key_type = NULL; + char *pubkey_b32 = NULL; + hs_service_authorized_client_t *client = NULL; + smartlist_t *fields = smartlist_new(); + + tor_assert(client_key_str); + + smartlist_split_string(fields, client_key_str, ":", + SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE, 0); + /* Wrong number of fields. */ + if (smartlist_len(fields) != 3) { + goto err; + } + + auth_type = smartlist_get(fields, 0); + key_type = smartlist_get(fields, 1); + pubkey_b32 = smartlist_get(fields, 2); + + /* Currently, the only supported auth type is "descriptor" and the only + * supported key type is "x25519". */ + if (strcmp(auth_type, "descriptor") || strcmp(key_type, "x25519")) { + goto err; + } + + /* We expect a specific length of the base32 encoded key so make sure we + * have that so we don't successfully decode a value with a different length + * and end up in trouble when copying the decoded key into a fixed length + * buffer. */ + if (strlen(pubkey_b32) != BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization encoded base32 public key " + "length is invalid: %s", pubkey_b32); + goto err; + } + + client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_authorized_client_t)); + if (base32_decode((char *) client->client_pk.public_key, + sizeof(client->client_pk.public_key), + pubkey_b32, strlen(pubkey_b32)) < 0) { + goto err; + } + + /* Success. */ + goto done; + + err: + service_authorized_client_free(client); + done: + /* It is also a good idea to wipe the public key. */ + if (pubkey_b32) { + memwipe(pubkey_b32, 0, strlen(pubkey_b32)); + } + if (fields) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(fields, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(fields); + } + return client; +} + +/* Load all the client public keys for the given service. Return 0 on + * success else -1 on failure. */ +static int +load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service) +{ + int ret = -1; + char *client_key_str = NULL; + char *client_key_file_path = NULL; + char *client_keys_dir_path = NULL; + hs_service_config_t *config; + smartlist_t *file_list = NULL; + + tor_assert(service); + + config = &service->config; + + /* Before calling this function, we already call load_service_keys to make + * sure that the directory exists with the right permission. So, if we + * cannot create a client pubkey key directory, we consider it as a bug. */ + client_keys_dir_path = hs_path_from_filename(config->directory_path, + dname_client_pubkeys); + if (BUG(hs_check_service_private_dir(get_options()->User, + client_keys_dir_path, + config->dir_group_readable, 1) < 0)) { + goto end; + } + + /* If the list of clients already exists, we must clear it first. */ + if (config->clients) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config->clients, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p, + service_authorized_client_free(p)); + smartlist_free(config->clients); + } + + config->clients = smartlist_new(); + + file_list = tor_listdir(client_keys_dir_path); + if (file_list == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization directory %s can't be listed.", + client_keys_dir_path); + goto end; + } + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(file_list, const char *, filename) { + hs_service_authorized_client_t *client = NULL; + + if (client_filename_is_valid(filename)) { + /* Create a full path for a file. */ + client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(client_keys_dir_path, + filename); + client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL); + /* Free immediately after using it. */ + tor_free(client_key_file_path); + + /* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */ + if (!client_key_str) { + continue; + } + + client = parse_authorized_client(client_key_str); + /* Free immediately after using it. */ + tor_free(client_key_str); + + if (client) { + smartlist_add(config->clients, client); + } + } + + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(filename); + + /* If the number of clients is greater than zero, set the flag to be true. */ + if (smartlist_len(config->clients) > 0) { + config->is_client_auth_enabled = 1; + } + + /* Success. */ + ret = 0; + end: + if (client_key_str) { + memwipe(client_key_str, 0, strlen(client_key_str)); + } + if (file_list) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(file_list, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(file_list); + } + tor_free(client_key_str); + tor_free(client_key_file_path); + tor_free(client_keys_dir_path); + return ret; +} + +STATIC void +service_authorized_client_free_(hs_service_authorized_client_t *client) +{ + if (!client) { + return; + } + memwipe(&client->client_pk, 0, sizeof(client->client_pk)); + tor_free(client); +} + /* Free a given service descriptor object and all key material is wiped. */ STATIC void service_descriptor_free_(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc) @@ -3281,6 +3487,7 @@ hs_service_lists_fnames_for_sandbox(smartlist_t *file_list, } service_add_fnames_to_list(service, file_list); smartlist_add_strdup(dir_list, service->config.directory_path); + smartlist_add_strdup(dir_list, dname_client_pubkeys); } FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END; } @@ -3451,7 +3658,6 @@ hs_service_load_all_keys(void) if (load_service_keys(service) < 0) { goto err; } - /* XXX: Load/Generate client authorization keys. (#20700) */ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(service); /* Final step, the staging list contains service in a quiescent state that diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h index 17c654ecf..c64eb7763 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h @@ -148,6 +148,12 @@ typedef struct hs_service_keys_t { unsigned int is_identify_key_offline : 1; } hs_service_keys_t; +/** Service side configuration of client authorization. */ +typedef struct hs_service_authorized_client_t { + /* The client auth public key used to encrypt the descriptor cookie. */ + curve25519_public_key_t client_pk; +} hs_service_authorized_client_t; + /* Service configuration. The following are set from the torrc options either * set by the configuration file or by the control port. Nothing else should * change those values. */ @@ -176,6 +182,13 @@ typedef struct hs_service_config_t { * HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints option. */ unsigned int num_intro_points; + /* True iff the client auth is enabled. */ + unsigned int is_client_auth_enabled : 1; + + /* List of hs_service_authorized_client_t's of clients that may access this + * service. Specified by HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient option. */ + smartlist_t *clients; + /* True iff we allow request made on unknown ports. Specified by * HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts option. */ unsigned int allow_unknown_ports : 1; @@ -356,6 +369,13 @@ STATIC void service_descriptor_free_(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc); #define service_descriptor_free(d) \ FREE_AND_NULL(hs_service_descriptor_t, \ service_descriptor_free_, (d)) + +STATIC void +service_authorized_client_free_(hs_service_authorized_client_t *client); +#define service_authorized_client_free(c) \ + FREE_AND_NULL(hs_service_authorized_client_t, \ + service_authorized_client_free_, (c)) + STATIC int write_address_to_file(const hs_service_t *service, const char *fname_);

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