tor-commits September 2017

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[tor/master] Move protocol-specific functions out of buffers.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 234c5015f1536bc51fe5f87c5b7c1072d3f9dbd2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 8 11:51:36 2017 -0400 Move protocol-specific functions out of buffers.c This commit does not change the implementation of any function: it only moves code and adds new includes as necessary. Part of #23149. --- changes/refactor-buffer | 3 + src/or/buffers.c | 982 +---------------------------------------- src/or/buffers.h | 26 +- src/or/connection.c | 2 + src/or/connection_edge.c | 1 + src/or/connection_or.c | 1 + src/or/control.c | 2 + src/or/include.am | 8 + src/or/proto_cell.c | 84 ++++ src/or/proto_cell.h | 17 + src/or/proto_control0.c | 27 ++ src/or/proto_control0.h | 14 + src/or/proto_http.c | 173 ++++++++ src/or/proto_http.h | 24 + src/or/proto_socks.c | 723 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/proto_socks.h | 20 + src/test/test_buffers.c | 5 + src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c | 1 + src/test/test_hs_cache.c | 1 + src/test/test_socks.c | 1 + 20 files changed, 1117 insertions(+), 998 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/refactor-buffer b/changes/refactor-buffer new file mode 100644 index 000000000..36b029672 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/refactor-buffer @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Code simplifications and refactoring: + - Split the portions of the buffer.c module that handle particular + protocols into separate modules. Part of ticket 23149. diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index bd84103c3..ef8676cd9 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -16,23 +16,10 @@ * buffers: one for incoming data, and one for outcoming data. These are fed * and drained from functions in connection.c, trigged by events that are * monitored in main.c. - * - * This module has basic support for reading and writing on buf_t objects. It - * also contains specialized functions for handling particular protocols - * on a buf_t backend, including SOCKS (used in connection_edge.c), Tor cells - * (used in connection_or.c and channeltls.c), HTTP (used in directory.c), and - * line-oriented communication (used in control.c). **/ #define BUFFERS_PRIVATE #include "or.h" -#include "addressmap.h" #include "buffers.h" -#include "config.h" -#include "connection_edge.h" -#include "connection_or.h" -#include "control.h" -#include "reasons.h" -#include "ext_orport.h" #include "util.h" #include "torlog.h" #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H @@ -68,16 +55,6 @@ * forever. */ -static void socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req, - socks5_reply_status_t reason); - -static int parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, - int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out, - size_t *want_length_out); -static int parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, - int state, char **reason, - ssize_t *drain_out); - /* Chunk manipulation functions */ #define CHUNK_HEADER_LEN offsetof(chunk_t, mem[0]) @@ -227,7 +204,7 @@ preferred_chunk_size(size_t target) * growing it as necessary, until buf->head has the first bytes bytes * of data from the buffer, or until buf->head has all the data in buf. */ -STATIC void +void buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes) { chunk_t *dest, *src; @@ -351,7 +328,7 @@ buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz) #endif /** Remove the first n bytes from buf. */ -static inline void +void buf_remove_from_front(buf_t *buf, size_t n) { tor_assert(buf->datalen >= n); @@ -907,7 +884,7 @@ write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) /** Helper: copy the first string_len bytes from buf * onto string. */ -static inline void +void peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf) { chunk_t *chunk; @@ -950,79 +927,6 @@ fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) return (int)buf->datalen; } -/** True iff the cell command command is one that implies a - * variable-length cell in Tor link protocol linkproto. */ -static inline int -cell_command_is_var_length(uint8_t command, int linkproto) -{ - /* If linkproto is v2 (2), CELL_VERSIONS is the only variable-length cells - * work as implemented here. If it's 1, there are no variable-length cells. - * Tor does not support other versions right now, and so can't negotiate - * them. - */ - switch (linkproto) { - case 1: - /* Link protocol version 1 has no variable-length cells. */ - return 0; - case 2: - /* In link protocol version 2, VERSIONS is the only variable-length cell */ - return command == CELL_VERSIONS; - case 0: - case 3: - default: - /* In link protocol version 3 and later, and in version "unknown", - * commands 128 and higher indicate variable-length. VERSIONS is - * grandfathered in. */ - return command == CELL_VERSIONS || command >= 128; - } -} - -/** Check buf for a variable-length cell according to the rules of link - * protocol version linkproto. If one is found, pull it off the buffer - * and assign a newly allocated var_cell_t to *out, and return 1. - * Return 0 if whatever is on the start of buf_t is not a variable-length - * cell. Return 1 and set *out to NULL if there seems to be the start - * of a variable-length cell on buf, but the whole thing isn't there - * yet. */ -int -fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto) -{ - char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE]; - var_cell_t *result; - uint8_t command; - uint16_t length; - const int wide_circ_ids = linkproto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS; - const int circ_id_len = get_circ_id_size(wide_circ_ids); - const unsigned header_len = get_var_cell_header_size(wide_circ_ids); - check(); - *out = NULL; - if (buf->datalen < header_len) - return 0; - peek_from_buf(hdr, header_len, buf); - - command = get_uint8(hdr + circ_id_len); - if (!(cell_command_is_var_length(command, linkproto))) - return 0; - - length = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr + circ_id_len + 1)); - if (buf->datalen < (size_t)(header_len+length)) - return 1; - result = var_cell_new(length); - result->command = command; - if (wide_circ_ids) - result->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(hdr)); - else - result->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); - - buf_remove_from_front(buf, header_len); - peek_from_buf((char*) result->payload, length, buf); - buf_remove_from_front(buf, length); - check(); - - *out = result; - return 1; -} - /** Move up to *buf_flushlen bytes from buf_in to * buf_out, and modify *buf_flushlen appropriately. * Return the number of bytes actually copied. @@ -1150,7 +1054,7 @@ buf_matches_at_pos(const buf_pos_t *pos, const char *s, size_t n) /** Return the first position in buf at which the n-character * string s occurs, or -1 if it does not occur. */ -STATIC int +int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n) { buf_pos_t pos; @@ -1167,868 +1071,6 @@ buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n) return -1; } -/** - * Scan the HTTP headers in the headerlen-byte memory range at - * headers, looking for a "Content-Length" header. Try to set - * *result_out to the numeric value of that header if possible. - * Return -1 if the header was malformed, 0 if it was missing, and 1 if - * it was present and well-formed. - */ -STATIC int -buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen, - size_t *result_out) -{ - const char *p, *newline; - char *len_str, *eos=NULL; - size_t remaining, result; - int ok; - *result_out = 0; /* The caller shouldn't look at this unless the - * return value is 1, but let's prevent confusion */ - -#define CONTENT_LENGTH "\r\nContent-Length: " - p = (char*) tor_memstr(headers, headerlen, CONTENT_LENGTH); - if (p == NULL) - return 0; - - tor_assert(p >= headers && p < headers+headerlen); - remaining = (headers+headerlen)-p; - p += strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH); - remaining -= strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH); - - newline = memchr(p, '\n', remaining); - if (newline == NULL) - return -1; - - len_str = tor_memdup_nulterm(p, newline-p); - /* We limit the size to INT_MAX because other parts of the buffer.c - * code don't like buffers to be any bigger than that. */ - result = (size_t) tor_parse_uint64(len_str, 10, 0, INT_MAX, &ok, &eos); - if (eos && !tor_strisspace(eos)) { - ok = 0; - } else { - *result_out = result; - } - tor_free(len_str); - - return ok ? 1 : -1; -} - -/** There is a (possibly incomplete) http statement on buf, of the - * form "\%s\\r\\n\\r\\n\%s", headers, body. (body may contain NULs.) - * If a) the headers include a Content-Length field and all bytes in - * the body are present, or b) there's no Content-Length field and - * all headers are present, then: - * - * - strdup headers into *headers_out, and NUL-terminate it. - * - memdup body into *body_out, and NUL-terminate it. - * - Then remove them from buf, and return 1. - * - * - If headers or body is NULL, discard that part of the buf. - * - If a headers or body doesn't fit in the arg, return -1. - * (We ensure that the headers or body don't exceed max len, - * _even if_ we're planning to discard them.) - * - If force_complete is true, then succeed even if not all of the - * content has arrived. - * - * Else, change nothing and return 0. - */ -int -fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, - char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, - char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen, - int force_complete) -{ - char *headers; - size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen=0; - int crlf_offset; - int r; - - check(); - if (!buf->head) - return 0; - - crlf_offset = buf_find_string_offset(buf, "\r\n\r\n", 4); - if (crlf_offset > (int)max_headerlen || - (crlf_offset < 0 && buf->datalen > max_headerlen)) { - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers too long."); - return -1; - } else if (crlf_offset < 0) { - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers not all here yet."); - return 0; - } - /* Okay, we have a full header. Make sure it all appears in the first - * chunk. */ - if ((int)buf->head->datalen < crlf_offset + 4) - buf_pullup(buf, crlf_offset+4); - headerlen = crlf_offset + 4; - - headers = buf->head->data; - bodylen = buf->datalen - headerlen; - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", (int)headerlen, (int)bodylen); - - if (max_headerlen <= headerlen) { - log_warn(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d larger than %d. Failing.", - (int)headerlen, (int)max_headerlen-1); - return -1; - } - if (max_bodylen <= bodylen) { - log_warn(LD_HTTP,"bodylen %d larger than %d. Failing.", - (int)bodylen, (int)max_bodylen-1); - return -1; - } - - r = buf_http_find_content_length(headers, headerlen, &contentlen); - if (r == -1) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Content-Length is bogus; maybe " - "someone is trying to crash us."); - return -1; - } else if (r == 1) { - /* if content-length is malformed, then our body length is 0. fine. */ - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"Got a contentlen of %d.",(int)contentlen); - if (bodylen < contentlen) { - if (!force_complete) { - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"body not all here yet."); - return 0; /* not all there yet */ - } - } - if (bodylen > contentlen) { - bodylen = contentlen; - log_debug(LD_HTTP,"bodylen reduced to %d.",(int)bodylen); - } - } else { - tor_assert(r == 0); - /* Leave bodylen alone */ - } - - /* all happy. copy into the appropriate places, and return 1 */ - if (headers_out) { - *headers_out = tor_malloc(headerlen+1); - fetch_from_buf(*headers_out, headerlen, buf); - (*headers_out)[headerlen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */ - } - if (body_out) { - tor_assert(body_used); - *body_used = bodylen; - *body_out = tor_malloc(bodylen+1); - fetch_from_buf(*body_out, bodylen, buf); - (*body_out)[bodylen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */ - } - check(); - return 1; -} - -/** - * Wait this many seconds before warning the user about using SOCKS unsafely - * again. */ -#define SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL 5 - -/** Warn that the user application has made an unsafe socks request using - * protocol socks_protocol on port port. Don't warn more than - * once per SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL, unless safe_socks is set. */ -static void -log_unsafe_socks_warning(int socks_protocol, const char *address, - uint16_t port, int safe_socks) -{ - static ratelim_t socks_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL); - - if (safe_socks) { - log_fn_ratelim(&socks_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_APP, - "Your application (using socks%d to port %d) is giving " - "Tor only an IP address. Applications that do DNS resolves " - "themselves may leak information. Consider using Socks4A " - "(e.g. via privoxy or socat) instead. For more information, " - "please see https://wiki.torproject.org/TheOnionRouter/" - "TorFAQ#SOCKSAndDNS.