September 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Add stream isolation support for HTTP CONNECT tunnels
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 53e4272b65514782d3f9a03afb7bffa8d55769dc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Aug 20 12:35:26 2017 -0400 Add stream isolation support for HTTP CONNECT tunnels I'm doing this using the Proxy-Authorization: header to support clients that understand it, and with a new tor-specific header that makes more sense for our use. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 98522218b..8d2b562d8 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -2412,7 +2412,20 @@ connection_ap_process_http_connect(entry_connection_t *conn) goto err; } - /* XXXX Look at headers */ + /* Abuse the 'username' and 'password' fields here. They are already an + * abuse. */ + { + char *authorization = http_get_header(headers, "Proxy-Authorization: "); + if (authorization) { + socks->username = authorization; // steal reference + socks->usernamelen = strlen(authorization); + } + char *isolation = http_get_header(headers, "X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: "); + if (isolation) { + socks->password = isolation; // steal reference + socks->passwordlen = strlen(isolation); + } + } socks->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT; socks->listener_type = CONN_TYPE_AP_HTTP_CONNECT_LISTENER;

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[fuzzing-corpora/master] Add corpus for HTTP CONNECT fuzzer
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 28bafe42cf75ab3aacdba89f82c5869a883689c5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 5 13:21:09 2017 -0400 Add corpus for HTTP CONNECT fuzzer --- .../01c18183897b12ddf2e7ae079c0438952c0fff1c | 5 + .../0204327771194b889199931725758a9b67d23398 | Bin 0 -> 254 bytes .../0550320eab3bb88bffa5361a7047b888c46d3e88 | 15 +++ .../0668d30a71ea9e904161a038ca2d19789619d2e5 | Bin 0 -> 183 bytes .../0807bfe9e496208243c7233e9087f8804ad72c72 | Bin 0 -> 35 bytes .../0827afc35d6ec9999bbae9a6dfbb47263a757f0a | 5 + .../0a381a7cccaa40291e07e19583b394091627b229 | 8 ++ .../0cb8b4c62145e503b1feb71ce6e180d06fa5e070 | 3 + .../0dc6caf0b3622e807136c558e7376f9863c6d150 | 2 + .../0fe3a38edb2258c0b2210c478b40174f18fe2298 | Bin 0 -> 103 bytes .../0feedd7bd535ebc0cf09ed2abee45268626c0d10 | Bin 0 -> 128 bytes .../107027609698ffc2c8f918556338f1179965d606 | 5 + .../11604703452a744f2130aced1fe43e421d2f30b5 | 5 + .../13284cfc5b4a33d9af0088f65b15dd540ef63be3 | 4 + .../133b056e3429eb676781ba91cbd84c24d5bbdbe2 | Bin 0 -> 89 bytes .../1652f91b18ed932d40871635465e7a6d2cfb215c | Bin 0 -> 103 bytes .../17ad9e1edc0c72dfb593d68fad8cbb327f00a826 | Bin 0 -> 192 bytes .../1854c107d98b8f23a4a67059fda9e7e813a00992 | 5 + .../19cfdac9a07654bde8328583acdcc35dc8959a82 | 5 + .../19f0a3af5f75a55b242df89f49981fa9b1db5179 | 3 + .../1ac6b760c1aa1864d305171696bed4b49dd907c9 | Bin 0 -> 110 bytes .../1b54e5d224dc5a0b4b10dbbbedc552df105b82a8 | Bin 0 -> 133 bytes .../1b77e74ae9ea6a7cb89fc8f940cc1b98717b8573 | Bin 0 -> 183 bytes .../1ba46542540b0994cb1ba7edff33a7a26b51967d | 5 + .../1d209d78a1527dbdd43b76ef4afcb2905cea8f39 | 4 + .../20fac59be48c39725f654700330ce9b3ede81e44 | Bin 0 -> 235 bytes .../21b7f96e7c910b06510df68a3f10a2289d57c5f2 | 5 + .../24c8d6ffaa8eef26779c68e142059da2f90c81cc | Bin 0 -> 183 bytes .../273cf59465a69c7e9f68a41f2ea8a64cb33b209a | 5 + .../280a92ca34431b8866e0ae9e74079b84f81ebf54 | Bin 0 -> 159 bytes .../282a172e8252740b6506e40f3a3f292153c03c80 | 5 + .../2f534a3dc8055868d880f484027e77b087f4cd24 | Bin 0 -> 103 bytes .../310adc56c6dab852b71c727f4806836bb2b97016 | 3 + .../318241d2bf48db0e432defbc728bc9a827fdb5b9 | 16 +++ .../34195a7cfd872b3b3a9ac2b50eb439cf042bc0ca | Bin 0 -> 103 bytes .../34aa6059b179ddc43aa55508813e2b37a4aedecd | 4 + .../34e19006fbbf54dea269c907c642c0bd218bc562 | 4 + .../35aa2da6f586620671320a3d4a037652f223b5a9 | Bin 0 -> 47 bytes .../362361698c84abebc86b5a32f02f3b68440d2745 | 5 + .../3884730de4c9a42f42899aff9c2122da6edc513e | 5 + .../38f5e8e60dce6e2f2ca5c5992ba67964a8bf22d9 | 4 + .../3ca4301e3c8edef3285a2815ffbe25fffdb8c230 | 4 + .../3df6802e1dbbf8334e95e50a65cad78a1b4a7b6c | 5 + .../4086d6f132c2d5ed2158a11e207933f2b16ce9d6 | Bin 0 -> 91 bytes .../4121047534532f9880a9f072ecf2a275ef5f06a1 | Bin 0 -> 82 bytes .../4197392a9d04a762ca3947a915e1f3af5838773e | 5 + .../4553b5f8c00c5e8c49a60a30601f85ec40544fe3 | Bin 0 -> 101 bytes .../45db3b0a31151407ac54531dd1c3d9a2fc4b8080 | 4 + .../47aa38e658cde9512b373ac2cb71e2a58894655e | 5 + .../49444f646cea20b6a1e8217bcd29cc04942c16ad | 4 + .../4a774c336b3c26e284d68bc6f20f76a1a48386c4 | 8 ++ .../4b66fd8cf6d25a229dddb7c5d4bae263e2d8ee75 | Bin 0 -> 259 bytes .../4eb11e1a3fbe6ff1b211362f1725b43deedbee54 | 4 + .../4ef06cf8683f33b68225a4d9cdd8dbbb75e1aa7b | Bin 0 -> 85 bytes .../5012ada5b37b81206bc9b0e185c80021624803d3 | Bin 0 -> 92 bytes .../5065b86344e7fc63d7649a12176fa05bb5157b60 | 2 + .../528b924b7aad2225c17b6f7324652394e3427353 | Bin 0 -> 103 bytes .../52b7805edb4adb5b5a2c1a40a3bf9b9674fee1cf | 4 + .../52d2db4e4b4c28d2764104afa93cd5ecf70d0938 | Bin 0 -> 213 bytes .../571d32b0992cbc15a879677afa5d733ca3523c37 | Bin 0 -> 92 bytes .../5728dac1e4332f0c6980576777b112bdf39eb861 | Bin 0 -> 90 bytes .../5877c8327e1dea084e140c0d9962fa5ce737980c | 5 + .../5991c6ed2fd27c92018ef7db13cb6e2a7c1d8e1d | 5 + .../5c6183b1114d4dd5799065575e02af9dbd331d8b | 7 ++ .../5e22c80c22d2c65d4037bf4d754bccddd5dc742d | 6 + .../5f0452164d398de96abf390a621fae26134f8be6 | Bin 0 -> 238 bytes .../5fa318a65f6ec6b356b3a5d415251a7f437785d4 | 3 + .../62da8128064753f2821dc87fe9d8096ba5c182d9 | 5 + .../62e848444405344e42d7a340661dd8865f52fd0b | 5 + .../65c7352efa0f2a74dfd2ff04c59af2868dacc7b0 | 5 + .../6712a9566733c40e8458f52801339b7b4a82f4a6 | 4 + .../671add1d204f3827efb5a4960d01e51cbe4db6f8 | 2 + .../6836dc296727a6ccb10fe66e031b521dc7a1e1a9 | Bin 0 -> 254 bytes .../6b91b4bddfca8d3436a4a27b49b24cd69fbea70c | 6 + .../6bf06f53d134a68799894ff8abbd9bb04dd84746 | Bin 0 -> 90 bytes .../6ea5389ec7eec248c27ad657e9d2c9a52739d2ec | 4 + .../70b54207d6714f6b49eace7bfa79e3953194d926 | 3 + .../721770cd4055b4a30bb16fe56197db3e3a38140e | Bin 0 -> 56 bytes .../727a261b9f02e209655f335ea62c7f046fb8577e | 4 + .../7432a1de7c1cebb3cb68f7efecf1f7d7690d548d | 5 + .../76fe4409fbc795bba255faa34421ebdfd5eb4acc | Bin 0 -> 161 bytes .../771ed14d78252093b1665a8cbcaee58f6c31af79 | 5 + .../7784290374a4ba027e53bef98c0a8acb73615d8c | 2 + .../7a247be127bc84c51179c3102c6a305dbc2ff87f | Bin 0 -> 254 bytes .../7da329abda10b6aeefe0db4f29b9208bd83bd7ad | Bin 0 -> 90 bytes .../7dab4b99561add0a045e5809bbec667022993893 | 89 ++++++++++++++ .../7dbc4ef3d92afcedd504977cdb4107f9f582f54a | 3 + .../7f94afc181b5f6216b0b730146b1c9dfecdfe124 | 2 + .../8205157f66c2aeac9c2211cdff7effcf753ac733 | Bin 0 -> 90 bytes .../85f07a36860f0287418576aa0a243162fdb787a4 | 2 + .../89020c00c6025c6035cfb2b783e9f5752415886b | Bin 0 -> 251 bytes .../8a59e92e3e7fd3f11f899fa1a56a5cd0f27bc5ca | 6 + .../8b3cd839c2ffb964ddefc945bac85a564aea0f1e | Bin 0 -> 224 bytes .../8bbfa3d8ea8d5fd009b37de5ba97d409b2bba538 | 5 + .../8c57c5dda7c6e910c5c3ea162d16a693fd07846f | 5 + .../8dd05cf3db6417bfe8f3b91c3f9f22f0417d60c0 | Bin 0 -> 115 bytes .../92315d20f377cbc7ed574cc5da719235f64d29f1 | Bin 0 -> 259 bytes .../926bbf621c27b8cb2e82b7f19a9587ea5ea53be6 | 3 + .../a0c44b283c54f74f3c652ea4bf600256ab22b267 | Bin 0 -> 119 bytes .../a13331b6a1dd901b811671bb6d5fd0ca50b2646c | 2 + .../a1dd1f2f89af3274f9591b5d71d4991a7ca6f996 | Bin 0 -> 101 bytes .../a26e326ecb349c64552cef6b6413f996a457b21b | Bin 0 -> 259 bytes .../a33872aa3c2011161cac75e264a557eea7012d34 | 2 + .../a384e1d213543c5c63ceaf09e529ef5c30e0d061 | 5 + .../a3c517ee9a2659f2396bed3a9368545c402b1c64 | 5 + .../a5518846a7833d1ddca7cbf9585ef2557cda5b7b | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../a815784705fbe4dd9a0540545409d9f7f06f7ca8 | Bin 0 -> 91 bytes .../a870d92d5bfa884ae813262e95c914bedd5f1277 | 5 + .../a8ccd9d12995457fbd254432236f2c945d5fb498 | 5 + .../a967ebf19c7877d91b8f57f029ff9e8bf3f8d28a | 6 + .../aa589d72d93276da75f0fa67a2eadd5318b09d44 | 2 + .../aabbdecdda5a02052f00241e23dd5e58841ebfa7 | Bin 0 -> 254 bytes .../ab2a6395a300c67898a5b42239b959c92f82c84c | Bin 0 -> 66 bytes .../ab48ffd461d5eeeea3035c7fe2d1e2543cff79a3 | 3 + .../acc75e67e3362f01e7472a61ed0a7801b96544f4 | 5 + .../add1fc893fd94eda474dedd701de9a175c7bb7a4 | 4 + .../ade56b819b929ec0c75ccce71178756e7c33d4db | Bin 0 -> 76 bytes .../b02e917f142fac3b1c385108cf12fdbf6181caa0 | 2 + .../b47e79d753d78cf6b8834a4bdb3746f5230ec24f | 4 + .../b83411aae6e25cd657309c26ab7fcdd59ef21282 | 4 + .../bb4cef547b25ae80e7514ff82bf7bcb18874405c | 5 + .../bcc629f3491d7caf85e6bc8a59bffcc527df6c2f | 5 + .../bf076782f3ef4892f35b5a9e61357b65d889028e | Bin 0 -> 91 bytes .../bfea677ac77611f7f9f46a58995945e61c300186 | 5 + .../c2c11e2312714bd72ab32d37abb612cc1cd3be7e | 4 + .../c366b32cc71afb73d2e15e91258d3ae740c7b27e | 2 + .../c4e0bf868eac0b8031ad88f142925a9f681ba341 | 4 + .../c6aa602baa30e8baf4852339710b612105fcc01e | 2 + .../c957220fb3dbf28027318f1e7515d8a965ce5755 | 5 + .../c96a41c195d70b8c7eaef6578f42aacaa09093f5 | Bin 0 -> 101 bytes .../c9bd4bc0d8fdeef1bb629a3e96e01e6958ad543b | 5 + .../c9e382a051bfbee347a28e7cb370002c65b67eb0 | 2 + .../cab32c3794fb89b6531d34003cdfc26a11e0793c | 5 + .../cbe32dabab228a83c2a96a7a69500305c6f1039a | 2 + .../ce13e1b77236d2d5e873fc04ab34acf7fc757876 | Bin 0 -> 35 bytes .../d09f37ce2dbf2584f54637851628d6526b8fbec5 | 4 + .../d2178a07b2984b269d931e59ac6d119f7c35ac46 | Bin 0 -> 133 bytes .../d31627b4d32fa7aa90ab3b7f5dcdca4ef96f75f7 | Bin 0 -> 73 bytes .../d491244aa07bf972890f8a141125dbddf59eae31 | Bin 0 -> 195 bytes .../d5364ca5d1643e0f9103da8025cffe96bfd8c1dc | Bin 0 -> 259 bytes .../d60d377d133ea617ce09b1899fed12f1ce698075 | Bin 0 -> 84 bytes .../d73013f42fb825a08b6fdf8d3995569a4089c722 | Bin 0 -> 259 bytes .../dbc05d1cae6356d6e6506bdf05c5194ebd69ea0e | Bin 0 -> 27 bytes .../deba37a585969a6a3569f6071425ac60d9ffd695 | 3 + .../debbc0a6122c2d51621cd2dd8f0248df8bffb870 | 2 + .../df7e42f580e0e79625d5dfde496366a820f8334c | 4 + .../e04af45b1c3ecc500bc055d35f11f857e5f497d5 | 5 + .../e2946cb8afae465ec45c6dacd6d5e36b39e450fc | Bin 0 -> 118 bytes .../e416be1adc2ca845191c50d764b902867d70e4d5 | 5 + .../e55922025a60d71a6015228d749bcb9cb40d55ac | 5 + .../e59fe11533af4bd8b6d8d93826483daa6df35acf | 4 + .../e6d49fc7babe19bc6a3091745888cc31d98df36e | 4 + .../e7f44dcfc79fc9d467daee72fce506fcd762e7dc | Bin 0 -> 100 bytes .../e89a64275cfaba4a8923ac00b22a9d6a60f8a071 | 5 + .../eac6c8d39f25cc73f1625414bd6331a7c43cdac1 | 3 + .../eb54af02c185ab2ff43ab824b9c076579ed494c1 | Bin 0 -> 133 bytes .../ebc7f2fb4264eb643095c27a0763a03d72156c9c | Bin 0 -> 259 bytes .../ec37d3b92de66f185a61412e1b08416d247a8f68 | 5 + .../ed325e61f469a38ca8136a336966d81ce44291cd | Bin 0 -> 219 bytes .../f112f94c9537989a0c5ac05ce5f678ec325fbe5b | 2 + .../f1ab8aa422dcc7628290ba11eb6a0b3cea9af444 | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++ .../f2ccc4da3ec05cb73bc1405444d7984030cc6cbd | 4 + .../f4e191c78391f614742ec4ef5604fc7235d3b857 | 6 + .../f671fc509cd86119a66f6613978bafa52291197a | 6 + .../f79ba51beca6ff1db13001fb17e9be0ad224d3eb | Bin 0 -> 117 bytes .../f7c63f92efe842caa6ee5da1dbb8ee2100e10344 | Bin 0 -> 191 bytes .../fbf294de62669f86818a2828150db39797a58fdb | Bin 0 -> 103 bytes .../fc76565938b6d26f96772aadc18a31c8490d3c72 | 1 + .../fec85951126304fb38f595dd1171182fcc7452ff | 4 + .../ff427a1b39d18e8d52514aafe097110d92ecfcfa | 5 + 170 files changed, 802 insertions(+) diff --git a/http-connect/01c18183897b12ddf2e7ae079c0438952c0fff1c b/http-connect/01c18183897b12ddf2e7ae079c0438952c0fff1c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5dd2b76 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/01c18183897b12ddf2e7ae079c0438952c0fff1c @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT le.com:'' HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Pro +X-baz + diff --git a/http-connect/0204327771194b889199931725758a9b67d23398 b/http-connect/0204327771194b889199931725758a9b67d23398 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2fba941 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/0204327771194b889199931725758a9b67d23398 differ diff --git a/http-connect/0550320eab3bb88bffa5361a7047b888c46d3e88 b/http-connect/0550320eab3bb88bffa5361a7047b888c46d3e88 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7e30c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/0550320eab3bb88bffa5361a7047b888c46d3e88 @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ + er.example.c +Cont0 +P oriz?tion: tion: ba +X-To/2.1 +:80 +Proxy-AuttAuttion: ba +X-To/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Auttr-S oriz?tion: ' oriz?tion: ba +oxy-AuthorizatiTn: latin: fobaz + +orizatiol@ bn: fobaz80 HTT0 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +P +Co - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/http-connect/0668d30a71ea9e904161a038ca2d19789619d2e5 b/http-connect/0668d30a71ea9e904161a038ca2d19789619d2e5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac67932 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/0668d30a71ea9e904161a038ca2d19789619d2e5 differ diff --git a/http-connect/0807bfe9e496208243c7233e9087f8804ad72c72 b/http-connect/0807bfe9e496208243c7233e9087f8804ad72c72 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c4ee901 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/0807bfe9e496208243c7233e9087f8804ad72c72 differ diff --git a/http-connect/0827afc35d6ec9999bbae9a6dfbb47263a757f0a b/http-connect/0827afc35d6ec9999bbae9a6dfbb47263a757f0a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c367ebe --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/0827afc35d6ec9999bbae9a6dfbb47263a757f0a @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:8Proxy-Authoriz HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-por-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/0a381a7cccaa40291e07e19583b394091627b229 b/http-connect/0a381a7cccaa40291e07e19583b394091627b229 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ea31625 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/0a381a7cccaa40291e07e19583b394091627b229 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: +X-Tor-StreÄm-Isola ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolattion: +X-Tor-Stream-Isola ba +Isolattionaz + diff --git a/http-connect/0cb8b4c62145e503b1feb71ce6e180d06fa5e070 b/http-connect/0cb8b4c62145e503b1feb71ce6e180d06fa5e070 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..40de8b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/0cb8b4c62145e503b1feb71ce6e180d06fa5e070 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + ' oriz?tion: ba +Xz + diff --git a/http-connect/0dc6caf0b3622e807136c558e7376f9863c6d150 b/http-connect/0dc6caf0b3622e807136c558e7376f9863c6d150 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..86ae167 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/0dc6caf0b3622e807136c558e7376f9863c6d150 @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT :¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿A¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿80 HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/0fe3a38edb2258c0b2210c478b40174f18fe2298 b/http-connect/0fe3a38edb2258c0b2210c478b40174f18fe2298 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0184434 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/0fe3a38edb2258c0b2210c478b40174f18fe2298 differ diff --git a/http-connect/0feedd7bd535ebc0cf09ed2abee45268626c0d10 b/http-connect/0feedd7bd535ebc0cf09ed2abee45268626c0d10 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2eebdad Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/0feedd7bd535ebc0cf09ed2abee45268626c0d10 differ diff --git a/http-connect/107027609698ffc2c8f918556338f1179965d606 b/http-connect/107027609698ffc2c8f918556338f1179965d606 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..861c691 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/107027609698ffc2c8f918556338f1179965d606 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:8 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/11604703452a744f2130aced1fe43e421d2f30b5 b/http-connect/11604703452a744f2130aced1fe43e421d2f30b5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b80e10a --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/11604703452a744f2130aced1fe43e421d2f30b5 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT xample.com:"" HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Pro +X-baz + diff --git a/http-connect/13284cfc5b4a33d9af0088f65b15dd540ef63be3 b/http-connect/13284cfc5b4a33d9af0088f65b15dd540ef63be3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..031a636 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/13284cfc5b4a33d9af0088f65b15dd540ef63be3 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server33333333333333333333333333333333333.ex'ample.cm:80Proxy-Authorizçççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorizat inao: b +X%Torÿÿÿream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/133b056e3429eb676781ba91cbd84c24d5bbdbe2 b/http-connect/133b056e3429eb676781ba91cbd84c24d5bbdbe2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b2d048 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/133b056e3429eb676781ba91cbd84c24d5bbdbe2 differ diff --git a/http-connect/1652f91b18ed932d40871635465e7a6d2cfb215c b/http-connect/1652f91b18ed932d40871635465e7a6d2cfb215c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f58170 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/1652f91b18ed932d40871635465e7a6d2cfb215c differ diff --git a/http-connect/17ad9e1edc0c72dfb593d68fad8cbb327f00a826 b/http-connect/17ad9e1edc0c72dfb593d68fad8cbb327f00a826 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..abd6187 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/17ad9e1edc0c72dfb593d68fad8cbb327f00a826 differ diff --git a/http-connect/1854c107d98b8f23a4a67059fda9e7e813a00992 b/http-connect/1854c107d98b8f23a4a67059fda9e7e813a00992 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..10cd4ef --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/1854c107d98b8f23a4a67059fda9e7e813a00992 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#ONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/19cfdac9a07654bde8328583acdcc35dc8959a82 b/http-connect/19cfdac9a07654bde8328583acdcc35dc8959a82 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..60571ef --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/19cfdac9a07654bde8328583acdcc35dc8959a82 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT .exampserver.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Promy-Authorization: ba +XCT seStream-Isÿlation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/19f0a3af5f75a55b242df89f49981fa9b1db5179 b/http-connect/19f0a3af5f75a55b242df89f49981fa9b1db5179 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c34dd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/19f0a3af5f75a55b242df89f49981fa9b1db5179 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +CONNECT 1.1ve:.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 r:80 +Proxy-Autation: ba JX-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/1ac6b760c1aa1864d305171696bed4b49dd907c9 b/http-connect/1ac6b760c1aa1864d305171696bed4b49dd907c9 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45a5abb Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/1ac6b760c1aa1864d305171696bed4b49dd907c9 differ diff --git a/http-connect/1b54e5d224dc5a0b4b10dbbbedc552df105b82a8 b/http-connect/1b54e5d224dc5a0b4b10dbbbedc552df105b82a8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ee5790 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/1b54e5d224dc5a0b4b10dbbbedc552df105b82a8 differ diff --git a/http-connect/1b77e74ae9ea6a7cb89fc8f940cc1b98717b8573 b/http-connect/1b77e74ae9ea6a7cb89fc8f940cc1b98717b8573 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9171e4 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/1b77e74ae9ea6a7cb89fc8f940cc1b98717b8573 differ diff --git a/http-connect/1ba46542540b0994cb1ba7edff33a7a26b51967d b/http-connect/1ba46542540b0994cb1ba7edff33a7a26b51967d new file mode 100644 index 0000000..47bb126 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/1ba46542540b0994cb1ba7edff33a7a26b51967d @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT le.com:00 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Pro +X-baz + diff --git a/http-connect/1d209d78a1527dbdd43b76ef4afcb2905cea8f39 b/http-connect/1d209d78a1527dbdd43b76ef4afcb2905cea8f39 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..974b79b --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/1d209d78a1527dbdd43b76ef4afcb2905cea8f39 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT 1:11.1ve:.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 r:80 +Proxy-Autation: ba JX-Tor-Stream-Isolation: .1 r:80 +Proxy-Autation: ba JP-Ta JP-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/20fac59be48c39725f654700330ce9b3ede81e44 b/http-connect/20fac59be48c39725f654700330ce9b3ede81e44 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..34d8ce5 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/20fac59be48c39725f654700330ce9b3ede81e44 differ diff --git a/http-connect/21b7f96e7c910b06510df68a3f10a2289d57c5f2 b/http-connect/21b7f96e7c910b06510df68a3f10a2289d57c5f2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1917b5f --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/21b7f96e7c910b06510df68a3f10a2289d57c5f2 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.± +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/24c8d6ffaa8eef26779c68e142059da2f90c81cc b/http-connect/24c8d6ffaa8eef26779c68e142059da2f90c81cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a06bd16 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/24c8d6ffaa8eef26779c68e142059da2f90c81cc differ diff --git a/http-connect/273cf59465a69c7e9f68a41f2ea8a64cb33b209a b/http-connect/273cf59465a69c7e9f68a41f2ea8a64cb33b209a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..daeb716 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/273cf59465a69c7e9f68a41f2ea8a64cb33b209a @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT le.com:6\''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Pro +X-baz + diff --git a/http-connect/280a92ca34431b8866e0ae9e74079b84f81ebf54 b/http-connect/280a92ca34431b8866e0ae9e74079b84f81ebf54 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aa13c5a Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/280a92ca34431b8866e0ae9e74079b84f81ebf54 differ diff --git a/http-connect/282a172e8252740b6506e40f3a3f292153c03c80 b/http-connect/282a172e8252740b6506e40f3a3f292153c03c80 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ffaff0 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/282a172e8252740b6506e40f3a3f292153c03c80 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT le.com:80 HTTP/1.11 +:80 +Pro +X-baz + diff --git a/http-connect/2f534a3dc8055868d880f484027e77b087f4cd24 b/http-connect/2f534a3dc8055868d880f484027e77b087f4cd24 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1a7a68f Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/2f534a3dc8055868d880f484027e77b087f4cd24 differ diff --git a/http-connect/310adc56c6dab852b71c727f4806836bb2b97016 b/http-connect/310adc56c6dab852b71c727f4806836bb2b97016 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1fd2d40 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/310adc56c6dab852b71c727f4806836bb2b97016 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +CONNECs ' oriz?tion: ba +Xz + diff --git a/http-connect/318241d2bf48db0e432defbc728bc9a827fdb5b9 b/http-connect/318241d2bf48db0e432defbc728bc9a827fdb5b9 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb499f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/318241d2bf48db0e432defbc728bc9a827fdb5b9 @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +ProZy-tion: ba +X-To/2.1 +:80 +Proxy-AuttAuttion: by-tion: ba +X-To/2.1 +:80 +Proxy-AuttAuttion: ba +X-To/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Auttr-St{eam-Isa +X-To/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Auttr-St{eam-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/34195a7cfd872b3b3a9ac2b50eb439cf042bc0ca b/http-connect/34195a7cfd872b3b3a9ac2b50eb439cf042bc0ca new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2af48f9 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/34195a7cfd872b3b3a9ac2b50eb439cf042bc0ca differ diff --git a/http-connect/34aa6059b179ddc43aa55508813e2b37a4aedecd b/http-connect/34aa6059b179ddc43aa55508813e2b37a4aedecd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9a8559 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/34aa6059b179ddc43aa55508813e2b37a4aedecd @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.ex'ample.cm:80*''''''''''''çççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxø-Authorization: ba +X%Torÿÿÿream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/34e19006fbbf54dea269c907c642c0bd218bc562 b/http-connect/34e19006fbbf54dea269c907c642c0bd218bc562 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e8232c --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/34e19006fbbf54dea269c907c642c0bd218bc562 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECserver.examo +Content-Length: oriz?tion: ' oriz?tion: ba +Xz + diff --git a/http-connect/35aa2da6f586620671320a3d4a037652f223b5a9 b/http-connect/35aa2da6f586620671320a3d4a037652f223b5a9 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c77fdf Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/35aa2da6f586620671320a3d4a037652f223b5a9 differ diff --git a/http-connect/362361698c84abebc86b5a32f02f3b68440d2745 b/http-connect/362361698c84abebc86b5a32f02f3b68440d2745 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57c24d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/362361698c84abebc86b5a32f02f3b68440d2745 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.exJmple.com:.exameeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee8ple.comeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee(eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolataon: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/3884730de4c9a42f42899aff9c2122da6edc513e b/http-connect/3884730de4c9a42f42899aff9c2122da6edc513e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..787457f --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/3884730de4c9a42f42899aff9c2122da6edc513e @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONN.1 +:80 +Pro +X-baz + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/http-connect/38f5e8e60dce6e2f2ca5c5992ba67964a8bf22d9 b/http-connect/38f5e8e60dce6e2f2ca5c5992ba67964a8bf22d9 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b440f9d --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/38f5e8e60dce6e2f2ca5c5992ba67964a8bf22d9 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.ex'ample.cm:80çççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X%Torÿÿÿream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/3ca4301e3c8edef3285a2815ffbe25fffdb8c230 b/http-connect/3ca4301e3c8edef3285a2815ffbe25fffdb8c230 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..269e513 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/3ca4301e3c8edef3285a2815ffbe25fffdb8c230 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.ex'ample.cm:80""""""""""çççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X%Torÿÿÿream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/3df6802e1dbbf8334e95e50a65cad78a1b4a7b6c b/http-connect/3df6802e1dbbf8334e95e50a65cad78a1b4a7b6c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96f34fd --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/3df6802e1dbbf8334e95e50a65cad78a1b4a7b6c @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-por-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/4086d6f132c2d5ed2158a11e207933f2b16ce9d6 b/http-connect/4086d6f132c2d5ed2158a11e207933f2b16ce9d6 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9407d2 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/4086d6f132c2d5ed2158a11e207933f2b16ce9d6 differ diff --git a/http-connect/4121047534532f9880a9f072ecf2a275ef5f06a1 b/http-connect/4121047534532f9880a9f072ecf2a275ef5f06a1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d44d192 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/4121047534532f9880a9f072ecf2a275ef5f06a1 differ diff --git a/http-connect/4197392a9d04a762ca3947a915e1f3af5838773e b/http-connect/4197392a9d04a762ca3947a915e1f3af5838773e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..201f0ad --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/4197392a9d04a762ca3947a915e1f3af5838773e @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80 HÔTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/4553b5f8c00c5e8c49a60a30601f85ec40544fe3 b/http-connect/4553b5f8c00c5e8c49a60a30601f85ec40544fe3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..09dc6da Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/4553b5f8c00c5e8c49a60a30601f85ec40544fe3 differ diff --git a/http-connect/45db3b0a31151407ac54531dd1c3d9a2fc4b8080 b/http-connect/45db3b0a31151407ac54531dd1c3d9a2fc4b8080 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99f03bb --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/45db3b0a31151407ac54531dd1c3d9a2fc4b8080 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.ex'ample.cm:80*''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''COECTçççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxø-Authorization: ba +Xotthoobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/47aa38e658cde9512b373ac2cb71e2a58894655e b/http-connect/47aa38e658cde9512b373ac2cb71e2a58894655e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5bb5a38 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/47aa38e658cde9512b373ac2cb71e2a58894655e @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT le.com:8° HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Pro +X-baz + diff --git a/http-connect/49444f646cea20b6a1e8217bcd29cc04942c16ad b/http-connect/49444f646cea20b6a1e8217bcd29cc04942c16ad new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f8130b --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/49444f646cea20b6a1e8217bcd29cc04942c16ad @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNEôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôô ôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôô HTTP/0.180 +Proxy-Authorization: ba) +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/4a774c336b3c26e284d68bc6f20f76a1a48386c4 b/http-connect/4a774c336b3c26e284d68bc6f20f76a1a48386c4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..68760b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/4a774c336b3c26e284d68bc6f20f76a1a48386c4 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +CONNECT server.exJmple.com:.example.com\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'''''\\\\\80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isola»tion: fo\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isola»tion: focaz + diff --git a/http-connect/4b66fd8cf6d25a229dddb7c5d4bae263e2d8ee75 b/http-connect/4b66fd8cf6d25a229dddb7c5d4bae263e2d8ee75 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..09d06bf Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/4b66fd8cf6d25a229dddb7c5d4bae263e2d8ee75 differ diff --git a/http-connect/4eb11e1a3fbe6ff1b211362f1725b43deedbee54 b/http-connect/4eb11e1a3fbe6ff1b211362f1725b43deedbee54 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af074b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/4eb11e1a3fbe6ff1b211362f1725b43deedbee54 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +C +Content-Length: - ONNECs ' oriz?tion: ba +Xz + diff --git a/http-connect/4ef06cf8683f33b68225a4d9cdd8dbbb75e1aa7b b/http-connect/4ef06cf8683f33b68225a4d9cdd8dbbb75e1aa7b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b8d6a8 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/4ef06cf8683f33b68225a4d9cdd8dbbb75e1aa7b differ diff --git a/http-connect/5012ada5b37b81206bc9b0e185c80021624803d3 b/http-connect/5012ada5b37b81206bc9b0e185c80021624803d3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c590903 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/5012ada5b37b81206bc9b0e185c80021624803d3 differ diff --git a/http-connect/5065b86344e7fc63d7649a12176fa05bb5157b60 b/http-connect/5065b86344e7fc63d7649a12176fa05bb5157b60 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..00b2989 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/5065b86344e7fc63d7649a12176fa05bb5157b60 @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT :¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿80 HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/528b924b7aad2225c17b6f7324652394e3427353 b/http-connect/528b924b7aad2225c17b6f7324652394e3427353 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..276ea41 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/528b924b7aad2225c17b6f7324652394e3427353 differ diff --git a/http-connect/52b7805edb4adb5b5a2c1a40a3bf9b9674fee1cf b/http-connect/52b7805edb4adb5b5a2c1a40a3bf9b9674fee1cf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9e31b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/52b7805edb4adb5b5a2c1a40a3bf9b9674fee1cf @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.ex'ample.cm:80 HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/52d2db4e4b4c28d2764104afa93cd5ecf70d0938 b/http-connect/52d2db4e4b4c28d2764104afa93cd5ecf70d0938 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c65daa Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/52d2db4e4b4c28d2764104afa93cd5ecf70d0938 differ diff --git a/http-connect/571d32b0992cbc15a879677afa5d733ca3523c37 b/http-connect/571d32b0992cbc15a879677afa5d733ca3523c37 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f346a42 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/571d32b0992cbc15a879677afa5d733ca3523c37 differ diff --git a/http-connect/5728dac1e4332f0c6980576777b112bdf39eb861 b/http-connect/5728dac1e4332f0c6980576777b112bdf39eb861 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f4624a Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/5728dac1e4332f0c6980576777b112bdf39eb861 differ diff --git a/http-connect/5877c8327e1dea084e140c0d9962fa5ce737980c b/http-connect/5877c8327e1dea084e140c0d9962fa5ce737980c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc5d64c --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/5877c8327e1dea084e140c0d9962fa5ce737980c @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT [erver.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/5991c6ed2fd27c92018ef7db13cb6e2a7c1d8e1d b/http-connect/5991c6ed2fd27c92018ef7db13cb6e2a7c1d8e1d new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2cdce4b --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/5991c6ed2fd27c92018ef7db13cb6e2a7c1d8e1d @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.exJmple.com:.example.com\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\r.exJmple.com:.example.co\\\\\\\\80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isola»tion: focaz + diff --git a/http-connect/5c6183b1114d4dd5799065575e02af9dbd331d8b b/http-connect/5c6183b1114d4dd5799065575e02af9dbd331d8b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..51eeedb --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/5c6183b1114d4dd5799065575e02af9dbd331d8b @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +ProZy-Auttion: ba +X-To/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Auttr-St{eam-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/5e22c80c22d2c65d4037bf4d754bccddd5dc742d b/http-connect/5e22c80c22d2c65d4037bf4d754bccddd5dc742d new file mode 100644 index 0000000..578a304 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/5e22c80c22d2c65d4037bf4d754bccddd5dc742d @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +CONNECT se +ver.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/5f0452164d398de96abf390a621fae26134f8be6 b/http-connect/5f0452164d398de96abf390a621fae26134f8be6 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71ca3f4 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/5f0452164d398de96abf390a621fae26134f8be6 differ diff --git a/http-connect/5fa318a65f6ec6b356b3a5d415251a7f437785d4 b/http-connect/5fa318a65f6ec6b356b3a5d415251a7f437785d4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..68e8314 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/5fa318a65f6ec6b356b3a5d415251a7f437785d4 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +C http://NECs ' oriz?tion: ba +Xz + diff --git a/http-connect/62da8128064753f2821dc87fe9d8096ba5c182d9 b/http-connect/62da8128064753f2821dc87fe9d8096ba5c182d9 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba64cb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/62da8128064753f2821dc87fe9d8096ba5c182d9 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.cm:80 HTTP/1.18 +Content-Length: 0 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isoioaltn: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/62e848444405344e42d7a340661dd8865f52fd0b b/http-connect/62e848444405344e42d7a340661dd8865f52fd0b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79d9e17 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/62e848444405344e42d7a340661dd8865f52fd0b @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/65c7352efa0f2a74dfd2ff04c59af2868dacc7b0 b/http-connect/65c7352efa0f2a74dfd2ff04c59af2868dacc7b0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d410d61 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/65c7352efa0f2a74dfd2ff04c59af2868dacc7b0 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT serve:.