%s", - socks_protocol, - (int)port, - safe_socks ? " Rejecting." : ""); - } - control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, - "DANGEROUS_SOCKS PROTOCOL=SOCKS%d ADDRESS=%s:%d", - socks_protocol, address, (int)port); -} - -/** Do not attempt to parse socks messages longer than this. This value is - * actually significantly higher than the longest possible socks message. */ -#define MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN 512 - -/** Return a new socks_request_t. */ -socks_request_t * -socks_request_new(void) -{ - return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(socks_request_t)); -} - -/** Free all storage held in the socks_request_t req. */ -void -socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req) -{ - if (!req) - return; - if (req->username) { - memwipe(req->username, 0x10, req->usernamelen); - tor_free(req->username); - } - if (req->password) { - memwipe(req->password, 0x04, req->passwordlen); - tor_free(req->password); - } - memwipe(req, 0xCC, sizeof(socks_request_t)); - tor_free(req); -} - -/** There is a (possibly incomplete) socks handshake on buf, of one - * of the forms - * - socks4: "socksheader username\\0" - * - socks4a: "socksheader username\\0 destaddr\\0" - * - socks5 phase one: "version #methods methods" - * - socks5 phase two: "version command 0 addresstype..." - * If it's a complete and valid handshake, and destaddr fits in - * MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN bytes, then pull the handshake off the buf, - * assign to req, and return 1. - * - * If it's invalid or too big, return -1. - * - * Else it's not all there yet, leave buf alone and return 0. - * - * If you want to specify the socks reply, write it into req->reply - * and set req->replylen, else leave req->replylen alone. - * - * If log_sockstype is non-zero, then do a notice-level log of whether - * the connection is possibly leaking DNS requests locally or not. - * - * If safe_socks is true, then reject unsafe socks protocols. - * - * If returning 0 or -1, req->address and req->port are - * undefined. - */ -int -fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, - int log_sockstype, int safe_socks) -{ - int res; - ssize_t n_drain; - size_t want_length = 128; - - if (buf->datalen < 2) /* version and another byte */ - return 0; - - do { - n_drain = 0; - buf_pullup(buf, want_length); - tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2); - want_length = 0; - - res = parse_socks(buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, req, log_sockstype, - safe_socks, &n_drain, &want_length); - - if (n_drain < 0) - buf_clear(buf); - else if (n_drain > 0) - buf_remove_from_front(buf, n_drain); - - } while (res == 0 && buf->head && want_length < buf->datalen && - buf->datalen >= 2); - - return res; -} - -/** The size of the header of an Extended ORPort message: 2 bytes for - * COMMAND, 2 bytes for BODYLEN */ -#define EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE 4 - -/** Read buf, which should contain an Extended ORPort message - * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate - * out with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the - * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we - * encountered an error while parsing it. */ -int -fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) -{ - char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; - uint16_t len; - - check(); - if (buf->datalen < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) - return 0; - peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); - len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); - if (buf->datalen < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) - return 0; - *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); - (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); - (*out)->len = len; - buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); - fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf); - return 1; -} - -/** Create a SOCKS5 reply message with reason in its REP field and - * have Tor send it as error response to req. - */ -static void -socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req, - socks5_reply_status_t reason) -{ - req->replylen = 10; - memset(req->reply,0,10); - - req->reply[0] = 0x05; // VER field. - req->reply[1] = reason; // REP field. - req->reply[3] = 0x01; // ATYP field. -} - -static const char SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG[] = - "HTTP/1.0 501 Tor is not an HTTP Proxy\r\n" - "Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n" - "<html>\n" - "<head>\n" - "<title>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</title>\n" - "</head>\n" - "<body>\n" - "<h1>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</h1>\n" - "\n" - "It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor as " - "an HTTP proxy.\n\n" - "This is not correct: Tor is a SOCKS proxy, not an HTTP proxy.\n" - "Please configure your client accordingly.\n" - "\n" - "\n" - "See <a href=\"https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html\">" - "https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html</a> for more " - "information.\n" - "\n" - "\n" - "</body>\n" - "</html>\n"; - -/** Implementation helper to implement fetch_from_*_socks. Instead of looking - * at a buffer's contents, we look at the datalen bytes of data in - * data. Instead of removing data from the buffer, we set - * drain_out to the amount of data that should be removed (or -1 if the - * buffer should be cleared). Instead of pulling more data into the first - * chunk of the buffer, we set *want_length_out to the number of bytes - * we'd like to see in the input buffer, if they're available. */ -static int -parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, - int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out, - size_t *want_length_out) -{ - unsigned int len; - char tmpbuf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN+1]; - tor_addr_t destaddr; - uint32_t destip; - uint8_t socksver; - char *next, *startaddr; - unsigned char usernamelen, passlen; - struct in_addr in; - - if (datalen < 2) { - /* We always need at least 2 bytes. */ - *want_length_out = 2; - return 0; - } - - if (req->socks_version == 5 && !req->got_auth) { - /* See if we have received authentication. Strictly speaking, we should - also check whether we actually negotiated username/password - authentication. But some broken clients will send us authentication - even if we negotiated SOCKS_NO_AUTH. */ - if (*data == 1) { /* username/pass version 1 */ - /* Format is: authversion [1 byte] == 1 - usernamelen [1 byte] - username [usernamelen bytes] - passlen [1 byte] - password [passlen bytes] */ - usernamelen = (unsigned char)*(data + 1); - if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u) { - *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u; - return 0; - } - passlen = (unsigned char)*(data + 2u + usernamelen); - if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen) { - *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen; - return 0; - } - req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */ - req->reply[0] = 1; /* authversion == 1 */ - req->reply[1] = 0; /* authentication successful */ - log_debug(LD_APP, - "socks5: Accepted username/password without checking."); - if (usernamelen) { - req->username = tor_memdup(data+2u, usernamelen); - req->usernamelen = usernamelen; - } - if (passlen) { - req->password = tor_memdup(data+3u+usernamelen, passlen); - req->passwordlen = passlen; - } - *drain_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen; - req->got_auth = 1; - *want_length_out = 7; /* Minimal socks5 command. */ - return 0; - } else if (req->auth_type == SOCKS_USER_PASS) { - /* unknown version byte */ - log_warn(LD_APP, "Socks5 username/password version %d not recognized; " - "rejecting.", (int)*data); - return -1; - } - } - - socksver = *data; - - switch (socksver) { /* which version of socks? */ - case 5: /* socks5 */ - - if (req->socks_version != 5) { /* we need to negotiate a method */ - unsigned char nummethods = (unsigned char)*(data+1); - int have_user_pass, have_no_auth; - int r=0; - tor_assert(!req->socks_version); - if (datalen < 2u+nummethods) { - *want_length_out = 2u+nummethods; - return 0; - } - if (!nummethods) - return -1; - req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */ - req->reply[0] = 5; /* socks5 reply */ - have_user_pass = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_USER_PASS, nummethods) !=NULL); - have_no_auth = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_NO_AUTH, nummethods) !=NULL); - if (have_user_pass && !(have_no_auth && req->socks_prefer_no_auth)) { - req->auth_type = SOCKS_USER_PASS; - req->reply[1] = SOCKS_USER_PASS; /* tell client to use "user/pass" - auth method */ - req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */ - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 2 (username/password)"); - r=0; - } else if (have_no_auth) { - req->reply[1] = SOCKS_NO_AUTH; /* tell client to use "none" auth - method */ - req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */ - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 0 (no authentication)"); - r=0; - } else { - log_warn(LD_APP, - "socks5: offered methods don't include 'no auth' or " - "username/password. Rejecting."); - req->reply[1] = '\xFF'; /* reject all methods */ - r=-1; - } - /* Remove packet from buf. Some SOCKS clients will have sent extra - * junk at this point; let's hope it's an authentication message. */ - *drain_out = 2u + nummethods; - - return r; - } - if (req->auth_type != SOCKS_NO_AUTH && !req->got_auth) { - log_warn(LD_APP, - "socks5: negotiated authentication, but none provided"); - return -1; - } - /* we know the method; read in the request */ - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: checking request"); - if (datalen < 7) {/* basic info plus >=1 for addr plus 2 for port */ - *want_length_out = 7; - return 0; /* not yet */ - } - req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1); - if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT && - req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE && - req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) { - /* not a connect or resolve or a resolve_ptr? we don't support it. */ - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req,SOCKS5_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); - - log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.", - req->command); - return -1; - } - switch (*(data+3)) { /* address type */ - case 1: /* IPv4 address */ - case 4: /* IPv6 address */ { - const int is_v6 = *(data+3) == 4; - const unsigned addrlen = is_v6 ? 16 : 4; - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: ipv4 address type"); - if (datalen < 6+addrlen) {/* ip/port there? */ - *want_length_out = 6+addrlen; - return 0; /* not yet */ - } - - if (is_v6) - tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&destaddr, data+4); - else - tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&destaddr, get_uint32(data+4)); - - tor_addr_to_str(tmpbuf, &destaddr, sizeof(tmpbuf), 1); - - if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); - log_warn(LD_APP, - "socks5 IP takes %d bytes, which doesn't fit in %d. " - "Rejecting.", - (int)strlen(tmpbuf)+1,(int)MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN); - return -1; - } - strlcpy(req->address,tmpbuf,sizeof(req->address)); - req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+4+addrlen)); - *drain_out = 6+addrlen; - if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR && - !addressmap_have_mapping(req->address,0)) { - log_unsafe_socks_warning(5, req->address, req->port, safe_socks); - if (safe_socks) { - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED); - return -1; - } - } - return 1; - } - case 3: /* fqdn */ - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: fqdn address type"); - if (req->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) { - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, - SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); - log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5 received RESOLVE_PTR command with " - "hostname type. Rejecting."); - return -1; - } - len = (unsigned char)*(data+4); - if (datalen < 7+len) { /* addr/port there? */ - *want_length_out = 7+len; - return 0; /* not yet */ - } - if (len+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); - log_warn(LD_APP, - "socks5 hostname is %d bytes, which doesn't fit in " - "%d. Rejecting.", len+1,MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN); - return -1; - } - memcpy(req->address,data+5,len); - req->address[len] = 0; - req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+5+len)); - *drain_out = 5+len+2; - - if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); - - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, - "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) gave Tor " - "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.", - req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address)); - return -1; - } - if (log_sockstype) - log_notice(LD_APP, - "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) instructed " - "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " - "necessary. This is good.", req->port); - return 1; - default: /* unsupported */ - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, - SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); - log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: unsupported address type %d. Rejecting.", - (int) *(data+3)); - return -1; - } - tor_assert(0); - break; - case 4: { /* socks4 */ - enum {socks4, socks4a} socks4_prot = socks4a; - const char *authstart, *authend; - /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4.protocol.txt */ - /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4A.protocol.txt */ - - req->socks_version = 4; - if (datalen < SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN) {/* basic info available? */ - *want_length_out = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN; - return 0; /* not yet */ - } - // buf_pullup(buf, 1280); - req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1); - if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT && - req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) { - /* not a connect or resolve? we don't support it. (No resolve_ptr with - * socks4.) */ - log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.", - req->command); - return -1; - } - - req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+2)); - destip = ntohl(get_uint32(data+4)); - if ((!req->port && req->command!=SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) || !destip) { - log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Port or DestIP is zero. Rejecting."); - return -1; - } - if (destip >> 8) { - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: destip not in form 0.0.0.x."); - in.s_addr = htonl(destip); - tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf)); - if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4 addr (%d bytes) too long. Rejecting.", - (int)strlen(tmpbuf)); - return -1; - } - log_debug(LD_APP, - "socks4: successfully read destip (%s)", - safe_str_client(tmpbuf)); - socks4_prot = socks4; - } - - authstart = data + SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN; - next = memchr(authstart, 0, - datalen-SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN); - if (!next) { - if (datalen >= 1024) { - log_debug(LD_APP, "Socks4 user name too long; rejecting."); - return -1; - } - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Username not here yet."); - *want_length_out = datalen+1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ - return 0; - } - authend = next; - tor_assert(next < data+datalen); - - startaddr = NULL; - if (socks4_prot != socks4a && - !addressmap_have_mapping(tmpbuf,0)) { - log_unsafe_socks_warning(4, tmpbuf, req->port, safe_socks); - - if (safe_socks) - return -1; - } - if (socks4_prot == socks4a) { - if (next+1 == data+datalen) { - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: No part of destaddr here yet."); - *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ - return 0; - } - startaddr = next+1; - next = memchr(startaddr, 0, data + datalen - startaddr); - if (!next) { - if (datalen >= 1024) { - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long."); - return -1; - } - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr not all here yet."); - *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ - return 0; - } - if (MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN <= next-startaddr) { - log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long. Rejecting."); - return -1; - } - // tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf->datalen); - - if (log_sockstype) - log_notice(LD_APP, - "Your application (using socks4a to port %d) instructed " - "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " - "necessary. This is good.", req->port); - } - log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success."); - strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf, - sizeof(req->address)); - if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, - "Your application (using socks4 to port %d) gave Tor " - "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.", - req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address)); - return -1; - } - if (authend != authstart) { - req->got_auth = 1; - req->usernamelen = authend - authstart; - req->username = tor_memdup(authstart, authend - authstart); - } - /* next points to the final \0 on inbuf */ - *drain_out = next - data + 1; - return 1; - } - case 'G': /* get */ - case 'H': /* head */ - case 'P': /* put/post */ - case 'C': /* connect */ - strlcpy((char*)req->reply, SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG, - MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN); - req->replylen = strlen((char*)req->reply)+1; - /* fall through */ - default: /* version is not socks4 or socks5 */ - log_warn(LD_APP, - "Socks version %d not recognized. (Tor is not an http proxy.)", - *(data)); - { - /* Tell the controller the first 8 bytes. */ - char *tmp = tor_strndup(data, datalen < 8 ? datalen : 8); - control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, - "SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL DATA=\"%s\"", - escaped(tmp)); - tor_free(tmp); - } - return -1; - } -} - -/** Inspect a reply from SOCKS server stored in buf according - * to state, removing the protocol data upon success. Return 0 on - * incomplete response, 1 on success and -1 on error, in which case - * reason is set to a descriptive message (free() when finished - * with it). - * - * As a special case, 2 is returned when user/pass is required - * during SOCKS5 handshake and user/pass is configured. - */ -int -fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason) -{ - ssize_t drain = 0; - int r; - if (buf->datalen < 2) - return 0; - - buf_pullup(buf, MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN); - tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2); - - r = parse_socks_client((uint8_t*)buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, - state, reason, &drain); - if (drain > 0) - buf_remove_from_front(buf, drain); - else if (drain < 0) - buf_clear(buf); - - return r; -} - -/** Implementation logic for fetch_from_*_socks_client. */ -static int -parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, - int state, char **reason, - ssize_t *drain_out) -{ - unsigned int addrlen; - *drain_out = 0; - if (datalen < 2) - return 0; - - switch (state) { - case PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK: - /* Wait for the complete response */ - if (datalen < 8) - return 0; - - if (data[1] != 0x5a) { - *reason = tor_strdup(socks4_response_code_to_string(data[1])); - return -1; - } - - /* Success */ - *drain_out = 8; - return 1; - - case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE: - /* we don't have any credentials */ - if (data[1] != 0x00) { - *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our " - "available authentication methods"); - return -1; - } - - log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: continuing without authentication"); - *drain_out = -1; - return 1; - - case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929: - /* we have a username and password. return 1 if we can proceed without - * providing authentication, or 2 otherwise. */ - switch (data[1]) { - case 0x00: - log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: we have auth details but server " - "doesn't require authentication."); - *drain_out = -1; - return 1; - case 0x02: - log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: need authentication."); - *drain_out = -1; - return 2; - /* fall through */ - } - - *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our available " - "authentication methods"); - return -1; - - case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK: - /* handle server reply to rfc1929 authentication */ - if (data[1] != 0x00) { - *reason = tor_strdup("authentication failed"); - return -1; - } - - log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: authentication successful."); - *drain_out = -1; - return 1; - - case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK: - /* response is variable length. BND.ADDR, etc, isn't needed - * (don't bother with buf_pullup()), but make sure to eat all - * the data used */ - - /* wait for address type field to arrive */ - if (datalen < 4) - return 0; - - switch (data[3]) { - case 0x01: /* ip4 */ - addrlen = 4; - break; - case 0x04: /* ip6 */ - addrlen = 16; - break; - case 0x03: /* fqdn (can this happen here?) */ - if (datalen < 5) - return 0; - addrlen = 1 + data[4]; - break; - default: - *reason = tor_strdup("invalid response to connect request"); - return -1; - } - - /* wait for address and port */ - if (datalen < 6 + addrlen) - return 0; - - if (data[1] != 0x00) { - *reason = tor_strdup(socks5_response_code_to_string(data[1])); - return -1; - } - - *drain_out = 6 + addrlen; - return 1; - } - - /* shouldn't get here... */ - tor_assert(0); - - return -1; -} - -/** Return true if cmd looks like a HTTP (proxy) request. */ -int -peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf) -{ - if (peek_buf_startswith(buf, "CONNECT ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "DELETE ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "GET ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "POST ") || - peek_buf_startswith(buf, "PUT " )) - return 1; - return 0; -} - /** Return 1 iff buf starts with cmd. cmd must be a null * terminated string, of no more than PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX bytes. */ int @@ -2044,22 +1086,6 @@ peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd) return fast_memeq(tmp, cmd, clen); } -/** Return 1 iff buf looks more like it has an (obsolete) v0 controller - * command on it than any valid v1 controller command. */ -int -peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf) -{ - if (buf->datalen >= 4) { - char header[4]; - uint16_t cmd; - peek_from_buf(header, sizeof(header), buf); - cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(header+2)); - if (cmd <= 0x14) - return 1; /* This is definitely not a v1 control command. */ - } - return 0; -} - /** Return the index within buf at which ch first appears, * or -1 if ch does not appear on buf. */ static off_t diff --git a/src/or/buffers.h b/src/or/buffers.h index d88408438..5a6f510f5 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.h +++ b/src/or/buffers.h @@ -39,23 +39,13 @@ int write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); int write_to_buf_compress(buf_t *buf, tor_compress_state_t *state, const char *data, size_t data_len, int done); int move_buf_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen); +void peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf); +void buf_remove_from_front(buf_t *buf, size_t n); int fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); -int fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto); -int fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, - char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, - char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen, - int force_complete); -socks_request_t *socks_request_new(void); -void socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req); -int fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, - int log_sockstype, int safe_socks); -int fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason); int fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len); -int peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf); #define PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX 16 int peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd); -int peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf); int fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out); @@ -64,14 +54,15 @@ int buf_set_to_copy(buf_t **output, void assert_buf_ok(buf_t *buf); +int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n); +void buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes); + #ifdef BUFFERS_PRIVATE -STATIC int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n); -STATIC void buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes); #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS void buf_get_first_chunk_data(const buf_t *buf, const char **cp, size_t *sz); buf_t *buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz); #endif -STATIC size_t preferred_chunk_size(size_t target); +ATTR_UNUSED STATIC size_t preferred_chunk_size(size_t target); #define DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC /** A single chunk on a buffer. */ @@ -103,10 +94,5 @@ struct buf_t { }; #endif -#ifdef BUFFERS_PRIVATE -STATIC int buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen, - size_t *result_out); -#endif - #endif diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 31a682387..637b38cec 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ #include "hs_common.h" #include "hs_ident.h" #include "nodelist.h" +#include "proto_http.h" +#include "proto_socks.h" #include "policies.h" #include "reasons.h" #include "relay.h" diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index a98b32450..4f990e0a0 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ #include "main.