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/6712a9566733c40e8458f52801339b7b4a82f4a6 b/http-connect/6712a9566733c40e8458f52801339b7b4a82f4a6 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..758b08e --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/6712a9566733c40e8458f52801339b7b4a82f4a6 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server333333333333ýýýý33333333333333333333333.ex'ample.cm:80Proxy-Authorizçççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorizat inao: b +X%Torÿÿÿream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/671add1d204f3827efb5a4960d01e51cbe4db6f8 b/http-connect/671add1d204f3827efb5a4960d01e51cbe4db6f8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e75aafa --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/671add1d204f3827efb5a4960d01e51cbe4db6f8 @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT :¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿80 HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/6836dc296727a6ccb10fe66e031b521dc7a1e1a9 b/http-connect/6836dc296727a6ccb10fe66e031b521dc7a1e1a9 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e6d4112 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/6836dc296727a6ccb10fe66e031b521dc7a1e1a9 differ diff --git a/http-connect/6b91b4bddfca8d3436a4a27b49b24cd69fbea70c b/http-connect/6b91b4bddfca8d3436a4a27b49b24cd69fbea70c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4504133 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/6b91b4bddfca8d3436a4a27b49b24cd69fbea70c @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +CONNECT server.exJmple.com:.example.com\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\r.exJmple.com:.example.co\\\:\\»\80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy- +Content-Lenexh: +X-Tor-Stream-Isola»tionþÿÿŸ: focaz + diff --git a/http-connect/6bf06f53d134a68799894ff8abbd9bb04dd84746 b/http-connect/6bf06f53d134a68799894ff8abbd9bb04dd84746 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af273ec Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/6bf06f53d134a68799894ff8abbd9bb04dd84746 differ diff --git a/http-connect/6ea5389ec7eec248c27ad657e9d2c9a52739d2ec b/http-connect/6ea5389ec7eec248c27ad657e9d2c9a52739d2ec new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96c6ea7 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/6ea5389ec7eec248c27ad657e9d2c9a52739d2ec @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.ex'ample.cm:81 HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/70b54207d6714f6b49eace7bfa79e3953194d926 b/http-connect/70b54207d6714f6b49eace7bfa79e3953194d926 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ca7b308 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/70b54207d6714f6b49eace7bfa79e3953194d926 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +C http ¿ ONN ' oriz?tion: ba +Xz + diff --git a/http-connect/721770cd4055b4a30bb16fe56197db3e3a38140e b/http-connect/721770cd4055b4a30bb16fe56197db3e3a38140e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9620f02 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/721770cd4055b4a30bb16fe56197db3e3a38140e differ diff --git a/http-connect/727a261b9f02e209655f335ea62c7f046fb8577e b/http-connect/727a261b9f02e209655f335ea62c7f046fb8577e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..935e44d --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/727a261b9f02e209655f335ea62c7f046fb8577e @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.ex'ample.cm:80"""ex'ample.cçççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X%Torÿÿÿream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/7432a1de7c1cebb3cb68f7efecf1f7d7690d548d b/http-connect/7432a1de7c1cebb3cb68f7efecf1f7d7690d548d new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b512a0e --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/7432a1de7c1cebb3cb68f7efecf1f7d7690d548d @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTÔP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/76fe4409fbc795bba255faa34421ebdfd5eb4acc b/http-connect/76fe4409fbc795bba255faa34421ebdfd5eb4acc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9905125 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/76fe4409fbc795bba255faa34421ebdfd5eb4acc differ diff --git a/http-connect/771ed14d78252093b1665a8cbcaee58f6c31af79 b/http-connect/771ed14d78252093b1665a8cbcaee58f6c31af79 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99e161b --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/771ed14d78252093b1665a8cbcaee58f6c31af79 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.exJmple.com:.example.com\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\r.exJmple.com:.example.co\\\:\\\\\80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isola»tion: focaz + diff --git a/http-connect/7784290374a4ba027e53bef98c0a8acb73615d8c b/http-connect/7784290374a4ba027e53bef98c0a8acb73615d8c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ade831 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/7784290374a4ba027e53bef98c0a8acb73615d8c @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT :¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿÿìììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿80 HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/7a247be127bc84c51179c3102c6a305dbc2ff87f b/http-connect/7a247be127bc84c51179c3102c6a305dbc2ff87f new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eaddf9c Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/7a247be127bc84c51179c3102c6a305dbc2ff87f differ diff --git a/http-connect/7da329abda10b6aeefe0db4f29b9208bd83bd7ad b/http-connect/7da329abda10b6aeefe0db4f29b9208bd83bd7ad new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d9e4b2 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/7da329abda10b6aeefe0db4f29b9208bd83bd7ad differ diff --git a/http-connect/7dab4b99561add0a045e5809bbec667022993893 b/http-connect/7dab4b99561add0a045e5809bbec667022993893 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eed9330 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/7dab4b99561add0a045e5809bbec667022993893 @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +CONNECT server.example.cm:80 HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Autho + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +rizationX%TorÿÿÿTor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/7dbc4ef3d92afcedd504977cdb4107f9f582f54a b/http-connect/7dbc4ef3d92afcedd504977cdb4107f9f582f54a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..82ad63f --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/7dbc4ef3d92afcedd504977cdb4107f9f582f54a @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +CONNECT 1.11.1.2evexample.com:80 HTTP/1.1 r:80'0 +Proxy-Autation: ba JX-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/7f94afc181b5f6216b0b730146b1c9dfecdfe124 b/http-connect/7f94afc181b5f6216b0b730146b1c9dfecdfe124 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb9453d --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/7f94afc181b5f6216b0b730146b1c9dfecdfe124 @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNEôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôô ôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôô ôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôion: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/8205157f66c2aeac9c2211cdff7effcf753ac733 b/http-connect/8205157f66c2aeac9c2211cdff7effcf753ac733 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd38f58 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/8205157f66c2aeac9c2211cdff7effcf753ac733 differ diff --git a/http-connect/85f07a36860f0287418576aa0a243162fdb787a4 b/http-connect/85f07a36860f0287418576aa0a243162fdb787a4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd8695c --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/85f07a36860f0287418576aa0a243162fdb787a4 @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CX%Torÿÿÿerver.ex'ample.cm:80*;'''''''''''''''''''''''''COECToobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/89020c00c6025c6035cfb2b783e9f5752415886b b/http-connect/89020c00c6025c6035cfb2b783e9f5752415886b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..391390c Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/89020c00c6025c6035cfb2b783e9f5752415886b differ diff --git a/http-connect/8a59e92e3e7fd3f11f899fa1a56a5cd0f27bc5ca b/http-connect/8a59e92e3e7fd3f11f899fa1a56a5cd0f27bc5ca new file mode 100644 index 0000000..951247d --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/8a59e92e3e7fd3f11f899fa1a56a5cd0f27bc5ca @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +CONNECT 0 HTTP/1.1 +:³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³Praxy-Authoxy-Authorization: rization: ³³³ion: ba +X-Tor-m Isolation: fobaz + +z + diff --git a/http-connect/8b3cd839c2ffb964ddefc945bac85a564aea0f1e b/http-connect/8b3cd839c2ffb964ddefc945bac85a564aea0f1e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f48d0a1 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/8b3cd839c2ffb964ddefc945bac85a564aea0f1e differ diff --git a/http-connect/8bbfa3d8ea8d5fd009b37de5ba97d409b2bba538 b/http-connect/8bbfa3d8ea8d5fd009b37de5ba97d409b2bba538 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..762761a --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/8bbfa3d8ea8d5fd009b37de5ba97d409b2bba538 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.exJmple.com:.example.com\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'''\\\\\80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-IStream-Isola»tion: focaz + diff --git a/http-connect/8c57c5dda7c6e910c5c3ea162d16a693fd07846f b/http-connect/8c57c5dda7c6e910c5c3ea162d16a693fd07846f new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5253a96 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/8c57c5dda7c6e910c5c3ea162d16a693fd07846f @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.exJmple.com:.example.com\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isola»tion: focaz + diff --git a/http-connect/8dd05cf3db6417bfe8f3b91c3f9f22f0417d60c0 b/http-connect/8dd05cf3db6417bfe8f3b91c3f9f22f0417d60c0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5147d02 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/8dd05cf3db6417bfe8f3b91c3f9f22f0417d60c0 differ diff --git a/http-connect/92315d20f377cbc7ed574cc5da719235f64d29f1 b/http-connect/92315d20f377cbc7ed574cc5da719235f64d29f1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c78de2 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/92315d20f377cbc7ed574cc5da719235f64d29f1 differ diff --git a/http-connect/926bbf621c27b8cb2e82b7f19a9587ea5ea53be6 b/http-connect/926bbf621c27b8cb2e82b7f19a9587ea5ea53be6 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f8b80e --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/926bbf621c27b8cb2e82b7f19a9587ea5ea53be6 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +CONNECT 777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777771.1ve:.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 r:80 +Proxy-Autation: ba JX-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/a0c44b283c54f74f3c652ea4bf600256ab22b267 b/http-connect/a0c44b283c54f74f3c652ea4bf600256ab22b267 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16ba761 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/a0c44b283c54f74f3c652ea4bf600256ab22b267 differ diff --git a/http-connect/a13331b6a1dd901b811671bb6d5fd0ca50b2646c b/http-connect/a13331b6a1dd901b811671bb6d5fd0ca50b2646c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f0f4e9e --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/a13331b6a1dd901b811671bb6d5fd0ca50b2646c @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT :¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿80 HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/a1dd1f2f89af3274f9591b5d71d4991a7ca6f996 b/http-connect/a1dd1f2f89af3274f9591b5d71d4991a7ca6f996 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bfdef2a Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/a1dd1f2f89af3274f9591b5d71d4991a7ca6f996 differ diff --git a/http-connect/a26e326ecb349c64552cef6b6413f996a457b21b b/http-connect/a26e326ecb349c64552cef6b6413f996a457b21b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9578124 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/a26e326ecb349c64552cef6b6413f996a457b21b differ diff --git a/http-connect/a33872aa3c2011161cac75e264a557eea7012d34 b/http-connect/a33872aa3c2011161cac75e264a557eea7012d34 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..54ec04c --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/a33872aa3c2011161cac75e264a557eea7012d34 @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CON7le.com:8Pizatiole.com:80izatECT/1rvem:80izatECT/1.rverÝexampld.com:8rÝexampld.com:8Pizatiole.ctm$80izatgon: b-IsolatCT/1.ion: fofaz + diff --git a/http-connect/a384e1d213543c5c63ceaf09e529ef5c30e0d061 b/http-connect/a384e1d213543c5c63ceaf09e529ef5c30e0d061 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..128e00d --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/a384e1d213543c5c63ceaf09e529ef5c30e0d061 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.#om:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/a3c517ee9a2659f2396bed3a9368545c402b1c64 b/http-connect/a3c517ee9a2659f2396bed3a9368545c402b1c64 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0af825e --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/a3c517ee9a2659f2396bed3a9368545c402b1c64 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-por-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/a5518846a7833d1ddca7cbf9585ef2557cda5b7b b/http-connect/a5518846a7833d1ddca7cbf9585ef2557cda5b7b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9d14bb --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/a5518846a7833d1ddca7cbf9585ef2557cda5b7b @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +CONNECT server.example.cm:80 HTTP/1.18 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Content-Leogth: 0 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isoioaltn: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/a815784705fbe4dd9a0540545409d9f7f06f7ca8 b/http-connect/a815784705fbe4dd9a0540545409d9f7f06f7ca8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc23759 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/a815784705fbe4dd9a0540545409d9f7f06f7ca8 differ diff --git a/http-connect/a870d92d5bfa884ae813262e95c914bedd5f1277 b/http-connect/a870d92d5bfa884ae813262e95c914bedd5f1277 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f120bc --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/a870d92d5bfa884ae813262e95c914bedd5f1277 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.exJmple.com:.example.com\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ÒÒÒ\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Awthorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isola»tion: focaz + diff --git a/http-connect/a8ccd9d12995457fbd254432236f2c945d5fb498 b/http-connect/a8ccd9d12995457fbd254432236f2c945d5fb498 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a10f01 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/a8ccd9d12995457fbd254432236f2c945d5fb498 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT le.com:ÇÏ HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Pro +X-baz + diff --git a/http-connect/a967ebf19c7877d91b8f57f029ff9e8bf3f8d28a b/http-connect/a967ebf19c7877d91b8f57f029ff9e8bf3f8d28a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6c8e6f --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/a967ebf19c7877d91b8f57f029ff9e8bf3f8d28a @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +CONNECT CONNECTexa0 HTTP/1.1 +:80mple.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isola\öon: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/aa589d72d93276da75f0fa67a2eadd5318b09d44 b/http-connect/aa589d72d93276da75f0fa67a2eadd5318b09d44 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8624ead --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/aa589d72d93276da75f0fa67a2eadd5318b09d44 @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/aabbdecdda5a02052f00241e23dd5e58841ebfa7 b/http-connect/aabbdecdda5a02052f00241e23dd5e58841ebfa7 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..36aedd7 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/aabbdecdda5a02052f00241e23dd5e58841ebfa7 differ diff --git a/http-connect/ab2a6395a300c67898a5b42239b959c92f82c84c b/http-connect/ab2a6395a300c67898a5b42239b959c92f82c84c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2173c0c Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/ab2a6395a300c67898a5b42239b959c92f82c84c differ diff --git a/http-connect/ab48ffd461d5eeeea3035c7fe2d1e2543cff79a3 b/http-connect/ab48ffd461d5eeeea3035c7fe2d1e2543cff79a3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a4ab2b --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/ab48ffd461d5eeeea3035c7fe2d1e2543cff79a3 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +C http://NEC/s ' oriz?tion: ba +Xz + diff --git a/http-connect/acc75e67e3362f01e7472a61ed0a7801b96544f4 b/http-connect/acc75e67e3362f01e7472a61ed0a7801b96544f4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9704f6c --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/acc75e67e3362f01e7472a61ed0a7801b96544f4 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT le.com:8\ HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Pro +X-baz + diff --git a/http-connect/add1fc893fd94eda474dedd701de9a175c7bb7a4 b/http-connect/add1fc893fd94eda474dedd701de9a175c7bb7a4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a57c815 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/add1fc893fd94eda474dedd701de9a175c7bb7a4 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAce:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: +Proxy-Authorizatiol@Öbn: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/ade56b819b929ec0c75ccce71178756e7c33d4db b/http-connect/ade56b819b929ec0c75ccce71178756e7c33d4db new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c047b3 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/ade56b819b929ec0c75ccce71178756e7c33d4db differ diff --git a/http-connect/b02e917f142fac3b1c385108cf12fdbf6181caa0 b/http-connect/b02e917f142fac3b1c385108cf12fdbf6181caa0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18dc774 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/b02e917f142fac3b1c385108cf12fdbf6181caa0 @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT :¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿Î¿¿¿)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿80¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/b47e79d753d78cf6b8834a4bdb3746f5230ec24f b/http-connect/b47e79d753d78cf6b8834a4bdb3746f5230ec24f new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e979fb --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/b47e79d753d78cf6b8834a4bdb3746f5230ec24f @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server3333333333333333X-Tor3333333333s333.ex'ample.cm:80Proxy-Authorizçççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorizat inao: b +X%Torÿÿÿream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/b83411aae6e25cd657309c26ab7fcdd59ef21282 b/http-connect/b83411aae6e25cd657309c26ab7fcdd59ef21282 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e8dd52 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/b83411aae6e25cd657309c26ab7fcdd59ef21282 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server3333333333333333X-Tor33333333333333.ex'ample.cm:80Proxy-Authorizçççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorizat inao: b +X%Torÿÿÿream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/bb4cef547b25ae80e7514ff82bf7bcb18874405c b/http-connect/bb4cef547b25ae80e7514ff82bf7bcb18874405c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..91574d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/bb4cef547b25ae80e7514ff82bf7bcb18874405c @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTÐ/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/bcc629f3491d7caf85e6bc8a59bffcc527df6c2f b/http-connect/bcc629f3491d7caf85e6bc8a59bffcc527df6c2f new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2c1517 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/bcc629f3491d7caf85e6bc8a59bffcc527df6c2f @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT xample.com:"0 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Pro +X-baz + diff --git a/http-connect/bf076782f3ef4892f35b5a9e61357b65d889028e b/http-connect/bf076782f3ef4892f35b5a9e61357b65d889028e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f44c2d Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/bf076782f3ef4892f35b5a9e61357b65d889028e differ diff --git a/http-connect/bfea677ac77611f7f9f46a58995945e61c300186 b/http-connect/bfea677ac77611f7f9f46a58995945e61c300186 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..629f813 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/bfea677ac77611f7f9f46a58995945e61c300186 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT s80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +PWoTor-Stream-Isolaxy?Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/c2c11e2312714bd72ab32d37abb612cc1cd3be7e b/http-connect/c2c11e2312714bd72ab32d37abb612cc1cd3be7e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da224fb --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/c2c11e2312714bd72ab32d37abb612cc1cd3be7e @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server3333333333333333X-Tor3333333333€€€€€€€3333.ex'ample.cm:80Proxy-Authorizçççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorizat inao: b +X%Torÿÿÿream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/c366b32cc71afb73d2e15e91258d3ae740c7b27e b/http-connect/c366b32cc71afb73d2e15e91258d3ae740c7b27e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3497782 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/c366b32cc71afb73d2e15e91258d3ae740c7b27e @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT :80 HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/c4e0bf868eac0b8031ad88f142925a9f681ba341 b/http-connect/c4e0bf868eac0b8031ad88f142925a9f681ba341 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a793652 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/c4e0bf868eac0b8031ad88f142925a9f681ba341 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.ex'ample.cm:80*'''''''''''''''''''COECTçççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxø-Authorization: ba +Xotthoobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/c6aa602baa30e8baf4852339710b612105fcc01e b/http-connect/c6aa602baa30e8baf4852339710b612105fcc01e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..682ac4e --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/c6aa602baa30e8baf4852339710b612105fcc01e @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777780 HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/c957220fb3dbf28027318f1e7515d8a965ce5755 b/http-connect/c957220fb3dbf28027318f1e7515d8a965ce5755 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..31237da --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/c957220fb3dbf28027318f1e7515d8a965ce5755 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""":"""""""""""""""""""""""""""" HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-por-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/c96a41c195d70b8c7eaef6578f42aacaa09093f5 b/http-connect/c96a41c195d70b8c7eaef6578f42aacaa09093f5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..23212cc Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/c96a41c195d70b8c7eaef6578f42aacaa09093f5 differ diff --git a/http-connect/c9bd4bc0d8fdeef1bb629a3e96e01e6958ad543b b/http-connect/c9bd4bc0d8fdeef1bb629a3e96e01e6958ad543b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1894971 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/c9bd4bc0d8fdeef1bb629a3e96e01e6958ad543b @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT 80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X"Tor-Stream-^yolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/c9e382a051bfbee347a28e7cb370002c65b67eb0 b/http-connect/c9e382a051bfbee347a28e7cb370002c65b67eb0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a258c98 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/c9e382a051bfbee347a28e7cb370002c65b67eb0 @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT :¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿K@@@@@@@¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿80 HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/cab32c3794fb89b6531d34003cdfc26a11e0793c b/http-connect/cab32c3794fb89b6531d34003cdfc26a11e0793c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28335e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/cab32c3794fb89b6531d34003cdfc26a11e0793c @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.comº80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/cbe32dabab228a83c2a96a7a69500305c6f1039a b/http-connect/cbe32dabab228a83c2a96a7a69500305c6f1039a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8321587 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/cbe32dabab228a83c2a96a7a69500305c6f1039a @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT :¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿÿìììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììììÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿«¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿80 HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/ce13e1b77236d2d5e873fc04ab34acf7fc757876 b/http-connect/ce13e1b77236d2d5e873fc04ab34acf7fc757876 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9380c3f Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/ce13e1b77236d2d5e873fc04ab34acf7fc757876 differ diff --git a/http-connect/d09f37ce2dbf2584f54637851628d6526b8fbec5 b/http-connect/d09f37ce2dbf2584f54637851628d6526b8fbec5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bee3ed5 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/d09f37ce2dbf2584f54637851628d6526b8fbec5 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.ex'ample.cm:80"""""çççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X%Torÿÿÿream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/d2178a07b2984b269d931e59ac6d119f7c35ac46 b/http-connect/d2178a07b2984b269d931e59ac6d119f7c35ac46 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e79c05 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/d2178a07b2984b269d931e59ac6d119f7c35ac46 differ diff --git a/http-connect/d31627b4d32fa7aa90ab3b7f5dcdca4ef96f75f7 b/http-connect/d31627b4d32fa7aa90ab3b7f5dcdca4ef96f75f7 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f28f02 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/d31627b4d32fa7aa90ab3b7f5dcdca4ef96f75f7 differ diff --git a/http-connect/d491244aa07bf972890f8a141125dbddf59eae31 b/http-connect/d491244aa07bf972890f8a141125dbddf59eae31 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ff2c0f Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/d491244aa07bf972890f8a141125dbddf59eae31 differ diff --git a/http-connect/d5364ca5d1643e0f9103da8025cffe96bfd8c1dc b/http-connect/d5364ca5d1643e0f9103da8025cffe96bfd8c1dc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9c0423a Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/d5364ca5d1643e0f9103da8025cffe96bfd8c1dc differ diff --git a/http-connect/d60d377d133ea617ce09b1899fed12f1ce698075 b/http-connect/d60d377d133ea617ce09b1899fed12f1ce698075 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3c7b8f Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/d60d377d133ea617ce09b1899fed12f1ce698075 differ diff --git a/http-connect/d73013f42fb825a08b6fdf8d3995569a4089c722 b/http-connect/d73013f42fb825a08b6fdf8d3995569a4089c722 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..74b3fcc Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/d73013f42fb825a08b6fdf8d3995569a4089c722 differ diff --git a/http-connect/dbc05d1cae6356d6e6506bdf05c5194ebd69ea0e b/http-connect/dbc05d1cae6356d6e6506bdf05c5194ebd69ea0e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c204963 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/dbc05d1cae6356d6e6506bdf05c5194ebd69ea0e differ diff --git a/http-connect/deba37a585969a6a3569f6071425ac60d9ffd695 b/http-connect/deba37a585969a6a3569f6071425ac60d9ffd695 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f7c62e --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/deba37a585969a6a3569f6071425ac60d9ffd695 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +CONNECT serv:80 HTTP/1.1 +orizationon:/1^mNNsola4i: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/debbc0a6122c2d51621cd2dd8f0248df8bffb870 b/http-connect/debbc0a6122c2d51621cd2dd8f0248df8bffb870 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b965ce9 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/debbc0a6122c2d51621cd2dd8f0248df8bffb870 @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +C +Content-Length: CONNECT xample.ONNECT \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/http-connect/df7e42f580e0e79625d5dfde496366a820f8334c b/http-connect/df7e42f580e0e79625d5dfde496366a820f8334c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..12ab054 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/df7e42f580e0e79625d5dfde496366a820f8334c @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.example.cm:80 HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/e04af45b1c3ecc500bc055d35f11f857e5f497d5 b/http-connect/e04af45b1c3ecc500bc055d35f11f857e5f497d5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..67ec54a --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/e04af45b1c3ecc500bc055d35f11f857e5f497d5 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-por-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/e2946cb8afae465ec45c6dacd6d5e36b39e450fc b/http-connect/e2946cb8afae465ec45c6dacd6d5e36b39e450fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8afaec1 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/e2946cb8afae465ec45c6dacd6d5e36b39e450fc differ diff --git a/http-connect/e416be1adc2ca845191c50d764b902867d70e4d5 b/http-connect/e416be1adc2ca845191c50d764b902867d70e4d5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6901ca --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/e416be1adc2ca845191c50d764b902867d70e4d5 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT [ HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/e55922025a60d71a6015228d749bcb9cb40d55ac b/http-connect/e55922025a60d71a6015228d749bcb9cb40d55ac new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe14668 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/e55922025a60d71a6015228d749bcb9cb40d55ac @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT [erver.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/e59fe11533af4bd8b6d8d93826483daa6df35acf b/http-connect/e59fe11533af4bd8b6d8d93826483daa6df35acf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2029d1e --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/e59fe11533af4bd8b6d8d93826483daa6df35acf @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.ex'ample.cm:80çççç HTTP/1.180 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X%Torÿÿÿream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/e6d49fc7babe19bc6a3091745888cc31d98df36e b/http-connect/e6d49fc7babe19bc6a3091745888cc31d98df36e new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1bcef87 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/e6d49fc7babe19bc6a3091745888cc31d98df36e @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server0 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-AuthorizatiTn: latin: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/e7f44dcfc79fc9d467daee72fce506fcd762e7dc b/http-connect/e7f44dcfc79fc9d467daee72fce506fcd762e7dc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2babef7 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/e7f44dcfc79fc9d467daee72fce506fcd762e7dc differ diff --git a/http-connect/e89a64275cfaba4a8923ac00b22a9d6a60f8a071 b/http-connect/e89a64275cfaba4a8923ac00b22a9d6a60f8a071 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd33b76 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/e89a64275cfaba4a8923ac00b22a9d6a60f8a071 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +ÿÿECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/eac6c8d39f25cc73f1625414bd6331a7c43cdac1 b/http-connect/eac6c8d39f25cc73f1625414bd6331a7c43cdac1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f74e783 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/eac6c8d39f25cc73f1625414bd6331a7c43cdac1 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +C httpNECs ' oriz?tion: ba +Xz + diff --git a/http-connect/eb54af02c185ab2ff43ab824b9c076579ed494c1 b/http-connect/eb54af02c185ab2ff43ab824b9c076579ed494c1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..131991b Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/eb54af02c185ab2ff43ab824b9c076579ed494c1 differ diff --git a/http-connect/ebc7f2fb4264eb643095c27a0763a03d72156c9c b/http-connect/ebc7f2fb4264eb643095c27a0763a03d72156c9c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cef9cf5 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/ebc7f2fb4264eb643095c27a0763a03d72156c9c differ diff --git a/http-connect/ec37d3b92de66f185a61412e1b08416d247a8f68 b/http-connect/ec37d3b92de66f185a61412e1b08416d247a8f68 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9eddcf --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/ec37d3b92de66f185a61412e1b08416d247a8f68 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONNECT le.com:'0 HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Pro +X-baz + diff --git a/http-connect/ed325e61f469a38ca8136a336966d81ce44291cd b/http-connect/ed325e61f469a38ca8136a336966d81ce44291cd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9876e67 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/ed325e61f469a38ca8136a336966d81ce44291cd differ diff --git a/http-connect/f112f94c9537989a0c5ac05ce5f678ec325fbe5b b/http-connect/f112f94c9537989a0c5ac05ce5f678ec325fbe5b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da1c284 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/f112f94c9537989a0c5ac05ce5f678ec325fbe5b @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +CONNECT :¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ÿÿÿÿÿ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿80¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ HTTP/1.1 + diff --git a/http-connect/f1ab8aa422dcc7628290ba11eb6a0b3cea9af444 b/http-connect/f1ab8aa422dcc7628290ba11eb6a0b3cea9af444 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e77dcb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/f1ab8aa422dcc7628290ba11eb6a0b3cea9af444 @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +CONNECT server.example.cm:80 HTTP/1.18 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +å + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Content-Leogth: 0 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isoioaltn: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/f2ccc4da3ec05cb73bc1405444d7984030cc6cbd b/http-connect/f2ccc4da3ec05cb73bc1405444d7984030cc6cbd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9516e0f --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/f2ccc4da3ec05cb73bc1405444d7984030cc6cbd @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT ce:80 HTTP/1.1 +:80X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: +Proxy-Authorizatiol@ bn: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/f4e191c78391f614742ec4ef5604fc7235d3b857 b/http-connect/f4e191c78391f614742ec4ef5604fc7235d3b857 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf638fe --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/f4e191c78391f614742ec4ef5604fc7235d3b857 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +CONNECT server.exJmple.com:.example.com\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\r.exJmple.com:.example.co\\\:\\COECT HTTP/1.1 +:80 +Proxy-Authoriza +X-ation: ba +X-Tor-Stream-Isola»tion: focaz + diff --git a/http-connect/f671fc509cd86119a66f6613978bafa52291197a b/http-connect/f671fc509cd86119a66f6613978bafa52291197a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8cdbf9b --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/f671fc509cd86119a66f6613978bafa52291197a @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +CONNECT 80 HTTP/1. +Content-Length: 1 +:80 +Proxy-Authorization: ba +X"Tor-Stream-^yolation: fobaz + diff --git a/http-connect/f79ba51beca6ff1db13001fb17e9be0ad224d3eb b/http-connect/f79ba51beca6ff1db13001fb17e9be0ad224d3eb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a756835 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/f79ba51beca6ff1db13001fb17e9be0ad224d3eb differ diff --git a/http-connect/f7c63f92efe842caa6ee5da1dbb8ee2100e10344 b/http-connect/f7c63f92efe842caa6ee5da1dbb8ee2100e10344 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5486bd Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/f7c63f92efe842caa6ee5da1dbb8ee2100e10344 differ diff --git a/http-connect/fbf294de62669f86818a2828150db39797a58fdb b/http-connect/fbf294de62669f86818a2828150db39797a58fdb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..95f9581 Binary files /dev/null and b/http-connect/fbf294de62669f86818a2828150db39797a58fdb differ diff --git a/http-connect/fc76565938b6d26f96772aadc18a31c8490d3c72 b/http-connect/fc76565938b6d26f96772aadc18a31c8490d3c72 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..54e1dc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/fc76565938b6d26f96772aadc18a31c8490d3c72 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONNECT serCOVNNECT le.com:00 HTTP/1.er.example.com1: \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/http-connect/fec85951126304fb38f595dd1171182fcc7452ff b/http-connect/fec85951126304fb38f595dd1171182fcc7452ff new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ef4b4d --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/fec85951126304fb38f595dd1171182fcc7452ff @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +CONNECT server.examp44444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444le.com:80 HTTP/1.1 +example.com:80 HTTP/1.1 + + diff --git a/http-connect/ff427a1b39d18e8d52514aafe097110d92ecfcfa b/http-connect/ff427a1b39d18e8d52514aafe097110d92ecfcfa new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aec2f2d --- /dev/null +++ b/http-connect/ff427a1b39d18e8d52514aafe097110d92ecfcfa @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONN.1 +:80 +Pro +X- +