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "policies.h" +#include "proto_socks.h" #include "reasons.h" #include "relay.h" #include "rendclient.h" diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index fc304e6f1..8cd36d66b 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ #include "microdesc.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" +#include "proto_cell.h" #include "reasons.h" #include "relay.h" #include "rephist.h" diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index bc173a6e1..cd78daa91 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "policies.h" +#include "proto_control0.h" +#include "proto_http.h" #include "reasons.h" #include "rendclient.h" #include "rendcommon.h" diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index 69b505fcd..caea04197 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/parsecommon.c \ src/or/periodic.c \ src/or/protover.c \ + src/or/proto_cell.c \ + src/or/proto_control0.c \ + src/or/proto_http.c \ + src/or/proto_socks.c \ src/or/policies.c \ src/or/reasons.c \ src/or/relay.c \ @@ -215,6 +219,10 @@ ORHEADERS = \ src/or/periodic.h \ src/or/policies.h \ src/or/protover.h \ + src/or/proto_cell.h \ + src/or/proto_control0.h \ + src/or/proto_http.h \ + src/or/proto_socks.h \ src/or/reasons.h \ src/or/relay.h \ src/or/rendcache.h \ diff --git a/src/or/proto_cell.c b/src/or/proto_cell.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9e5cdff42 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_cell.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. +#include "or.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "proto_cell.h" + +#include "connection_or.h" + +/** True iff the cell command command is one that implies a + * variable-length cell in Tor link protocol linkproto. */ +static inline int +cell_command_is_var_length(uint8_t command, int linkproto) +{ + /* If linkproto is v2 (2), CELL_VERSIONS is the only variable-length cells + * work as implemented here. If it's 1, there are no variable-length cells. + * Tor does not support other versions right now, and so can't negotiate + * them. + */ + switch (linkproto) { + case 1: + /* Link protocol version 1 has no variable-length cells. */ + return 0; + case 2: + /* In link protocol version 2, VERSIONS is the only variable-length cell */ + return command == CELL_VERSIONS; + case 0: + case 3: + default: + /* In link protocol version 3 and later, and in version "unknown", + * commands 128 and higher indicate variable-length. VERSIONS is + * grandfathered in. */ + return command == CELL_VERSIONS || command >= 128; + } +} + +/** Check buf for a variable-length cell according to the rules of link + * protocol version linkproto. If one is found, pull it off the buffer + * and assign a newly allocated var_cell_t to *out, and return 1. + * Return 0 if whatever is on the start of buf_t is not a variable-length + * cell. Return 1 and set *out to NULL if there seems to be the start + * of a variable-length cell on buf, but the whole thing isn't there + * yet. */ +int +fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto) +{ + char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE]; + var_cell_t *result; + uint8_t command; + uint16_t length; + const int wide_circ_ids = linkproto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS; + const int circ_id_len = get_circ_id_size(wide_circ_ids); + const unsigned header_len = get_var_cell_header_size(wide_circ_ids); + *out = NULL; + if (buf->datalen < header_len) + return 0; + peek_from_buf(hdr, header_len, buf); + + command = get_uint8(hdr + circ_id_len); + if (!(cell_command_is_var_length(command, linkproto))) + return 0; + + length = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr + circ_id_len + 1)); + if (buf->datalen < (size_t)(header_len+length)) + return 1; + result = var_cell_new(length); + result->command = command; + if (wide_circ_ids) + result->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(hdr)); + else + result->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); + + buf_remove_from_front(buf, header_len); + peek_from_buf((char*) result->payload, length, buf); + buf_remove_from_front(buf, length); + + *out = result; + return 1; +} + diff --git a/src/or/proto_cell.h b/src/or/proto_cell.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..91729a391 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_cell.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_PROTO_CELL_H +#define TOR_PROTO_CELL_H + +struct buf_t; +struct var_cell_t; + +int fetch_var_cell_from_buf(struct buf_t *buf, struct var_cell_t **out, + int linkproto); + +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/proto_control0.c b/src/or/proto_control0.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4c505fa6f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_control0.c @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. +#include "or.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "proto_control0.h" + +/** Return 1 iff buf looks more like it has an (obsolete) v0 controller + * command on it than any valid v1 controller command. */ +int +peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf) +{ + if (buf->datalen >= 4) { + char header[4]; + uint16_t cmd; + peek_from_buf(header, sizeof(header), buf); + cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(header+2)); + if (cmd <= 0x14) + return 1; /* This is definitely not a v1 control command. */ + } + return 0; +} + diff --git a/src/or/proto_control0.h b/src/or/proto_control0.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6df6bebaa --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_control0.h @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_PROTO_CONTROL0_H +#define TOR_PROTO_CONTROL0_H + +struct buf_t; +int peek_buf_has_control0_command(struct buf_t *buf); + +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/proto_http.c b/src/or/proto_http.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2ba3f93ab --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_http.c @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. +#define PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE +#include "or.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "proto_http.h" + +/** Return true if cmd looks like a HTTP (proxy) request. */ +int +peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf) +{ + if (peek_buf_startswith(buf, "CONNECT ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "DELETE ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "GET ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "POST ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "PUT " )) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/** There is a (possibly incomplete) http statement on buf, of the + * form "\%s\\r\\n\\r\\n\%s", headers, body. (body may contain NULs.) + * If a) the headers include a Content-Length field and all bytes in + * the body are present, or b) there's no Content-Length field and + * all headers are present, then: + * + * - strdup headers into *headers_out, and NUL-terminate it. + * - memdup body into *body_out, and NUL-terminate it. + * - Then remove them from buf, and return 1. + * + * - If headers or body is NULL, discard that part of the buf. + * - If a headers or body doesn't fit in the arg, return -1. + * (We ensure that the headers or body don't exceed max len, + * _even if_ we're planning to discard them.) + * - If force_complete is true, then succeed even if not all of the + * content has arrived. + * + * Else, change nothing and return 0. + */ +int +fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, + char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, + char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen, + int force_complete) +{ + char *headers; + size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen=0; + int crlf_offset; + int r; + + if (!buf->head) + return 0; + + crlf_offset = buf_find_string_offset(buf, "\r\n\r\n", 4); + if (crlf_offset > (int)max_headerlen || + (crlf_offset < 0 && buf->datalen > max_headerlen)) { + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers too long."); + return -1; + } else if (crlf_offset < 0) { + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers not all here yet."); + return 0; + } + /* Okay, we have a full header. Make sure it all appears in the first + * chunk. */ + if ((int)buf->head->datalen < crlf_offset + 4) + buf_pullup(buf, crlf_offset+4); + headerlen = crlf_offset + 4; + + headers = buf->head->data; + bodylen = buf->datalen - headerlen; + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", (int)headerlen, (int)bodylen); + + if (max_headerlen <= headerlen) { + log_warn(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d larger than %d. Failing.", + (int)headerlen, (int)max_headerlen-1); + return -1; + } + if (max_bodylen <= bodylen) { + log_warn(LD_HTTP,"bodylen %d larger than %d. Failing.", + (int)bodylen, (int)max_bodylen-1); + return -1; + } + + r = buf_http_find_content_length(headers, headerlen, &contentlen); + if (r == -1) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Content-Length is bogus; maybe " + "someone is trying to crash us."); + return -1; + } else if (r == 1) { + /* if content-length is malformed, then our body length is 0. fine. */ + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"Got a contentlen of %d.",(int)contentlen); + if (bodylen < contentlen) { + if (!force_complete) { + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"body not all here yet."); + return 0; /* not all there yet */ + } + } + if (bodylen > contentlen) { + bodylen = contentlen; + log_debug(LD_HTTP,"bodylen reduced to %d.",(int)bodylen); + } + } else { + tor_assert(r == 0); + /* Leave bodylen alone */ + } + + /* all happy. copy into the appropriate places, and return 1 */ + if (headers_out) { + *headers_out = tor_malloc(headerlen+1); + fetch_from_buf(*headers_out, headerlen, buf); + (*headers_out)[headerlen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */ + } + if (body_out) { + tor_assert(body_used); + *body_used = bodylen; + *body_out = tor_malloc(bodylen+1); + fetch_from_buf(*body_out, bodylen, buf); + (*body_out)[bodylen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */ + } + return 1; +} + +/** + * Scan the HTTP headers in the headerlen-byte memory range at + * headers, looking for a "Content-Length" header. Try to set + * *result_out to the numeric value of that header if possible. + * Return -1 if the header was malformed, 0 if it was missing, and 1 if + * it was present and well-formed. + */ +STATIC int +buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen, + size_t *result_out) +{ + const char *p, *newline; + char *len_str, *eos=NULL; + size_t remaining, result; + int ok; + *result_out = 0; /* The caller shouldn't look at this unless the + * return value is 1, but let's prevent confusion */ + +#define CONTENT_LENGTH "\r\nContent-Length: " + p = (char*) tor_memstr(headers, headerlen, CONTENT_LENGTH); + if (p == NULL) + return 0; + + tor_assert(p >= headers && p < headers+headerlen); + remaining = (headers+headerlen)-p; + p += strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH); + remaining -= strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH); + + newline = memchr(p, '\n', remaining); + if (newline == NULL) + return -1; + + len_str = tor_memdup_nulterm(p, newline-p); + /* We limit the size to INT_MAX because other parts of the buffer.c + * code don't like buffers to be any bigger than that. */ + result = (size_t) tor_parse_uint64(len_str, 10, 0, INT_MAX, &ok, &eos); + if (eos && !tor_strisspace(eos)) { + ok = 0; + } else { + *result_out = result; + } + tor_free(len_str); + + return ok ? 1 : -1; +} + diff --git a/src/or/proto_http.h b/src/or/proto_http.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dbff823cc --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_http.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_PROTO_HTTP_H +#define TOR_PROTO_HTTP_H + +struct buf_t; + +int fetch_from_buf_http(struct buf_t *buf, + char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, + char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen, + int force_complete); +int peek_buf_has_http_command(const struct buf_t *buf); + +#ifdef PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE +STATIC int buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen, + size_t *result_out); +#endif + +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.c b/src/or/proto_socks.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..20804455c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_socks.c @@ -0,0 +1,723 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. +#include "or.h" +#include "addressmap.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "control.h" +#include "config.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" +#include "proto_socks.h" +#include "reasons.h" + +static void socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req, + socks5_reply_status_t reason); + +static int parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, + int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out, + size_t *want_length_out); +static int parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, + int state, char **reason, + ssize_t *drain_out); +/** + * Wait this many seconds before warning the user about using SOCKS unsafely + * again. */ +#define SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL 5 + +/** Warn that the user application has made an unsafe socks request using + * protocol socks_protocol on port port. Don't warn more than + * once per SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL, unless safe_socks is set. */ +static void +log_unsafe_socks_warning(int socks_protocol, const char *address, + uint16_t port, int safe_socks) +{ + static ratelim_t socks_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL); + + if (safe_socks) { + log_fn_ratelim(&socks_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_APP, + "Your application (using socks%d to port %d) is giving " + "Tor only an IP address. Applications that do DNS resolves " + "themselves may leak information. Consider using Socks4A " + "(e.g. via privoxy or socat) instead. For more information, " + "please see https://wiki.torproject.org/TheOnionRouter/" + "TorFAQ#SOCKSAndDNS.%s", + socks_protocol, + (int)port, + safe_socks ? " Rejecting." : ""); + } + control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, + "DANGEROUS_SOCKS PROTOCOL=SOCKS%d ADDRESS=%s:%d", + socks_protocol, address, (int)port); +} + +/** Do not attempt to parse socks messages longer than this. This value is + * actually significantly higher than the longest possible socks message. */ +#define MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN 512 + +/** Return a new socks_request_t. */ +socks_request_t * +socks_request_new(void) +{ + return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(socks_request_t)); +} + +/** Free all storage held in the socks_request_t req. */ +void +socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req) +{ + if (!req) + return; + if (req->username) { + memwipe(req->username, 0x10, req->usernamelen); + tor_free(req->username); + } + if (req->password) { + memwipe(req->password, 0x04, req->passwordlen); + tor_free(req->password); + } + memwipe(req, 0xCC, sizeof(socks_request_t)); + tor_free(req); +} + +/** There is a (possibly incomplete) socks handshake on buf, of one + * of the forms + * - socks4: "socksheader username\\0" + * - socks4a: "socksheader username\\0 destaddr\\0" + * - socks5 phase one: "version #methods methods" + * - socks5 phase two: "version command 0 addresstype..." + * If it's a complete and valid handshake, and destaddr fits in + * MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN bytes, then pull the handshake off the buf, + * assign to req, and return 1. + * + * If it's invalid or too big, return -1. + * + * Else it's not all there yet, leave buf alone and return 0. + * + * If you want to specify the socks reply, write it into req->reply + * and set req->replylen, else leave req->replylen alone. + * + * If log_sockstype is non-zero, then do a notice-level log of whether + * the connection is possibly leaking DNS requests locally or not. + * + * If safe_socks is true, then reject unsafe socks protocols. + * + * If returning 0 or -1, req->address and req->port are + * undefined. + */ +int +fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, + int log_sockstype, int safe_socks) +{ + int res; + ssize_t n_drain; + size_t want_length = 128; + + if (buf->datalen < 2) /* version and another byte */ + return 0; + + do { + n_drain = 0; + buf_pullup(buf, want_length); + tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2); + want_length = 0; + + res = parse_socks(buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, req, log_sockstype, + safe_socks, &n_drain, &want_length); + + if (n_drain < 0) + buf_clear(buf); + else if (n_drain > 0) + buf_remove_from_front(buf, n_drain); + + } while (res == 0 && buf->head && want_length < buf->datalen && + buf->datalen >= 2); + + return res; +} + +/** The size of the header of an Extended ORPort message: 2 bytes for + * COMMAND, 2 bytes for BODYLEN */ +#define EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE 4 + +/** Read buf, which should contain an Extended ORPort message + * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate + * out with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the + * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we + * encountered an error while parsing it. */ +int +fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) +{ + char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; + uint16_t len; + + if (buf->datalen < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); + len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); + if (buf->datalen < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); + (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); + (*out)->len = len; + buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); + fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf); + return 1; +} + +/** Create a SOCKS5 reply message with reason in its REP field and + * have Tor send it as error response to req. + */ +static void +socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req, + socks5_reply_status_t reason) +{ + req->replylen = 10; + memset(req->reply,0,10); + + req->reply[0] = 0x05; // VER field. + req->reply[1] = reason; // REP field. + req->reply[3] = 0x01; // ATYP field. +} + +static const char SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG[] = + "HTTP/1.0 501 Tor is not an HTTP Proxy\r\n" + "Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n" + "<html>\n" + "<head>\n" + "<title>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</title>\n" + "</head>\n" + "<body>\n" + "<h1>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</h1>\n" + "\n" + "It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor as " + "an HTTP proxy.\n\n" + "This is not correct: Tor is a SOCKS proxy, not an HTTP proxy.\n" + "Please configure your client accordingly.\n" + "\n" + "\n" + "See <a href=\"https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html\">" + "https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html</a> for more " + "information.\n" + "\n" + "\n" + "</body>\n" + "</html>\n"; + +/** Implementation helper to implement fetch_from_*_socks. Instead of looking + * at a buffer's contents, we look at the datalen bytes of data in + * data. Instead of removing data from the buffer, we set + * drain_out to the amount of data that should be removed (or -1 if the + * buffer should be cleared). Instead of pulling more data into the first + * chunk of the buffer, we set *want_length_out to the number of bytes + * we'd like to see in the input buffer, if they're available. */ +static int +parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, + int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out, + size_t *want_length_out) +{ + unsigned int len; + char tmpbuf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN+1]; + tor_addr_t destaddr; + uint32_t destip; + uint8_t socksver; + char *next, *startaddr; + unsigned char usernamelen, passlen; + struct in_addr in; + + if (datalen < 2) { + /* We always need at least 2 bytes. */ + *want_length_out = 2; + return 0; + } + + if (req->socks_version == 5 && !req->got_auth) { + /* See if we have received authentication. Strictly speaking, we should + also check whether we actually negotiated username/password + authentication. But some broken clients will send us authentication + even if we negotiated SOCKS_NO_AUTH. */ + if (*data == 1) { /* username/pass version 1 */ + /* Format is: authversion [1 byte] == 1 + usernamelen [1 byte] + username [usernamelen bytes] + passlen [1 byte] + password [passlen bytes] */ + usernamelen = (unsigned char)*(data + 1); + if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u) { + *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u; + return 0; + } + passlen = (unsigned char)*(data + 2u + usernamelen); + if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen) { + *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen; + return 0; + } + req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */ + req->reply[0] = 1; /* authversion == 1 */ + req->reply[1] = 0; /* authentication successful */ + log_debug(LD_APP, + "socks5: Accepted username/password without checking."); + if (usernamelen) { + req->username = tor_memdup(data+2u, usernamelen); + req->usernamelen = usernamelen; + } + if (passlen) { + req->password = tor_memdup(data+3u+usernamelen, passlen); + req->passwordlen = passlen; + } + *drain_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen; + req->got_auth = 1; + *want_length_out = 7; /* Minimal socks5 command. */ + return 0; + } else if (req->auth_type == SOCKS_USER_PASS) { + /* unknown version byte */ + log_warn(LD_APP, "Socks5 username/password version %d not recognized; " + "rejecting.", (int)*data); + return -1; + } + } + + socksver = *data; + + switch (socksver) { /* which version of socks? */ + case 5: /* socks5 */ + + if (req->socks_version != 5) { /* we need to negotiate a method */ + unsigned char nummethods = (unsigned char)*(data+1); + int have_user_pass, have_no_auth; + int r=0; + tor_assert(!req->socks_version); + if (datalen < 2u+nummethods) { + *want_length_out = 2u+nummethods; + return 0; + } + if (!nummethods) + return -1; + req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */ + req->reply[0] = 5; /* socks5 reply */ + have_user_pass = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_USER_PASS, nummethods) !=NULL); + have_no_auth = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_NO_AUTH, nummethods) !=NULL); + if (have_user_pass && !(have_no_auth && req->socks_prefer_no_auth)) { + req->auth_type = SOCKS_USER_PASS; + req->reply[1] = SOCKS_USER_PASS; /* tell client to use "user/pass" + auth method */ + req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */ + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 2 (username/password)"); + r=0; + } else if (have_no_auth) { + req->reply[1] = SOCKS_NO_AUTH; /* tell client to use "none" auth + method */ + req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */ + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 0 (no authentication)"); + r=0; + } else { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "socks5: offered methods don't include 'no auth' or " + "username/password. Rejecting."); + req->reply[1] = '\xFF'; /* reject all methods */ + r=-1; + } + /* Remove packet from buf. Some SOCKS clients will have sent extra + * junk at this point; let's hope it's an authentication message. */ + *drain_out = 2u + nummethods; + + return r; + } + if (req->auth_type != SOCKS_NO_AUTH && !req->got_auth) { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "socks5: negotiated authentication, but none provided"); + return -1; + } + /* we know the method; read in the request */ + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: checking request"); + if (datalen < 7) {/* basic info plus >=1 for addr plus 2 for port */ + *want_length_out = 7; + return 0; /* not yet */ + } + req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1); + if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT && + req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE && + req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) { + /* not a connect or resolve or a resolve_ptr? we don't support it. */ + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req,SOCKS5_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + + log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.", + req->command); + return -1; + } + switch (*(data+3)) { /* address type */ + case 1: /* IPv4 address */ + case 4: /* IPv6 address */ { + const int is_v6 = *(data+3) == 4; + const unsigned addrlen = is_v6 ? 