1 0

[tor/master] Replace buf->datalen usage in proto_*.c with buf_datalen() call.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit cddac959e7fb5729956a5250351e0fa1289d719f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 8 11:54:44 2017 -0400 Replace buf->datalen usage in proto_*.c with buf_datalen() call. This lets us remove BUFFERS_PRIVATE from two of the modules. --- src/or/proto_cell.c | 5 ++--- src/or/proto_control0.c | 3 +-- src/or/proto_http.c | 4 ++-- src/or/proto_socks.c | 14 +++++++------- 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/proto_cell.c b/src/or/proto_cell.c index 9e5cdff42..4c86b7e4d 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_cell.c +++ b/src/or/proto_cell.c @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ -#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "proto_cell.h" @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto) const int circ_id_len = get_circ_id_size(wide_circ_ids); const unsigned header_len = get_var_cell_header_size(wide_circ_ids); *out = NULL; - if (buf->datalen < header_len) + if (buf_datalen(buf) < header_len) return 0; peek_from_buf(hdr, header_len, buf); @@ -65,7 +64,7 @@ fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto) return 0; length = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr + circ_id_len + 1)); - if (buf->datalen < (size_t)(header_len+length)) + if (buf_datalen(buf) < (size_t)(header_len+length)) return 1; result = var_cell_new(length); result->command = command; diff --git a/src/or/proto_control0.c b/src/or/proto_control0.c index 4c505fa6f..5478d07e4 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_control0.c +++ b/src/or/proto_control0.c @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ -#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "proto_control0.h" @@ -14,7 +13,7 @@ int peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf) { - if (buf->datalen >= 4) { + if (buf_datalen(buf) >= 4) { char header[4]; uint16_t cmd; peek_from_buf(header, sizeof(header), buf); diff --git a/src/or/proto_http.c b/src/or/proto_http.c index 2ba3f93ab..a47644a30 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_http.c +++ b/src/or/proto_http.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, crlf_offset = buf_find_string_offset(buf, "\r\n\r\n", 4); if (crlf_offset > (int)max_headerlen || - (crlf_offset < 0 && buf->datalen > max_headerlen)) { + (crlf_offset < 0 && buf_datalen(buf) > max_headerlen)) { log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers too long."); return -1; } else if (crlf_offset < 0) { @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, headerlen = crlf_offset + 4; headers = buf->head->data; - bodylen = buf->datalen - headerlen; + bodylen = buf_datalen(buf) - headerlen; log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", (int)headerlen, (int)bodylen); if (max_headerlen <= headerlen) { diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.c b/src/or/proto_socks.c index 20804455c..f1728bde3 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_socks.c +++ b/src/or/proto_socks.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, ssize_t n_drain; size_t want_length = 128; - if (buf->datalen < 2) /* version and another byte */ + if (buf_datalen(buf) < 2) /* version and another byte */ return 0; do { @@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, else if (n_drain > 0) buf_remove_from_front(buf, n_drain); - } while (res == 0 && buf->head && want_length < buf->datalen && - buf->datalen >= 2); + } while (res == 0 && buf->head && want_length < buf_datalen(buf) && + buf_datalen(buf) >= 2); return res; } @@ -154,11 +154,11 @@ fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; uint16_t len; - if (buf->datalen < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + if (buf_datalen(buf) < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) return 0; peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); - if (buf->datalen < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + if (buf_datalen(buf) < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) return 0; *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long. Rejecting."); return -1; } - // tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf->datalen); + // tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf_datalen(buf)); if (log_sockstype) log_notice(LD_APP, @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason) { ssize_t drain = 0; int r; - if (buf->datalen < 2) + if (buf_datalen(buf) < 2) return 0; buf_pullup(buf, MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN);

1 0

[tor/master] Make buffers.c independent of or.h
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 5921b465e7764d35b3f128cf0cf096eca3226688 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 8 12:23:39 2017 -0400 Make buffers.c independent of or.h Also, put ext_or function in new module; it had accidentally gotten into proto_socks.c --- src/or/buffers.c | 8 +++++++- src/or/buffers.h | 18 +++++++++++++----- src/or/ext_orport.c | 3 ++- src/or/include.am | 2 ++ src/or/or.h | 14 +++++++------- src/or/proto_ext_or.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/proto_ext_or.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ src/or/proto_socks.c | 29 ----------------------------- src/test/test_buffers.c | 1 + 9 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index 18517b999..ee888b42a 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -17,11 +17,17 @@ * and drained from functions in connection.c, trigged by events that are * monitored in main.c. **/ + #define BUFFERS_PRIVATE -#include "or.h" +#include "orconfig.h" +#include <stddef.h> #include "buffers.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "compress.h" #include "util.h" +#include "torint.h" #include "torlog.h" +#include "tortls.h" #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include <unistd.h> #endif diff --git a/src/or/buffers.h b/src/or/buffers.h index e710ac64a..35fa46593 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.h +++ b/src/or/buffers.h @@ -12,8 +12,17 @@ #ifndef TOR_BUFFERS_H #define TOR_BUFFERS_H +#include "compat.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "torint.h" #include "testsupport.h" +typedef struct buf_t buf_t; + +struct tor_tls_t; +struct tor_compress_state_t; +struct ext_or_cmd_t; + buf_t *buf_new(void); buf_t *buf_new_with_capacity(size_t size); size_t buf_get_default_chunk_size(const buf_t *buf); @@ -30,13 +39,14 @@ size_t buf_get_total_allocation(void); int read_to_buf(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof, int *socket_error); -int read_to_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf); +int read_to_buf_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf); int flush_buf(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen); -int flush_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen); +int flush_buf_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, + size_t *buf_flushlen); int write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); -int write_to_buf_compress(buf_t *buf, tor_compress_state_t *state, +int write_to_buf_compress(buf_t *buf, struct tor_compress_state_t *state, const char *data, size_t data_len, int done); int move_buf_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen); void peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf); @@ -47,8 +57,6 @@ int fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len); #define PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX 16 int peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd); -int fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out); - int buf_set_to_copy(buf_t **output, const buf_t *input); diff --git a/src/or/ext_orport.c b/src/or/ext_orport.c index 01dc06ce1..83dc13ecf 100644 --- a/src/or/ext_orport.c +++ b/src/or/ext_orport.c @@ -23,8 +23,9 @@ #include "ext_orport.h" #include "control.h" #include "config.h" -#include "util.h" #include "main.h" +#include "proto_ext_or.h" +#include "util.h" /** Allocate and return a structure capable of holding an Extended * ORPort message of body length len. */ diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index caea04197..fe860339f 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/protover.c \ src/or/proto_cell.c \ src/or/proto_control0.c \ + src/or/proto_ext_or.c \ src/or/proto_http.c \ src/or/proto_socks.c \ src/or/policies.c \ @@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ ORHEADERS = \ src/or/protover.h \ src/or/proto_cell.h \ src/or/proto_control0.h \ + src/or/proto_ext_or.h \ src/or/proto_http.h \ src/or/proto_socks.h \ src/or/reasons.h \ diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 5d55094a0..11d3bb31c 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1179,11 +1179,8 @@ typedef struct { uint16_t length; /**< How long is the payload body? */ } relay_header_t; -typedef struct buf_t buf_t; typedef struct socks_request_t socks_request_t; -#define buf_t buf_t - typedef struct entry_port_cfg_t { /* Client port types (socks, dns, trans, natd) only: */ uint8_t isolation_flags; /**< Zero or more isolation flags */ @@ -1243,6 +1240,8 @@ typedef struct server_port_cfg_t { #define CONTROL_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x8abc765du #define LISTENER_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x1a1ac741u +struct buf_t; + /** Description of a connection to another host or process, and associated * data. * @@ -1314,8 +1313,9 @@ typedef struct connection_t { struct event *read_event; /**< Libevent event structure. */ struct event *write_event; /**< Libevent event structure. */ - buf_t *inbuf; /**< Buffer holding data read over this connection. */ - buf_t *outbuf; /**< Buffer holding data to write over this connection. */ + struct buf_t *inbuf; /**< Buffer holding data read over this connection. */ + struct buf_t *outbuf; /**< Buffer holding data to write over this + * connection. */ size_t outbuf_flushlen; /**< How much data should we try to flush from the * outbuf? */ time_t timestamp_lastread; /**< When was the last time libevent said we could @@ -1722,11 +1722,11 @@ typedef struct entry_connection_t { /** For AP connections only: buffer for data that we have sent * optimistically, which we might need to re-send if we have to * retry this connection. */ - buf_t *pending_optimistic_data; + struct buf_t *pending_optimistic_data; /* For AP connections only: buffer for data that we previously sent * optimistically which we are currently re-sending as we retry this * connection. */ - buf_t *sending_optimistic_data; + struct buf_t *sending_optimistic_data; /** If this is a DNSPort connection, this field holds the pending DNS * request that we're going to try to answer. */ diff --git a/src/or/proto_ext_or.c b/src/or/proto_ext_or.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d7f8cab1b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_ext_or.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#include "or.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" +#include "proto_ext_or.h" + +/** The size of the header of an Extended ORPort message: 2 bytes for + * COMMAND, 2 bytes for BODYLEN */ +#define EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE 4 + +/** Read buf, which should contain an Extended ORPort message + * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate + * out with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the + * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we + * encountered an error while parsing it. */ +int +fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) +{ + char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; + uint16_t len; + + if (buf_datalen(buf) < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); + len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); + if (buf_datalen(buf) < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); + (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); + (*out)->len = len; + buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); + fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf); + return 1; +} + diff --git a/src/or/proto_ext_or.h b/src/or/proto_ext_or.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2ef185356 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_ext_or.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_PROTO_EXT_OR_H +#define TOR_PROTO_EXT_OR_H + +struct buf_t; +struct ext_or_cmt_t; + +int fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(struct buf_t *buf, + struct ext_or_cmd_t **out); + +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.c b/src/or/proto_socks.c index 7c7431cae..f153658bb 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_socks.c +++ b/src/or/proto_socks.c @@ -140,35 +140,6 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, return res; } -/** The size of the header of an Extended ORPort message: 2 bytes for - * COMMAND, 2 bytes for BODYLEN */ -#define EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE 4 - -/** Read buf, which should contain an Extended ORPort message - * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate - * out with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the - * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we - * encountered an error while parsing it. */ -int -fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) -{ - char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; - uint16_t len; - - if (buf_datalen(buf) < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) - return 0; - peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); - len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); - if (buf_datalen(buf) < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) - return 0; - *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); - (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); - (*out)->len = len; - buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); - fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf); - return 1; -} - /** Create a SOCKS5 reply message with reason in its REP field and * have Tor send it as error response to req. */ diff --git a/src/test/test_buffers.c b/src/test/test_buffers.c index 49a1015d8..26c062597 100644 --- a/src/test/test_buffers.c +++ b/src/test/test_buffers.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "buffers.h" #include "ext_orport.h" #include "proto_cell.h" +#include "proto_ext_or.h" #include "proto_http.h" #include "proto_control0.h" #include "proto_socks.h"