16 : 4; + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: ipv4 address type"); + if (datalen < 6+addrlen) {/* ip/port there? */ + *want_length_out = 6+addrlen; + return 0; /* not yet */ + } + + if (is_v6) + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&destaddr, data+4); + else + tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&destaddr, get_uint32(data+4)); + + tor_addr_to_str(tmpbuf, &destaddr, sizeof(tmpbuf), 1); + + if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); + log_warn(LD_APP, + "socks5 IP takes %d bytes, which doesn't fit in %d. " + "Rejecting.", + (int)strlen(tmpbuf)+1,(int)MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN); + return -1; + } + strlcpy(req->address,tmpbuf,sizeof(req->address)); + req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+4+addrlen)); + *drain_out = 6+addrlen; + if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR && + !addressmap_have_mapping(req->address,0)) { + log_unsafe_socks_warning(5, req->address, req->port, safe_socks); + if (safe_socks) { + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED); + return -1; + } + } + return 1; + } + case 3: /* fqdn */ + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: fqdn address type"); + if (req->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) { + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, + SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); + log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5 received RESOLVE_PTR command with " + "hostname type. Rejecting."); + return -1; + } + len = (unsigned char)*(data+4); + if (datalen < 7+len) { /* addr/port there? */ + *want_length_out = 7+len; + return 0; /* not yet */ + } + if (len+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); + log_warn(LD_APP, + "socks5 hostname is %d bytes, which doesn't fit in " + "%d. Rejecting.", len+1,MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN); + return -1; + } + memcpy(req->address,data+5,len); + req->address[len] = 0; + req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+5+len)); + *drain_out = 5+len+2; + + if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); + + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, + "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) gave Tor " + "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.", + req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address)); + return -1; + } + if (log_sockstype) + log_notice(LD_APP, + "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) instructed " + "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " + "necessary. This is good.", req->port); + return 1; + default: /* unsupported */ + socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, + SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); + log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: unsupported address type %d. Rejecting.", + (int) *(data+3)); + return -1; + } + tor_assert(0); + break; + case 4: { /* socks4 */ + enum {socks4, socks4a} socks4_prot = socks4a; + const char *authstart, *authend; + /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4.protocol.txt */ + /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4A.protocol.txt */ + + req->socks_version = 4; + if (datalen < SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN) {/* basic info available? */ + *want_length_out = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN; + return 0; /* not yet */ + } + // buf_pullup(buf, 1280); + req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1); + if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT && + req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) { + /* not a connect or resolve? we don't support it. (No resolve_ptr with + * socks4.) */ + log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.", + req->command); + return -1; + } + + req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+2)); + destip = ntohl(get_uint32(data+4)); + if ((!req->port && req->command!=SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) || !destip) { + log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Port or DestIP is zero. Rejecting."); + return -1; + } + if (destip >> 8) { + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: destip not in form 0.0.0.x."); + in.s_addr = htonl(destip); + tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf)); + if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4 addr (%d bytes) too long. Rejecting.", + (int)strlen(tmpbuf)); + return -1; + } + log_debug(LD_APP, + "socks4: successfully read destip (%s)", + safe_str_client(tmpbuf)); + socks4_prot = socks4; + } + + authstart = data + SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN; + next = memchr(authstart, 0, + datalen-SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN); + if (!next) { + if (datalen >= 1024) { + log_debug(LD_APP, "Socks4 user name too long; rejecting."); + return -1; + } + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Username not here yet."); + *want_length_out = datalen+1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ + return 0; + } + authend = next; + tor_assert(next < data+datalen); + + startaddr = NULL; + if (socks4_prot != socks4a && + !addressmap_have_mapping(tmpbuf,0)) { + log_unsafe_socks_warning(4, tmpbuf, req->port, safe_socks); + + if (safe_socks) + return -1; + } + if (socks4_prot == socks4a) { + if (next+1 == data+datalen) { + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: No part of destaddr here yet."); + *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ + return 0; + } + startaddr = next+1; + next = memchr(startaddr, 0, data + datalen - startaddr); + if (!next) { + if (datalen >= 1024) { + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long."); + return -1; + } + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr not all here yet."); + *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ + return 0; + } + if (MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN <= next-startaddr) { + log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long. Rejecting."); + return -1; + } + // tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf->datalen); + + if (log_sockstype) + log_notice(LD_APP, + "Your application (using socks4a to port %d) instructed " + "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " + "necessary. This is good.", req->port); + } + log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success."); + strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf, + sizeof(req->address)); + if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, + "Your application (using socks4 to port %d) gave Tor " + "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.", + req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address)); + return -1; + } + if (authend != authstart) { + req->got_auth = 1; + req->usernamelen = authend - authstart; + req->username = tor_memdup(authstart, authend - authstart); + } + /* next points to the final \0 on inbuf */ + *drain_out = next - data + 1; + return 1; + } + case 'G': /* get */ + case 'H': /* head */ + case 'P': /* put/post */ + case 'C': /* connect */ + strlcpy((char*)req->reply, SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG, + MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN); + req->replylen = strlen((char*)req->reply)+1; + /* fall through */ + default: /* version is not socks4 or socks5 */ + log_warn(LD_APP, + "Socks version %d not recognized. (Tor is not an http proxy.)", + *(data)); + { + /* Tell the controller the first 8 bytes. */ + char *tmp = tor_strndup(data, datalen < 8 ? datalen : 8); + control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, + "SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL DATA=\"%s\"", + escaped(tmp)); + tor_free(tmp); + } + return -1; + } +} + +/** Inspect a reply from SOCKS server stored in buf according + * to state, removing the protocol data upon success. Return 0 on + * incomplete response, 1 on success and -1 on error, in which case + * reason is set to a descriptive message (free() when finished + * with it). + * + * As a special case, 2 is returned when user/pass is required + * during SOCKS5 handshake and user/pass is configured. + */ +int +fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason) +{ + ssize_t drain = 0; + int r; + if (buf->datalen < 2) + return 0; + + buf_pullup(buf, MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN); + tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2); + + r = parse_socks_client((uint8_t*)buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, + state, reason, &drain); + if (drain > 0) + buf_remove_from_front(buf, drain); + else if (drain < 0) + buf_clear(buf); + + return r; +} + +/** Implementation logic for fetch_from_*_socks_client. */ +static int +parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, + int state, char **reason, + ssize_t *drain_out) +{ + unsigned int addrlen; + *drain_out = 0; + if (datalen < 2) + return 0; + + switch (state) { + case PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK: + /* Wait for the complete response */ + if (datalen < 8) + return 0; + + if (data[1] != 0x5a) { + *reason = tor_strdup(socks4_response_code_to_string(data[1])); + return -1; + } + + /* Success */ + *drain_out = 8; + return 1; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE: + /* we don't have any credentials */ + if (data[1] != 0x00) { + *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our " + "available authentication methods"); + return -1; + } + + log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: continuing without authentication"); + *drain_out = -1; + return 1; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929: + /* we have a username and password. return 1 if we can proceed without + * providing authentication, or 2 otherwise. */ + switch (data[1]) { + case 0x00: + log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: we have auth details but server " + "doesn't require authentication."); + *drain_out = -1; + return 1; + case 0x02: + log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: need authentication."); + *drain_out = -1; + return 2; + /* fall through */ + } + + *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our available " + "authentication methods"); + return -1; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK: + /* handle server reply to rfc1929 authentication */ + if (data[1] != 0x00) { + *reason = tor_strdup("authentication failed"); + return -1; + } + + log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: authentication successful."); + *drain_out = -1; + return 1; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK: + /* response is variable length. BND.ADDR, etc, isn't needed + * (don't bother with buf_pullup()), but make sure to eat all + * the data used */ + + /* wait for address type field to arrive */ + if (datalen < 4) + return 0; + + switch (data[3]) { + case 0x01: /* ip4 */ + addrlen = 4; + break; + case 0x04: /* ip6 */ + addrlen = 16; + break; + case 0x03: /* fqdn (can this happen here?) */ + if (datalen < 5) + return 0; + addrlen = 1 + data[4]; + break; + default: + *reason = tor_strdup("invalid response to connect request"); + return -1; + } + + /* wait for address and port */ + if (datalen < 6 + addrlen) + return 0; + + if (data[1] != 0x00) { + *reason = tor_strdup(socks5_response_code_to_string(data[1])); + return -1; + } + + *drain_out = 6 + addrlen; + return 1; + } + + /* shouldn't get here... */ + tor_assert(0); + + return -1; +} + diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.h b/src/or/proto_socks.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4a2477319 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_socks.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_PROTO_SOCKS_H +#define TOR_PROTO_SOCKS_H + +struct socks_request_t; +struct buf_t; + +struct socks_request_t *socks_request_new(void); +void socks_request_free(struct socks_request_t *req); +int fetch_from_buf_socks(struct buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, + int log_sockstype, int safe_socks); +int fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason); + +#endif + diff --git a/src/test/test_buffers.c b/src/test/test_buffers.c index a85fb95f0..3eb4ac2a3 100644 --- a/src/test/test_buffers.c +++ b/src/test/test_buffers.c @@ -4,9 +4,14 @@ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #define BUFFERS_PRIVATE +#define PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "ext_orport.h" +#include "proto_cell.h" +#include "proto_http.h" +#include "proto_control0.h" +#include "proto_socks.h" #include "test.h" /** Run unit tests for buffers.c */ diff --git a/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c b/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c index 75fe6249a..c4c74df66 100644 --- a/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c +++ b/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include "entrynodes.h" #include "routerparse.h" #include "networkstatus.h" +#include "proto_http.h" #include "geoip.h" #include "dirserv.h" #include "dirvote.h" diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_cache.c b/src/test/test_hs_cache.c index cbd88acff..950c0483d 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_cache.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_cache.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include "rendcache.h" #include "directory.h" #include "connection.h" +#include "proto_http.h" #include "hs_test_helpers.h" #include "test_helpers.h" diff --git a/src/test/test_socks.c b/src/test/test_socks.c index 7c0960f0f..571f45735 100644 --- a/src/test/test_socks.c +++ b/src/test/test_socks.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "config.h" +#include "proto_socks.h" #include "test.h" typedef struct socks_test_data_t {