1 0

[tor/master] Move protocol-specific functions out of buffers.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 234c5015f1536bc51fe5f87c5b7c1072d3f9dbd2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 8 11:51:36 2017 -0400 Move protocol-specific functions out of buffers.c This commit does not change the implementation of any function: it only moves code and adds new includes as necessary. Part of #23149. --- changes/refactor-buffer | 3 + src/or/buffers.c | 982 +---------------------------------------- src/or/buffers.h | 26 +- src/or/connection.c | 2 + src/or/connection_edge.c | 1 + src/or/connection_or.c | 1 + src/or/control.c | 2 + src/or/include.am | 8 + src/or/proto_cell.c | 84 ++++ src/or/proto_cell.h | 17 + src/or/proto_control0.c | 27 ++ src/or/proto_control0.h | 14 + src/or/proto_http.c | 173 ++++++++ src/or/proto_http.h | 24 + src/or/proto_socks.c | 723 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/proto_socks.h | 20 + src/test/test_buffers.c | 5 + src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c | 1 + src/test/test_hs_cache.c | 1 + src/test/test_socks.c | 1 + 20 files changed, 1117 insertions(+), 998 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/refactor-buffer b/changes/refactor-buffer new file mode 100644 index 000000000..36b029672 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/refactor-buffer @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Code simplifications and refactoring: + - Split the portions of the buffer.c module that handle particular + protocols into separate modules. Part of ticket 23149. diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index bd84103c3..ef8676cd9 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -16,23 +16,10 @@ * buffers: one for incoming data, and one for outcoming data. These are fed * and drained from functions in connection.c, trigged by events that are * monitored in main.c. - * - * This module has basic support for reading and writing on buf_t objects. It - * also contains specialized functions for handling particular protocols - * on a buf_t backend, including SOCKS (used in connection_edge.c), Tor cells - * (used in connection_or.c and channeltls.c), HTTP (used in directory.c), and - * line-oriented communication (used in control.c). **/ #define BUFFERS_PRIVATE #include "or.h" -#include "addressmap.h" #include "buffers.h" -#include "config.h" -#include "connection_edge.h" -#include "connection_or.h" -#include "control.h" -#include "reasons.h" -#include "ext_orport.h" #include "util.h" #include "torlog.h" #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H @@ -68,16 +55,6 @@ * forever. */ -static void socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req, - socks5_reply_status_t reason); - -static int parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, - int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out, - size_t *want_length_out); -static int parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, - int state, char **reason, - ssize_t *drain_out); - /* Chunk manipulation functions */ #define CHUNK_HEADER_LEN offsetof(chunk_t, mem[0]) @@ -227,7 +204,7 @@ preferred_chunk_size(size_t target) * growing it as necessary, until buf->head has the first bytes bytes * of data from the buffer, or until buf->head has all the data in buf. */ -STATIC void +void buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes) { chunk_t *dest, *src; @@ -351,7 +328,7 @@ buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz) #endif /** Remove the first n bytes from buf. */ -static inline void +void buf_remove_from_front(buf_t *buf, size_t n) { tor_assert(buf->datalen >= n); @@ -907,7 +884,7 @@ write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) /** Helper: copy the first string_len bytes from buf * onto string. */ -static inline void +void peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf) { chunk_t *chunk; @@ -950,79 +927,6 @@ fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) return (int)buf->datalen; } -/** True iff the cell command command is one that implies a - * variable-length cell in Tor link protocol linkproto. */ -static inline int -cell_command_is_var_length(uint8_t command, int linkproto) -{ - /* If linkproto is v2 (2), CELL_VERSIONS is the only variable-length cells - * work as implemented here. If it's 1, there are no variable-length cells. - * Tor does not support other versions right now, and so can't negotiate - * them. - */ - switch (linkproto) { - case 1: - /* Link protocol version 1 has no variable-length cells. */ - return 0; - case 2: - /* In link protocol version 2, VERSIONS is the only variable-length cell */ - return command == CELL_VERSIONS; - case 0: - case 3: - default: - /* In link protocol version 3 and later, and in version "unknown", - * commands 128 and higher indicate variable-length. VERSIONS is - * grandfathered in. */ - return command == CELL_VERSIONS || command >= 128; - } -} - -/** Check buf for a variable-length cell according to the rules of link - * protocol version linkproto. If one is found, pull it off the buffer - * and assign a newly allocated var_cell_t to *out, and return 1. - * Return 0 if whatever is on the start of buf_t is not a variable-length - * cell. Return 1 and set *out to NULL if there seems to be the start - * of a variable-length cell on buf, but the whole thing isn't there - * yet. */ -int -fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto) -{ - char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE]; - var_cell_t *result; - uint8_t command; - uint16_t length; - const int wide_circ_ids = linkproto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS; - const int circ_id_len = get_circ_id_size(wide_circ_ids); - const unsigned header_len = get_var_cell_header_size(wide_circ_ids); - check(); - *out = NULL; - if (buf->datalen < header_len) - return 0; - peek_from_buf(hdr, header_len, buf); - - command = get_uint8(hdr + circ_id_len); - if (!(cell_command_is_var_length(command, linkproto))) - return 0; - - length = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr + circ_id_len + 1)); - if (buf->datalen < (size_t)(header_len+length)) - return 1; - result = var_cell_new(length); - result->command = command; - if (wide_circ_ids) - result->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(hdr)); - else - result->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); - - buf_remove_from_front(buf, header_len); - peek_from_buf((char*) result->payload, length, buf); - buf_remove_from_front(buf, length); - check(); - - *out = result; - return 1; -} - /** Move up to *buf_flushlen bytes from buf_in to * buf_out, and modify *buf_flushlen appropriately. * Return the number of bytes actually copied. @@ -1150,7 +1054,7 @@ buf_matches_at_pos(const buf_pos_t *pos, const char *s, size_t n) /** Return the first position in buf at which the n-character * string s occurs, or -1 if it does not occur. */ -STATIC int +int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n) { buf_pos_t pos; @@ -1167,868 +1071,6 @@ buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n) return -1; } -/** - * Scan the HTTP headers in the headerlen-byte memory range at - * headers, looking for a "Content-Length" header. Try to set - * *result_out to the numeric value of that header if possible. - * Return -1 if the header was malformed, 0 if it was missing, and 1 if - * it was present and well-formed. - */ -STATIC int -buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen, - size_t *result_out) -{ - const char *p, *newline; - char *len_str, *eos=NULL; - size_t remaining, result; - int ok; - *result_out = 0; /* The caller shouldn't look at this unless the - * return value is 1, but let's prevent confusion */ - -#define CONTENT_LENGTH "\r\nContent-Length: " - p = (char*) tor_memstr(headers, headerlen, CONTENT_LENGTH); - if (p == NULL) - return 0; - - tor_assert(p >= headers && p < headers+headerlen); - remaining = (headers+headerlen)-p; - p += strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH); - remaining -= strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH); - - newline = memchr(p, '\n', remaining); - if (newline == NULL) - return -1; - - len_str = tor_memdup_nulterm(p, newline-p); - /* We limit the size to INT_MAX because other parts of the buffer.c - * code don't like buffers to be any bigger than that. */ - result = (size_t) tor_parse_uint64(len_str, 10, 0, INT_MAX, &ok, &eos); - if (eos && !tor_strisspace(eos)) { - ok = 0; - } else { - *result_out = result; - } - tor_free(len_str); - - return ok ? 1 : -1; -} - -/** There is a (possibly incomplete) http statement on buf, of the - * form "\%s\\r\\n\\r\\n\%s", headers, body. (body may contain NULs.) - * If a) the headers include a Content-Length field and all bytes in - * the body are present, or b) there's no Content-Length field and - * all headers are present, then: - * - * - strdup headers into *headers_out, and NUL-terminate it. - * - memdup body into *body_out, and NUL-terminate it. - * - Then remove them from buf, and return 1. - * - * - If headers or body is NULL, discard that part of the buf. - * - If a headers or body doesn't fit in the arg, return -1. - * (We ensure that the headers or body don't exceed max len, - * _even if_ we're planning to discard them.) - * - If force_complete is true, then succeed even if not all of the - * content has arrived. - * - * Else, change nothing and return 0. - */ -int -fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, - char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, - char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen, - int force_complete) -{ - char *headers; - size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen=0; - int crlf_offset; - int r; - - check(); - if (!buf->head) - return 0; - - crlf_offset = buf_find_string_offset(buf, "\r\n\r\n", 4); - if (crlf_offset > (int)max_headerlen || - (crlf_offset < 0 && buf->datalen > max_headerlen)) { - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers too long."); - return -1; - } else if (crlf_offset < 0) { - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers not all here yet."); - return 0; - } - /* Okay, we have a full header. Make sure it all appears in the first - * chunk. */ - if ((int)buf->head->datalen < crlf_offset + 4) - buf_pullup(buf, crlf_offset+4); - headerlen = crlf_offset + 4; - - headers = buf->head->data; - bodylen = buf->datalen - headerlen; - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", (int)headerlen, (int)bodylen); - - if (max_headerlen <= headerlen) { - log_warn(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d larger than %d. Failing.", - (int)headerlen, (int)max_headerlen-1); - return -1; - } - if (max_bodylen <= bodylen) { - log_warn(LD_HTTP,"bodylen %d larger than %d. Failing.", - (int)bodylen, (int)max_bodylen-1); - return -1; - } - - r = buf_http_find_content_length(headers, headerlen, &contentlen); - if (r == -1) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Content-Length is bogus; maybe " - "someone is trying to crash us."); - return -1; - } else if (r == 1) { - /* if content-length is malformed, then our body length is 0. fine. */ - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"Got a contentlen of %d.",(int)contentlen); - if (bodylen < contentlen) { - if (!force_complete) { - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"body not all here yet."); - return 0; /* not all there yet */ - } - } - if (bodylen > contentlen) { - bodylen = contentlen; - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"bodylen reduced to %d.",(int)bodylen); - } - } else { - tor_assert(r == 0); - /* Leave bodylen alone */ - } - - /* all happy. copy into the appropriate places, and return 1 */ - if (headers_out) { - *headers_out = tor_malloc(headerlen+1); - fetch_from_buf(*headers_out, headerlen, buf); - (*headers_out)[headerlen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */ - } - if (body_out) { - tor_assert(body_used); - *body_used = bodylen; - *body_out = tor_malloc(bodylen+1); - fetch_from_buf(*body_out, bodylen, buf); - (*body_out)[bodylen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */ - } - check(); - return 1; -} - -/** - * Wait this many seconds before warning the user about using SOCKS unsafely - * again. */ -#define SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL 5 - -/** Warn that the user application has made an unsafe socks request using - * protocol socks_protocol on port port. Don't warn more than - * once per SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL, unless safe_socks is set. */ -static void -log_unsafe_socks_warning(int socks_protocol, const char *address, - uint16_t port, int safe_socks) -{ - static ratelim_t socks_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL); - - if (safe_socks) { - log_fn_ratelim(&socks_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_APP, - "Your application (using socks%d to port %d) is giving " - "Tor only an IP address. Applications that do DNS resolves " - "themselves may leak information. Consider using Socks4A " - "(e.g. via privoxy or socat) instead. For more information, " - "please see https://wiki.torproject.org/TheOnionRouter/" - "TorFAQ#SOCKSAndDNS.%s", - socks_protocol, - (int)port, - safe_socks ? " Rejecting." : ""); - } - control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, - "DANGEROUS_SOCKS PROTOCOL=SOCKS%d ADDRESS=%s:%d", - socks_protocol, address, (int)port); -} - -/** Do not attempt to parse socks messages longer than this. This value is - * actually significantly higher than the longest possible socks message. */ -#define MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN 512 - -/** Return a new socks_request_t. */ -socks_request_t * -socks_request_new(void) -{ - return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(socks_request_t)); -} - -/** Free all storage held in the socks_request_t req. */ -void -socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req) -{ - if (!req) - return; - if (req->username) { - memwipe(req->username, 0x10, req->usernamelen); - tor_free(req->username); - } - if (req->password) { - memwipe(req->password, 0x04, req->passwordlen); - tor_free(req->password); - } - memwipe(req, 0xCC, sizeof(socks_request_t)); - tor_free(req); -} - -/** There is a (possibly incomplete) socks handshake on buf, of one - * of the forms - * - socks4: "socksheader username\\0" - * - socks4a: "socksheader username\\0 destaddr\\0" - * - socks5 phase one: "version #methods methods" - * - socks5 phase two: "version command 0 addresstype..." - * If it's a complete and valid handshake, and destaddr fits in - * MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN bytes, then pull the handshake off the buf, - * assign to req, and return 1. - * - * If it's invalid or too big, return -1. - * - * Else it's not all there yet, leave buf alone and return 0. - * - * If you want to specify the socks reply, write it into req->reply - * and set req->replylen, else leave req->replylen alone. - * - * If log_sockstype is non-zero, then do a notice-level log of whether - * the connection is possibly leaking DNS requests locally or not. - * - * If safe_socks is true, then reject unsafe socks protocols. - * - * If returning 0 or -1, req->address and req->port are - * undefined. - */ -int -fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, - int log_sockstype, int safe_socks) -{ - int res; - ssize_t n_drain; - size_t want_length = 128; - - if (buf->datalen < 2) /* version and another byte */ - return 0; - - do { - n_drain = 0; - buf_pullup(buf, want_length); - tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2); - want_length = 0; - - res = parse_socks(buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, req, log_sockstype, - safe_socks, &n_drain, &want_length); - - if (n_drain < 0) - buf_clear(buf); - else if (n_drain > 0) - buf_remove_from_front(buf, n_drain); - - } while (res == 0 && buf->head && want_length < buf->datalen && - buf->datalen >= 2); - - return res; -} - -/** The size of the header of an Extended ORPort message: 2 bytes for - * COMMAND, 2 bytes for BODYLEN */ -#define EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE 4 - -/** Read buf, which should contain an Extended ORPort message - * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate - * out with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the - * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we - * encountered an error while parsing it. */ -int -fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) -{ - char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; - uint16_t len; - - check(); - if (buf->datalen < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) - return 0; - peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); - len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); - if (buf->datalen < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) - return 0; - *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); - (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); - (*out)->len = len; - buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); - fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf); - return 1; -} - -/** Create a SOCKS5 reply message with reason in its REP field and - * have Tor send it as error response to req. - */ -static void -socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req, - socks5_reply_status_t reason) -{ - req->replylen = 10; - memset(req->reply,0,10); - - req->reply[0] = 0x05; // VER field. - req->reply[1] = reason; // REP field. - req->reply[3] = 0x01; // ATYP field. -} - -static const char SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG[] = - "HTTP/1.0 501 Tor is not an HTTP Proxy\r\n" - "Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n" - "<html>\n" - "<head>\n" - "<title>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</title>\n" - "</head>\n" - "<body>\n" - "<h1>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</h1>\n" - "\n" - "It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor as " - "an HTTP proxy.\n\n" - "This is not correct: Tor is a SOCKS proxy, not an HTTP proxy.\n" - "Please configure your client accordingly.\n" - "\n" - "\n" - "See <a href=\"https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html\">" - "https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html</a> for more " - "information.\n" - "\n" - "\n" - "</body>\n" - "</html>\n"; - -/** Implementation helper to implement fetch_from_*_socks. Instead of looking - * at a buffer's contents, we look at the datalen bytes of data in - * data. Instead of removing data from the buffer, we set - * drain_out to the amount of data that should be removed (or -1 if the - * buffer should be cleared). Instead of pulling more data into the first - * chunk of the buffer, we set *want_length_out to the number of bytes - * we'd like to see in the input buffer, if they're available. */ -static int -parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, - int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out, - size_t *want_length_out) -{ - unsigned int len; - char tmpbuf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN+1]; - tor_addr_t destaddr; - uint32_t destip; - uint8_t socksver; - char *next, *startaddr; - unsigned char usernamelen, passlen; - struct in_addr in; - - if (datalen < 2) { - /* We always need at least 2 bytes. */ - *want_length_out = 2; - return 0; - } - - if (req->socks_version == 5 && !req->got_auth) { - /* See if we have received authentication. Strictly speaking, we should - also check whether we actually negotiated username/password - authentication. But some broken clients will send us authentication - even if we negotiated SOCKS_NO_AUTH. */ - if (*data == 1) { /* username/pass version 1 */ - /* Format is: authversion [1 byte] == 1 - usernamelen [1 byte] - username [usernamelen bytes] - passlen [1 byte] - password [passlen bytes] */ - usernamelen = (unsigned char)*(data + 1); - if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u) { - *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u; - return 0; - } - passlen = (unsigned char)*(data + 2u + usernamelen); - if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen) { - *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen; - return 0; - } - req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */ - req->reply[0] = 1; /* authversion == 1 */ - req->reply[1] = 0; /* authentication successful */ - log_debug(LD_APP, - "socks5: Accepted username/password without checking."); - if (usernamelen) { - req->username = tor_memdup(data+2u, usernamelen); - req->usernamelen = usernamelen; - } - if (passlen) { - req->password = tor_memdup(data+3u+usernamelen, passlen); - req->passwordlen = passlen; - } - *drain_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen; - req->got_auth = 1; - *want_length_out = 7; /* Minimal socks5 command. */ - return 0; - } else if (req->auth_type == SOCKS_USER_PASS) { - /* unknown version byte */ - log_warn(LD_APP, "Socks5 username/password version %d not recognized; " - "rejecting.", (int)*data); - return -1; - } - } - - socksver = *data; - - switch (socksver) { /* which version of socks? */ - case 5: /* socks5 */ - - if (req->socks_version != 5) { /* we need to negotiate a method */ - unsigned char nummethods = (unsigned char)*(data+1); - int have_user_pass, have_no_auth; - int r=0; - tor_assert(!req->socks_version); - if (datalen < 2u+nummethods) { - *want_length_out = 2u+nummethods; - return 0; - } - if (!nummethods) - return -1; - req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */ - req->reply[0] = 5; /* socks5 reply */ - have_user_pass = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_USER_PASS, nummethods) !=NULL); - have_no_auth = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_NO_AUTH, nummethods) !=NULL); - if (have_user_pass && !(have_no_auth && req->socks_prefer_no_auth)) { - req->auth_type = SOCKS_USER_PASS; - req->reply[1] = SOCKS_USER_PASS; /* tell client to use "user/pass" - auth method */ - req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */ - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 2 (username/password)"); - r=0; - } else if (have_no_auth) { - req->reply[1] = SOCKS_NO_AUTH; /* tell client to use "none" auth - method */ - req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */ - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 0 (no authentication)"); - r=0; - } else { - log_warn(LD_APP, - "socks5: offered methods don't include 'no auth' or " - "username/password. Rejecting."); - req->reply[1] = '\xFF'; /* reject all methods */ - r=-1; - } - /* Remove packet from buf. Some SOCKS clients will have sent extra - * junk at this point; let's hope it's an authentication message. */ - *drain_out = 2u + nummethods; - - return r; - } - if (req->auth_type != SOCKS_NO_AUTH && !req->got_auth) { - log_warn(LD_APP, - "socks5: negotiated authentication, but none provided"); - return -1; - } - /* we know the method; read in the request */ - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: checking request"); - if (datalen < 7) {/* basic info plus >=1 for addr plus 2 for port */ - *want_length_out = 7; - return 0; /* not yet */ - } - req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1); - if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT && - req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE && - req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) { - /* not a connect or resolve or a resolve_ptr? we don't support it. */ - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req,SOCKS5_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); - - log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.", - req->command); - return -1; - } - switch (*(data+3)) { /* address type */ - case 1: /* IPv4 address */ - case 4: /* IPv6 address */ { - const int is_v6 = *(data+3) == 4; - const unsigned addrlen = is_v6 ? 16 : 4; - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: ipv4 address type"); - if (datalen < 6+addrlen) {/* ip/port there? */ - *want_length_out = 6+addrlen; - return 0; /* not yet */ - } - - if (is_v6) - tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&destaddr, data+4); - else - tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&destaddr, get_uint32(data+4)); - - tor_addr_to_str(tmpbuf, &destaddr, sizeof(tmpbuf), 1); - - if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); - log_warn(LD_APP, - "socks5 IP takes %d bytes, which doesn't fit in %d. " - "Rejecting.", - (int)strlen(tmpbuf)+1,(int)MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN); - return -1; - } - strlcpy(req->address,tmpbuf,sizeof(req->address)); - req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+4+addrlen)); - *drain_out = 6+addrlen; - if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR && - !addressmap_have_mapping(req->address,0)) { - log_unsafe_socks_warning(5, req->address, req->port, safe_socks); - if (safe_socks) { - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED); - return -1; - } - } - return 1; - } - case 3: /* fqdn */ - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: fqdn address type"); - if (req->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) { - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, - SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); - log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5 received RESOLVE_PTR command with " - "hostname type. Rejecting."); - return -1; - } - len = (unsigned char)*(data+4); - if (datalen < 7+len) { /* addr/port there? */ - *want_length_out = 7+len; - return 0; /* not yet */ - } - if (len+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); - log_warn(LD_APP, - "socks5 hostname is %d bytes, which doesn't fit in " - "%d. Rejecting.", len+1,MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN); - return -1; - } - memcpy(req->address,data+5,len); - req->address[len] = 0; - req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+5+len)); - *drain_out = 5+len+2; - - if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); - - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, - "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) gave Tor " - "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.", - req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address)); - return -1; - } - if (log_sockstype) - log_notice(LD_APP, - "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) instructed " - "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " - "necessary. This is good.", req->port); - return 1; - default: /* unsupported */ - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, - SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); - log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: unsupported address type %d. Rejecting.", - (int) *(data+3)); - return -1; - } - tor_assert(0); - break; - case 4: { /* socks4 */ - enum {socks4, socks4a} socks4_prot = socks4a; - const char *authstart, *authend; - /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4.protocol.txt */ - /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4A.protocol.txt */ - - req->socks_version = 4; - if (datalen < SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN) {/* basic info available? */ - *want_length_out = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN; - return 0; /* not yet */ - } - // buf_pullup(buf, 1280); - req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1); - if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT && - req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) { - /* not a connect or resolve? we don't support it. (No resolve_ptr with - * socks4.) */ - log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.", - req->command); - return -1; - } - - req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+2)); - destip = ntohl(get_uint32(data+4)); - if ((!req->port && req->command!=SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) || !destip) { - log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Port or DestIP is zero. Rejecting."); - return -1; - } - if (destip >> 8) { - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: destip not in form 0.0.0.x."); - in.s_addr = htonl(destip); - tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf)); - if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4 addr (%d bytes) too long. Rejecting.", - (int)strlen(tmpbuf)); - return -1; - } - log_debug(LD_APP, - "socks4: successfully read destip (%s)", - safe_str_client(tmpbuf)); - socks4_prot = socks4; - } - - authstart = data + SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN; - next = memchr(authstart, 0, - datalen-SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN); - if (!next) { - if (datalen >= 1024) { - log_debug(LD_APP, "Socks4 user name too long; rejecting."); - return -1; - } - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Username not here yet."); - *want_length_out = datalen+1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ - return 0; - } - authend = next; - tor_assert(next < data+datalen); - - startaddr = NULL; - if (socks4_prot != socks4a && - !addressmap_have_mapping(tmpbuf,0)) { - log_unsafe_socks_warning(4, tmpbuf, req->port, safe_socks); - - if (safe_socks) - return -1; - } - if (socks4_prot == socks4a) { - if (next+1 == data+datalen) { - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: No part of destaddr here yet."); - *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ - return 0; - } - startaddr = next+1; - next = memchr(startaddr, 0, data + datalen - startaddr); - if (!next) { - if (datalen >= 1024) { - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long."); - return -1; - } - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr not all here yet."); - *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ - return 0; - } - if (MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN <= next-startaddr) { - log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long. Rejecting."); - return -1; - } - // tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf->datalen); - - if (log_sockstype) - log_notice(LD_APP, - "Your application (using socks4a to port %d) instructed " - "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " - "necessary. This is good.", req->port); - } - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success."); - strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf, - sizeof(req->address)); - if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, - "Your application (using socks4 to port %d) gave Tor " - "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.", - req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address)); - return -1; - } - if (authend != authstart) { - req->got_auth = 1; - req->usernamelen = authend - authstart; - req->username = tor_memdup(authstart, authend - authstart); - } - /* next points to the final \0 on inbuf */ - *drain_out = next - data + 1; - return 1; - } - case 'G': /* get */ - case 'H': /* head */ - case 'P': /* put/post */ - case 'C': /* connect */ - strlcpy((char*)req->reply, SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG, - MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN); - req->replylen = strlen((char*)req->reply)+1; - /* fall through */ - default: /* version is not socks4 or socks5 */ - log_warn(LD_APP, - "Socks version %d not recognized. (Tor is not an http proxy.)", - *(data)); - { - /* Tell the controller the first 8 bytes. */ - char *tmp = tor_strndup(data, datalen < 8 ? datalen : 8); - control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, - "SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL DATA=\"%s\"", - escaped(tmp)); - tor_free(tmp); - } - return -1; - } -} - -/** Inspect a reply from SOCKS server stored in buf according - * to state, removing the protocol data upon success. Return 0 on - * incomplete response, 1 on success and -1 on error, in which case - * reason is set to a descriptive message (free() when finished - * with it). - * - * As a special case, 2 is returned when user/pass is required - * during SOCKS5 handshake and user/pass is configured. - */ -int -fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason) -{ - ssize_t drain = 0; - int r; - if (buf->datalen < 2) - return 0; - - buf_pullup(buf, MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN); - tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2); - - r = parse_socks_client((uint8_t*)buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, - state, reason, &drain); - if (drain > 0) - buf_remove_from_front(buf, drain); - else if (drain < 0) - buf_clear(buf); - - return r; -} - -/** Implementation logic for fetch_from_*_socks_client. */ -static int -parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, - int state, char **reason, - ssize_t *drain_out) -{ - unsigned int addrlen; - *drain_out = 0; - if (datalen < 2) - return 0; - - switch (state) { - case PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK: - /* Wait for the complete response */ - if (datalen < 8) - return 0; - - if (data[1] != 0x5a) { - *reason = tor_strdup(socks4_response_code_to_string(data[1])); - return -1; - } - - /* Success */ - *drain_out = 8; - return 1; - - case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE: - /* we don't have any credentials */ - if (data[1] != 0x00) { - *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our " - "available authentication methods"); - return -1; - } - - log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: continuing without authentication"); - *drain_out = -1; - return 1; - - case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929: - /* we have a username and password. return 1 if we can proceed without - * providing authentication, or 2 otherwise. */ - switch (data[1]) { - case 0x00: - log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: we have auth details but server " - "doesn't require authentication."); - *drain_out = -1; - return 1; - case 0x02: - log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: need authentication."); - *drain_out = -1; - return 2; - /* fall through */ - } - - *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our available " - "authentication methods"); - return -1; - - case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK: - /* handle server reply to rfc1929 authentication */ - if (data[1] != 0x00) { - *reason = tor_strdup("authentication failed"); - return -1; - } - - log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: authentication successful."); - *drain_out = -1; - return 1; - - case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK: - /* response is variable length. BND.ADDR, etc, isn't needed - * (don't bother with buf_pullup()), but make sure to eat all - * the data used */ - - /* wait for address type field to arrive */ - if (datalen < 4) - return 0; - - switch (data[3]) { - case 0x01: /* ip4 */ - addrlen = 4; - break; - case 0x04: /* ip6 */ - addrlen = 16; - break; - case 0x03: /* fqdn (can this happen here?) */ - if (datalen < 5) - return 0; - addrlen = 1 + data[4]; - break; - default: - *reason = tor_strdup("invalid response to connect request"); - return -1; - } - - /* wait for address and port */ - if (datalen < 6 + addrlen) - return 0; - - if (data[1] != 0x00) { - *reason = tor_strdup(socks5_response_code_to_string(data[1])); - return -1; - } - - *drain_out = 6 + addrlen; - return 1; - } - - /* shouldn't get here... */ - tor_assert(0); - - return -1; -} - -/** Return true if cmd looks like a HTTP (proxy) request. */ -int -peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf) -{ - if (peek_buf_startswith(buf, "CONNECT ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "DELETE ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "GET ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "POST ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "PUT " )) - return 1; - return 0; -} - /** Return 1 iff buf starts with cmd. cmd must be a null * terminated string, of no more than PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX bytes. */ int @@ -2044,22 +1086,6 @@ peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd) return fast_memeq(tmp, cmd, clen); } -/** Return 1 iff buf looks more like it has an (obsolete) v0 controller - * command on it than any valid v1 controller command. */ -int -peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf) -{ - if (buf->datalen >= 4) { - char header[4]; - uint16_t cmd; - peek_from_buf(header, sizeof(header), buf); - cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(header+2)); - if (cmd <= 0x14) - return 1; /* This is definitely not a v1 control command. */ - } - return 0; -} - /** Return the index within buf at which ch first appears, * or -1 if ch does not appear on buf. */ static off_t diff --git a/src/or/buffers.h b/src/or/buffers.h index d88408438..5a6f510f5 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.h +++ b/src/or/buffers.h @@ -39,23 +39,13 @@ int write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); int write_to_buf_compress(buf_t *buf, tor_compress_state_t *state, const char *data, size_t data_len, int done); int move_buf_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen); +void peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf); +void buf_remove_from_front(buf_t *buf, size_t n); int fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); -int fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto); -int fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, - char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, - char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen, - int force_complete); -socks_request_t *socks_request_new(void); -void socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req); -int fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, - int log_sockstype, int safe_socks); -int fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason); int fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len); -int peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf); #define PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX 16 int peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd); -int peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf); int fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out); @@ -64,14 +54,15 @@ int buf_set_to_copy(buf_t **output, void assert_buf_ok(buf_t *buf); +int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n); +void buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes); + #ifdef BUFFERS_PRIVATE -STATIC int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n); -STATIC void buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes); #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS void buf_get_first_chunk_data(const buf_t *buf, const char **cp, size_t *sz); buf_t *buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz); #endif -STATIC size_t preferred_chunk_size(size_t target); +ATTR_UNUSED STATIC size_t preferred_chunk_size(size_t target); #define DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC /** A single chunk on a buffer. */ @@ -103,10 +94,5 @@ struct buf_t { }; #endif -#ifdef BUFFERS_PRIVATE -STATIC int buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen, - size_t *result_out); -#endif - #endif diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 31a682387..637b38cec 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ #include "hs_common.h" #include "hs_ident.h" #include "nodelist.h" +#include "proto_http.h" +#include "proto_socks.h" #include "policies.h" #include "reasons.h" #include "relay.h" diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index a98b32450..4f990e0a0 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ #include "main.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "policies.h" +#include "proto_socks.h" #include "reasons.h" #include "relay.h" #include "rendclient.h" diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index fc304e6f1..8cd36d66b 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ #include "microdesc.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" +#include "proto_cell.h" #include "reasons.h" #include "relay.h" #include "rephist.h" diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index bc173a6e1..cd78daa91 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "policies.h" +#include "proto_control0.h" +#include "proto_http.h" #include "reasons.h" #include "rendclient.h" #include "rendcommon.h" diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index 69b505fcd..caea04197 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/parsecommon.c \ src/or/periodic.c \ src/or/protover.c \ + src/or/proto_cell.c \ + src/or/proto_control0.c \ + src/or/proto_http.c \ + src/or/proto_socks.c \ src/or/policies.c \ src/or/reasons.c \ src/or/relay.c \ @@ -215,6 +219,10 @@ ORHEADERS = \ src/or/periodic.h \ src/or/policies.h \ src/or/protover.h \ + src/or/proto_cell.h \ + src/or/proto_control0.h \ + src/or/proto_http.h \ + src/or/proto_socks.h \ src/or/reasons.h \ src/or/relay.h \ src/or/rendcache.h \ diff --git a/src/or/proto_cell.c b/src/or/proto_cell.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9e5cdff42 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_cell.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. +#include "or.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "proto_cell.h" + +#include "connection_or.h" + +/** True iff the cell command command is one that implies a + * variable-length cell in Tor link protocol linkproto. */ +static inline int +cell_command_is_var_length(uint8_t command, int linkproto) +{ + /* If linkproto is v2 (2), CELL_VERSIONS is the only variable-length cells + * work as implemented here. If it's 1, there are no variable-length cells. + * Tor does not support other versions right now, and so can't negotiate + * them. + */ + switch (linkproto) { + case 1: + /* Link protocol version 1 has no variable-length cells. */ + return 0; + case 2: + /* In link protocol version 2, VERSIONS is the only variable-length cell */ + return command == CELL_VERSIONS; + case 0: + case 3: + default: + /* In link protocol version 3 and later, and in version "unknown", + * commands 128 and higher indicate variable-length. VERSIONS is + * grandfathered in. */ + return command == CELL_VERSIONS || command >= 128; + } +} + +/** Check buf for a variable-length cell according to the rules of link + * protocol version linkproto. If one is found, pull it off the buffer + * and assign a newly allocated var_cell_t to *out, and return 1. + * Return 0 if whatever is on the start of buf_t is not a variable-length + * cell. Return 1 and set *out to NULL if there seems to be the start + * of a variable-length cell on buf, but the whole thing isn't there + * yet. */ +int +fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto) +{ + char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE]; + var_cell_t *result; + uint8_t command; + uint16_t length; + const int wide_circ_ids = linkproto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS; + const int circ_id_len = get_circ_id_size(wide_circ_ids); + const unsigned header_len = get_var_cell_header_size(wide_circ_ids); + *out = NULL; + if (buf->datalen < header_len) + return 0; + peek_from_buf(hdr, header_len, buf); + + command = get_uint8(hdr + circ_id_len); + if (!(cell_command_is_var_length(command, linkproto))) + return 0; + + length = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr + circ_id_len + 1)); + if (buf->datalen < (size_t)(header_len+length)) + return 1; + result = var_cell_new(length); + result->command = command; + if (wide_circ_ids) + result->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(hdr)); + else + result->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); + + buf_remove_from_front(buf, header_len); + peek_from_buf((char*) result->payload, length, buf); + buf_remove_from_front(buf, length); + + *out = result; + return 1; +} + diff --git a/src/or/proto_cell.h b/src/or/proto_cell.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..91729a391 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_cell.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_PROTO_CELL_H +#define TOR_PROTO_CELL_H + +struct buf_t; +struct var_cell_t; + +int fetch_var_cell_from_buf(struct buf_t *buf, struct var_cell_t **out, + int linkproto); + +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/proto_control0.c b/src/or/proto_control0.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4c505fa6f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_control0.c @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. +#include "or.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "proto_control0.h" + +/** Return 1 iff buf looks more like it has an (obsolete) v0 controller + * command on it than any valid v1 controller command. */ +int +peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf) +{ + if (buf->datalen >= 4) { + char header[4]; + uint16_t cmd; + peek_from_buf(header, sizeof(header), buf); + cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(header+2)); + if (cmd <= 0x14) + return 1; /* This is definitely not a v1 control command. */ + } + return 0; +} + diff --git a/src/or/proto_control0.h b/src/or/proto_control0.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6df6bebaa --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_control0.h @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_PROTO_CONTROL0_H +#define TOR_PROTO_CONTROL0_H + +struct buf_t; +int peek_buf_has_control0_command(struct buf_t *buf); + +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/proto_http.c b/src/or/proto_http.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2ba3f93ab --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_http.c @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. +#define PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE +#include "or.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "proto_http.h" + +/** Return true if cmd looks like a HTTP (proxy) request. */ +int +peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf) +{ + if (peek_buf_startswith(buf, "CONNECT ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "DELETE ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "GET ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "POST ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "PUT " )) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/** There is a (possibly incomplete) http statement on buf, of the + * form "\%s\\r\\n\\r\\n\%s", headers, body. (body may contain NULs.) + * If a) the headers include a Content-Length field and all bytes in + * the body are present, or b) there's no Content-Length field and + * all headers are present, then: + * + * - strdup headers into *headers_out, and NUL-terminate it. + * - memdup body into *body_out, and NUL-terminate it. + * - Then remove them from buf, and return 1. + * + * - If headers or body is NULL, discard that part of the buf. + * - If a headers or body doesn't fit in the arg, return -1. + * (We ensure that the headers or body don't exceed max len, + * _even if_ we're planning to discard them.) + * - If force_complete is true, then succeed even if not all of the + * content has arrived. + * + * Else, change nothing and return 0. + */ +int +fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, + char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, + char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen, + int force_complete) +{ + char *headers; + size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen=0; + int crlf_offset; + int r; + + if (!buf->head) + return 0; + + crlf_offset = buf_find_string_offset(buf, "\r\n\r\n", 4); + if (crlf_offset > (int)max_headerlen || + (crlf_offset < 0 && buf->datalen > max_headerlen)) { + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers too long."); + return -1; + } else if (crlf_offset < 0) { + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers not all here yet."); + return 0; + } + /* Okay, we have a full header. Make sure it all appears in the first + * chunk. */ + if ((int)buf->head->datalen < crlf_offset + 4) + buf_pullup(buf, crlf_offset+4); + headerlen = crlf_offset + 4; + + headers = buf->head->data; + bodylen = buf->datalen - headerlen; + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", (int)headerlen, (int)bodylen); + + if (max_headerlen <= headerlen) { + log_warn(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d larger than %d. Failing.", + (int)headerlen, (int)max_headerlen-1); + return -1; + } + if (max_bodylen <= bodylen) { + log_warn(LD_HTTP,"bodylen %d larger than %d. Failing.", + (int)bodylen, (int)max_bodylen-1); + return -1; + } + + r = buf_http_find_content_length(headers, headerlen, &contentlen); + if (r == -1) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Content-Length is bogus; maybe " + "someone is trying to crash us."); + return -1; + } else if (r == 1) { + /* if content-length is malformed, then our body length is 0. fine. */ + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"Got a contentlen of %d.",(int)contentlen); + if (bodylen < contentlen) { + if (!force_complete) { + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"body not all here yet."); + return 0; /* not all there yet */ + } + } + if (bodylen > contentlen) { + bodylen = contentlen; + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"bodylen reduced to %d.",(int)bodylen); + } + } else { + tor_assert(r == 0); + /* Leave bodylen alone */ + } + + /* all happy. copy into the appropriate places, and return 1 */ + if (headers_out) { + *headers_out = tor_malloc(headerlen+1); + fetch_from_buf(*headers_out, headerlen, buf); + (*headers_out)[headerlen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */ + } + if (body_out) { + tor_assert(body_used); + *body_used = bodylen; + *body_out = tor_malloc(bodylen+1); + fetch_from_buf(*body_out, bodylen, buf); + (*body_out)[bodylen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */ + } + return 1; +} + +/** + * Scan the HTTP headers in the headerlen-byte memory range at + * headers, looking for a "Content-Length" header. Try to set + * *result_out to the numeric value of that header if possible. + * Return -1 if the header was malformed, 0 if it was missing, and 1 if + * it was present and well-formed. + */ +STATIC int +buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen, + size_t *result_out) +{ + const char *p, *newline; + char *len_str, *eos=NULL; + size_t remaining, result; + int ok; + *result_out = 0; /* The caller shouldn't look at this unless the + * return value is 1, but let's prevent confusion */ + +#define CONTENT_LENGTH "\r\nContent-Length: " + p = (char*) tor_memstr(headers, headerlen, CONTENT_LENGTH); + if (p == NULL) + return 0; + + tor_assert(p >= headers && p < headers+headerlen); + remaining = (headers+headerlen)-p; + p += strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH); + remaining -= strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH); + + newline = memchr(p, '\n', remaining); + if (newline == NULL) + return -1; + + len_str = tor_memdup_nulterm(p, newline-p); + /* We limit the size to INT_MAX because other parts of the buffer.c + * code don't like buffers to be any bigger than that. */ + result = (size_t) tor_parse_uint64(len_str, 10, 0, INT_MAX, &ok, &eos); + if (eos && !tor_strisspace(eos)) { + ok = 0; + } else { + *result_out = result; + } + tor_free(len_str); + + return ok ? 1 : -1; +} + diff --git a/src/or/proto_http.h b/src/or/proto_http.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dbff823cc --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_http.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_PROTO_HTTP_H +#define TOR_PROTO_HTTP_H + +struct buf_t; + +int fetch_from_buf_http(struct buf_t *buf, + char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, + char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen, + int force_complete); +int peek_buf_has_http_command(const struct buf_t *buf); + +#ifdef PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE +STATIC int buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen, + size_t *result_out); +#endif + +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.c b/src/or/proto_socks.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..20804455c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_socks.c @@ -0,0 +1,723 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. +#include "or.h" +#include "addressmap.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "control.h" +#include "config.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" +#include "proto_socks.h" +#include "reasons.h" + +static void socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req, + socks5_reply_status_t reason); + +static int parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, + int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out, + size_t *want_length_out); +static int parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, + int state, char **reason, + ssize_t *drain_out); +/** + * Wait this many seconds before warning the user about using SOCKS unsafely + * again. */ +#define SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL 5 + +/** Warn that the user application has made an unsafe socks request using + * protocol socks_protocol on port port. Don't warn more than + * once per SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL, unless safe_socks is set. */ +static void +log_unsafe_socks_warning(int socks_protocol, const char *address, + uint16_t port, int safe_socks) +{ + static ratelim_t socks_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL); + + if (safe_socks) { + log_fn_ratelim(&socks_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_APP, + "Your application (using socks%d to port %d) is giving " + "Tor only an IP address. Applications that do DNS resolves " + "themselves may leak information. Consider using Socks4A " + "(e.g. via privoxy or socat) instead. For more information, " + "please see https://wiki.torproject.org/TheOnionRouter/" + "TorFAQ#SOCKSAndDNS.%s", + socks_protocol, + (int)port, + safe_socks ? " Rejecting." : ""); + } + control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, + "DANGEROUS_SOCKS PROTOCOL=SOCKS%d ADDRESS=%s:%d", + socks_protocol, address, (int)port); +} + +/** Do not attempt to parse socks messages longer than this. This value is + * actually significantly higher than the longest possible socks message. */ +#define MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN 512 + +/** Return a new socks_request_t. */ +socks_request_t * +socks_request_new(void) +{ + return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(socks_request_t)); +} + +/** Free all storage held in the socks_request_t req. */ +void +socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req) +{ + if (!req) + return; + if (req->username) { + memwipe(req->username, 0x10, req->usernamelen); + tor_free(req->username); + } + if (req->password) { + memwipe(req->password, 0x04, req->passwordlen); + tor_free(req->password); + } + memwipe(req, 0xCC, sizeof(socks_request_t)); + tor_free(req); +} + +/** There is a (possibly incomplete) socks handshake on buf, of one + * of the forms + * - socks4: "socksheader username\\0" + * - socks4a: "socksheader username\\0 destaddr\\0" + * - socks5 phase one: "version #methods methods" + * - socks5 phase two: "version command 0 addresstype..." + * If it's a complete and valid handshake, and destaddr fits in + * MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN bytes, then pull the handshake off the buf, + * assign to req, and return 1. + * + * If it's invalid or too big, return -1. + * + * Else it's not all there yet, leave buf alone and return 0. + * + * If you want to specify the socks reply, write it into req->reply + * and set req->replylen, else leave req->replylen alone. + * + * If log_sockstype is non-zero, then do a notice-level log of whether + * the connection is possibly leaking DNS requests locally or not. + * + * If safe_socks is true, then reject unsafe socks protocols. + * + * If returning 0 or -1, req->address and req->port are + * undefined. + */ +int +fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, + int log_sockstype, int safe_socks) +{ + int res; + ssize_t n_drain; + size_t want_length = 128; + + if (buf->datalen < 2) /* version and another byte */ + return 0; + + do { + n_drain = 0; + buf_pullup(buf, want_length); + tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2); + want_length = 0; + + res = parse_socks(buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, req, log_sockstype, + safe_socks, &n_drain, &want_length); + + if (n_drain < 0) + buf_clear(buf); + else if (n_drain > 0) + buf_remove_from_front(buf, n_drain); + + } while (res == 0 && buf->head && want_length < buf->datalen && + buf->datalen >= 2); + + return res; +} + +/** The size of the header of an Extended ORPort message: 2 bytes for + * COMMAND, 2 bytes for BODYLEN */ +#define EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE 4 + +/** Read buf, which should contain an Extended ORPort message + * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate + * out with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the + * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we + * encountered an error while parsing it. */ +int +fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) +{ + char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; + uint16_t len; + + if (buf->datalen < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); + len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); + if (buf->datalen < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); + (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); + (*out)->len = len; + buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); + fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf); + return 1; +} + +/** Create a SOCKS5 reply message with reason in its REP field and + * have Tor send it as error response to req. + */ +static void +socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req, + socks5_reply_status_t reason) +{ + req->replylen = 10; + memset(req->reply,0,10); + + req->reply[0] = 0x05; // VER field. + req->reply[1] = reason; // REP field. + req->reply[3] = 0x01; // ATYP field. +} + +static const char SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG[] = + "HTTP/1.0 501 Tor is not an HTTP Proxy\r\n" + "Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n" + "<html>\n" + "<head>\n" + "<title>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</title>\n" + "</head>\n" + "<body>\n" + "<h1>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</h1>\n" + "\n" + "It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor as " + "an HTTP proxy.\n\n" + "This is not correct: Tor is a SOCKS proxy, not an HTTP proxy.\n" + "Please configure your client accordingly.\n" + "\n" + "\n" + "See <a href=\"https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html\">" + "https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html</a> for more " + "information.\n" + "\n" + "\n" + "</body>\n" + "</html>\n"; + +/** Implementation helper to implement fetch_from_*_socks. Instead of looking + * at a buffer's contents, we look at the datalen bytes of data in + * data. Instead of removing data from the buffer, we set + * drain_out to the amount of data that should be removed (or -1 if the + * buffer should be cleared). Instead of pulling more data into the first + * chunk of the buffer, we set *want_length_out to the number of bytes + * we'd like to see in the input buffer, if they're available. */ +static int +parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, + int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out, + size_t *want_length_out) +{ + unsigned int len; + char tmpbuf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN+1]; + tor_addr_t destaddr; + uint32_t destip; + uint8_t socksver; + char *next, *startaddr; + unsigned char usernamelen, passlen; + struct in_addr in; + + if (datalen < 2) { + /* We always need at least 2 bytes. */ + *want_length_out = 2; + return 0; + } + + if (req->socks_version == 5 && !req->got_auth) { + /* See if we have received authentication. Strictly speaking, we should + also check whether we actually negotiated username/password + authentication. But some broken clients will send us authentication + even if we negotiated SOCKS_NO_AUTH. */ + if (*data == 1) { /* username/pass version 1 */ + /* Format is: authversion [1 byte] == 1 + usernamelen [1 byte] + username [usernamelen bytes] + passlen [1 byte] + password [passlen bytes] */ + usernamelen = (unsigned char)*(data + 1); + if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u) { + *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u; + return 0; + } + passlen = (unsigned char)*(data + 2u + usernamelen); + if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen) { + *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen; + return 0; + } + req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */ + req->reply[0] = 1; /* authversion == 1 */ + req->reply[1] = 0; /* authentication successful */ + log_debug(LD_APP, + "socks5: Accepted username/password without checking."); + if (usernamelen) { + req->username = tor_memdup(data+2u, usernamelen); + req->usernamelen = usernamelen; + } + if (passlen) { + req->password = tor_memdup(data+3u+usernamelen, passlen); + req->passwordlen = passlen; + } + *drain_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen; + req->got_auth = 1; + *want_length_out = 7; /* Minimal socks5 command. */ + return 0; + } else if (req->auth_type == SOCKS_USER_PASS) { + /* unknown version byte */ + log_warn(LD_APP, "Socks5 username/password version %d not recognized; " + "rejecting.", (int)*data); + return -1; + } + } + + socksver = *data; + + switch (socksver) { /* which version of socks? */ + case 5: /* socks5 */ + + if (req->socks_version != 5) { /* we need to negotiate a method */ + unsigned char nummethods = (unsigned char)*(data+1); + int have_user_pass, have_no_auth; + int r=0; + tor_assert(!req->socks_version); + if (datalen < 2u+nummethods) { + *want_length_out = 2u+nummethods; + return 0; + } + if (!nummethods) + return -1; + req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */ + req->reply[0] = 5; /* socks5 reply */ + have_user_pass = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_USER_PASS, nummethods) !=NULL); + have_no_auth = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_NO_AUTH, nummethods) !=NULL); + if (have_user_pass && !(have_no_auth && req->socks_prefer_no_auth)) { + req->auth_type = SOCKS_USER_PASS; + req->reply[1] = SOCKS_USER_PASS; /* tell client to use "user/pass" + auth method */ + req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */ + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 2 (username/password)"); + r=0; + } else if (have_no_auth) { + req->reply[1] = SOCKS_NO_AUTH; /* tell client to use "none" auth + method */ + req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */ + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 0 (no authentication)"); + r=0; + } else { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "socks5: offered methods don't include 'no auth' or " + "username/password. Rejecting."); + req->reply[1] = '\xFF'; /* reject all methods */ + r=-1; + } + /* Remove packet from buf. Some SOCKS clients will have sent extra + * junk at this point; let's hope it's an authentication message. */ + *drain_out = 2u + nummethods; + + return r; + } + if (req->auth_type != SOCKS_NO_AUTH && !req->got_auth) { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "socks5: negotiated authentication, but none provided"); + return -1; + } + /* we know the method; read in the request */ + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: checking request"); + if (datalen < 7) {/* basic info plus >=1 for addr plus 2 for port */ + *want_length_out = 7; + return 0; /* not yet */ + } + req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1); + if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT && + req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE && + req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) { + /* not a connect or resolve or a resolve_ptr? we don't support it. */ + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req,SOCKS5_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + + log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.", + req->command); + return -1; + } + switch (*(data+3)) { /* address type */ + case 1: /* IPv4 address */ + case 4: /* IPv6 address */ { + const int is_v6 = *(data+3) == 4; + const unsigned addrlen = is_v6 ? 16 : 4; + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: ipv4 address type"); + if (datalen < 6+addrlen) {/* ip/port there? */ + *want_length_out = 6+addrlen; + return 0; /* not yet */ + } + + if (is_v6) + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&destaddr, data+4); + else + tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&destaddr, get_uint32(data+4)); + + tor_addr_to_str(tmpbuf, &destaddr, sizeof(tmpbuf), 1); + + if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); + log_warn(LD_APP, + "socks5 IP takes %d bytes, which doesn't fit in %d. " + "Rejecting.", + (int)strlen(tmpbuf)+1,(int)MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN); + return -1; + } + strlcpy(req->address,tmpbuf,sizeof(req->address)); + req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+4+addrlen)); + *drain_out = 6+addrlen; + if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR && + !addressmap_have_mapping(req->address,0)) { + log_unsafe_socks_warning(5, req->address, req->port, safe_socks); + if (safe_socks) { + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED); + return -1; + } + } + return 1; + } + case 3: /* fqdn */ + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: fqdn address type"); + if (req->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) { + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, + SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); + log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5 received RESOLVE_PTR command with " + "hostname type. Rejecting."); + return -1; + } + len = (unsigned char)*(data+4); + if (datalen < 7+len) { /* addr/port there? */ + *want_length_out = 7+len; + return 0; /* not yet */ + } + if (len+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); + log_warn(LD_APP, + "socks5 hostname is %d bytes, which doesn't fit in " + "%d. Rejecting.", len+1,MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN); + return -1; + } + memcpy(req->address,data+5,len); + req->address[len] = 0; + req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+5+len)); + *drain_out = 5+len+2; + + if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); + + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, + "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) gave Tor " + "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.", + req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address)); + return -1; + } + if (log_sockstype) + log_notice(LD_APP, + "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) instructed " + "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " + "necessary. This is good.", req->port); + return 1; + default: /* unsupported */ + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, + SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); + log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: unsupported address type %d. Rejecting.", + (int) *(data+3)); + return -1; + } + tor_assert(0); + break; + case 4: { /* socks4 */ + enum {socks4, socks4a} socks4_prot = socks4a; + const char *authstart, *authend; + /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4.protocol.txt */ + /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4A.protocol.txt */ + + req->socks_version = 4; + if (datalen < SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN) {/* basic info available? */ + *want_length_out = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN; + return 0; /* not yet */ + } + // buf_pullup(buf, 1280); + req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1); + if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT && + req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) { + /* not a connect or resolve? we don't support it. (No resolve_ptr with + * socks4.) */ + log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.", + req->command); + return -1; + } + + req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+2)); + destip = ntohl(get_uint32(data+4)); + if ((!req->port && req->command!=SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) || !destip) { + log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Port or DestIP is zero. Rejecting."); + return -1; + } + if (destip >> 8) { + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: destip not in form 0.0.0.x."); + in.s_addr = htonl(destip); + tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf)); + if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4 addr (%d bytes) too long. Rejecting.", + (int)strlen(tmpbuf)); + return -1; + } + log_debug(LD_APP, + "socks4: successfully read destip (%s)", + safe_str_client(tmpbuf)); + socks4_prot = socks4; + } + + authstart = data + SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN; + next = memchr(authstart, 0, + datalen-SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN); + if (!next) { + if (datalen >= 1024) { + log_debug(LD_APP, "Socks4 user name too long; rejecting."); + return -1; + } + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Username not here yet."); + *want_length_out = datalen+1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ + return 0; + } + authend = next; + tor_assert(next < data+datalen); + + startaddr = NULL; + if (socks4_prot != socks4a && + !addressmap_have_mapping(tmpbuf,0)) { + log_unsafe_socks_warning(4, tmpbuf, req->port, safe_socks); + + if (safe_socks) + return -1; + } + if (socks4_prot == socks4a) { + if (next+1 == data+datalen) { + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: No part of destaddr here yet."); + *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ + return 0; + } + startaddr = next+1; + next = memchr(startaddr, 0, data + datalen - startaddr); + if (!next) { + if (datalen >= 1024) { + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long."); + return -1; + } + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr not all here yet."); + *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ + return 0; + } + if (MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN <= next-startaddr) { + log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long. Rejecting."); + return -1; + } + // tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf->datalen); + + if (log_sockstype) + log_notice(LD_APP, + "Your application (using socks4a to port %d) instructed " + "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " + "necessary. This is good.", req->port); + } + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success."); + strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf, + sizeof(req->address)); + if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, + "Your application (using socks4 to port %d) gave Tor " + "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.", + req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address)); + return -1; + } + if (authend != authstart) { + req->got_auth = 1; + req->usernamelen = authend - authstart; + req->username = tor_memdup(authstart, authend - authstart); + } + /* next points to the final \0 on inbuf */ + *drain_out = next - data + 1; + return 1; + } + case 'G': /* get */ + case 'H': /* head */ + case 'P': /* put/post */ + case 'C': /* connect */ + strlcpy((char*)req->reply, SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG, + MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN); + req->replylen = strlen((char*)req->reply)+1; + /* fall through */ + default: /* version is not socks4 or socks5 */ + log_warn(LD_APP, + "Socks version %d not recognized. (Tor is not an http proxy.)", + *(data)); + { + /* Tell the controller the first 8 bytes. */ + char *tmp = tor_strndup(data, datalen < 8 ? datalen : 8); + control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, + "SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL DATA=\"%s\"", + escaped(tmp)); + tor_free(tmp); + } + return -1; + } +} + +/** Inspect a reply from SOCKS server stored in buf according + * to state, removing the protocol data upon success. Return 0 on + * incomplete response, 1 on success and -1 on error, in which case + * reason is set to a descriptive message (free() when finished + * with it). + * + * As a special case, 2 is returned when user/pass is required + * during SOCKS5 handshake and user/pass is configured. + */ +int +fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason) +{ + ssize_t drain = 0; + int r; + if (buf->datalen < 2) + return 0; + + buf_pullup(buf, MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN); + tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2); + + r = parse_socks_client((uint8_t*)buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, + state, reason, &drain); + if (drain > 0) + buf_remove_from_front(buf, drain); + else if (drain < 0) + buf_clear(buf); + + return r; +} + +/** Implementation logic for fetch_from_*_socks_client. */ +static int +parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, + int state, char **reason, + ssize_t *drain_out) +{ + unsigned int addrlen; + *drain_out = 0; + if (datalen < 2) + return 0; + + switch (state) { + case PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK: + /* Wait for the complete response */ + if (datalen < 8) + return 0; + + if (data[1] != 0x5a) { + *reason = tor_strdup(socks4_response_code_to_string(data[1])); + return -1; + } + + /* Success */ + *drain_out = 8; + return 1; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE: + /* we don't have any credentials */ + if (data[1] != 0x00) { + *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our " + "available authentication methods"); + return -1; + } + + log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: continuing without authentication"); + *drain_out = -1; + return 1; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929: + /* we have a username and password. return 1 if we can proceed without + * providing authentication, or 2 otherwise. */ + switch (data[1]) { + case 0x00: + log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: we have auth details but server " + "doesn't require authentication."); + *drain_out = -1; + return 1; + case 0x02: + log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: need authentication."); + *drain_out = -1; + return 2; + /* fall through */ + } + + *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our available " + "authentication methods"); + return -1; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK: + /* handle server reply to rfc1929 authentication */ + if (data[1] != 0x00) { + *reason = tor_strdup("authentication failed"); + return -1; + } + + log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: authentication successful."); + *drain_out = -1; + return 1; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK: + /* response is variable length. BND.ADDR, etc, isn't needed + * (don't bother with buf_pullup()), but make sure to eat all + * the data used */ + + /* wait for address type field to arrive */ + if (datalen < 4) + return 0; + + switch (data[3]) { + case 0x01: /* ip4 */ + addrlen = 4; + break; + case 0x04: /* ip6 */ + addrlen = 16; + break; + case 0x03: /* fqdn (can this happen here?) */ + if (datalen < 5) + return 0; + addrlen = 1 + data[4]; + break; + default: + *reason = tor_strdup("invalid response to connect request"); + return -1; + } + + /* wait for address and port */ + if (datalen < 6 + addrlen) + return 0; + + if (data[1] != 0x00) { + *reason = tor_strdup(socks5_response_code_to_string(data[1])); + return -1; + } + + *drain_out = 6 + addrlen; + return 1; + } + + /* shouldn't get here... */ + tor_assert(0); + + return -1; +} + diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.h b/src/or/proto_socks.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4a2477319 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_socks.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_PROTO_SOCKS_H +#define TOR_PROTO_SOCKS_H + +struct socks_request_t; +struct buf_t; + +struct socks_request_t *socks_request_new(void); +void socks_request_free(struct socks_request_t *req); +int fetch_from_buf_socks(struct buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, + int log_sockstype, int safe_socks); +int fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason); + +#endif + diff --git a/src/test/test_buffers.c b/src/test/test_buffers.c index a85fb95f0..3eb4ac2a3 100644 --- a/src/test/test_buffers.c +++ b/src/test/test_buffers.c @@ -4,9 +4,14 @@ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #define BUFFERS_PRIVATE +#define PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "ext_orport.h" +#include "proto_cell.h" +#include "proto_http.h" +#include "proto_control0.h" +#include "proto_socks.h" #include "test.h" /** Run unit tests for buffers.c */ diff --git a/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c b/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c index 75fe6249a..c4c74df66 100644 --- a/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c +++ b/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include "entrynodes.h" #include "routerparse.h" #include "networkstatus.h" +#include "proto_http.h" #include "geoip.h" #include "dirserv.h" #include "dirvote.h" diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_cache.c b/src/test/test_hs_cache.c index cbd88acff..950c0483d 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_cache.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_cache.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include "rendcache.h" #include "directory.h" #include "connection.h" +#include "proto_http.h" #include "hs_test_helpers.h" #include "test_helpers.h" diff --git a/src/test/test_socks.c b/src/test/test_socks.c index 7c0960f0f..571f45735 100644 --- a/src/test/test_socks.c +++ b/src/test/test_socks.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "config.h" +#include "proto_socks.h" #include "test.h" typedef struct socks_test_data_t {

1 0

[tor/master] Make buf_pullup() expose the pulled-up data.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit f28e314b0d5a6d4c677b87378cea70dc6524546b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 8 12:07:25 2017 -0400 Make buf_pullup() expose the pulled-up data. This lets us drop the testing-only function buf_get_first_chunk_data(), and lets us implement proto_http and proto_socks without looking at buf_t internals. --- src/or/buffers.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++---------------- src/or/buffers.h | 4 ++-- src/or/proto_http.c | 10 ++++------ src/or/proto_socks.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- src/test/test_buffers.c | 16 ++++++---------- 5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index ef8676cd9..18517b999 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -203,22 +203,33 @@ preferred_chunk_size(size_t target) /** Collapse data from the first N chunks from buf into buf->head, * growing it as necessary, until buf->head has the first bytes bytes * of data from the buffer, or until buf->head has all the data in buf. + * + * Set *head_out to point to the first byte of available data, and + * *len_out to the number of bytes of data available at + * *head_out. Note that *len_out may be more or less than + * bytes, depending on the number of bytes available. */ void -buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes) +buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes, const char **head_out, size_t *len_out) { chunk_t *dest, *src; size_t capacity; - if (!buf->head) + if (!buf->head) { + *head_out = NULL; + *len_out = 0; return; + } check(); if (buf->datalen < bytes) bytes = buf->datalen; capacity = bytes; - if (buf->head->datalen >= bytes) + if (buf->head->datalen >= bytes) { + *head_out = buf->head->data; + *len_out = buf->head->datalen; return; + } if (buf->head->memlen >= capacity) { /* We don't need to grow the first chunk, but we might need to repack it.*/ @@ -263,22 +274,11 @@ buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes) } check(); + *head_out = buf->head->data; + *len_out = buf->head->datalen; } #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS -/* Return the data from the first chunk of buf in cp, and its length in sz. */ -void -buf_get_first_chunk_data(const buf_t *buf, const char **cp, size_t *sz) -{ - if (!buf || !buf->head) { - *cp = NULL; - *sz = 0; - } else { - *cp = buf->head->data; - *sz = buf->head->datalen; - } -} - /* Write sz bytes from cp into a newly allocated buffer buf. * Returns NULL when passed a NULL cp or zero sz. * Asserts on failure: only for use in unit tests. diff --git a/src/or/buffers.h b/src/or/buffers.h index 5a6f510f5..e710ac64a 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.h +++ b/src/or/buffers.h @@ -55,11 +55,11 @@ int buf_set_to_copy(buf_t **output, void assert_buf_ok(buf_t *buf); int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n); -void buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes); +void buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes, + const char **head_out, size_t *len_out); #ifdef BUFFERS_PRIVATE #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS -void buf_get_first_chunk_data(const buf_t *buf, const char **cp, size_t *sz); buf_t *buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz); #endif ATTR_UNUSED STATIC size_t preferred_chunk_size(size_t target); diff --git a/src/or/proto_http.c b/src/or/proto_http.c index a47644a30..3977de186 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_http.c +++ b/src/or/proto_http.c @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ -#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. #define PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" @@ -48,12 +47,12 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen, int force_complete) { - char *headers; + const char *headers; size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen=0; int crlf_offset; int r; - if (!buf->head) + if (buf_datalen(buf) == 0) return 0; crlf_offset = buf_find_string_offset(buf, "\r\n\r\n", 4); @@ -67,11 +66,10 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, } /* Okay, we have a full header. Make sure it all appears in the first * chunk. */ - if ((int)buf->head->datalen < crlf_offset + 4) - buf_pullup(buf, crlf_offset+4); headerlen = crlf_offset + 4; + size_t headers_in_chunk = 0; + buf_pullup(buf, headerlen, &headers, &headers_in_chunk); - headers = buf->head->data; bodylen = buf_datalen(buf) - headerlen; log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", (int)headerlen, (int)bodylen); diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.c b/src/or/proto_socks.c index f1728bde3..7c7431cae 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_socks.c +++ b/src/or/proto_socks.c @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ -#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. #include "or.h" #include "addressmap.h" #include "buffers.h" @@ -115,17 +114,19 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, int res; ssize_t n_drain; size_t want_length = 128; + const char *head = NULL; + size_t datalen = 0; if (buf_datalen(buf) < 2) /* version and another byte */ return 0; do { n_drain = 0; - buf_pullup(buf, want_length); - tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2); + buf_pullup(buf, want_length, &head, &datalen); + tor_assert(head && datalen >= 2); want_length = 0; - res = parse_socks(buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, req, log_sockstype, + res = parse_socks(head, datalen, req, log_sockstype, safe_socks, &n_drain, &want_length); if (n_drain < 0) @@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, else if (n_drain > 0) buf_remove_from_front(buf, n_drain); - } while (res == 0 && buf->head && want_length < buf_datalen(buf) && + } while (res == 0 && head && want_length < buf_datalen(buf) && buf_datalen(buf) >= 2); return res; @@ -591,13 +592,16 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason) { ssize_t drain = 0; int r; + const char *head = NULL; + size_t datalen = 0; + if (buf_datalen(buf) < 2) return 0; - buf_pullup(buf, MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN); - tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2); + buf_pullup(buf, MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN, &head, &datalen); + tor_assert(head && datalen >= 2); - r = parse_socks_client((uint8_t*)buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, + r = parse_socks_client((uint8_t*)head, datalen, state, reason, &drain); if (drain > 0) buf_remove_from_front(buf, drain); diff --git a/src/test/test_buffers.c b/src/test/test_buffers.c index 3eb4ac2a3..49a1015d8 100644 --- a/src/test/test_buffers.c +++ b/src/test/test_buffers.c @@ -220,8 +220,7 @@ test_buffer_pullup(void *arg) /* There are a bunch of cases for pullup. One is the trivial case. Let's mess around with an empty buffer. */ - buf_pullup(buf, 16); - buf_get_first_chunk_data(buf, &cp, &sz); + buf_pullup(buf, 16, &cp, &sz); tt_ptr_op(cp, OP_EQ, NULL); tt_uint_op(sz, OP_EQ, 0); @@ -234,7 +233,7 @@ test_buffer_pullup(void *arg) crypto_rand(stuff, 16384); write_to_buf(stuff, 3000, buf); write_to_buf(stuff+3000, 3000, buf); - buf_get_first_chunk_data(buf, &cp, &sz); + buf_pullup(buf, 0, &cp, &sz); tt_ptr_op(cp, OP_NE, NULL); tt_int_op(sz, OP_LE, 4096); @@ -242,9 +241,8 @@ test_buffer_pullup(void *arg) * can get tested. */ tt_int_op(fetch_from_buf(tmp, 3000, buf), OP_EQ, 3000); tt_mem_op(tmp,OP_EQ, stuff, 3000); - buf_pullup(buf, 2048); + buf_pullup(buf, 2048, &cp, &sz); assert_buf_ok(buf); - buf_get_first_chunk_data(buf, &cp, &sz); tt_ptr_op(cp, OP_NE, NULL); tt_int_op(sz, OP_GE, 2048); tt_mem_op(cp,OP_EQ, stuff+3000, 2048); @@ -261,13 +259,12 @@ test_buffer_pullup(void *arg) write_to_buf(stuff+8000, 4000, buf); write_to_buf(stuff+12000, 4000, buf); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf), OP_EQ, 16000); - buf_get_first_chunk_data(buf, &cp, &sz); + buf_pullup(buf, 0, &cp, &sz); tt_ptr_op(cp, OP_NE, NULL); tt_int_op(sz, OP_LE, 4096); - buf_pullup(buf, 12500); + buf_pullup(buf, 12500, &cp, &sz); assert_buf_ok(buf); - buf_get_first_chunk_data(buf, &cp, &sz); tt_ptr_op(cp, OP_NE, NULL); tt_int_op(sz, OP_GE, 12500); tt_mem_op(cp,OP_EQ, stuff, 12500); @@ -288,9 +285,8 @@ test_buffer_pullup(void *arg) write_to_buf(stuff, 4000, buf); write_to_buf(stuff+4000, 4000, buf); fetch_from_buf(tmp, 100, buf); /* dump 100 bytes from first chunk */ - buf_pullup(buf, 16000); /* Way too much. */ + buf_pullup(buf, 16000, &cp, &sz); assert_buf_ok(buf); - buf_get_first_chunk_data(buf, &cp, &sz); tt_ptr_op(cp, OP_NE, NULL); tt_int_op(sz, OP_EQ, 7900); tt_mem_op(cp,OP_EQ, stuff+100, 7900);