1 0

[tor/master] Make buffers.c independent of or.h
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 5921b465e7764d35b3f128cf0cf096eca3226688 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 8 12:23:39 2017 -0400 Make buffers.c independent of or.h Also, put ext_or function in new module; it had accidentally gotten into proto_socks.c --- src/or/buffers.c | 8 +++++++- src/or/buffers.h | 18 +++++++++++++----- src/or/ext_orport.c | 3 ++- src/or/include.am | 2 ++ src/or/or.h | 14 +++++++------- src/or/proto_ext_or.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/proto_ext_or.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ src/or/proto_socks.c | 29 ----------------------------- src/test/test_buffers.c | 1 + 9 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index 18517b999..ee888b42a 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -17,11 +17,17 @@ * and drained from functions in connection.c, trigged by events that are * monitored in main.c. **/ + #define BUFFERS_PRIVATE -#include "or.h" +#include "orconfig.h" +#include <stddef.h> #include "buffers.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "compress.h" #include "util.h" +#include "torint.h" #include "torlog.h" +#include "tortls.h" #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include <unistd.h> #endif diff --git a/src/or/buffers.h b/src/or/buffers.h index e710ac64a..35fa46593 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.h +++ b/src/or/buffers.h @@ -12,8 +12,17 @@ #ifndef TOR_BUFFERS_H #define TOR_BUFFERS_H +#include "compat.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "torint.h" #include "testsupport.h" +typedef struct buf_t buf_t; + +struct tor_tls_t; +struct tor_compress_state_t; +struct ext_or_cmd_t; + buf_t *buf_new(void); buf_t *buf_new_with_capacity(size_t size); size_t buf_get_default_chunk_size(const buf_t *buf); @@ -30,13 +39,14 @@ size_t buf_get_total_allocation(void); int read_to_buf(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof, int *socket_error); -int read_to_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf); +int read_to_buf_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf); int flush_buf(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen); -int flush_buf_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen); +int flush_buf_tls(struct tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, + size_t *buf_flushlen); int write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf); -int write_to_buf_compress(buf_t *buf, tor_compress_state_t *state, +int write_to_buf_compress(buf_t *buf, struct tor_compress_state_t *state, const char *data, size_t data_len, int done); int move_buf_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen); void peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf); @@ -47,8 +57,6 @@ int fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len); #define PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX 16 int peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd); -int fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out); - int buf_set_to_copy(buf_t **output, const buf_t *input); diff --git a/src/or/ext_orport.c b/src/or/ext_orport.c index 01dc06ce1..83dc13ecf 100644 --- a/src/or/ext_orport.c +++ b/src/or/ext_orport.c @@ -23,8 +23,9 @@ #include "ext_orport.h" #include "control.h" #include "config.h" -#include "util.h" #include "main.h" +#include "proto_ext_or.h" +#include "util.h" /** Allocate and return a structure capable of holding an Extended * ORPort message of body length len. */ diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index caea04197..fe860339f 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/protover.c \ src/or/proto_cell.c \ src/or/proto_control0.c \ + src/or/proto_ext_or.c \ src/or/proto_http.c \ src/or/proto_socks.c \ src/or/policies.c \ @@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ ORHEADERS = \ src/or/protover.h \ src/or/proto_cell.h \ src/or/proto_control0.h \ + src/or/proto_ext_or.h \ src/or/proto_http.h \ src/or/proto_socks.h \ src/or/reasons.h \ diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 5d55094a0..11d3bb31c 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1179,11 +1179,8 @@ typedef struct { uint16_t length; /**< How long is the payload body? */ } relay_header_t; -typedef struct buf_t buf_t; typedef struct socks_request_t socks_request_t; -#define buf_t buf_t - typedef struct entry_port_cfg_t { /* Client port types (socks, dns, trans, natd) only: */ uint8_t isolation_flags; /**< Zero or more isolation flags */ @@ -1243,6 +1240,8 @@ typedef struct server_port_cfg_t { #define CONTROL_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x8abc765du #define LISTENER_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x1a1ac741u +struct buf_t; + /** Description of a connection to another host or process, and associated * data. * @@ -1314,8 +1313,9 @@ typedef struct connection_t { struct event *read_event; /**< Libevent event structure. */ struct event *write_event; /**< Libevent event structure. */ - buf_t *inbuf; /**< Buffer holding data read over this connection. */ - buf_t *outbuf; /**< Buffer holding data to write over this connection. */ + struct buf_t *inbuf; /**< Buffer holding data read over this connection. */ + struct buf_t *outbuf; /**< Buffer holding data to write over this + * connection. */ size_t outbuf_flushlen; /**< How much data should we try to flush from the * outbuf? */ time_t timestamp_lastread; /**< When was the last time libevent said we could @@ -1722,11 +1722,11 @@ typedef struct entry_connection_t { /** For AP connections only: buffer for data that we have sent * optimistically, which we might need to re-send if we have to * retry this connection. */ - buf_t *pending_optimistic_data; + struct buf_t *pending_optimistic_data; /* For AP connections only: buffer for data that we previously sent * optimistically which we are currently re-sending as we retry this * connection. */ - buf_t *sending_optimistic_data; + struct buf_t *sending_optimistic_data; /** If this is a DNSPort connection, this field holds the pending DNS * request that we're going to try to answer. */ diff --git a/src/or/proto_ext_or.c b/src/or/proto_ext_or.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d7f8cab1b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_ext_or.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#include "or.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" +#include "proto_ext_or.h" + +/** The size of the header of an Extended ORPort message: 2 bytes for + * COMMAND, 2 bytes for BODYLEN */ +#define EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE 4 + +/** Read buf, which should contain an Extended ORPort message + * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate + * out with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the + * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we + * encountered an error while parsing it. */ +int +fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) +{ + char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; + uint16_t len; + + if (buf_datalen(buf) < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); + len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); + if (buf_datalen(buf) < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); + (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); + (*out)->len = len; + buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); + fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf); + return 1; +} + diff --git a/src/or/proto_ext_or.h b/src/or/proto_ext_or.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2ef185356 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/proto_ext_or.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_PROTO_EXT_OR_H +#define TOR_PROTO_EXT_OR_H + +struct buf_t; +struct ext_or_cmt_t; + +int fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(struct buf_t *buf, + struct ext_or_cmd_t **out); + +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.c b/src/or/proto_socks.c index 7c7431cae..f153658bb 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_socks.c +++ b/src/or/proto_socks.c @@ -140,35 +140,6 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, return res; } -/** The size of the header of an Extended ORPort message: 2 bytes for - * COMMAND, 2 bytes for BODYLEN */ -#define EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE 4 - -/** Read buf, which should contain an Extended ORPort message - * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate - * out with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the - * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we - * encountered an error while parsing it. */ -int -fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) -{ - char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; - uint16_t len; - - if (buf_datalen(buf) < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) - return 0; - peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); - len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); - if (buf_datalen(buf) < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) - return 0; - *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); - (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); - (*out)->len = len; - buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); - fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf); - return 1; -} - /** Create a SOCKS5 reply message with reason in its REP field and * have Tor send it as error response to req. */ diff --git a/src/test/test_buffers.c b/src/test/test_buffers.c index 49a1015d8..26c062597 100644 --- a/src/test/test_buffers.c +++ b/src/test/test_buffers.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "buffers.h" #include "ext_orport.h" #include "proto_cell.h" +#include "proto_ext_or.h" #include "proto_http.h" #include "proto_control0.h" #include "proto_socks.h"

1 0

[tor/master] Replace buf->datalen usage in proto_*.c with buf_datalen() call.
by nickm＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit cddac959e7fb5729956a5250351e0fa1289d719f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 8 11:54:44 2017 -0400 Replace buf->datalen usage in proto_*.c with buf_datalen() call. This lets us remove BUFFERS_PRIVATE from two of the modules. --- src/or/proto_cell.c | 5 ++--- src/or/proto_control0.c | 3 +-- src/or/proto_http.c | 4 ++-- src/or/proto_socks.c | 14 +++++++------- 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/proto_cell.c b/src/or/proto_cell.c index 9e5cdff42..4c86b7e4d 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_cell.c +++ b/src/or/proto_cell.c @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ -#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "proto_cell.h" @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto) const int circ_id_len = get_circ_id_size(wide_circ_ids); const unsigned header_len = get_var_cell_header_size(wide_circ_ids); *out = NULL; - if (buf->datalen < header_len) + if (buf_datalen(buf) < header_len) return 0; peek_from_buf(hdr, header_len, buf); @@ -65,7 +64,7 @@ fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto) return 0; length = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr + circ_id_len + 1)); - if (buf->datalen < (size_t)(header_len+length)) + if (buf_datalen(buf) < (size_t)(header_len+length)) return 1; result = var_cell_new(length); result->command = command; diff --git a/src/or/proto_control0.c b/src/or/proto_control0.c index 4c505fa6f..5478d07e4 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_control0.c +++ b/src/or/proto_control0.c @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ -#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove. #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "proto_control0.h" @@ -14,7 +13,7 @@ int peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf) { - if (buf->datalen >= 4) { + if (buf_datalen(buf) >= 4) { char header[4]; uint16_t cmd; peek_from_buf(header, sizeof(header), buf); diff --git a/src/or/proto_http.c b/src/or/proto_http.c index 2ba3f93ab..a47644a30 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_http.c +++ b/src/or/proto_http.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, crlf_offset = buf_find_string_offset(buf, "\r\n\r\n", 4); if (crlf_offset > (int)max_headerlen || - (crlf_offset < 0 && buf->datalen > max_headerlen)) { + (crlf_offset < 0 && buf_datalen(buf) > max_headerlen)) { log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers too long."); return -1; } else if (crlf_offset < 0) { @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, headerlen = crlf_offset + 4; headers = buf->head->data; - bodylen = buf->datalen - headerlen; + bodylen = buf_datalen(buf) - headerlen; log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", (int)headerlen, (int)bodylen); if (max_headerlen <= headerlen) { diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.c b/src/or/proto_socks.c index 20804455c..f1728bde3 100644 --- a/src/or/proto_socks.c +++ b/src/or/proto_socks.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, ssize_t n_drain; size_t want_length = 128; - if (buf->datalen < 2) /* version and another byte */ + if (buf_datalen(buf) < 2) /* version and another byte */ return 0; do { @@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, else if (n_drain > 0) buf_remove_from_front(buf, n_drain); - } while (res == 0 && buf->head && want_length < buf->datalen && - buf->datalen >= 2); + } while (res == 0 && buf->head && want_length < buf_datalen(buf) && + buf_datalen(buf) >= 2); return res; } @@ -154,11 +154,11 @@ fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; uint16_t len; - if (buf->datalen < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + if (buf_datalen(buf) < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) return 0; peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); - if (buf->datalen < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + if (buf_datalen(buf) < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) return 0; *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long. Rejecting."); return -1; } - // tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf->datalen); + // tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf_datalen(buf)); if (log_sockstype) log_notice(LD_APP, @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason) { ssize_t drain = 0; int r; - if (buf->datalen < 2) + if (buf_datalen(buf) < 2) return 0; buf_pullup(buf, MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN);