1 0

[tor/master] Repair wide lines from previous commit.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit d61da9e61fa0ea15789464c7c3754a9af30fcbb4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 8 15:22:30 2017 -0400 Repair wide lines from previous commit. --- src/common/buffers.c | 8 +++++--- src/common/buffers.h | 8 +++++--- src/common/buffers_tls.c | 4 ++-- src/or/connection.c | 10 ++++++---- src/or/main.c | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/buffers.c b/src/common/buffers.c index 683952ddf..bade1ce16 100644 --- a/src/common/buffers.c +++ b/src/common/buffers.c @@ -551,8 +551,9 @@ read_to_chunk(buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, tor_socket_t fd, size_t at_most, */ /* XXXX indicate "read blocked" somehow? */ int -buf_read_from_socket(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof, - int *socket_error) +buf_read_from_socket(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, + int *reached_eof, + int *socket_error) { /* XXXX It's stupid to overload the return values for these functions: * "error status" and "number of bytes read" are not mutually exclusive. @@ -637,7 +638,8 @@ flush_chunk(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz, * -1 on failure. Return 0 if write() would block. */ int -buf_flush_to_socket(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen) +buf_flush_to_socket(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, + size_t *buf_flushlen) { /* XXXX It's stupid to overload the return values for these functions: * "error status" and "number of bytes flushed" are not mutually exclusive. diff --git a/src/common/buffers.h b/src/common/buffers.h index 73a688cff..7666f1895 100644 --- a/src/common/buffers.h +++ b/src/common/buffers.h @@ -35,10 +35,12 @@ size_t buf_slack(const buf_t *buf); uint32_t buf_get_oldest_chunk_timestamp(const buf_t *buf, uint32_t now); size_t buf_get_total_allocation(void); -int buf_read_from_socket(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof, - int *socket_error); +int buf_read_from_socket(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, + int *reached_eof, + int *socket_error); -int buf_flush_to_socket(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen); +int buf_flush_to_socket(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, + size_t *buf_flushlen); int buf_add(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); int buf_add_compress(buf_t *buf, struct tor_compress_state_t *state, diff --git a/src/common/buffers_tls.c b/src/common/buffers_tls.c index d22b56b63..13c9087db 100644 --- a/src/common/buffers_tls.c +++ b/src/common/buffers_tls.c @@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ flush_chunk_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, return r; } -/** As buf_flush_to_socket(), but writes data to a TLS connection. Can write more than - * flushlen bytes. +/** As buf_flush_to_socket(), but writes data to a TLS connection. Can write + * more than flushlen bytes. */ int buf_flush_to_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t flushlen, diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 1462bf480..0a343108d 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -127,8 +127,9 @@ static int connection_finished_flushing(connection_t *conn); static int connection_flushed_some(connection_t *conn); static int connection_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn); static int connection_reached_eof(connection_t *conn); -static int connection_buf_read_from_socket(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, - int *socket_error); +static int connection_buf_read_from_socket(connection_t *conn, + ssize_t *max_to_read, + int *socket_error); static int connection_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn, int package_partial); static void client_check_address_changed(tor_socket_t sock); static void set_constrained_socket_buffers(tor_socket_t sock, int size); @@ -3630,8 +3631,9 @@ connection_buf_read_from_socket(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, /* !connection_speaks_cells, !conn->linked_conn. */ int reached_eof = 0; CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, - result = buf_read_from_socket(conn->s, at_most, conn->inbuf, &reached_eof, - socket_error)); + result = buf_read_from_socket(conn->s, at_most, conn->inbuf, + &reached_eof, + socket_error)); if (reached_eof) conn->inbuf_reached_eof = 1; diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 9dc84f7de..e9b50763f 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -855,7 +855,8 @@ conn_close_if_marked(int i) } else retval = -1; /* never flush non-open broken tls connections */ } else { - retval = buf_flush_to_socket(conn->s, conn->outbuf, sz, &conn->outbuf_flushlen); + retval = buf_flush_to_socket(conn->s, conn->outbuf, sz, + &conn->outbuf_flushlen); } if (retval >= 0 && /* Technically, we could survive things like TLS_WANT_WRITE here. But don't bother for now. */

1 0

[tor/master] Repair buffer API so everything starts with buf_.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 4a7e90adc5828263a5d2dc3744818f2189c04bc7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 8 15:16:39 2017 -0400 Repair buffer API so everything starts with buf_. Our convention is that functions which manipulate a type T should be named T_foo. But the buffer functions were super old, and followed all kinds of conventions. Now they're uniform. Here's the perl I used to do this: \#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p s/read_to_buf\(/buf_read_from_socket\(/; s/flush_buf\(/buf_flush_to_socket\(/; s/read_to_buf_tls\(/buf_read_from_tls\(/; s/flush_buf_tls\(/buf_flush_to_tls\(/; s/write_to_buf\(/buf_add\(/; s/write_to_buf_compress\(/buf_add_compress\(/; s/move_buf_to_buf\(/buf_move_to_buf\(/; s/peek_from_buf\(/buf_peek\(/; s/fetch_from_buf\(/buf_get_bytes\(/; s/fetch_from_buf_line\(/buf_get_line\(/; s/fetch_from_buf_line\(/buf_get_line\(/; s/buf_remove_from_front\(/buf_drain\(/; s/peek_buf_startswith\(/buf_peek_startswith\(/; s/assert_buf_ok\(/buf_assert_ok\(/; --- src/common/buffers.c | 48 +++++------ src/common/buffers.h | 22 ++--- src/common/buffers_tls.c | 10 +-- src/common/buffers_tls.h | 4 +- src/or/channeltls.c | 2 +- src/or/connection.c | 52 ++++++------ src/or/connection.h | 12 +-- src/or/connection_edge.c | 10 +-- src/or/connection_or.c | 8 +- src/or/control.c | 18 ++--- src/or/directory.c | 36 ++++----- src/or/dirserv.c | 10 +-- src/or/ext_orport.c | 18 ++--- src/or/main.c | 6 +- src/or/proto_cell.c | 8 +- src/or/proto_control0.c | 2 +- src/or/proto_ext_or.c | 6 +- src/or/proto_http.c | 14 ++-- src/or/proto_socks.c | 4 +- src/or/relay.c | 8 +- src/test/test_buffers.c | 202 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- src/test/test_extorport.c | 8 +- src/test/test_helpers.c | 2 +- src/test/test_oom.c | 2 +- src/test/test_socks.c | 2 +- 25 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 257 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/buffers.c b/src/common/buffers.c index 1a9144e14..683952ddf 100644 --- a/src/common/buffers.c +++ b/src/common/buffers.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ #ifdef PARANOIA /** Helper: If PARANOIA is defined, assert that the buffer in local variable * buf is well-formed. */ -#define check() STMT_BEGIN assert_buf_ok(buf); STMT_END +#define check() STMT_BEGIN buf_assert_ok(buf); STMT_END #else #define check() STMT_NIL #endif @@ -282,14 +282,14 @@ buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz) /* Allocate a buffer */ buf_t *buf = buf_new_with_capacity(sz); tor_assert(buf); - assert_buf_ok(buf); + buf_assert_ok(buf); tor_assert(!buf->head); /* Allocate a chunk that is sz bytes long */ buf->head = chunk_new_with_alloc_size(CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz)); buf->tail = buf->head; tor_assert(buf->head); - assert_buf_ok(buf); + buf_assert_ok(buf); tor_assert(buf_allocation(buf) >= sz); /* Copy the data and size the buffers */ @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz) buf->datalen = sz; buf->head->datalen = sz; buf->head->data = &buf->head->mem[0]; - assert_buf_ok(buf); + buf_assert_ok(buf); /* Make sure everything is large enough */ tor_assert(buf_allocation(buf) >= sz); @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz) /** Remove the first n bytes from buf. */ void -buf_remove_from_front(buf_t *buf, size_t n) +buf_drain(buf_t *buf, size_t n) { tor_assert(buf->datalen >= n); while (n) { @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ read_to_chunk(buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, tor_socket_t fd, size_t at_most, */ /* XXXX indicate "read blocked" somehow? */ int -read_to_buf(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof, +buf_read_from_socket(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof, int *socket_error) { /* XXXX It's stupid to overload the return values for these functions: @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ read_to_buf(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof, return (int)total_read; } -/** Helper for flush_buf(): try to write sz bytes from chunk +/** Helper for buf_flush_to_socket(): try to write sz bytes from chunk * chunk of buffer buf onto socket s. On success, deduct * the bytes written from *buf_flushlen. Return the number of bytes * written on success, 0 on blocking, -1 on failure. @@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ flush_chunk(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz, return 0; } else { *buf_flushlen -= write_result; - buf_remove_from_front(buf, write_result); + buf_drain(buf, write_result); tor_assert(write_result < INT_MAX); return (int)write_result; } @@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ flush_chunk(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz, * -1 on failure. Return 0 if write() would block. */ int -flush_buf(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen) +buf_flush_to_socket(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen) { /* XXXX It's stupid to overload the return values for these functions: * "error status" and "number of bytes flushed" are not mutually exclusive. @@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ flush_buf(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen) * Return the new length of the buffer on success, -1 on failure. */ int -write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) +buf_add(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) { if (!string_len) return (int)buf->datalen; @@ -712,14 +712,14 @@ write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) * onto string. */ void -peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf) +buf_peek(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf) { chunk_t *chunk; tor_assert(string); /* make sure we don't ask for too much */ tor_assert(string_len <= buf->datalen); - /* assert_buf_ok(buf); */ + /* buf_assert_ok(buf); */ chunk = buf->head; while (string_len) { @@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf) * must be \<= the number of bytes on the buffer. */ int -fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) +buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) { /* There must be string_len bytes in buf; write them onto string, * then memmove buf back (that is, remove them from buf). @@ -747,8 +747,8 @@ fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) * Return the number of bytes still on the buffer. */ check(); - peek_from_buf(string, string_len, buf); - buf_remove_from_front(buf, string_len); + buf_peek(string, string_len, buf); + buf_drain(buf, string_len); check(); tor_assert(buf->datalen < INT_MAX); return (int)buf->datalen; @@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) * Return the number of bytes actually copied. */ int -move_buf_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen) +buf_move_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen) { /* We can do way better here, but this doesn't turn up in any profiles. */ char b[4096]; @@ -781,8 +781,8 @@ move_buf_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen) * it does two copies instead of 1, but I kinda doubt that this will be * critical path. */ size_t n = len > sizeof(b) ? sizeof(b) : len; - fetch_from_buf(b, n, buf_in); - write_to_buf(b, n, buf_out); + buf_get_bytes(b, n, buf_in); + buf_add(b, n, buf_out); len -= n; } *buf_flushlen -= cp; @@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n) /** Return 1 iff buf starts with cmd. cmd must be a null * terminated string, of no more than PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX bytes. */ int -peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd) +buf_peek_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd) { char tmp[PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX]; size_t clen = strlen(cmd); @@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd) return 0; if (buf->datalen < clen) return 0; - peek_from_buf(tmp, clen, buf); + buf_peek(tmp, clen, buf); return fast_memeq(tmp, cmd, clen); } @@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ buf_find_offset_of_char(buf_t *buf, char ch) * length exceeds *data_len. */ int -fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len) +buf_get_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len) { size_t sz; off_t offset; @@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len) *data_len = sz + 2; return -1; } - fetch_from_buf(data_out, sz+1, buf); + buf_get_bytes(data_out, sz+1, buf); data_out[sz+1] = '\0'; *data_len = sz+1; return 1; @@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len) * done is true, flush the data in the state and finish the * compression/uncompression. Return -1 on failure, 0 on success. */ int -write_to_buf_compress(buf_t *buf, tor_compress_state_t *state, +buf_add_compress(buf_t *buf, tor_compress_state_t *state, const char *data, size_t data_len, const int done) { @@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ buf_set_to_copy(buf_t **output, /** Log an error and exit if buf is corrupted. */ void -assert_buf_ok(buf_t *buf) +buf_assert_ok(buf_t *buf) { tor_assert(buf); tor_assert(buf->magic == BUFFER_MAGIC); diff --git a/src/common/buffers.h b/src/common/buffers.h index 77cc9ce0f..73a688cff 100644 --- a/src/common/buffers.h +++ b/src/common/buffers.h @@ -35,27 +35,27 @@ size_t buf_slack(const buf_t *buf); uint32_t buf_get_oldest_chunk_timestamp(const buf_t *buf, uint32_t now); size_t buf_get_total_allocation(void); -int read_to_buf(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof, +int buf_read_from_socket(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof, int *socket_error); -int flush_buf(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen); +int buf_flush_to_socket(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen); -int write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); -int write_to_buf_compress(buf_t *buf, struct tor_compress_state_t *state, +int buf_add(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); +int buf_add_compress(buf_t *buf, struct tor_compress_state_t *state, const char *data, size_t data_len, int done); -int move_buf_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen); -void peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf); -void buf_remove_from_front(buf_t *buf, size_t n); -int fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); -int fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len); +int buf_move_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen); +void buf_peek(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf); +void buf_drain(buf_t *buf, size_t n); +int buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); +int buf_get_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len); #define PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX 16 -int peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd); +int buf_peek_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd); int buf_set_to_copy(buf_t **output, const buf_t *input); -void assert_buf_ok(buf_t *buf); +void buf_assert_ok(buf_t *buf); int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n); void buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes, diff --git a/src/common/buffers_tls.c b/src/common/buffers_tls.c index e47073869..d22b56b63 100644 --- a/src/common/buffers_tls.c +++ b/src/common/buffers_tls.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ read_to_chunk_tls(buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, tor_tls_t *tls, * ready to write -- or vice versa. */ int -read_to_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf) +buf_read_from_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf) { int r = 0; size_t total_read = 0; @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ read_to_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf) return (int)total_read; } -/** Helper for flush_buf_tls(): try to write sz bytes from chunk +/** Helper for buf_flush_to_tls(): try to write sz bytes from chunk * chunk of buffer buf onto socket s. (Tries to write * more if there is a forced pending write size.) On success, deduct the * bytes written from *buf_flushlen. Return the number of bytes @@ -125,17 +125,17 @@ flush_chunk_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, *buf_flushlen -= r; else *buf_flushlen = 0; - buf_remove_from_front(buf, r); + buf_drain(buf, r); log_debug(LD_NET,"flushed %d bytes, %d ready to flush, %d remain.", r,(int)*buf_flushlen,(int)buf->datalen); return r; } -/** As flush_buf(), but writes data to a TLS connection. Can write more than +/** As buf_flush_to_socket(), but writes data to a TLS connection. Can write more than * flushlen bytes. */ int -flush_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t flushlen, +buf_flush_to_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t flushlen, size_t *buf_flushlen) { int r; diff --git a/src/common/buffers_tls.h b/src/common/buffers_tls.h index 4fce6c113..d6b35fe93 100644 --- a/src/common/buffers_tls.h +++ b/src/common/buffers_tls.h @@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ struct buf_t; struct tor_tls_t; -int read_to_buf_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, +int buf_read_from_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, struct buf_t *buf); -int flush_buf_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, struct buf_t *buf, size_t sz, +int buf_flush_to_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, struct buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen); #endif diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c index 654745118..4ccd3b5fb 100644 --- a/src/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/or/channeltls.c @@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method(channel_t *chan, tor_assert(packed_cell); if (tlschan->conn) { - connection_write_to_buf(packed_cell->body, cell_network_size, + connection_buf_add(packed_cell->body, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)); /* This is where the cell is finished; used to be done from relay.c */ diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 866ce5e0b..1462bf480 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ * they call connection_stop_reading() or connection_stop_writing(). * * To queue data to be written on a connection, call - * connection_write_to_buf(). When data arrives, the + * connection_buf_add(). When data arrives, the * connection_process_inbuf() callback is invoked, which dispatches to a * type-specific function (such as connection_edge_process_inbuf() for * example). Connection types that need notice of when data has been written @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int connection_finished_flushing(connection_t *conn); static int connection_flushed_some(connection_t *conn); static int connection_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn); static int connection_reached_eof(connection_t *conn); -static int connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, +static int connection_buf_read_from_socket(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, int *socket_error); static int connection_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn, int package_partial); static void client_check_address_changed(tor_socket_t sock); @@ -2143,7 +2143,7 @@ connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type) fmt_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port)); } - connection_write_to_buf(buf, strlen(buf), conn); + connection_buf_add(buf, strlen(buf), conn); conn->proxy_state = PROXY_HTTPS_WANT_CONNECT_OK; break; } @@ -2209,7 +2209,7 @@ connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type) buf[8] = 0; /* no userid */ } - connection_write_to_buf((char *)buf, buf_size, conn); + connection_buf_add((char *)buf, buf_size, conn); tor_free(buf); conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK; @@ -2240,7 +2240,7 @@ connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type) conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE; } - connection_write_to_buf((char *)buf, 2 + buf[1], conn); + connection_buf_add((char *)buf, 2 + buf[1], conn); break; } @@ -2346,7 +2346,7 @@ connection_send_socks5_connect(connection_t *conn) memcpy(buf + 20, &port, 2); } - connection_write_to_buf((char *)buf, reqsize, conn); + connection_buf_add((char *)buf, reqsize, conn); conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK; } @@ -2472,7 +2472,7 @@ connection_read_proxy_handshake(connection_t *conn) if (socks_args_string) tor_free(socks_args_string); - connection_write_to_buf((char *)buf, reqsize, conn); + connection_buf_add((char *)buf, reqsize, conn); conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK; ret = 0; @@ -3371,7 +3371,7 @@ connection_bucket_should_increase(int bucket, or_connection_t *conn) /** Read bytes from conn-\>s and process them. * - * It calls connection_read_to_buf() to bring in any new bytes, + * It calls connection_buf_read_from_socket() to bring in any new bytes, * and then calls connection_process_inbuf() to process them. * * Mark the connection and return -1 if you want to close it, else @@ -3413,7 +3413,7 @@ connection_handle_read_impl(connection_t *conn) tor_assert(!conn->marked_for_close); before = buf_datalen(conn->inbuf); - if (connection_read_to_buf(conn, &max_to_read, &socket_error) < 0) { + if (connection_buf_read_from_socket(conn, &max_to_read, &socket_error) < 0) { /* There's a read error; kill the connection.*/ if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { connection_or_notify_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn), @@ -3510,7 +3510,7 @@ connection_handle_read(connection_t *conn) * Return -1 if we want to break conn, else return 0. */ static int -connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, +connection_buf_read_from_socket(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, int *socket_error) { int result; @@ -3551,7 +3551,7 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, initial_size = buf_datalen(conn->inbuf); /* else open, or closing */ - result = read_to_buf_tls(or_conn->tls, at_most, conn->inbuf); + result = buf_read_from_tls(or_conn->tls, at_most, conn->inbuf); if (TOR_TLS_IS_ERROR(result) || result == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) or_conn->tls_error = result; else @@ -3600,7 +3600,7 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, /* If we have any pending bytes, we read them now. This *can* * take us over our read allotment, but really we shouldn't be * believing that SSL bytes are the same as TCP bytes anyway. */ - int r2 = read_to_buf_tls(or_conn->tls, pending, conn->inbuf); + int r2 = buf_read_from_tls(or_conn->tls, pending, conn->inbuf); if (BUG(r2<0)) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "apparently, reading pending bytes can fail."); return -1; @@ -3612,7 +3612,7 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, result, (long)n_read, (long)n_written); } else if (conn->linked) { if (conn->linked_conn) { - result = move_buf_to_buf(conn->inbuf, conn->linked_conn->outbuf, + result = buf_move_to_buf(conn->inbuf, conn->linked_conn->outbuf, &conn->linked_conn->outbuf_flushlen); } else { result = 0; @@ -3630,7 +3630,7 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, /* !connection_speaks_cells, !conn->linked_conn. */ int reached_eof = 0; CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, - result = read_to_buf(conn->s, at_most, conn->inbuf, &reached_eof, + result = buf_read_from_socket(conn->s, at_most, conn->inbuf, &reached_eof, socket_error)); if (reached_eof) conn->inbuf_reached_eof = 1; @@ -3700,17 +3700,17 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, /** A pass-through to fetch_from_buf. */ int -connection_fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn) +connection_buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn) { - return fetch_from_buf(string, len, conn->inbuf); + return buf_get_bytes(string, len, conn->inbuf); } -/** As fetch_from_buf_line(), but read from a connection's input buffer. */ +/** As buf_get_line(), but read from a connection's input buffer. */ int -connection_fetch_from_buf_line(connection_t *conn, char *data, +connection_buf_get_line(connection_t *conn, char *data, size_t *data_len) { - return fetch_from_buf_line(conn->inbuf, data, data_len); + return buf_get_line(conn->inbuf, data, data_len); } /** As fetch_from_buf_http, but fetches from a connection's input buffer_t as @@ -3747,7 +3747,7 @@ connection_outbuf_too_full(connection_t *conn) * * This function gets called either from conn_write_callback() in main.c * when libevent tells us that conn wants to write, or below - * from connection_write_to_buf() when an entire TLS record is ready. + * from connection_buf_add() when an entire TLS record is ready. * * Update conn-\>timestamp_lastwritten to now, and call flush_buf * or flush_buf_tls appropriately. If it succeeds and there are no more @@ -3858,7 +3858,7 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) /* else open, or closing */ initial_size = buf_datalen(conn->outbuf); - result = flush_buf_tls(or_conn->tls, conn->outbuf, + result = buf_flush_to_tls(or_conn->tls, conn->outbuf, max_to_write, &conn->outbuf_flushlen); /* If we just flushed the last bytes, tell the channel on the @@ -3921,7 +3921,7 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) result = (int)(initial_size-buf_datalen(conn->outbuf)); } else { CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, - result = flush_buf(conn->s, conn->outbuf, + result = buf_flush_to_socket(conn->s, conn->outbuf, max_to_write, &conn->outbuf_flushlen)); if (result < 0) { if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) @@ -4062,11 +4062,11 @@ connection_write_to_buf_impl_,(const char *string, size_t len, if (zlib) { dir_connection_t *dir_conn = TO_DIR_CONN(conn); int done = zlib < 0; - CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, r = write_to_buf_compress(conn->outbuf, + CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, r = buf_add_compress(conn->outbuf, dir_conn->compress_state, string, len, done)); } else { - CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, r = write_to_buf(string, len, conn->outbuf)); + CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, r = buf_add(string, len, conn->outbuf)); } if (r < 0) { if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) { @@ -4977,9 +4977,9 @@ assert_connection_ok(connection_t *conn, time_t now) /* buffers */ if (conn->inbuf) - assert_buf_ok(conn->inbuf); + buf_assert_ok(conn->inbuf); if (conn->outbuf) - assert_buf_ok(conn->outbuf); + buf_assert_ok(conn->outbuf); if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); diff --git a/src/or/connection.h b/src/or/connection.h index 0bcf0ccdc..57b9a4a1d 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.h +++ b/src/or/connection.h @@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ void connection_bucket_refill(int seconds_elapsed, time_t now); int connection_handle_read(connection_t *conn); -int connection_fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn); -int connection_fetch_from_buf_line(connection_t *conn, char *data, +int connection_buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn); +int connection_buf_get_line(connection_t *conn, char *data, size_t *data_len); int connection_fetch_from_buf_http(connection_t *conn, char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, @@ -139,18 +139,18 @@ int connection_flush(connection_t *conn); MOCK_DECL(void, connection_write_to_buf_impl_, (const char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn, int zlib)); /* DOCDOC connection_write_to_buf */ -static void connection_write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t len, +static void connection_buf_add(const char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn); /* DOCDOC connection_write_to_buf_compress */ -static void connection_write_to_buf_compress(const char *string, size_t len, +static void connection_buf_add_compress(const char *string, size_t len, dir_connection_t *conn, int done); static inline void -connection_write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn) +connection_buf_add(const char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn) { connection_write_to_buf_impl_(string, len, conn, 0); } static inline void -connection_write_to_buf_compress(const char *string, size_t len, +connection_buf_add_compress(const char *string, size_t len, dir_connection_t *conn, int done) { connection_write_to_buf_impl_(string, len, TO_CONN(conn), done ? -1 : 1); diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 4f990e0a0..9f47f4117 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -2276,7 +2276,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(entry_connection_t *conn) if (socks->replylen) { had_reply = 1; - connection_write_to_buf((const char*)socks->reply, socks->replylen, + connection_buf_add((const char*)socks->reply, socks->replylen, base_conn); socks->replylen = 0; if (sockshere == -1) { @@ -2373,7 +2373,7 @@ connection_ap_process_natd(entry_connection_t *conn) /* look for LF-terminated "[DEST ip_addr port]" * where ip_addr is a dotted-quad and port is in string form */ - err = connection_fetch_from_buf_line(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn), tmp_buf, &tlen); + err = connection_buf_get_line(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn), tmp_buf, &tlen); if (err == 0) return 0; if (err < 0) { @@ -3041,7 +3041,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply, return; } if (replylen) { /* we already have a reply in mind */ - connection_write_to_buf(reply, replylen, ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(reply, replylen, ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)); conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1; return; } @@ -3049,7 +3049,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply, memset(buf,0,SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN); buf[1] = (status==SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED ? SOCKS4_GRANTED : SOCKS4_REJECT); /* leave version, destport, destip zero */ - connection_write_to_buf(buf, SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN, ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(buf, SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN, ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)); } else if (conn->socks_request->socks_version == 5) { size_t buf_len; memset(buf,0,sizeof(buf)); @@ -3068,7 +3068,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply, /* 4 bytes for the header, 2 bytes for the port, 16 for the address. */ buf_len = 22; } - connection_write_to_buf(buf,buf_len,ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(buf,buf_len,ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)); } /* If socks_version isn't 4 or 5, don't send anything. * This can happen in the case of AP bridges. */ diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 8cd36d66b..d890b58da 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1979,7 +1979,7 @@ connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING) rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_CELL); - connection_write_to_buf(networkcell.body, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(networkcell.body, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn)); /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */ if (conn->chan) { @@ -2009,8 +2009,8 @@ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf,(const var_cell_t *cell, tor_assert(cell); tor_assert(conn); n = var_cell_pack_header(cell, hdr, conn->wide_circ_ids); - connection_write_to_buf(hdr, n, TO_CONN(conn)); - connection_write_to_buf((char*)cell->payload, + connection_buf_add(hdr, n, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add((char*)cell->payload, cell->payload_len, TO_CONN(conn)); if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 0); @@ -2085,7 +2085,7 @@ connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn) channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)); circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); - connection_fetch_from_buf(buf, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_get_bytes(buf, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn)); /* retrieve cell info from buf (create the host-order struct from the * network-order string) */ diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index cd78daa91..eb6f21352 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static inline void connection_write_str_to_buf(const char *s, control_connection_t *conn) { size_t len = strlen(s); - connection_write_to_buf(s, len, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(s, len, TO_CONN(conn)); } /** Given a len-character string in data, made of lines @@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ connection_printf_to_buf(control_connection_t *conn, const char *format, ...) tor_assert(0); } - connection_write_to_buf(buf, (size_t)len, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(buf, (size_t)len, TO_CONN(conn)); tor_free(buf); } @@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ queued_events_flush_all(int force) SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(controllers, control_connection_t *, control_conn) { if (control_conn->event_mask & bit) { - connection_write_to_buf(ev->msg, msg_len, TO_CONN(control_conn)); + connection_buf_add(ev->msg, msg_len, TO_CONN(control_conn)); } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(control_conn); @@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ handle_control_getconf(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t body_len, tor_assert(strlen(tmp)>4); tmp[3] = ' '; msg = smartlist_join_strings(answers, "", 0, &msg_len); - connection_write_to_buf(msg, msg_len, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(msg, msg_len, TO_CONN(conn)); } else { connection_write_str_to_buf("250 OK\r\n", conn); } @@ -1656,12 +1656,12 @@ handle_control_mapaddress(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, if (smartlist_len(reply)) { ((char*)smartlist_get(reply,smartlist_len(reply)-1))[3] = ' '; r = smartlist_join_strings(reply, "\r\n", 1, &sz); - connection_write_to_buf(r, sz, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(r, sz, TO_CONN(conn)); tor_free(r); } else { const char *response = "512 syntax error: not enough arguments to mapaddress.\r\n"; - connection_write_to_buf(response, strlen(response), TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(response, strlen(response), TO_CONN(conn)); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH(reply, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); @@ -3246,7 +3246,7 @@ handle_control_getinfo(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, size_t esc_len; esc_len = write_escaped_data(v, strlen(v), &esc); connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "250+%s=\r\n", k); - connection_write_to_buf(esc, esc_len, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(esc, esc_len, TO_CONN(conn)); tor_free(esc); } } @@ -4987,7 +4987,7 @@ connection_control_process_inbuf(control_connection_t *conn) sizeof(buf)-6); body_len = 2+strlen(buf+6)+2; /* code, msg, nul. */ set_uint16(buf+0, htons(body_len)); - connection_write_to_buf(buf, 4+body_len, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(buf, 4+body_len, TO_CONN(conn)); connection_mark_and_flush(TO_CONN(conn)); return 0; @@ -5009,7 +5009,7 @@ connection_control_process_inbuf(control_connection_t *conn) /* First, fetch a line. */ do { data_len = conn->incoming_cmd_len - conn->incoming_cmd_cur_len; - r = connection_fetch_from_buf_line(TO_CONN(conn), + r = connection_buf_get_line(TO_CONN(conn), conn->incoming_cmd+conn->incoming_cmd_cur_len, &data_len); if (r == 0) diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 57dfdd9ca..b1094634f 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -1912,11 +1912,11 @@ directory_send_command(dir_connection_t *conn, request_len = strlen(request); total_request_len += request_len; - connection_write_to_buf(request, request_len, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(request, request_len, TO_CONN(conn)); url_len = strlen(url); total_request_len += url_len; - connection_write_to_buf(url, url_len, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(url, url_len, TO_CONN(conn)); tor_free(url); if (!strcmp(httpcommand, "POST") || payload) { @@ -1933,11 +1933,11 @@ directory_send_command(dir_connection_t *conn, request_len = strlen(request); total_request_len += request_len; - connection_write_to_buf(request, request_len, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(request, request_len, TO_CONN(conn)); if (payload) { /* then send the payload afterwards too */ - connection_write_to_buf(payload, payload_len, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(payload, payload_len, TO_CONN(conn)); total_request_len += payload_len; } @@ -3466,7 +3466,7 @@ write_http_status_line(dir_connection_t *conn, int status, return; } log_debug(LD_DIRSERV,"Wrote status 'HTTP/1.0 %d %s'", status, reason_phrase); - connection_write_to_buf(buf, strlen(buf), TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(buf, strlen(buf), TO_CONN(conn)); } /** Write the header for an HTTP/1.0 response onto conn-\>outbuf, @@ -3539,7 +3539,7 @@ write_http_response_header_impl(dir_connection_t *conn, ssize_t length, memcpy(cp, "\r\n", 3); else tor_assert(0); - connection_write_to_buf(tmp, strlen(tmp), TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(tmp, strlen(tmp), TO_CONN(conn)); } /** As write_http_response_header_impl, but sets encoding and content-typed @@ -3902,7 +3902,7 @@ handle_get_frontpage(dir_connection_t *conn, const get_handler_args_t *args) * this page no matter what.] */ write_http_response_header_impl(conn, dlen, "text/html", "identity", NULL, DIRPORTFRONTPAGE_CACHE_LIFETIME); - connection_write_to_buf(frontpage, dlen, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(frontpage, dlen, TO_CONN(conn)); } else { write_http_status_line(conn, 404, "Not found"); } @@ -4539,15 +4539,15 @@ handle_get_status_vote(dir_connection_t *conn, const get_handler_args_t *args) conn->compress_state = tor_compress_new(1, compress_method, choose_compression_level(estimated_len)); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(items, const char *, c, - connection_write_to_buf_compress(c, strlen(c), conn, 0)); - connection_write_to_buf_compress("", 0, conn, 1); + connection_buf_add_compress(c, strlen(c), conn, 0)); + connection_buf_add_compress("", 0, conn, 1); } else { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(items, const char *, c, - connection_write_to_buf(c, strlen(c), TO_CONN(conn))); + connection_buf_add(c, strlen(c), TO_CONN(conn))); } } else { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(dir_items, cached_dir_t *, d, - connection_write_to_buf(compress_method != NO_METHOD ? + connection_buf_add(compress_method != NO_METHOD ? d->dir_compressed : d->dir, compress_method != NO_METHOD ? d->dir_compressed_len : d->dir_len, @@ -4795,14 +4795,14 @@ handle_get_keys(dir_connection_t *conn, const get_handler_args_t *args) conn->compress_state = tor_compress_new(1, compress_method, choose_compression_level(len)); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(certs, authority_cert_t *, c, - connection_write_to_buf_compress( + connection_buf_add_compress( c->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, c->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len, conn, 0)); - connection_write_to_buf_compress("", 0, conn, 1); + connection_buf_add_compress("", 0, conn, 1); } else { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(certs, authority_cert_t *, c, - connection_write_to_buf(c->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, + connection_buf_add(c->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, c->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len, TO_CONN(conn))); } @@ -4831,7 +4831,7 @@ handle_get_hs_descriptor_v2(dir_connection_t *conn, switch (rend_cache_lookup_v2_desc_as_dir(query, &descp)) { case 1: /* valid */ write_http_response_header(conn, strlen(descp), NO_METHOD, 0); - connection_write_to_buf(descp, strlen(descp), TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(descp, strlen(descp), TO_CONN(conn)); break; case 0: /* well-formed but not present */ write_http_status_line(conn, 404, "Not found"); @@ -4883,7 +4883,7 @@ handle_get_hs_descriptor_v3(dir_connection_t *conn, /* Found requested descriptor! Pass it to this nice client. */ write_http_response_header(conn, strlen(desc_str), NO_METHOD, 0); - connection_write_to_buf(desc_str, strlen(desc_str), TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(desc_str, strlen(desc_str), TO_CONN(conn)); done: return 0; @@ -4922,7 +4922,7 @@ handle_get_networkstatus_bridges(dir_connection_t *conn, status = networkstatus_getinfo_by_purpose("bridge", time(NULL)); size_t dlen = strlen(status); write_http_response_header(conn, dlen, NO_METHOD, 0); - connection_write_to_buf(status, dlen, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(status, dlen, TO_CONN(conn)); tor_free(status); goto done; } @@ -4939,7 +4939,7 @@ handle_get_robots(dir_connection_t *conn, const get_handler_args_t *args) const char robots[] = "User-agent: *\r\nDisallow: /\r\n"; size_t len = strlen(robots); write_http_response_header(conn, len, NO_METHOD, ROBOTS_CACHE_LIFETIME); - connection_write_to_buf(robots, len, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add(robots, len, TO_CONN(conn)); } return 0; } diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 4faca9454..b3a0b0d23 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -3617,9 +3617,9 @@ spooled_resource_flush_some(spooled_resource_t *spooled, return SRFS_DONE; } if (conn->compress_state) { - connection_write_to_buf_compress((const char*)body, bodylen, conn, 0); + connection_buf_add_compress((const char*)body, bodylen, conn, 0); } else { - connection_write_to_buf((const char*)body, bodylen, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_add((const char*)body, bodylen, TO_CONN(conn)); } return SRFS_DONE; } else { @@ -3656,11 +3656,11 @@ spooled_resource_flush_some(spooled_resource_t *spooled, return SRFS_ERR; ssize_t bytes = (ssize_t) MIN(DIRSERV_CACHED_DIR_CHUNK_SIZE, remaining); if (conn->compress_state) { - connection_write_to_buf_compress( + connection_buf_add_compress( ptr + spooled->cached_dir_offset, bytes, conn, 0); } else { - connection_write_to_buf(ptr + spooled->cached_dir_offset, + connection_buf_add(ptr + spooled->cached_dir_offset, bytes, TO_CONN(conn)); } spooled->cached_dir_offset += bytes; @@ -3925,7 +3925,7 @@ connection_dirserv_flushed_some(dir_connection_t *conn) if (conn->compress_state) { /* Flush the compression state: there could be more bytes pending in there, * and we don't want to omit bytes. */ - connection_write_to_buf_compress("", 0, conn, 1); + connection_buf_add_compress("", 0, conn, 1); tor_compress_free(conn->compress_state); conn->compress_state = NULL; } diff --git a/src/or/ext_orport.c b/src/or/ext_orport.c index 83dc13ecf..c22a2f13d 100644 --- a/src/or/ext_orport.c +++ b/src/or/ext_orport.c @@ -70,10 +70,10 @@ connection_write_ext_or_command(connection_t *conn, return -1; set_uint16(header, htons(command)); set_uint16(header+2, htons(bodylen)); - connection_write_to_buf(header, 4, conn); + connection_buf_add(header, 4, conn); if (bodylen) { tor_assert(body); - connection_write_to_buf(body, bodylen, conn); + connection_buf_add(body, bodylen, conn); } return 0; } @@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ connection_ext_or_auth_neg_auth_type(connection_t *conn) if (connection_get_inbuf_len(conn) < 1) return 0; - if (connection_fetch_from_buf(authtype, 1, conn) < 0) + if (connection_buf_get_bytes(authtype, 1, conn) < 0) return -1; log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Client wants us to use %d auth type", authtype[0]); @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ connection_ext_or_auth_handle_client_nonce(connection_t *conn) if (connection_get_inbuf_len(conn) < EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) return 0; - if (connection_fetch_from_buf(client_nonce, + if (connection_buf_get_bytes(client_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN, conn) < 0) return -1; @@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ connection_ext_or_auth_handle_client_nonce(connection_t *conn) &reply, &reply_len) < 0) return -1; - connection_write_to_buf(reply, reply_len, conn); + connection_buf_add(reply, reply_len, conn); memwipe(reply, 0, reply_len); tor_free(reply); @@ -348,9 +348,9 @@ static void connection_ext_or_auth_send_result(connection_t *conn, int success) { if (success) - connection_write_to_buf("\x01", 1, conn); + connection_buf_add("\x01", 1, conn); else - connection_write_to_buf("\x00", 1, conn); + connection_buf_add("\x00", 1, conn); } /** Receive the client's hash from conn, validate that it's @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ connection_ext_or_auth_handle_client_hash(connection_t *conn) if (connection_get_inbuf_len(conn) < EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN) return 0; - if (connection_fetch_from_buf(provided_client_hash, + if (connection_buf_get_bytes(provided_client_hash, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN, conn) < 0) return -1; @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ connection_ext_or_start_auth(or_connection_t *or_conn) log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "ExtORPort authentication: Sending supported authentication types"); - connection_write_to_buf((const char *)authtypes, sizeof(authtypes), conn); + connection_buf_add((const char *)authtypes, sizeof(authtypes), conn); conn->state = EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_AUTH_TYPE; return 0; diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index a9d4bdb6e..9dc84f7de 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ conn_close_if_marked(int i) (int)conn->outbuf_flushlen, conn->marked_for_close_file, conn->marked_for_close); if (conn->linked_conn) { - retval = move_buf_to_buf(conn->linked_conn->inbuf, conn->outbuf, + retval = buf_move_to_buf(conn->linked_conn->inbuf, conn->outbuf, &conn->outbuf_flushlen); if (retval >= 0) { /* The linked conn will notice that it has data when it notices that @@ -850,12 +850,12 @@ conn_close_if_marked(int i) connection_wants_to_flush(conn)); } else if (connection_speaks_cells(conn)) { if (conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { - retval = flush_buf_tls(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->tls, conn->outbuf, sz, + retval = buf_flush_to_tls(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->tls, conn->outbuf, sz, &conn->outbuf_flushlen); } else retval = -1; /* never flush non-open broken tls connections */ } else { - retval = flush_buf(conn->s, conn->outbuf, sz, &conn->outbuf_flushlen); + retval = buf_flush_to_socket(conn->s, conn->outbuf, sz, &conn->outbuf_flushlen); } if (retval >= 0 && /* Technically, we could survive things like TLS_WANT_WRITE here. But don't bother for now. */ diff --git a/src/or/proto_cell.c b/src/or/proto_cell.c index 4c86b7e4d..4ce38ebfc 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_cell.c +++ b/src/or/proto_cell.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto) *out = NULL; if (buf_datalen(buf) < header_len) return 0; - peek_from_buf(hdr, header_len, buf); + buf_peek(hdr, header_len, buf); command = get_uint8(hdr + circ_id_len); if (!(cell_command_is_var_length(command, linkproto))) @@ -73,9 +73,9 @@ fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto) else result->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); - buf_remove_from_front(buf, header_len); - peek_from_buf((char*) result->payload, length, buf); - buf_remove_from_front(buf, length); + buf_drain(buf, header_len); + buf_peek((char*) result->payload, length, buf); + buf_drain(buf, length); *out = result; return 1; diff --git a/src/or/proto_control0.c b/src/or/proto_control0.c index 5478d07e4..af8478648 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_control0.c +++ b/src/or/proto_control0.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf) if (buf_datalen(buf) >= 4) { char header[4]; uint16_t cmd; - peek_from_buf(header, sizeof(header), buf); + buf_peek(header, sizeof(header), buf); cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(header+2)); if (cmd <= 0x14) return 1; /* This is definitely not a v1 control command. */ diff --git a/src/or/proto_ext_or.c b/src/or/proto_ext_or.c index d7f8cab1b..70419265d 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_ext_or.c +++ b/src/or/proto_ext_or.c @@ -26,15 +26,15 @@ fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) if (buf_datalen(buf) < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) return 0; - peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); + buf_peek(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); if (buf_datalen(buf) < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) return 0; *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); (*out)->len = len; - buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); - fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf); + buf_drain(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); + buf_get_bytes((*out)->body, len, buf); return 1; } diff --git a/src/or/proto_http.c b/src/or/proto_http.c index 3977de186..6e0316574 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_http.c +++ b/src/or/proto_http.c @@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ int peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf) { - if (peek_buf_startswith(buf, "CONNECT ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "DELETE ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "GET ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "POST ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "PUT " )) + if (buf_peek_startswith(buf, "CONNECT ") || + buf_peek_startswith(buf, "DELETE ") || + buf_peek_startswith(buf, "GET ") || + buf_peek_startswith(buf, "POST ") || + buf_peek_startswith(buf, "PUT " )) return 1; return 0; } @@ -110,14 +110,14 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, /* all happy. copy into the appropriate places, and return 1 */ if (headers_out) { *headers_out = tor_malloc(headerlen+1); - fetch_from_buf(*headers_out, headerlen, buf); + buf_get_bytes(*headers_out, headerlen, buf); (*headers_out)[headerlen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */ } if (body_out) { tor_assert(body_used); *body_used = bodylen; *body_out = tor_malloc(bodylen+1); - fetch_from_buf(*body_out, bodylen, buf); + buf_get_bytes(*body_out, bodylen, buf); (*body_out)[bodylen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */ } return 1; diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.c b/src/or/proto_socks.c index f153658bb..f92d61491 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_socks.c +++ b/src/or/proto_socks.c @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, if (n_drain < 0) buf_clear(buf); else if (n_drain > 0) - buf_remove_from_front(buf, n_drain); + buf_drain(buf, n_drain); } while (res == 0 && head && want_length < buf_datalen(buf) && buf_datalen(buf) >= 2); @@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason) r = parse_socks_client((uint8_t*)head, datalen, state, reason, &drain); if (drain > 0) - buf_remove_from_front(buf, drain); + buf_drain(buf, drain); else if (drain < 0) buf_clear(buf); diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 18ccc65b8..15ab730a8 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -1670,7 +1670,7 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, } stats_n_data_bytes_received += rh.length; - connection_write_to_buf((char*)(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE), + connection_buf_add((char*)(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE), rh.length, TO_CONN(conn)); #ifdef MEASUREMENTS_21206 @@ -2038,13 +2038,13 @@ connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int package_partial, /* XXXX We could be more efficient here by sometimes packing * previously-sent optimistic data in the same cell with data * from the inbuf. */ - fetch_from_buf(payload, length, entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data); + buf_get_bytes(payload, length, entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data); if (!buf_datalen(entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data)) { buf_free(entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data); entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data = NULL; } } else { - connection_fetch_from_buf(payload, length, TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_buf_get_bytes(payload, length, TO_CONN(conn)); } log_debug(domain,TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT": Packaging %d bytes (%d waiting).", @@ -2056,7 +2056,7 @@ connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int package_partial, retry */ if (!entry_conn->pending_optimistic_data) entry_conn->pending_optimistic_data = buf_new(); - write_to_buf(payload, length, entry_conn->pending_optimistic_data); + buf_add(payload, length, entry_conn->pending_optimistic_data); } if (connection_edge_send_command(conn, RELAY_COMMAND_DATA, diff --git a/src/test/test_buffers.c b/src/test/test_buffers.c index d2d1223f3..44cfedf46 100644 --- a/src/test/test_buffers.c +++ b/src/test/test_buffers.c @@ -45,15 +45,15 @@ test_buffers_basic(void *arg) for (j=0;j<256;++j) { str[j] = (char)j; } - write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); - write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); + buf_add(str, 256, buf); + buf_add(str, 256, buf); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ, 512); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 200, buf); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 200, buf); tt_mem_op(str,OP_EQ, str2, 200); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ, 312); memset(str2, 0, sizeof(str2)); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 256, buf); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 256, buf); tt_mem_op(str+200,OP_EQ, str2, 56); tt_mem_op(str,OP_EQ, str2+56, 200); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ, 56); @@ -61,16 +61,16 @@ test_buffers_basic(void *arg) /* Okay, now we should be 512 bytes into the 4096-byte buffer. If we add * another 3584 bytes, we hit the end. */ for (j=0;j<15;++j) { - write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); + buf_add(str, 256, buf); } - assert_buf_ok(buf); + buf_assert_ok(buf); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ, 3896); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 56, buf); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 56, buf); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ, 3840); tt_mem_op(str+200,OP_EQ, str2, 56); for (j=0;j<15;++j) { memset(str2, 0, sizeof(str2)); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 256, buf); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 256, buf); tt_mem_op(str,OP_EQ, str2, 256); } tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ, 0); @@ -80,38 +80,38 @@ test_buffers_basic(void *arg) /* Okay, now make sure growing can work. */ buf = buf_new_with_capacity(16); //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 16); - write_to_buf(str+1, 255, buf); + buf_add(str+1, 255, buf); //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 256); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 254, buf); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 254, buf); tt_mem_op(str+1,OP_EQ, str2, 254); //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 256); - assert_buf_ok(buf); - write_to_buf(str, 32, buf); + buf_assert_ok(buf); + buf_add(str, 32, buf); //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 256); - assert_buf_ok(buf); - write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); - assert_buf_ok(buf); + buf_assert_ok(buf); + buf_add(str, 256, buf); + buf_assert_ok(buf); //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 512); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ, 33+256); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 33, buf); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 33, buf); tt_int_op(*str2,OP_EQ, str[255]); tt_mem_op(str2+1,OP_EQ, str, 32); //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 512); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ, 256); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 256, buf); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 256, buf); tt_mem_op(str,OP_EQ, str2, 256); /* now try shrinking: case 1. */ buf_free(buf); buf = buf_new_with_capacity(33668); for (j=0;j<67;++j) { - write_to_buf(str,255, buf); + buf_add(str,255, buf); } //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 33668); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ, 17085); for (j=0; j < 40; ++j) { - fetch_from_buf(str2, 255,buf); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 255,buf); tt_mem_op(str2,OP_EQ, str, 255); } @@ -119,18 +119,18 @@ test_buffers_basic(void *arg) buf_free(buf); buf = buf_new_with_capacity(33668); for (j=0;j<67;++j) { - write_to_buf(str,255, buf); + buf_add(str,255, buf); } for (j=0; j < 20; ++j) { - fetch_from_buf(str2, 255,buf); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 255,buf); tt_mem_op(str2,OP_EQ, str, 255); } for (j=0;j<80;++j) { - write_to_buf(str,255, buf); + buf_add(str,255, buf); } //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf),33668); for (j=0; j < 120; ++j) { - fetch_from_buf(str2, 255,buf); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 255,buf); tt_mem_op(str2,OP_EQ, str, 255); } @@ -139,27 +139,27 @@ test_buffers_basic(void *arg) buf = buf_new_with_capacity(4096); buf2 = buf_new_with_capacity(4096); for (j=0;j<100;++j) - write_to_buf(str, 255, buf); + buf_add(str, 255, buf); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ, 25500); for (j=0;j<100;++j) { r = 10; - move_buf_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); + buf_move_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); tt_int_op(r,OP_EQ, 0); } tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ, 24500); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf2),OP_EQ, 1000); for (j=0;j<3;++j) { - fetch_from_buf(str2, 255, buf2); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 255, buf2); tt_mem_op(str2,OP_EQ, str, 255); } r = 8192; /*big move*/ - move_buf_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); + buf_move_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); tt_int_op(r,OP_EQ, 0); r = 30000; /* incomplete move */ - move_buf_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); + buf_move_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); tt_int_op(r,OP_EQ, 13692); for (j=0;j<97;++j) { - fetch_from_buf(str2, 255, buf2); + buf_get_bytes(str2, 255, buf2); tt_mem_op(str2,OP_EQ, str, 255); } buf_free(buf); @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ test_buffers_basic(void *arg) buf = buf_new_with_capacity(5); cp = "Testing. This is a moderately long Testing string."; for (j = 0; cp[j]; j++) - write_to_buf(cp+j, 1, buf); + buf_add(cp+j, 1, buf); tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "Testing", 7)); tt_int_op(1,OP_EQ, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "esting", 6)); tt_int_op(1,OP_EQ, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "est", 3)); @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ test_buffers_basic(void *arg) { char *mem = tor_malloc_zero(65536); buf = buf_new(); - write_to_buf(mem, 65536, buf); + buf_add(mem, 65536, buf); tor_free(mem); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf), OP_EQ, 65536); @@ -233,62 +233,62 @@ test_buffer_pullup(void *arg) /* Let's add some data. */ crypto_rand(stuff, 16384); - write_to_buf(stuff, 3000, buf); - write_to_buf(stuff+3000, 3000, buf); + buf_add(stuff, 3000, buf); + buf_add(stuff+3000, 3000, buf); buf_pullup(buf, 0, &cp, &sz); tt_ptr_op(cp, OP_NE, NULL); tt_int_op(sz, OP_LE, 4096); /* Make room for 3000 bytes in the first chunk, so that the pullup-move code * can get tested. */ - tt_int_op(fetch_from_buf(tmp, 3000, buf), OP_EQ, 3000); + tt_int_op(buf_get_bytes(tmp, 3000, buf), OP_EQ, 3000); tt_mem_op(tmp,OP_EQ, stuff, 3000); buf_pullup(buf, 2048, &cp, &sz); - assert_buf_ok(buf); + buf_assert_ok(buf); tt_ptr_op(cp, OP_NE, NULL); tt_int_op(sz, OP_GE, 2048); tt_mem_op(cp,OP_EQ, stuff+3000, 2048); tt_int_op(3000, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf)); - tt_int_op(fetch_from_buf(tmp, 3000, buf), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(buf_get_bytes(tmp, 3000, buf), OP_EQ, 0); tt_mem_op(tmp,OP_EQ, stuff+3000, 2048); buf_free(buf); /* Now try the large-chunk case. */ buf = buf_new_with_capacity(3000); /* rounds up to next power of 2. */ - write_to_buf(stuff, 4000, buf); - write_to_buf(stuff+4000, 4000, buf); - write_to_buf(stuff+8000, 4000, buf); - write_to_buf(stuff+12000, 4000, buf); + buf_add(stuff, 4000, buf); + buf_add(stuff+4000, 4000, buf); + buf_add(stuff+8000, 4000, buf); + buf_add(stuff+12000, 4000, buf); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf), OP_EQ, 16000); buf_pullup(buf, 0, &cp, &sz); tt_ptr_op(cp, OP_NE, NULL); tt_int_op(sz, OP_LE, 4096); buf_pullup(buf, 12500, &cp, &sz); - assert_buf_ok(buf); + buf_assert_ok(buf); tt_ptr_op(cp, OP_NE, NULL); tt_int_op(sz, OP_GE, 12500); tt_mem_op(cp,OP_EQ, stuff, 12500); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf), OP_EQ, 16000); - fetch_from_buf(tmp, 12400, buf); + buf_get_bytes(tmp, 12400, buf); tt_mem_op(tmp,OP_EQ, stuff, 12400); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf), OP_EQ, 3600); - fetch_from_buf(tmp, 3500, buf); + buf_get_bytes(tmp, 3500, buf); tt_mem_op(tmp,OP_EQ, stuff+12400, 3500); - fetch_from_buf(tmp, 100, buf); + buf_get_bytes(tmp, 100, buf); tt_mem_op(tmp,OP_EQ, stuff+15900, 10); buf_free(buf); /* Make sure that the pull-up-whole-buffer case works */ buf = buf_new_with_capacity(3000); /* rounds up to next power of 2. */ - write_to_buf(stuff, 4000, buf); - write_to_buf(stuff+4000, 4000, buf); - fetch_from_buf(tmp, 100, buf); /* dump 100 bytes from first chunk */ + buf_add(stuff, 4000, buf); + buf_add(stuff+4000, 4000, buf); + buf_get_bytes(tmp, 100, buf); /* dump 100 bytes from first chunk */ buf_pullup(buf, 16000, &cp, &sz); - assert_buf_ok(buf); + buf_assert_ok(buf); tt_ptr_op(cp, OP_NE, NULL); tt_int_op(sz, OP_EQ, 7900); tt_mem_op(cp,OP_EQ, stuff+100, 7900); @@ -324,23 +324,23 @@ test_buffer_copy(void *arg) /* Now try with a short buffer. */ s = "And now comes an act of enormous enormance!"; len = strlen(s); - write_to_buf(s, len, buf); + buf_add(s, len, buf); tt_int_op(len, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf)); /* Add junk to buf2 so we can test replacing.*/ - write_to_buf("BLARG", 5, buf2); + buf_add("BLARG", 5, buf2); tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_set_to_copy(&buf2, buf)); tt_int_op(len, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf2)); - fetch_from_buf(b, len, buf2); + buf_get_bytes(b, len, buf2); tt_mem_op(b, OP_EQ, s, len); /* Now free buf2 and retry so we can test allocating */ buf_free(buf2); buf2 = NULL; tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_set_to_copy(&buf2, buf)); tt_int_op(len, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf2)); - fetch_from_buf(b, len, buf2); + buf_get_bytes(b, len, buf2); tt_mem_op(b, OP_EQ, s, len); /* Clear buf for next test */ - fetch_from_buf(b, len, buf); + buf_get_bytes(b, len, buf); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf),OP_EQ,0); /* Okay, now let's try a bigger buffer. */ @@ -350,13 +350,13 @@ test_buffer_copy(void *arg) len = strlen(s); for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) { b[0]=i; - write_to_buf(b, 1, buf); - write_to_buf(s, len, buf); + buf_add(b, 1, buf); + buf_add(s, len, buf); } tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_set_to_copy(&buf2, buf)); tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf2), OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf)); for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) { - fetch_from_buf(b, len+1, buf2); + buf_get_bytes(b, len+1, buf2); tt_int_op((unsigned char)b[0],OP_EQ,i); tt_mem_op(b+1, OP_EQ, s, len); } @@ -381,13 +381,13 @@ test_buffer_ext_or_cmd(void *arg) tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, cmd); /* Three bytes: shouldn't work. */ - write_to_buf("\x00\x20\x00", 3, buf); + buf_add("\x00\x20\x00", 3, buf); tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf, &cmd)); tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, cmd); tt_int_op(3, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf)); /* 0020 0000: That's a nil command. It should work. */ - write_to_buf("\x00", 1, buf); + buf_add("\x00", 1, buf); tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf, &cmd)); tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_NE, cmd); tt_int_op(0x20, OP_EQ, cmd->cmd); @@ -397,10 +397,10 @@ test_buffer_ext_or_cmd(void *arg) cmd = NULL; /* Now try a length-6 command with one byte missing. */ - write_to_buf("\x10\x21\x00\x06""abcde", 9, buf); + buf_add("\x10\x21\x00\x06""abcde", 9, buf); tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf, &cmd)); tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, cmd); - write_to_buf("f", 1, buf); + buf_add("f", 1, buf); tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf, &cmd)); tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_NE, cmd); tt_int_op(0x1021, OP_EQ, cmd->cmd); @@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ test_buffer_ext_or_cmd(void *arg) cmd = NULL; /* Now try a length-10 command with 4 extra bytes. */ - write_to_buf("\xff\xff\x00\x0aloremipsum\x10\x00\xff\xff", 18, buf); + buf_add("\xff\xff\x00\x0aloremipsum\x10\x00\xff\xff", 18, buf); tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf, &cmd)); tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_NE, cmd); tt_int_op(0xffff, OP_EQ, cmd->cmd); @@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ test_buffer_ext_or_cmd(void *arg) * waiting. */ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf, &cmd)); tmp = tor_malloc_zero(65535); - write_to_buf(tmp, 65535, buf); + buf_add(tmp, 65535, buf); tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf, &cmd)); tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_NE, cmd); tt_int_op(0x1000, OP_EQ, cmd->cmd); @@ -461,36 +461,36 @@ test_buffer_allocation_tracking(void *arg) tt_int_op(buf_allocation(buf1), OP_EQ, 0); tt_int_op(buf_get_total_allocation(), OP_EQ, 0); - write_to_buf(junk, 4000, buf1); - write_to_buf(junk, 4000, buf1); - write_to_buf(junk, 4000, buf1); - write_to_buf(junk, 4000, buf1); + buf_add(junk, 4000, buf1); + buf_add(junk, 4000, buf1); + buf_add(junk, 4000, buf1); + buf_add(junk, 4000, buf1); tt_int_op(buf_allocation(buf1), OP_EQ, 16384); - fetch_from_buf(junk, 100, buf1); + buf_get_bytes(junk, 100, buf1); tt_int_op(buf_allocation(buf1), OP_EQ, 16384); /* still 4 4k chunks */ tt_int_op(buf_get_total_allocation(), OP_EQ, 16384); - fetch_from_buf(junk, 4096, buf1); /* drop a 1k chunk... */ + buf_get_bytes(junk, 4096, buf1); /* drop a 1k chunk... */ tt_int_op(buf_allocation(buf1), OP_EQ, 3*4096); /* now 3 4k chunks */ tt_int_op(buf_get_total_allocation(), OP_EQ, 12288); /* that chunk was really freed. */ - write_to_buf(junk, 4000, buf2); + buf_add(junk, 4000, buf2); tt_int_op(buf_allocation(buf2), OP_EQ, 4096); /* another 4k chunk. */ /* * We bounce back up to 16384 by allocating a new chunk. */ tt_int_op(buf_get_total_allocation(), OP_EQ, 16384); - write_to_buf(junk, 4000, buf2); + buf_add(junk, 4000, buf2); tt_int_op(buf_allocation(buf2), OP_EQ, 8192); /* another 4k chunk. */ tt_int_op(buf_get_total_allocation(), OP_EQ, 5*4096); /* that chunk was new. */ /* Make a really huge buffer */ for (i = 0; i < 1000; ++i) { - write_to_buf(junk, 4000, buf2); + buf_add(junk, 4000, buf2); } tt_int_op(buf_allocation(buf2), OP_GE, 4008000); tt_int_op(buf_get_total_allocation(), OP_GE, 4008000); @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ test_buffer_time_tracking(void *arg) tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_get_oldest_chunk_timestamp(buf, START_MSEC)); tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_get_oldest_chunk_timestamp(buf, START_MSEC+1000)); - write_to_buf("ABCDEFG", 7, buf); + buf_add("ABCDEFG", 7, buf); tt_int_op(1000, OP_EQ, buf_get_oldest_chunk_timestamp(buf, START_MSEC+1000)); buf2 = buf_copy(buf); @@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ test_buffer_time_tracking(void *arg) /* Now add more bytes; enough to overflow the first chunk. */ monotime_coarse_set_mock_time_nsec(START_NSEC + 123 * (uint64_t)1000000); for (i = 0; i < 600; ++i) - write_to_buf("ABCDEFG", 7, buf); + buf_add("ABCDEFG", 7, buf); tt_int_op(4207, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf)); /* The oldest bytes are still in the front. */ @@ -552,12 +552,12 @@ test_buffer_time_tracking(void *arg) /* Once those bytes are dropped, the chunk is still on the first * timestamp. */ - fetch_from_buf(tmp, 100, buf); + buf_get_bytes(tmp, 100, buf); tt_int_op(2000, OP_EQ, buf_get_oldest_chunk_timestamp(buf, START_MSEC+2000)); /* But once we discard the whole first chunk, we get the data in the second * chunk. */ - fetch_from_buf(tmp, 4000, buf); + buf_get_bytes(tmp, 4000, buf); tt_int_op(107, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf)); tt_int_op(2000, OP_EQ, buf_get_oldest_chunk_timestamp(buf, START_MSEC+2123)); @@ -565,12 +565,12 @@ test_buffer_time_tracking(void *arg) its time gets updated */ monotime_coarse_set_mock_time_nsec(START_NSEC + 5617 * (uint64_t)1000000); for (i = 0; i < 600; ++i) - write_to_buf("ABCDEFG", 7, buf); + buf_add("ABCDEFG", 7, buf); tt_int_op(4307, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf)); tt_int_op(2000, OP_EQ, buf_get_oldest_chunk_timestamp(buf, START_MSEC+2123)); - fetch_from_buf(tmp, 4000, buf); - fetch_from_buf(tmp, 306, buf); + buf_get_bytes(tmp, 4000, buf); + buf_get_bytes(tmp, 306, buf); tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_get_oldest_chunk_timestamp(buf, START_MSEC+5617)); tt_int_op(383, OP_EQ, buf_get_oldest_chunk_timestamp(buf, START_MSEC+6000)); @@ -596,23 +596,23 @@ test_buffers_compress_fin_at_chunk_end_impl(compress_method_t method, sz = buf_get_default_chunk_size(buf); msg = tor_malloc_zero(sz); - write_to_buf(msg, 1, buf); + buf_add(msg, 1, buf); tt_assert(buf->head); /* Fill up the chunk so the compression stuff won't fit in one chunk. */ tt_uint_op(buf->head->memlen, OP_LT, sz); headerjunk = buf->head->memlen - 7; - write_to_buf(msg, headerjunk-1, buf); + buf_add(msg, headerjunk-1, buf); tt_uint_op(buf->head->datalen, OP_EQ, headerjunk); tt_uint_op(buf_datalen(buf), OP_EQ, headerjunk); /* Write an empty string, with finalization on. */ compress_state = tor_compress_new(1, method, level); - tt_int_op(write_to_buf_compress(buf, compress_state, "", 0, 1), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(buf_add_compress(buf, compress_state, "", 0, 1), OP_EQ, 0); in_len = buf_datalen(buf); contents = tor_malloc(in_len); - tt_int_op(fetch_from_buf(contents, in_len, buf), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(buf_get_bytes(contents, in_len, buf), OP_EQ, 0); if (method == NO_METHOD) { tt_uint_op(in_len, OP_EQ, headerjunk); @@ -655,23 +655,23 @@ test_buffers_compress_impl(compress_method_t method, msg = tor_malloc(512); crypto_rand(msg, 512); - tt_int_op(write_to_buf_compress(buf, compress_state, + tt_int_op(buf_add_compress(buf, compress_state, msg, 128, 0), OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(write_to_buf_compress(buf, compress_state, + tt_int_op(buf_add_compress(buf, compress_state, msg+128, 128, 0), OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(write_to_buf_compress(buf, compress_state, + tt_int_op(buf_add_compress(buf, compress_state, msg+256, 256, 0), OP_EQ, 0); done = !finalize_with_nil; - tt_int_op(write_to_buf_compress(buf, compress_state, + tt_int_op(buf_add_compress(buf, compress_state, "all done", 9, done), OP_EQ, 0); if (finalize_with_nil) { - tt_int_op(write_to_buf_compress(buf, compress_state, "", 0, 1), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(buf_add_compress(buf, compress_state, "", 0, 1), OP_EQ, 0); } in_len = buf_datalen(buf); contents = tor_malloc(in_len); - tt_int_op(fetch_from_buf(contents, in_len, buf), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(buf_get_bytes(contents, in_len, buf), OP_EQ, 0); tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, tor_uncompress(&expanded, &out_len, contents, in_len, @@ -765,11 +765,11 @@ test_buffers_tls_read_mocked(void *arg) buf = buf_new(); next_reply_val[0] = 1024; - tt_int_op(128, OP_EQ, read_to_buf_tls(NULL, 128, buf)); + tt_int_op(128, OP_EQ, buf_read_from_tls(NULL, 128, buf)); next_reply_val[0] = 5000; next_reply_val[1] = 5000; - tt_int_op(6000, OP_EQ, read_to_buf_tls(NULL, 6000, buf)); + tt_int_op(6000, OP_EQ, buf_read_from_tls(NULL, 6000, buf)); done: UNMOCK(tor_tls_read); @@ -849,19 +849,19 @@ test_buffer_peek_startswith(void *arg) buf = buf_new(); tt_ptr_op(buf, OP_NE, NULL); - tt_assert(peek_buf_startswith(buf, "")); - tt_assert(! peek_buf_startswith(buf, "X")); + tt_assert(buf_peek_startswith(buf, "")); + tt_assert(! buf_peek_startswith(buf, "X")); - write_to_buf("Tor", 3, buf); + buf_add("Tor", 3, buf); - tt_assert(peek_buf_startswith(buf, "")); - tt_assert(peek_buf_startswith(buf, "T")); - tt_assert(peek_buf_startswith(buf, "To")); - tt_assert(peek_buf_startswith(buf, "Tor")); - tt_assert(! peek_buf_startswith(buf, "Top")); - tt_assert(! peek_buf_startswith(buf, "For")); - tt_assert(! peek_buf_startswith(buf, "Tork")); - tt_assert(! peek_buf_startswith(buf, "Torpor")); + tt_assert(buf_peek_startswith(buf, "")); + tt_assert(buf_peek_startswith(buf, "T")); + tt_assert(buf_peek_startswith(buf, "To")); + tt_assert(buf_peek_startswith(buf, "Tor")); + tt_assert(! buf_peek_startswith(buf, "Top")); + tt_assert(! buf_peek_startswith(buf, "For")); + tt_assert(! buf_peek_startswith(buf, "Tork")); + tt_assert(! buf_peek_startswith(buf, "Torpor")); done: buf_free(buf); diff --git a/src/test/test_extorport.c b/src/test/test_extorport.c index fc9f27a5a..f8ee94c3a 100644 --- a/src/test/test_extorport.c +++ b/src/test/test_extorport.c @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ connection_write_to_buf_impl_replacement(const char *string, size_t len, tor_assert(string); tor_assert(conn); - write_to_buf(string, len, conn->outbuf); + buf_add(string, len, conn->outbuf); } static char * @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ buf_get_contents(buf_t *buf, size_t *sz_out) if (*sz_out >= ULONG_MAX) return NULL; /* C'mon, really? */ out = tor_malloc(*sz_out + 1); - if (fetch_from_buf(out, (unsigned long)*sz_out, buf) != 0) { + if (buf_get_bytes(out, (unsigned long)*sz_out, buf) != 0) { tor_free(out); return NULL; } @@ -399,14 +399,14 @@ handshake_start(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving) #define WRITE(s,n) \ do { \ - write_to_buf((s), (n), TO_CONN(conn)->inbuf); \ + buf_add((s), (n), TO_CONN(conn)->inbuf); \ } while (0) #define CONTAINS(s,n) \ do { \ tt_int_op((n), OP_LE, sizeof(b)); \ tt_int_op(buf_datalen(TO_CONN(conn)->outbuf), OP_EQ, (n)); \ if ((n)) { \ - fetch_from_buf(b, (n), TO_CONN(conn)->outbuf); \ + buf_get_bytes(b, (n), TO_CONN(conn)->outbuf); \ tt_mem_op(b, OP_EQ, (s), (n)); \ } \ } while (0) diff --git a/src/test/test_helpers.c b/src/test/test_helpers.c index 4c0580cff..997f24737 100644 --- a/src/test/test_helpers.c +++ b/src/test/test_helpers.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ connection_write_to_buf_mock(const char *string, size_t len, tor_assert(string); tor_assert(conn); - write_to_buf(string, len, conn->outbuf); + buf_add(string, len, conn->outbuf); } /* Set up a fake origin circuit with the specified number of cells, diff --git a/src/test/test_oom.c b/src/test/test_oom.c index f03a504d1..2391a3052 100644 --- a/src/test/test_oom.c +++ b/src/test/test_oom.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ add_bytes_to_buf(buf_t *buf, size_t n_bytes) while (n_bytes) { size_t this_add = n_bytes > sizeof(b) ? sizeof(b) : n_bytes; crypto_rand(b, this_add); - write_to_buf(b, this_add, buf); + buf_add(b, this_add, buf); n_bytes -= this_add; } } diff --git a/src/test/test_socks.c b/src/test/test_socks.c index 571f45735..0791db9a1 100644 --- a/src/test/test_socks.c +++ b/src/test/test_socks.c @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static const struct testcase_setup_t socks_setup = { buf_t *buf = testdata->buf; \ socks_request_t *socks = testdata->req; #define ADD_DATA(buf, s) \ - write_to_buf(s, sizeof(s)-1, buf) + buf_add(s, sizeof(s)-1, buf) static void socks_request_clear(socks_request_t *socks)