1 0

[translation/tails-onioncircuits_completed] Update translations for tails-onioncircuits_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 7bb5646e9fdc45ed0eceac2967c913508f1d9823 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 5 16:48:23 2017 +0000 Update translations for tails-onioncircuits_completed --- it/onioncircuits.pot | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/it/onioncircuits.pot b/it/onioncircuits.pot index e2d3984b8..e2e662952 100644 --- a/it/onioncircuits.pot +++ b/it/onioncircuits.pot @@ -3,16 +3,17 @@ # This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package. # # Translators: -# Giuseppe Pignataro <rogepix(a)gmail.com>, 2016 +# Giuseppe Pignataro (Fasbyte01) <rogepix(a)gmail.com>, 2016 # Random_R, 2016 -# Walter Nosay, 2016 +# Sebastiano Pistore <SebastianoPistore.info(a)protonmail.ch>, 2017 +# Raffox97, 2016 msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-05-31 14:42+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2016-06-02 14:44+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Random_R\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2017-08-03 13:00+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2017-09-05 16:41+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Sebastiano Pistore <SebastianoPistore.info(a)protonmail.ch>\n" "Language-Team: Italian (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/it/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ msgstr "Stato" #: ../onioncircuits:142 msgid "Click on a circuit for more detail about its Tor relays." -msgstr "Clicca un circuito per maggiori dettagli sui suoi relay Tor." +msgstr "Clicca un circuito per maggiori dettagli sui suoi nodi Tor." #: ../onioncircuits:221 msgid "The connection to Tor was lost..."

1 0

[translation/tails-onioncircuits] Update translations for tails-onioncircuits
by translation＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 9af8bd95e513ba31e2906187d98dadf3becf6ff5 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 5 16:48:18 2017 +0000 Update translations for tails-onioncircuits --- it/onioncircuits.pot | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/it/onioncircuits.pot b/it/onioncircuits.pot index e2d3984b8..e2e662952 100644 --- a/it/onioncircuits.pot +++ b/it/onioncircuits.pot @@ -3,16 +3,17 @@ # This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package. # # Translators: -# Giuseppe Pignataro <rogepix(a)gmail.com>, 2016 +# Giuseppe Pignataro (Fasbyte01) <rogepix(a)gmail.com>, 2016 # Random_R, 2016 -# Walter Nosay, 2016 +# Sebastiano Pistore <SebastianoPistore.info(a)protonmail.ch>, 2017 +# Raffox97, 2016 msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-05-31 14:42+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2016-06-02 14:44+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Random_R\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2017-08-03 13:00+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2017-09-05 16:41+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Sebastiano Pistore <SebastianoPistore.info(a)protonmail.ch>\n" "Language-Team: Italian (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/it/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ msgstr "Stato" #: ../onioncircuits:142 msgid "Click on a circuit for more detail about its Tor relays." -msgstr "Clicca un circuito per maggiori dettagli sui suoi relay Tor." +msgstr "Clicca un circuito per maggiori dettagli sui suoi nodi Tor." #: ../onioncircuits:221 msgid "The connection to Tor was lost..."

1 0

[translation/tor-and-https_completed] Update translations for tor-and-https_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 38545e34a3b31ad0e882d0d8f853bfeafe178faa Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 5 16:47:39 2017 +0000 Update translations for tor-and-https_completed --- it.po | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/it.po b/it.po index 1b5d06278..0de575452 100644 --- a/it.po +++ b/it.po @@ -6,12 +6,13 @@ # jan <jan.reister(a)unimi.it>, 2014 # Matteo Anese <anese.matteo(a)gmail.com>, 2015 # Random_R, 2014 +# Sebastiano Pistore <SebastianoPistore.info(a)protonmail.ch>, 2017 msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2014-07-17 14:23+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2016-03-21 16:27+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Filippo <inactive+fvalle1(a)transifex.com>\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2017-09-05 16:41+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Sebastiano Pistore <SebastianoPistore.info(a)protonmail.ch>\n" "Language-Team: Italian (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/it/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ msgstr "Sito.com" #: C/tor-and-https.svg:363 #, no-wrap msgid "user / pw" -msgstr "utente/password" +msgstr "utente / password" #. (itstool) path: defs/text #. Keep it short: 7em max. Seven times the capital letter "M".

1 0

[translation/tor-and-https] Update translations for tor-and-https
by translation＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 7421fc14f2eca9f408b0f20943c8f0ea9d4ddc98 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 5 16:47:35 2017 +0000 Update translations for tor-and-https --- it.po | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/it.po b/it.po index 1b5d06278..0de575452 100644 --- a/it.po +++ b/it.po @@ -6,12 +6,13 @@ # jan <jan.reister(a)unimi.it>, 2014 # Matteo Anese <anese.matteo(a)gmail.com>, 2015 # Random_R, 2014 +# Sebastiano Pistore <SebastianoPistore.info(a)protonmail.ch>, 2017 msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2014-07-17 14:23+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2016-03-21 16:27+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Filippo <inactive+fvalle1(a)transifex.com>\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2017-09-05 16:41+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Sebastiano Pistore <SebastianoPistore.info(a)protonmail.ch>\n" "Language-Team: Italian (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/it/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ msgstr "Sito.com" #: C/tor-and-https.svg:363 #, no-wrap msgid "user / pw" -msgstr "utente/password" +msgstr "utente / password" #. (itstool) path: defs/text #. Keep it short: 7em max. Seven times the capital letter "M".

1 0

[translation/torbutton-torbuttondtd] Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd
by translation＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 16eb4332a94f7d5ae1149bbe32605806614486a1 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 5 16:47:15 2017 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd --- it/torbutton.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/it/torbutton.dtd b/it/torbutton.dtd index a18ff01b4..d5aed79fe 100644 --- a/it/torbutton.dtd +++ b/it/torbutton.dtd @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ <!ENTITY torbutton.context_menu.cookieProtections.key "C"> <!ENTITY torbutton.button.tooltip "Fai clic per inizializzare Torbutton"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.security_settings "Impostazioni di Sicurezza Tor Browser"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.restore_defaults "Ripristina Defaults"> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.restore_defaults "Ripristina Default"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.custom_warning "Le tue impostazioni del browser sembrano avere preferenze di sicurezza insolite. Per motivi di sicurezza e privacy, ti consigliamo di scegliere uno dei livelli di sicurezza predefiniti."> <!ENTITY torbutton.cookiedialog.title "Gestisci protezione Cookies"> <!ENTITY torbutton.cookiedialog.lockCol "Protetto">

1 0

[translation/abouttor-homepage_completed] Update translations for abouttor-homepage_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit f1ce0d2f7fe059d983881223be32d62005d0ee60 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 5 16:46:52 2017 +0000 Update translations for abouttor-homepage_completed --- it/aboutTor.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/it/aboutTor.dtd b/it/aboutTor.dtd index 2794b0236..a016f6bbf 100644 --- a/it/aboutTor.dtd +++ b/it/aboutTor.dtd @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ <!ENTITY aboutTor.check.label "Test Impostazioni della Rete Tor"> -<!ENTITY aboutTor.success.label "Benvenuto nel Browser TOR"> +<!ENTITY aboutTor.success.label "Benvenuto nel browser TOR"> <!ENTITY aboutTor.success2.label "Connesso alla rete TOR."> <!ENTITY aboutTor.success3.label "Ora sei libero di navigare in internet anonimamente."> <!ENTITY aboutTor.failure.label "Qualcosa è Andato Storto!">

1 0

[translation/abouttor-homepage] Update translations for abouttor-homepage
by translation＠torproject.org 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

commit 04af24f58be92b70df1567934bf78dbfdfe946c5 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 5 16:46:47 2017 +0000 Update translations for abouttor-homepage --- it/aboutTor.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/it/aboutTor.dtd b/it/aboutTor.dtd index 2794b0236..a016f6bbf 100644 --- a/it/aboutTor.dtd +++ b/it/aboutTor.dtd @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ <!ENTITY aboutTor.check.label "Test Impostazioni della Rete Tor"> -<!ENTITY aboutTor.success.label "Benvenuto nel Browser TOR"> +<!ENTITY aboutTor.success.label "Benvenuto nel browser TOR"> <!ENTITY aboutTor.success2.label "Connesso alla rete TOR."> <!ENTITY aboutTor.success3.label "Ora sei libero di navigare in internet anonimamente."> <!ENTITY aboutTor.failure.label "Qualcosa è Andato Storto!">

1 0

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tor-commits September 2017