1 0

[tor/master] Move buffers.c and buffers_tls.c into src/common
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 336aa21e37b6c5bd4f1215ceba27c21f6c43dce7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 8 15:10:32 2017 -0400 Move buffers.c and buffers_tls.c into src/common These are no longer tor-specific, so they can be part of the infrastructure. --- src/{or => common}/buffers.c | 0 src/{or => common}/buffers.h | 0 src/{or => common}/buffers_tls.c | 0 src/{or => common}/buffers_tls.h | 0 src/common/include.am | 4 ++++ src/or/include.am | 4 ---- 6 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/common/buffers.c similarity index 100% rename from src/or/buffers.c rename to src/common/buffers.c diff --git a/src/or/buffers.h b/src/common/buffers.h similarity index 100% rename from src/or/buffers.h rename to src/common/buffers.h diff --git a/src/or/buffers_tls.c b/src/common/buffers_tls.c similarity index 100% rename from src/or/buffers_tls.c rename to src/common/buffers_tls.c diff --git a/src/or/buffers_tls.h b/src/common/buffers_tls.h similarity index 100% rename from src/or/buffers_tls.h rename to src/common/buffers_tls.h diff --git a/src/common/include.am b/src/common/include.am index 125388881..cd5eea340 100644 --- a/src/common/include.am +++ b/src/common/include.am @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ src_common_libor_ctime_testing_a_CFLAGS = @CFLAGS_CONSTTIME@ $(TEST_CFLAGS) LIBOR_A_SRC = \ src/common/address.c \ src/common/backtrace.c \ + src/common/buffers.c \ src/common/compat.c \ src/common/compat_threads.c \ src/common/compat_time.c \ @@ -110,6 +111,7 @@ src/common/src_common_libor_testing_a-log.$(OBJEXT) \ LIBOR_CRYPTO_A_SRC = \ src/common/aes.c \ + src/common/buffers_tls.c \ src/common/compress.c \ src/common/compress_lzma.c \ src/common/compress_none.c \ @@ -147,6 +149,8 @@ src_common_libor_event_testing_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TEST_CFLAGS) COMMONHEADERS = \ src/common/address.h \ src/common/backtrace.h \ + src/common/buffers.h \ + src/common/buffers_tls.h \ src/common/aes.h \ src/common/ciphers.inc \ src/common/compat.h \ diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index 6dc43749b..021f5f9d5 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ EXTRA_DIST+= src/or/ntmain.c src/or/Makefile.nmake LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/addressmap.c \ src/or/bridges.c \ - src/or/buffers.c \ - src/or/buffers_tls.c \ src/or/channel.c \ src/or/channelpadding.c \ src/or/channeltls.c \ @@ -156,8 +154,6 @@ endif ORHEADERS = \ src/or/addressmap.h \ src/or/bridges.h \ - src/or/buffers.h \ - src/or/buffers_tls.h \ src/or/channel.h \ src/or/channelpadding.h \ src/or/channeltls.h \

1 0

[tor/master] Move the tls parts of buffers.c into buffers_tls.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 150089cbd7445f76a5d29df7d33c15c3a1ada034 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 8 15:06:40 2017 -0400 Move the tls parts of buffers.c into buffers_tls.c --- src/or/buffers.c | 181 +----------------------------------------------- src/or/buffers.h | 27 ++++++-- src/or/buffers_tls.c | 175 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/buffers_tls.h | 19 +++++ src/or/connection.c | 1 + src/or/include.am | 2 + src/or/main.c | 1 + src/test/test_buffers.c | 1 + 8 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 185 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index ee888b42a..1a9144e14 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ #include "util.h" #include "torint.h" #include "torlog.h" -#include "tortls.h" #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include <unistd.h> #endif @@ -101,22 +100,6 @@ } while (0) #endif -/** Return the next character in chunk onto which data can be appended. - * If the chunk is full, this might be off the end of chunk->mem. */ -static inline char * -CHUNK_WRITE_PTR(chunk_t *chunk) -{ - return chunk->data + chunk->datalen; -} - -/** Return the number of bytes that can be written onto chunk without - * running out of space. */ -static inline size_t -CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(const chunk_t *chunk) -{ - return (chunk->mem + chunk->memlen) - (chunk->data + chunk->datalen); -} - /** Move all bytes stored in chunk to the front of chunk->mem, * to free up space at the end. */ static inline void @@ -183,9 +166,6 @@ chunk_grow(chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz) return chunk; } -/** If a read onto the end of a chunk would be smaller than this number, then - * just start a new chunk. */ -#define MIN_READ_LEN 8 /** Every chunk should take up at least this many bytes. */ #define MIN_CHUNK_ALLOC 256 /** No chunk should take up more than this many bytes. */ @@ -479,7 +459,7 @@ buf_copy(const buf_t *buf) /** Append a new chunk with enough capacity to hold capacity bytes to * the tail of buf. If capped, don't allocate a chunk bigger * than MAX_CHUNK_ALLOC. */ -static chunk_t * +chunk_t * buf_add_chunk_with_capacity(buf_t *buf, size_t capacity, int capped) { chunk_t *chunk; @@ -564,23 +544,6 @@ read_to_chunk(buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, tor_socket_t fd, size_t at_most, } } -/** As read_to_chunk(), but return (negative) error code on error, blocking, - * or TLS, and the number of bytes read otherwise. */ -static inline int -read_to_chunk_tls(buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, tor_tls_t *tls, - size_t at_most) -{ - int read_result; - - tor_assert(CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(chunk) >= at_most); - read_result = tor_tls_read(tls, CHUNK_WRITE_PTR(chunk), at_most); - if (read_result < 0) - return read_result; - buf->datalen += read_result; - chunk->datalen += read_result; - return read_result; -} - /** Read from socket s, writing onto end of buf. Read at most * at_most bytes, growing the buffer as necessary. If recv() returns 0 * (because of EOF), set *reached_eof to 1 and return 0. Return -1 on @@ -633,67 +596,6 @@ read_to_buf(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof, return (int)total_read; } -/** As read_to_buf, but reads from a TLS connection, and returns a TLS - * status value rather than the number of bytes read. - * - * Using TLS on OR connections complicates matters in two ways. - * - * First, a TLS stream has its own read buffer independent of the - * connection's read buffer. (TLS needs to read an entire frame from - * the network before it can decrypt any data. Thus, trying to read 1 - * byte from TLS can require that several KB be read from the network - * and decrypted. The extra data is stored in TLS's decrypt buffer.) - * Because the data hasn't been read by Tor (it's still inside the TLS), - * this means that sometimes a connection "has stuff to read" even when - * poll() didn't return POLLIN. The tor_tls_get_pending_bytes function is - * used in connection.c to detect TLS objects with non-empty internal - * buffers and read from them again. - * - * Second, the TLS stream's events do not correspond directly to network - * events: sometimes, before a TLS stream can read, the network must be - * ready to write -- or vice versa. - */ -int -read_to_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf) -{ - int r = 0; - size_t total_read = 0; - - check_no_tls_errors(); - - check(); - - if (BUG(buf->datalen >= INT_MAX)) - return -1; - if (BUG(buf->datalen >= INT_MAX - at_most)) - return -1; - - while (at_most > total_read) { - size_t readlen = at_most - total_read; - chunk_t *chunk; - if (!buf->tail || CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(buf->tail) < MIN_READ_LEN) { - chunk = buf_add_chunk_with_capacity(buf, at_most, 1); - if (readlen > chunk->memlen) - readlen = chunk->memlen; - } else { - size_t cap = CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(buf->tail); - chunk = buf->tail; - if (cap < readlen) - readlen = cap; - } - - r = read_to_chunk_tls(buf, chunk, tls, readlen); - check(); - if (r < 0) - return r; /* Error */ - tor_assert(total_read+r < INT_MAX); - total_read += r; - if ((size_t)r < readlen) /* eof, block, or no more to read. */ - break; - } - return (int)total_read; -} - /** Helper for flush_buf(): try to write sz bytes from chunk * chunk of buffer buf onto socket s. On success, deduct * the bytes written from *buf_flushlen. Return the number of bytes @@ -728,43 +630,6 @@ flush_chunk(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz, } } -/** Helper for flush_buf_tls(): try to write sz bytes from chunk - * chunk of buffer buf onto socket s. (Tries to write - * more if there is a forced pending write size.) On success, deduct the - * bytes written from *buf_flushlen. Return the number of bytes - * written on success, and a TOR_TLS error code on failure or blocking. - */ -static inline int -flush_chunk_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, - size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen) -{ - int r; - size_t forced; - char *data; - - forced = tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tls); - if (forced > sz) - sz = forced; - if (chunk) { - data = chunk->data; - tor_assert(sz <= chunk->datalen); - } else { - data = NULL; - tor_assert(sz == 0); - } - r = tor_tls_write(tls, data, sz); - if (r < 0) - return r; - if (*buf_flushlen > (size_t)r) - *buf_flushlen -= r; - else - *buf_flushlen = 0; - buf_remove_from_front(buf, r); - log_debug(LD_NET,"flushed %d bytes, %d ready to flush, %d remain.", - r,(int)*buf_flushlen,(int)buf->datalen); - return r; -} - /** Write data from buf to the socket s. Write at most * sz bytes, decrement *buf_flushlen by * the number of bytes actually written, and remove the written bytes @@ -806,50 +671,6 @@ flush_buf(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen) return (int)flushed; } -/** As flush_buf(), but writes data to a TLS connection. Can write more than - * flushlen bytes. - */ -int -flush_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t flushlen, - size_t *buf_flushlen) -{ - int r; - size_t flushed = 0; - ssize_t sz; - tor_assert(buf_flushlen); - tor_assert(*buf_flushlen <= buf->datalen); - tor_assert(flushlen <= *buf_flushlen); - sz = (ssize_t) flushlen; - - /* we want to let tls write even if flushlen is zero, because it might - * have a partial record pending */ - check_no_tls_errors(); - - check(); - do { - size_t flushlen0; - if (buf->head) { - if ((ssize_t)buf->head->datalen >= sz) - flushlen0 = sz; - else - flushlen0 = buf->head->datalen; - } else { - flushlen0 = 0; - } - - r = flush_chunk_tls(tls, buf, buf->head, flushlen0, buf_flushlen); - check(); - if (r < 0) - return r; - flushed += r; - sz -= r; - if (r == 0) /* Can't flush any more now. */ - break; - } while (sz > 0); - tor_assert(flushed < INT_MAX); - return (int)flushed; -} - /** Append string_len bytes from string to the end of * buf. * diff --git a/src/or/buffers.h b/src/or/buffers.h index 35fa46593..77cc9ce0f 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.h +++ b/src/or/buffers.h @@ -19,9 +19,7 @@ typedef struct buf_t buf_t; -struct tor_tls_t; struct tor_compress_state_t; -struct ext_or_cmd_t; buf_t *buf_new(void); buf_t *buf_new_with_capacity(size_t size); @@ -39,11 +37,8 @@ size_t buf_get_total_allocation(void); int read_to_buf(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof, int *socket_error); -int read_to_buf_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf); int flush_buf(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen); -int flush_buf_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, - size_t *buf_flushlen); int write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); int write_to_buf_compress(buf_t *buf, struct tor_compress_state_t *state, @@ -100,6 +95,28 @@ struct buf_t { chunk_t *head; /**< First chunk in the list, or NULL for none. */ chunk_t *tail; /**< Last chunk in the list, or NULL for none. */ }; + +chunk_t *buf_add_chunk_with_capacity(buf_t *buf, size_t capacity, int capped); +/** If a read onto the end of a chunk would be smaller than this number, then + * just start a new chunk. */ +#define MIN_READ_LEN 8 + +/** Return the number of bytes that can be written onto chunk without + * running out of space. */ +static inline size_t +CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(const chunk_t *chunk) +{ + return (chunk->mem + chunk->memlen) - (chunk->data + chunk->datalen); +} + +/** Return the next character in chunk onto which data can be appended. + * If the chunk is full, this might be off the end of chunk->mem. */ +static inline char * +CHUNK_WRITE_PTR(chunk_t *chunk) +{ + return chunk->data + chunk->datalen; +} + #endif #endif diff --git a/src/or/buffers_tls.c b/src/or/buffers_tls.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e47073869 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/buffers_tls.c @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE +#include "orconfig.h" +#include <stddef.h> +#include "buffers.h" +#include "buffers_tls.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "compress.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "torint.h" +#include "torlog.h" +#include "tortls.h" +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include <unistd.h> +#endif + +/** As read_to_chunk(), but return (negative) error code on error, blocking, + * or TLS, and the number of bytes read otherwise. */ +static inline int +read_to_chunk_tls(buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, tor_tls_t *tls, + size_t at_most) +{ + int read_result; + + tor_assert(CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(chunk) >= at_most); + read_result = tor_tls_read(tls, CHUNK_WRITE_PTR(chunk), at_most); + if (read_result < 0) + return read_result; + buf->datalen += read_result; + chunk->datalen += read_result; + return read_result; +} + +/** As read_to_buf, but reads from a TLS connection, and returns a TLS + * status value rather than the number of bytes read. + * + * Using TLS on OR connections complicates matters in two ways. + * + * First, a TLS stream has its own read buffer independent of the + * connection's read buffer. (TLS needs to read an entire frame from + * the network before it can decrypt any data. Thus, trying to read 1 + * byte from TLS can require that several KB be read from the network + * and decrypted. The extra data is stored in TLS's decrypt buffer.) + * Because the data hasn't been read by Tor (it's still inside the TLS), + * this means that sometimes a connection "has stuff to read" even when + * poll() didn't return POLLIN. The tor_tls_get_pending_bytes function is + * used in connection.c to detect TLS objects with non-empty internal + * buffers and read from them again. + * + * Second, the TLS stream's events do not correspond directly to network + * events: sometimes, before a TLS stream can read, the network must be + * ready to write -- or vice versa. + */ +int +read_to_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf) +{ + int r = 0; + size_t total_read = 0; + + check_no_tls_errors(); + + if (BUG(buf->datalen >= INT_MAX)) + return -1; + if (BUG(buf->datalen >= INT_MAX - at_most)) + return -1; + + while (at_most > total_read) { + size_t readlen = at_most - total_read; + chunk_t *chunk; + if (!buf->tail || CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(buf->tail) < MIN_READ_LEN) { + chunk = buf_add_chunk_with_capacity(buf, at_most, 1); + if (readlen > chunk->memlen) + readlen = chunk->memlen; + } else { + size_t cap = CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(buf->tail); + chunk = buf->tail; + if (cap < readlen) + readlen = cap; + } + + r = read_to_chunk_tls(buf, chunk, tls, readlen); + if (r < 0) + return r; /* Error */ + tor_assert(total_read+r < INT_MAX); + total_read += r; + if ((size_t)r < readlen) /* eof, block, or no more to read. */ + break; + } + return (int)total_read; +} + +/** Helper for flush_buf_tls(): try to write sz bytes from chunk + * chunk of buffer buf onto socket s. (Tries to write + * more if there is a forced pending write size.) On success, deduct the + * bytes written from *buf_flushlen. Return the number of bytes + * written on success, and a TOR_TLS error code on failure or blocking. + */ +static inline int +flush_chunk_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, + size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen) +{ + int r; + size_t forced; + char *data; + + forced = tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tls); + if (forced > sz) + sz = forced; + if (chunk) { + data = chunk->data; + tor_assert(sz <= chunk->datalen); + } else { + data = NULL; + tor_assert(sz == 0); + } + r = tor_tls_write(tls, data, sz); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (*buf_flushlen > (size_t)r) + *buf_flushlen -= r; + else + *buf_flushlen = 0; + buf_remove_from_front(buf, r); + log_debug(LD_NET,"flushed %d bytes, %d ready to flush, %d remain.", + r,(int)*buf_flushlen,(int)buf->datalen); + return r; +} + +/** As flush_buf(), but writes data to a TLS connection. Can write more than + * flushlen bytes. + */ +int +flush_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t flushlen, + size_t *buf_flushlen) +{ + int r; + size_t flushed = 0; + ssize_t sz; + tor_assert(buf_flushlen); + tor_assert(*buf_flushlen <= buf->datalen); + tor_assert(flushlen <= *buf_flushlen); + sz = (ssize_t) flushlen; + + /* we want to let tls write even if flushlen is zero, because it might + * have a partial record pending */ + check_no_tls_errors(); + + do { + size_t flushlen0; + if (buf->head) { + if ((ssize_t)buf->head->datalen >= sz) + flushlen0 = sz; + else + flushlen0 = buf->head->datalen; + } else { + flushlen0 = 0; + } + + r = flush_chunk_tls(tls, buf, buf->head, flushlen0, buf_flushlen); + if (r < 0) + return r; + flushed += r; + sz -= r; + if (r == 0) /* Can't flush any more now. */ + break; + } while (sz > 0); + tor_assert(flushed < INT_MAX); + return (int)flushed; +} + diff --git a/src/or/buffers_tls.h b/src/or/buffers_tls.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4fce6c113 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/buffers_tls.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_BUFFERS_TLS_H +#define TOR_BUFFERS_TLS_H + +struct buf_t; +struct tor_tls_t; + +int read_to_buf_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, + struct buf_t *buf); +int flush_buf_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, struct buf_t *buf, size_t sz, + size_t *buf_flushlen); + +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 637b38cec..866ce5e0b 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include "or.h" #include "bridges.h" #include "buffers.h" +#include "buffers_tls.h" /* * Define this so we get channel internal functions, since we're implementing * part of a subclass (channel_tls_t). diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index fe860339f..6dc43749b 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/addressmap.c \ src/or/bridges.c \ src/or/buffers.c \ + src/or/buffers_tls.c \ src/or/channel.c \ src/or/channelpadding.c \ src/or/channeltls.c \ @@ -156,6 +157,7 @@ ORHEADERS = \ src/or/addressmap.h \ src/or/bridges.h \ src/or/buffers.h \ + src/or/buffers_tls.h \ src/or/channel.h \ src/or/channelpadding.h \ src/or/channeltls.h \ diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 7939f1984..a9d4bdb6e 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ #include "backtrace.h" #include "bridges.h" #include "buffers.h" +#include "buffers_tls.h" #include "channel.h" #include "channeltls.h" #include "channelpadding.h" diff --git a/src/test/test_buffers.c b/src/test/test_buffers.c index 26c062597..d2d1223f3 100644 --- a/src/test/test_buffers.c +++ b/src/test/test_buffers.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #define PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" +#include "buffers_tls.h" #include "ext_orport.h" #include "proto_cell.h" #include "proto_ext_or.h"

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